THE CLANS OF BAJAUR AND DIR.[69]
The inhabitants of both these countries are mainly Yusafzais—Tarkanri or
Tarklanri Yusafzais in Bajaur, and Akozai Yusafzais in Dir.
Bajaur is bounded on the north by Dir, and on the east by Dir and Swat,
on the south-east and south by the Utman Khel country, on the south
again for a short distance by the Mohmands, and on the west by
Afghanistan. It is an extremely mountainous country, watered by the Rud
River, and including within its area the valleys of the Rud, of
Babukarra, Watelai and Chaharmung.
The Bajauris or Tarkanris are Sarbani Pathans of the Khakhai Khel branch
and representatives of the ancient Gandhari, with whom they returned
from Kabul in the fifteenth century to the Peshawar Valley, and a
hundred years later subjugated and dispossessed the Gujars, then in
occupation of Bajaur. “In 1504,” we are reminded by Oliver, “the Emperor
Baber acquired the sovereignty of Kabul and Ghazni, and in the following
year made an extensive frontier tour, coming by the Khyber Pass to
Peshawar, going along the whole border, and returning by the Sakhi
Sarwar Pass and the Bori Valley to Ghazni. At this period the Pathan
settlers are described as pretty well established in Laghman, Peshawar,
Swat and Bajaur; though some of the original occupants still struggled
for independence under their hereditary chiefs. During the next
twenty-five years the Mogul Baber undertook many forays—for most of them
could not be called anything else—to punish the hill Pathans, or to
protect his own subjects, dispersing the men, carrying off the women and
cattle; but, as a rule, the tribes were even then fully able to hold
their own. Guided by the Dilazaks, he marched against Bajaur, carried
the fortress of the original Sultan by escalade, using the new
matchlocks, which greatly astonished the enemy, the net result being to
extend the power of the Tarklanris.”
The Tarkanris have three main divisions:
1. Ismailzai.
2. Isozai.
3. Mamunds,
and of the different valleys into which Bajaur is split up, the Maidan
Valley is occupied by the Ismailzai, the Baraul and Jandol Valleys by
the Isozai, and the valleys of Babukarra, Chaharmung and Watelai by the
Mamunds, who also own a good deal of land across the border in
Afghanistan. Some six or seven alien tribes also live among the
Bajauris—chiefly in the Jandol and Maidan Valleys. Originally Jandol
belonged to Bajaur, but it has within recent years come under the
political control of Dir, whose ruler, however, has little or no
authority over the people of the Jandol Valley.
[Sidenote: The Valleys of Bajaur]
The Maidan Valley is about ten miles long, rich and fertile and well
cultivated, watered by the Maidan or Kunai River. The Jandol Valley,
whose northern and southern boundaries are the Janbatai Range and the
Rud River, has a total area of some 144 square miles, being about
fourteen miles long, with a breadth ranging from six to ten miles, and
is also rich and well cultivated. The Baraul Valley is divided into an
upper and a lower, the upper including the Janbatai district, and good
crops are raised here, and iron of excellent quality is exported. The
Babukarra Valley is about fifteen miles long, with an average width of
five or six miles; the range of the Hindu Raj divides it from Asmar on
the north, on the east the Takwara spur separates it from Jandol, on the
west is the Mamund or Watelai Valley, while to the south, on the right
bank of the Bajaur River, is the country of the Utman Khel. The
Chaharmung Valley lies between the Mamund country on the north-east and
the Kamangara Valley on the south-west. The Watelai Valley, occupied by
the Mamunds, the most important section of the Tarkanris or Bajauris,
lies between the valleys of Chaharmung and Babukarra; it is about
thirteen miles in length, with a maximum breadth of ten miles, and is
well cultivated, but has no main river of any importance running through
it, and the bed of the valley is much cut up by deep nullahs. The
Mamunds are probably the most warlike of the Tarkanris, and can put
12,000 men in the field, all well armed as frontier tribesmen go.
The position of the Khan of Nawagai requires some explanation. He is the
hereditary chief of a branch of the Salarzai sub-division of the
Mamunds, and also of all the Tarkanris, but his authority has of late
years very greatly diminished, although he is still by no means without
influence, even far beyond the borders of his own Khanate. His actual
territory is an irregular tract of country on the left bank of the Rud
River, together with the district of Surkamar; part of his country was
encroached upon some years ago by the Mohmands, and he has never been
sufficiently powerful to regain permanent possession of it.
The country known as Dir comprises roughly the whole area drained by the
Panjkora River and its affluents, as far south as its junction with the
Rud River of Bajaur. The Upper Panjkora Valley is known as the Panjkora
Kohistan, and is divided into two parts called Bashkar and Sheringal.
The principal subsidiary valleys of Dir are the Kashkar or Dir, the
Baraul and the Maidan on the west, and the Ushiri and Talash Valleys on
the east. The northern limit of Dir is the crest of the mountain range
which divides it from Chitral and Yasin; the Durand line is the boundary
on the west; on the east it is bounded by Kohistan, and on the south by
the valley of Upper Swat and by Bajaur. From the mass of mountains to
the north three giant spurs or ranges run down towards the south. The
easternmost of these, forming the watershed between the Swat and the
Indus Rivers, runs first due south and then west to the Malakand. The
central forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Swat. The
westernmost range is a continuation of the Hindu Raj, runs
south-westerly, and forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Rud
Rivers on the one side and the Kunar on the other. The most important
pass which crosses it is the Lowari or Laorai (10,250 feet), open for
convoys from April to November; it carries the main road from India to
Chitral.
[Sidenote: Description of Dir]
The four sections of the Malizai sub-division of the Khwazozai-Akozais
resident in Dir are:
1. Painda Khel.
2. Sultan Khel.
3. Nusrudin Khel.
4. Ausa Khel.
On the Panjkora River, commencing from the north, in the Kashkar Valley,
in which the village of Dir is situated, is the Akhund Khel sub-section
of the Painda Khel Malizais, to which the Khan of Dir belongs. Below
these again, on the left bank of the river, are more of the Painda Khel,
and on the right bank the Sultan Khel; and, still further down, the
Sultan Khel, Nusrudin Khel and Ausa Khel on both banks of the river.
The route to Chitral from the Swat Valley leads through this country.
Leaving the Swat River at Chakdara, the road turns abruptly to the west
and enters the Uch Valley, passing by the Katgola Pass (3000 feet) into
the Talash Valley, where, as Bellew tells us and as later travellers
have confirmed, there are extensive ruins of massive fortifications on
the south side of the valley and nine or ten miles from the Panjkora,
covering the hills for a distance of several miles. From here the ascent
is very steep to the summit of the Kamrani Pass, to the north-east of
which, in a valley, lies Mundah, the stronghold of Mian Gul Jan, the
quarrelsome younger brother of the Khan of Dir. The descent from the
kotal to Sado or Khungai is very steep. Turning to the right from Sado,
the road passes up the Panjkora Valley, the river being crossed on the
fourth march from Sado at Chutiatun, whence, a few miles further along
the right bank of the Dir stream, Dir itself is reached. “Here,” writes
Enriquez, “situated on a low hill is the stronghold of the Khan. The
fort has three towers, each surmounted with a loop-holed fighting
top.... The vale of Dir is well cultivated and numbers of chenars are
scattered about it, so that its greenness is refreshing after the
wearying aridity of the Panjkora. The little town of Dir occupies a
steep khud abreast of the fort. Its crazy huts are built one above the
other, so that the roof of one forms the promenade or front garden of
the one above.” Then on up the Dir Valley, via Mirga, to the Lowari Pass
and Chitral. An alternative route, branching off from Sado, runs
westward for some way and then, turning northward again, ascends the bed
of the Jandol River to the Janbatai Pass (7212 feet); after crossing
this the road leads along the Baraul Valley to Chutiatun and Dir, where
it joins the first mentioned road.
The people of Dir and Bajaur are all Sunni Muhammadans, intensely
bigoted, but superstitious rather than religious. Their country is very
much priest-ridden, and the people are unusually susceptible to the
influence of the mullahs, who are able to excite them to fanaticism more
easily and to a greater degree than among other Pathans. The fighting
men in Dir and Bajaur number probably not less than 80,000; they, and
more particularly the men of Dir, have a very strong sense of
discipline; and in the event of a general fanatical rising the
combination of tribes which could be formed would be by no means one to
be despised, since they would probably receive material assistance, if
not indeed open and active help, from Swat, from the Utman Khels, and
very possibly from the men of Buner.
OPERATIONS.
[Sidenote: Umra Khan of Jandol]
It will be convenient here to give some account of Umra Khan of Jandol,
whose usurpations were responsible for the formation of the Chitral
Relief Expedition, the operations of which, in the countries of Dir and
Bajaur, are about to be described.
Umra Khan was a younger son of the Khan of Jandol, and a grandson of the
Chief of Bajaur who took up arms against us during the Ambela campaign.
He quarrelled with his father and was expelled from the country; but
returning in 1878 he killed his elder brother, and later, as the result
of a year’s successful fighting, he made himself master of Jandol, and
eventually brought under his control a tract of country extending from
the Dir-Chitral border in the north to the Swat River in the south, and
including the whole of Dir, the greater part of Bajaur and a portion of
Swat. In 1891 and 1892 the Kabul Government undertook certain
operations, which were not particularly successful, to check Umra Khan’s
aggressions, and up to the latter year he seems to have been friendly
inclined towards the British. In 1892, however, when he was being
somewhat pressed, both by the Afghans from without and by rebels within
his kingdom, an appeal which he made to the Government of India for
assistance in the form of arms and ammunition was refused; and in 1893,
as a result of the Durand Mission to Kabul, the territory of Asmar,
which he had coveted and seized, and whence he had been driven, was
handed over to Afghanistan. All this gave great offence to Umra Khan,
and it was shortly after these events that he mixed himself in Chitral
affairs—described in their proper place—leading to the despatch of the
Chitral Relief Force in 1895 and the resultant operations in Dir and
Bajaur.
[Sidenote: Detail of the Force]
_Chitral Relief Expedition, 1895._—It had been intended to mobilise the
First Division as being nearest to the scene of operations; but some of
the units of which it was composed were then on service in Waziristan,
while the nature of the country to be operated in precluded the
employment of others. The force was ultimately composed as hereunder
detailed, was placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir R. Low,
K.C.B., and its base was fixed at Nowshera.
FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Kinloch, C.B.
1st Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment.
1st Battalion King’s Royal Rifles.
15th Sikhs.
37th Dogras.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Waterfield.
2nd Battalion K.O.S. Borderers.
1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
4th Sikhs.
Guides Infantry.
THIRD BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O.
1st Battalion The Buffs.
2nd Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
25th Punjab Infantry.[70]
2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
11th Bengal Lancers.
Guides Cavalry.
13th Bengal Infantry.[71]
23rd Pioneers.
15th Field Battery R.A.
No. 8 M.B. Royal Artillery.
4 guns, No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery.
No. 1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 6 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
RESERVE BRIGADE.
Major-General Channer, V.C., C.B.
No. 7 Bengal Mountain Battery.[72]
3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade.
26th Punjab Infantry.[73]
2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas.
2nd Battalion 3rd Gurkhas.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION TROOPS.
1st Battalion East Lancashire Regiment.
29th Punjab Infantry.[74]
30th Punjab Infantry.[75]
No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery.
MOVEABLE COLUMN (ABBOTTABAD).
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas.
2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
Railway concentration commenced on the 26th March, and in seven days the
force was concentrated at Hoti Mardan and Nowshera. A proclamation was
published to the tribes through whose territory it would be necessary
for the force to pass, announcing that the quarrel of the British
Government was only with Umra Khan of Jandol, and stating that there was
no intention of permanently occupying the tribal country, or of
interfering with the independence of its inhabitants. In reply, the Sam
Ranizais consented to our passage through their territory, while some of
the headmen in Lower Swat tried to adopt an attitude of armed
neutrality, and the Upper Swatis failed to combine against us. The Khan
of Nawagai promised to do his best to keep Bajaur quiet, and the maliks
among the Bunerwals, Utman Khels and Mohmands seemed anxious to keep
their people out of the quarrel.
[Sidenote: The Malakand Pass]
On the 1st April the First Brigade moved to Lundkwar, the Second and
Third to Jalala, the General intending to advance into Swat by the
Shakot and Malakand Passes. During this day, however, the report of the
friendly or neutral intentions of the border tribes was seriously
discounted by the receipt of information that large bodies of tribesmen
were holding not only these two passes, but also the Morah, which, by
reason of its propinquity to Buner, there had been no intention of
using. It appearing that of the three the Malakand was the least
strongly occupied, Sir Robert Low decided to force the Malakand, making
a feint with his cavalry towards the Shakot. He therefore concentrated
all three brigades at Dargai, at the southern foot of the Malakand,
early on the morning of the 2nd April.
Leaving Dargai, the track took for some way a north-easterly direction
up the gradually narrowing valley; it then turned north-west and,
leaving the bed of the valley, zigzagged up to the crest, whence two
paths led into the Swat Valley. The kotal itself is some 2850 feet above
sea-level, but on the left of the position precipitous hills rise to a
height of over 400 feet, while on the right the crest of the range
slopes steeply up to three tall peaks. The whole of the ridge, with the
heights on either flank, formed a position not less than two miles long
and was held in strength.
The Second Brigade was sent forward early on the 3rd to force the pass,
it being the intention of the general commanding that the position once
taken, the First Brigade, which alone was entirely supplied with mule
transport, should then be pushed on to the Swat River. Of the Second
Brigade, the 4th Sikhs and Guides Infantry ascended parallel spurs on
the west of the valley, intending to turn the position from this flank;
while the remaining battalions, covered by the fire of three mountain
batteries, advanced directly upon the Pass. The infantry on the flank
were, however, very stubbornly opposed, while the actual ascent was most
difficult, and the general commanding the Second Brigade, seeing that
the advance would be greatly delayed, sent forward his remaining
battalions to the frontal attack, which the First Brigade was now called
upon to support. The infantry, during their advance, captured sangar
after sangar, and moving forward very steadily, the position was finally
carried, after some five hours’ fighting, at the point of the bayonet,
the 4th Sikhs and Guides running in on the enemy’s right at the same
time. Two regiments of the First Brigade pressed the pursuit of the
retreating enemy as far as Khar, where they bivouacked; the 4th Sikhs
occupied the vicinity of the crest; and the remainder of the Second
Brigade withdrew to Dargai.
It was estimated that we had been opposed by about 12,000 men, of whom
probably a third possessed firearms; their losses, mainly by reason of
their holding the position to the last, were heavy; our casualties were
11 killed and 51 wounded.
During the advance, our troops fortunately came upon the remains of an
old disused Buddhist road, well built and skilfully aligned, and which
two days’ work rendered fit for camel transport, thus greatly
facilitating the passage of supplies.
[Sidenote: Advance into Swat]
Early on the afternoon of the 4th, the First Brigade advanced into the
Swat Valley, the Second Brigade taking its place on the Malakand, and
the Third remaining at Dargai. The leading brigade was opposed, and even
attacked, with great boldness, by large numbers of tribesmen falling
back from the Shakot and Morah Passes, but these lost severely from the
fire of our infantry and the sabres of the Guides Cavalry, who made a
fine charge over bad ground.
The First Brigade halted at Khar, where that of General Waterfield
joined it, and whence reconnaissances moved up the Swat Valley.
Opportunity was further taken of the halt to open communications with
the headmen of many of the neighbouring villages, and also with the
former Khan of Dir, whom Umra Khan had dispossessed of his country; and
by these measures our troops were assured an unopposed passage through
the Baraul and Dir Valleys, and of the neutrality of some of the more
powerful of the clans of Upper Swat and Bajaur.
On the 6th, it being reported that a large body of Umra Khan’s personal
followers, under command of his brother, had occupied Chakdara and the
fort and village of Ramora, about two miles further up the Swat River,
five squadrons of cavalry, supported by other arms from the Second
Brigade, were ordered to cross the Swat River early next morning and
reconnoitre towards Uch, opportunity being at the same time taken to
destroy the fort at Ramora. These parties, and another sent out to
search for a suitable site for a bridge over the Swat River, were
opposed by some 4500 men who lost very severely, especially at the hands
of the cavalry, who pursued as far as the Katgola Pass, about 7½ miles
distant. Chakdara was then occupied and a bridge constructed.
It was now determined that the First Brigade should remain in occupation
of the Swat Valley, and it accordingly handed over all its mule
transport to the two other brigades—the Second taking up the lead and
crossing the Swat River, while the Third advanced to Khar; and on the
same day, the 8th, the cavalry reconnoitred the Talash Valley as far as
Shamshikhan, and the Adinzai Valley up to the foot of the Laram Pass,
which was reported impracticable for transport. On the 9th the cavalry
reconnoitred up to Sado on the Panjkora River, which can be approached
by two roads, that to the west by the Shigu Kas being just passable,
while that by the Kamrani Pass (3300 feet) was unfit for transport. Next
day the advanced troops reached Sado, and the cavalry reconnoitred for
some distance up the Rud River, being fired on near Kotkai by a small
body of the enemy; the Second Brigade marched to Gumbat and part of the
Third closed up to Uch.
At this period, in view of the possibility of trouble in the Buner and
Mohmand countries, the Reserve Brigade was moved up to Mardan from Rawal
Pindi, and a second reserve brigade was mobilised, but the units
composing it were not required to leave their garrisons; they were No. 1
Mountain Battery R.A., 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 28th
Punjab Infantry, and 39th Garhwal Rifles.
[Sidenote: Bridging the Panjkora]
The Panjkora River had been rising every day, and by the 11th April had
become quite unfordable, and, while bridging materials were being
collected, the Second Brigade was closed up to Sado and Khungai, the
Third being distributed between Gumbat and Chakdara. By the night of the
12th the bridge was ready for foot traffic, the river showed no signs of
further rising, and six companies of the Guides crossed to the right
bank, where they formed an entrenched position to serve as a
bridge-head, commanded at short range from the high ground of the left
bank. Here the Guides were conveniently placed to carry out the orders
they were to execute on the following morning, viz. to march down the
right bank of the river and destroy certain villages whence the convoys
had been persistently annoyed. It had been intended to support the
Guides by passing over other troops, and another company of the Guides
was later able to cross; but during the night of the 12th–13th the river
suddenly rose, bringing down large masses of timber and practically
breaking up the newly-completed bridge.
At 6 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Battye took five companies up the Rud
River, leaving two companies to hold the bridge-head, and marched up the
left bank to Subhan Killa, whence parties were detached to the east to
burn three villages. Re-concentrating then at Subhan Killa, the Rud or
Jandol River was crossed and the heights on the right bank of the
Panjkora were ascended, from whence other villages were destroyed. About
noon large parties of the enemy appeared to be advancing, and on Colonel
Battye signalling this information to Headquarters at Sado, he was
directed to fall back on the bridge-head, where the high bank was lined
by troops of the Second Brigade to cover the retirement. As usual on the
frontier, the retirement had no sooner commenced than it was hotly
pressed, and it was perhaps not begun quite so soon as it might have
been, or as was under the circumstances advisable, owing to the fact
that it was impossible for the commander with the main body of the
Guides infantry to be certain whether the detached parties had, or had
not, complied with the order to fall back. The conduct of the
retirement, made practically under the eyes of the whole of the Second
Brigade, was, as recorded by General Low and as endorsed by all who saw
it, “a splendid performance.” Very deliberately the different companies
retired, fiercely assailed on all sides, yet coolly firing by word of
command, and relinquishing quietly and almost imperceptibly one position
only to take up another a few yards back. Twice did the Guides fix
bayonets to meet the onrush, expected but never actually made. Shortly
before recrossing the Jandol River near its junction with the Panjkora,
Colonel Battye fell mortally wounded, the command devolving on Captain
Campbell.
[Sidenote: Across the River]
The bridge-head was reached just before dark, and the enemy kept up a
fire till nearly 11 a.m. The Guides were reinforced by two Maxims and a
company of the 4th Sikhs sent across the river on rafts, while support
was also afforded by five companies of infantry on the left bank and a
mountain battery, whose firing of star shell probably prevented any
attempt to rush the post. By early morning of the 14th the tribal
gathering—chiefly Utman Khels and men from Mundah—had dispersed, having
experienced very heavy losses. On this day the Third Brigade moved up to
Sado, and six more companies of the 4th Sikhs were sent over on rafts to
the Guides entrenchment; but the continued rapid rise of the river made
bridge construction at this spot impossible, and eventually a suspension
bridge was thrown across a gorge two miles lower down the river, being
completed by the evening of the 16th.
On this date the rain, which had been falling heavily for some days,
ceased, and the river began to subside. The Third Brigade was now
ordered to lead, and crossed to the right bank on the 17th, the Second
Brigade moving over next day. General Gatacre advanced up the Jandol
Valley, experiencing some opposition about Manugai, and finally
bivouacked at Ghobani, where early next morning the Second Brigade
joined him. An hour later the combined force advanced on Mundah and
Miankilai, which were found deserted, and the cavalry pushed a
reconnaissance to the foot of the Janbatai Pass, finding the people
generally friendly.
From here it was decided to despatch a small flying column to Chitral,
and a mountain battery, with two infantry battalions and half a company
of Sappers from the Third Brigade, marched on that afternoon to Barwa
and on the 19th to the Janbatai Pass.
Bandai was reached by General Gatacre’s advance column on the 20th, and
here he received news that the Chitral garrison was in great straits,
and therefore he proposed to General Low that he should be permitted to
push on with 500 men; this suggestion was approved, and, pressing
forward, General Gatacre was in Dir on the 22nd.
In the meantime the situation had undergone some change. Umra Khan had
fled to the Asmar border, and thence to Kabul, leaving the resettlement
of his territory to the British; the left flank of our line of advance
was in a measure menaced by the presence of the Utman Khel, Nawagai and
Mamund tribesmen; while intelligence, received on the 21st, that the
siege of Chitral had been abandoned, obviated the need for any forced
march to its relief such as had been arranged.
From Dir to Ashreth in Chitral territory via the Lowari Pass was
twenty-three miles, and the whole of General Gatacre’s column, in spite
of the extraordinary difficulties of the road, was concentrated at
Ashreth by the 30th April, and was ordered to halt there for the
present. On the 10th May the 1st Battalion the Buffs, the Derajat
Mountain Battery, and the 4th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners were led
by General Gatacre to Chitral, where the Gilgit Column had arrived on
the 20th April, and with this the object of the expedition may be said
to have been accomplished; Umra Khan, who had actually originated all
the trouble, had fled the country, while on the 27th April Sher Afzul,
the late claimant to the Mehtarship of Chitral, had been brought into
our camp at Dir, having been captured in Bashkar by some of the Khan of
Dir’s levies.
[Sidenote: Withdrawal of the Force]
On the 10th May the troops hitherto serving on the lines of
communication were formed into a Fourth Brigade of the Chitral Relief
Force, under Brigadier-General Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., and
it was not until the middle of August that some of the troops—mostly of
the Fourth Brigade—commenced their return march to India. On the 4th
September the Third Brigade ceased to exist; on the 28th General Low’s
Headquarters demobilised at Nowshera; and about the same date
Brigadier-General Waterfield assumed command of the Malakand Brigade and
of all troops remaining beyond the frontier.
On the final withdrawal of the force it was found that while regular
troops must continue to be maintained on the Malakand Pass, at Chakdara,
and in Chitral territory, it would be possible to keep open the
Nowshera-Chitral road by peaceful means, its security from the Swat
River to the borders of Chitral territory being maintained by levies,
and the route adopted being via Panjkora and Dir.
During this expedition the troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Robert
Low had sustained a loss in action of twenty-one killed and 101 wounded;
but in addition, and in consequence of fanatical attacks, further
casualties were experienced, altogether two soldiers and forty-nine
followers having been killed, and three soldiers and forty-seven
followers wounded, between the middle of April and the date of the final
withdrawal of the force.
After our troops had returned to India the condition of affairs in
Bajaur and Dir was generally satisfactory, and the arrangements for the
maintenance of the road promised to work well. There was a certain
amount of local unrest, as was only perhaps to be expected; but both in
1896 and 1897 the Chitral reliefs marched by the Malakand-Chitral road
without experiencing any interference whatever on the part of the
tribesmen. At various times both the Khan of Dir and the Khan of Nawagai
attempted to extend their influence by force of arms, the one in Jandol,
the other in the Babukarra Valley, but both showed themselves ready to
yield to the pacificatory influence of the political agent for Dir and
Swat. There were rumours also that Umra Khan contemplated revisiting
this part of the frontier, but he ultimately decided to return to Kabul.
The whole country had been so recently pacified that it was hardly to be
hoped that it would remain quiescent during the disturbances of the year
1897. The Mullahs, always opposed to the establishment of any civilising
influence tending to weaken or destroy their supremacy over their
peoples, had been busy preaching against the British, and it was known
that they were doing their utmost to form a hostile combination of the
clans against us; while other outside influences, which need not here be
particularly specified, were also known to be in action. The Khans of
Dir and Nawagai behaved very well under difficult circumstances, and
seem to have done their best to check and stifle sedition, but proved in
the end unable altogether to restrain the fanaticism of their followers.
When the “Mad Mullah” actually arrived in Swat from Buner in July, 1897,
the Khan of Dir was away in Kohistan, but even had he been present it
seems improbable that he would have had sufficient influence or power to
stem the outbreak, culminating in the attacks upon the Malakand and
Chakdara positions described in Chapter V. But on his return to Swat,
and when the tide had turned in our favour, both he and the Khan of
Nawagai did what in them lay to assist the British Government, by
reopening communications and by holding the important river crossings on
the Chitral road.
[Sidenote: Operations of 1897]
_Operations of the Malakand Field Force in Dir and Bajaur in 1897._—The
attacks on the Malakand and on the Chakdara post, with the composition
and early operations of the Malakand Field Force, under Major-General
Sir Bindon Blood, have already been described in Chapter V. These
operations commenced with the subjection and punishment of the people of
Lower and Upper Swat. It had been proposed to deal next with the Utman
Khels, but more important events then transpiring, obliged the
postponement of the coercion of this tribe; and the news that the forces
of the Hadda Mullah, signally defeated on the 9th August by the troops
from Peshawar, were advancing into Dir, caused the recall of General
Blood’s Second Brigade from Utman Khel territory, and the move of his
Third Brigade to Uch in the Adinzai Valley. The Mullah’s gathering now
dispersed, and General Blood was directed to co-operate with General
Elles in the punishment of the Mohmands, by moving with two brigades
through Bajaur via Sado and Nawagai. At Nawagai our troops would be in
rear of the Mohmands, who had never before been attacked from the north,
and from this place a caravan route leads due south to the Peshawar
border, passing Lokerai in the Bohai Valley, where are many Mohmand
villages.
On the 4th and 5th September General Wodehouse moved his brigade—now
somewhat reconstructed—hurriedly from Uch to Sado, and was only just in
time to prevent the seizure of the Panjkora Bridge by the Bajauris and
Utman Khels, who had now made up their minds to oppose us. The First
Brigade (Meiklejohn) was now left to hold the Swat Valley and our
communications up to Sado; the Second (Jeffreys) marched from Chakdara,
via Sarai, the Panjkora and Kotkai to Ghosam, where it arrived on the
9th; while by the 11th the Third Brigade (Wodehouse) was concentrated at
Shakrata, equidistant from Mundah and Barwa, cavalry reconnaissances
being pushed forward to the Batai and Shinai passes. On the 12th the
Second Brigade was at Khar,[76] and the Third at Shamshak in the Watelai
Valley, where the camp was fired into during the night.
Sir Bindon Blood had now intended to co-operate with General Elles, and
for this purpose he himself moved on the 14th with the Third Brigade to
Nawagai, while General Jeffreys seized the Rambat Pass, bivouacking on
the Chaharmung stream near Inayat Kila, an Utman Khel village. Here a
determined attack was made upon the Second Brigade camp at night by
Mamunds and Utman Khels, who were unusually well armed and, creeping
along the broken ground, were able to gain positions near the camp from
which they maintained a very galling fire for nearly six hours, almost
without intermission. Our casualties were seven killed (three British
officers) and ten wounded, and the losses among the transport were
serious, amounting to nearly a hundred. When daylight appeared the
cavalry were sent after the retreating enemy and accounted for many of
them.
[Sidenote: The Mamund Country]
The idea of joining the Third Brigade at Nawagai had now to be given up
in favour of punitive operations in the Mamund country, and co-operation
with General Elles was for the present impossible; the First Brigade was
therefore ordered to move up to the Panjkora, the Third remaining
entrenched at Nawagai. Here, on the night of the 19th and 20th
determined attacks were made upon the camp, chiefly by the Hadda
Mullah’s men from the Bedmanai Pass; they were beaten off without much
difficulty, but some of them were shot down within ten yards of the
entrenchment; we had one man killed and thirty-one wounded, among the
latter being General Wodehouse. On the 22nd Sir Bindon Blood proceeded
to the Mamund Valley to rejoin General Jeffreys; the Third Brigade on
the same date being attached to the force under General Elles for
completion of the operations against the Mohmands.
[Sidenote: In the Watelai Valley]
In the meantime the Second Brigade under General Jeffreys had been
engaged in further fighting. On the 16th the troops marched up the
Watelai Valley in three small columns, directed respectively on Badalai,
Badan and Agra, and experienced in the operations which resulted the
heaviest loss which British troops have suffered in frontier warfare, in
a single day’s fighting, since the Ambela campaign. The right column
destroyed some villages and then, finding a considerable force of the
enemy occupying a strong position from which it seemed impossible to
dislodge them without guns, returned to camp. The remaining two columns
moved up the valley, the enemy retiring before them; when, however, it
became necessary for the troops to halt to await the return of a party
which had been detached, the enemy began to press forward in
considerable numbers, inflicting some loss upon two companies of the
35th Sikhs, which were falling back upon their supports. The pressure
was, however, temporarily relieved by an opportune charge of a squadron
of the 11th Bengal Lancers under Captain Cole. The two columns commenced
their withdrawal to camp at Inayat Kila about 3 p.m. A flanking party of
two companies of the 35th Sikhs had not received the order to retire,
but when the party commenced to do so, it withdrew in a direction rather
diverging from the general line of retreat. These companies were
assailed by the enemy on all sides, and did not extricate themselves,
assisted finally by the Guides, until they had suffered over forty
casualties. As the whole force continued its retirement darkness came
on, accompanied by a heavy thunderstorm, and the General, considering it
would be difficult to reach camp that night and anxious about his
flanking parties, decided to occupy some villages till morning. The
orders failed, however, to reach all the units; some pushed on to camp;
but about dusk General Jeffreys found himself with no troops at his
immediate disposal, except four guns of No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, a
small party of Sappers, and a few men of the Buffs and 35th Sikhs, who
had become separated from their companies in the dark. With these the
General decided to occupy a hamlet called Bilot, about 3½ miles from
camp. Part of this village was burning and half was in possession of the
enemy, who had been following up closely, and the party with the General
was only able to occupy and entrench one angle of the hamlet. Fighting
was kept up at the closest possible quarters, and with heavy losses on
both sides, until the arrival, about midnight, of four companies of the
35th Sikhs, with whose assistance the enemy were easily driven off, the
rest of the night passing quietly.
The casualties during this day’s fighting amounted to 38 killed and 116
wounded, including three followers.
During the next few days the Second Brigade was busily employed in
destroying villages and removing grain stores—always under fire, while
the retirement to camp was invariably closely pressed. On the 23rd the
Mamunds professed to be disheartened at their losses and anxious to make
terms; but it seems probable that all they wished was to gain breathing
time, for the negotiations came to nothing, and operations were
accordingly resumed on the 29th September when many towers were
demolished. The wounded were sent down to the Panjkora, and the heavy
casualties in transport animals were made good.
On the 30th September the brigade attacked the villages of Agra and Gat,
and severe fighting ensued, the enemy in great numbers occupying a
position of considerable strength. More than once the Mamunds had to be
driven from their sangars at the point of the bayonet, and, although the
object of the operations was effected and the retirement was
satisfactorily carried out, the want of more troops—for the brigade was
by now greatly weakened—was much felt; on this day the casualties
numbered twelve killed and forty-nine wounded, while throughout the
losses in officers had been out of all proportion. Sir Bindon Blood now
reinforced the troops in the Mamund country by bringing up another
squadron of the Guides Cavalry, the 10th Field Battery, No. 8 Bengal
Mountain Battery, the 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, four
companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry, and No. 5 Company Madras Sappers
and Miners.
[Sidenote: Close of the Operations]
On the 3rd October the Second Brigade, with two mountain batteries,
attacked and destroyed the village of Badalai, experiencing small
opposition until the retirement commenced, when the enemy came on with
great boldness, and to the number of between two and three thousand.
There was now a very large body of troops at Inayat Kila, and the
Mamunds began clearly to recognise the hopelessness of prolonging the
resistance. They accordingly opened negotiations through the Khan of
Nawagai, their jirgah finally coming in on the 11th October and agreeing
to all our terms. The operations against the Mamunds, who had shown
fighting qualities of a high order, now came to an end, and the troops
were withdrawn from the Watelai Valley. During the period from the 14th
September to the 11th October, our casualties totalled 61 killed and 218
wounded.
On his way back to the Malakand, Sir Bindon Blood halted in the Salarzai
Valley and easily forced that section of the Tarkanris to submit, while
the Babukarra Valley was thoroughly explored. The last of the troops
crossed the Panjkora on the 23rd, and four days later the whole force
returned to the Swat Valley.
Since the conclusion of the operations just described, the clans of Dir
and Bajaur have given no trouble to the British Government; but the
efforts which the ambitions of the local khans cause them to make in
order to add to their territories, and the constant intrigues of
pretenders and other claimants, combine with the natural pugnacity of
the Pathan to cause some occasional anxiety as to the continued security
of our communications with Chitral.