MOHMANDS: OPERATIONS.[86]
The British Government first came into contact with the Mohmands during
the Afghan War of 1838–42, at which time one Saadat Khan was Chief of
Lalpura. On the news of the approach of the British army, Turabaz Khan,
his cousin and enemy, immediately started off to meet the army of the
Indus at Jhelum. Saadat Khan thereupon espoused the cause of the
Barakzais, and Turabaz Khan was installed as Khan of Lalpura by Colonel
Wade, and seems to have done loyal service for Mackeson while we held
Afghanistan. After the disasters at Kabul the whole country rose, and
Turabaz Khan, at risk to himself, saved an English lady and her child
from the Pesh-Bolak garrison, and took them down the river on a raft to
Peshawar. The officers of the _Jazailchis_ stationed at Pesh-Bolak
escaped over the Tartara hills, and Turabaz Khan himself took refuge in
British territory. He returned with General Pollock’s force, but was
ousted by Saadat Khan on the withdrawal of our troops. He subsequently
made his peace with the Amir and received a _jaghir_, or grant of land,
in Kama.
During the early years of British rule in the Peshawar Valley, the
Mohmands gave more trouble than almost any other tribe.
The Michni Mohmands, after annexation, were allowed to hold a fief from
the British Government in the Doaba, of which they collected the
revenue. A portion of the lands they cultivated themselves, farming out
the remainder to other tribes of the plains as tenants. Many of their
clansmen dwelt in the plains of Michni, and some in the neighbouring
hills, and they traded largely in the Peshawar Valley. The Halimzai
Mohmands also held Panjpao in British Doaba as a fief, chiefly
cultivated by tenants. A few of their men lived in the plains, but the
majority in the hills, and these also traded in the valley. The Pandiali
Mohmands at a former period had held a similar jaghir in the Doaba, but
not since British rule. They had few relations either with the
Government or the people of the Peshawar Valley, and inhabited a very
strong locality in the hills. These fiefs had originally been granted to
the Mohmands by former governments, as blackmail to buy off
depredations.
The first inroad of the Mohmands occurred in December, 1850, in an
unprovoked attack on the village of Shabkadar, organised by Fateh Khan,
a son of Saadat Khan, who at that time was still the chief of Lalpura,
and who was naturally not well disposed towards us, and was doing his
best to incite the tribe to hostilities. In the following year a number
of outrages were committed: two attacks were made upon Matta in March
and April by the chief of Pandiali; other minor depredations succeeded
in July, headed by a leading man from Panjpao; and in October the Michni
Mohmands made so serious an attack upon British villages, that later in
the month the Supreme Government directed that the Mohmand fiefs in the
Doaba should be confiscated, our border posts strengthened, and that
punitive operations should be undertaken against the offenders.
[Sidenote: Operations in 1851–52]
_Operations against the Mohmands in 1851–52._—Accordingly on the 25th
October of this year, a force numbering 1593 of all ranks marched out
from Peshawar towards the Mohmand frontier. It was under the command of
Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., and was composed as under:
Det. 3rd Company 1st Battalion Artillery.[87]
No. 17 Light Field Battery.[87]
Two companies 61st Foot.
Two companies 98th Foot.
2nd Irregular Cavalry.
2nd Company Sappers and Miners.
66th Gurkha Regiment.
Wing 71st Native Infantry.[88]
The force moved, unopposed, to the village of Dab, via Mian Khel, and
here the hamlets were destroyed, Shabkadar and Matta were reinforced,
and a position was taken up to cover the erection of a fort at Michni.
In the meantime several outrages had been committed in Peshawar,
instigated by Saadat Khan, then at the head of a small armed force in
the Tartara Hills; and it seeming likely that he meditated an attack
upon some of our frontier villages, measures were taken by Sir Colin for
their protection, and for that of the bridge of boats over the Kabul
River forming his communications with Peshawar.
Saadat Khan continued very active; he busied himself in endeavouring to
unite the Mohmands; on the 26th he had moved to Gandab, twenty miles
north-west of Shabkadar, and here on the 30th he was joined by the Chief
of Bajaur with a large following. On the 28th and 29th the Mohmands
attacked two of our villages, burnt another, and finally, on the 7th
December, Saadat Khan suddenly moved out of a gorge in the hills to the
right front of camp, and took up a position with 4000 footmen and a
small body of horse. At the same time the hills to the westward, near
Dab, had been strongly occupied by the enemy, while a party of 200 came
down to the left bank of the Kabul River immediately in rear of the
camp. Seeing the force thus displayed, the Brigadier directed that a
troop of Horse Artillery and six companies of the 53rd Regiment should
at once move out from Peshawar to the bridge of boats on the Kabul
River.
On the 8th December the Mohmands, to the number of 3000 or 4000, under
Saadat Khan, advanced upon Matta, but were driven off, and all this day
the tribesmen were reported to be collecting in great strength in
Pandiali, under the Chief of Bajaur, and Sir Colin accordingly sent in
to Peshawar for reinforcements; and their arrival, after a forced march,
the 53rd having covered forty-two miles in thirty hours, undoubtedly
prevented an attack upon the camp near Dab. The British force was now
far too strong for the Mohmands, whose gathering broke up, Saadat Khan
returning to Lalpura. Desultory operations continued for some few more
weeks, but finally the force was recalled to Peshawar on the 14th
February.
[Sidenote: Action near Shabkadar]
On the 30th March news was received at Fort Shabkadar that the Mohmands
were collecting in the high ground in front to the number of between 400
and 500, and troops were moved out from the post, causing the enemy’s
retreat to the hills. It was known that Saadat Khan was making great
efforts to unite the various clans in view of again attempting the
recovery of the lands we had annexed; and finally, on the 15th April,
the Mohmands debouched from the hills, in numbers not less than 6000
matchlock men with some eighty horsemen, and moved along the foot of the
hills in front of Shabkadar, taking the direction of Matta. Sir Colin
Campbell had himself gone out to Shabkadar, where he had gathered some
600 troops, and he speedily issued from the fort with two Horse
Artillery guns and 266 sabres of the 7th Light Cavalry[89] and 15th
Irregular Cavalry,[89] and dispersed the enemy, causing them
considerable loss.
In the month of July following this affair, the Michni and Panjpao
Mohmands, exiled from house and lands and cut off from trade, tendered
their submission and prayed for the restoration of their fiefs, which
were handed back on payment of a nominal annual tribute. The Panjpao or
Halimzai Mohmands gave no further cause for dissatisfaction, but the men
of Michni fell into arrears in the payment of their tribute, and their
Chief, when invited into Peshawar to make an explanation, fled instead
to the hills. It was therefore necessary to attach the property of the
tribesmen to the extent of the amount of tribute and, further, to
inflict and recover a fine. To assist the civil authorities in enforcing
these measures a small force of all arms proceeded to Michni, a company
of infantry was sent to Mian Khel, and patrols so arranged as to seize
all cattle moving off to the hills. It was proposed to transfer the
Michni jaghir to some of our own subjects, but it was obvious that these
could not hold the lands and be responsible for the revenue, unless they
were secured from all chance of raids from the independent border
villages beyond Michni. It was therefore resolved to destroy the three
villages particularly concerned, and to prevent their being ever
reoccupied; for such measures it was necessary to obtain the assistance
of a military force strong enough to meet any resistance the Mohmands of
that part of the border might make.
_Operations against the Michni Mohmands in 1854._—For this purpose,
while the garrisons of the forts and posts at Abazai, Shabkadar, Mian
Khel and Michni were strengthened, a force as below enumerated was
concentrated at Michni, under command of Colonel Cotton, 22nd Foot:
Two guns 1st Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery.
2nd Company 2nd Battalion Artillery with Mountain Train Battery
(4 howitzers and 4 guns).
Two companies 22nd Foot.
2nd Company Sappers and Miners.
One squadron 10th Light Cavalry.[90]
One squadron 1st Irregular Cavalry.[91]
Three companies 1st Native Infantry.[92]
9th Native Infantry.[93]
1st Sikh Infantry.
[Sidenote: Operations in 1854]
The advance commenced on the 31st August along the left bank of the
Kabul River in the direction of Shahmansur Khel, which was captured
after some opposition. While the destruction of the village and the
removal of grain stores was in progress, the heights above had to be
seized and held, and the troops engaged on this duty were exposed to an
unceasing and galling fire, and suffered several casualties, but the
subsequent retirement to camp was practically unmolested. On the 2nd
September Colonel Cotton again moved out, and destroyed the villages of
Dab and Sadin, when the troops returned to Peshawar, and the
well-affected among the Michni Mohmands paid up their share of the
tribute due.
After this the Mohmands continued to commit outrages, issuing in large
bodies from the hills and harrying the border, and between March, 1855,
and July, 1857, no fewer than thirty-six serious raids, having plunder
and murder for their objects, were committed by the Mohmands of
Pandiali. The Commissioner, Colonel Edwardes, had been supported by the
Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, in recommending punitive
operations in the Pandiali Valley, but the Government were unwilling to
undertake them at the time, and when the Mutiny broke out in 1857 our
attention was at once more pressingly directed to other quarters.
During this period the Mohmands failed, by any concerted action, to
avail themselves of an unusually favourable opportunity of increasing
their annoyance, but raids and outrages did not cease, while there were
no troops available on the frontier to move out against them. From the
beginning of September 1857 to March 1860, thirty-nine serious outrages
were committed by members of this tribe. Within five years eighty-five
raids had been conducted by parties of an average strength of
seventy-five men, in which fourteen British subjects had been killed,
twenty-seven wounded, and fifty-five carried off, while over 1200 head
of cattle had been plundered. This was exclusive of forty minor raids in
which thirty-five British subjects had been killed or wounded and 267
head of cattle driven away, but though an expedition was urged by the
local authorities, the Government still refused to sanction one. At
last, about the end of March 1860, Nauroz Khan, an adopted son of Saadat
Khan of Lalpura, sent in seeking for peace, and finally it was agreed
that bygones should be bygones, that the Chief of Lalpura should be
responsible for the future peace of the frontier, that there should be
something of a general amnesty, and that the blockade of the country
should be raised.
[Sidenote: Unrest in 1863]
Soon after this the Khans of Lalpura and Pandiali came into Peshawar in
person and made their submission to the Commissioner. For three years
there was peace on the border, the Mohmands desisting from troubling
until the Ambela expedition in 1863, described in Chapter IV., when the
emissaries of the Akhund of Swat were sent all over the hills bordering
the Peshawar Valley, but were successful in exciting disturbances among
the Mohmands only. Sultan Muhammad Khan, another son of Saadat Khan,
Chief of Lalpura, owned the Akhund’s religious supremacy, and was,
moreover, ill-disposed towards the British. Collecting a body of
Mohmands, joined by a miscellaneous rabble of Safis, Bajauris and the
like, he came down to our frontier on the 5th December, 1863, at the
head of some 500 men. The officer commanding Fort Shabkadar at once
turned out with fifty-five sabres and ninety-six bayonets, and drove the
enemy back beyond our frontier, inflicting some loss. The Shabkadar
garrison was reinforced from Peshawar, and the Mohmands again advancing
on the 7th from the shelter of the hills, were again forced to retire.
Nauroz Khan now, however, joined his brother, and, supported by the
priesthood, the two managed, by the beginning of the new year, to
collect a miscellaneous assemblage of close upon 6000 armed men—mostly
Mohmands and mainly represented by men from the Halimzai and Khwaezai
clans—and with these it was now proposed to meet the British troops
stationed at Shabkadar.
This force had recently been very considerably strengthened, and now
numbered some 1800 of all ranks, with three Horse Artillery guns, under
Colonel Macdonnell, C.B.
On the morning of the 2nd January, 1864, the enemy made their
appearance, debouching from a gorge north-west of Shabkadar, and formed
up in something of the appearance of a crescent. The action which
resulted was on our side almost entirely confined to the cavalry and
guns. The British commander succeeded to some extent in drawing the
enemy into the plain, where they were repeatedly charged by the cavalry
and finally driven beyond the border, having sustained about eighty
casualties.
The effects of this check were felt throughout the Mohmand country, at
least 1000 men departing next morning to their homes, while in a few
days the gathering completely dispersed.
The Amir Sher Ali Khan now took the Mohmands in hand, ejecting and
imprisoning Saadat Khan and his son, Nauroz Khan, and replacing the
former in the chieftainship by a son of his ancient rival, Turabaz Khan.
Eventually, however, Nauroz Khan came to his own again, returning from
Afghanistan in 1870 and assuming the Khan-ship.
During the years immediately following the operations near Shabkadar in
1864, the Mohmand border was not disturbed by anything more than
isolated outrages—sufficiently serious though these were; and it was not
until the invasion of Afghanistan in 1878 that the independent Mohmands
began again to be really troublesome. At this time a grandson of Saadat
Khan was Chief of Lalpura, and he sent a Mohmand contingent to
co-operate with the Amir’s troops at Ali Musjid. These, however, fled
without firing a shot, and the Khan then came in and tendered his
submission to Sir S. Browne at Dakka. The Khan of Goshta refused to come
in, and it was believed to be at his instigation that a raid was made by
hill Mohmands on the village of Sarai, on the left bank of the Kabul
River, in the Kama district. A small column was sent out from Jalalabad,
and some of the ringleaders were captured.
On the 6th February a mixed force of 12,000 Mohmands and Bajauris made
an attack upon the village of a friendly chief, one Azim Khan, who had
been placed by us in charge of the two districts of Goshta and Chardeh.
On the next day General Macpherson, V.C., C.B., took out a small force
of some 900 cavalry and infantry from Jalalabad, intending to act in
combination with another body moving from Basawal by Chardeh upon
Goshta, and which was to intercept the Mohmands in their retirement; but
the enemy having received notice of the proposed operations, retreated
hurriedly to the hills, and the two columns returned to their respective
stations.
[Sidenote: Affair at Kam Dakka]
_Affair at Kam Dakka in 1879._—After this some of the Tarakzais and
Halimzais were implicated in an attack upon a surveyor’s party near
Michni, for which the divisions concerned were fined; and then in April
of this year there was a more serious gathering of Mohmands brought
together by a notorious mullah, for the purpose of raiding into British
territory or making attacks on our posts in the Khyber. On the night of
the 20th April between 200 and 300 Khwaezai and Halimzai Mohmands began
to cross the Kabul River from Palosi to Shinpokh—from the left to the
right bank. The Khan of Lalpura sent the news in to Dakka that a large
body of Mohmands was within three miles of that place and had already
engaged his outposts. He asked for help, as he expected a night attack.
Arrangements were made for rendering such assistance as could be
afforded, but no attack was delivered. The officer commanding at Dakka
moved out on the 21st with a small mixed force, found the Kam Dakka Pass
clear, and also that the village of that name, on the right bank of the
Kabul River and seven miles east of Dakka, was unoccupied by the enemy.
It was reported here that the Mohmands were in great strength in the
vicinity of the north bank, and the villagers appeared alarmed and
seemed unwilling that Major Barnes’ force should be withdrawn. The
troops, however, returned the same day, unopposed, to Dakka, but on
arrival here it was decided to send infantry to Kam Dakka, and 130
rifles of the Mhairwara Battalion[94] started thither at 5 p.m.,
reaching the village at 11.15 p.m. This detachment, commanded by Captain
O’Moore Creagh, was to protect Kam Dakka from an attack from the north
bank of the river, and was to hold the village for three days.
The villagers, however, appeared unwilling to be compromised by
harbouring British troops, said they were quite capable of taking care
of themselves, objected to the troops entering their village, and
seemed, in fact, anything but friendly.
[Sidenote: Relief of Detachment]
Early next morning Captain O’Moore Creagh took up a position partially
covering the village, and then, finding crowds of Mohmands crossing the
river and threatening his flank, he withdrew to a better position near a
graveyard and on the river bank, where he hastily threw up an
entrenchment. He had by this time been reinforced by thirty-six rifles
of his regiment from Dakka. Scarcely had this entrenchment been
completed, about 9 a.m., and followers and baggage animals been brought
under cover, water stored, etc., when the enemy came down from the hills
and completely surrounded the detachment. They persistently attacked
from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., frequently getting to the closest quarters, and
having to be repulsed with the bayonet. The ammunition now began to run
low, the enemy had closed in all round to within sixty to a hundred
yards, and the situation became most critical, when it was relieved by
the opportune approach of reinforcements.
These had been sent off from Dakka and Lundi Kotal so soon as the
situation at Kam Dakka had become known at divisional headquarters.
Under cover of the fire of the reinforcing troops, and some dashing
charges by a troop of the 10th Bengal Cavalry, the Mhairwara detachment
was withdrawn from the entrenchment, and the retirement on Dakka was
commenced. This was reached about 8.30 p.m., the enemy pressing the
rearguard closely, but being unable, owing to the darkness, to cause
more than a very few casualties. A strong force of all arms moved out on
the next day to Kam Dakka, but few of the enemy were met with.
In April, 1879, the same month as the Kam Dakka affair above related,
Muhammad Sadik Khan, the eldest son of Nauroz Khan, who was with the
British force at Gandamak, fled from the camp and joined the Amir Yakub
Khan—whose mother was a sister of Nauroz Khan—and, as soon as our troops
left Dakka in June, 1879, he was appointed Khan of Lalpura in the place
of the Khan installed in 1875. When the second invasion of Afghanistan
took place, the Khan of Lalpura hesitated for some days as to what
action he should take, but at length appeared at Dakka, and for two
months all went well at Lalpura and also at Goshta.
_Action on the Gara Heights, January 1880._—The journey of the Amir
Yakub Khan to India gave the first shock to the Mohmands, and further
agitation was produced by the news of the fighting at Kabul. The mullahs
began to arouse the fanaticism of the tribesmen, and the Khans of
Lalpura and Goshta placed themselves at the head of the movement and
collected large numbers of men at Palosi and Rena. On the 11th January
the Mohmands began to pass the river, and three days later about 5400
men under the Khan of Lalpura had crossed and taken up a strong position
on the Gara Heights, about two miles from Fort Dakka and between that
place and Kam Dakka. Fortunately, this move had been anticipated, and
nearly all the officers at Fort Dakka had made themselves thoroughly
familiar with the features of the position. Arrangements were now made
to attack the enemy on the Gara Heights in front from Dakka, while
another column from Lundi Kotal attacked them in flank and rear, so
that, beset on three sides and with the unfordable Kabul River on the
other, escape would be impossible and destruction almost certain.
[Sidenote: The Gara Heights]
On the 15th the Dakka Column moved out and was drawn up in position
facing the Gara Heights by 11 a.m. It was commanded by Colonel
Boisragon, 30th Punjab Native Infantry, and was composed as under:
Four guns I Bty. C. Bde. Royal Horse Artillery.
94 sabres 6th Dragoon Guards.
50 sabres 17th Bengal Cavalry.[95]
110 bayonets 1st Battalion 25th Foot.
100 bayonets 8th Native Infantry.[96]
500 bayonets 30th Punjab Native Infantry.
It had been arranged that the force from Lundi Kotal should start six
hours previously, and it was hoped that by this time it was in a
position to enable it to cut off the enemy’s retreat. The Dakka force
advanced to the attack covered by the fire of the four guns, and the
heights were taken without any very serious opposition, the enemy
evacuating one position after another, until, utterly routed, they fled
down the reverse slopes towards Kam Dakka. As soon as the guns of the
Lundi Kotal column were heard, about 5 p.m., Colonel Boisragon pressed
on and joined hands with Brigadier-General Doran, commanding the troops
from Lundi Kotal, in Kam Dakka. In the meantime the enemy had made good
their escape, either towards Rena or across the river.
Brigadier-General Doran had left Lundi Kotal at 4.30 a.m. with the
undermentioned troops:
Two guns 11–9th Royal Artillery.
20 sabres 17th Bengal Cavalry.
200 bayonets 5th Fusiliers.
200 bayonets 25th Foot.
30 bayonets Madras Sappers and Miners.
300 bayonets 1st Madras Native Infantry.[97]
200 bayonets 4th Madras Native Infantry.[98]
300 bayonets 31st Punjab Native Infantry.
Progress, via the Inzari Kandao, was very slow, the troops could move
only in single file, the battery mules could hardly be got along, some
baggage animals fell over the precipices and were lost, and the
rearguard was sixty-seven hours in covering seventeen miles. The gorge
of the Shilman Gakhe was forced after but a feeble resistance, and
eventually Brigadier-General Doran was able to join Colonel Boisragon as
already related; but all the baggage of the Lundi Kotal column, owing to
the extraordinary difficulties of the road, did not reach the bivouac
until the morning of the 18th. Meanwhile, on the 16th January, 500 men
had been passed over the river on rafts and destroyed the village of
Rena, whereafter the columns returned unmolested to Dakka and Lundi
Kotal.
The operations, though a failure in regard to combination, had not been
without effect; the tribesmen had suffered a severe defeat and had
sustained many casualties; and nearly all the clans having been
represented in the force opposed to us, the moral effect of the defeat
was felt throughout the tribe, and for some months the Mohmands remained
quiet. The success of Ayub Khan at Kandahar excited a rising which
collapsed on the news of his subsequent defeat, and during the next
sixteen years or more there was no recrudescence of large-scale trouble
among the Mohmands on our border.
[Sidenote: Partition of their Country]
The difficulty of restraining and punishing the Mohmands had for
years been intensified by the doubts which existed as to the
respective spheres of influence of the British and Kabul
Governments; it had been hoped that the Durand Agreement of 1893 had
helped to smooth these difficulties away; but the Agreement,
although apparently concurred in by the Amir, did not commend itself
to his judgment on reconsideration, so far at least as the partition
of control over the Mohmands was concerned. At last in 1896 the
Government of India, with a view of terminating a state of
indecision which had become intolerable, resolved to make an attempt
to bring certain of the Mohmand clans more immediately under British
control. The efforts made in this direction were so far successful
that, despite certain hostile influences—religious and political—the
Halimzais, Tarakzais, Utmanzais, Dawezais, and also the Pandiali
sections, were held to be henceforth in British territory, and
seemed themselves cordially to concur when the new arrangement was
announced to them.
When the frontier disturbances commenced in 1897 the above-named clans
evinced no disposition to take part, although the Hadda Mullah, an
especially notorious agitator, himself lived in the Mohmand country and
had acquired a commanding influence over the clans, with some of whom he
was said to have helped to defend the Malakand in 1895; and when in July
the rising occurred among the men of Swat, some of the leading Mohmands
among our new subjects offered their assistance to the representatives
of the British Government.
Eventually the Hadda Mullah succeeded in stirring up the tribesmen, who,
while unwilling to assist their co-religionists in Swat, had no
objection to raid in the vicinity of their own border; and accordingly
by the 7th August information had reached the authorities at Peshawar
that some 3000 Mohmands were marching from Gandab to attack Shabkadar.
The General Officer commanding at Peshawar proposed reinforcing Fort
Shabkadar with regular troops, but this proposal was negatived by the
Commissioner, who was in hopes that the Halimzais, who had so recently
accepted our protection, would be able and willing to prevent the
advance of the raiders.
It was, however, speedily apparent that measures so heroic were quite
beyond the power of the Halimzais; they temporised, they gave
information of the hostile movement, but they did not oppose the forces
of the Hadda Mullah; and eventually, as was almost to be expected, many
of the Halimzai fighting men enlisted under his banners.
On the afternoon of the 7th August the attack was delivered, both the
fort of Shabkadar and the neighbouring village of Shankargarh being the
objects of the assaults of the tribesmen, who, to the number of nearly
5000, now descended from the hills. The village was burned, but the
attack on the fort was easily beaten off, and by next morning many of
the enemy had retired whence they came. The news of the projected attack
had reached Peshawar on the night of the 7th, and about midnight a force
as under started for Shabkadar under Lieutenant-Colonel Woon, 20th
Punjab Infantry:
Four guns 51st Field Artillery.
Two squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers.
Two companies Somerset Light Infantry.
20th Punjab Infantry.
[Sidenote: Action at Shabkadar]
The cavalry went on in advance and reached Shabkadar early on the
morning of the 8th, but the guns and infantry were much delayed in
crossing the Kabul River, then in flood, by the ferry at Hajizai, and
did not reach the scene of action until some hours later. With the
troops available, Lieutenant-Colonel Woon moved out against the enemy,
but finding them in considerable strength and occupying a favourable
position, he decided against attacking, and withdrew to the fort. Early
on the 9th the Shabkadar troops again advanced to the attack; the enemy,
who had been reinforced during the night, had now taken up a line about
two miles in length, occupied by some 6000 men, whose right rested on
the higher hills; their centre extended across the low hills; while the
left stretched into the cultivated ground in the plain itself. Colonel
Woon began his attack in front with the infantry, intending to turn the
enemy’s left with the cavalry and artillery, but he could effect little
or no impression on the Mohmand position, and the enemy now making a
determined attempt to turn our left, Colonel Woon began to withdraw
towards the fort to avoid being completely enveloped.
At this moment Brigadier-General Elles arrived upon the scene from
Peshawar, and finding that most of the enemy had hurried down from the
high ground and were engaged with our infantry in the open, he directed
the two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers to charge from right to
left along the whole line of tribesmen. Charging down upon the left
rear, the squadrons rode down the whole line, clearing the front; the
infantry then again advanced, the Mohmands were driven back and pursued
to the high ground, and in a short time not a man of them was to be
seen.
Our loss was nine killed and sixty-five wounded, while among the enemy
more than 200 were killed and many wounded.
The gathering seems to have been representative of almost every tribe
living north of the Kabul River and between our border and that of
Afghanistan, from the banks of the Swat, Panjkora and Kunar Rivers, with
perhaps the single exception of the Tarakzais.
A cavalry reconnaissance was made next day, the 10th, some miles up the
Gandab Valley without seeing anything of the enemy; but as the
gathering, so far from having dispersed, was reported as intending to
return to the attack after replenishment of ammunition and supplies, the
troops at Shabkadar were made up to 2500 men, a bridge of boats was
substituted for the ferry at Hajizai, telegraphic communication was
established between Peshawar and Shabkadar, and fresh troops were sent
up to fill the gaps in the Peshawar garrison.
While the necessity for the early chastisement of the Mohmands was
recognised by the Indian Government, it was considered that, in view of
the generally disturbed state of the north-west frontier, the moment was
not propitious for such action, and consequently it was decided merely
to concentrate two strong moveable columns, the one at Peshawar and the
other at Shabkadar, ready for eventualities.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1897]
_Expedition against the Mohmands, 1897._—Signs of restlessness were now
being daily reported from the Afridi and Orakzai country, and finally,
on the 23rd and 24th August, the smouldering embers of fanaticism in
this direction burst suddenly into flames, and the Khyber forts were
attacked as described in Chapter XIII. The Hadda Mullah was once again
rumoured to have taken the field with 4000 Baizai Mohmands, intending
another attack upon Shabkadar; his other plan of attacking Dir, in
retaliation for the friendly attitude towards us of the Khan of that
country, having come to naught by reason of operations which have been
elsewhere described. In consequence of these reports the Government now,
during the first week in September, sanctioned extensive punitive
operations against the various tribes on the Peshawar border, and
decided that the Mohmands should be the first tribe to be taken in hand.
Everything pointed to the operations being short and decisive, as two
powerful bodies were about to move into the Mohmand country from
opposite directions. Sir Bindon Blood was to act from the north and
east, while Brigadier-General Elles (with the rank of Major-General),
with two brigades under Brigadier-Generals Westmacott and Macgregor,
would move from Shabkadar.
1ST (WESTMACOTT’S) BRIGADE.
1st Battalion Somerset Light Infantry.
20th Punjab Infantry.
2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas.
2ND (MACGREGOR’S) BRIGADE.
2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
9th Gurkhas.
37th Dogras.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
13th Bengal Lancers.
No. 3 Mountain Battery R.A.
No. 5 Mountain Battery R.A.
28th Bombay Pioneers.[99]
Patiala Regiment, Imperial Service Troops.
Nabha Regiment, Imperial Service Troops.
Two Maxim guns, Devonshire Regiment.
[Sidenote: Combined Operations]
Marching out of Shabkadar on the 15th September, General Elles reached
Ghalanai next day with the 1st Brigade, the 2nd Brigade getting no
further than Dand, as the road, especially over the Kharappa Pass,
required much work on it to make it practicable for baggage animals. On
the 17th a small force under General Westmacott moved on to Katsai, two
and a half miles south of the Nahaki Pass, which was reconnoitred and
reported very difficult. On this day communication was established with
Sir Bindon Blood, and measures were concerted for the attack on the
Bedmanai Pass which the Hadda Mullah was said to be holding with a large
force; the Gandab Halimzais came in at Nahaki and agreed to comply with
our terms. On the 19th Westmacott’s Brigade was concentrated at Nahaki,
and that of General Macgregor began to close up from Dand to Ghalanai.
On the 21st September General Elles with the 1st Brigade arrived at
Lakarai, where General Blood was met; and on the day following General
Elles moved his force on to Khazina, where he was joined by the 3rd
Brigade of the Malakand Field Force, placed at his disposal by General
Blood, to enable him to deal with the gathering at the Bedmanai Pass and
to clear the Mitai and Suran Valleys. The Nahaki Pass, dominating the
whole of this part of the Mohmand country, was now held by troops of
Macgregor’s brigade.
The Bedmanai Pass lies some five miles west-south-west of Khazina. The
track leading thence to the pass runs along the bed of a broad dry
nullah, and about a mile and a half further on, a narrow gap, between
the Gharibai Hill and the northern end of a spur jutting out from the
Yari Sar Mountain, gives entrance to a broad valley. Crossing this, four
small villages are passed, and the path winds upwards along the nullah
through a narrow gorge, until the summit of the pass, commanded from the
highest point of Yari Sar, is reached.
On the morning of the 23rd the troops moved forward and, after some
opposition, carried the Bedmanai Pass, the capture of which, contrary to
expectation, proved tolerably easy of accomplishment, as not more than
700 or 800 Mohmands, chiefly Baizais, were present. As to the actual
assault, the 20th Punjab Infantry led and were opposed on every ridge,
and the men of this regiment particularly distinguished themselves in
clearing the heights, well supported by the fire of the guns and Maxims.
The attached brigade meanwhile moved in support of General Westmacott up
the centre and guarding the right flank, and was only slightly engaged,
our casualties totalling no more than four. This easy victory was
attributable to the heavy losses which the men led by the Hadda Mullah,
had already experienced in their attack upon General Blood before
described. That, their real effort, had failed, and they had very little
heart for further fighting; also General Elles had previously so
disposed his cavalry as to prevent any help reaching the defenders of
the Bedmanai Pass from the Mitai and Suran Valleys.
During the two following days these valleys were visited and towers were
destroyed. The attached brigade now left to join the Tirah Expeditionary
Force, marching via Nahaki and Gandab to Peshawar; and General Elles
prepared to move on Jarobi, where, in the most rugged and inaccessible
part of the Baizai Mohmand country, a glen at the head of the Shindarra
Valley, was the home of the Hadda Mullah. The road thither was found to
be very difficult, but the opposition was not formidable, only some
nineteen casualties being experienced.
[Sidenote: The Clans give in]
During the next few days the troops were employed in marching through
the Bohai Dag and adjacent valleys, demolishing the defences of the
Baizai Mohmands and exacting submission. The opposition here was rather
more formidable but was easily broken down. The clans now began to give
in: the Khwaezai, Halimzai, Utmanzai, Dawezai jirgahs arrived asking for
terms, the acceptance of which was expedited by the troops continuing to
visit the uttermost parts of the country; and by the 3rd October all our
claims had been met and the force returned to Peshawar, where, on the
7th, it was broken up.
The objects of the expedition had been accomplished. All concerned in
the raid on Shabkadar had been punished; the Hadda Mullah had been
discredited, his dwelling destroyed and he himself driven into Afghan
territory; and the Mohmand country had been traversed from end to end.
That these operations did not, however, immediately initiate a period of
absolute quiet on the Border, goes without saying. There were outbreaks
and raids upon villages close to our frontier and within the territories
of tribes which had come under our protection; and it was very apparent
that the Indian Government could exercise but little more than a nominal
authority over any of the clans of the Mohmand tribe. Still, some
advance had been made, and when in 1906 an extension of the railway was
commenced from Peshawar to the Afghan frontier through Shilman, the
Mohmands did not offer any really serious opposition to the
undertaking.[100]
In March, 1908, three rather serious raids were carried out in our
territory by Mohmand tribesmen—at the village of Marozai, six miles
north-east of Shankargarh (Shabkadar); at Mirzadhar, two miles from
Marozai; and at Chikkar, nine miles south-east of Shankargarh.
All three raids were believed to be the work of men of the Mohmand
gathering which collected at the end of the Zakha Khel expedition, as
mentioned in Chapter XIII.; in consequence of these outrages the posts
at Abazai and Shabkadar were strengthened. Early in April, however, the
mullahs began to preach against the British in Ningrahar, and within a
few days had succeeded in collecting a large following of Mohmands with
the reported object of attacking Shabkadar. The movement spread,
villagers in masses joined the force, and by the 17th it was computed
that some 5000 men, including 2000 Afghans, were gathered together under
Hazrat Mullah in Kamali, to the north-west of Halimzai territory. It is
not surprising under the circumstances that the Chief Commissioner,
North-West Frontier Province, detected danger of a fanatical outbreak.
[Sidenote: Fresh Trouble]
Within four days the numbers of the Mohmand _lashkar_ had increased to
10,000 men, our post at Matta was fired into, and on the 21st General
Anderson, with two guns and 1000 bayonets, moved out from Peshawar, to
which place troops were sent forward from Nowshera. At Matta and
Shabkadar, and towards the Mohmands generally, General Willcocks,
commanding at Peshawar, occupied, according to instructions, a purely
defensive advanced position, the object being to prevent any collision
and to offer no possible ground for Mohmand attack. It was, however,
abundantly clear that the fanatical feeling against us was spreading,
that _ghaza_ was being preached, and that men were flocking to the
standards of the mullahs from Bajaur, Utman Khel territory, Asmar,
Kohistan and Kunar, while grain, ammunition and money were being sent
down to the Mohmands from Ningrahar.
On the 23rd considerable bodies of the enemy occupied the foothills just
across our border opposite Abazai, and General Willcocks accordingly,
considering that the Mohmands probably intended assuming the offensive,
ordered up additional troops from Peshawar to Shabkadar, and with their
arrival he had, on the line Abazai-Shabkadar-Michni, 2700 infantry, 520
sabres and twelve guns.
_Expedition against the Mohmands, 1908._—The authorities at home and at
Simla now concurred in thinking that no good purpose was likely to be
served by the maintenance of the mere defensive, and that it would
probably be a safer policy to advance and disperse the gathering before
it became larger and led to a big fanatical outbreak. The immediate
mobilisation of two brigades with divisional troops and a reserve was
ordered. General Willcocks was placed in command, and directed to cross
the border and assume the offensive. The force was thus composed:
FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Anderson.
1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.
53rd Sikhs.
57th Wilde’s Rifles.
59th Scinde Rifles.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Major-General Barrett.
1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
Guides Infantry.
28th Punjabis.
55th Coke’s Rifles.
RESERVE BRIGADE.
Major-General Ramsay.
1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers.
21st Punjabis.
22nd Punjabis.
40th Pathans.
This brigade to proceed to Peshawar.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
21st Cavalry.
No. 8. M.B.R.G.A.
23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery.
28th Mountain Battery.
No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners.
No. 1 Company Sappers and Miners.
34th Sikh Pioneers.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1908]
The troops being for the most part all on the spot, in consequence of
the conclusion, then just arrived at, of the Zakha Khel expedition, no
time was lost, and on the 24th April an advance was made with all troops
available at Shabkadar and Matta, when the enemy’s positions to the west
of these posts were attacked and captured. A heavy blow was inflicted on
the Mohmands, and a reconnaissance, carried out on the following day,
found no signs of them about their former positions or in the Gandab
Valley. It was, however, very clear that the rising was not crushed; the
mullahs were doing their best to enlist recruits in Dir and Swat, and an
attempt was also being made to induce the Zakha Khels to join, so far,
however, without success; but there seemed small doubt that all branches
of the Mohmands were represented in the recent actions with our columns
from Matta and Shabkadar. For some few days after the dispersal of the
gathering in front of Shabkadar, the British troops remained inactive,
in order to see whether the assembly of the tribal jirgah, which had
been arranged for, would enable General Willcocks to arrive at
reasonable terms.
It had been hoped that the disinclination shown by the tribes of Dir,
Swat, Bajaur and the Bazar Valley to make common cause with the
Mohmands, and the difficulty of keeping the lashkar in the field, would
have led to the gradual dispersal of the whole gathering, especially in
view of the projected meeting of the jirgah on the 4th May.
On the 2nd May, however, the Viceroy telegraphed to the India Office
explaining that the centre of unrest had now shifted to the Khyber,
where for some time past at Pesh-Bolak one Sufi Sahib, a noted
firebrand, had been collecting a force of Afghans. This army, whose
numbers were estimated at anything between 13,000 and 20,000 men, had
already passed Lundi Khana, and was believed to intend an attack on the
fortified serai at Lundi Kotal that evening, and possibly also on Ali
Musjid and the fort at Chora belonging to the Malikdin Khel chief, who
had often proved himself our friend.
[Sidenote: The Khyber Danger]
In consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs troops were
despatched to Jamrud with a view to rendering assistance, and the
Mohmand Field Force was directed to remain strictly on the defensive.
The General Officer left in command was further instructed, when the
jirgah assembled, to observe a temporising policy, encouraging
attendance and requiring an explanation of past conduct, but neither
announcing terms nor making any definite communication. Recognising also
that the greater danger was now threatening from the Khyber, the larger
part of the force present under General Willcocks at Shabkadar and
Peshawar was drawn to the pass.
The Reserve Brigade, under General Ramsay, reached Lundi Kotal on the
3rd May, while that under General Barrett marched to Ali Musjid; General
Anderson remained at Shabkadar with his brigade in observation of the
Mohmands.
On the night of the 2nd May repeated efforts had been made by the Khyber
gathering (which appeared to be entirely composed of Afghans, no Afridis
having joined it), to capture our post of Michni Kandao, which was ably
defended by Subadar Tor Khan of the Khyber Rifles. Lundi Kotal was also
fired into, and several attempts made to burn the serai, but these were
all beaten off, although firing took place daily. On the 4th General
Willcocks felt himself strong enough to attack, and moved out from Lundi
Kotal in two columns against the enemy, who occupied the Shinwari
villages about 4000 yards to the west. One column consisted of Ramsay’s
infantry brigade, with the 80th Battery R.F.A. and the 28th Mountain
Battery, while the other was under Colonel Roos-Keppel, and was composed
of fifty dismounted men 19th Lancers, two companies 21st Punjabis, and
500 of the Khyber Rifles. The enemy were driven from their sangars and
the shelter of the villages, and, having suffered severely, disappeared
over the Afghan boundary. It being apparent that nothing further was to
be apprehended on this part of the frontier, the troops left Lundi Kotal
on the 7th, and were back in Peshawar on the 8th and 9th, having left
behind two mountain guns at Lundi Kotal and the 54th Sikhs at Jamrud.
During the absence of the force all had remained quiet on the
Mohmand-Peshawar border from Michni to Abazai, but there were signs of a
general disinclination to send tribal representatives to a jirgah; and
finally, on the 9th May—by which date the limit of time allowed had
expired—news arrived of the refusal of some maliks to come in, and of
the receipt of insulting messages from others. It was therefore decided,
on the 10th May, to send troops into the Mohmand country, and the
advance commenced accordingly on the 13th.
In the meantime cases of cholera had occurred among the troops, and
certain changes became inevitable in the composition of the Mohmand
Field Force. In the 1st Brigade the 22nd Punjabis replaced the 1st
Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers; in the 2nd Brigade the 54th Sikhs
replaced the Guides Infantry, relegated, with the 21st Punjabis, to the
lines of communication beyond Shabkadar; while in the 3rd Brigade the
1st Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment and the 19th Punjabis replaced the
Munster Fusiliers and the 22nd Punjabis.
[Sidenote: The Troops Advance]
Nahaki was occupied on the 14th by part of the 1st Brigade without
opposition, but a reconnaissance made to the Khapakh Pass was fired on,
and it was found to be held in strength. Both brigades closed up on the
16th at Nahaki, and while here the camp of the 1st Brigade was attacked
in a most determined manner on the nights of the 16th and 18th. The
enemy lost heavily on both occasions, but inflicted considerable loss
upon our troops. On the 17th all the force was engaged in destroying the
towers of villages belonging to Kandahari Safis and Halimzais; and on
the next day the 2nd Brigade proceeded up the Bohai Dag to destroy the
headquarters of the Hazrat Mullah, and met with strong opposition from
the Khwaezais, Baizais and others near Zarawar China, the hills on both
sides of the valley being held. The enemy were dislodged, with heavy
loss, by the 28th and 55th. This brigade returned to Nahaki on the 20th,
and the 1st moved north towards Lakarai, and found the enemy holding in
considerable strength the village of Umra Kilai, with a deep and very
intricate nullah behind and hills beyond. They were driven off after a
stubborn resistance, during which their leaders repeatedly led charges
with swords. The Mohmand losses were consequently very heavy, but none
the less they made some half-hearted attacks on the bivouac during the
night. Our casualties were five killed and seventeen wounded.
During the next day several towers between Nahaki and Lakarai were
destroyed, a measure which resulted in some of the clans beginning to
come in and submit.
On the 23rd the 1st Brigade moved from Lakarai to Shato Khel with only
slight opposition, and on the day following to Kargha; the enemy had
prepared and held a strong position at the entrance to Ambahar, but on
their left flank being turned they fled, pursued by the cavalry, and
heavily punished by the fire of the infantry. On the 27th General
Willcocks returned, via Mulla Kilai, to Nahaki, and by this day the
recalcitrant Utmanzai, Dawezai and Khwaezai had sent in jirgahs and
submitted. There only remained the Khuda Khel Baizais, and their country
was visited by the 2nd Brigade from Nahaki on the 28th, and this
division was severely punished.
The force began its retirement to India on this date, and on the 1st
June the last troops of the Mohmand Field Force had recrossed the
border. Our casualties had been rather heavy for so short a campaign—38
killed or died of wounds and 184 wounded; 51 succumbed to disease.
There does not appear to be any reason to believe that the continuation
of the work on the Loi-Shilman railway had any connection with the
Mohmand rising of 1908. The Tarakzai Mohmands are the only clan whose
country abuts on the proposed line, and these do not seem to have taken
any part in the fighting of that year.