AFRIDIS: OPERATIONS CONTINUED.[112]
KHYBER PASS AFRIDIS.
From the year 1857 onwards the Khyber Pass Afridis have given the Punjab
Government a good deal of trouble, and it has been necessary to carry
out many raids and expeditions against one or other of the clans, and,
at times, against all of them. Just before the outbreak of the Mutiny,
when the Amir Dost Muhammad was encamped at Jamrud after his interview
with Sir John Lawrence, a party of Kuki Khels fired upon some British
officers near the mouth of the Khyber, and mortally wounded one of them.
The blockade then established was maintained throughout that troublous
year, and was so injurious to the interests of the clan that they paid
up a fine and agreed to other terms proposed by us. The Zakha Khels were
at the same time under blockade for innumerable highway robberies, but
they also early made their submission.
They broke out again in 1861, and raided British territory in the
neighbourhood of Kajurai—a tract of country occupied during the winter
by the remainder of the clans of the Khyber Pass Afridis, and it was
found necessary to put the usual pressure on these to induce them for
the future to refuse passage through their lands at Kajurai to Zakha
Khel and other robbers.
The Zakha Khel and Kuki Khel continued to give trouble, and maintained
their reputation as the most inveterate and audacious of robbers, whose
depredations up to the very walls of Peshawar, and even within the city
and cantonments, have been notorious since the days of Sikh rule. In
those days, moreover, the Sikh governors cultivated methods of
repression and punishment such as we have never practised. In General
Thackwell’s diary, dated Peshawar, 23rd November, 1839, he writes,
“Called on General Avitabili to take leave. They say Avitabili is a
tiger in this government, he has been known to flay criminals alive and
to break the bones of poor wretches on the wheel previous to hanging
them in chains, and at our conference to-day very gravely wondered we
did not put poison in sugar to send in traffic among the Khyberees.”
In December 1874, the bandmaster[113] of the 72nd Highlanders, stationed
at Peshawar, was carried off by some Zakha Khel raiders and taken to the
Khyber, being subsequently released uninjured; and during the operations
against the Jawakis in 1877–78 the Zakha Khels sent to their aid a
contingent of from 300–400 men, who fired on some British troops in the
Kohat Pass and then turned back.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1878]
_Expedition against the Zakha Khels of the Bazar Valley, December
1878._—From the very commencement of the second Afghan war in 1878, the
Afridis of the Khyber Pass began to give trouble. At the end of November
a signalling party on the Shagai Heights, east of Ali Musjid in the
Khyber, was attacked by some Kuki Khels from the village of Kadam, two
men being killed and one wounded, but for this outrage punishment was
inflicted by the tribal jirgah. Annoyance did not, however, cease; our
communications in the Khyber were continually harassed, and the camp at
Ali Musjid was fired into regularly every night, the culprits belonging
chiefly to the Zakha Khel clan. One or two small raids upon tribal
villages proving ineffectual, a punitive expedition into the Bazar
Valley was decided upon, the troops composing it being drawn from the
2nd Division of the Peshawar Valley Field Force, the headquarters of
which were then at Jamrud, and from the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division
then at Dakka. The following composed the two columns:
JAMRUD COLUMN.
3 guns, D/A. R.H.A.
300 bayonets, 1/5th Fusiliers.
200 bayonets, 51st Foot.
1 troop, 11th Bengal Lancers.
1 troop, 13th Bengal Lancers.
500 bayonets, 2nd Gurkhas.
400 bayonets, Mhairwara Battalion.
DAKKA COLUMN.
2 guns, 11/9th R.A.
300 bayonets, 1/17th Foot.
41 bayonets, 8th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
263 bayonets, 27th Punjab Native Infantry.
114 bayonets, 45th Sikhs.
The Jamrud column, starting at 5 p.m. on the 19th December, and moving
by Chora, a village inhabited by friendly Malikdin Khels, reached Walai
in the Bazar Valley by midday on the 20th, and from here communication
was established with the Dakka column, which had then reached the Sisobi
Pass[114]—about three miles to the east—and expected to effect a
junction with the Jamrud Column next day.
On the 21st the Jamrud Column marched to China, and visited every
village of any importance in the valley, destroying all the towers,
returning that night to Walai, and withdrawing thence unopposed to Ali
Musjid on the 22nd.
The Dakka troops destroyed the towers in the vicinity of their bivouac,
marching later to Nikai, which was also burnt. It being then too late to
arrive at the Sisobi Pass on the return march before nightfall, the
General (Tytler) halted, owing to difficulties as to water, in the
Thabai Pass, with the intention of retiring on Dakka by this route.
During the night the tribesmen assembled in strength about the camp, and
when the march was resumed at daybreak it was seen that the enemy meant
disputing every foot of it. The Afridis notoriously attack the baggage
guard in preference to any other part of a force, and it was therefore
determined to change the usual order of march. Orders were consequently
issued for each corps to take its own baggage with it; the artillery and
sappers, being most encumbered with mules, followed close to the
advanced guard; while a very strong rearguard was left behind, which,
being wholly relieved from the charge of baggage, was able to resist the
pressure from the rear.
The road was winding, steep, and very difficult for mules, and from the
moment the force started a lively but ineffective fusillade was opened
on the column. The heights were taken and held by flanking parties; the
rearguard was hotly engaged; the enemy seized the positions of the
rearguard and of the flanking parties as soon as they were abandoned;
and Dakka was not reached by the whole column until 11.30 p.m., when the
force had marched 22 miles, and had lost two men killed and twenty
wounded.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1879]
_Second Expedition against the Zakha Khels of the Bazar Valley, January
1879._—After the expedition of December 1878, the Khyber Pass Afridis
continuing to give trouble, every effort was made to break up the tribal
combination, and the Kuki Khels and Kambar Khels came in and tendered
their submission. The attitude of the Zakha Khels was, however, so
unsatisfactory that the political officer, Major Cavagnari, recommended
a temporary occupation of the Bazar Valley, coupled with visits to all
the recusant villages in that and the Bara Valley. In consequence,
Lieutenant-General Maude, commanding the 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley
Field Force, applied on the 16th January for sanction for the proposed
operations, in concert with a force furnished from the 1st Division.
Sanction was accorded by the Commander-in-Chief, but a time-limit of ten
days was laid down within which the operations were to be concluded. The
following troops were placed at the disposal of Lieutenant-General
Maude:
JAMRUD COLUMN.
2 guns, D/A Royal Horse Artillery.
2 guns, 11/9th Royal Field Artillery.
315 bayonets, 5th Fusiliers.
316 bayonets, 25th Foot.
145 sabres, 13th Bengal Lancers.
55 bayonets, Madras Sappers and Miners.
356 bayonets, 24th Punjab Native Infantry.
BASAWAL COLUMN.
2 guns, 11/9th Royal Artillery.
361 bayonets, 1/17th Foot.
210 bayonets, 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.
32 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
43 bayonets, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
201 bayonets, 4th Gurkhas.
ALI MUSJID COLUMN.
2 guns, 11/9th Royal Artillery.
213 bayonets, 51st Foot.
31 bayonets, Madras Sappers and Miners.
312 bayonets, 2nd Gurkhas.
320 bayonets, Mhairwara Battalion.
311 bayonets, 6th Native Infantry.[115]
DAKKA COLUMN.
52 bayonets, 1/17th Foot.
104 bayonets, 27th Punjab Native Infantry.
257 bayonets, 45th Sikhs.
[Sidenote: The different Columns]
Leaving Jamrud on the 24th January, the Jamrud Column marched by way of
the Khyber Stream and the Chora Pass to Berar Kats, arriving there late
on the following afternoon. There was some firing at the baggage escort
_en route_ and at the camp after dark, but it soon ceased.
The Ali Musjid Column started on the 25th, and, moving by Alachi,
reached Karamna the same afternoon, being there joined by the 6th Native
Infantry, which had marched thither from Lundi Kotal by way of the Bori
Pass, the southern foot of which is in the north-west corner of the
Karamna Valley. On this day the towers of the Karamna villages were
destroyed, as were those of Barg, to which place the column marched on
the 27th.
The Basawal Column reached China on the afternoon of the 25th January,
and was here joined by the Dakka force, the united columns moving on to
Kasaba and Sisobi on the 26th; the Sisobi Pass was occupied on the 27th,
and made practicable. Here a junction was effected with the Jamrud
force, and on the afternoon of this day all the columns were united in
the Bazar Valley under Lieutenant-General Maude, who early that morning
had secured possession of the China hill.
During all these movements the Zakha Khel had shown great hostility; the
force had been fired on night and day from the moment of entry into the
country, while the inhabitants had deserted their villages and had, in
many instances, themselves set fire to them. In a reconnaissance on the
28th of the Bukar Pass leading to the Bara Valley a good deal of
opposition was experienced, and in the destruction on the 29th of the
towers of Halwai the enemy disclosed their presence in large numbers. It
was now clear that any invasion of the Bara Valley would bring on an
Afridi war, and it subsequently transpired that other tribes, as well as
other clans of Afridis, were assembling to oppose our further
advance—detachments from the Shinwaris and Orakzais, as well as from the
Kuki Khel, Aka Khel, Kambar Khel, Malikdin Khel, and Sipah Afridis,
gathering together and holding the passes over the Bara hills.
The responsibility of Lieutenant-General Maude as to further operations
was not lightened by the receipt on the 29th January of a circular
letter from Army Headquarters, reminding column commanders in
Afghanistan that the operations then in progress were directed against
the Amir and his troops alone, and that unnecessary collisions with the
tribes were to be as far as possible avoided. Lieutenant-General Maude
therefore telegraphed for more explicit instructions, especially as to
whether he should force an entrance to the Bara Valley.
[Sidenote: Close of the Operations]
Before any reply could be expected, an urgent demand was received from
the General Officer commanding First Division, Peshawar Valley Field
Force, for the immediate return of his troops, in view of an expected
attack upon Jalalabad and Dakka by Mohmands and Bajauris; but the
awkwardness of such a request in the middle of operations was smoothed
by the Afridis of the Bazar Valley now evincing a disposition to open
negotiations, while a deputation from all divisions of the Bara Valley
Zakha Khels actually arrived in camp. On the 2nd February the Political
Officer reported that he had made satisfactory terms with the jirgah;
and although the same evening General Maude was informed that the words
of the circular above referred to did not preclude his carrying out an
expedition into the Bara Valley should he consider such to be necessary,
he decided that the whole force under his command should commence its
withdrawal on the 3rd; and on that date accordingly the different
columns left the Bazar Valley, the Dakka force by the Sisobi Pass and
the troops of the Second Division via Chora for Jamrud and Ali Musjid.
There was no molestation by the Afridis during the retirement of any of
the columns, which, during the operations described, had sustained a
loss of five killed and thirteen wounded.
The effect of this expedition did not last more than a few weeks, for by
the end of March the Zakha Khels had again begun to give trouble,
continuing to do so until the termination in May of the first phase of
the second Afghan war. On the withdrawal from Afghanistan in June, the
Khyber Afridis made only one insignificant attempt to molest our troops;
and, fortunately for us, the trials of what has been called “the Death
March”[116] were not aggravated by the attacks of fanatical tribesmen,
during the retirement India-wards through the Khyber of the Peshawar
Valley Field Force.
After the close of the first phase of the campaign in Afghanistan,
arrangements, which worked generally satisfactorily, were made with the
Afridis for the safety of the Khyber; while the agreement come to in
1881, and honourably kept on both sides for sixteen years, will be found
in Chapter XI.
It has been said that the Afridis of the Khyber kept faithfully to their
treaty engagements during the sixteen years which followed the events
which have been just described, but in 1892 there was one comparatively
minor case of misconduct, when a Kuki Khel malik, smarting under a
grievance connected with the deprivation for misbehaviour of a portion
of his allowances, collected a body of 500 or 600 men and attacked three
of the Khyber posts. The Tirah mullahs made an unsuccessful attempt to
persuade other Afridi clans to join, and the prompt despatch of troops
to Jamrud was sufficient to cause the dispersal of the lashkar.
[Sidenote: The Outbreak of 1897]
Five years afterwards there was a sudden, unaccountable, and widespread
display of hostility towards the government, in which almost all the
border tribes from the Malakand to the Tochi were concerned; and it
seems necessary to make something of the nature of a statement of the
causes which have been put forward, at various times and by different
persons, for an outbreak so serious and so wholly unexpected. It must,
however, from the outset be borne in mind that, when we made our
agreement for the safeguarding of the pass with and by the Khyber
Afridis, they put the recognition upon record of the independence of
their responsibility for the security of the road from any government
aid in the matter of troops; while it was further by them admitted that
“it lies with the Indian Government to retain its troops within the pass
or withdraw them and to re-occupy it at pleasure.” In face of this
admission it is not easy to see how the Afridis can justify their
complaint (made to the Amir of Afghanistan), that our hold on the Khyber
was an infringement of treaty rights.
It may be admitted that a strong case is presented by those who hold
that the real cause of the general Pathan revolt of 1897 is traceable to
the policy which dictated the Afghan Boundary agreement of 1893. It is
indisputable that one of the results of this measure—imperatively
demanded by the difficulty, always present and ever increasing, of
controlling the tribes immediately beyond our border—aroused a sense of
distrust and uneasiness among the Pathans of the frontier. ‘They watched
in impotent wrath the erection of the long line of demarcation pillars;
they were told that henceforth all to the east of that line practically
belonged to the British, and that the allegiance of all who dwelt within
it must be to us; they saw their country mapped and measured; they
witnessed the establishment of military posts, not merely on their
borders, but in their very midst, as at Wana; and they came to a
conclusion, not unnatural to an ignorant people ever hostile to any form
of settled and civilised government, that their country was annexed and
their independence menaced.’ The tribesmen themselves put forward many
pretexts for their action—after the event; but religious fanaticism
undoubtedly furnished the actual incentive, while there are not wanting
indications that the discomfiture of the infidel (the Greek) at the
hands of the followers of Islam (the Turk), furnished the spur which
incited the tribesmen to try and throw off the yoke of the unbeliever.
Then, again, there seems no doubt that the men of the border believed
that they might safely rely upon the support, moral and material, of the
Amir of Afghanistan. It was known that the Durand Boundary Agreement was
not particularly palatable to the Ruler of the Unruly; he had lately
written a book on _Jehad_; he had recently assumed a title[117] which
seemed to include all Muhammadans under his sovereignty; for years he
had been a personal friend of the Hadda Mullah, one of the chief
apostles of insurrection. As a matter of fact, however, subsequent
revelations proved that the Amir’s attitude towards his ally had been
perfectly correct, throughout a situation which for him was both
difficult and dangerous; he issued proclamations enjoining neutrality;
he caused Afghan reinforcements moving eastward to be stopped and
dispersed; the Afridis themselves admitted that “His Highness advised us
not to fight with the British Government;” but the Amir was not able
effectively to control the active sympathies with the insurrectionary
movement of some of his people in general, and of Ghulam Haidar, his
Commander-in-Chief, in particular.
[Sidenote: Amir and Afridis]
The initial outbreaks, preceding that of the Afridis, occurred on the
10th June, 1897, in the Tochi Valley, on the 26th July at the Malakand,
and on the 7th August at Shabkadar in the Peshawar Valley; and shortly
after this latter date the possibility of the rising, already
sufficiently formidable, spreading to the Afridis and Orakzais, caused
the concentration at Rawal Pindi of two brigades, in addition to those
which had already been formed for service against other tribes on the
frontier. At the same time a movable column, composed of the three arms,
was formed at Peshawar, intended for the protection of the frontier
immediately adjacent to that cantonment, but not intended to carry on
operations in the Khyber; the garrison of Jamrud was doubled, and
regular troops occupied the frontier forts at Michni and Abazai. For
some reason, not readily apparent, the authorities on the spot, military
and civil, do not seem to have felt any real apprehension for the safety
of the Khyber; and, as has been said elsewhere, reports sent from Kohat,
emphasising the serious and widespread character of the rising, and
pointing out the extent to which Afridis and Orakzais seemed to be
implicated, appear to have been discredited or were considered to be
exaggerated.
On the 17th August, definite information reached Peshawar from the
Khyber that an Afridi force, reported 10,000 strong, had left Bagh in
Tirah on the 16th, with the intention of attacking the Khyber posts on
the 18th. Both the General Officer commanding and the Commissioner of
Peshawar decided against any occupation of the Khyber forts by regular
troops, for the reason that such a course would imply distrust of the
tribesmen holding to their treaty obligations. This decision, and the
resultant abandonment of the Khyber, and the failure to support the
Khyber Rifles holding its different posts, have been widely criticised
and greatly condemned. Holdich says: “But, alas! whilst the Afridi
fought for us, we failed to fight for ourselves; 9500 troops about the
Peshawar frontier looked on, whilst 500 Afridis maintained British
honour in the Khyber.” And those who were present at a lecture given at
Simla in 1898, on “the Campaign in Tirah,” will not have forgotten the
general chorus of approval which there greeted the remarks of a
prominent Punjab civilian, that “the 23rd of August was a day of pain
and humiliation for every Englishman in India. We had 12,000 troops at
the mouth of the Pass or within easy reach of Ali Musjid, marking time
as it were, or held in leash, and we allowed these forts to fall one
after the other.”
But whatever opinion may be held in regard to the reasons of policy
which held back the troops of the regular army, there seems no question
that at the time any forward movement on anything like a large scale was
practically out of the question; pack transport especially was very
scarce, all immediately and locally available having already been
requisitioned for military operations elsewhere in progress. At the same
time, it cannot be denied that the military authorities in Peshawar had
been in receipt of at least a fortnight’s definite notice of what might
be expected, while, for any operations in the Khyber Pass itself,
wheeled transport, contrary to ordinary frontier experience, could have
been utilised practically throughout.
[Sidenote: Precautionary Measures]
The following precautionary measures were taken: Ali Musjid and Fort
Maude were reinforced by 100 tribesmen each; the Zakha Khel and Shinwari
maliks were reminded of their obligations; additional troops were sent
to Fort Bara, and a column of all arms to Jamrud; while—a step which
aroused, perhaps, more adverse comment than any other—the British
commandant of the Khyber Rifles was recalled from Lundi Kotal to
Peshawar, the Commissioner considering that his presence at the former
place might hamper the action of the Indian Government.
On the 23rd August, when the storm finally broke over the Khyber, the
distribution of the Khyber Rifles was as under:
Jamrud, 271.
Bagiar, 13.
Jehangira, 7.
Fort Maude, 42 + 100 tribesmen.
Ali Musjid, 80 + 100 tribesmen
(of whom only 40 were present on the
23rd).
Katta Kushtia, 7.
Gurgurra, 10.
Lundi Kotal, 374.
Fort Tytler, 20.
Fort Maude was attacked at 10 in the morning, but in the afternoon
Brigadier-General Westmacott, commanding at Jamrud, moved out to the
entrance to the Khyber, and thence shelled the enemy about Fort Maude.
[Sidenote: Attack on Lundi Kotal]
The attackers thereupon dispersed, and, on General Westmacott
withdrawing again to Jamrud, Fort Maude, Bagiar and Jehangira were
evacuated by their garrisons and then destroyed by the enemy. The Afridi
lashkar then attacked Ali Musjid, and by evening the garrison, short of
ammunition and hearing of the fall of the three posts above mentioned,
escaped to Jamrud, having lost three of their number killed and wounded.
From Ali Musjid the tribesmen marched on the morning of the 24th for
Lundi Kotal, their numbers being swelled _en route_, and being
unmolested in their passage, since the garrisons of Katta Kushtia and
Gurgurra early abandoned their posts and took to the hills. The attack
on the fortified serai at Lundi Kotal began at 8 a.m., and during the
whole of that day and the night that followed, the defence was
resolutely maintained under Subadar Mursil Khan, who had two sons in the
attacking force and one with him in the Khyber Rifles. The garrison
consisted of five native officers, and 369 men of the Khyber Rifles. Of
these, 120 belonged to miscellaneous clans—Shilmani Mohmands,
Peshawaris, and Kohat Pass Afridis; of the remaining 249, 70 were
Loargai Shinwaris, 50 were Mullagoris, the remainder being Zakha Khel
and Malikdin Khel Afridis. During the 24th the fire from the walls kept
the attack at a distance; but on the morning of the 25th, a Shinwari
jemadar being wounded, his men seemed to think they had done enough for
honour, scaled the north wall, and deserted to their homes—the Afridis
of the garrison, it is said, sending a volley after them. It is not
clear exactly what proportion of the besieged gave friendly admittance
to the besiegers and what proportion remained true to their salt; but
negotiations were opened, Mursil Khan was killed, and about 11 a.m. the
gate was opened from inside by treacherous hands and the tribesmen
swarmed in. The Mullagori and Shilmani sepoys fought their way out and
escaped—the Native Officer of the Mullagori company eventually bringing
his little command back to Jamrud without the loss of a rifle. It was
estimated that in the attacks on the Khyber posts the enemy had
sustained some 250 casualties, and immediately after the fall of Lundi
Kotal they dispersed to their homes, promising to reassemble on the 15th
September.
One of the most serious results of the capture of the Lundi Kotal serai
was that fifty thousand rounds of ammunition fell into the hands of the
enemy.
_The Tirah Expedition of 1897–98 against the Khyber Pass and Aka Khel
Afridis._—On the 3rd September the necessary orders were issued for the
formation and concentration of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, the actual
date for the expedition to start being fixed as the 12th October. By
this date it was hoped that the operations, then in progress in other
parts of the frontier and elsewhere described, would have ceased, and
that both troops and transport there in use would be available for the
larger expedition now projected. These anticipations, however, were not
altogether justified by events, only one brigade with its accompanying
transport being set free for employment under Sir William Lockhart, who
was recalled from leave in England to command the Tirah Field Force,
consisting of some 44,000 men. (For composition of the force see note at
end of chapter.)
Kohat was made the base of operations, with an advanced base at
Shinawari, thirty miles from Maidan. This route was on the whole
considered an easier and shorter one into Tirah than those from Peshawar
by the Bara and Mastura valleys, or from Kohat via the Khanki, despite,
too, the fact that the nearest railway terminus was at Khushalgarh on
the left bank of the Indus, and thirty miles to the east of Kohat.
The troops were divided into a main column of two divisions, each of two
brigades of infantry with divisional troops; two subsidiary columns;
line of communication troops; and a reserve mixed brigade at Rawal
Pindi.
[Sidenote: Transport Requirements]
The main column, operating from Kohat and Shinawari, was to move on
Tirah via the Chagru Kotal, Sampagha and Arhanga Passes; while of the
two subsidiary columns one was to operate from Peshawar, and the other
from the Miranzai and Kurram Valleys, as circumstances might require.
From railhead at Khushalgarh to Shinawari, the advanced base, the road
was practicable for carts, thence onwards the troops could only be
served by pack animals, and of these some 60,000 were required for the
use of the Tirah Expeditionary Force alone, not counting those already
engaged with other frontier expeditions still in progress.[118] The
collection of so vast an amount of transport naturally caused delay, and
it was not until the 20th October that any forward movement could take
place.
With the arrival of troops at Shinawari a commencement had been made at
improving the road from thence over the Chagru Kotal to Kharappa, and by
the 15th October it was fit for transport animals as far as the top of
the pass. In order, however, to work on the north side of the kotal, and
so complete the road construction in readiness for the advance on the
20th, it was necessary to drive the enemy from the vicinity so as to
prevent them from disturbing our working parties.
On the 18th, then, Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer, temporarily
commanding at Shinawari, moved out with troops of the 2nd Division,
distributed in two columns. The main column was composed of
Brigadier-General Kempster’s 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division:
1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment.
1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas.
15th Sikhs.
To which were added
No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
No. 8 Mountain Battery.
Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers.
Scouts, 5th Gurkhas.
The second column was under Brigadier-General Westmacott, who had either
with him, or was joined by on reaching the Chagru Kotal, three of the
battalions of his own, the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division, viz.:
2nd Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers.
1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment.
1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas,
supplemented for this day by
No. 5 Mountain Battery.
No. 9 Mountain Battery.
Rocket Detachment Royal Artillery.
[Sidenote: First Action at Dargai]
The two columns left camp at Shinawari, the one at 4.30 a.m., the other
half an hour later. The main column moved along the foothills to the
north-west of camp and, then, making a wide circle to the east, was to
operate against the right flank and right rear of the enemy occupying
the cliffs about Dargai. The second column was to make a frontal attack
upon Dargai from the Chagru Kotal; and on its arrival here about 8.30,
and seeing few of the enemy on the Dargai position, it was decided to at
once attack without awaiting the turning movement of the main column.
Some description of the famous position must now be given. [119] “The
Chagru Kotal is at the top of the hill, 5525 feet high, between the
plain on the southern or Shinawari side of the Samana Range and the
Khanki Valley, but at the lowest point of the gap between the Samana
Sukh, or western extremity of that part of the Samana Range on which
stand Forts Gulistan, Saraghari and Lockhart, and the heights above
Dargai. These heights, continued to the north beyond the village of
Dargai, form what is called the Narikh Sukh, from which a rough track
drops down into the Narikh Darra a short distance above its junction
with the Chagru defile, which again meets the Khanki River almost at
right angles some two miles further on. The road from Shinawari to the
Khanki Valley runs very nearly due north. At the Chagru Kotal it is
overlooked on the east by the Samana Sukh, a steep cliff rising
precipitously to a height of some 700 feet above it, at a distance of
from 700 to 800 yards. Opposite and nearly parallel to this on the
western side of the kotal, but 1000 yards from it, are the Dargai
heights, which attain an elevation of slightly over 6600 feet, 1100 feet
above the Chagru Kotal. Although the range from the kotal to the enemy’s
sangars on the top of the heights was only 1800 yards, the distance to
be traversed on foot was about a couple of miles. For the first mile or
more the track followed a more or less level course, until, passing
through the village of Mamu Khan, it took a sharp turn to the right and
began to zigzag up a very steep watercourse, which became gradually
narrower as it neared the top of a small wooded, rocky ridge running
roughly parallel to the enemy’s position and connected with it by a
narrow col or saddle. This ridge was 400 feet lower than the crest of
the position, and some 350 yards from the foot of it. The angle of
descent from the position to the top of the ridge, or rather to the
narrow gap at which alone it was possible to cross the ridge—which
elsewhere was precipitous on the side nearest the position—was less
steep than the slope from the gap downwards—or rearwards. Consequently,
except at a point not far beyond the village of Mamu Khan, which was too
distant from the position to be of any importance, the attacking force
was not exposed to the enemy’s fire until it reached the gap. The
approach to the gap was, as has been already stated, up a watercourse
which narrowed at the top until it formed a sort of funnel, not wide
enough to admit of the passage of more than two or three men abreast,
who, as they issued from it, found themselves at the edge of a narrow
ledge, 350 yards long to the foot of the position, exposed every inch of
the way to a fire from half a mile of sangared crest.”
The cliffs of Dargai are everywhere almost sheer, the final ascent being
made by a rough track, which climbs up at a point where the cliff is
rather more broken and shelving than elsewhere.
[Sidenote: The Dargai Position]
The advance commenced about 9 a.m., the 3rd Gurkhas leading, followed by
the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and Northamptons; and just before
midday the position had been taken, the enemy, chiefly Orakzai Ali
Khels, at the last only offering a comparatively feeble resistance, as
they were beginning to feel the pressure of the main column. These fled
towards the Khanki Valley, leaving twenty dead behind them. The
attacking force had sustained but fifteen casualties—two killed and
thirteen wounded. The advance of the main column had been greatly
delayed by the impracticable character of the ground, which had
necessitated the return of the mountain battery and all other pack
animals; and it was after 3 p.m. before the junction of the two columns
was effected at Dargai, by which time parties of the enemy had commenced
to harass the rear of the main column, and some 4000 Afridis appeared to
be advancing from the direction of the Khanki Valley, with the intention
of attempting a re-occupation of the position.
No operation of this campaign has been more criticised, either by those
who took part in it or by historians, than the evacuation on the 18th
October of the Dargai position and its recapture thereby necessitated
only two days later. The matter is barely touched upon in Sir William
Lockhart’s despatch, appearing in the _Gazette of India_ of January
22nd, 1898, beyond a remark that “the track to the water supply was
afterwards found to be about three miles in length, so commanded from
the adjacent heights that water could not have been obtained in the
presence of an enemy unless these heights as well as Dargai itself had
been held.” The inference is that, to hold the position won on the 18th,
and safeguard the water supply, a far larger force would have been
required than could at the time be spared. “Colonel (now
Lieutenant-General) Hutchinson in his book, the _Campaign in Tirah_,
states[120] as the principal excuse for the failure to hold the Dargai
heights when they had once been captured, that ‘the water supply of
Dargai was at a place called Khand Talao, nearly three miles away to the
west, and the road to it was commanded throughout by adjacent heights,
so that, in the presence of an enemy, water could not have been obtained
for the troops, unless these heights, as well as the village of Dargai,
had been held in force.’ This statement is all the more remarkable in
view of the fact that, on the excellent map of the position which he
gives three pages before, are clearly marked both the small Talao (or
tank), 100 yards below the village, containing muddy but not undrinkable
water, which we used at first on the morning of the 21st, but also the
larger tank some 500 yards further to the east.... The summit of the
Narikh Sukh completely dominates the village of Dargai and the reverse
slope of the enemy’s position, and commands an extensive view of the
country for miles round. It is strewn with large rocks, very much like a
Dartmoor Tor, and abounds in natural cover. A battalion left there on
the 18th could have set at defiance any number of tribesmen, and,
supported by another battalion on the kotal to connect it with the base
and furnish it with supplies, could with little difficulty, in
conjunction with the troops already in possession of the Samana across
the valley, have effectually prevented any attempt of the Afridis to
come up to meet us from the Khanki Valley.”
[Sidenote: Retirement from Dargai]
Immediately the junction of the two columns had been effected the
retirement to camp commenced; a mountain battery was posted at the
Chagru Kotal, and another, with a battalion, on the Samana Sukh, to
cover the withdrawal—a difficult operation and attended with
considerable loss, for the path was very steep and broken, and the enemy
pressed the rearguard closely. They do not, however, appear to have
pursued beyond the heights, and the further retirement of Sir Power
Palmer’s force to Shinawari via the Chagru Kotal was unmolested. Our
total casualties this day amounted to one officer and seven men killed,
five officers and twenty-nine men wounded.
The reports which he had received, as to the relation of the Dargai
position in occupation by the enemy to the use of the road over the
Chagru Kotal, seem to have convinced General Yeatman-Biggs, now again
commanding his division, that passage could not safely be attempted
unless the tribesmen were dislodged from the heights on the left flank.
He, therefore, proposed to Sir William Lockhart on the 19th, that the
advance be made by way of Gulistan, the Samana Sukh, and the Talai
Spur;[121] but this suggestion was negatived, and the previous
arrangement for the advance to Kharappa over the Chagru Kotal was to
stand, Sir William considering that the well-known anxiety of the enemy
as to their flanks, would cause them to evacuate the Dargai position on
our troops arriving at the junction of the Narikh and Chagru ravines; at
the same time the G.O.C.-in-Chief admitted that “it would be necessary
to clear the Dargai heights overlooking the road to the west.” It seems,
then, that what Sir William Lockhart suggested was a frontal attack on
the Dargai position, combined with a threatening of the flanks by
continuing the advance towards Kharappa.
The force placed at the disposal of General Yeatman-Biggs on the 20th,
was composed of the troops of his own division, which had already taken
the Dargai position on the 18th, _less_ the 36th Sikhs, but strengthened
by the inclusion of the 21st Madras Pioneers (divisional troops) and by
the loan of two infantry battalions (2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment
and 3rd Sikhs) from the 1st Division. The whole force left camp at
Shinawari at 4.30 a.m. on the 20th by the direct road to the Chagru
Kotal: no flank attack was attempted as on the previous occasion, but,
fortunately, the expectation of such a movement kept a large contingent
of the enemy from the actual point of attack during the whole day. As
might have been expected with the passage by a single narrow road of so
large a body of troops and transport, the block, inevitable under
ordinary conditions, was accentuated by the opposition experienced; and,
while some of the baggage was unable even to leave the Shinawari camp
that day, late on the 21st the Shinawari-Chagru Kotal road was for quite
half its length still absolutely choked with transport of all kinds—many
of the animals had been standing loaded up for upwards of thirty-six
hours.
[Sidenote: Second Action at Dargai]
The Dargai position, which on the 18th had been held by a limited number
of Orakzais, was now occupied by a gathering of tribesmen estimated to
number 12,000, partly Orakzais, but more than half consisting of Afridis
from the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamar Khel, Zakha Khel, Kuki Khel,
and Sipah clans.
The advanced troops, under Brigadier-General Kempster, reached the kotal
about 8 a.m., and, on being joined there by Major-General Yeatman-Biggs,
were at once ordered to take the position; the remainder of the force
being halted on the summit or the south side of the pass, and no attempt
being made to threaten the enemy’s flanks by continuing the advance. The
assault on Dargai was led by the Gurkha Scouts and 1st Battalion 2nd
Gurkhas, with the Dorsets in support and the Derbyshire Regiment in
reserve, covered by the long-range fire of the Gordons and Maxim gun
from a ridge immediately west of the kotal, of three mountain batteries
on the pass, and of another on the Samana Sukh. The whole of the
infantry of the attack was able to mass, without loss and under cover,
within less than 500 yards of the position, and from here the Gurkhas
dashed out, and, with something over fifty casualties, succeeded in
establishing themselves in shelter in the broken and dead ground
immediately under the cliffs. The enemy now concentrated a rapid,
accurate, and well-sustained fire upon the narrow col or saddle
described on page 322. The remainder of the Gurkhas were unable to get
across, and attempts made, first by the Dorsets and then by the
Derbyshires, to rush forward in driblets (necessitated both by the
narrow exit from the “funnel” and the congested state of the ground
whereon these regiments were massed) were beaten back with considerable
loss. About 2.30 p.m. the colonel of the Dorsets, the senior officer on
the spot, signalled for reinforcements. The Gordon Highlanders and 3rd
Sikhs were then sent up, and, under a rapid concentrated fire from all
the batteries, the Gordons led a dash, which was joined by all the other
troops in the position, and the enemy, not waiting for the final
assault, fled towards the Khanki Valley.
[Sidenote: Second Capture of Position]
By this time it was too late to continue the advance; consequently,
while the bulk of the force bivouacked about the Chagru Kotal, the
Narikh Sukh was held by the Derbyshires, the position at Dargai by the
Gurkhas and Dorsets, with the Gordon Highlanders lower down the hill.
The total casualties sustained in this, the second assault on Dargai,
amounted to four officers and thirty-four men killed, fourteen officers
and 147 men wounded. It may here be mentioned that the troops now
holding these heights remained wholly unmolested, even when, after the
23rd, the position was occupied by no more than one battalion—the 30th
Punjab Infantry.
On the 21st the Second Division resumed its march; on the 24th the First
Division began to move from Shinawari; and by the evening of the 27th
the whole of the main force under Sir William Lockhart’s command, was,
with its supplies and transport, concentrated at Kharappa ready for a
further advance. During this time the Sampagha Pass to the north was
reconnoitred, foraging parties were sent out, camps were strengthened
and communications improved; the enemy was always active, following up
reconnoitring and foraging parties, and “sniping” nightly into camp,
whereby several casualties were sustained.
By the 28th a force of some 17,600 fighting men, nearly as many
followers, and 24,000 animals, was concentrated in camp, and marched out
this day to Ghandaki, a short four miles from Kharappa, proceeding by
two roads; and in the afternoon a reconnaissance by the 1st Brigade of
the First Division was pushed to the foot of the Sampagha Pass. On the
following day the same brigade moved out while it was still dark; the
Devons seized a village and some spurs on the right of the road to the
pass, the Derbyshire Regiment occupied a mass of small brown hills in
the centre—afterwards the first artillery position, and the 1st Gurkhas
moved against the Kandi Mishti villages on the left. The Sampagha was
captured by direct attack, the opposition not being very serious, and by
11.30 a.m. was in our hands, at a cost of two killed and thirty wounded.
Three brigades were that same day pushed forward into the Mastura
Valley, where up to this date no European had ever penetrated, the 1st
Brigade remaining on the south of the Sampagha to help forward the
transport, and eventually joining the main body on the night of the
30th.
On the 31st the force moved against the Arhanga Pass leading into Afridi
Tirah, but the general expectation that the tribesmen would here make a
real stand proved unfounded. The pass was captured practically by a
single brigade—General Westmacott’s—at the expense of only three
casualties, and the 2nd Brigade, First Division, with the whole of the
Second Division, hurried on to Maidan, leaving the 1st Brigade of the
First Division in the Mastura Valley.
Arrived in Maidan, expeditions were now made into the settlements of the
different tribesmen in arms against us. As a preliminary, Bagh was
visited on the 1st November. This was about three miles to the west of
the Maidan camp, is the political centre of Tirah, and the meeting place
of the Afridi jirgahs. On the 9th, a reconnaissance was made of Saran
Sar, a pass into the Bara Valley, a number of defensive villages of the
Zakha Khel were destroyed, and grain and forage supplies were removed;
we sustained a considerable number of casualties in the retirement, the
Northampton Regiment especially losing heavily. On the 13th, a force
under General Kempster visited the Waran Valley to overawe and punish
the Aka Khels, and the house of the notorious mullah, Saiyid Akbar, was
destroyed. In the retirement our rearguard was again heavily handled,
over 70 casualties being sustained at the hands of the Aka Khel, Zakha
Khel, Kamar Khel and Sipah Afridis who took part in the action.
[Sidenote: In Afridi Tirah]
On the 18th November, the main force moved from Maidan to Bagh, which
was considered a better political and strategical centre; and on the
22nd, Sir William Lockhart accompanied thence a force which, under
General Westmacott, started on a three days’ reconnaissance to Dwa Toi
to explore the approaches to the Bara Valley and to punish the Kuki
Khels. In all these expeditions our losses were not light, the rearguard
being invariably followed up and harassed; the clans in general, and the
Zakha Khel in particular, appeared irreconcilably hostile; and
skirmishes and attacks on convoys were of almost daily occurrence.
Foraging parties from Mastura camp were also attacked by the Orakzais,
but it was evident that the back of the resistance of this tribe had
been broken at Dargai, and, indeed, by the 20th November they had
accepted our terms and paid their fines in full, both in rifles and in
money. The greater part of Afridi Tirah had now been traversed and
surveyed; the Chamkannis and westerly Orakzais were visited and punished
as mentioned in Chapter XVI., and Sir William Lockhart now resolved to
evacuate Tirah and attack the Afridis in their winter settlements near
Peshawar.
Heavy baggage was now sent back from Bagh and Mastura to Shinawari, the
base was changed from Khushalgarh to Peshawar, and on the 7th December
the Maidan and Mastura Valleys were evacuated, the 2nd Brigade of the
First Division rejoining its division detailed to march down the Mastura
Valley. The Second Division withdrew by the Bara Valley, and experienced
some of the heaviest rearguard fighting ever encountered in an Indian
frontier campaign.
The march of the First Division was but little opposed throughout. On
the 9th the 1st Brigade marched from Haidar Khel into the Waran Valley,
destroyed a large number of fortified houses, and also the house of
Saiyid Akbar, which had been partially repaired since destroyed by
General Kempster’s brigade. In its retirement the Aka Khel and Zakha
Khel pressed upon our rearguard, but the losses were not heavy. The
remainder of the march down the valley was practically unmolested, and
the division was concentrated at Ilmgudar near Peshawar on the 17th
November.
[Sidenote: In the Bara Valley]
General Westmacott’s brigade of the Second Division marched from Bagh on
the 7th, through the Shaloba Pass to Dwa Toi, where it was joined on the
9th by General Kempster’s troops, whose march had been delayed, at the
outset, by the necessity for destroying the defences of the Kambar Khel
and Malikdin Khel, and, during its execution, by the state of the road
rendered slippery by rain and congested by the baggage of the advanced
brigade. On the 10th, the march of the two brigades was unopposed, but
on the 11th, movement and communication were rendered difficult by a
thick mist, touch was lost between the two brigades, and the Afridis
following up closely, favoured by the mist and abundant cover, inflicted
great loss among the transport and followers. Part of the rearguard did
not get into camp at all that night, and, seizing some houses, the
commander defended his rearguard and a large amount of transport against
the attacks of the tribesmen, who kept up a fire all night. On the 12th
the Second Division closed up and remained halted. On the 13th the march
was resumed, and the tribesmen attacking with great boldness as soon as
the rearguard of the rear brigade (General Westmacott’s) left camp, the
fighting was continuous throughout the day. The enemy suffered heavily
in his attacks on the baggage column and rearguard, but, nothing
daunted, came on again and again, making most determined rushes. Firing
was incessant throughout the night into the bivouac of Westmacott’s
brigade, which encamped where darkness found it, and the brigade was
again attacked at daybreak, but the enemy did not on this day follow the
column very far or for very long. On the 17th December the two brigades
of the Second Division had reached respectively Bara and Mamanai; here
they remained for the present guarding the Bara Valley line, while the
Peshawar Column and First Division advanced into the Khyber Pass and
Bazar Valley.
On the 18th December the Peshawar Column reconnoitred the Khyber Pass as
far as Fort Maude; on the 23rd Ali Musjid was occupied; and on the 26th
the column marched to Lundi Kotal, finding villages deserted, barracks
destroyed, and everywhere damage done to Government property. The
Shinwaris living about Lundi Kotal, who had assisted in the early
attacks on the Khyber posts, had by now paid up their fines and
submitted, and proved their repentance by assisting in picqueting the
hills and keeping off Zakha Khel raiders, and even restored some of the
property taken away when the serai at Lundi Kotal was looted.
The Bazar Valley, which is one of a series of parallel valleys running
almost due east and west, is only about twenty miles long, with an
average breadth of between eight and twelve miles from watershed to
watershed, and lies at an elevation of 3000 feet. On the north the
Alachi Mountains separate it from the Khyber, and on the south the Sur
Ghar Range divides it from the Bara Valley. Through the valley the Bazar
stream runs almost due east till it joins the Khyber stream at Jabagai.
The east end of the valley is narrow, and just before its final
debouchure into the Peshawar Plain it contracts into an almost
impassable defile. The west end, on the other hand, is comparatively
wide and open, and climbs gradually up to the snow-capped range of the
Safed Koh, the lower ridges of which form the boundary of the Bazar
Valley. The Zakha Khel own this upper portion of the valley. It consists
of two main branches, each about two miles broad, enclosing between them
an irregular spur. This spur, running out from the main watershed in a
series of relatively small hills, ends in an abrupt peak just above
China. About two and a half miles east of China the two branch valleys
unite, and in the apex of their junction, closing the mouth of the China
plain, is an isolated hill known as Khar Ghundai.
Through the circle of mountains to the south-west and west go four main
passes—Mangal Bagh and Bukar leading into the Bara Valley, and the
Thabai and Sisobi, or Tsatsobi, into Afghanistan. The former give
communication to neighbours, the latter form back-doors or “bolt-holes”
into Afghanistan, and the existence of these back-doors constitutes the
real difficulty of dealing effectively with the Zakha Khels. The
“front-door” is over the Alachi Range, crossed by the Chora, Alachi,
Bori, and Bazar Passes, and of these the first named is the easiest, but
it leads, as has been already stated, through Malikdin Khel territory.
[Sidenote: The Bazar Valley]
On the 25th the First Division entered the Bazar Valley in two columns
from the immediate vicinity of Ali Musjid, where it had concentrated the
day previous. The 1st Brigade moved by the Alachi Pass to Karamna, and
the 2nd by way of the Chora Pass to Chora; neither was seriously
opposed, but the roads were found to be very difficult. On the 26th the
1st Brigade was only able to march as far as Barg, no more than two and
a half miles, but a road presenting extraordinary difficulties to the
progress of troops and almost impassable to transport. The same day the
2nd Brigade was advancing to China, with its rearguard harassed all the
way; it returned next day to Chora, followed up on both flanks, and
reached the Khyber on the 28th and Jamrud on the 29th. The 1st Brigade
supported, on the 27th, the retirement of the 2nd Brigade from China,
moved back to Karamna on the 28th, and on the next day returned to the
Khyber, the rearguard, furnished by the Derbyshire Regiment, being
persistently followed up nearly to Lala China in the Khyber.
During the latter part of December and beginning of January 1898, the
Peshawar column was frequently engaged with the Zakha Khels about Lundi
Kotal, and on all sides punitive measures, accompanied by desultory and
indecisive fighting, continued as before. Many of the Afridi clans—the
Malikdin Khels, Kambar Khels, Sipah and Kamar Khels—had sent in asking
for peace, while bewailing the severity of our terms; but the Aka Khels
were obdurate, and the Zakha Khels as defiant as at the very
commencement of the campaign, their two most recalcitrant maliks, Khwas
Khan and Wali Muhammad Khan, from the secure haven of Afghanistan,
exhorting them to stand firm and to continue to resist.
[Sidenote: End of Tirah Campaign]
The last action of the campaign took place at the Shinkamar Pass on the
29th January, when all the four brigades combined to endeavour to
surround the Kajurai plain, where the Afridis were reported to be again
grazing their cattle. Few of the columns employed experienced any
opposition, but one operating from Mamanai, and belonging to General
Westmacott’s brigade, when about to retire was hotly engaged by the
enemy, and sustained some seventy casualties; these were chiefly among
the Yorkshire Light Infantry and the 36th Sikhs, the last-named regiment
losing a splendid frontier soldier in their commanding officer, Colonel
John Haughton.
Before the end of February nearly all the Afridi clans had submitted or
were making advances towards a settlement; the Khyber Pass had been
reopened to kafilas, but the Zakha Khels evinced no real intention of
giving in. On the 17th March, therefore, preparations were made for a
spring campaign; Sir William Lockhart returned to Jamrud, fresh
transport was distributed among the troops, and one of the brigades of
the Second Division made a short advance towards the Bara Valley. The
effect upon the Zakha Khels was immediate. By the 3rd April all the
clans had definitely submitted and given hostages for fines still due;
hostilities then ceased and demobilisation commenced, but for some
months regular troops were retained in occupation of the Khyber posts.
By November 1898 the arrangements for the government of the Khyber
previously in force were practically re-established.
The total casualties during the campaign amounted to 287 killed, 853
wounded and ten missing.
It was hoped that the settlement effected, coupled with the knowledge
the Afridis now possessed that no part of their country was inaccessible
to British troops, would have proved satisfactory to both sides; and it
was noticed as a favourable sign that the enlistment of Pathans, and
especially of Afridis, into the regiments of the Indian Army, had never
been brisker than during the months immediately succeeding the close of
hostilities. It was hardly to be expected that individual raids and
outrages would cease, and had any such expectations been cherished they
would have speedily been disappointed; but at any rate for a brief term
of years it was not considered necessary to undertake military
operations against any of the Afridis. But among these tribesmen the
mullahs appear to be specially inimical to the British Government—as
they probably would be to any civilised administration—while there is
also always present in Afghanistan a faction opposed to British
interests, and from this faction disaffected tribesmen can safely reckon
upon a large measure of support. In 1904 a number of Afridis visited
Kabul—whether by invitation or not is not certain—were accorded a very
friendly reception, and seem to have returned determined—especially the
Zakha Khel members of the deputation—upon a policy of opposition to the
British authorities. During the next four years raids, ever increasing
in audacity, were committed on and within our border by the Zakha Khels,
culminating on the 28th January, 1908, in a raid carried out by some
seventy or eighty men upon the city of Peshawar, whence property valued
at a lakh of rupees was carried off, the raiders getting clear away.
Tribal allowances were stopped in the endeavour to force the more
well-behaved tribesmen to undertake the coercion of the Zakha Khel, but
they declared their inability to restrain the clan—and their impotence
was recognised—while suggesting to the British authorities the
occupation of the Bazar Valley, as the only means of dealing effectively
with a situation which was rapidly becoming intolerable, since security
of life and property on the Kohat and Peshawar borders was seriously
menaced.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1908]
By the beginning of 1908 the Government of India saw that military
operations must inevitably be undertaken, and proposed that three
brigades (one in reserve) should be mobilised in view of an expedition
into the Bazar Valley; and on the 13th February Major-General Sir J.
Willcocks, who had been appointed to command, moved out from Peshawar.
The three brigades were thus constituted:
FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Anderson.
1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
53rd Sikhs.
59th Scinde Rifles.
2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Major-General Barrett.
1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
28th Punjabis.
45th Sikhs.
54th Sikhs.
THIRD (RESERVE) BRIGADE.
Major-General Watkis.
1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers.
1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
1st Battalion 6th Gurkhas.
55th Coke’s Rifles.
No. 9 Company 2nd Sappers and Miners.
23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
Two Squadrons 19th Lancers.
Two Squadrons 37th Lancers.
23rd Sikh Pioneers.
25th Punjabis.
No. 3 Mountain Battery.
Four Guns, 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery.
No. 6 Company 1st Sappers and Miners.
800 Khyber Rifles.
The main force, under General Willcocks, left Peshawar on the 13th
February, and on the 15th, marching by the Chora Pass, entered the Bazar
Valley. The Second Brigade, with some divisional troops, pushed on
rapidly through Malikdin Khel country, accompanied by little or no
transport and all ranks carrying three days rations on the person, and
bivouacked that night near Walai. The latter part of the march was
opposed. The First Brigade followed more leisurely, escorting the
baggage and supply columns of both brigades, and halted for the night at
Chora, sending forward next day the Second Brigade baggage and supplies.
On the same day a small column under Colonel Roos-Keppel, political
adviser with the force, and composed of a wing of the 2nd Battalion 5th
Gurkhas and the Khyber Rifles, left Lundi Kotal, and, marching by the
Bazar Pass, arrived that evening at China. There was no opposition en
route, but the camps, both here and at Walai, were subjected to the
usual “sniping” after nightfall.
The Walai camp was particularly well chosen; it was well covered, was
surrounded by a circle of hills admitting of effective picqueting, had a
secure line of communication with Chora, and, commanding as it did the
whole valley, was especially well placed for carrying out punitive
operations among the Zakha Khels.
[Sidenote: In the Bazar Valley]
From the 17th to the 24th the troops were engaged in destroying towers
and defensive enclosures, and in collecting wood and fodder; the columns
were always followed up by the enemy, who, however, usually suffered
heavily; the whole of the Bazar Valley was visited and important surveys
were completed; sniping occurred on most nights; but already by the 23rd
the resistance offered was no more than half-hearted, and that afternoon
a tolerably representative jirgah came in professing anxiety to effect a
settlement. An agreement was rendered difficult by the presence about
the Thabai Pass of a gathering of Shinwaris and Mohmands, who had come
to offer their services to the Zakha Khels, but these were prevailed
upon to withdraw; and after protracted negotiations, lasting from the
25th to the 27th, a satisfactory settlement was arrived at. On the 29th
the force withdrew wholly unmolested to the Khyber and Peshawar, the
Afridi jirgah having undertaken the punishment of raiders,
responsibility for future good behaviour, and restitution, as far as
possible, of stolen property.
The casualties in this short and successful campaign amounted to three
killed and thirty-seven wounded.
NOTE.
_COMPOSITION OF THE TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE._
THE MAIN COLUMN.
FIRST DIVISION.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. P. SYMONS, C.B.
FIRST BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. C. HART, V.C., C.B.
1st Battalion, the Devonshire Regiment.
2nd Battalion, the Derbyshire Regiment.
2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
30th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
SECOND BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. GASELEE, A.D.C., C.B.
1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.
2nd Battalion, the Yorkshire Regiment.
2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
Two Squadrons, 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
28th Regiment of Bombay Infantry (Pioneers).[122]
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
The Nabha Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
The Maler Kotla Imperial Service Sappers.
SECOND DIVISION.
COMMANDING—MAJOR-GENERAL A. G. YEATMAN-BIGGS, C.B.
THIRD BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—COLONEL F. J. KEMPSTER, A.D.C., D.S.O.
1st Battalion, the Dorsetshire Regiment.
1st Battalion, the Gordon Highlanders.
1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
15th (the Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
FOURTH BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. WESTMACOTT, C.B., D.S.O.
2nd Battalion, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers.
1st Battalion, the Northamptonshire Regiment.
1st Battalion, 3rd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
36th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers.
Two Squadrons, 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
21st Regiment of Madras Infantry (Pioneers).
No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
The Jhind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
The Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers.
LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.
COMMANDING—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR A. P. PALMER, K.C.B.
3rd Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.
18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery.
22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
39th Garhwal (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
2nd Regiment Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
No. 1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
The Jeypore Imperial Service Transport Corps.
The Gwalior Imperial Service Transport Corps.
[Sidenote: Composition of Force]
THE PESHAWAR COLUMN.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. G. HAMMOND, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.
57th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
2nd Battalion, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
2nd Battalion, the Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
9th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
34th Pioneers.
45th (Rattray’s Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN.
COMMANDING—COLONEL W. HILL.
3rd Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
6th Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.
2nd Regiment of Central India Horse.[123]
12th (Khelat-i-Ghilzie) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.
The Kapurthala Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
THE RAWAL PINDI RESERVE BRIGADE.
COMMANDING—BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. R. MACGREGOR, D.S.O.
1st Battalion, the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry.
2nd Battalion, the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
27th Regiment (1st Baluch Battalion) of Bombay (Light)
Infantry.[124]
2nd Regiment of Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.[125]
Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers.