AFRIDIS.[101]
The Afridis are a large tribe, inhabiting the lower and easternmost
spurs of the Safed Koh Range, to the west and south of the Peshawar
district, including the Bazar and Bara Valleys. On the east they are
bounded by British territory; on their north they have the Mohmands;
west, the Shinwaris; and south, the Orakzais and Bangash.
Their origin is very obscure; Bellew identifies them with one of the
peoples referred to by Herodotus; their traditions, however, says James,
would lead us to believe that, in common with other Pathan tribes, they
are the descendants of Khalid-ibn-Walid, a Jew, who embraced Islamism,
and whose descendants had possession of great tracts in the western
portion of Afghanistan during the tenth century. At this time, upon the
convulsions in the country owing to the advance of Mahmud of Ghazni, a
chief named Afrid was obliged, owing to his enormities and feuds, to fly
from his country and seek refuge with a kindred spirit, by name Wazir,
in the wilds of Shir-i-Talla. Here he seems to have settled and to have
remained with his family for a considerable time. Turner gives something
of the same story, viz. that Afrid, an individual of unknown country and
parentage, came to Ghor, and there had an intrigue with a woman of the
Karerai tribe, the eventual result of which was the tribe of Afridis.
Cavagnari says of their origin that they are supposed to have been
descended from a woman named Maimana, who had two sons, Afrid and Adam.
But it is probably sufficient to surmise that they are a tribe of
Pactiyan stock, who have been established in their present country for
many centuries—far longer than the majority of Pathan tribes—and that
living as they do on the high road from Central Asia to India, it is
likely that they have a large admixture of Turkish and Scythian blood.
The Afridi country being bleak and sterile, and the rainfall but small,
agriculture is only scantily pursued, although they raise a coarse kind
of rice in the Bara Valley, a considerable amount of which finds its way
to the Peshawar market. Some of the tribe also gain a precarious living
by cutting and selling timber for firewood, but many of the clans
possess great stock in cattle, cows, sheep and goats, and go in for
breeding mules and donkeys, which are much thought of locally. Their
chief manufactures are coarse mats and cloth, while in Maidan, at
Ilmgudar near Fort Bara, and in the Kohat Pass there are factories which
annually turn out a certain number of rifles.
[Sidenote: As Soldiers]
The Afridi in appearance is generally a fine, tall, athletic highlander,
whose springy step at once denotes his mountain origin. They are lean
but muscular men, with long, gaunt faces, high noses and cheekbones, and
rather fair complexions. Brave and hardy, they make good soldiers, but
are apt to be somewhat homesick in the hot weather, and they have gained
a greater reputation for fidelity as soldiers than in any other way. The
Afridi has uniformly shown himself ready to enlist in our army, and at
the present moment there are probably 4000 of this tribe serving in the
ranks of the Indian army or in the Khyber Rifles. But since the Pathan
is notoriously restless and dislikes expatriation, the average length of
service is shorter than in the case of our other Indian soldiers; the
result being that a greater number of trained soldiers from Pathan
squadrons and companies annually pass back to their homes, than is the
case with a proportionately larger establishment of any other race.
While, therefore, their loyalty, while actually in our service and even
during frontier expeditions against their own kinsmen, has been all that
could be wished, it is not perhaps saying much—considering their normal
family relations—that they should cheerfully fight for us against them.
But, on the other hand, it can hardly be expected that men who have
become again merged in their tribe, and who, according to their own
ideas, are no longer bound to us by any obligation, should maintain an
attitude of complete aloofness from any tribal movement prompted by
racial feeling, or by that fanaticism which, on the border, has been
defined as “a sentiment of religious intolerance excited into reckless
action.” During the Tirah Campaign the number of pensioners and
reservists who fought against our troops is believed to have been very
large. As long ago as 1884 it was stated of the Afridis that “almost
every fighting man possesses a gun or pistol, besides other arms; many
of the firearms are rifled, and some have percussion locks.” To-day the
armament of these tribesmen is far more complete and up-to-date,[102]
and there can be no doubt that the fighting powers of the Afridis have
increased during recent years to a very formidable extent. At the same
time our powers of effectively dealing with them have increased in a
still greater ratio. Our soldiers are more suitably trained for the
particular warfare waged in these border hills; they are infinitely
better armed; the services of transport and supply are more efficiently
organised; the country of the independent tribesmen is more thoroughly
known; the moral effect of uniformly successful expeditions—are all
factors which more than counterbalance any accession of strength which
the last twenty-five years have brought to the Afridis.
As to the measures to be taken effectually to coerce them, Oliver,
writing twenty-two years ago, said that “strong as are the natural
positions they hold among the spurs and defiles of the Safed Koh and the
bare, rugged, inhospitable ranges of the Khyber; difficult of approach
the passes which might have to be forced, and unanimous as the clans may
be to defend them at the signal of a common danger, the people are so
dependent on the plains, their position—secure though it may sound—is
really their weakest point, and makes it easy to shut them up in their
own hills. Peshawar, the great field for their plundering operations, is
also the market for their produce and the source of supply for their
many domestic wants. Exclusion from Peshawar is to many clans a severe
form of punishment; and an effectual blockade that will cut them off
from the outer world, would probably bring them to terms sooner than an
expedition.” But Holdich again reminds us that “across those wild
break-neck passes over the Safed Koh into Ningrahar ... the hard-pressed
Afridi can constantly find refuge for his family, and sanctuary for
himself, amongst the Durani tribes who dwell on the northern slopes of
the Safed Koh.” That there is always that back door, “the keys of which
are in their own pockets,” and that “at the worst they could shift
across the hills into Afghanistan, and there was the prospect ... that
something more than mere shelter would be accorded by the ruler of
Kabul.”
[Sidenote: Their Character]
Of the moral attributes of the Afridis few people have found much to say
in praise. Mackeson wrote of them: “The Afridis are a most avaricious
race, desperately fond of money. Their fidelity is measured by the
length of the purse of the seducer, and they transfer their obedience
and support from one party to another of their own clansmen, according
to the comparative liberality of the donation.” Elphinstone, generally
ready enough to record anything good of Afghans, said of the Afridis:
“On the whole they are the greatest robbers among the Afghans, and, I
imagine, have no faith or sense of honour; for I never heard of anybody
hiring an escort of Khaiberis to secure his passage through their
country—a step which always ensures a traveller’s safety in the lands of
any other tribe.” MacGregor considers this estimate harsh, but that
furnished by the same authority is hardly more flattering: “A ruthless,
cowardly robber—a cold-blooded treacherous murderer; brought up from his
earliest childhood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless
revenge, nothing has changed him; as he has lived—a shameless, cruel
savage—so he dies. And it would seem that, notwithstanding his long
intercourse with us, and the fact that large numbers have been and are
in our service, and must have learnt in some way what faith, justice and
mercy mean, yet the Afridi is no better than in the days of his father.”
Against these adverse testimonies, however, there is the opinion of Sir
Robert Warburton, who spent eighteen years in their midst and who wrote
of them: “The Afridi lad from his earliest childhood is taught by the
circumstances of his existence and life to distrust all mankind, and
very often his near relations, heirs to his small plot of land by
inheritance, are his deadliest enemies. Distrust of all mankind, and
readiness to strike the first blow for the safety of his own life, have
therefore become the maxims of the Afridi. If you can overcome this
mistrust, and be kind in words to him, he will repay you by great
devotion, and he will put up with any punishment you like to give him
except abuse. It took me years to get through this thick crust of
mistrust, but what was the after-result? For upwards of fifteen years I
went about unarmed amongst these people. My camp, wherever it happened
to be pitched, was always guarded and protected by them. The deadliest
enemies of the Khyber range, with a long record of blood-feuds, dropped
those feuds for the time being when in my camp. Property was always
safe.... Time after time have the Afridi elders and jirgahs supported me
even against their own Maliks.”
[Sidenote: Warburton’s Opinion]
Notwithstanding all that has been said against the Afridi he is, on the
whole, one of the finest of the Pathan races on our border. His
appearance is greatly in his favour, and he is really braver, more open,
and not more treacherous than many other Pathans. This much is certain,
that he has the power of prejudicing Englishmen in his favour, and there
are few brought into contact with him who do not at least begin with an
enthusiastic admiration for his manliness. Again, with a tight hand over
him, many of his faults remain dormant, and he soon develops into a
valuable soldier.
Though eternally at feud among themselves, they seldom quarrel with
neighbouring tribes; that is, the Afridis do not care to waste their
energies in fighting with their neighbours, but reserve the luxury for
home consumption—a feud to an Afridi is the salt of life, the one
pleasure that makes existence tolerable. On occasion, in the face of
common danger, they are capable of concerted action, as was shown in the
Tirah Campaign of 1897, but even then one clan held entirely aloof.
Though nominally under the control of their Maliks, the Afridis have
very little respect for their authority and are thoroughly democratic.
They are all of the Sunni persuasion of the Muhammadan faith.
The following are the eight clans into which the Afridi tribe is
divided, and of these the first six are known collectively as the
“Khyber Afridis”:
1. Kuki Khel.
2. Malikdin Khel.
3. Kambar Khel.
4. Kamrai or Kamar Khel.
5. Zakha Khel.
6. Sipah.
7. Aka Khel.
8. Adam Khel.
The _Aka Khels_ have no connection with the Khyber and are located to
the south of the Bara River. The _Adam Khels_ inhabit the hills between
the districts of Kohat and Peshawar, and cannot be regarded, except
ethnologically, as a part of the Afridi tribe; for whether they are
viewed with reference to their position, their interests or their
habits, they are a distinct community.
The area of the country inhabited by the Afridis is about nine hundred
square miles. The principal streams draining their hills are the
northern branch of the Bara River, or Bara proper, the Bazar or Chora
River, and the Khyber stream, all flowing into the Peshawar Valley. The
valleys lying near the sources of the Bara River are included in the
general name of Tirah, which comprises an area of 600 to 700 square
miles. The greater part of Tirah is inhabited by different clans of the
Orakzai tribe, but the valleys known as Rajgal and Maidan are occupied
by the Afridis. The Rajgal Valley is drained by one main stream, into
which fall some lesser streams from the surrounding hills. Its length is
about ten miles, and the breadth of the open country about four to five
miles. The elevation is over 5000. Maidan lies to the south of Rajgal,
and is a circular valley about ten miles across, watered by several
large watercourses. The streams from Rajgal and Maidan unite and form
the Bara River, flowing down the valley of the same name to the Kajurai
Plain, shortly before entering which the Bara is joined by the Mastura
River.
[Sidenote: The Clans]
The _Kuki Khel_ number some 5600 fighting men, and occupy the Rajgal
valley and the eastern end of the Khyber Pass, as far as the Rohtas
Hill, which overhangs the fort at Ali Musjid, and also the Bezai Spur—a
long underfeature which flanks, but at a considerable distance, the
latter part of the railway and road from Peshawar to Fort Jumrud. This
clan has a bitter feud with the Zakha Khel, and is Gar in politics.
The _Malikdin Khel_ is the Khan Khel or head clan of the Afridis, and is
closely connected with the Kambar Khel, their settlements in Maidan,
Chora and Kajurai lying together. In Maidan they occupy the central and
northern portion of the valley—Bagh, the recognised meeting place of the
Afridi Jirgahs, “where the Khyber raid and Afridi rebellion of 1897–98
were planned, and where fanaticism, intrigue and sedition have always
been hot-bedded and nourished,” being in their country. The Malikdin
Khels number some 6000 fighting men, and are Samil in politics.
The _Kambar Khel_ is numerically the most powerful of all the Afridi
clans, being able on emergency to put 10,000 armed men in the field;
they belong to the Gar political faction. This clan is very migratory,
occupying in the hot weather the Kahu Darra and the valley of the
Shalobar River, which joins the Bara River at Dwatoi, and moving in the
winter to the Kajurai Plain and to other minor settlements. This clan is
very strongly represented in the Indian Army and Border Militia.
The _Kamrai_ or _Kumar Khel_ form but a small clan, Samil in politics,
having its settlements in the extreme west of the Bara Valley, and also
moving down to the Kajurai Valley to the west of Peshawar in the winter
months. Their fighting men number no more than about 800.
[Sidenote: Their Holy Places]
The _Zakha Khel_ owe their undoubted importance to their geographical
position in Afridi-land, rather than to the number of armed men they can
turn out—probably not less than 6000. Their holdings stretch diagonally
across the Afridi country from the south-east corner of Maidan to the
Khyber Pass; they are the wildest and most turbulent amongst their
tribe, and their land being unproductive they depend a good deal upon
raiding and blackmail for their livelihood, are “the wolves of the
community,” and since—at any rate up to recent times—“they lent no
soldiers to the ranks of the British army and had no pensions to lose,”
the Zakha Khels have always been more ready to give trouble than the
rest of their fellow-tribesmen. They hold, moreover, some five miles of
the country lying on either side of the road in what Warburton calls
“the real Khyber proper,” from the Shrine of Gurgurra (the
sloe-tree)—where a small post is held by the Khyber Rifles—to Loargai in
the Shinwari country. Of this shrine Warburton tells the following story
of the manner in which the Zakha Khels managed to remove the reproach
which had been levelled against them, _i.e._ that their country
possessed none of the ziarats, or sacred shrines, to the memory of
saints or martyrs. “The Zakha Khel Afridis,” writes Warburton, “bear a
most unenviable name as being the greatest thieves, housebreakers,
robbers and raiders amongst all the Khyber clans, their word or promise
never being believed or trusted by their Afridi brethren without a
substantial security being taken for its fulfilment. Naturally a race so
little trusted were not fortunate enough to possess a holy man whose
tomb would have served as a sanctuary to swear by, and thus save the
necessity of the substantial security. One day, however, a Kaka Khel Mia
came into their limits with the object of seeking safe conduct through
their territory to the next tribe. They received him with all
politeness, but finding in the course of conversation that he was of
saintly character—a holy Kaka Khel Mia—they came to the conclusion that
he was just the individual wanted to put their character for
truthfulness on a better footing. They therefore killed him and buried
him, making his tomb a shrine for all true believers to reverence, and a
security for themselves to swear by.”
Oliver caps this story with another of the same character: “A Mullah was
caught copying the Koran. ‘You tell us these books come from God, and
here you are making them yourself. It is not good for a Mullah to tell
lies’; so the indignant Afridis made another ziarat for him.”
It is only quite within recent years that the Zakha Khels have taken to
military service, and even now the number enlisted in the regular Indian
army is relatively small, the majority preferring service near their
homes and joining the Khyber Rifles. In politics the Zakha Khels are
Samil.
The _Sipah_ is only a small clan, Samil in politics, and cherishing a
standing feud with the Aka Khels. Their main settlements are in the
upper portion of the Bara Valley, with the Zakha Khel bordering them on
one side and the Kambar Khel on the other, while they also have
settlements in the Kajurai plain, where is their notorious rifle factory
at Ilmgudar.
Ranken defines the tribal limits in the Khyber Pass as follows: “The
Kuki Khels from Jumrud to where the Mackeson road begins; the Sipah
Afridis from the beginning of the Mackeson road to Shagai; the Kambar
Khel from Sultan Tarra to the white mosque of Ali Musjid; the Malikdin
Khel from the mosque to Gurgurra; the Zakha Khel from Gurgurra to the
Kandar ravine near Garhi Lalabeg; and the Shinwaris westward of
Torkhan.”
[Sidenote: The Khyber Pass Afridis]
The above-mentioned six clans are known collectively, as already
mentioned, as the “Khyber Pass Afridis.” British connection with them
commenced as far back as 1839, when a Sikh force under Colonel Wade, and
Shah Shuja’s contingent with British officers, forced the Khyber—of
which the actual defile may be said to be in the hands of these
half-dozen clans. “In our earlier Afghan campaigns they fully maintained
their ancient fame,” writes Oliver, “as bold and faithless robbers, but
from the time the Punjab was annexed, up to the second Afghan War, their
behaviour was, for Afridis, fairly good. In 1878 some of the clans took
sides with us, and some with the Amir, necessitating a couple of
expeditions into the Bazar Valley,” and during the two phases of the
campaign not less than 15,000 fighting men were required to keep open
our communications with India by the Khyber route, despite the
arrangement which had been come to with the clans bordering on the
Khyber, and which will now be described.
When, in 1878, the Government of India called upon the
Commander-in-Chief to put forward proposals for the conduct of a
campaign in Afghanistan, Sir Frederick Haines offered the suggestion,
_inter alia_, that “a demonstration should be made early in the
operations of an advance by the Khyber, by encamping out a certain
proportion of the Peshawar troops, making arrangements with the Khyberis
for their passage through the pass.”[103] In consequence of the above,
Major Cavagnari was instructed to come to a friendly understanding with
the Khyber Pass Afridis, and to arrange for the passage of troops
through the defiles at certain rates. Major Cavagnari based his estimate
of the money payments to be made to the headmen of the clans, on the
sums paid by Colonel Mackeson for the same purpose during the latter
period of the first Afghan War; and he finally compounded with the six
clans of Khyber Afridis for a payment of Rs. 5950 per mensem, which sum
was willingly accepted. When, in September 1880, northern Afghanistan
was finally evacuated by our troops, the Indian Government, recognising
the undesirability of maintaining any regular force in the Khyber,
expressed a wish to hand the pass over entirely to the independent
charge of the neighbouring clans, provided some wholly satisfactory
arrangement could be come to for keeping the road open, and for
safeguarding the caravans passing to and fro between Afghanistan and
India. Early in 1881 a complete jirgah of all the Khyber clans assembled
in Peshawar, and an agreement was arrived at whereby the independence of
the Afridis was recognised, and they engaged, in consideration of
certain allowances, to maintain order throughout the Khyber; the
Government of India reserved the right of re-occupation of the pass, and
was to take all tolls; the Afridis providing a force of Jazailchis paid
for by the Indian Government, and were to deal by a general jirgah with
all offences committed on the road. The allowances were fixed at Rs.
85,860 per annum for the six clans immediately concerned with the
policing of the pass, and for the Shinwaris of Loargai; and a further
sum of approximately the same amount was guaranteed by the Government of
India for the upkeep of the Jazailchis—since improved into the Khyber
Rifles—a body about 550 strong. As a set-off against these money grants
the tolls on caravans amounted to some 60,000 rupees per annum. The
allowances then granted are to-day substantially the same; the pass is
again in charge of the Khyber Afridis, and is again guarded, from Jumrud
to Lundi Kotal, by the Khyber Rifles, who have, however, been completely
reorganised, and are now a body 1700 strong, with six British officers.
[Sidenote: The Khyber]
Of that portion of the Khyber which is under our own control the
following description is given by Warburton: “The main road from
Peshawar to Kabul passes through Jumrud, going almost due east to west.
After leaving Jumrud it passes through an easy country, having low hills
on the left hand side, and about the third mile it enters the hills at
an opening called Shadi Bagiar. A ridge from the lofty Ghund-ghar on the
left runs down to the road, and faces a similar ridge coming down from a
prolongation of the Rhotas Range. The highway runs for a short distance
through the bed of a ravine, and then joins the road made by Colonel
Mackeson in 1839–42, until it ascends to the Shagai Plateau on the left
hand side, and here Ali Musjid is seen for the first time. Still going
westward the road turns to the right, and by an easy zigzag descends to
the stream and runs along its side, and below Ali Musjid goes up the
waterway. The new road along the cliff was made by us in 1879–80, and
here is the narrowest part of the Khyber, not more than fifteen feet
broad with the Rhotas hill on the right hand fully 2000 feet overhead.
Still progressing, at about 400 yards from Ali Musjid, on the left hand
side, three or four large springs issuing from the rock give the whole
water supply to this quarter. Between two and three miles comes the
Malikdin Khel hamlet of Katta Kushtia; soon after Gurgurra is reached,
and then we are in Zakha Khel limits in the real Khyber proper, until we
come to the Shinwaris of Lundi Kotal, or more properly Loargai. The
valley now widens out, and on either side lie the hamlets and some sixty
forts of the Zakha Khel Afridis. Here, there is no stream, and the
residents have to depend on rainwater collected in tanks. The Loargai
Shinwari Plateau is some seven miles in length, and there is its widest
part. Just here above Lundi Khana, the old road was a very nasty bit....
From Shadi Bagiar to Lundi Khana the pass cannot be more than twenty
miles in a direct line. When the first detachment of our troops returned
from Kabul,[104] they marched from Ali Musjid along the bed of the
stream, by Lala China, Jabagai, Gagri, Kaddam, ‘the real gate,’ and Jam,
villages of the Kuki Khel Afridis, to Jumrud; but Colonel Mackeson,
finding this way extremely difficult and unsuitable for guns and wheeled
traffic, made an excellent road from Ali Musjid to Fort Jumrud through
the hills, the same that we now use.”
[Sidenote: The Trans-Frontier Khyber]
The trans-frontier portion of the Khyber route to Kabul is described by
Oliver as follows: “Over the Lundi Khana Pass, called the Kotal,[105]
the road rises by a steep ascent between steep cliffs less than 150 feet
apart, and down again till the Valley of the Kabul River is reached at
Dakka.... At Jalalabad—ninety miles from Peshawar—the cross ranges of
hills are, for a change, replaced by a well-watered fertile stretch of
country, a score of miles long by a dozen wide, dotted with towers,
villages and trees; and where the Kabul River—that has all along had to
struggle through mere cracks—becomes a broad clear stream 100 yards
wide. Thence the route lies through a thoroughly unattractive country
again, over long stony ridges, across rocky river beds, varied with an
occasional fine valley like Fathabad, or an oasis like Nimlah, to
Gandamak, which, by way of comparison with what is beyond again, is a
land flowing with milk and honey; for on by Jagdalak and the Lataband
Pass, or Tezin and the Khurd Kabul, is a wild waste of bare hills,
surrounded by still more lofty and forbidding mountains. The teeth
become more closely set together; the road narrower; the stony ridges
change to bleak heights from 7000 to 8000 feet high, the river beds,
deep valleys, or narrow defiles, like the fatal Jagdalak, almost devoid
of verdure, and into whose gloomy ravines the winter sun can hardly
penetrate—these are the outworks that have to be negotiated before the
gardens and orchards, the bazaars and forts of Kabul, can be
approached.”
The _Aka Khel_ clan occupies the hills to the south-west of Peshawar
between the Bara River and the country of the Adam Khels, also the Bara
and the Waran Valleys. It was in the Waran Valley and in the house of
that firebrand among the border clergy, Saiyid Akbar, that there was
found, during the course of the Tirah expedition, the whole of the
inflammatory correspondence which had passed between the Afridi maliks
and mullahs prior to and during the Pathan revolt of 1897. This clan is
Samil in politics and can put 4000 armed men in the field.
[Sidenote: The Adam Khels]
The _Adam Khel_ clan is located in the hills between Peshawar and Kohat,
being bounded on the north and east by the Khattaks, on the south by the
Bangash, and on the west by the Aka Khels (their deadly enemies), and by
the Orakzais. They are one of the most powerful and numerous of the
Afridi clans, have a great reputation for bravery, and can bring into
the field 6500 fighting men, who, moreover, are unusually well armed,
with rifles stolen from our cantonments and with those they manufacture
themselves at their factories in the Kohat Pass. They are to a small
extent cultivators, but their chief occupation is carrying salt from the
mines; while the allowance they receive from the Indian Government for
keeping open the Kohat-Peshawar road is an assistance to their revenues,
an allowance which has been paid them since the days of the Sikh
governors of Peshawar. The Adam Khels do not belong to either of the two
great political factions. From the situation of the Adam Khel country,
and owing to the fact that their very existence is dependent upon their
trade with British territory, this particular clan is very susceptible
to a blockade and can consequently be easily brought to terms. Nearly
all the trouble we have had with the Adam Khels in the past has been due
to disputes about the salt tax, or about the maintenance of a
practicable road through the Kohat Pass. This short cut from Peshawar to
Kohat has a certain strategic value; by this road the two frontier
garrisons are no more than thirty-seven miles apart, and only ten of
these are in independent territory, while round by railway, via
Khushalgarh on the Indus, the distance is 200 miles. Two divisions of
the Adam Khels are the actual keepers of the pass, and though we pay,
and have paid for years, a considerable subsidy, until comparatively
lately we were not allowed to make a road, or even to remove the
boulders that obstructed the path. From about 1865 onwards the question
of the construction of a road practicable for wheeled traffic was
continually raised, and was as often dropped in face of tribal
opposition. It was one of the main objects of the expedition of 1877,
but was given up by Lord Lytton to avoid “breaking the spirit of the
clan,” who evinced their gratitude the year following—that of the Afghan
War—by threatening to close the road to us. This threat came, however,
to nothing, and the pass formed, throughout the campaign, an unmolested
and important means of communication between Peshawar and Kohat. Water
is very scarce in the pass, the supply being dependent mainly upon
tanks.
During the risings of 1897–98 the Adam Khels remained perfectly quiet,
and troops constantly used the pass, through which at last, in 1901, a
metalled cart road was made.