UTMAN KHELS.[65]
The trans-frontier portion of this tribe occupies the country between
the Rud River on the north, the Panjkora and Swat Rivers on the east and
south-east, and the Ambahar River on the south and south-west: their
neighbours being the Bajauris on the north, the Akozai Yusafzais or
Swatis on the east, and the Mohmands on the west; while the Peshawar
district is the southern boundary. The country is a network of low hills
and nullahs, and is generally unfertile and unproductive. The
cis-frontier people of the tribe own certain lands in the northern
portion of the Yusafzai Plain, originally bestowed upon them by the
Baizais, when these, some time in the sixteenth century, were being
pressed by the Ranizais. In the course of time the Baizais have
practically been pushed from their own country by the Utman Khels. The
Utman Khels hold the villages situated on the spur running down from the
Pajja and Morah Ranges, and also the villages of Shamozai and Matta, on
the north-west slopes of the Ganga Ghar Mountain.
The Utman Khel are said to be Sarbani Pathans of the Kodai Karlanri
branch, who moved eastwards with the Yusafzais when these migrated from
their earlier homes north-west of the Suleiman range, occupying their
present territory simultaneously with the Yusafzai conquest of Swat.
They are a hardy set of mountaineers, of good physique, hardworking,
many of them eking out a scanty livelihood as labourers about Peshawar;
“often,” so Oliver tells us, “naked from the waist up—a custom opposed
to Pathan ideas—but not very civilised. They live in small groups of
houses, rather than villages, stuck on the mountain side, secure in
their inaccessibility.” There are no chiefs of any importance among
them, and they are a very democratic people. They are estimated to
number some 9,000 fighting men, poorly armed. The trans-frontier Utman
Khels have always held themselves rather aloof, and few of them enlist
with us; but the cis-frontier men have lately taken more freely to
service in the levies, and even in the Indian army, and are said to make
excellent soldiers.
Their country lies on both banks of the Swat River until the limits of
the Mohmand territory are reached, and here the river bends to the south
and forms the boundary between the two tribes. The country is throughout
very difficult, there are few roads passable by any but a pedestrian,
and the only means of crossing the Swat—here rushing a deep swift
torrent between steep cliff-like banks—is afforded by a few rope
bridges. To the north of the river are a number of valleys between spurs
running out from the Koh-i-Mohr. To the south and south-east of this
mountain are the important divisions of Barang and Ambahar; to the
north-east lies Arang; and south of the Swat River, and between it and
British territory, is the narrow hilly tract of Laman or Daman,
traversed by the Sulala Range.
[Sidenote: Utman Khel Clans]
The tribe is divided into eight main clans as under:
1. Ismailzai.
2. Mandal.
3. Alizai.
4. Matakai.
5. Gurai.
6. Peghozai.
7. Bimarai.
8. Sinazai.
The Ismailzai is by far the largest and most important clan, and
occupies the right bank of the Swat River and the northern slopes of the
Koh-i-Mohr. The three last-named clans of the tribe live in Totai on the
left bank of the Swat below its junction with the Panjkora, within Sam
Ranizai limits, and separated from the Laman by the Jhindai Valley. The
Laman accommodates a number of other tribes besides the Utman Khel.
The roads leading from our territory into the Utman Khel country are all
difficult, but there is a good road from Matta, on the Mohmand border,
through Pandiali to Ambahar. The dwellers in Laman can be easily
coerced, but in their time, and particularly during the first years of
British occupation of the frontier country, they have given a great deal
of trouble, raiding the border and sheltering outlaws.
The Utman Khels are quite a distinct people, being unconnected with any
of the Pathan races which surround them—whether Mohmands, Bajauris, or
Yusafzais; they have more than once waged war with the Mohmands, but
consider themselves to be on specially friendly terms with the
Shinwaris.
OPERATIONS.
In the middle of the last century the favourite raiding ground of the
restless spirits of the Utman Khels was the Hastnagar division. Early in
1852, they permitted one Ajun Khan, a notoriously disaffected man, to
take up his residence in Utman Khel villages to the north of the
district, and here he gathered together a band of adventurers like
himself to raid upon our border. Finally in April, Ajun Khan collected
some 200 mounted men, attacked Charsada, the headquarters of the
division, plundered the treasury and slew some of our officials. On the
following day he occupied Abazai, and then visited Pranghar and
Nawedand, where he took up his quarters. Within a week, however, Sir
Colin Campbell was moving troops out against him from Peshawar.
_Expedition against the Independent Utman Khels, 1852._—Sir Colin
Campbell established his headquarters at Abazai and there concentrated
the following force:
First Troop, 1st Brigade Horse Artillery.
Two 8–inch howitzers, 4th Battalion Artillery.
300 bayonets, 32nd Foot.
One squadron 2nd Irregular Cavalry.
One squadron Guides Cavalry.
2nd Company Sappers and Miners.
300 bayonets, 28th Native Infantry.
300 bayonets, 66th Gurkhas.
Guides Infantry.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1852]
On the 11th May the force moved out and destroyed Nawedand, experiencing
some slight opposition, and while the operations were in progress Sir
Colin was joined by the 1st Punjab Infantry under Captain Coke, and by
two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry under Lieutenant Hughes. These
regiments had left Kohat at 2 a.m. on the 8th and reached Peshawar,
forty miles distant, the same day; there was a delay in crossing the
Kabul River owing to the bridge of boats having been swept away, but by
the evening of the 10th Coke’s party was across, arriving at Abazai at
daybreak with a two hours’ halt _en route_. Finding at Abazai that Sir
Colin had left to attack Nawedand, Coke again pushed on, took part in
the attack, and returned with the force to Abazai, having thus covered
another forty miles, or a total of eighty since 2 a.m. on the 8th.
On the 12th General Campbell moved about seven miles to Gandera, and on
the 13th he attacked, carried and destroyed Pranghar, the stronghold of
the Utman Khels, who were in considerable strength and held out
gallantly against the fire of our ten guns. The force then withdrew.
At the end of this year the fort of Abazai was erected for the better
security of this part of the border.
After this expedition, the conduct of the Independent Utman Khels—as
distinguished from the Utman Khels of Sam Baizai—was uniformly good, and
for more than twenty years the Indian Government had no grounds for any
complaint against them. On the 9th December, 1876, however, an offence
of the very gravest description was committed by this tribe, chiefly by
men from Ambahar and the Laman; a number of them, instigated by persons
of influence in British territory, attacking a body of unarmed coolies
engaged in the preliminary operations connected with the canal about to
be taken from the Swat River near Abazai. It appears that the party,
consisting of a hundred men, surrounded the tents in which the coolies
were sleeping about 2 a.m.; then, at a given signal, having cut through
the ropes of the tents, threw them down and butchered the helpless,
struggling inmates through the tent-cloth. The camp was then robbed of
almost everything it contained, some of the dead and wounded being
stripped of the very clothes on their backs. Of the sixty-five coolies,
six were killed and twenty-seven wounded, some dangerously. Having
plundered the camp, the raiders effected their escape to the hills
before any assistance could reach the spot from Fort Abazai; but all the
neighbouring headmen, suspected of complicity, were apprehended and sent
into Peshawar.
It seems probable that this raid would never have taken place if proper
steps had been taken for the protection of the men employed on the canal
works—a project, and the taking up land for which, known to have aroused
suspicion and dislike; and it cannot be denied that sufficient
precautions were not taken by the responsible officers to prevent an
attack of this kind, when the work was being carried on so near the
border. It could not, however, have well been anticipated that a
Muhammadan tribe would, without provocation and with no quarrel with the
British Government, attack and kill an unarmed body of their
co-religionists—a dastardly outrage, which brought down upon the
perpetrators the virtual excommunication of the aged Akhund of Swat.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1878]
_Operations against the Independent Utman Khels, 1878._—In consequence
of this affair, the Utman Khels were, as a tribe, excluded from British
territory, but at the time it was not possible to take more active
measures against them. At the beginning of 1878, however, it was
proposed to Government that an attempt should be made to surprise the
village of Sapri, where dwelt the man who had been the leader of the
party concerned in the attack on the coolie camp; for it was felt that
while he was at large and unpunished, any really satisfactory settlement
with the tribe would be practically impossible; his village, moreover,
was close to our border. The proposal was sanctioned, and at 7 p.m. on
the 14th February, 1878, Captain Wigram Battye,[66] accompanied by
Captain Cavagnari,[67] marched from Mardan with 264 sabres and twelve
bayonets of the Guides, the infantry mounted on mules.
The party moved by the main Tangi-Abazai road for some distance, but on
arrival near Tangi, the column turned off to the north, crossed the line
of the Swat Canal, and arriving within two miles of Abazai, left the
horses there under a small escort. The troops had marched thirty-two
miles, making a long detour so as to avoid villages whence news of the
movement might have been conveyed across the border. Moving on, the Swat
River was struck, and its left bank ascended for about four miles to
Mada Baba Ziarat, where a mountain torrent joins the river; and climbing
a rough path by the side of this torrent, the kotal leading to the
village of Sapri was soon reached. It was still dark, but from here
Captain Battye sent a small party on to a spur commanding the village,
and especially the towers of the man particularly wanted for the outrage
near Abazai. With daylight the village was rushed, the tribesmen being
taken completely by surprise, and Mian Rakan-ud-din, the leader, was
shot down. Some of his immediate attendants surrendered, and others
bolted to the hills above the village, whence they kept up a desultory
fire on the troops. But Captain Battye was able to withdraw his party to
Fort Abazai without further molestation. Our casualties were eight
wounded.
As a result of this measure some of the Utman Khel villages showed
themselves most anxious to effect a satisfactory settlement with
Government; others, however—those of Zirak and Pakhai—remained recusant,
and consequently, while the submission of the repentant villages was
accepted, it was decided to coerce the remainder. On the 20th March,
therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins left Mardan for the Utman Khel
border with a force composed of four guns of the Hazara Mountain
Battery, 245 sabres and 453 bayonets of the Guides. The Zirak villages
were first dealt with. The force entered the hills as day was breaking,
and experienced no opposition at the first village, Tarakai, but moving
on from here entered a valley formed by the Sulala range of hills and
divided into two parts by the Tor Tam hill; on the near side of this
hill were the remaining Zirak villages, and on the other were those of
Pakhai. The first village was found to be deserted, but our troops were
fired on from the others; the enemy were, however, easily dispersed and
the remaining Zirak villages cleared. Leaving now the Guides cavalry in
occupation, Colonel Jenkins secured possession of the Tor Tam hill with
the infantry and guns without any serious opposition, and thence had the
Pakhai villages at his mercy. The Zirak and Pakhai headmen were now
called upon to submit, which they did after the usual hesitation, and
agreed to pay the fines demanded of them. The force then withdrew from
the valley unmolested, and bivouacked that night at the Jhinda outpost
of the Swat canal works, having marched over forty miles since noon of
the previous day. Mardan was again reached on the 22nd.
[Sidenote: Punitive Measures]
During 1882 there was a slight revival of trouble in connection with the
canal works, but thenceforward the Utman Khels gave us no cause for
complaint until 1895, when some divisions opposed General Low’s
advance[68] at the passage of the Swat River; they also shared in other
attacks upon us during the operations of that spring, but no punitive
measures were taken against them for these signs of hostility. In 1897
again large numbers of Utman Khels took part in the attacks on the
Malakand; some assisted their old enemies the Mohmands in the fighting
about Shabkadar; and others again of the divisions which live on the
further bank of the Swat River helped in the assaults on Chakdara, and
later tried to seize the bridge over the Panjkora, but were forestalled
by General Meiklejohn.
The trans-frontier Utman Khels thereafter only broke out once, joining
the Mamunds in the attack on General Jeffreys’ camp described in Chapter
VII., but, on the whole, they remained quiet while our troops were in
Bajaur, and even helped to keep open the lines of communications where
these passed near their border.
_Expedition against the Utman Khels, 1897._—As stated in Chapter V.,
General Blood had intended sending a brigade from Lower Swat into the
Utman Khel country, but at the moment the services of the troops were
required elsewhere, and operations against the Utman Khels had to be
postponed. For the time, therefore, Government contented itself with
imposing terms upon such clans as had shown themselves hostile, and
demanding the submission of the whole tribe. By the close of the year,
however, the Utman Khel generally had evinced no inclination to comply
with our terms, and on the 22nd November, therefore, a small force was
collected to compel submission. It was concentrated near Dargai, at the
southern foot of the Malakand Pass, and was placed under the command of
Colonel A. J. F. Reid; it was composed as under:
One squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers.
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
1st Battalion The Buffs.
21st Punjab Infantry.
35th Sikhs.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1897]
In addition to the above, the 16th Bengal Infantry was sent to Abazai to
protect the head of the Swat River canal, and to help the local
political officers in dealing with the Utman Khels of the Laman. The
initial destination of the force was the Totai Valley, and on the 23rd
Colonel Reid marched to Hariankot at the foot of the pass leading to
Kot, which was reached next day. The road over the pass, although it had
been improved by working parties, was found very difficult for laden
camels. On the west side of the pass the valley widens considerably, and
is highly cultivated. The villagers of Lower Totai showed every sign of
wishing to be friendly, and many jirgahs came in asking for terms. All
the clans accepted our terms without hesitation, except the Agra jirgah,
and the force accordingly arranged to march into that valley. Two routes
were reconnoitred from Kot, but that via Silai Patai was eventually
adopted, although it required much work to make it passable. The
villagers along the route proved very submissive, bringing in supplies,
and the Agra jirgah met Colonel Reid on their boundary to tender
submission. On the 27th the troops marched to Bargholai along a very
difficult track through a narrow gorge. The Agra Valley was thoroughly
explored, reconnaissances were pushed forward to the passes, and much
useful survey work was done. All the representatives of the Utman Khel
had now submitted except the Kanauri Ismailzai, so a small column was
detailed to visit the Kanauri villages, which lay high up in the hills
above Kot, to the west of Colonel Reid’s camp. The road was very bad and
steep, but halfway there the jirgah was met hurrying down to submit.
By the 4th December all the clans had complied with our terms, and the
troops were withdrawn to Hariankot and the column broken up.
Since that date this tribe has given no serious trouble to the British
Government.