CHITRALIS.[77]
Chitral is the largest and the most important state on the northern part
of the north-western frontier. It lies immediately to the west of
Gilgit, while on the other side it is divided by the Hindu Kush from the
province of Kafiristan—transferred to the dominions of Afghanistan
during the latter part of the reign of the late Amir Abdurrahman Khan.
South of Gilgit the Shandur spur and the watershed between the Chitral
and Panjkora Rivers divide the country from Yasin, Kohistan and Dir; it
is bordered on the north by the Hindu Kush; while to the south the
watershed of the Arnawai Stream forms the boundary between Chitral and
the districts of Dir and Asmar. It is an especially mountainous country,
“composed partly of gigantic snowy peaks, mostly of barren rocky
mountains, and, in a very small degree, of cultivated land. The valleys
are narrow and confined, the main ones in their inhabited portions
running from 5000 to 8000 feet above sea-level. It is only in them that
any cultivation at all is found, and even then it is not carried on very
extensively.... But the whole food production is small, and barely
suffices for the people of the country, leaving little to spare for
outsiders. The climate varies according to the height of the valley. In
the lower parts, at about 5000 feet above sea-level, it ranges from 12°
or 15° in winter to 100° in summer, and higher up, at 8000 feet, it
would vary from 5° or so below zero to about 90° in summer.”[78]
Sir George Robertson, in his _Chitral_, says that “food is so scarce
that a fat man has never yet been seen in the country; even the upper
classes look underfed, and the most effective of bribes is a full meal.
The hill tracks, which form the main lines of communication, are seldom
easy; they are often difficult, sometimes dangerous.”
The country is watered by the river which goes in its northern course
indifferently by the names of the Yarkhun, the Mastuj or the Chitral
River, and which, flowing from a glacier of the Hindu Kush, runs
south-westerly to Asmar, where it becomes known as the Kunar River, and
falls into the Kabul River near Jalalabad. During its course it receives
the drainage of numerous valleys on either side, and is spanned by many
rope bridges, by several untrustworthy native-built bridges, usually
constructed on a rough cantilever principle, and by good suspension
bridges at important crossings, such as Chitral, Mastuj, Drosh and other
places. “Even when the rivers are moderately placid and shallow, the
fords,” Sir George Robertson tells us, “are always bad, because of the
boulders and stones in their beds; they are frequently devious also;
and, consequently, always require a guide. It is dangerous to miss the
proper line, for then one is liable to be carried into deep, heavy
water, or to find oneself in a quicksand.”[79]
[Sidenote: The Roads to Chitral]
There are two main routes from Chitral to India: that which has been
followed in the preceding chapter, from Chitral over the Lowari Pass,
through Dir and Swat, and across the Malakand to railhead at Dargai; and
another from Chitral across the Shandur Pass to the Gilgit road, and
thence through Kashmir and the Jhelum Valley to the rail at Rawal Pindi.
Those passes leading to the north or to the west are for the most part
very difficult; some are impracticable for pack animals, some are only
passable at all during certain brief seasons of the year; others again
could only be crossed by a lightly equipped force of selected troops
under unusually favourable circumstances. The Baroghil Pass (12,460
feet), which leads out of the Yarkhun Valley into Wakhan, is practicable
for laden animals during eight months of the year, and climbs over what
Holdich calls “the comparatively easy slopes of the flat-backed Hindu
Kush.” Many passes, but all more or less difficult, lead from Chitral
into Kafiristan, while that leading from Chitral to Upper Badakshan—the
Dorah Pass (14,800 feet)—is much trodden, and is used by laden animals
as a commercial link between the Kunar Valley and Badakshan. It is open
from July to September, and has been crossed as late as early in
November.
Chitral is an important state by reason of its situation at the
extremity of the country over which the Government of India exerts its
influence. Sir Francis Younghusband has described this state as “one of
the chinks in the wall of defence. Not a very large one, but certainly
capable of being made into a considerable one if we do not look after
it, and in time; for not only is there a chink just here, but the wall
is thinner too. Practicable roads across the mountains, especially those
by the Baroghil and Dorah passes, lead into Chitral; while the width of
the mountains from the plains on the south to the plains on the north,
as the crow flies, is 400 miles by the Pamirs and Gilgit, but through
Chitral only 200. So Chitral is a place to be looked after and
efficiently guarded.”
[Sidenote: Importance of Chitral]
Gilgit and Chitral seemed to the Government of India to afford good
watch-towers whence the country south of the Hindu Kush might be guarded
and controlled, since the northern passes provide a difficult but by no
means impracticable route for the incursion of a hostile force large
enough to cause trouble, or at least excitement, upon this portion of
the Border. But our occupation of Chitral is not universally approved.
Sir Thomas Holdich[80] has said that “the retention of Chitral may well
be regarded as a doubtful advantage.... As an outpost to keep watch and
ward for an advance from the north, Chitral is useless, for no serious
menace is possible from the north. As a safeguard otherwise, it is hard
to say from what it will protect us. It is in short the outcome of
political, not of military, strategy. As a political centre it must be
remembered that it possesses an outlook westwards over the hills and
valleys through which the Amir’s great commercial roads have been
projected, as well as northwards to the Hindu Kush passes. But it is at
best an expensive and burdensome outpost, and is, on the whole, the
least satisfactory of all the forward positions that we have recently
occupied.”
Elsewhere,[81] however, Sir Thomas Holdich seems in some degree to
qualify these opinions. Writing of these northern mountain approaches to
India, he says, “We cannot altogether leave them alone. They have to be
watched by the official guardians of our frontier, and all the gathered
threads of them converging on Leh or Gilgit must be held by hands that
are alert and strong. It is just as dangerous an error to regard such
approaches to India as negligible quantities in the military and
political field of Indian defence, as to take a serious view of their
practicability for purposes of invasion.... The Dorah Pass ... is the
one gateway which is normally open from year to year, and its existence
renders necessary an advanced watchtower at Chitral.”
The country is divided into the nine districts of Laspur, Mastuj,
Torikho, Mulrikho, Kosht, Owir, Khuzara, Chitral and Drosh. The
population totals something over seventy thousand, and the fighting
strength is estimated at six thousand men, armed for the most part with
matchlocks of local manufacture or imported from Badakshan. There are
also in the country under a thousand Sniders and muzzle-loading Enfield
rifles, presented at different times to the Mehtar or ruler by the
Indian Government.
The Chitralis are the only non-Pathan tribe described in this book and
are a mixed race of Aryan type, of whose origin little is known: the
language of the country is Chitrali, and Persian is also spoken by some
of the upper classes. The people are all Muhammadans, mostly Sunnis, but
by no means of a particularly strict or fanatical type; and while the
priests have a certain amount of influence, they are unable to work
their flocks up into any high degree of religious frenzy as is possible
with certain Pathans. The people of Chitral are splendid mountaineers
with great powers of endurance, and have fought well on occasion. Sir
George Robertson has thus described their characteristics:[82] “There
are few more treacherous people than the Chitralis, and they have a
wonderful capacity for cold-blooded cruelty; yet none are kinder to
little children, or have stronger affection for blood or
foster-relations when cupidity or jealousy do not intervene. All have
pleasant manners and engaging light-heartedness, free from all trace of
boisterous behaviour, a great fondness for music, dancing and singing, a
passion for simple-minded ostentation, and an instinctive yearning for
softness and luxury, which is the mainspring of their intense cupidity
and avarice. No race is more untruthful, or has greater power of keeping
a collective secret. Their vanity is easily injured, they are revengeful
and venal, but they are charmingly picturesque and admirable companions.
Perhaps the most convenient trait they possess, as far as we are
concerned, is a complete absence of religious fanaticism.... Sensuality
of the grossest kind, murder, abominable cruelty, treachery or violent
death, are never long absent from the thoughts of a people than whom
none in the world are of simpler, gentler appearance.”
[Sidenote: Early History]
The early history of Chitral is a record of intrigue, civil war and
assassination—“a monotonous tale of murder and perfidy—the slaying of
brother by brother, of son by father,” and each successive Mehtar
appears to have waded to the throne through seas of blood. The founder
of the Chitral Royal Family was Shah Katur, whose descendants, dividing
into two branches, parcelled the mountainous country from Kafiristan to
Gilgit between them—the Khushwakt branch ruling the eastern portion,
while the Katur branch governed in the west, or Lower Chitral. At the
time of the British occupation of the Punjab, one Gauhar Aman reigned in
the Khushwakt district, while Shah Afzul II. ruled in Lower Chitral.
About 1854 the Kashmir State, having long suffered from the
encroachments of the ruler of Upper Chitral, appealed to Shah Afzul for
assistance, and he, induced thereto far more by hatred of his kinsman
than by any wish to oblige the Kashmir authorities, seized, in 1855,
Mastuj, then the headquarters of the Khushwaktia chief. Possession was,
however, regained in the year following, but the place was again
captured by the Chitralis in 1857.
In this year Shah Afzul II. died quietly in his bed—the demise of a
ruler from natural causes was almost unprecedented in this country—and
was succeeded by his second son, Aman-ul-Mulk, known as “the great
Mehtar.” In 1860 the eastern chief also died, being succeeded in the
Mehtarship of Khushwaktia by Mir Wali, who was deposed and slain by his
own brother; while in 1880 Aman-ul-Mulk invaded and possessed himself of
the eastern portion of Chitral, uniting the whole country under his
sovereignty. Not long after this, during the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton,
it was decided that the policy of the Government of India should be so
extended as to control the external affairs of Chitral in a direction
friendly to our interests; so as to secure an effective guardianship
over the northern passes, and to keep watch over what goes on beyond
them. To initiate and carry out this policy, Major Biddulph was sent to
Gilgit in 1877 and spent some years there, succeeding in entering into
relations with Aman-ul-Mulk, then Mehtar of Chitral. No very definite
arrangement was come to at this time, the position was considered rather
too isolated, and Major Biddulph was withdrawn. Then in 1885 Lord
Dufferin despatched the late General Sir William Lockhart at the head of
an important mission, to enter into more definite and closer relations
with the Mehtar of Chitral, and to report upon the defences of the
country. Colonel Lockhart, as he then was, spent more than a year in
Chitral; he wintered at Gilgit, traversed the State of Hunza, crossed
the Hindu Kush, passed through Wakhan down the southernmost branch of
the Oxus, and travelled over Chitral territory from one end of the
country to the other. Similar visits were paid to Chitral by Colonel
Durand in 1888 and 1889, and in this latter year the Agency at Gilgit,
withdrawn in 1881, was re-established, and certain allowances, doubled
in 1891, were granted to the Mehtar, Aman-ul-Mulk.
[Sidenote: Beginning of Trouble]
In the following year the thirty-two years’ reign of “the great Mehtar”
came to an end, he dying suddenly of heart failure while in _durbar_.
His eldest son, Nizam-ul-Mulk, was away in Yasin at the time, and the
second brother, Afzul-ul-Mulk, seized the fort at Chitral with its
arsenal and treasure, and sent off urgent demands to the Agent at Gilgit
that he might at once be recognized as Mehtar. Nothing was to be feared
from Nizam, who was no fighter and fled to Gilgit, leaving Afzul to
return triumphant to Chitral. Afzul had, however, apparently overlooked
or disregarded the fact that there was another candidate for the
Mehtarship in one Sher Afzul, fourth son of Shah Afzul II., and
consequently a younger brother of Aman-ul-Mulk and uncle to
Afzul-ul-Mulk. Sher Afzul seems to have left Kabul, where he had been
living, directly he heard of his brother’s death, crossed the Dorah Pass
from Badakshan at the head of a handful of followers, and, marching
rapidly, surprised the fort at Chitral, Afzul-ul-Mulk being shot down in
the ensuing _mêlée_.
Sher Afzul, who seemed to have many adherents in the country, was now
proclaimed Mehtar, but his reign was a very short one. Nizam-ul-Mulk,
plucking up courage, determined to proceed to Chitral and turn out the
new pretender. He was joined by a Hunza chief of considerable military
capacity and force of character, while his advance appears to have been
preceded by extravagant rumours that his candidature was supported by
the British authorities; and Sher Afzul then, losing heart, fled back to
Kabul by way of the Kunar Valley.
Nizam-ul-Mulk was now formally recognised as Mehtar by the British
Government, and two of the political officers of the Gilgit Agency
visited the new ruler in Chitral and promised him that, under certain
conditions, the same allowances and support would be given to him as had
been afforded to his father, Aman-ul-Mulk. So far as could be seen, it
appeared that the new ruler was in the way to be fairly well established
on the throne.
It is now necessary to revert to Umra Khan of Jandol, of whom some
mention has already been made in the last chapter, and whose actions and
aggressions were largely responsible for the troubles which now arose
upon this part of the frontier.
At the end of 1894 the situation here was as follows: Umra Khan had at
last made friends with his old enemy, the Khan of Nawagai; he had
established his authority over a considerable portion of Swat, the
greater part of Bajaur, and the whole of Dir; while he had possessed
himself of the strip of country known as Narsat, hitherto claimed alike
by Chitral, Dir and Asmar. He had attacked some villages in the Bashgul
Valley, claimed by Chitral; had commenced to build forts at Arnawai and
Birkot, in the Kunar Valley; and had encroached upon Chitral territory,
and demanded the payment of tribute from Chitral villages. The ex-Khan
of Dir was at this time a refugee in Upper Swat. Nizam-ul-Mulk was
proving himself a fairly efficient and popular, though not a strong,
ruler; Sher Afzul was believed to be safely interned at Kabul; and
Nizam’s younger brother, Amir-ul-Mulk, who had at first fled from
Chitral, had now returned there and been well received by the new
Mehtar.
[Sidenote: Murder of Nizam]
On the 1st January, 1895, Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot dead while out hawking
by one of the servants, and at the instigation, of Amir-ul-Mulk, who at
once caused himself to be proclaimed Mehtar, but his recognition was
delayed for reference to Simla. There can be little doubt that this
fresh murder was the outcome of a conspiracy between Amir-ul-Mulk, Sher
Afzul and Umra Khan, and that the object was to remove Nizam and cause
him to be temporarily succeeded by Amir, who was then to resign in
favour of Sher Afzul. Umra Khan was to be called in merely to help the
furtherance of the schemes of the other two: but Umra Khan had his own
personal interests to consult, and on hearing news of the murder he at
once crossed the Lowari Pass with between 3000 and 4000 men, and
occupied the southern Chitral Valley. He sent on letters stating that he
had come to wage a holy war against the Kafirs of the Bashgul Valley,
that he had no hostile designs against Chitral, and that if Amir-ul-Mulk
did not join and help him he must take the consequences. Umra Khan now
advanced on Kila Drosh, twenty-five miles below Chitral fort.
At this date there were rather over 3000 troops garrisoning posts in the
Upper Indus, Gilgit and Chitral Valleys, and of these roughly one-third
were regular troops of the Indian Army, the remainder belonging to
regiments of the Kashmir Durbar. When the murder of Nizam took place,
Lieutenant Gurdon was in political charge at Chitral, accompanied by no
more than eight men of the 14th Sikhs, drawn from a detachment of 103
posted at Mastuj under Lieutenant Harley. There were no other troops of
any kind in Chitral, and the nearest garrison was at Gupis, far on the
eastern side of the Shandur Pass. The nearest regular troops were
ninety-nine men of the 14th Sikhs at Gilgit, while the 32nd Pioneers,
rather over 800 strong, were employed on the Bunji-Chilas road. Gurdon
at once drew upon Mastuj for fifty Sikhs of its garrison, and these
reached him unhindered and unmolested on the 7th January. In
anticipation of possible trouble, the following moves then took place:
Mastuj was reinforced by 100 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles from Gupis,
200 men of the same regiment moved up to Ghizr, while Gupis was
strengthened by 150 men of the 6th Kashmir Light Infantry from Gilgit.
Shortly before this Surgeon-Major Robertson—now Sir George Robertson—had
relieved Colonel Bruce in charge of the Gilgit Agency, and he now at
once left for Chitral, taking with him some of the 4th Kashmir Rifles
under Captain Townsend, Central India Horse, and the remainder of the
14th Sikhs from Mastuj—100 in all. Before he reached there, however, the
Chitralis, who had at first evinced some intention of opposing Umra
Khan, had been driven from a position they had taken up in front of Kila
Drosh; while a fortnight later—on the 9th February—the fort of Drosh was
surrendered, without any pretence of resistance, to Umra Khan, with all
its rifles and stores. About the 18th the situation, already
sufficiently complicated, was rendered even more so by the news that
Sher Afzul, probably the most generally popular of all the claimants to
the throne, had arrived at Drosh. He was at once joined by some of the
lower class Chitralis, and by the end of February nearly all the
Adamzadas (members of clans descended from the founder of the ruling
family) had also gone over to him. On the 1st March the British Agent
withdrew his escort—now numbering 100 of the 14th Sikhs and 320 of the
4th Kashmir Rifles—into the fort at Chitral; and on the following day in
_durbar_, it being patent that Amir-ul-Mulk, listening to the promptings
of ill-advisers, had been intriguing with Umra Khan, Amir was placed
under surveillance, and his young brother, Shuja-ul-Mulk, was formally
recognised as Mehtar, subject to the approval of the Government of
India.
[Sidenote: The New Mehtar]
The number of followers with which Umra Khan had entered Chitral
territory had been gradually increasing, as his star appeared to be in
the ascendant, and his total strength was now estimated at between 5000
and 8000 men. On the afternoon of the 3rd March Sher Afzul reached the
neighbourhood of Chitral at the head of an armed force, and took up a
position in some villages about two miles to the south-west of the fort.
At 4.15 two hundred men of the Kashmir Rifles were sent out, under
Captains Campbell, Townsend and Baird, to check the enemy’s advance.
Captain Campbell proposed to attack the position in front, while fifty
men under Captain Baird made a flank attack along some high ground to
the west. The enemy were found to be well armed and strongly posted; the
Kashmir troops were met with a very heavy fire, and the attempts to
carry the position by assault failed. It was rapidly getting dark, and
Captain Campbell commenced to retire, being followed up closely by the
enemy. The main body sustained heavy losses, but gained the fort under
cover of the fire of a party of the 14th Sikhs; Captain Baird’s
detachment became, however, isolated, Baird himself was mortally
wounded, being carried back by Surgeon Captain Whitchurch, and this
party only made its way back to the fort after desperate fighting, in
which several were killed and many wounded. On this day, out of 150 men
actually engaged, twenty-five were killed and thirty wounded. Captain
Campbell was severely wounded, and the command of the troops in Chitral
fort now devolved upon Captain Townsend. On this day the siege of
Chitral fort may be said to have commenced, and for many weeks no news
of the garrison reached the outer world.
[Sidenote: The Chitral-Gilgit Line]
_Events on the Chitral-Gilgit Line._—We may now conveniently describe
the events which took place on the line of communications between
Chitral and Mastuj, and all that befell the small bodies of reinforcing
troops and the convoys, which were struggling westward through a very
difficult and actively hostile country.
On the 26th February the following instructions had issued from the
British Agent: “Lieutenant Edwardes, commanding at Ghizr, to hand over
that garrison to Lieutenant Gough, and to come on to Chitral, there to
take command of the Puniali levies which had been ordered up from
Gilgit; Lieutenant Moberley, commanding at Mastuj, was directed to order
Lieutenant Fowler, R.E. (expected shortly to reach Mastuj with a party
of Bengal Sappers and Miners), to continue his march to Chitral; and to
send on a supply of Snider ammunition to Chitral by a suitable escort
making ordinary marches.” These two last-mentioned orders were received
at Mastuj on the 28th February, and on the following day the ammunition
was sent off to Chitral under escort of forty of the Kashmir Rifles. On
the 2nd March, however, disquieting news reaching Mastuj as to the state
of affairs on the road, Lieutenant Moberley was in doubt as to whether
he should not recall the ammunition escort, but it was ultimately
permitted to proceed. On this date Captain Ross was expected at Laspur
with 100 of the 14th Sikhs, and Lieutenant Moberley wrote asking him to
come straight through to Mastuj in a single stage; this Captain Ross
did, reaching Mastuj on the 3rd.
He marched on again the following day to support the ammunition escort,
which had been obliged to halt at Buni owing to the onward road having
been broken down; and on the 5th the force at Buni was further
strengthened by the arrival there of twenty men of the Bengal Sappers
and Miners, accompanied by Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes.
The possibility of the road being designedly broken had been foreseen by
the British Agent, who had caused certain orders to be issued to meet
such an eventuality; but as these never reached Lieutenant Moberley, to
whom they had been addressed at Mastuj, it seems unnecessary here to
recapitulate them.
[Sidenote: The Fighting at Reshun]
On the 5th March Captain Ross returned with his Sikhs to Mastuj, while
on the next day the combined detachment—two British officers, twenty
Bengal Sappers and forty of the 4th Kashmir Rifles—marched on to Reshun,
a large, straggling village situated on a sloping plain on the left bank
of the Chitral River. Here news came in of fighting at Chitral, but the
night passed quietly, and at noon on the 7th the two officers, with the
twenty sappers, ten rifles and a number of coolies, moved off to repair
a break reported about three miles distant. Reaching a narrow defile
near Parpish, sangars were noticed on the high cliffs; these were at
once occupied by the tribesmen, firing became general, four of the
little party were hit, one being killed, and a retirement on Reshun was
now ordered.
Eight more men were hit during this retirement. On arrival at an
entrenchment which had been thrown up by the rest of the party near the
village, the position was found too exposed, and a cluster of
houses—affording better cover—was seized, and the work of improving the
defences was at once proceeded with.
A fierce but unsuccessful attack was made just before dawn, and firing
was kept up during the 8th from a large number of Martini and Snider
rifles; at the end of the day the total losses of the defence—including
the casualties near Parpish—amounted to seven killed or died of wounds
and sixteen wounded. For the next five days the little garrison defended
its post with conspicuous gallantry against heavy odds and repeated
attacks from the enemy, who had succeeded in establishing themselves
under cover close up to the walls. Lieutenant Fowler specially
distinguished himself in making several successful sorties to obtain
water. On the 13th the enemy opened negotiations, stating that all
fighting at Chitral had ceased, and that Sher Afzul was engaged in
friendly correspondence with the British Government. By the 15th, it
seeming that matters were in course of arrangement, the two officers
were persuaded to leave their defences, and were then treacherously
seized, while the Chitralis succeeded in rushing the defences.
Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were now taken in charge by some of Umra
Khan’s men, and proceeding by Chitral and Drosh to Jandol, were
eventually released and sent in to Sir Robert Low’s camp at Sado in
April.
When, on the 6th March, Lieutenant Edwardes heard of the gathering below
Reshun, he had at once sent back news to Mastuj, where it arrived the
same evening, and Captain Ross thereupon started next morning with his
party—two British officers, one native officer and ninety-three of other
ranks—to bring Lieutenant Edwardes’ detachment back to Buni. Reaching
Buni late on the night of the 7th, he there left his native officer with
thirty-three rank and file, and pushed on next morning for Reshun with
the remainder of his party. At 1 p.m. the Koragh Defile was reached; as
described by Robertson, “the defile is the result of the river cutting
its winding course through terrible cliffs. A goat, scuttling along the
high ridges, might start a thunderous avalanche of boulders down the
unstable slopes. At the lower end of this frightful gorge the pathway
begins to ascend from the river above some caves, and then zigzags
upwards. There the ‘point’ of the advance guard was fired upon, and
hundreds of men disclosed themselves and set the very hillsides rolling
down.” The small party were in a trap. Several men were at once hit, and
Captain Ross then decided to occupy some caves in the river bank. He
made several attempts to scale the cliffs and to force his way back to
Buni, but was everywhere met by a heavy fire from both banks of the
river, and by a deadly hail of rocks from the cliffs above. Captain Ross
was killed, and eventually his subaltern, Lieutenant Jones, with only
fourteen men, ten of the party being wounded, reached Buni on the
evening of the 10th. Here he occupied a house and held it until the
17th, when Lieutenant Moberley marched out from Mastuj with 150 men of
the Kashmir troops, and relieved and brought in the remnants of Captain
Ross’ party.
From the 22nd March until the 9th April Mastuj was invested by the
enemy, but on this latter date they began to retire owing to the advance
of the Gilgit column under Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly. The Mastuj garrison
had only one man wounded.
[Sidenote: The Gilgit Column]
_Advance of the Gilgit Column._—During the first week in March reports
of the serious state of affairs in the Chitral Valley began to reach
Gilgit, whence a few days later the Assistant British Agent sent down a
request to Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly to bring to Gilgit a wing of the
32nd Pioneers, then engaged in road-making between Bunji and Chilas. In
peace time this officer commanded no more than his own regiment, but on
hostilities occurring he automatically became the military head of the
whole district, and all military responsibility rested on him alone. The
message reached Colonel Kelly on the 14th, and by the 22nd the wing
(strength 403) had arrived at Gilgit; on the same day Colonel Kelly was
informed by telegraph from the Adjutant General that he was in military
command in the Gilgit Agency, and was also Chief Political Officer so
long as communications with Chitral were interrupted; in regard to
operations he was to use his own judgment but was to run no unnecessary
risks. He was also informed of the advance of a relief force via Swat
about the 1st April. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly now issued the following
orders: 200 men to start early on the 23rd for Chitral, followed on the
next day by the remainder of the wing, accompanied by two guns of No. 1
Kashmir Mountain Battery. Of the other half battalion 200 were called up
to Gilgit from the Indus Valley, while the remainder of the regiment
(242) was to proceed to Chilas.
At this time the various happenings on the Gilgit-Chitral road were
known, except that no tidings had come in of the disaster to the party
under Lieutenant Edwardes. Colonel Kelly’s command now extended from
Astor to Chitral, and contained, exclusive of the troops in the Mastuj
and Chitral districts, four mountain guns, 845 of the 32nd Pioneers,
about 1250 Rifles of the Kashmir Infantry, and 160 Kashmir Sappers. But
in deciding upon the numbers of which the Relief Column was to be
composed, with which he intended to force his way to Chitral, it was
necessary also to provide for the safety of Gilgit and for keeping open
the line of communications. There was nothing to be feared from the
people of Hunza and Nagar, whose chiefs at once furnished 1000 men for
employment as levies; but the people of Chilas required watching, though
apparently submissive, while those of Yasin were sure to be in sympathy
with their near neighbours of Chitral. From Gilgit to Chitral was 220
miles, and between the two posts was the Shandur Pass (12,250 feet), at
this season deep in snow. As far as Gupis there was a made mule road,
but thence forward the road was a mere track; while throughout its
length there were many places where it might be easily blocked, and
where an enemy might take up an almost impregnable position. The supply
question was further one of great anxiety, especially should the country
prove hostile, but it was known that reserve supplies were stored at
Gupis, Ghizr and Mastuj. Bearing all these points in mind,
Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly decided to limit the strength of the Relief
Column to 400 men of the 32nd Pioneers, two guns of the Kashmir Mountain
Battery, 40 Kashmir Sappers and 100 of the Hunza and Nagar levies. The
column started in two parties. As far as Gupis, which was reached on the
26th and 27th, mule transport was used, but this was here exchanged for
coolies and ponies; owing, however, to desertions among the coolies the
loads had to be reduced—there were no tents and each man had an
allowance of 15 lbs. of baggage—while only six days’ supplies could be
taken with the column.
[Sidenote: Crossing the Shandur]
Ghizr was reached on the 30th and 31st March, and the march to the
Shandur Pass was commenced. The snow was now so deep that the battery
mules and the ponies could not proceed; Colonel Kelly therefore withdrew
200 of his men under Captain Borradaile to Teru and returned himself
with the rest of the column to Ghizr where the supply question did not
present such difficulties. Borradaile was next day to attempt to cross
the Shandur Pass, reach and entrench himself at Laspur, return the
transport, and try and open communications with Mastuj.
Snow fell heavily during the next twenty-four hours and no start could
be made until 11 a.m. on the 3rd, by which time the guns and a
detachment of the Kashmir Rifles had joined Borradaile. The pass was
crossed under extraordinary difficulties, the infantry reaching Laspur
on the night of the 4th, and the guns and Kashmir Infantry the following
afternoon. A reconnaissance on the 6th revealed the presence in the
neighbourhood of the enemy, who were reported also to be entrenched near
the Chakalwat defile some thirteen miles further on. On this day Colonel
Kelly arrived with fifty Nagar levies, and next day fifty Puniali levies
also came in. Some idea of the severity of the climate may be gathered
from the fact that among the troops there were sixty-three cases of snow
blindness and forty-three of frost-bite.
The second part of the column, delayed at Ghizr, was unable to reach
Laspur until the 9th, but Colonel Kelly, considering it inadvisable to
wait, pushed on to Gasht with the remainder of his party, and after
reconnoitring the enemy’s position, determined to attack. The enemy’s
position was naturally very strong and the sangars well placed; these
blocked the valley on either side of the river and were continued up to
the snow line, while the right of the position was further protected by
a mass of fallen snow descending into the water. On the 9th Colonel
Kelly advanced towards the enemy’s position at Chakalwat; the Hunza
levies were sent up the heights on one side to get above and fire into
the sangars; while the Puniali men ascended on the other flank to drive
the enemy from their stone shoots on the slopes above the river.
The force deployed on a gentle slope facing the right-hand sangars, and
the two guns opened fire at 800 yards range. This shell-fire and the
volleys of the infantry cleared the enemy out of the right sangar, while
the Hunza levies had already driven them from those higher up. The next
line of sangars was attacked in the same manner, and the enemy now began
to give way and were soon in full flight, having lost between fifty and
sixty killed. Our casualties were only four men wounded.
[Sidenote: Forcing the Nisa Gol]
Colonel Kelly now moved on to Mastuj, where the rest of his column
closed up on the 11th, and the three days spent here were occupied in
the collection of transport and supplies and in pushing out
reconnaissances. These disclosed the presence of the enemy in a strong
and well-fortified position, where the Chitral River Valley is cleft by
a deep ravine known as the Nisa Gol, 200 or 300 feet deep, with
precipitous sides. The defence was prepared on much the same lines as at
Chakalwat, but the sangars were of better construction, being provided
with head cover, while their front was covered by the precipices of the
Nisa Gol.
It was decided to attack on the 13th and to try and turn the enemy’s
left. Colonel Kelly pursued the same tactics as in the earlier action,
bringing his artillery fire to bear on the sangars while keeping up a
heavy rifle fire, his levies climbing the precipitous hillsides and
turning the flank. The guns silenced sangar after sangar, gradually
moving in closer; a place was discovered where the ravine could be
crossed, and a party reached the opposite side just as the levies had
turned the position. The enemy now evacuated their defences and fled,
fired on by the guns and the infantry. Our loss was seven killed and
thirteen wounded.
There was no further opposition to the advance of the Gilgit column,
beyond such as was experienced from broken bridges and roads, and on the
20th April Colonel Kelly’s force marched into Chitral and joined the
garrison.
[Sidenote: Siege of Chitral Fort]
_The Siege of Chitral Fort._—This commenced, as has been said, on the
3rd March, after the action of that date wherein the British troops had
suffered many casualties; and when, in consequence of Captain Campbell
having been severely wounded, the command of the troops devolved upon
Captain Townsend. The garrison of the fort consisted of six British
officers, of whom five only were fit for duty, ninety-nine men of the
14th Sikhs, and 301 of all ranks of the 4th Kashmir Rifles. There were
in addition fifty-two Chitralis—men whose loyalty was at best
dubious—and eighty-five followers. The supplies, on half-rations, could
be made to last two and a half months, while of ammunition there were
300 rounds per Martini-Henri rifle of the Sikhs and 280 rounds per
Snider of the Kashmir troops. The fort was about seventy yards square
with a tower at each corner, and a fifth guarded the path to the river;
the walls of the fort were some twenty-five feet in height and from
eight to ten feet thick; it was practically commanded on all sides, and
surrounded on three by houses, walls, and all kinds of cover. The number
of British officers was so small and the Kashmir troops, who composed
three-fourths of the fort-garrison, were so shaken by their losses on
the 3rd, that Captain Townsend resolved to remain as far as possible on
the defensive. He confined his energies, therefore, to devising measures
of defence, to the provision of cover within and the demolition of cover
without the walls, to arranging a system for quickly extinguishing
fires, and to providing as far as possible for proper sanitation.
The garrison was therefore engaged in real fighting on two occasions
only during the forty-eight days that the siege lasted, and the losses
incurred in the passive defence of the fort were not heavy; there was,
however, much sickness, and at the end of the first week only eighty
Sikhs and 240 of the Kashmir Rifles remained fit for duty. From the 16th
to the 23rd there was a truce, during which Sher Afzul did his best to
persuade the British Agent to agree to withdraw the garrison to Mastuj,
or to India by way of Jandol. During the suspension of hostilities
Captain Townsend effected many improvements in the defences. The guard
duties were very heavy, half the effectives being on duty at a time, and
the defenders were harassed day and night by a desultory rifle fire.
On the 7th, under cover of a heavy rifle fire, a party of the enemy
crept up to the tower at the south-eastern corner and managed to set it
on fire. A strong wind was blowing, and for some time matters looked
very serious, as the tower, being largely composed of wood, burned
fiercely. No sooner did the fire seem to be mastered than it blazed up
again; the enemy, occupying the high ground, were able to fire upon men
going in and out of the tower with water and earth; the British Agent
and a Sikh soldier were here wounded, while a sentry of the Kashmir
Rifles was killed. On the 10th an attack was made on the waterway, and
on the morning of the 17th the enemy could distinctly be heard at work
upon a mine, leading to the same tower as that attacked on the 7th. It
was clear that the entrance of the mine was in a summer-house about a
hundred and fifty feet from the tower, and which there had been no time
to demolish; while from the distinctness with which the sound of digging
could be heard, the mine had evidently reached within a few feet of the
base of the tower. It was decided to make a sortie, carry the
summer-house where it was thought the mine shaft would be found, and
destroy the mine, since matters had gone too far to counter-mine.
[Sidenote: Harley’s Sortie]
For this duty forty men of the 14th Sikhs, with their _jemadar_, and
sixty of the Kashmir Rifles, with a native officer, were placed under
command of Lieutenant H. K. Harley, 14th Sikhs, with orders to leave the
fort at 4 p.m. by the east gate, rush the summer-house, and hold it on
the enemy’s side, while the rest of the party destroyed or blew in the
mine gallery. The summer-house was taken with a loss of two men killed,
the defenders—some thirty Pathans—bolting to the cover of a wall and
opening fire from thence upon Harley’s party. Leaving some men to keep
these in check, Harley led the remainder to the mine shaft, just outside
the summer-house. Thirty-five Chitralis, armed with swords, came out and
were at once bayoneted. Harley now cleared the mine, arranged powder and
fuse, but it was untamped and the charge exploded prematurely; none the
less the effect was excellent, the mine being burst open right up to the
foot of the tower, and lying exposed like a trench. Two prisoners were
brought in, two of the enemy were killed in the mine by the explosion,
two Pathans were shot in the summer-house, and many of the enemy were
shot down by the covering fire from the walls of the fort. Harley’s
party had eight men killed and thirteen wounded.
The enemy now seemed to have made their last effort; they had learnt
that the defenders were still able to assume a vigorous offensive, and
they knew that help was drawing nearer from the direction of Gilgit. On
the night of the 18th–19th the investing force quietly withdrew and
abandoned the siege; Sher Afzul and the Jandol chiefs fled that night to
Bashkar and Asmar, and on the afternoon of the 20th the Gilgit force
marched in.
During the siege the loss of the garrison of Chitral fort amounted,
exclusive of the casualties on the 3rd March, to seventeen killed and
thirty-two wounded.