requisites of action for, 521, 530.
whether action for, without damage, 529, 531, 595, 596 n.
fraudulently procuring wife to refuse to live with husband, 533.
sufficient if false statement one motive of plaintiff’s action, 535,
536 n.
representation of intention, 537, 539, 541 n., 542, 547 n.
purchase on credit with present intention not to pay, 542, 548.
promissory representation, 550.
known impossible prophecy, 551 n.
statement of vendor as to price, 551, 553 n.
statement of opinion, 551, 553, 555.
statement as to value, 553 n.
statement as to value of promissory note, 557.
statement of value, whether opinion or fact, 551, 553, 555, 559, 560
n.
statement as to matter within special knowledge of defendant, 556,
560, 616.
concealment of material fact, 561, 562 n.
statement must be known to be false or made recklessly, 563, 569 n.
statement made recklessly without knowledge of facts, 573 n.
liability for innocent or negligent misrepresentation, 572, 573 n.,
574, 576.
statement by fiduciary, 578.
estoppel to deny truth of statement, 580, 582 n.
duty to make representation good, 581.
duty to know whether statement true, 583, 584 n.
statement of belief as if fact, 584.
statement without reasonable ground for belief, 588 n.
reliance on statement where defendant obviously without personal
knowledge, 588 n.
not necessary that defendant profit by, 588.
statement expected to be passed on to others, 592, 595 n.
statement not expected to be passed on to others, 595.
procuring plaintiff to incur liability, 597, 598.
procuring plaintiff to refrain from selling property, 599, 601.
whether plaintiff must use diligence to guard against, 606, 607 n.,
608, 612 n., 616, 617 n.
execution of instrument without reading, 608 n.
reliance on representation where equal means of knowledge, 608 n.,
612.
reliance on friendship, 608 n.
reliance on representation where plaintiff informed of truth by
another, 612 n.
reliance on assertion of title, 612 n.
reliance on statement as to boundary, 612 n.
reliance on representation as to quantity of land, 612, 613.
refusal of defendant to put representation in writing, 612 n.
representation as to law, 616 n.
stipulations against liability for, 617.
measure of damage in action for, 604, 605, 606 n.
DEFAMATION,
_Publication_,
communication to plaintiff alone not a, 657, 659.
communication to plaintiff’s wife, 658.
communication by defamer to his own wife, 658 n.
communication to business partner, 658 n.
communication to plaintiff’s attorney, 659 n.
mailing of post card, whether a, 660 n.
in ignorance of the libel, 660 n.
must be of and concerning plaintiff, 665.
of and concerning plaintiff, what is, 669, 672, 676.
reading letter to third person a, 658.
reading letter by third person a, 659.
_Libel_,
what is, 679.
defamatory statement that describes two different persons, 671.
defamatory statements partially describing each of two different
persons, 672.
words injurious to plaintiff in the eyes of part of the community,
673, 674 n.
use of plaintiff’s name to describe fictitious person, 674.
_Slander_,
words imputing crime, 661, 682, 683.
words imputing unchastity to a woman, 683, 685.
words disparaging one in his calling, 687, 690, 691.
imputation of misconduct to clergyman, 689 n.
imputation of misconduct to teacher, 689 n.
imputation of drunkenness to officer, 689 n.
imputation of insolvency to tradesman, 690.
imputation of cheating to tradesman, 691 n.
imputation of ignorance to physician, 692.
imputation of misconduct in office of honor not of profit, 693 n.
words imputing a loathsome disease, 694, 695.
imputation of insanity, 694, 695 n.
defamatory words causing special damage, 807, 808, 809, 811.
words to be taken in natural sense, 661.
_Justification_,
truth a, 695.
belief in truth not, 676, 771 n.
repetition not a, 677.
_Absolutely Privileged Occasions_,
statements in legislative proceedings, 697 n., 710 n.
in course of acts of state, 697 n.
official statements of administrative officers, 710 n.
statements in judicial proceedings, by judge, 695; by witness, 703,
707;
by counsel, 697, 702 n.
what are judicial proceedings, 702 n., 710 n.
irrelevant statements in judicial proceedings, 696, 703, 707, 709
n.
what statements are irrelevant, 704, 709 n., 710 n.
_Conditionally Privileged Occasions_,
reports of legislative proceedings, 720.
reports of judicial proceedings, 714.
reports of ex parte judicial proceedings, 716.
reports of quasi judicial proceedings, 729, 729 n.
report of proceedings of church commission, 730 n.
petition or memorial for removal of public officer, 768 n.
fair abstracts of judicial proceedings, 731.
reports of public meetings in general, whether, 727, 728 n.
publication of reports of administrative officers, 729 n.
reports of news by newspapers not, 732.
statements in common interest of maker and receiver, 734, 736 n.
statements by person immediately interested to protect his own
interest, 737 n.
statement of suspicions in course of investigation of crime, 736.
statement in course of dispute as to property, 738 n.
solicited statements in interest of receiver, 738.
statement by commercial agency, 739 n.
statement by attorney to client, 740 n.
statement in course of business duty, 740 n.
statement by member of family as to character of suitor, 740 n.
statement as to character of candidate for admission to society,
740 n.
solicited statements as to character of servant, 738.
solicited statements as to credit of tradesman, 739 n.
statements by a fiduciary to his principal, 740 n.
volunteered statements in interest of receiver, when, 740, 746 n.,
747, 749.
publication of, in presence of stranger, 750, 753, 754 n.
general publication as to candidate for local office, 754 n.
publication of matter of public interest in the community, 755.
statements in public meetings, 756 n.
published reply to defamatory statements, 756 n.
publication to representative of interested receiver, 763.
publication of, on post card, not justifiable, 754.
publication of, to type-writer, whether justifiable, 758, 761 n.
publication of, to wrong person, by mistake, whether excused, 761
n.
malice destroys immunity in, 761.
_Fair Comment_,
upon public matters not actionable, 726, 769, 771 n.
what are public matters, 771 n., 795 n.
distinguished from privilege, 770, 779, 795 n.
criticism of published writings when, 772, 775, 782.
aspersion of motives not, 769, 775.
false charges of specific acts, 775 n., 785 n., 792.
violent attacks and insulting statements, not, 786 n.
_Malice_,
in fact and law, 662.
what is, 749, 771 n.
burden is on plaintiff to show, 790 n.
publication _prima facie_ evidence of, 663.
express, must be proved, if occasion is privileged, 790.
a question of _bona fides_ not of reasonableness, 763.
a question of reasonableness as well as _bona fides_, 766.
DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY, 815 n.
of title (see SLANDER OF TITLE).
of goods, 819, 823 n., 861.
DOGS (see ANIMALS),
trespass on land by, 406 n., 445.
DRUNKENNESS,
no excuse for tort, 662 n.
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE (see MASTER AND SERVANT),
right of employer “to have labor flow freely to him,” 903.
inducing breach of contract by employees, 884, 887.
inducing employer to discharge employee because not a member of trade
union, 939, 978 (see MALICIOUS INJURY TO PLAINTIFF BY INFLUENCING
CONDUCT OF ANOTHER).
boycotting, 950, 952, 978, 988, 989 n., 997, 998, 1004.
picketing, 978 n.
ENTICING,
servant, 864, 868.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT (see IMPRISONMENT).
FENCE,
malicious erection of, 928.
FRIGHT (see MENTAL OR NERVOUS SHOCK).
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE (see CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE).
IMPRISONMENT (see ARREST),
what is, 18, 20, 21, 21 n., 23, 23 n., 28 n.
contact not necessary, 19, 21, 23.
what is not, 19, 20, 24.
mere words without submission to restraint not an, 19, 20.
partial obstruction not an, 24.
shadowing by detectives, 23 n.
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE (see CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE).
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT (see ACCIDENT).
INFANT,
liable for torts, 96, 97 n.
negligence of, 88, 88 n., 90, 93, 93 n.
INJUNCTION,
maliciously obtaining, 648 n.
INSANE PERSON,
liable for torts, 29, 29 n., 662 n.
INSULT,
gestures no assault, 11, 11 n., 12 n.
looks no assault, 11, 11 n., 12 n.
words no assault, 11, 11 n., 12 n.
action lies for written or spoken, by statute in Va., 657 n.
insulting statements not fair comment, 786 n.
INVITEE (see OCCUPIER OF PREMISES).
JUDGE,
statements by, absolutely privileged, 695.
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,
statements in, absolutely privileged, 695, 697, 703, 707, 709 n.
reports of, conditionally privileged, 714, 716, 720, 731, 761.
reports of quasi, conditionally privileged, 729.
JURY,
malice in action for malicious prosecution a question for, 638.
malice in fact in defamation a question for, 662, 752, 763, 790.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE,
advice of, when probable cause for prosecution, 635 n.
LABORERS, STATUTE OF,
actress not a servant within, 879.
LAND (see MALICIOUS USE OF ONE’S OWN LAND; DANGEROUS USE OF LAND).
LANDLORD AND TENANT,
liability of landlord for defect in premises, 220, 222 n.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE (see CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE).
LEAVE AND LICENSE,
no bar to action for injury received in prize fight, 18.
procuring abortion with plaintiff’s consent, 19 n.
injury in course of illegal charivari party, 18 n.
LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS,
statements in absolutely privileged, 720.
reports of conditionally privileged, 720.
LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT (see ANIMALS; DANGEROUS USE OF LAND),
constitutionality of legislation imposing, 482 n., 494 n.
LIBEL (see DEFAMATION).
LIQUIDATION,
malicious proceedings in, against company, 645 n.
LORD CAMPBELL’S ACT, 372 n.
LUNACY,
malicious proceedings in, 645 n.
LUNATIC (see INSANE PERSON).
MALICIOUS CONSPIRACY (see CONSPIRACY).
MALICIOUS EXHIBITING OF ARTICLES OF THE PEACE,
actionable, 625.
MALICIOUS INJURY TO PLAINTIFF BY INFLUENCING CONDUCT OF ANOTHER,
enticing servant to leave master, 864.
debauching servant of another, 866.
inducing breach of contract, 874, 884, 887.
inducing breach of contract by laborers, 884, 887, 979 n.
suborning witness to commit perjury, 710.
helping debtor to make assignment in fraud of creditors, 846.
slander of title, 813, 816.
disparagement of goods, 819.
fraudulent imitation of trade-mark, 827.
use of envelopes marked telegram leading patrons of telegraph company
to believe latter imposing on them, 837 n.
fraudulent statement that plaintiff had gone out of business, 854,
859.
fraudulent sending out of plaintiff’s business card under injurious
circumstances, 831.
false though not defamatory imputation upon plaintiff, 812.
slander of plaintiff’s wife resulting in injury to business, 837 n.
fraudulently inducing testator to revoke bequest to plaintiff, 847,
849.
false statement to mortgagee procuring foreclosure in breach of
gratuitous promise to mortgagor, 849 n.
fraudulently procuring third person to sell to defendant in breach of
oral contract with plaintiff within statute of frauds, 852 n.
fraudulently altering and defacing will leaving legacy to plaintiff,
852.
loosening horse’s shoe to discredit blacksmith, 829.
inducing servant at will to leave master, 868.
frightening wild fowl from resorting to plaintiff’s land, 935, 937.
threats of physical injury to plaintiff’s customers, 863, 864, 897,
935, 968.
threats of pecuniary loss to plaintiff’s customers, 952, 996.
threat of physical injury to plaintiff’s workmen, 863, 978 n.
threat of vexatious suits against customers, 863 n.
annoyance of workmen resorting to plaintiff, 979 n.
threat to sell adjoining property to colored family, 923 n.
threat by association of retail dealers to cease dealing with
manufacturer or wholesale dealer, 997 n.
threats, what may lawfully be threatened, 975, 975 n.
refusal to insure ship if plaintiff employed as master, 836 n.
sermon warning congregation against physician, 837 n.
interference with blind advertisement, 838.
inducing one not to contract with plaintiff, 906, 978, 989, 996, 998,
1004.
boycotting, 952, 987, 989 n., 997, 997 n., 998, 1004, 1012 n.
strike to strengthen union, 978, 988;
to gain control of labor market, 989 n.;
to bring pressure on third person, 997, 998, 1009;
to procure discharge of plaintiff as means towards better
conditions in shop, 998 n.;
to get rid of objectionable foreman, 998 n.
inducing employer to discharge employee because not a member of trade
union, 939, 978.
inducing employer to break contracts with laborers, 979 n.
“smashing” rates, 906, 913.
conspiracy, 910, 971.
inciting pauper to sue plaintiff, 651.
MALICIOUS INJURY TO PLAINTIFF BY TORT TO ANOTHER,
destruction of husband’s house by wife to injure insurer, 841.
MALICIOUS INSTITUTION OF CIVIL ACTION,
actionable, 650 n.
not actionable, 649.
voluntary abandonment of former action is failure, 629 n.
abandonment by way of compromise not failure, 629 n.
attachment vacated evidence of want of probable cause, 634 n.
by instigating another to sue, 651.
in name of another, 655.
prosecution of unfounded claim for patent, 645 n.
MALICIOUS PROCEEDINGS,
in bankruptcy, 644.
in lunacy, 645 n.
for removal of officer, 645 n.
levy on execution under fraudulent judgment, 648 n.
procurement of execution of search warrant, 648 n.
attachment, 646.
arrest on civil process, 648 n.
holding to bail, 648 n.
replevin, 648 n.
garnishment, 648 n.
procurement of injunction, 648 n.
excessive attachment, 652 n.
for winding up company, 645 n.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
_Institution of Criminal Proceedings_, 620.
application for warrant but none issued, 624 n.
arrest without warrant, no further prosecution, 624 n.
search warrant issued, no arrest or seizure of property, 624 n.
warrant issued, plaintiff leaves jurisdiction to avoid arrest, 620.
_Nature of Criminal Charge_, 624.
prosecution under unconstitutional statute, 624 n.
prosecution in court without jurisdiction, 624 n.
_Failure of Prosecution_,
generally essential, 627.
when not necessary, 625.
_nolle prosequi_ is, 627.
indictment quashed is, when, 629 n.
striking from docket because in wrong court, when, 629 n.
_Abandonment of Prosecution_,
if voluntary equivalent to termination in defendant’s favor, 627.
by way of compromise not equivalent to termination in defendant’s
favor, 629 n.
otherwise where settlement obtained by duress, 630 n.
_Reasonable or Probable Cause_,
essential, 630.
definition of, 631 n.
a question for court, 632, 637.
conviction, though reversed, _prima facie_ evidence of, 632, 633 n.
conviction, though reversed, conclusive evidence of, 627.
commitment for grand jury, evidence of, 632, 633 n.
finding of indictment evidence of, 632, 633 n.
advice of counsel is, 634.
advice of justice of the peace, whether, 635 n.
advice of layman not, 635 n.
what must be stated to counsel, 636 n.
defendant’s belief in plaintiff’s innocence negatives, 639.
failure of prosecution, whether evidence of want of, 633 n., 641.
want of, not to be inferred from malice, 643 n.
if not, still no action for, if plaintiff was in fact guilty, 644.
_Malice_,
meaning of, 637, 638 n., 642.
question of fact for jury, 637.
not a necessary inference from want of probable cause, 636, 641,
643 n.
of no moment, if probable cause exists, 630.
_Damage_, 624.
MALICIOUS USE OF ONE’S OWN LAND,
general discussion of doctrine of, 923, 939, 952 n.
by erecting fence to annoy neighbors, 927 n., 928.
by erecting building annoying to neighbor, 926.
by diverting percolating water, 928 n.
malice must be dominant motive, 935 n.
by frightening wild fowl from resorting to plaintiff’s land, 935,
937.
by cutting trees causing evaporation from stream to injury of
plaintiff’s water right, 938.
MALICIOUS WORDS (see DEFAMATION; MALICIOUS INJURY TO PLAINTIFF BY
INFLUENCING CONDUCT OF ANOTHER; SLANDER OF TITLE).
MANUFACTURER,
liability of, for defects, 228, 233, 235, 251.
MARRIAGE,
loss of, is special damage, 807.
loss of performance of promise to marry, is special damage, 884 n.
fraudulent, of plaintiff’s daughter, 869.
MASTER AND SERVANT,
seduction of servant of another, 866.
enticing servant of another, 864.
threat of physical injury to servant of another, 863.
inducing servant at will to leave master, 873 n.
MENTAL OR NERVOUS SHOCK,
action for causing, 45, 49 n., 50, 57 n., 58, 61.
MISFEASANCE (see NEGLIGENCE).
MISTAKE,
in addressing a privileged communication, 761 n.
defamation by, 761 n.
MORAL DUTY,
assumption of performance of, 129, 141.
in absence of relation between parties, 131.
where relation between parties, 134, 137 n.
MOTIVE (see MALICE),
aspersion of, of public man, not fair comment, 769, 775.
NEGLIGENCE (see CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; OCCUPIER OF PREMISES;
TRESPASSERS; PUBLIC WRONG),
without damage, no liability, 41.
must be proximate cause of injury, 42.
standard of care, 63, 66 n., 67, 76.
ordinary care, definition of, 70.
standard in case of physical disability, 71, 73.
degrees of, 77, 79, 79 n., 82 n., 83, 85 n.
statutory degrees of, 86.
of infant, 88, 88 n., 90, 92 n., 93.
proof of, 98, 102, 106, 111, 113, 115.
duty of care, 120, 125.
definition of, 156.
requirement of duty of care toward person injured, 156.
in performance of gratuitous undertaking, 184 n.
liability for, of maker or vendor of chattel, 228, 233, 235, 246,
251.
comparative negligence, 267, 268 n., 269.
difference between gross negligence and wanton or reckless conduct,
340, 342 n., 343.
as ground of recovery for injury by vicious animal, 434.
breach of rules of a private corporation, whether, 508 n.
violation of ordinance, whether, 508 n.
breach of statutory duty, whether, 391, 400 n., 504, 506, 506 n.
liability for negligent language, 573 n.
NERVOUS SHOCK (see MENTAL OR NERVOUS SHOCK).
NEWSPAPER,
has no peculiar privilege in defamation, 732.
NOLLE PROSEQUI (see MALICIOUS PROSECUTION).
NONFEASANCE, 127, 129, 131, 134, 137, 142 n.
NUISANCE (see DANGEROUS USE OF LAND),
“attractive” 165, 170 n., 170, 173, 176 n.; age to which doctrine
applicable, 171 n.
allowing land to go to weeds not, 493.
trees shading another’s land not, 495.
stored explosives, 498, 502.
OCCUPIER OF PREMISES (see TRESPASS; NUISANCE “attractive”; LANDLORD AND
TENANT),
liability to trespassers, 147, 149 n.
liability to known trespassers, 149.
liability to anticipated trespassers, 150, 154, 156 n.
liability to trespassers prohibited by statute, 153 n.
duty to look out for trespassers, 156 n.
liability to licensee, 177, 179, 183, 183 n., 186, 191.
injury to licensee by “trap,” 179.
liability to children licensees, 183 n.
liability where known permissive use by public, 183 n.
liability in case of gratuitous carriage, 183 n.
liability to licensee for negligent operation of active force, 186,
190 n.
duty to notify of withdrawal of license, 191.
liability to invitee, 194, 199 n.
duty to child accompanying invitee, 200 n.
liability to children invitees, 200 n.
duty to invitee of licensee, 200 n.
liability where plaintiff exceeds invitation, 200 n.
liability where notice habitually disregarded, 201.
not an insurer of safety of invitees, 203.
duty toward invitees to ascertain condition of premises, 202.
liability for injury to invitees by third persons, 204.
who are invitees, 207, 214, 220 n.
liability to social guest, 222, 225 n.
liability in case of license conferred by law, 225, 227 n.
liability to trespasser or licensee in case of breach of statutory
duty, 520.
PARTY,
statements by, privileged, 709 n.
PEACE,
malicious exhibition of articles of, 626.
PHYSICAL IMPACT,
necessity of, 45, 50, 58, 62 n.
PHYSICIAN,
slander of, 691.
PICKETING, 897, 968, 978 n., 1005, 1010.
POSTAL CARD,
whether mailing is publication, 660 n.
sending privileged communication by, 754.
PRIVACY,
interference with, 797.
PRIVILEGE (see DEFAMATION).
PRIZE FIGHT,
each party to, liable to other, 18.
PROBABLE CAUSE (see MALICIOUS PROSECUTION).
PROFESSION (see DEFAMATION).
PROMISE,
loss of performance of gratuitous, is special damage, 811.
PUBLIC MEETINGS,
reports of, whether privileged, 727, 728 n.
PUBLIC WRONG,
plaintiff’s participation in, no bar where wilful injury, 377.
violation of Sunday law, whether bar to action for negligence, 379,
381, 388 n.
violation of ordinance, whether bar to action for negligence, 388,
391.
violation of licensing or registration law, whether bar to action for
negligence, 398, 400 n.
unlicensed automobile, status of, in highway, 398, 401 n., 402 n.
injury by dog unmuzzled in violation of ordinance, 434 n.
injuries by animals running at large contrary to statute, 441 n.
breach of statutory duty, whether negligence, 391, 400 n., 504, 506,
506 n.
violation of ordinance, whether negligence, 508 n.
PUBLICATION (see DEFAMATION).
REASONABLE AND PROBABLE CAUSE (see MALICIOUS PROSECUTION).
REPETITION,
of slander, actionable, 677.
REPORTS,
of legislative and judicial proceedings, privileged (see DEFAMATION).
RES IPSA LOQUITUR,
inference of negligence, 98, 102, 102 n., 105 n., 106.
necessary allegation, 105 n.
doctrine applies only in absence of explanation, 105 n.
in actions by servant against master, 107, 107 n.
elements of the doctrine, 110 n.
burden of proof not shifted, merely burden of going forward, 111 n.
other inferences must be excluded, 113 n.
simply a rule of evidence, 115 n.
SCIENTER (see ANIMALS).
SEARCH WARRANT,
malicious procurement of execution of, 648 n.
SEDUCTION,
of daughter, 866.
of plaintiff’s fiancée, 884 n.
action by woman for, 16.
statutory action for, 17 n.
by guardian, 17 n.
SERVICE, LOSS OF,
by enticing servant, 864.
by seducing daughter or female servant, 866.
SLANDER (see DEFAMATION).
SLANDER OF TITLE (see DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY),
differs from slander of person, 813.
what is, 815 n.
action for, survives as injury to property, 813.
special damage essential, 816.
whether malice required, 816 n.
what is special damage, 819 n., 847 n., 855, 859 n., 883 n., 884 n.
SMASHING RATES,
is fair competition, 906, 913.
SPECIAL DAMAGE (see DAMAGE).
SUBORNATION OF WITNESS,
action for, 710.
SUNDAY LAWS (see PUBLIC WRONG).
TELEGRAM,
sending privileged communication by, 753.
THREATS (see MALICIOUS INJURY TO PLAINTIFF BY INFLUENCING CONDUCT OF
ANOTHER).
TRADE,
competition in (see COMPETITION).
slander of one in (see DEFAMATION).
TRADE DISPUTES ACT (English), 897 n., 967 n.
TRADE-MARK,
fraudulent imitation of, 827.
TRESPASSER (see NUISANCE “attractive”),
takes risk of condition of premises, 157.
negligent injury of, 147, 149, 150.
wilful, negligent injury to, 149 n.
child, duty to, 150 n., 160.
occupier may assume, will look out for himself, 156 n.
child, takes risk of condition of premises, 160.
setting traps for, 160 n., 176 n.
TRUTH,
justification in action for defamation, 695.
TURN TABLE CASES (see NUISANCE “attractive”).
TYPEWRITER,
communication to, a publication, 758.
communication to, not privileged, 758.
communication to, privileged, 761 n.
VENDOR OF CHATTEL,
liability of, to third persons for defects, 228, 233, 235, 251.
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA (see LEAVE AND LICENSE).
WATER COMPANY,
liability in tort for failure to provide water, 262 n.
WEEDS (see DANGEROUS USE OF LAND).
WITNESS,
no action against, for perjury, 712.
action for subornation of, 710.
statements of, privileged (see DEFAMATION)
WORDS,
insulting, no assault, 11, 11 n., 12 n.
malicious (see MALICIOUS WORDS).
construction of, in defamation, 661.
-----
Footnote 1:
Smith _v._ Newsam, 1 Vent. 256; Tombs _v._ Painter, 13 East, 1; Lewis
_v._ Hoover, 3 Blackf. 407; Handy _v._ Johnson, 5 Md. 450; People _v._
Carlson, 160 Mich. 426; Saunders _v._ Gilbert, 156 N. C. 463; Leach
_v._ Leach, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 699 _Accord_.
Footnote 2:
The report of the same case in 2 Keble, 545, adds: “The defendant
pleaded the plaintiff began first, and the stroke he received, whereby
he lost his eye, was on his own assault, and in defense of the
defendant.”
Footnote 3:
Blake _v._ Barnard, 9 Car. & P. 626; State _v._ Crow, 1 Ired. 375;
Commonwealth _v._ Eyre, 1 S. & R. 347; Biggins _v._ Gulf R. Co., 102
Tex. 417 _Accord_. Compare Handy _v._ Johnson, 5 Md. 450.
Similarly, a mere preparation for a possible assault, but without any
act indicating a present intention to do personal violence to another,
is not an assault. Lawson _v._ State, 30 Ala. 14; Godwin _v._ Collins,
67 Fla. 197; Penny _v._ State, 114 Ga. 77; Gober _v._ State, 7 Ga.
App. 206; Haupt _v._ Swenson, 125 Ia. 694; State _v._ Painter, 67 Mo.
84; State _v._ Milsaps, 82 N. C. 549. But compare State _v._ Hampton,
63 N. C. 13.
Footnote 4:
Townsdin _v._ Nutt, 19 Kan. 282; Handy _v._ Johnson, 5 Md. 450;
Fairme’s Case, 5 City Hall Rec. 95; Brister _v._ State, 40 Tex. Cr.
505; Western T. Co. _v._ Bowdoin, (Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 1
_Accord_. Jones _v._ State, 89 Ark. 213 (_semble_) _Contra_.
Compare Cobbett _v._ Grey, 4 Ex. 744, _per_ Pollock, C. B.; Burton
_v._ State, 8 Ala. App. 295; Wells _v._ State, 108 Ark. 312; People
_v._ Lilley, 43 Mich. 521; Grimes _v._ State, 99 Miss. 232;
Commonwealth _v._ Roman, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 64; Trimble _v._ State, 57
Tex. Cr. 439.
In Mortin _v._ Shoppee, 3 Car. & P. 373, defendant rode up to
plaintiff’s gate, plaintiff being in his garden about three yards off,
and, shaking his whip, said, “Come out, and I will lick you before
your own servants.” Compare People _v._ Yslas, 27 Cal. 630; State _v._
Shipman, 81 N. C. 513.
Footnote 5:
Only so much of the case is given as relates to the question of
assault.
Footnote 6:
United States _v._ Kiernan, 3 Cranch, C. C. 435; Plonty _v._ Murphy,
82 Minn. 268; People _v._ Lee, 1 Wheeler, Crim. Cas. 364; State _v._
Davis, 1 Ired. 125; Alexander _v._ Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476; Newell _v._
Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589; Bishop _v._ Ranney, 59 Vt. 316; Barnes _v._
Martin, 15 Wis. 240; Keep _v._ Quallman, 68 Wis. 451 _Accord_.
Footnote 7:
United States _v._ Myers, 1 Cranch, C. C. 310; Keefe _v._ State, 19
Ark. 190; Hixson _v._ Slocum, 156 Ky. 487; State _v._ Dooley, 121 Mo.
591; State _v._ Herron, 12 Mont. 230; State _v._ Morgan, 3 Ired. 186;
State _v._ Cherry, 11 Ired. 475; State _v._ Church, 63 N. C. 15;
Bishop _v._ Ranney, 59 Vt. 316; French _v._ Ware, 65 Vt. 338 _Accord_.
Footnote 8:
State _v._ Church, 63 N. C. 15 _Accord_.
Firing a revolver in plaintiff’s presence but not at him, intending to
frighten him but not to do him any bodily harm, was held not to be an
assault. Degenhardt _v._ Heller, 93 Wis. 662. Compare Nelson _v._
Crawford, 122 Mich. 466.
Footnote 9:
The argument for the plaintiff is omitted.
Footnote 10:
In Chapman _v._ State, 78 Ala. 463; State _v._ Yturaspe, 22 Idaho,
360; State _v._ Sears, 86 Mo. 169; State _v._ Godfrey, 17 Or. 300;
McKay _v._ State, 44 Tex. 43, it was decided that a defendant who
aimed an unloaded pistol at another, although perhaps liable for a
civil assault, was not guilty of a criminal assault. See also 2 Green,
Cr. Cas. 271 n.; Territory _v._ Gomez, 14 Ariz. 139; People _v._
Sylva, 143 Cal. 62. Such conduct was held to be a criminal assault in
State _v._ Shepard, 10 Ia. 126; Commonwealth _v._ White, 110 Mass.
407; State _v._ Barry, 45 Mont. 598; Clark _v._ State, (Okl. Cr.) 106
Pac. 803; State _v._ Smith, 2 Humph. 457; Richels _v._ State, 1 Sneed,
606 (_semble_); Morison’s Case, 1 Brown, Just. R. (Scotch) 394. In
Commonwealth _v._ White, _supra_, Wells, J., said: “It is not the
secret intent of the assaulting party, nor the undisclosed fact of his
ability or inability to commit a battery, that is material, but what
his conduct and the attending circumstances denote at the time to the
party assaulted.” Cf. Howell _v._ Winters, 58 Wash. 436.
Footnote 11:
Only so much of the case is printed as relates to this count.
Footnote 12:
State _v._ Daniel, 136 N. C. 571; Degenhardt _v._ Heller, 93 Wis. 662
_Accord_. Wood _v._ Young, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1931 _Contra_. It is not an
assault to make the kissing sign to another. Fuller _v._ State, 44
Tex. Cr. 463.
Mere words, looks, or gestures, however violent or insulting, do not
amount to an assault. State _v._ Borrelli, 24 Del. 349;
Reimenschneider _v._ Neusis, 175 Ill. App. 172; Harvey _v._ Harvey,
124 La. 595; Bouillon _v._ La Clede Gas Light Co., 148 Mo. App. 462;
State _v._ Daniel, 136 N. C. 571; Lewis _v._ Fountain, 168 N. C. 277.
A _fortiori_ violent language over the telephone is no assault. Kramer
_v._ Ricksmeier, 159 Ia. 48.
No action lies for the shame and insult to a woman from inviting her
to illicit intercourse. Davis _v._ Richardson, 76 Ark. 348; Reed _v._
Maley, 115 Ky. 816; State _v._ White, 52 Mo. App. 285. _Aliter_ where
accompanied by acts that put her in fear. Johnson _v._ Hohn, 168 Ia.
147; Jeppsen _v._ Jensen, 47 Utah, 536; Newell _v._ Whitcher, 53 Vt.
589. And a common carrier is liable, as a public service company, for
insults to a passenger by its employees. Knoxville Co. _v._ Lane, 103
Tenn. 376.
“Injury is committed not only when a man is struck with the fist or
beaten with a stick or lashed, but also when abusive language is
publicly addressed to any one, or when ... some one ... has followed
about a married woman or a young boy or girl, or when some person’s
modesty may be said to have been assailed.” Institutes of Justinian,
iv, 4, 1.
“Likewise it is an injury of this kind when one person, without
actually striking another, keeps raising his hand menacingly and
creates in the other the fear that he will be struck.... Likewise if
he mocks another with indecent or indecorous gestures; or if by means
of gesticulations he indicates things of such a kind that if they were
expressed in spoken words or in writing they would convey an injury.”
Voet, Commentary on the Pandects, xlvii, 10, § 7.
“Ignominious treatment is an injury only when it is an infringement of
one of the absolute rights of personality: a right that is recognized
by the law of the State as included amongst the natural rights of
every freeman. Such an infringement of another’s right may be regarded
as offensive to good morals (_contra bonos mores_); hence the
definition of _injuria_ as ‘an insult offered to any person against
good morals’ (_contumelia contra bonos mores alicui illata_).” De
Villiers, Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries, 22.
Footnote 13:
Meader _v._ Stone, 7 Met. (Mass.) 147 _Accord_.
See Rex _v._ Smith, 2 Car. & P. 449; Preiser _v._ Wielandt, 48 App.
Div. 569.
Footnote 14:
Hostile touching or in anger. Singer Co. _v._ Methvin, 184 Ala. 554;
McGlone _v._ Hanger, 56 Ind. App. 243; Booher _v._ Trainer, 172 Mo.
App. 376; Hough _v._ Iderhoff, 69 Or. 568; Raefeldt _v._ Koenig, 152
Wis. 459 _Accord_.
Touching _contra bonos mores_ but with no hostile intent. Richmond
_v._ Fisk, 160 Mass. 34. Taking liberties with a woman. Hatchett _v._
Blacketer, 162 Ky. 266; Timmons _v._ Kenrick, 53 Ind. App. 490.
Unauthorized surgical operation. Pratt _v._ Davis, 224 Ill. 300; Mohr
_v._ Williams, 95 Minn. 261; Schloendorff _v._ Society, 211 N. Y. 125;
Rolater _v._ Strain, 39 Okl. 572. But see Bennan _v._ Parsonnet, 83 N.
J. Law, 20. _Aliter_ where authorized by a minor. Bakker _v._ Welsh,
144 Mich. 632.
Footnote 15:
Kerifford’s Case, Clayt. 22 pl. 38 _Accord_. See, also, Steinman _v._
Baltimore Laundry Co., 109 Md. 62; Courtney _v._ Kneib, 131 Mo. App.
204.
Footnote 16:
The statement of the case has been abridged.
Footnote 17:
Courtney _v._ Kneib, 131 Mo. App. 204 _Accord_. Compare Reynolds _v._
Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273.
Footnote 18:
A part of the case, relating to a point of practice, is omitted.
Footnote 19:
Dodwell _v._ Burford, 1 Mod. 24; Hopper _v._ Reeve, 7 Taunt. 698;
Spear _v._ Chapman, 8 Ir. L. R. 461; Reynolds _v._ Pierson, 29 Ind.
App. 273; Burdick _v._ Worrall, 4 Barb. 596 (_semble_); Bull _v._
Colton, 22 Barb. 94; Clark _v._ Downing, 55 Vt. 259 _Accord_. But see
Kirland _v._ State, 43 Ind. 146.
An injury to the clothes on one’s back is a trespass on the person,
Regina _v._ Day, 1 Cox, C. C. 207. So is the removal of an ulster from
the plaintiff, Geraty _v._ Stern, 30 Hun, 426; or seizing anything in
the plaintiff’s hand, Scott _v._ State, 118 Ala. 115; Dyk _v._ De
Young, 35 Ill. App. 138; Steinman _v._ Baltimore Laundry Co., 109 Md.
62 (_semble_); Respublica _v._ De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111; or cutting
a rope connecting the plaintiff with his slave, State _v._ Davis, 1
Hill (S. C.) 46.
Footnote 20:
The statement of the pleadings and the arguments of counsel are
omitted.
Footnote 21:
Berry _v._ Da Costa, L. R. 1 C. P. 331; Collins _v._ Mack, 31 Ark.
684; Hattin _v._ Chapman, 46 Conn. 607; Graves _v._ Rivers, 123 Ga.
224; Tubbs _v._ Van Kleek, 12 Ill. 446; Tyler _v._ Salley, 82 Me. 128;
Sauer _v._ Schulenberg, 33 Md. 288; Sherman _v._ Rawson, 102 Mass.
395; Kelley _v._ Riley, 106 Mass. 339; Bennett _v._ Beam, 42 Mich.
346; Schmidt _v._ Durnham, 46 Minn. 227; Green _v._ Spencer, 3 Mo.
318; Musselman _v._ Barker, 26 Neb. 737; Coil _v._ Wallace, 24 N. J.
Law, 291; Kniffen _v._ McConnell, 30 N. Y. 285; Spellings _v._ Parks,
104 Tenn. 351; Daggett _v._ Wallace, 75 Tex. 352; Giese _v._ Schultz,
69 Wis. 521 _Accord_.
Weaver _v._ Bachert, 2 Pa. St. 80; Wrynn _v._ Downey, 27 R. I. 454
_Contra_.
Footnote 22:
But see 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, 65; 1 Bishop, New Criminal Law, §
38.
Footnote 23:
Beseler _v._ Stephani, 71 Ill. 400; Woodward _v._ Anderson, 9 Bush,
624; Paul _v._ Frazier, 3 Mass. 71; Welsund _v._ Schueller, 98 Minn.
475; Robinson _v._ Musser, 78 Mo. 153; Hamilton _v._ Lomax, 26 Barb.
615; Weaver _v._ Bachert, 2 Pa. St. 80; Conn _v._ Wilson, 2 Overt. 233
_Accord_. See Desborough _v._ Homes, 1 F. & F. 6.
An action is allowed by statute in some jurisdictions. Marshall _v._
Taylor, 98 Cal. 55; Swett _v._ Gray, 141 Cal. 83; McIlvain _v._ Emery,
88 Ind. 298; Verwers _v._ Carpenter, 166 Ia. 273; Watson _v._ Watson,
49 Mich. 540; Hood _v._ Sudderth, 111 N. C. 215; Breon _v._ Henkle, 14
Or. 494. The Scotch law is to the same effect. Smith, Law of Damages
in Scotland, 128. Under these statutes it has been held that there
must be a real seduction: “Consent must be procured by some trick or
artifice other than mere solicitation.” Brown _v._ Kingsley, 38 Ia.
220. Compare Breon _v._ Henkle, 14 Or. 494.
Even without a statute a guardian is liable in damages for the
seduction of his ward. Graham _v._ Wallace, 50 App. Div. 101. See also
Smith _v._ Richards, 29 Conn. 232.
Footnote 24:
Boulter _v._ Clarke, Bull. N. P. 16; Reg. _v._ Coney, 8 Q. B. D. 534,
538, 546, 549, 567; Logan _v._ Austin, 1 Stewart (Ala.) 476; Cadwell
_v._ Farrell, 28 Ill. 438; Adams _v._ Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531; Lund _v._
Tyler, 115 Ia. 236; McNeil _v._ Mullin, 70 Kan. 634; Galbraith _v._
Fleming, 60 Mich. 403; Grotton _v._ Glidden, 84 Me. 589; Commonwealth
_v._ Colburg, 119 Mass. 350 (_semble_); Lizana _v._ Lang. 90 Miss.
469; Jones _v._ Gale, 22 Mo. App. 637; Morris _v._ Miller, 83 Neb.
218; Stout _v._ Wren, 1 Hawks (N. C.), 420; Barholt _v._ Wright, 45
Ohio St. 177 (explaining Champer _v._ State, 14 Ohio St. 437); McCue
_v._ Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (_semble_); Willey _v._ Carpenter, 64 Vt. 212;
Shay _v._ Thompson, 59 Wis. 540; Miller _v._ Bayer, 94 Wis. 124
(procuring an abortion with plaintiff’s consent) _Accord_.
Reg. _v._ Coney, 15 Cox, C. C. 46 (_semble_), _per_ HAWKINS J.;
Hegarty _v._ Shine, L. R. 4 Ir. 288, 294 (_semble_); Goldnamer _v._
O’Brien, 98 Ky. 569 (procuring an abortion with plaintiff’s consent);
Lykins _v._ Hamrick, 144 Ky. 80, _Contra_. If the plaintiff is injured
by the defendant, both being engaged in an illegal charivari party, he
cannot recover damages from the defendant. Gilmore _v._ Fuller, 198
Ill. 130.
As to injury in the course of a “friendly scuffle,” see Gibeline _v._
Smith, 106 Mo. App. 545.
Footnote 25:
McNay _v._ Stratton, 9 Ill. App. 215; Price _v._ Bailey, 66 Ill. 48;
Hildebrand _v._ McCrum, 101 Ind. 61; Smith _v._ State, 7 Humph. 43;
Sorenson _v._ Dundas, 50 Wis. 335 _Accord_.
Compare Marshall _v._ Heller, 55 Wis. 392. For recent definitions see
Westberry _v._ Clanton, 136 Ga. 795; Coolahan _v._ Marshall Field &
Co., 159 Ill. App. 466; Efroymson _v._ Smith, 29 Ind. App. 451; Comer
_v._ Knowles, 17 Kan. 436; New York R. Co. _v._ Waldron, 116 Md. 441;
Smith _v._ Clark, 37 Utah, 116, 126.
Footnote 26:
Anon. 1 Vent. 306; Anon. 7 Mod. 8; Whithead _v._ Keyes, 3 All. 495
_Accord_.
Footnote 27:
If the bailiff, who has a process against one, says to him when he is
on horseback or in a coach, “You are my prisoner; I have a writ
against you,” upon which he submits, turns back, or goes with him,
though the bailiff never touched him, yet it is an arrest, because he
submitted to the process; but if, instead of going with the bailiff,
he had gone or fled from him, it could be no arrest, unless the
bailiff laid hold of him. Horner _v._ Battyn, Bull. N. P. 62.
Footnote 28:
Chinn _v._ Morris, 2 Car. & P. 361; Pocock _v._ Moore, Ry. & M. 321;
Peters _v._ Stanway, 6 Car. & P. 737; Granger _v._ Hill, 4 Bing. N.C.
212; Warner _v._ Riddiford, 4 C. B. N. S. 180 (criticizing Arrowsmith
_v._ Le Mesurier, 2 B. & P. N. R. 211); Singleton _v._ Kansas City
Base Ball Co., 172 Mo. App. 299 _Accord_.
To hold a man by the sleeve without professing to arrest him or
leading him to believe he is not free to get away is not an
imprisonment. Macintosh _v._ Cohen, 24 N. Zeal. L. R. 625.
Footnote 29:
Part of the case, not relating to imprisonment, has been omitted.
Footnote 30:
Johnson _v._ Tompkins, Baldw. C. C. 571, 601; Collins _v._ Fowler, 10
Ala. 858; Courtoy _v._ Dozier, 20 Ga. 369; Hawk _v._ Ridgway, 33 Ill.
473; Brushaber _v._ Stegemann, 22 Mich. 266; Josselyn _v._ McAllister,
25 Mich. 45; Moore _v._ Thompson, 92 Mich. 498; Ahern _v._ Collins, 39
Mo. 145; Strout _v._ Gooch, 8 Greenl. 126; Mowry _v._ Chase, 100 Mass.
79; Emery _v._ Chesley, 18 N. H. 198; Browning _v._ Rittenhouse, 40 N.
J. Law, 230; Hebrew _v._ Pulis, 73 N. J. Law, 621; Gold _v._ Bissell,
1 Wend. 210; Van Voorhees _v._ Leonard, 1 Thomp. & C. 148; Searls _v._
Viets, 2 Thomp. & C. 224; Limbeck _v._ Gerry, 15 Misc. 663; Martin
_v._ Houck, 141 N. C. 317; Huntington _v._ Shultz, Harp. 452; Mead
_v._ Young, 2 Dev. & Batt. 521; Haskins _v._ Young, 2 Dev. & Batt.
527; Jones _v._ Jones, 13 Ired. 448; McCracken _v._ Ansley, 4 Strob.
1; Gunderson _v._ Struebing, 125 Wis. 173 _Accord_.
Submission to wrongful detention by conductor of a train in
consequence of his representation of authority to detain plaintiff was
held an imprisonment in Whitman _v._ Atchison R. Co., 85 Kan. 150.
There must be reasonable ground for fear that defendant will use
force. Powell _v._ Champion Fibre Co., 150 N. C. 12.
But compare Cottam _v._ Oregon City, 98 Fed. 570, deciding that a
submission to arrest rather than pay an illegal license fee is not an
imprisonment.
Footnote 31:
A portion of the case, relating to damages, is omitted.
Footnote 32:
As to “shadowing” by detectives, see Chappell _v._ Stewart, 82 Md.
323; People _v._ Weiler, 179 N. Y. 46; Schultz _v._ Ins. Co., 151 Wis.
537.
Footnote 33:
Stat. 13 Ed. I. c. 48.
Footnote 34:
The concurring opinions of Williams and Patteson, JJ., are omitted.
Footnote 35:
Wright _v._ Wilson, 1 Ld. Raym. 739; Crossett _v._ Campbell, 122 La.
659; Balmain Ferry Co. _v._ Robertson, 4 C. L. R. (Australia) 379,
aff’d [1910] A. C. 295; Queen _v._ Macquarie, 13 N. S. W. Sup. Ct. R.
(Law) 264 (_semble_) _Accord_.
See Hawk _v._ Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473; Cullen _v._ Dickenson, 33 S. D.
27.
To order one to leave a boat which was moored to a wharf and, upon his
refusal, to set the boat adrift is an imprisonment. Queen _v._
Macquarie, 13 N. S. W. Sup. Ct. R. (Law) 264.
Compare Herd _v._ Weardale Steel Co. [1913] 3 K. B. 771; Robinson _v._
Ferry Co. [1910] A. C. 295; Whittaker _v._ Sanford, 110 Me. 77;
Talcott _v._ National Exhibition Co., 144 App. Div. 337.
Footnote 36:
Gates _v._ Miles, 3 Conn. 64, 70; McIntyre _v._ Sholty, 121 Ill. 660;
Amick _v._ O’Hara, 6 Blackf. 258, 259; Cross _v._ Kent, 32 Md. 581;
Feld _v._ Borodófski, 87 Miss. 727; Bullock _v._ Babcock, 3 Wend. 391;
Krom _v._ Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647. (imprisonment); Ward _v._
Conatser, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 64; Brennan _v._ Donaghey, 19 N. Zeal. Gaz.
L. R. 289, affirming s. c. 2 New Zeal. Gaz. L. R. 410 _Accord_.
The rule is the same as to torts in general. Behrens _v._ McKenzie, 23
Ia. 333, 343; Chesapeake R. Co. _v._ Francisco, 149 Ky. 307; Morain
_v._ Devlin, 132 Mass. 87 (nuisance); Gibson _v._ Pollock, 179 Mo.
App. 188; Jewell _v._ Colby, 66 N. H. 399; Re Heller, 3 Paige, 199;
Williams _v._ Hays, 143 N. Y. 442 (compare Williams _v._ Hays, 157 N.
Y. 541); Williams _v._ Cameron, 26 Barb. 172; Lancaster Bank _v._
Moore, 78 Pa. St. 407, 412; Morse _v._ Crawford, 17 Vt. 499
(conversion).
A lunatic has been held liable under a statute giving an action to the
widow and children of one killed by the “careless, wanton, or
malicious” use of firearms. Young _v._ Young, 141 Ky. 76.
In McIntyre _v._ Sholty, _supra_, Magruder, J., said, p. 664: “It is
well settled that, though a lunatic is not punishable criminally, he
is liable in a civil action for any tort he may commit. However justly
this doctrine may have been originally subject to criticism on the
grounds of reason and principle, it is now too firmly supported by the
weight of authority to be disturbed. It is the outcome of the
principle, that, in trespass, the intent is not conclusive. Mr.
Sedgwick, in his work on Damages (margin, p. 456), says that, on
principle, a lunatic should not be held liable for his tortious acts.
Opposed to this view, however, is a majority of the decisions and text
writers.”
“So long as the primitive notion prevailed that the doer of harm was
absolutely responsible therefor, the insanity of the doer could afford
no defence, either to a criminal prosecution or a civil action. 7
Harv. L. Rev. 446. When this notion was so far modified that
misadventure or accident on the part of the doer became a defence, it
would have been entirely logical for the courts to treat the acts or
the omissions of lunatics as involuntary, and consequently not
tortious but accidental.” Burdick, Torts (2d ed.), 60. See also Ames,
Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 99–100; Hornblower, Insanity and
the Law of Negligence, 5 Col. L. Rev. 278.
“827. A person who causes damage to another while in a condition of
unconsciousness or in a condition of morbid disturbance of mental
activity incompatible with the free determination of the will is not
responsible for the damage....”
“829. A person who ... is by virtue of 827 ... not responsible for any
damage caused by him shall nevertheless where compensation cannot be
obtained from a third party charged with the duty of supervision make
compensation for damage in so far as according to the circumstances
(e. g. according to the relative positions of the parties) equity
requires compensation and he is not deprived of the means which he
needs for his own maintenance suitable to his station in life and for
the fulfilment of his statutory duties to furnish maintenance to
others.”—German Civil Code, §§ 827, 829.
Footnote 37:
Underwood v. Hewson, 1 Stra. 596; Welch _v._ Durand, 36 Conn. 182;
Atchison _v._ Dullam, 16 Ill. App. 42; Hodges _v._ Weltberger, 6 Monr.
(Ky.) 337; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620; Chataigne _v._
Bergeron, 10 La. An. 699; Sullivan _v._ Murphy, 2 Miles (Pa.) 298;
Castle _v._ Duryee, 2 Keyes, 169; Taylor _v._ Rainbow, 2 Hen. & Mun.
423 _Accord_.
See to the same effect Morgan _v._ Cox, 22 Mo. 373; Dygert _v._
Bradley, 8 Wend. 469; Jennings _v._ Fundeburg, 4 McC. 161; Tally _v._
Ayres, 3 Sneed, 677 (the injury to chattels); Wetzel _v._ Satterwhite,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 93 (injury to property); Wright _v._ Clark,
50 Vt. 130. Compare Osborne _v._ Van Dyke, 113 Ia. 557.
Footnote 38:
Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524, 538 (_semble_); Morris _v._ Platt,
32 Conn. 75, 84–90 (defendant in defending himself lawfully against A.
fired a pistol at A., but accidentally hit the plaintiff); Paxton _v._
Boyer, 67 Ill. 132 (facts similar to those in Morris _v._ Platt,
_supra_); Crabtree _v._ Dawson, 119 Ky. 148 _Accord_.
Footnote 39:
Only the opinion of the court is given.
Footnote 40:
Alderson _v._ Waistell, 1 Car. & K. 358; The Virgo, 25 W. R. 397;
Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524 (_semble_); Strouse _v._
Whittlesey, 41 Conn. 559; Sutton _v._ Bonnett, 114 Ind. 243; Holland
_v._ Bartch, 120 Ind. 46 (see also Bennett _v._ Ford, 47 Ind. 264);
Harvey _v._ Dunlop, Hill & D. 193; Center _v._ Finney, 17 Barb. 94,
Seld. Notes, 80 _Accord_.
But one who by blasting throws rocks upon the plaintiff’s land is
liable in trespass _quare clausum fregit_, irrespective of negligence.
Central Co. _v._ Vandenheuk, 147 Ala. 546; Bessemer Co. _v._ Doak, 152
Ala. 166; Sloss Co. _v._ Salser, 158 Ala. 511; Birmingham Co. _v._
Grover, 159 Ala. 276; Hay _v._ Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; Tremain _v._
Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 163; St. Peter _v._ Denison, 58 N. Y. 416;
Sullivan _v._ Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290; Holland House _v._ Baird, 169 N.
Y. 136, 140. And the same rule has been applied to trespass to the
person by blasting. Sullivan _v._ Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290; Turner _v._
Degnon Co., 99 App. Div. 135.
Footnote 41:
Only so much of the report is given as relates to the first count.
Footnote 42:
See The Mediana, [1900] A. C. 113, 116–118; Columbus Co. _v._ Clowes,
[1903] 1 K. B. 244.
Footnote 43:
Brunsden _v._ Humphrey, 14 Q. B. D. 141, 150 (_semble_); Vogrin _v._
American Steel Co., 179 Ill. App. 245; Muncie Pulp Co. _v._ Davis, 162
Ind. 558; Foster _v._ County, 63 Kan. 43; Stepp _v._ Chicago R. Co.,
85 Mo. 229; Commercial Bank _v._ Ten Eyck, 48 N. Y. 305; McCaffrey
_v._ Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 47 Hun, 404; Washington _v._ Baltimore
R. Co., 17 W. Va. 190 _Accord_.
Compare Clifton _v._ Hooper, 6 Q. B. 468.
Footnote 44:
Statement condensed. Only part of opinion is given.
Footnote 45:
Carlisle Banking Co. _v._ Bragg, [1911] 1 K. B. 489; Jackson _v._
Metropolitan R. Co., 2 C. P. D. 125; Steel Car Co. _v._ Chec, 184 Fed.
868; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Pearce, 142 Ala. 680; Florida R. Co. _v._
Williams, 37 Fla. 406; Perry _v._ Central R., 66 Ga. 746; Cleveland R.
Co. _v._ Lindsay, 109 Ill. App. 533; City _v._ Martin, 74 Ind. 449;
Hart _v._ Brick Co., 154 Ia. 741; Goins _v._ North Coal Co., 140 Ky.
323; County _v._ Collison, 122 Md. 91; Tutein _v._ Hurley, 98 Mass.
211; McNally _v._ Colwell, 91 Mich. 527; Harlan _v._ St. Louis R. Co.,
65 Mo. 22; Wallace _v._ Chicago R. Co., 48 Mont. 427; Brotherton _v._
Manhattan Beach Co., 48 Neb. 563; Koch _v._ Fox, 71 App. Div. 288;
Alexander _v._ City, 165 N. C. 527; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Hess, 34
Okl. 615; Thubron _v._ Dravo Co., 238 Pa. St. 443; Anderson _v._
Southern R. Co., 70 S. C. 490; Newton _v._ Oregon R. Co., 43 Utah,
219; Sowles _v._ Moore, 65 Vt. 322; Schwartz _v._ Shull, 45 W. Va.
405; Klatt _v._ Foster, 92 Wis. 622 _Accord_.
Footnote 46:
Only so much of the case as relates to this count is given. The
arguments are omitted. The statement was compiled, by Professor
Jeremiah Smith, from the bill of exceptions filed in the Social Law
Library of Boston.
Footnote 47:
Western Co. _v._ Wood, 57 Fed. 471; Kyle _v._ Chicago R. Co., 182 Fed.
613; McCray _v._ Sharpe, 188 Ala. 375; Bachelder _v._ Morgan, 179 Ala.
339; St. Louis Co. _v._ Taylor, 84 Ark. 42; Chicago Co. _v._ Moss, 89
Ark. 187; Green _v._ Southern R. Co., 9 Ga. App. 751; Haas _v._ Metz,
78 Ill. App. 46; Kalen _v._ Terre Haute Co., 18 Ind. App. 202; Zabron
_v._ Cunard Co., 151 Ia. 345; Kentucky Traction Co. _v._ Bain, 161 Ky.
44; Wyman _v._ Leavitt, 71 Me. 227; Wilson _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 160
Mo. App. 649; Arthur _v._ Henry, 157 N. C. 438; Samarra _v._ Allegheny
Co., 238 Pa. St. 469; Folk _v._ Seaboard Co., 99 S. C. 284; Chesapeake
R. Co. _v._ Tinsley, 116 Va. 600; Gulf Co. _v._ Trott, 86 Tex. 412
_Accord_.
Footnote 48:
“Ordinary street cars must be run with reference to ordinary
susceptibilities, and the liability of their proprietors cannot be
increased simply by a passenger’s notifying the conductor that he has
unstable nerves.” Holmes J., in Spade _v._ Lynn R. Co., 172 Mass. 488,
491. But compare Webber _v._ Old Colony R. Co., 210 Mass. 432.
Footnote 49:
Victorian Commissioners _v._ Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222; Haile _v._
Tex. Co., 60 Fed. 557; St. Louis Co. _v._ Bragg, 69 Ark. 402; Braun
_v._ Craven, 175 Ill. 401 (_semble_); Kansas Co. _v._ Dalton, 65 Kan.
661; Morse _v._ Chesapeake Co., 117 Ky. 11; Reed _v._ Ford, 129 Ky.
471; White _v._ Sander, 168 Mass. 296; Smith _v._ Postal Co., 174
Mass. 576; Homans _v._ Boston Co., 180 Mass. 456 (_semble_); Cameron
_v._ N. E. Co., 182 Mass. 310 (_semble_); Nelson _v._ Crawford, 122
Mich. 466; Crutcher _v._ Cleveland Co., 132 Mo. App. 311; Deming _v._
Chicago Co., 80 Mo. App. 152; Rawlings _v._ Wabash Co., 97 Mo. App.
515; Ward _v._ West Co., 65 N. J. Law, 383; Porter _v._ Del. Co., 73
N. J. Law, 405 (_semble_); Mitchell _v._ Rochester Co., 151 N. Y. 107;
Newton _v._ N. Y. Co., 106 App. Div. 415 (_semble_); Prince _v._
Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 667 (_semble_); Hutchinson _v._ Stern, 115 App.
Div. 791; Miller _v._ Belt Co., 78 Ohio St. 309; Ewing _v._ Pittsburgh
Co., 147 Pa. St. 40; Linn _v._ Duquesne Co., 204 Pa. St. 551; Huston
_v._ Freemansburg, 212 Pa. St. 548; Hess _v._ American Pipe Co., 221
Pa. St. 67; Morris _v._ Lackawana R. Co., 228 Pa. St. 198; Taylor _v._
Atlantic Co., 78 S. C. 552; Ford _v._ Schliessman, 107 Wis. 479, 483
(_semble_) Accord.
The damages for an admitted tort to the person may be enhanced by
proof of nervous shock caused by fright induced by the defendant’s
misconduct. Eagan _v._ Middlesex R. Co., 212 Fed. 562, 214 Fed. 747;
Birmingham Co. _v._ Martini, 2 Ala. App. 653; Melone _v._ Sierra Co.,
151 Cal. 113; Seger _v._ Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290; Masters _v._
Warren, 27 Conn. 293; Garvey _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 155 Ill. App.
601; Pittsburgh Co. _v._ Sponier, 85 Ind. 165; McClintic _v._ Eckman,
153 Ky. 704; Newport Co. _v._ Gholson, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 938; City Co.
_v._ Robinson, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 555; Green _v._ Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69;
Warren _v._ Boston Co., 163 Mass. 484; Homans _v._ Boston Co., 180
Mass. 456; Cameron _v._ N. E. Co., 182 Mass. 310; Driscoll _v._
Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102; Conley _v._ United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238;
Smith _v._ St. Paul Co., 30 Minn. 169; Hollingshed _v._ Yazoo R. Co.,
99 Miss. 464; Butts _v._ Nat. Bank, 99 Mo. App. 168; Breen _v._ St.
Louis Co., 102 Mo. App. 479; Heiberger _v._ Missouri Tel. Co., 133 Mo.
App. 452; Lowe _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 145 Mo. App. 248; Buchanan
_v._ West Co., 52 N. J. Law, 265; Consol. Co. _v._ Lambertson, 59 N.
J. Law, 297; Stokes _v._ Schlacter, 66 N. J. Law, 334; Porter _v._
Del. Co., 73 N. J. Law, 405; Kennell _v._ Gershonovitz, 84 N. J. Law,
577; O’Flaherty _v._ Nassau Co., 34 App. Div. 74 (affirmed 165 N. Y.
624); Cohn _v._ Ansonia Co., 162 App. Div. 791; Pa. Co. _v._ Graham,
63 Pa. St. 290; Scott _v._ Montgomery, 95 Pa. St. 444; Ewing _v._
Pittsburgh Co., 147 Pa. St. 40 (_semble_); Linn _v._ Duquesne Co., 204
Pa. St. 551 (_semble_); Samarra _v._ Allegheny R. Co., 238 Pa. St.
469; Folk _v._ Seaboard Co., 99 S. C. 284; Godeau _v._ Blood, 52 Vt.
251; Nordgren _v._ Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305; Shutz _v._ Chicago Co., 73
Wis. 147; and even though the admitted tort is only an assault as
distinguished from a battery. Kline _v._ Kline, 158 Ind. 602; Williams
_v._ Underhill, 63 App. Div. 223; Leach _v._ Leach, 11 Tex. Civ. App.
699. It must be shown that there was causal connection between the
fright and the shock. Hack _v._ Dady, 142 App. Div. 510.
In Homans _v._ Boston Co., _supra_, the court said, through Holmes, C.
J.: “As has been explained repeatedly, it is an arbitrary exception,
based upon a notion of what is practicable, that prevents a recovery
for visible illness resulting from nervous shock alone. Spade _v._
Lynn Co.; Smith _v._ Postal Co., 174 Mass. 576. But when there has
been a battery and the nervous shock results from the same wrongful
management as the battery, it is at least equally impracticable to go
further and to inquire whether the shock comes through the battery or
along with it. Even were it otherwise, recognizing as we must the
logic in favor of the plaintiff when a remedy is denied because the
only immediate wrong was a shock to the nerves, we think that when the
reality of the cause is guaranteed by proof of a substantial battery
of the person there is no occasion to press further the exception to
general rules.” See also Spade _v._ Lynn Co., 172 Mass. 690, per
Holmes, C. J.
_Liability for frightening an Animal to Death._ The doctrine of the
principal case was carried so far in Lee _v._ Burlington, 113 Ia.,
356, that no recovery was allowed for the death of a horse from fright
caused by the careless conduct of the defendant. But the opposite view
prevailed in Louisville R. Co. _v._ Melton, 158 Ala. 509, and Conklin
_v._ Thompson, 29 Barb. 218.
Footnote 50:
Portions of the statement of facts have been omitted.
Footnote 51:
See to the same effect Phillips _v._ Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11; Cleveland
Co. _v._ Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374; Gaskins _v._ Runkle, 25 Ind. App.
584; Mahoney _v._ Dankwart, 108 Ia. 321; McGee _v._ Vanover, 148 Ky.
737; Chesapeake R. Co. _v._ Robinett, 151 Ky. 778; Sperier _v._ Ott,
116 La. 1087; Renner _v._ Canfield, 36 Minn. 90; Bucknam _v._ Great
Northern R. Co., 76 Minn. 373; Sanderson _v._ Great Northern R. Co.,
88 Minn. 162; Hutchinson _v._ Stern, 115 App. Div. 791; Gosa _v._
Southern Ry., 67 S. C. 347; Gulf R. Co. _v._ Overton, 101 Tex. 583
(but compare Gulf R. Co. _v._ Coopwood, 16 Tex. Ct. Rep. 354); Taylor
_v._ Spokane R. Co., 72 Wash. 378, rev’g 67 Wash. 96.
Footnote 52:
Pullman Co. _v._ Lutz, 154 Ala. 517; Spearman _v._ McCrary, 4 Ala.
App. 473; Sloane _v._ So. Co., 111 Cal. 668; Watson _v._ Dilts, 116
Ia. 249; Cowan _v._ Tel. Co., 122 Ia. 379, 382 (_semble_); Purcell
_v._ St. Paul Co., 48 Minn. 134, 138; Lesch _v._ Great Northern R.
Co., 97 Minn. 503; Watkins _v._ Kaolin Co., 131 N. C. 536; Taber _v._
Seaboard Co., 81 S. C. 317; Simone _v._ R. I. Co., 28 R. I. 186; Mack
_v._ South Co., 52 S. C. 323; Hill _v._ Kimball, 76 Tex. 210; Gulf Co.
_v._ Hayter, 93 Tex. 239; Yoakum _v._ Kroeger, (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S.
W. 953; St. Louis Co. _v._ Murdock, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 249; Pankopf
_v._ Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146; Fitzpatrick _v._ Gr. W. Co., 12 Up. Can.
Q. B. 645; Bell _v._ Great Northern R. Co., 26 L. R. Ir. 428; Cooper
_v._ Caledonia Co. (Court of Sess., June 14, 1902), 4. F. 880
_Accord_.
See Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence
without Impact, 41 Am. L. Reg. & Rev. 141.
_Mental Anguish caused by Negligence in Transmission of Telegrams._ In
a few states the addressee is allowed to recover damages for mental
anguish resulting from the negligent failure of a telegraph company to
make seasonable delivery of a message. Mentzer _v._ Western Co., 93
Ia. 752; Cowan _v._ Western Co., 122 Ia. 379; Hurlburt _v._ Western
Co., 123 Ia. 295; Chapman _v._ Western Co., 90 Ky. 265; Western Co.
_v._ Van Cleave, 107 Ky. 464; Western Co. _v._ Fisher, 107 Ky. 513;
Graham _v._ Western Co., 109 La. 1069; Barnes _v._ Western Co., 27
Nev. 438 (_semble_); Thompson _v._ Western Co., 106 N. C. 549; Young
_v._ Western Co., 107 N. C. 370; Bryan _v._ Western Co., 133 N. C.
603; Woods _v._ Western Co., 148 N. C. 1; Hellams _v._ Western Co., 70
S. C. 83 (_statutory_); Capers _v._ Western Co., 71 S. C. 29;
Wadsworth _v._ Western Co., 86 Tenn. 695; Railroad _v._ Griffin, 92
Tenn. 694; So Relle _v._ Western Co., 55 Tex. 308; Stuart _v._ Western
Co., 66 Tex. 580; Western Co. _v._ Beringer, 84 Tex. 38.
But the weight of authority is against such recovery. Chase _v._
Western Co., 44 Fed. 554; Crawson _v._ Western Co., 47 Fed. 544; Tyler
_v._ Western Co., 54 Fed. 634; Western Co. _v._ Wood, 57 Fed. 471;
Gahan _v._ Western Co., 59 Fed. 433; Stansell _v._ Western Co., 107
Fed. 668; Western Co. _v._ Sklar, 126 Fed. 295; Rowan _v._ Western
Co., 149 Fed. 550; Blount _v._ Western Co., 126 Ala. 105; Western Co.
_v._ Krichbaum, 132 Ala. 535; Western Co. _v._ Blocker, 138 Ala. 484;
Western Co. _v._ Waters, 139 Ala. 652; Peay _v._ Western Co., 64 Ark.
538 (but changed by statute, Western Co. _v._ McMullin, 98 Ark. 346);
Russell _v._ Western Co., 3 Dak. 315; Internat. Co. _v._ Saunders, 32
Fla. 434; Chapman _v._ Western Co., 88 Ga. 763; Giddens _v._ Western
Co., 111 Ga. 824; Western Co. _v._ Haltom, 71 Ill. App. 63; Western
Co. _v._ Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64 (overruling Reese _v._ Western Co., 123
Ind. 294); West _v._ Western Co., 39 Kan. 93 (_semble_); Cole _v._
Gray, 70 Kan. 705; Francis _v._ Western Co., 58 Minn. 252; Western Co.
_v._ Rogers, 68 Miss. 748; Duncan _v._ Western Co., 93 Miss. 500;
Connell _v._ Western Co., 116 Mo. 34; Newman _v._ Western Co., 54 Mo.
App. 434; Curtin _v._ Western Co., 13 App. Div. 253; Morton _v._
Western Co., 53 Ohio St. 431; Butner _v._ Western Co., 2 Okl. 234;
Western Co. _v._ Chouteau, 28 Okl. 664; Lewis _v._ Western Co., 57 S.
C. 325 (law changed by statute in 1900, Capers _v._ Western Co., 71 S.
C. 29); Connelly _v._ Western Co., 100 Va. 51; Corcoran _v._ Postal
Co., 80 Wash. 570; Davis _v._ Western Co., 46 W. Va. 48; Summerfield
_v._ Western Co., 87 Wis. 1; Koerber _v._ Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 464
(_semble_).
Footnote 53:
Only the judgment of the court is printed.
Footnote 54:
Hall _v._ Jackson, 24 Col. App. 225; Dunn _v._ Western Co., 2 Ga. App.
845; Goddard _v._ Watters, 14 Ga. App. 722 (_semble_); Watson _v._
Dilts, 116 Ia. 249, 124 Ia. 249; Lonergan _v._ Small, 81 Kan. 48;
Nelson _v._ Crawford, 122 Mich. 466 (_semble_); Preiser _v._ Wielandt,
48 App. Div. 569; Buchanan _v._ Stout, 123 App. Div. 648 (_semble_);
Miller _v._ R. R. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 324 (_semble_); Butler _v._
Western Co., 62 S. C. 222 (_semble_); Western Co. _v._ Watson, 82
Miss. 101 (_semble_); Shellabarger _v._ Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566;
Wilson _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 160 Mo. App. 649; Hill _v._ Kimball, 76
Tex. 210; Davidson _v._ Lee, (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 904; Jeppsen
_v._ Jensen, 47 Utah 536 _Accord_.
_Threats not amounting to an Assault._ Threats of bodily harm sent by
letter and causing illness by reason of apprehension of bodily harm
are grounds for an action. Houston _v._ Woolley, 37 Mo. App. 15;
Grimes _v._ Gates, 47 Vt. 594. Compare Stevens _v._ Steadman, 140 Ga.
680; Degenhardt _v._ Heller, 93 Wis. 662.
Footnote 55:
The opinion of Cozens-Hardy, M.R., sustaining the award is omitted.
Footnote 56:
“On principle, the distinction between cases of physical impact or
lesion being necessary as a ground of liability for damage caused
seems to have nothing in its favour—always on the footing that the
causal connection between the injury and the occurrence is
established. If compensation is to be recovered under the statute or
at common law in respect of an occurrence which has caused dislocation
of a limb, on what principle can it be denied if the same occurrence
has caused unhinging of the mind? The personal injury in the latter
case may be infinitely graver than in the former, and to what avail—in
the incidence of justice, or the principle of law—is it to say that
there is a distinction between things physical and mental? This is the
broadest difference of all, and it carries with it no principle of
legal distinction. Indeed it may be suggested that the proposition
that injury so produced to the mind is unaccompanied by physical
affection or change might itself be met by modern physiology or
pathology with instant challenge.” Lord Shaw in Coyle _v._ Watson,
[1915] A. C. 1, 14.
Footnote 57:
Statement abridged.
Footnote 58:
Metropolitan R. Co. _v._ Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193; Hyman _v._ Nye, 6
Q. B. D. 685; Simkin _v._ London R. Co., 21 Q. B. D. 453; Smith _v._
Browne, 28 L. R. Ir. 1; Bizzell _v._ Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Western R.
Co. _v._ Vaughan, 113 Ga. 354; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Scott, 42 Ill. 132;
City _v._ Cook, 99 Ind. 10; Needham _v._ Louisville R. Co., 85 Ky.
423; Merrill _v._ Bassett, 97 Me. 501; Heinz _v._ Baltimore R. Co.,
113 Md. 582; Chenery _v._ Fitchburg R. Co., 160 Mass. 211; Brick _v._
Bosworth, 162 Mass. 334; Keown _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 141 Mo. 86;
Teepan _v._ Taylor, 141 Mo. App. 282; Brown _v._ Merrimack Bank, 67 N.
H. 549; Nashville R. Co. _v._ Wade, 127 Tenn. 154; Coates _v._ Canaan,
51 Vt. 131; Fowler _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 18 W. Va. 579; Schrunk _v._
St. Joseph, 120 Wis. 223 _Accord_.
“We do not understand that an employer’s liability for the negligent
act of his superintendent can be measured by the latter’s poise of
temperament, nor that the character of a given act of the
superintendent in respect of negligence can be made to depend upon his
excitability or the reverse. It is the duty of a superintendent to do
what an ordinarily careful and prudent man would do under the same
circumstances, and the employer is liable if he fail to do this and
injury results to an employe.” Bessemer Land Co. _v._ Campbell, 121
Ala. 50, 60.
Also it is erroneous to charge the jury that failure to exercise the
care of “an ordinary man under like circumstances” or of “a person
under similar circumstances” or “just such as one of you, similarly
employed, would have exercised under like circumstances” amounts to
negligence. Austin R. Co. _v._ Beatty, 73 Tex. 592; St. Louis R. Co.
_v._ Finley, 79 Tex. 85; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Gower, 85 Tenn. 465.
Footnote 59:
“See Lambert _v._ Bessey, T. Raym. 422; Scott _v._ Shepherd, 3 Wils.
403. Probably an action of trespass might have been brought.”
[Reporter’s note.]
Footnote 60:
Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524; Thompson _v._ Chicago R. Co., 189
Fed. 723; Fort Smith Co. _v._ Slover, 58 Ark. 168; Richardson _v._
Kier, 34 Cal. 63; Nolan _v._ New York R. Co., 53 Conn. 461; Wolf Mfg.
Co. _v._ Wilson, 152 Ill. 9; Cincinnati R. Co. _v._ Peters, 80 Ind.
168; Galloway _v._ Chicago R. Co., 87 Ia. 458; Schneider _v._ Little,
184 Mich. 315; Lauritsen _v._ Bridge Co., 87 Minn. 518; McGraw _v._
Chicago R. Co., 59 Neb. 397; Roberts _v._ Boston R. Co., 69 N. H. 354;
Drake _v._ Mount, 33 N. J. Law, 441; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Watson, 36
Okl. 1; Ahern _v._ Oregon Co., 24 Or. 276; Houston R. Co. _v._
Alexander, 103 Tex. 594; Washington _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 17 W. Va.
190 _Accord_.
Footnote 61:
Sharp _v._ Powell, L. R. 7. C. P. 253; Pearson _v._ Cox, 2 C. P. D.
369; Gregg _v._ Illinois R. Co., 147 Ill. 550, 560; Missouri R. Co.
_v._ Columbia, 65 Kan. 390, 400; Sutphen _v._ Hedden, 67 N. J. Law,
324; Crutchfield _v._ Richmond R. Co., 76 N. C. 320; Martin _v._
Highland Park Co., 128 N. C. 264; Simpson _v._ Southern R. Co., 154 N.
C. 51; McCauley _v._ Logan, 152 Pa. St. 202; Bradley _v._ Lake Shore
R. Co., 238 Pa. St. 315 (“only an extreme visionary would have
imagined the consequences which followed or that injury could result
to person or property therefrom”); Consumers Brewing Co. _v._ Doyle,
102 Va. 399; Lippert _v._ Brewing Co., 141 Wis. 453 _Accord_.
Footnote 62:
Only that part of the opinion which relates to this instruction is
given.
Footnote 63:
“There is no absolute or intrinsic negligence; it is always relative
to some circumstances of time, place, or person.” Bramwell, B., in
Degg _v._ Midland R. Co., 1 Hurlst. & N. 773, 781. See also Bowen, L.
J., in Thomas _v._ Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685, 694.
Bizzell _v._ Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Needham _v._ San Francisco R. Co.,
37 Cal. 409; Diamond Iron Co. _v._ Giles, 7 Houst. 557; Atlantic R.
Co. _v._ Moore, 8 Ga. App. 185; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Johnson, 103 Ill.
512; Parks _v._ Yost, 93 Kan. 334; Sheridan _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 101
Md. 50; Kelly _v._ Michigan R. Co., 65 Mich. 186; De Bolt _v._ Kansas
City R. Co., 123 Mo. 496; Garland _v._ Boston R. Co., 76 N. H. 556;
New Jersey Exp. Co. _v._ Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 434; McGuire _v._
Spence, 91 N. Y. 303; Connell _v._ New York R. Co., 144 App. Div. 664;
Anderson _v._ Atlantic R. Co., 161 N. C. 462; Elster _v._ Springfield,
49 Ohio St. 82; Frankford Co. _v._ Philadelphia R. Co., 54 Pa. St.
345; Virginia Power Co. _v._ Smith, 117 Va. 418; Morrison _v._ Power
Co., 75 W. Va. 608; Davis _v._ Chicago R. Co., 58 Wis. 646 _Accord_.
Hence it is incorrect to define ordinary care as “such care as the
ordinary person uses in the transaction of the ordinary affairs of
life.” Hennesey _v._ Chicago R. Co., 99 Wis. 109.
Footnote 64:
Only part of the opinion is given.
Footnote 65:
Rosenthal _v._ Chicago R. Co., 255 Ill. 552; Indianapolis Traction Co.
_v._ Crawley, 51 Ind. App. 357 (deaf man); O’Flaherty _v._ Union R.
Co., 45 Mo. 70; Simms _v._ South Carolina R. Co., 27 S. C. 268.
_Accord_.
Footnote 66:
Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.
Footnote 67:
The instruction which the court held should have been given in Winn
_v._ Lowell was: “If the plaintiff was a person of poor sight, common
prudence required of her greater care in walking upon the streets, and
avoiding obstructions, than is required of persons of good sight.”
Footnote 68:
Compare Fenneman _v._ Holden, 75 Md. 1; Karl _v._ Juniata, 206 Pa. St.
633; Thompson _v._ Salt Lake Co., 16 Utah 281.
Footnote 69:
Statement abridged. Only so much of the opinion is given as relates to
a single point.
Footnote 70:
Compare Wilson _v._ Brett, 11 M. & W. 113; Austin _v._ Manchester R.
Co., 10 C. B. 454; Grill _v._ General Collier Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 600;
Steamboat New World _v._ King, 16 How. 469; Purple _v._ Union R. Co.,
114 Fed. 123; Oregon Co. _v._ Roe, 176 Fed. 715; Stringer _v._ Alabama
R. Co., 99 Ala. 397; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Shanks, 94 Ind. 598; Denny
_v._ Chicago R. Co., 150 Ia. 460; Raymond _v._ Portland R. Co., 100
Me. 529; McPheeters _v._ Hannibal R. Co., 45 Mo. 22; Reed _v._
Telegraph Co., 135 Mo. 661; Village _v._ Holliday, 50 Neb. 229;
Perkins _v._ New York R. Co., 24 N. Y. 196; McAdoo _v._ Richmond R.
Co., 105 N. C. 140; Fitzgerald _v._ Grand Trunk R. Co., 4 Ont. App.
601 _Accord_.
In Wilson _v._ Brett, _supra_, Rolfe, B., said: “I could see no
difference between negligence and gross negligence—... it was the same
thing with the addition of a vituperative epithet.”
Footnote 71:
Maryland R. Co. _v._ Tucker, 115 Md. 43; Cates _v._ Hall, 171 N. C.
360; Lundy _v._ Southern Tel. Co., 90 S. C. 25 _Accord_.
See various forms of stating this general doctrine in 2 Hutchinson on
Carriers, (3d. ed.) §§ 895, 896; 4 Elliott on Railroads (1st ed.) §
1585; 1 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (6th ed.) § 51.
In Wharton on Negligence (1st ed.) §§ 636, 637, the author says that
the diligence should be “that which a good carrier of the particular
grade is accustomed to exert;” _i. e._, “the diligence and skill which
a good business man in his specialty is accustomed to use under
similar circumstances.”
For a criticism of Wharton’s statement, see 1 S. & R. Negl. (6th ed.)
§§ 43–50. And compare 2 Hutchinson on Carriers (3d ed.) § 897, note
13.
“It is reasonable care under the existing circumstances that one
person has the right to require of another; and that degree of care
becomes increased with any increase of the apparent danger involved in
its absence or with the increased power of control of one of the
parties whose conduct is in question.... A common carrier of
passengers either by rail or by water has so complete a control and
the consequences of negligence on his part may be so serious that he
is justly held to a very high degree of care for their safety; and
accordingly it has been often said, both in this and in other
jurisdictions, that he is held to the exercise of the highest degree
of care. But as was pointed out in Dodge _v._ Boston & Bangor
Steamship Co., 148 Mass. 207, 217, 218, this phrase and similar words
which have been used to convey the same idea mean simply that the
carrier is bound to use the utmost care consistent with the nature of
his undertaking and with a due regard for all other matters that ought
to be considered in conducting the business. This conductor was not
bound absolutely to exercise the highest degree of care in running his
car, but only the highest degree of care which was consistent with the
practical performance of all his duties in seeing that the car was run
safely without unreasonable delays, and so as to provide for the
safety and convenience and properly rapid transit of his passengers.
What was required of him was the highest degree of care consistent
with the practical management and operation of his car for the
carriage of passengers, ‘or in other words, the requirement [was]
reasonable care according to the nature of the contract’ with the
passengers.” Sheldon, J., in Gardner _v._ Boston R. Co., 204 Mass.
213, 216. Compare Campbell, J., in Michigan R. Co. _v._ Coleman, 28
Mich. 440, 449.
Footnote 72:
Only so much of the case is given as relates to a single point.
Footnote 73:
“Due care,” “reasonable care,” and “ordinary care” are synonymous
terms. Neal _v._ Gillett, 23 Conn. 437; Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Faith,
175 Ill. 58; Raymond _v._ Portland R. Co., 100 Me. 529; Durant _v._
Palmer, 29 N. J. Law, 544.
Footnote 74:
“But it would savor too much of refinement to hold that there is any
practical inaccuracy in saying that one driving a high-powered
automobile must exercise a greater care toward others on a state
highway than one plodding along a country road with an ox team.” Rugg,
C. J., in Com. _v._ Horsfall, 213 Mass. 232, 235.
Footnote 75:
“The rule, that due diligence is such attention and effort applied to
a given case as the ordinary prudent man would put forth under the
same circumstances, seems to meet the demands of every conceivable
case.... The ratio of diligence to circumstances being thus fixed, the
two extremes may change to an infinite extent without destroying the
ratio, and without giving rise to what we term negligence. The bailee
who undertakes the carriage of stone for the paving of a street is
held to the rule that he must use such attention and effort as the
ordinary prudent man would use under like circumstances.”
“The bailee, who undertakes to repair a delicate watch, is held to the
rule that he must use such attention and effort as the ordinary
prudent man would use under the same circumstances. The contract of
the watchmaker is the same, relatively, as that of the hod-carrier.
Each contracts to provide the reasonable ordinary skill and attention
which a man in his position would exercise under like circumstances.
The ratio, proportion, or correspondence of diligence to
circumstances, of care to surroundings, is fixed and identical. And in
determining a question of diligence or negligence in either case, it
would be only necessary to apply the same rule to varying
circumstances and persons, to demand the same ratio between varying
extremes. And it is not too much to assert that all the perplexity and
misunderstanding on the subject of diligence and negligence are due to
the habit of confounding the specific acts and circumstances, which
must always vary, with the ratio or relation between them, which
remains always the same. It is true that there _may_ be different
ratios of effort and attention to the circumstances and to the results
desired. A man may contract to furnish the highest skill, the most
perfect means and appliances, the most assiduous attention in the
accomplishment of a specific end. But, when an individual so
contracts, there is the element of _special_ or _positive_ intention
introduced, which takes the case out of the category of diligence, and
renders such a contract a special and extraordinary one. The law never
requires such a special, positive intention....” 6 Albany Law Journ.
313, 314.
Footnote 76:
Arguments omitted.
Footnote 77:
A fuller statement of the views of the learned judge may be found in
the extracts, which follow, from his work on Bailments:
“Section 11. [On the subject of the various degrees of care or
diligence which are recognized in the common law.]... There may be a
high degree of diligence, a common degree of diligence, and a slight
degree of diligence;...”
“Common or ordinary diligence is that degree of diligence which men in
general exact in respect to their own concerns.... That may be said to
be common or ordinary diligence, in the sense of the law, which men of
common prudence generally exercise about their own affairs in the age
and country in which they live.”
“Section 16. Having thus ascertained the nature of ordinary diligence,
we may now be prepared to decide upon the other two degrees. High or
great diligence is of course extraordinary diligence, or that which
very prudent persons take of their own concerns; and low or slight
diligence is that which persons of less than common prudence, or
indeed of any prudence at all, take of their own concerns. Sir William
Jones considers the latter to be the exercise of such diligence as a
man of common sense, however inattentive, takes of his own concerns.
Perhaps this is expressing the measure a little too loosely; for a man
may possess common sense, nay, uncommon sense, and yet be so grossly
inattentive to his own concerns as to deserve the appellation of
having no prudence at all. The measure is rather to be drawn from the
diligence which men, habitually careless or of little prudence (not
‘however inattentive’ they may be), generally take in their own
concerns.”
“Section 17. Having, then, arrived at the three degrees of diligence,
we are naturally led to those of negligence, which correspond thereto;
for negligence may be ordinary, or less than ordinary, or more than
ordinary. Ordinary negligence may be defined to be the want of
ordinary diligence, and slight negligence to be the want of great
diligence, and gross negligence to be the want of slight diligence.
For he who is only less diligent than very careful men cannot be said
to be more than slightly inattentive; he who omits ordinary care is a
little more negligent than men ordinarily are; and he who omits even
slight diligence fails in the lowest degree of prudence, and is deemed
grossly negligent....” Story on Bailments (8th ed.), §§ 11, 16, 17.
See also Redington _v._ Pacific Co., 107 Cal. 317, 323–324; Belt Line
R. Co. _v._ Banicki, 102 Ill. App. 642; Union R. Co. _v._ Henry, 36
Kan. 565; French _v._ Buffalo R. Co., 2 Abb. Dec. 196, 200–201, 4
Keyes 108, 113–114; Cederson _v._ Navigation Co., 38 Or. 343; Lockwood
_v._ Belle City R. Co., 92 Wis. 97, 111–113; Astin _v._ Chicago R.
Co., 143 Wis. 477.
“The theory that there are three degrees of negligence described by
the terms slight, ordinary, and gross, has been introduced into the
common law from some of the commentators on the Roman law. It may be
doubted if these terms can be usefully applied in practice. Their
meaning is not fixed, or capable of being so. One degree, thus
described, not only may be confounded with another, but it is quite
impracticable exactly to distinguish them. Their signification
necessarily varies according to circumstances, to whose influence the
courts have been forced to yield, until there are so many real
exceptions that the rules themselves can scarcely be said to have a
general operation. In Storer _v._ Gowen, 18 Maine, 177, the Supreme
Court of Maine says: ‘How much care will, in a given case, relieve a
party from the imputation of gross negligence, or what omission will
amount to the charge, is necessarily a question of fact, depending on
a great variety of circumstances which the law cannot exactly define.’
Mr. Justice Story, Bailments, § 11, says: ‘Indeed, what is common or
ordinary diligence is more a matter of fact than of law.’ If the law
furnishes no definition of the terms gross negligence, or ordinary
negligence, which can be applied in practice, but leaves it to the
jury to determine, in each case, what the duty was, and what omissions
amount to a breach of it, it would seem that imperfect and confessedly
unsuccessful attempts to define that duty had better be abandoned.
“Recently, the judges of several courts have expressed their
disapprobation of these attempts to fix the degrees of diligence by
legal definitions, and have complained of the impracticability of
applying them. Wilson _v._ Brett, 11 Meeson and Wels. 113; Wyld _v._
Pickford, 8 ibid. 443, 461, 462; Hinton _v._ Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646, 651.
It must be confessed that the difficulty in defining gross negligence,
which is apparent in perusing such cases as Tracy et al. _v._ Wood, 3
Mason 132, and Foster _v._ The Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, would alone
be sufficient to justify these complaints. It may be added that some
of the ablest commentators on the Roman law, and on the civil code of
France have wholly repudiated this theory of three degrees of
diligence, as unfounded in principles of natural justice, useless in
practice, and presenting inextricable embarrassments and difficulties.
See Toullier’s Droit Civil, 6th vol., p. 239, etc.; 11th vol., p. 203,
etc.; Makeldey, Man. Du Droit Romain, 191.” Curtis, J., in Steamboat
_v._ King, 16 How. 469, 474 (injury to gratuitous passenger).
“Confusion has arisen from regarding negligence as a positive instead
of a negative word. It is really the absence of such care as it was
the duty of the defendant to use. A bailee is only bound to use the
ordinary care of a man, and so the absence of it is called gross
negligence. A person who undertakes to do some work for reward to an
article must exercise the care of a skilled workman, and the absence
of such care in him is negligence. Gross, therefore, is a word of
description, and not a definition; and it would have been only
introducing a source of confusion to use the expression gross
negligence, instead of the equivalent, a want of due care and skill in
navigating the vessel, which was again and again used by the Lord
Chief Justice in his summing up.” Willes, J., in Grill _v._ General
Collier Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 600.
As to the standard for physicians, see McNevins _v._ Lowe, 40 Ill.
209; Small _v._ Howard, 128 Mass. 131; Luka _v._ Lowrie, 171 Mich.
122; Booth _v._ Andrus, 91 Neb. 810; McCandless _v._ McWha, 22 Pa. St.
261.
Footnote 78:
Statement rewritten. Only part of case is given.
Footnote 79:
The word gross was struck out by chap. 375, Acts of 1907, § 1.
Footnote 80:
Compare Martin _v._ Boston R. Co., 205 Mass. 16; Devine _v._ New York
R. Co., 205 Mass. 416.
Footnote 81:
For other cases of statutory degrees of negligence, see Seaboard R.
Co. _v._ Cauthen, 115 Ga. 422; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Long, 94 Ky.
410; Western Tel. Co. _v._ Reeves, 34 Okl. 468; Davis _v._ Railroad
Co., 63 S. C. 370. That the wanton and reckless disregard of
consequences which makes a defendant liable at common law to a
plaintiff not in the exercise of due care is something more than
negligence gross in degree, see Birmingham R. Co. _v._ Pinckard, 124
Ala. 372; Denman _v._ Johnston, 85 Mich. 387; Banks _v._ Braman, 188
Mass. 367; Southern Mfg. Co. _v._ Bradley, 52 Tex. 587; Barlow _v._
Foster, 149 Wis. 613.
Footnote 82:
Statement of facts abridged. Only so much of the case is given as
relates to one point. Arguments omitted.
Footnote 83:
E. g., Neal _v._ Gillett, 23 Conn. 437 (child of 13; charge that age
was not to be taken into account upheld). This is universally
rejected. Lynch _v._ Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; Washington R. Co. _v._
Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401; Government R. Co. _v._ Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70;
Chicago R. Co. _v._ Murray, 71 Ill. 601; Indianapolis R. Co. _v._
Wilson, 134 Ind. 95; McMillan _v._ Burlington R. Co., 46 Ia. 231;
Kansas R. Co. _v._ Whipple, 39 Kan. 531; Lynch _v._ Smith, 104 Mass.
52; Huff _v._ Ames, 16 Neb. 139; Swift _v._ Staten Island R. Co., 123
N. Y. 645; Pennsylvania R. Co. _v._ Kelly, 31 Pa. St. 372; Queen _v._
Dayton Coal Co., 95 Tenn. 458; Cook _v._ Houston Navigation Co., 76
Tex. 353; Roth _v._ Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525.
Footnote 84:
Smith _v._ Pittsburgh R. Co., 90 Fed. 783; Warble _v._ Sulzberger, 185
Ala. 603; Denver Tramway Co. _v._ Nicholas, 35 Col. 462; Rohloff _v._
Fair Haven R. Co., 76 Conn. 689; Goldstein _v._ People’s R. Co., 5
Pennewill, 306; Elwood R. Co. _v._ Ross, 26 Ind. App. 258; Wyman _v._
Berry, 106 Me. 43; Munn _v._ Reed, 4 All. 431; Rasmussen _v._ Whipple,
211 Mass. 546 (but see Angelary _v._ Springfield R. Co., 213 Mass.
110); Lucarelli _v._ Boston R. Co., 213 Mass. 454; Strudgeon _v._
Village, 107 Mich. 496; Consolidated Traction Co. _v._ Scott, 58 N. J.
Law, 682; Swift _v._ Staten Island R. Co., 123 N. Y. 645; Laferty _v._
Third Ave. R. Co., 176 N. Y. 594; Lake Erie R. Co. _v._ Mackey, 53
Ohio St. 370; Box & Label Co. _v._ Caine, 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. N. S. 81
(Aff’d 78 Ohio St. 405); Dubiver _v._ City R. Co., 44 Or. 227; Rachmel
_v._ Clark, 205 Pa. St. 314; Parker _v._ Washington R. Co., 207 Pa.
St. 438 (but compare Mulligan _v._ Burrough, 243 Pa. St. 361); Texas
R. Co. _v._ Phillips, 91 Tex. 278; Christensen _v._ Oregon R. Co., 29
Utah, 192; Blankenship _v._ Chesapeake R. Co., 94 Va. 449; Deputy _v._
Kimmell, 73 W. Va. 595 _Accord_.
Children are seldom made defendants in actions for negligence. Most of
the discussions as to the standard of care required of children are to
be found in cases where the children, or their parents or
representatives, were plaintiffs seeking to recover for damage to the
children alleged to be caused by defendant’s negligence, and where the
defendant contended that the action was barred by the contributory
negligence of the child. A good discussion where defendant was an
infant may be found in Briese _v._ Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89.
Footnote 85:
Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
Footnote 86:
Northern R. Co. _v._ Heaton, 191 Fed. 24; Little Rock Traction Co.
_v._ Nelson, 66 Ark. 494 (boy ten years old); Quincy Gas Co. _v._
Bauman, 203 Ill. 295, 104 Ill. App. 600 (seven); Fishburn _v._
Burlington R. Co., 127 Ia. 483 (six); Kentucky Hotel Co. _v._ Camp, 97
Ky. 424 (seven); McMahon _v._ Northern R. Co., 39 Md. 438 (six);
Purcell _v._ Boston R. Co., 211 Mass. 79; Giaccobe _v._ Boston R. Co.,
215 Mass. 224 (seven); Godfrey _v._ Boston R. Co., 215 Mass. 432
(six); Weitzel _v._ Detroit R. Co., 186 Mich. 7 (nine); Ritscher _v._
Orange R. Co., 79 N. J. Law, 462 (six); Verdon _v._ Automobile Co., 80
N. J. Law, 199 (seven); Citizen’s R. Co. _v._ Bell, 26 Ohio Cir. Ct.
R. 691 (seven); Galveston R. Co. _v._ Moore, 59 Tex. 64 (six);
Robinson _v._ Cone, 22 Vt. 213 (three); McVoy _v._ Oakes, 91 Wis. 214
(seven); Frasers _v._ Tramways Co., 20 Sc. L. R. 192 (six); Plantza
_v._ Glasgow, 47 Sc. L. R. 688 (five) _Accord_.
A few jurisdictions have an absolute rule as to children under seven.
Government R. Co. _v._ Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Tuohy,
196 Ill. 410; Reichle _v._ Transit Co., 241 Pa. St. 1 (six); Schnurr
_v._ Traction Co., 153 Pa. St. 29; Dodd _v._ Gas Co., 95 S. C. 9. Also
several jurisdictions rely on presumptions as to children between
seven and fourteen (or sometimes twelve). Birmingham R. Co. _v._
Jones, 146 Ala. 277; City _v._ McLain, 67 Miss. 4; Hebert _v._ Hudson
Electric Co., 136 App. Div. 107; Rolin _v._ Tobacco Co., 141 N. C.
300; Dowlen _v._ Texas Power Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 174 S. W. 674; City
_v._ Shull, 97 Va. 419; Traction Co. _v._ Wilkinson, 101 Va. 394. See
also (as to children over fourteen) Central R. Co. _v._ Phillips, 91
Ga. 526; Frauenthal _v._ Laclede Gas Co., 67 Mo. App. 1; Murphy _v._
Perlstein, 73 App. Div. 256; Travers _v._ Hartmann, 5 Boyce, 302.
In Berdos _v._ Tremont Mills, 209 Mass. 489, 494, Rugg, J., says: “It
is common knowledge that children under the age of fourteen are
lacking in prudence, foresight, and restraint, and that their
curiosity and restlessness have a tendency to get them into positions
of danger. There is some point in every life where these conditions
are present in such degree as to deprive the child of capacity to
assume risk intelligently, or to be guilty of negligence consciously.
That point varies in different children for divers reasons. There is
no hard and fast rule that at any particular age a minor is presumed
to be able to comprehend risks or to be capable of negligence. Extreme
cases can be stated which obviously fall on one side or the other of
the line. In some jurisdictions it has been held that _prima facie_ a
child under fourteen years of age is presumed not to be capable of
contributory negligence. Tucker _v._ Buffalo Cotton Mills, 76 S. C.
539, and cases cited. Tutwiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co. _v._ Enslen, 129
Ala. 336. But the sounder doctrine seems to be that age is an
important though not decisive factor in determining capacity, and that
the decision of that question is not helped or hampered by any legal
presumption. This is the law of this Commonwealth.”
Compare Jacobs _v._ Koehler Co., 208 N. Y. 416.
In Kyle _v._ Boston R. Co., 215 Mass. 260, a boy five years and eleven
months old, who ran in front of an approaching car was held negligent
as a matter of law. It has generally been held that children under six
are not to be charged with negligence. See City _v._ Lewis, 155 Ky.
832; Johnson _v._ City, 164 Mich. 251; Love _v._ Detroit R. Co., 170
Mich. 1; Eskildsen _v._ City, 29 Wash. 583.
As to lower ages, see Morgan _v._ Bridge Co., 5 Dill. 96; Louisville
R. Co. _v._ Arp, 136 Ga. 489; Indianapolis R. Co. _v._ Bordenchecker,
33 Ind. App. 138; Fink _v._ City, 115 Ia. 641; Berry _v._ St. Louis R.
Co., 214 Mo. 593. Compare Gardner _v._ Grace, 1 F. & F. 359; Dorr _v._
Atlantic R. Co., 76 N. H. 160 (five and a half); Campbell _v._ Ord, 11
Sc. L. R. 54; McGregor _v._ Ross, 20 Sc. L. R. 462.
Footnote 87:
Statement abridged. Only so much of the opinion is given as relates to
a single point.
Footnote 88:
Garrison _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 92 Ark. 437; De Soto Co. _v._ Hill,
179 Ala. 186 (personal standard applied to a boy brighter than his
age); Jollimore _v._ Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 314; Herrington _v._
City, 125 Ga. 58; Elk Mills _v._ Grant, 140 Ga. 727; Keller _v._
Gaskill, 9 Ind. App. 670; Cole _v._ Searfoss, 49 Ind. App. 334;
Louisville R. Co. _v._ Allnutt, 150 Ky. 831; Van Natta _v._ Peoples R.
Co., 133 Mo. 13; Spillane _v._ Missouri R. Co., 135 Mo. 414; Moeller
_v._ United R. Co., 242 Mo. 721; David _v._ West Jersey R. Co., 84 N.
J. Law, 685; Marius _v._ Motor Co., 146 App. Div. 608; Gigoux _v._
County, 73 Or. 212; Bridger _v._ Asheville R. Co., 27 S. C. 456; North
Texas Construction Co. _v._ Bostick, 98 Tex. 239; Kyne _v._ Southern
R. Co., 41 Utah, 368; Quinn _v._ Ross Car Co., 157 Wis. 543 _Accord_.
As to experience, see Stern _v._ Bensieck, 161 Mo. 146.