Section 2901 of the Georgia Civil Code is as follows:—

“Due care in a child of tender years is such care as its capacity,

mental and physical, fits it for exercising in the actual

circumstances of the occasion and situation under investigation.”

In Harrington _v._ Mayor, 125 Ga. 58, 60, Lumpkin, J., said: “The

average child of its own age is not the standard by which to measure

its legal diligence with exactness. ‘Such care as the capacity of the

particular child enables it to use naturally and reasonably, is what

the law requires.’” Compare Bleckley, C. J., in Western & Atlantic R.

Co. _v._ Young, 81 Ga. 397, 416, 417.

Footnote 89:

The liability of an infant for his torts is universally recognized.

_Trespass._ Y. B. 35 Hen. VI. f. 11, pl. 18; Burnard _v._ Haggis, 14

C. B. N. S. 45; Neal _v._ Gillett, 23 Conn. 437; Wilson _v._ Garrard,

59 Ill. 51; Peterson _v._ Haffner, 59 Ind. 130; Scott _v._ Watson, 46

Me. 362; Marshall _v._ Wing, 50 Me. 62; Sikes _v._ Johnson, 16 Mass.

389; School District _v._ Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507; Campbell _v._ Stakes,

2 Wend. 137; Hartfield _v._ Roper, 21 Wend. 615, 620; Tifft _v._

Tifft, 4 Denio, 175; Conklin _v._ Thompson, 29 Barb. 218; Huchting

_v._ Engel, 17 Wis. 230; Vosburg _v._ Putney, 80 Wis. 523; Vosburg

_v._ Putney, 86 Wis. 278.

_Conversion._ Mills _v._ Graham, 1 B. & P. N. R. 140; Bristow _v._

Clark, 1 Esp. 171; Vasse _v._ Smith, 6 Cranch, 226; Oliver _v._

McClellan, 21 Ala. 675; Ashlock _v._ Vivell, 29 Ill. App. 388; Lewis

_v._ Littlefield, 15 Me. 233; Caswell _v._ Parker, 96 Me. 39

(_semble_); Homer _v._ Thwing, 3 Pick. 492; Walker _v._ Davis, 1 Gray,

506; Wheeler Co. _v._ Jacobs, 2 Misc. 236; Green _v._ Sperry, 16 Vt.

390; Baxter _v._ Bush, 29 Vt. 465.

_Deceit._ Fitts _v._ Hall, 9 N. H. 441; Word _v._ Vance, 1 N. & McC.

197.

_Defamation._ Hodsman _v._ Grissell, Noy, 129; Drane _v._ Pawley, 8

Ky. Law Rep. 530; Fears _v._ Riley, 148 Mo. 49.

_Negligence._ Jennings _v._ Rundall, 8 T. R. 335; Dixon _v._ Bell, 1

Stark. 287; Marsh _v._ Loader, 14 C. B. N. S. 535; Latt _v._ Booth, 3

Car. & K. 292; Humphrey _v._ Douglass, 10 Vt. 71 _Accord_.

In Scott _v._ Watson, _supra_, Appleton, J., said: “Nor is his infancy

any defence, for infants are liable for torts.... The parent is not

answerable for the torts of his minor child, committed in his absence

and without his authority or approval, but the minor is answerable

therefor. Tifft _v._ Tifft, 4 Denio, 177. The minor is not exempt from

liability, though the trespass was committed by the express command of

the father. Humphrey _v._ Douglass, 10 Vt. 71.

“Nor can the defendant derive any support from the scriptural

injunction to children of obedience to their parents, invoked in

defence. No such construction can be given to the command, ‘Children,

obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right,’ as to sanction or

justify the trespass of the son upon the land of another, and the

asportation of his crops, even though done by the express commands of

his father. The defence is as unsound in its theology as it is

baseless in its law.” [Smith _v._ Kron, 96 N. C. 392, 397; O’Leary

_v._ Brooks, 7 N. D. 554; Humphrey _v._ Douglass, 10 Vt. 71; Huchting

_v._ Engel, 17 Wis. 230 _Accord_.]

May, J., dissented, saying: “I am not quite satisfied with either the

law or the theology of the opinion in this case. That sins of

ignorance may be winked at, is both a dictate of reason and of

Scripture. It is true, as a general rule, that infants who have

arrived at the age of discretion are liable for their tortious acts.

But, for the protection of infants, ought not the rule to be limited

to cases where the infant acts under such circumstances that _he must

know or be presumed to know_ that the acts which he commits are

unauthorized and wrong, when it appears that in the commission of the

acts he was under the control and direction of his father? Will not an

opposite doctrine tend to encourage disobedience in the child, and

thus be subversive of the best interests of the community? Will it not

also tend to subject him to embarrassment and insolvency when he shall

arrive at full age? If all the members of a family under age are to be

held liable in trespass or trover for the food which they eat, when

that food is in fact the property of another, but, being set before

them, they partake of it, in ignorance of such fact, by the command or

direction of the parent, and under the belief that it is his, will not

such a doctrine be in conflict with the principle that the common law

is intended as a shield and protection against the improvidence of

infancy? While the decided cases upon this subject seem to be limited

to cases of contract, is there not the same reason for extending it,

and applying it to cases like the one before us? In all the cases

which I have examined in which infants have been held liable, the

proof shows acts of positive wrong committed under circumstances where

the infant must have known the nature and character of his acts. If

the doctrines of the opinion are to prevail in a case like this, then

the common law is but the revival of the old doctrine that the

parents, by eating sour grapes, have set the children’s teeth on edge.

The rule that a servant who acts in ignorance of the rights of his

principal is to be held liable for his acts, does not fall within the

principles for which I contend.”

Footnote 90:

Welch _v._ Durand, 36 Conn. 182; Flinn _v._ State, 24 Ind. 286;

Peterson _v._ Haffner, 59 Ind. 130; Mercer _v._ Corbin, 117 Ind. 450;

Commonwealth _v._ Lister, 15 Phila. 405; Vosburg _v._ Putney, 80 Wis.

523; Vosburg _v._ Putney, 86 Wis. 278 _Accord_.

Footnote 91:

The topics dealt with in this section do not concern the substantive

law of tort. They fall rather under the heads of procedure and

evidence. But, without some knowledge of these particular subjects, it

is difficult to understand the ground of decision in some of the cases

on the general subject of negligence.

Footnote 92:

Statement, arguments, and parts of opinions omitted.

Footnote 93:

This decision and Bridges _v._ North London R. Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 213,

put an end in England to a conflict of authority as to the power of

the judge to withdraw the case from the jury where there was an

“invitation to alight” or “slamming the door” of a compartment car.

See the cases cited in 21 Halsbury, Laws of England, 445.

A like question, much discussed in the United States, is: A man,

without looking or listening, attempts to cross the track of a steam

railway, and is hit by a negligently managed engine. Should the judge

rule that crossing without looking and listening (or crossing without

stopping, looking, and listening) is, as matter of law, negligent

conduct? Or should the judge tell the jury that such conduct is

evidence from which negligence _may be_ inferred, and that it is for

them to say whether they _do_ infer it? As to this, there is a

conflict of authority. See discussion and collected cases in 3 Elliott

on Railroads (1st ed.) § 1167; 2 Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of

Negligence, Chap. 52, Article 2, §§ 1637–1661, especially §§ 1640,

1649, 1650, 1653; 33 Cyc. 1116 ff.; Beach on Contributory Negligence

(3d ed.) §§ 181, 182.

Other like questions arise in case of alighting from a moving car:

Puget Sound R. Co. _v._ Felt, 181 Fed. 938; Birmingham R. Co. _v._

Girod, 164 Ala. 10; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Plott, 108 Ark. 292; Carr

_v._ Eel River R. Co., 98 Cal. 366; Coursey _v._ Southern R. Co., 113

Ga. 297; Ardison _v._ Illinois R. Co., 249 Ill. 300; Louisville R. Co.

_v._ Crunk, 119 Ind. 542; Walters _v._ Missouri R. Co., 82 Kan. 739;

Hayden _v._ Chicago R. Co., 160 Ky. 836; Cumberland R. Co. _v._

Maugans, 61 Md. 53; Street _v._ Chicago R. Co., 124 Minn. 517; Johnson

_v._ St. Joseph R. Co., 143 Mo. App. 376; Willis _v._ Metropolitan R.

Co., 63 App. Div. 332; Pennsylvania R. Co. _v._ Lyons, 129 Pa. St.

113; Kearney _v._ Seaboard R. Co., 158 N. C. 521; San Antonio Traction

Co. _v._ Badgett, (Tex. Civ. App.) 158 S. W. 803; Gaines _v._ Ogden R.

Co., 44 Utah, 512; Breeden _v._ Seattle R. Co., 60 Wash. 522.

Boarding moving car: Central R. Co. _v._ Hingson, 186 Ala. 40; South

Chicago R. Co. _v._ Dufresne, 200 Ill. 456; Chicago Traction Co. _v._

Lundahl, 215 Ill. 289; Pence _v._ Wabash R. Co., 116 Ia. 279; Jonas

_v._ South Covington R. Co., 162 Ky. 171; Mabry _v._ Boston R. Co.,

214 Mass. 463; Foley _v._ Detroit R. Co., 179 Mich. 586; Hull _v._

Minneapolis R. Co., 116 Minn. 349; Nolan _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 250

Mo. 602.

Standing on platform or running board: Texas R. Co. _v._ Lacey, 185

Fed. 225; Central R. Co. _v._ Brown, 165 Ala. 493; Holloway _v._

Pasadena R. Co., 130 Cal. 177; Augusta R. Co. _v._ Snider, 118 Ga.

146; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Newell, 212 Ill. 332; Math _v._ Chicago R.

Co., 243 Ill. 114; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Stillwell, 142 Ky. 330;

Blair _v._ Lewiston R. Co., 110 Me. 235; Olund _v._ Worcester R. Co.,

206 Mass. 544; Heshion _v._ Boston R. Co., 208 Mass. 117; Wheeler _v._

Boston R. Co., 220 Mass. 298; Lacey _v._ Minneapolis R. Co., 118 Minn.

301; Setzler _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 227 Mo. 454; Trussell _v._

Traction Co., 79 N. J. Law, 533; Ward _v._ International R. Co., 206

N. Y. 83; Edwards _v._ New Jersey R. Co., 144 App. Div. 554;

Germantown R. Co. _v._ Walling, 97 Pa. St. 55; Brice _v._ Southern R.

Co., 85 S. C. 216.

Part of body protruding from car: Georgetown R. Co. _v._ Smith, 25

App. D. C. 259; Clerc _v._ Morgan’s R. Co., 107 La. 370; Lange _v._

Metropolitan R. Co., 151 Mo. App. 500; Kuttner _v._ Central R. Co., 80

N. J. Law, 11; Goller _v._ Fonda R. Co., 110 App. Div. 620.

Footnote 94:

But see L. R. 6 Q. B. 760–761.

Footnote 95:

Arguments omitted; also the concurring opinion of Lush, J., and the

dissenting opinion of Hannen, J.

Footnote 96:

Affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, L. R. 6 Q. B. 759.

Byrne _v._ Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722; Scott _v._ London Docks Co., 3 H. &

C. 596; Skinner _v._ London R. Co., 5 Ex. 787; The Joseph D. Thomas,

81 Fed. 578; Hastorf _v._ Hudson River Co., 110 Fed. 669; Cincinnati

R. Co. _v._ South Fork Coal Co., 139 Fed. 528; Kahn _v._ Cap Co., 139

Cal. 340; Armour _v._ Golkowska, 202 Ill. 144; Talge _v._ Hockett, 55

Ind. App. 303; Nicoll _v._ Sweet, 163 Ia. 683; Melvin _v._

Pennsylvania Steel Co., 180 Mass. 196; Hull _v._ Berkshire R. Co., 217

Mass. 361; Cleary _v._ Cavanaugh, 219 Mass. 281; Scharff _v._ Southern

Construction Co., 115 Mo. App. 157; Pratt _v._ Missouri R. Co., 139

Mo. App. 502; Mullen _v._ St. John, 57 N. Y. 567; Wolf _v._ American

Society, 164 N. Y. 30; Griffen _v._ Manice, 166 N. Y. 188; Kennedy

_v._ McAllaster, 31 App. Div. 453; Scheider _v._ American Bridge Co.,

78 App. Div. 163; Travers _v._ Murray, 87 App. Div. 552; Connor _v._

Koch, 89 App. Div. 33; Larkin _v._ Reid Co., 161 App. Div. 77;

Papazian _v._ Baumgartner, 49 Misc. 244; Barnes _v._ Automobile Co.,

32 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 233; Muskogee Traction Co. _v._ McIntire, 37 Okl.

684; Edwards _v._ Manufacturers’ Co., 27 R. I. 248; Patterson _v._

Brewing Co., 16 S. D. 33; Richmond R. Co. _v._ Hudgins, 100 Va. 409;

Gibson _v._ Chicago R. Co., 61 Wash. 639; Carroll _v._ Chicago R. Co.,

99 Wis. 399; Klitzke _v._ Webb, 120 Wis. 254; Schmidt _v._ Johnson

Co., 145 Wis. 49; Snyder _v._ Wheeling Electrical Co., 43 W. Va. 661

_Accord_.

Where the declaration alleges negligence and sets forth the nature and

particulars of the accident but not the particulars of the alleged

negligence, plaintiff may rely upon this doctrine, if the accident is

of such a kind as to indicate that it would not have happened without

negligence on the part of the defendant. James _v._ Boston R. Co., 204

Mass. 158.

The doctrine applies only in the absence of explanation. Cook _v._

Newhall, 213 Mass. 392. The inference may be met by defendant’s

showing the real cause of the accident. Nawrocki _v._ Chicago R. Co.,

156 Ill. App. 563; Parsons _v._ Hecla Iron Works, 186 Mass. 221; Cohen

_v._ Farmers’ Co., 70 Misc. 548; Stearns _v._ Spinning Co., 184 Pa.

St. 519; Scarpelli _v._ Washington Power Co., 63 Wash. 18. By

plaintiff showing by his own witnesses just how the accident happened.

Buckland _v._ New York R. Co., 181 Mass. 3. Or by defendant’s showing

that reasonable care was employed to prevent all probable sources of

accident. Thompson _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 243 Mo. 336, 355; Sweeney

_v._ Edison Co., 158 App. Div. 449.

“There are many cases that hold that an unexplained accident with a

machine, not liable to occur if such machine was properly constructed

and in a proper state of repair, is evidence of negligence; as in

Spaulding _v._ C. & N. W. R. Co., 30 Wis. 110, where it was held that

the escape of fire from a passing locomotive engine, sufficient to

cause damage, raised a presumption of improper construction or

insufficient repair or negligent handling of such engine. To the same

effect are Cummings _v._ Nat. Furnace Co., 60 Wis. 603; Kurz &

Huttenlocher Ice Co. _v._ M. & N. R. Co., 84 Wis. 171; Stacy _v._ M.,

L. S. & W. R. Co., 85 Wis. 225; Mullen _v._ St. John, 57 N. Y. 567;

Volkmar _v._ Manhattan R. Co., 134 N. Y. 418; McCarragher _v._ Rogers,

120 N. Y. 526, and many others that might be cited. Such cases lay

down a very well-recognized principle in the law of negligence, but do

not ... conflict in the slightest degree with numerous authorities

that go on another principle, just as well-recognized and firmly

established, to the effect that undisputed proof of freedom of the

machine from all discoverable defects, either in construction or

repair, effectually overcomes any mere inference or presumption

arising from the happening of the accident, so as to leave no question

in that regard for the jury; as in Spaulding _v._ C. & N. W. R. Co.,

33 Wis. 582, where this court held the inference that a locomotive

engine was defective, arising merely from the escape of fire therefrom

sufficient to cause damage, rebutted by conclusive proof that the

engine was free from discoverable defects, so as to leave nothing on

that point for the consideration of a jury.” Marshall, J., Vorbrich

_v._ Geuder Co., 96 Wis. 277, 284. See Green _v._ Urban Constructing

Co., 106 App. Div. 460 _Accord_.

Footnote 97:

The arguments of counsel and a part of the opinion are omitted.

Footnote 98:

There is a conflict of authority upon the question whether the maxim

_res ipsa loquitur_ is applicable in an action by a servant against a

master. See cases collected in an elaborate note, 6 Lawyers’ Reports,

Annotated, New Series, 337–363. See also 2 Labatt on Master & Servant,

§§ 833, 834, 835; especially authorities cited in § 834, note 8.

Footnote 99:

“There was much discussion by counsel of the doctrine of _res ipsa

loquitur_ and its relevancy to the facts of this case. The thing

speaks for itself, is a principle applied by the law where under the

circumstances shown the accident presumably would not have occurred in

the use of a machine if due care had been exercised, or, in the case

of an elevator, when in its normal operation after due inspection. The

doctrine does not dispense with the requirement that the party who

alleges negligence must prove the fact, but relates only to the mode

of proving it. The fact of the accident furnishes merely some evidence

to go to the jury, which requires the defendant ‘to go forward with

his proof.’ The rule of _res ipsa loquitur_ does not relieve the

plaintiff of the burden of showing negligence, nor does it raise any

presumption in his favor. Whether the defendant introduces evidence or

not, the plaintiff in this case will not be entitled to a verdict

unless he satisfies the jury by the preponderance of the evidence that

his injuries were caused by a defect in the elevator attributable to

the defendant’s negligence. The law attaches no special weight, as

proof, to the fact of an accident, but simply holds it to be

sufficient for the consideration of the jury even in the absence of

any additional evidence. Womble _v._ Grocery Co., 135 N. C. 474; 2

Labatt on Master & Servant, § 834; 4 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2509. In

all other respects, the parties stand before the jury just as if there

was no such rule. The judge should carefully instruct the jury as to

the application of the principle, so that they will not give to the

fact of the accident any greater artificial weight than the law

imparts to it. Wigmore, in the section just cited, says the following

considerations ought to limit the doctrine of _res ipsa loquitur_: 1.

The apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance no injurious

operation is to be expected unless from a careless construction,

inspection, or user; 2. Both inspection and user must have been, at

the time of the injury, in the control of the party charged; 3. The

injurious occurrence must have happened irrespective of any voluntary

action at the time by the party injured. He says further that the

doctrine is to some extent founded upon the fact that the chief

evidence of the true cause of the injury, whether culpable or

innocent, is practically accessible to the party charged and perhaps

inaccessible to the party injured. What are the general limits of the

doctrine and what is the true reason for its adoption, we will not now

undertake to decide. It is established in the law as a rule for our

guidance and must be enforced whenever applicable, and to the extent

that it is applicable, to the facts of the particular case.” Walker,

J., in Stewart _v._ Van Deventer Carpet Co., 138 N. C. 60, 65.

The burden of proof is not shifted; merely the burden of going

forward. Sweeney _v._ Erving, 228 U. S. 233; Ferrier _v._ Chicago R.

Co., 185 Ill. App. 326; Bigwood _v._ Boston R. Co., 209 Mass. 345;

Alabama R. Co. _v._ Groome, 97 Miss. 201; Kay _v._ Metropolitan R.

Co., 163 N. Y. 447.

Footnote 100:

The arguments of counsel, concurring opinion of Vaughan-Williams, L.

J., and dissenting opinion of Buckley, L. J., and part of the opinion

of Moulton, L. J., dealing with another point, are omitted.

Footnote 101:

Bonham _v._ Winchester Arms Co., 179 Ill. App. 469; Prestolite Co.

_v._ Skeel, 182 Ind. 593; Rice _v._ Chicago R. Co., 153 Mo. App. 35;

Dalzell _v._ New York R. Co., 136 App. Div. 329 _Accord_.

The nature and circumstances of the accident itself must not only

support an inference of defendant’s negligence but must exclude all

others. Lucid _v._ Powder Co., 199 Fed. 377.

Footnote 102:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 103:

“The maxim _res ipsa loquitur_ is simply a rule of evidence.

The general rule is that negligence is never presumed from the mere

fact of injury, yet the manner of the occurrence of the injury

complained of, or the attendant circumstances, may sometimes well

warrant an inference of negligence. It is sometimes said that it

warrants a presumption of negligence, but the presumption referred to

is not one of law, but of fact. It is, however, more correct and less

confusing to refer to it as an inference, rather than a presumption,

and not an inference which the law draws from the fact, but an

inference which the jury are authorized to draw, and not an inference

which the jury are compelled to draw.” Cobb, J., in Palmer Brick Co.

_v._ Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 842. See Sweeney _v._ Erving, 228 U. S.

233, 240; Harlow _v._ Standard Imp. Co., 145 Cal. 477; National

Biscuit Co. _v._ Wilson, 169 Ind. 442; O’Neil _v._ Toomey, 218 Mass.

242; Lincoln _v._ Detroit R. Co., 179 Mich. 189; Boucher _v._ Boston

R. Co., 76 N. H. 91; Ross _v._ Cotton Mills, 140 N. C. 115. But

compare Thompson _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 243 Mo. 336, 353.

Footnote 104:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 105:

59 N. J. Law, 474.

Footnote 106:

Actiesselskabet Ingrid _v._ Central R. Co., 216 Fed. 72; Huneke _v._

West Brighton Amusement Co., 80 App. Div. 268; De Glopper _v._

Nashville R. Co., 123 Tenn. 633 _Accord_.

Footnote 107:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 108:

Carpenter _v._ Walker, 170 Ala. 659; Miller _v._ Fletcher, 142 Ga.

668; Zabron _v._ Cunard Co., 151 Ia. 345; Randolph _v._ Snyder, 139

Ky. 159; Springfield Egg Co. _v._ Springfield Ice Co., 259 Mo. 664;

Hales _v._ Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 239; Robinson _v._ Threadgill, 13

Ired. Law, 39; Hobbs _v._ Smith, 27 Okl. 830 _Accord_.

Footnote 109:

The opinion of Lord Esher, M. R., is omitted.

Footnote 110:

The settled practice allows an action against a carrier either upon

contract or upon tort, as best suits the purposes of the pleader. 3

Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed.), § 1325.

Footnote 111:

Sect. 2222. “There must be fixed on the line of said roads, and at the

distance of four hundred yards from the centre of each of such road

crossings, and on each side thereof, a post, and the engineer shall be

required, whenever he shall arrive at either of said posts, to blow

the whistle of the locomotive until it arrives at the public road, and

to simultaneously check and keep checking the speed thereof, so as to

stop in time should any person or thing be crossing said track on said

road.”

Sect. 2224. “If any engineer neglects to blow said whistle as

required, and to check the speed as required, he is guilty of a

misdemeanor....”—Georgia Code of 1895.

Footnote 112:

Only so much of the case is given as relates to a single point.

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 113:

But see Mayer _v._ Thompson, 104 Ala. 611; Carter _v._ Atlantic R.

Co., 84 S. C. 456; Lough _v._ Davis, 30 Wash. 204.

Footnote 114:

Stiewel _v._ Borman, 63 Ark. 30; Owens _v._ Nichols, 139 Ga. 475;

Baird _v._ Shipman, 132 Ill. 16; Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. _v._

Jester, 180 Ind. 357; Ward _v._ Pullman Co., 131 Ky. 142; Consolidated

Gas Co. _v._ Connor, 114 Md. 140; Ellis _v._ McNaughton, 76 Mich. 237;

Orcutt _v._ Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424; Hagerty _v._ Montana Ore

Co., 38 Mont. 69; Horner _v._ Lawrence, 37 N. J. Law, 46; Schlosser

_v._ Great Northern R. Co., 20 N. D. 406, 411; Greenberg _v._

Whitcomb, 90 Wis. 225 _Accord_.

Footnote 115:

Northern R. Co. _v._ State, 29 Md. 420; Dyche _v._ Vicksburg R. Co.,

79 Miss. 361; Bresnahan _v._ Lonsdale Co., (R. I. 1900) 51 Atl. 624

_Accord_.

See also Willes, J., in Skelton _v._ London R. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 631,

636; Bailey _v._ Walker, 29 Mo. 407; Thorne _v._ Deas, 4 Johns. 84,

96; Hyde _v._ Moffat, 16 Vt. 271.

Footnote 116:

Allen _v._ Hixson, 111 Ga. 460; Griswold _v._ Boston R. Co., 183 Mass.

434; Stager _v._ Laundry Co., 38 Or. 480, 489; Scholl _v._ Belcher, 63

Or. 310; Ollett _v._ Pennsylvania R. Co., 201 Pa. St. 361; King _v._

Interstate R. Co., 23 R. I. 583; Riley _v._ Gulf R. Co., (Tex. Civ.

App.) 16 S. W. 595 _Accord_. See also Kenney _v._ Hannibal R. Co., 70

Mo. 252.

Whitesides _v._ Southern R. Co., 128 N. C. 229 (divided court)

_contra_. See also Dyche _v._ Vicksburg R. Co., 79 Miss. 361.

Footnote 117:

Ohio R. Co. _v._ Early, 141 Ind. 73; Raasch _v._ Elite Laundry Co., 98

Minn. 357 (_semble_); Salter _v._ Nebraska Telephone Co., 79 Neb. 373

(_semble_) _Accord_. See also Shaw _v._ Milwaukee R. Co., 103 Minn. 8.

It has been held also that such a duty is incidental to the relation

of carrier and passenger. Layne _v._ Chicago R. Co., 175 Mo. App. 35,

41. Compare Kambour _v._ Boston R. Co., 77 N. H. 33; Southern R. Co.

_v._ Sewell, 18 Ga. App. 544.

It has always been regarded as incidental to the employment of seamen.

The Iroquois, 194 U. S. 240; U.S. _v._ Knowles, 4 Sawy. 517; Scarff

_v._ Metcalf, 107 N.Y. 211.

Footnote 118:

See also Weymire _v._ Wolfe, 52 Ia. 533; Trout _v._ Watkins, 148 Mo.

App. 621. Compare Texas R. Co. _v._ Geraldon, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 71.

On the whole subject, see Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harvard Law Rev.

99, 111–113; Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort

Liability, 56 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 217, 316; Bruce,

Humanity and the Law, 73 Central Law Journ. 335.

Footnote 119:

A woman’s head-dress catches fire: water is at hand: a man, instead of

assisting to quench the fire, looks on and laughs at it. A drunken

man, falling with his face downwards into a puddle, is in danger of

suffocation: lifting his head a little on one side would save him:

another man sees this and lets him lie. A quantity of gunpowder lies

scattered about a room: a man is going into it with a lighted candle:

another, knowing this, lets him go in without warning. Who is there

that in any of these cases would think punishment misapplied?—Author’s

Note.

Footnote 120:

This proposed code was not enacted.

Footnote 121:

A Penal Code prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, and published

by command of the Governor-General of India in Council; Calcutta,

1837.

Footnote 122:

As to the authorship of these notes, see the preface to the English

edition (1875) of Macaulay’s Works. As to the code itself, see

Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, 298–323.

Footnote 123:

Statement abridged. Arguments of counsel omitted.

Footnote 124:

Grand Trunk R. Co. _v._ Barnett, [1911] A. C. 361; Louisville R. Co.

_v._ Womack, 173 Fed. 752; Chesapeake R. Co. _v._ Hawkins, 174 Fed.

597; Graysonia Lumber Co. _v._ Carroll, 102 Ark. 460; Chicago Terminal

Co. _v._ Kotoski, 199 Ill. 383; Neice _v._ Chicago R. Co., 254 Ill.

595; Jordan _v._ Grand Rapids R. Co., 162 Ind. 464; Burgess _v._

Atchison R. Co., 83 Kan. 497; Lando _v._ Chicago R. Co., 81 Minn. 279;

Ingram-Day Lumber Co. _v._ Harvey, 98 Miss. 11; Koegel _v._ Missouri

R. Co., 181 Mo. 379; Hoberg _v._ Collins, 80 N. J. Law, 425; Gulf R.

Co. _v._ Dees, 44 Okl. 118; Woodward _v._ Southern R. Co., 90 S. C.

262; Norfolk R. Co. _v._ Wood, 99 Va. 156; Huff _v._ Chesapeake R.

Co., 48 W. Va. 45 _Accord_.

So in case of persons wrongfully upon engines, cars, or trains.

Chicago R. Co. _v._ McDonough, 112 Ill. App. 315; Handley _v._

Missouri R. Co., 61 Kan. 237; Planz _v._ Boston R. Co., 157 Mass. 377;

Bjornquist _v._ Boston R. Co., 185 Mass. 130; Feeback _v._ Missouri R.

Co., 167 Mo. 206; Wickenburg _v._ Minneapolis R. Co., 94 Minn. 276

(boy of twelve); Johnson _v._ New York R. Co., 173 N. Y. 79; Morgan

_v._ Oregon R. Co., 27 Utah, 92. But see Johnson _v._ Chicago R. Co.,

123 Ia. 224; Pierce _v._ North Carolina R. Co., 124 N. C. 83. As to

who is a trespasser in such a place, see Yancey _v._ Boston R. Co.,

205 Mass. 162.

“A railway company may lawfully require a wilful trespasser upon one

of its moving trains to immediately cease his unlawful conduct, by

such means as not to indicate a willingness to deprive him of his

self-control in leaving the train, the speed of the train not being so

great that a personal injury to him should be expected to occur,

giving due consideration to the duty of the trespasser to cease his

lawlessness by all reasonable means in his power and reasonable

expectation that he will use such means in attempting to do it. It is

not sufficient to indicate an intentional injury that the party

causing it had reasonable ground to expect that such a result was

within reasonable probabilities, otherwise a violation of the duty to

exercise ordinary care would, of itself, be sufficient to indicate

such injury. The danger of inflicting a personal injury upon a person

by the conduct of another must be such as to reasonably permit of a

belief that such other either contemplated producing it, or, being

conscious of the danger that it would occur, imposed such danger upon

that person in utter disregard of the consequences, to warrant saying,

reasonably, that the circumstances indicate willingness to perpetrate

such injury.” Marshall, J., in Bolin _v._ Chicago R. Co., 108 Wis.

333, 351–352. See also Hoberg _v._ Collins, 80 N. J. Law, 425, 429.

But compare Palmer _v._ Gordon, 173 Mass. 410; Romana _v._ Boston R.

Co., 226 Mass. 533.

Footnote 125:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 126:

Rome Furnace Co. _v._ Patterson, 120 Ga. 521; Fields _v._ Louisville

R. Co., 163 Ky. 673 _Accord_. See also Hector Min. Co. _v._ Robertson,

22 Col. 491; Hobbs _v._ Blanchard, 74 N. H. 116; Stuck _v._ Kanawha R.

Co., 76 W. Va. 453; Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers, 27 Harvard Law

Rev. 403.

As to duty to observed child trespasser, see Little Rock R. Co. _v._

Barker, 39 Ark. 491, 500; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Lohges, 6 Ind. App.

288; Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Welch, 114 Md. 536. To observed helpless

trespasser, see Tanner _v._ Louisville R. Co., 60 Ala. 621; Pannell

_v._ Nashville R. Co., 97 Ala. 298; Martin _v._ Chicago R. Co., 194

Ill. 138; Krenzer _v._ Pittsburgh R. Co., 151 Ind. 587; Glenn _v._

Louisville R. Co., 28 Ky. Law Rep. 949. To trespasser observed in a

dangerous position, see Haley _v._ Kansas City R. Co., 113 Ala. 640;

Atkinson _v._ Kelley, 8 Ala. App. 571; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Townsend,

69 Ark. 380, 383; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Kotoski, 199 Ill. 383;

Richardson _v._ Missouri R. Co., 90 Kan. 292; Whitehead _v._ St. Louis

R. Co., 99 Mo. 263; Mathews _v._ Chicago R. Co., 63 Mo. App. 569;

Omaha R. Co. _v._ Cook, 42 Neb. 577.

Footnote 127:

Statement rewritten; part of case omitted; argument omitted.

Footnote 128:

The above portions of the instructions are set out in the argument of

counsel, pp. 235–237.

Footnote 129:

Schmidt _v._ Michigan Coal Co., 159 Mich. 308; Myers _v._ Boston R.

Co., 72 N. H. 175; Carney _v._ Concord St. R. Co., 72 N. H. 364; Brown

_v._ Boston R. Co., 73 N. H. 568; Magar _v._ Hammond, 171 N. Y. 377;

O’Leary _v._ Brooks Elevator Co., 7 N. D. 568 _Accord_. See also

Houston R. Co. _v._ Garrett, (Tex. Civ. App.) 160 S. W. 111.

As to the effect of a statute prohibiting the particular trespass, see

Marra _v._ New York R. Co., 139 App. Div. 707.

As to when a horse is trespassing, see Taft _v._ New York R. Co., 157

Mass. 297.

Footnote 130:

The statement and part of the opinion are omitted.

Footnote 131:

That in general there is no duty to look out for trespassers on the

track or right of way, see also Cleveland R. Co. _v._ Tartt, 99 Fed.

369; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Jones, 191 Ala. 484; Goudreau _v._

Connecticut Co., 84 Conn. 406; Atlantic R. Co. _v._ McDonald, 135 Ga.

635; Curd _v._ Cincinnati R. Co., 163 Ky. 104; Baltimore R. Co. _v._

State, 114 Md. 536; Petur _v._ Erie R. Co., 151 App. Div. 578; Carter

_v._ Erie R. Co., 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 377; Laeve _v._ Missouri R.

Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 1129.

Jeffries _v._ Seaboard R. Co., 129 N. C. 236 _contra_. See also Ark.

Kirby’s Dig. § 6607; Tenn. Shannon’s Code, § 1574(4).

As to duty of trainmen in a place where there is a known likelihood of

trespassers, see Southern R. Co. _v._ Donovan, 84 Ala. 141; Bullard

_v._ Southern R. Co., 116 Ga. 644; Cincinnati R. Co. _v._ Blankenship,

157 Ky. 699; Risbridger _v._ Michigan R. Co., 188 Mich. 672; Fearons

_v._ Kansas City R. Co., 180 Mo. 208; Eppstein _v._ Missouri R. Co.,

197 Mo. 720; Krummack _v._ Missouri R. Co., 98 Neb. 773; St. Louis R.

Co. _v._ Hodge, (Okl.) 157 Pac. 60; Whelan _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 70

W. Va. 442; Whalen _v._ Chicago R. Co., 75 Wis. 654. _Contra_:

Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Welch, 114 Md. 536; Boden _v._ Boston R. Co.,

205 Mass. 504; Haltiwanger _v._ Columbia R. Co., 64 S. C. 7. Compare

Lowery _v._ Walker, [1911] A. C. 10.

The trainmen may assume that an adult trespasser, not in obvious

peril, will look out for himself. Indianapolis R. Co. _v._ McClaren,

62 Ind. 566; Campbell _v._ Kansas City R. Co., 55 Kan. 536; St. Louis

R. Co. _v._ Herrin, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 718. As to a child, see

Pennsylvania R. Co. _v._ Morgan, 82 Pa. St. 134.

Footnote 132:

“The duty must be one owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs in

respect to the very matter or act charged as negligence.”—PARSONS, C.

J., in Pittsfield C. M. Co. _v._ Pittsfield Shoe Co., 71 N. H. 522,

531.

Footnote 133:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 134:

Hardcastle _v._ South Yorkshire R. Co., 4 H. & N. 67; Ponting _v._

Noakes, [1894] 2 Q. B. 281; Scoggin _v._ Atlantic Cement Co., 179 Ala.

213; Gordon _v._ Roberts, 162 Cal. 506; Whitney _v._ New York R. Co.,

87 Conn. 623; Garner _v._ Town, 7 Ga. App. 630; McDermott _v._ Burke,

256 Ill. 401; Northwestern El. Co. _v._ O’Malley, 107 Ill. App. 599;

Knapp _v._ Doll, 180 Ind. 526; St. Joseph I. Co. _v._ Bertch, 33 Ind.

App. 491; Upp _v._ Darner, 150 Ia. 403; Bransom _v._ Labrot, 81 Ky.

638; Mallock _v._ Derby, 190 Mass. 208; Flanagan _v._ Sanders, 138

Mich. 253; Dahl _v._ Valley Dredging Co., 125 Minn. 90; Schmidt _v._

Distilling Co., 90 Mo. 284; Henry _v._ Disbrow M. Co., 144 Mo. App.

350; Butler _v._ Chicago R. Co., 155 Mo. App. 287; Burrill _v._

Alexander, 75 N. H. 554; Kleinberg _v._ Schween, 134 App. Div. 493;

Riggle _v._ Lens, 71 Or. 125; Clapp _v._ La Grill, 103 Tenn. 164;

Stamford Oil Co. _v._ Barnes, 103 Tex. 409; Denison Light Co. _v._

Patton, 105 Tex. 621; Lunsford _v._ Colonial Coal Co., 115 Va. 346;

Anderson _v._ Northern R. Co., 19 Wash. 340; West _v._ Shaw, 61 Wash.

227.

As to setting traps for trespassers, see Bird _v._ Holbrook, 4 Bing.

628; Hooker _v._ Miller, 37 Ia. 613. Compare Marble _v._ Ross, 124

Mass. 44; Loomis _v._ Terry, 17 Wend. 497; Sherfey _v._ Bartley, 4

Sneed, 58.

Footnote 135:

Latham _v._ Johnson, [1913] 1 K. B. 398; Cleveland R. Co. _v._

Ballentine, 84 Fed. 935; Riedel _v._ West Jersey Co., 177 Fed. 374;

Pastorello _v._ Stone, 89 Conn. 286; Norman _v._ Bartholomew, 104 Ill.

App. 667; Nelson _v._ Burnham Co., 114 Me. 213; Peninsular Trust Co.

_v._ City, 131 Mich. 571; Houck _v._ Chicago R. Co., 116 Mo. App. 559;

Hughes _v._ Boston R. Co., 71 N. H. 279; Leithold _v._ Philadelphia R.

Co., 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 137; Dobbins _v._ Missouri R. Co., 91 Tex. 60;

Bottum _v._ Hawks, 84 Vt. 370; Curtis _v._ Stone Quarries, 37 Wash.

355; Uthermohler _v._ Mining Co., 50 W. Va. 457; Ritz _v._ City, 45 W.

Va. 262 Accord. Compare Walsh _v._ Pittsburg R. Co., 221 Pa. St. 463;

Lyttle _v._ Harlem Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345.

Footnote 136:

This opinion, too long to be inserted here, will be found in 2 Cent.

Law Journal, 170.

Footnote 137:

Railroad Co. _v._ Stout, 17 Wall. 657; Union R. Co. _v._ McDonald, 152

U. S. 262 (slackpit); St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Underwood, (C. C. A.) 194

Fed. 363 (pile of lumber); Southern R. Co. _v._ Bunt, 131 Ala. 591;

Thompson _v._ Alexander Cotton Mills Co., 190 Ala. 184 (drain

containing hot water); Barrett _v._ Southern P. R. Co., 91 Cal. 296

(but see Peters _v._ Bowman, 115 Cal. 345—pond; George _v._ Los

Angeles R. Co., 126 Cal. 357—cars standing unattended); Ferguson _v._

Columbus R. Co., 75 Ga. 637, 77 Ga. 102 (but see Savannah R. Co. _v._

Beavers, 113 Ga. 398—excavation); City _v._ McMahon, 154 Ill. 141;

Donk Bros. _v._ Leavitt, 109 Ill. App. 385; Belt R. Co. _v._ Charters,

123 Ill. App. 322 (but see American Advertising Co. _v._ Flannigan,

100 Ill. App. 452); Chicago R. Co. _v._ Fox, 38 Ind. App. 268; Lewis

_v._ Cleveland R. Co., 42 Ind. App. 337; Edgington _v._ Burlington R.

Co., 116 Ia. 410 (but see Anderson _v._ Ft. Dodge R. Co., 150 Ia.

465); Price _v._ Atchison Water Co., 58 Kan. 551 (reservoir); Kansas

City R. Co. _v._ Matson, 68 Kan. 815 (wood pile); Osborn _v._ Atchison

R. Co., 86 Kan. 440 (abandoned round house—but see Somerfield _v._

Land and Power Co., 93 Kan. 762—unguarded canal); Bransom _v._ Labrot,

81 Ky. 638 (pile of timber); Palermo _v._ Orleans Ice Co., 130 La. 833

(gutter containing hot water); Koons _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 65 Mo.

592; Schmidt _v._ Kansas City Distilling Co., 90 Mo. 284 (hole made by

escaping steam); Berry _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 214 Mo. 593 (but see

Overholt _v._ Vieths, 93 Mo. 422—abandoned quarry; Barney _v._

Hannibal R. Co., 126 Mo. 372—unfenced freight yard; Kelly _v._ Benas,

217 Mo. 1—pile of lumber); Chicago R. Co. _v._ Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb.

889; Evansich _v._ Gulf R. Co., 57 Tex. 126 (but see Missouri R. Co.

_v._ Edwards, 90 Tex. 65; Johnson _v._ Atlas Supply Co., (Tex. Civ.

App.) 183 S. W. 31, 33); Smalley _v._ Rio Grande R. Co., 34 Utah, 423

(but see Palmer _v._ Oregon S. L. Co., 34 Utah, 466); Haynes _v._

City, 69 Wash. 419 (but see Barnhart _v._ Chicago R. Co., 89 Wash.

304); Kelley _v._ Southern R. Co., 152 Wis. 328 (but see Emond _v._

Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83—pond) _Accord_.

Compare McCabe _v._ American Woolen Co., (C. C. A.) 132 Fed. 1006

(unguarded canal); Valley Planing Mill _v._ McDaniel, 119 Ark. 139;

Brinkley _v._ Cooper, 70 Ark. 331; Prickett _v._ Pardridge, 189 Ill.

App. 307; Stendal _v._ Boyd, 73 Minn. 53; Dahl _v._ Valley Dredging

Co., 125 Minn. 90; Cooper _v._ Overton, 102 Tenn. 211.

See also Smith, Landowner’s Liability to Children, 11 Harv. Law Rev.

349, 434; 7 Thompson, Negligence, § 1031; Burdick, Torts (3d. ed.), §§

558–569.

As to the age to which the doctrine is applicable, see Belt R. Co.

_v._ Charters, 123 Ill. App. 322; State Bank _v._ Mandel, 176 Ill.

App. 278; Wilmes _v._ Chicago R. Co. 175 Ia. 101; Shaw _v._ Chicago R.

Co., (Mo.) 184 S. W. 1151.

Footnote 138:

Wilmot _v._ McPadden, 79 Conn. 367 (building in course of

construction); Daniels _v._ New York R. Co., 154 Mass. 349; Ryan _v._

Towar, 128 Mich. 463 (water wheel); Peninsular Trust Co. _v._ City,

131 Mich. 571 (reservoir); Hughes _v._ Boston R. Co., 71 N. H. 279

(torpedo on right of way); Delaware R. Co. _v._ Reich, 61 N. J. Law,

635; Walsh _v._ Fitchburg R. Co., 145 N. Y. 301; Railroad Co. _v._

Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235; Paolino _v._ McKendall, 24 R. I. 432

(unguarded fire); Uthermohlen _v._ Bogg’s Run Co., 50 W. Va. 457

_Accord_.

Footnote 139:

The arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Lords

Atkinson, Collins, and Loreburn are omitted.

Footnote 140:

See Latham _v._ Johnson, [1913] 1 K. B. 398. In that case Hamilton, L.

J., said (pp. 415–416): “Two other terms must be alluded to—a ‘trap’

and ‘attraction’ or ‘allurement.’ A trap is a figure of speech, not a

formula. It involves the idea of concealment and surprise, of an

appearance of safety under circumstances cloaking a reality of danger.

Owners and occupiers alike expose licensees and visitors to traps on

their premises at their peril, but a trap is a relative term. In the

case of an infant, there are moral as well as physical traps. There

may accordingly be a duty towards infants not merely not to dig

pitfalls for them, but not to lead them into temptation.

‘Allurements,’ too, is a vague word. It may refer only to the

circumstances under which the injured child has entered the close.

Here it is hard to see how infantile temptations can give rights,

however much they may excuse peccadilloes. A child will be a

trespasser still, if he goes on private ground without leave or right,

however natural it may have been for him to do so. On the other hand,

the allurement may arise after he has entered with leave or as of

right. Then the presence in a frequented place of some object of

attraction, tempting him to meddle where he ought to abstain, may well

constitute a trap, and in the case of a child too young to be capable

of contributory negligence it may impose full liability on the owner

or occupier, if he ought, as a reasonable man, to have anticipated the

presence of the child and the attractiveness and peril of the object.”

“Finally, what objects which attract infants to their hurt are traps

even to them? Not all objects with which children hurt themselves

simpliciter. A child can get into mischief and hurt itself with

anything if it is young enough. In some cases the answer may rest with

the jury, but it must be matter of law to say whether a given object

can be a trap in the double sense of being fascinating and fatal. No

strict answer has been, or perhaps ever will be, given to the

question, but I am convinced that a heap of paving stone in broad

daylight in a private close cannot so combine the properties of

temptation and retribution as to be properly called a trap.”

Footnote 141:

Statement abridged. Arguments omitted, and parts of opinions.

Footnote 142:

See also Cole _v._ Willcutt, 214 Mass. 453; Habina _v._ Twin City

Electric Co., 150 Mich. 41; Chesley _v._ Rocheford, 4 Neb. Unoff. 768,

777.

For examples of “traps,” see Lowery _v._ Walker, [1911] A. C. 10;

Rollestone _v._ Cassirer, 3 Ga. App. 161; Foren _v._ Rodick, 90 Me.

276; Hill _v._ President and Trustees, 61 Or. 190; Grant _v._ Hass, 31

Tex. Civ. App. 688; Brinilson _v._ Chicago R. Co., 144 Wis. 614.

Footnote 143:

Affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, L. R. 2 C. P. 311. Hounsell _v._

Smyth, 7 C. B. N. S. 731; Batchelor _v._ Fortescue, 11 Q. B. D. 474;

Watson _v._ Manitou R. Co., 41 Col. 138; Bentley _v._ Loverock, 102

Ill. App. 166; Joseph _v._ Henrici Co., 137 Ill. 171; Indiana R. Co.

_v._ Barnhart, 115 Ind. 399; South Bend Iron Works _v._ Larger, 11

Ind. App. 367; Dixon _v._ Swift, 98 Me. 207; Reardon _v._ Thompson,

149 Mass. 267; Blackstone _v._ Chelmsford Foundry Co., 170 Mass. 321;

Vanderbeck _v._ Hendry, 34 N. J. Law, 467; Fitzpatrick _v._ Cumberland

Glass Co., 61 N. J. Law, 378; Taylor _v._ Turnpike Co., 65 N. J. Law,

102; Victory _v._ Baker, 67 N. Y. 366; Larmore _v._ Crown Point Iron

Co., 101 N. Y. 391; Sterger _v._ Van Sicklen, 132 N. Y. 499;

Englehardt _v._ Central R. Co., 139 App. Div. 786; McCann _v._

Thilemann, 36 Misc. 145; Monroe _v._ Atlantic R. Co., 151 N. C. 374;

Costello _v._ Farmers’ Bank, 34 N. D. 131; Kelley _v._ City, 41 Ohio

St. 263; Schiffer _v._ Sauer, 238 Pa. St. 550; Lunsford’s

Administrator _v._ Colonial Coal Co., 115 Va. 346 _Accord_.

But see Brinilson _v._ Chicago R. Co., 144 Wis. 614.

_As to liability to children licensees_, see Jansen _v._ Siddal, 41

Ill. App. 279; Cleveland R. Co. _v._ Means, (Ind. App.) 104 N. E. 785;

Benson _v._ Baltimore Traction Co., 77 Md. 535; McCoy _v._ Walsh, 186

Mass. 369; Romana _v._ Boston R. Co., 218 Mass. 76; Bottum _v._ Hawks,

84 Vt. 370.

But see Knapp _v._ Doll, 180 Ind. 526 (citing cases); Wilmes _v._

Chicago R. Co., 175 Ia. 101; Lyttle _v._ Town Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345.

_As to liability where there is a known, permissive, general use by

the public_, see Pomponio _v._ New York R. Co., 66 Conn. 528; Western

R. Co. _v._ Meigs, 74 Ga. 857; Green _v._ Chicago R. Co., 110 Mich.

648; Barry _v._ New York R. Co., 92 N. Y. 289; Taylor _v._ Delaware

Canal Co., 113 Pa. St. 162; Delaney _v._ Milwaukee R. Co., 33 Wis. 67.

Compare Tucker _v._ Draper, 62 Neb. 66.

_Liability in case of gratuitous carriage_: [The judge at the trial in

charging the jury] “suggested that the measure of duty towards a bare

licensee is different, where the licensor accepts the duty of carrying

him, from what it is where he merely permits him to pass through his

premises; and I think the cases support this view.... I think it was

competent for the jury to find, as they must be taken to have found, a

failure of that ordinary care which is due from a person who

undertakes the carriage of another gratuitously. The principle in all

cases of this class is that the care exercised must be reasonable; and

the standard of reasonableness naturally must vary according to the

circumstances of the case, the trust reposed, and the skill and

appliances at the disposal of the person to whom another confides a

duty. There is an obvious difference between the measure of confidence

reposed and responsibility accepted in the case of a person who merely

receives permission to traverse the premises of another, and in the

case where a person or his property is received into the custody of

another for transportation: see in the case of goods, Southcote’s

Case, (1601) 4 Rep. 83 b. cited in Coggs _v._ Bernard, 1 Smith, L. C.,

11th ed., p. 173, and the notes thereto. In the case of persons

received for carriage, PARKE, B., says in Lygo _v._ Newbold, (1854) 9

Ex. 302, at p. 305: ‘A person who undertakes to provide for the

conveyance of another, although he does so gratuitously, is bound to

exercise due and reasonable care.’ In Austin _v._ Great Western Ry.

Co., [1867] 2 Q. B. 442, at p. 445, BLACKBURN, J., says: ‘I think that

what was said in the case of Marshall _v._ York, Newcastle and Berwick

Ry. Co., (1851) 11 C. B. 655, was quite correct. It was there laid

down that the right which a passenger by railway has to be carried

safely does not depend on his having made a contract, but that the

fact of his being a passenger casts a duty on the company to carry him

safely.’”

COLLINS, M. R., in Harris _v._ Perry, [1903] 2 K. B. 219, 225, 226.

And see, also, Sington on Negligence, 61, 62. But compare Beard _v._

Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153.

In the case of a gratuitous loan of a chattel, the lender owes no duty

to the borrower except to give warning of any defects actually known

to the lender. Gagnon _v._ Dana, 69 N. H. 264; Coughlin _v._ Gillison,

[1899] 1 Q. B. 145. “A contract of gratuitous service, however, such

as one of carriage, involves a duty of reasonable care, and must

therefore be distinguished from a contract of gratuitous bailment or a

gift, which does not.” Salmond on Torts, 361.

Footnote 144:

Foster _v._ Portland Min. Co., (C. C. A.) 114 Fed. 613; Central R. Co.

_v._ Robertson, 95 Ga. 430; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Reinhardt, 235 Ill.

576, 139 Ill. App. 53; Indianapolis Water Co. _v._ Harold, 170 Ind.

170; Lawson _v._ Shreveport Waterworks Co., 111 La. 73; Schaaf _v._

St. Louis Basket Co., 151 Mo. App. 35; Furey _v._ New York R. Co., 67

N. J. Law, 270; Fogarty _v._ Bogart, 59 App. Div. 114; Toledo Real

Estate Co. _v._ Putney, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 486; Bush _v._ Johnston,

23 Pa. St. 209 _Accord_. Compare Moffatt _v._ Kenny, 174 Mass. 311.

Footnote 145:

The case is reprinted from the Law Times Reports, except the opinions

of Crompton, J., and Blackburn, J., which are taken from the Weekly

Reporter.

Footnote 146:

The reference should be 25 L. J. (N. S.) or 34 L. J.

Footnote 147:

Felton _v._ Aubrey, 74 Fed. 350; De Haven _v._ Hennessey, (C. C. A.)

137 Fed. 472; Standard Car Co. _v._ McGuire, 161 Fed. 527; Pomponio

_v._ New York R. Co., 66 Conn. 528; Rink _v._ Lowry, 38 Ind. App. 132;

Schmidt _v._ Michigan Coal Co., 159 Mich. 308; Clarkin _v._

Biwabik-Bessemer Co., 65 Minn. 483; Hyatt _v._ Murray, 101 Minn. 507;

Schaaf _v._ St. Louis Basket Co., 151 Mo. App. 35; Knowles _v._ Exeter

Mfg. Co., 77 N. H. 268; Houston R. Co. _v._ Bulger, 35 Tex. Civ. App.

478; Houston R. Co. _v._ O’Leary, (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 601

(explosion of car containing fire-works); St. Louis R. Co. _v._

Balthrop, (Tex. Civ. App.) 167 S. W. 246; Hoadley _v._ International

Paper Co., 72 Vt. 79 _Accord_.

Illinois R. Co. _v._ Godfrey, 71 Ill. 500; Cunningham _v._ Toledo R.

Co., 260 Ill. 589; Dixon _v._ Swift, 98 Me. 207; O’Brien _v._ Union R.

Co., 209 Mass. 449 _Contra_. See also Fox _v._ Warner Asphalt Co., 204

N. Y. 240; Roche _v._ American Ice Co., 140 App. Div. 341; Rosenthal

_v._ United Beef Co., 52 Misc. 166. Compare Knight _v._ Lanier, 69

App. Div. 454.

Footnote 148:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 149:

Corby _v._ Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. 556; Rooney _v._ Woolworth, 78 Conn.

167; Graves _v._ Thomas, 95 Ind. 361; Penso _v._ McCormick, 125 Ind.

116; Morrison _v._ Carpenter, 179 Mich. 207; Wheeler _v._ St. Joseph

Stock Yards Co., 66 Mo. App. 260 _Accord_. Compare Ellsworth _v._

Metheney, (C. C. A.) 104 Fed. 119; Cahill _v._ Stone, 153 Cal. 571;

Martin _v._ Louisville Bridge Co., 41 Ind. App. 493; Quigley _v._

Clough, 173 Mass. 429; Phillips _v._ Library Co., 55 N. J. Law, 307;

Beck _v._ Carter, 68 N. Y. 283; Hanson _v._ Spokane Valley Land Co.,

58 Wash. 6.

Footnote 150:

Statement and arguments omitted.

Footnote 151:

Farrant _v._ Barnes, 11 C. B. N. S. 553; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 137.

Footnote 152:

And see Bolch _v._ Smith, 7 H. & N. 736; 31 L. J. (Ex.) 201.

Footnote 153:

Bennett _v._ Louisville R. Co., 102 U. S. 577; Alabama Steel Co. _v._

Clements, 146 Ala. 259; Hobart Tie Co. _v._ Keck, 89 Ark. 122; Whitney

_v._ New York R. Co., 87 Conn. 623; Christopher _v._ Russell, 63 Fla.

191; Southern Express Co. _v._ Williamson, 66 Fla. 286; Horton _v._

Harvey, 119 Ga. 219; Latham _v._ Roach, 72 Ill. 179; Spry Lumber Co.

_v._ Duggan, 182 Ill. 218; Calvert _v._ Springfield Electric Co., 231

Ill. 290; Laurie _v._ McCullough, 174 Ind. 477; Young _v._ People’s

Gas Co., 128 Ia. 290; Anderson _v._ Hair, 103 Ky. 196; Carleton _v._

Franconia Iron Co., 99 Mass. 216; McDermott _v._ Sallaway, 198 Mass.

517; Marston _v._ Reynolds, 211 Mass. 590; Jacobsen _v._ Simons, 217

Mass. 194; Samuelson _v._ Cleveland Iron Co., 49 Mich. 164; Donaldson

_v._ Wilson, 60 Mich. 86; Pelton _v._ Schmidt, 104 Mich. 345; Nash

_v._ Minneapolis Mill Co., 24 Minn. 501; Emery _v._ Minneapolis

Exposition, 56 Minn. 460; Kean _v._ Schoening, 103 Mo. App. 77; Shaw

_v._ Goldman, 116 Mo. App. 332; Montague _v._ Hanson, 38 Mont. 376;

Land _v._ Fitzgerald, 68 N. J. Law, 28; Smith _v._ Jackson, 70 N. J.

Law, 183; Ackert _v._ Lansing, 59 N. Y. 646; Weller _v._ Consolidated

Gas Co., 198 N. Y. 98; Wilson _v._ Olano, 28 App. Div. 448; Withers

_v._ Brooklyn Exchange, 106 App. Div. 255; Higgins _v._ Ruppert, 124

App. Div. 530; Massey _v._ Seller, 45 Or. 267; Newingham _v._ Blair,

232 Pa. St. 511; Freer _v._ Cameron, 4 Rich. Law, 228; League _v._

Stradley, 68 S. C. 515; Richmond R. Co. _v._ Moore, 94 Va. 493; Smith

_v._ Parkersburg Ass’n, 48 W. Va. 232; Landry _v._ Great Northern R.

Co., 152 Wis. 379 _Accord_.

_As to child accompanying invitee_: see Butler _v._ Chicago R. Co.,

155 Mo. App. 287.

_Liability to children invitees_: see Miller _v._ Peck Dry Goods Co.,

104 Mo. App. 609; Houck _v._ Chicago R. Co., 116 Mo. App. 559.

_Liability where plaintiff departs from or goes beyond the permission

or invitation_: New York Oil Co. _v._ Pusey, 211 Fed. 622; Louisville

R. Co. _v._ Sides, 129 Ala. 399; First Nat. Bank _v._ Chandler, 144

Ala. 286; Coberth _v._ Great Atlantic Co., 36 App. D. C. 569;

Etheredge _v._ Central R. Co., 122 Ga. 853; Bennett _v._ Butterfield,

112 Mich. 96; Hutchinson _v._ Cleveland Iron Co., 141 Mich. 346; Trask

_v._ Shotwell, 41 Minn. 66; Ryerson _v._ Bathgate, 67 N. J. Law, 337;

Gilfillan _v._ German Hospital, 115 App. Div. 48; Castoriano _v._

Miller, 15 Misc. 254; Weaver _v._ Carnegie Steel Co., 223 Pa. St. 238;

Hagan _v._ Delaware Steel Co., 240 Pa. St. 222; Pierce _v._ Whitcomb,

48 Vt. 127; Peake _v._ Buell, 90 Wis. 508; Lehmann _v._ Amsterdam

Coffee Co., 146 Wis. 213.

But compare Pauckner _v._ Wakem, 231 Ill. 276.

_Use for purpose not intended by owner or occupier_: Thiele _v._

McManus, 3 Ind. App. 132; Smith _v._ Trimble, 111 Ky. 861; Ferguson

_v._ Ferguson, (Ky.) 114 S. W. 297; Speicher _v._ New York Tel. Co.,

60 N. J. Law, 242, 59 N. J. Law, 23; Clark _v._ Fehlhaber, 106 Va.

803. See also Urban _v._ Focht, 231 Pa. St. 623.

_Invitee of licensee_: see Brehmer _v._ Lyman, 71 Vt. 98.

In Cox _v._ Coulson, [1916] 2 K. B. 177, a spectator in a theatre was

injured by the discharge of a pistol during a performance. Bankes, L.

J., said: “It seems to me obvious that the duty of the invitor in a

case like the present is not only confined to the state of the

premises, using that expression as extending to the structure merely.

The duty must to some extent extend to the performance given in the

structure, because the performance may be of such a kind as to render

the structure an unsafe place to be in whilst the performance is going

on, or it may be of such a kind as to render the structure unsafe

unless some obvious precaution is taken. As an illustration under the

latter head I would instance a case where a tight-rope dancer performs

on a rope stretched over the heads of the audience. In such a case the

provision of a net under the rope to protect the audience in case the

performer fell seems so obvious a precaution to take that in the

absence of it the premises could not be said to be reasonably safe. In

the present case the performance was one which included a discharge of

pistols loaded with blank ammunition as one of the incidents. If the

pistols had been properly loaded, it is difficult to see that the

incident exposed any member of the audience in any ordinarily

constructed theatre to any danger. On the other hand, if any one of

the pistols was not properly loaded, what would otherwise be a safe

performance became an exceedingly dangerous one, and any part of the

auditorium might be rendered an extremely unsafe place to be in.

Whether the circumstances were such that any negligence or want of

proper care can be attributed to the appellant in relation to the

loading of the pistol or in relation to the ammunition supplied for

that purpose has not been investigated, and I do not think that

justice can be done between the parties until this is done.”

Footnote 154:

These notices read as follows: “All persons riding on this elevator do

so at their own risk.”

Footnote 155:

Craney _v._ Union Stockyards Co., 240 Ill. 602; Kentucky Distilleries

Co. _v._ Leonard, (Ky.) 79 S. W. 281 _Accord_. But see Burns _v._

Boston R. Co., 183 Mass. 96; Pike _v._ Boston R. Co., 192 Mass. 426.

Footnote 156:

Statement rewritten. Only so much of the case is given as relates to a

single point. The passage in quotation marks is taken from the report

of this case in 67 Northeastern Reporter, 863.

Footnote 157:

Bell _v._ Central Nat. Bank, 28 App. D. C. 580; Connolly _v._ Des

Moines Inv. Co., 130 Ia. 633; Branham _v._ Buckley, 158 Ky. 848;

Schnatterer _v._ Bamberger, 81 N. J. Law. 558 _Accord_.

Footnote 158:

Washington Market Co. _v._ Clagett, 19 App. D. C. 12; Woods _v._

Trinity Parish, 21 D. C. 540; Nave _v._ Flack, 90 Ind. 205; Ford _v._

Crigler, (Ky.) 74 S. W. 661; Perrine _v._ Union Stockyards Co., 81

Neb. 790; Kenny _v._ Hall Realty Co., 85 Misc. 439; Glase _v._ City,

169 Pa. St. 488 _Accord_. Compare Larson _v._ Red River Transportation

Co., 111 Minn. 427; Eisenberg _v._ Missouri R. Co., 33 Mo. App. 85;

Henkel _v._ Murr, 31 Hun, 28; Alperin _v._ Earle, 55 Hun, 211.

Footnote 159:

Moone _v._ Smith, 6 Ga. App. 649; Mastad _v._ Swedish Brethren, 83

Minn. 40; Rommel _v._ Schambacher, 120 Pa. St. 579 _Accord_.

But compare Woolworth _v._ Conboy, 170 Fed. 934; Lord _v._ Sherer Co.,

205 Mass. 1.

Footnote 160:

Jones _v._ New York R. Co., 211 Mass. 521; De Boer _v._ Brooklyn Wharf

Co., 51 App. Div. 289 _Accord_. Compare Hillman _v._ Boston R. Co.,

207 Mass. 478.

This case is often cited as though it decided that the defendant was

liable to the plaintiff for harm suffered by the plaintiff on account

of a defect in the premises; _e. g._, defective planks on the

crossing. For a more correct view of the real question involved see

the able argument of Mr. Thorndike in Stevens _v._ Nichols, _post_.

_Liability of owner or occupier of a place manifestly intended for

public or general use_: see Crogan _v._ Schiele, 53 Conn. 186; Howe

_v._ Ohmart, 7 Ind. App. 32; Davis _v._ Central Congregational

Society, 129 Mass. 367; Holmes _v._ Drew, 151 Mass. 578; Gordon _v._

Cummings, 152 Mass. 513; Kelly _v._ Southern R. Co., 28 Minn. 98;

Marsh _v._ Minneapolis Brewing Co., 92 Minn. 182; Rachmel _v._ Clark,

205 Pa. St. 314.

_Liability of owner or occupier who passively acquiesces in use by

others_: see White _v._ France, 2 C. P. D. 308; Alabama R. Co. _v._

Godfrey, 156 Ala. 202; Herzog _v._ Hemphill, 7 Cal. App. 116;

Pastorello _v._ Stone, 89 Conn. 286; Etheredge _v._ Central R. Co.,

122 Ga. 853; Nave _v._ Flack, 90 Ind. 205; Evansville R. Co. _v._

Griffin, 100 Ind. 221; Martin _v._ Louisville Bridge Co., 41 Ind. App.

493; Zoebisch _v._ Tarbell, 10 Allen, 385; Bowler _v._ Pacific Mills,

200 Mass. 364; Habina _v._ Twin City Electric Co., 150 Mich. 41; Moore

_v._ Wabash R. Co., 84 Mo. 481, 488; Kelly _v._ Benas, 217 Mo. 1;

Barry _v._ Calvary Cemetery Assn., 106 Mo. App. 358; Walsh _v._

Fitchburg R. Co., 145 N. Y. 301; Fox _v._ Warner Asphalt Co., 204 N.

Y. 340; Monroe _v._ Atlantic R. Co., 151 N. C. 374; Phillips _v._ Orr,

152 N. C. 583; Railroad Co. _v._ Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235; Breckenridge

_v._ Bennett, 7 Kulp (Pa.) 95.

Footnote 161:

The report in 155 Mass. 472 does not give any portion of the

arguments. The following passages are extracts from the printed brief

for the defendants.

Footnote 162:

Smith _v._ London Docks Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 326; Holmes _v._

Northeastern R. Co., L. R. 4 Ex. 254, L. R. 6 Ex. 123; Wright _v._

London R. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 298, 1 Q. B. D. 252; Berlin Mills _v._

Croteau, (C. C. A.) 88 Fed. 860; Smith _v._ Day, (C. C. A.) 100 Fed.

244; Currier _v._ Trustees, (C. C. A.) 117 Fed. 44; Rhode _v._ Duff,

(C. C. A.) 208 Fed. 115; Middleton _v._ Ross, (C. C. A.) 213 Fed. 6;

Alabama R. Co. _v._ Godfrey, 156 Ala. 202; Schmidt _v._ Bauer, 80 Cal.

565; Herzog _v._ Hemphill, 7 Cal. App. 116; Pauckner _v._ Wakem, 231

Ill. 276; Franey _v._ Union Stockyards Co., 235 Ill. 522, 138 Ill.

App. 215; Purtell _v._ Coal Co., 256 Ill. 110; Northwestern R. Co.

_v._ O’Malley, 107 Ill. App. 599; Deach _v._ Woolner, 187 Ill. App.

524; Faris _v._ Hoberg, 134 Ind. 269; Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Slaughter,

167 Ind. 330; Thiele _v._ McManus, 3 Ind. App. 132; Wilmes _v._

Chicago R. Co., 175 Ia. 101; Lackat _v._ Lutz, 94 Ky. 287; Smith _v._

Trimble, 111 Ky. 861; Kentucky Distilleries Co. _v._ Leonard, (Ky.) 79

S. W. 281; Bell _v._ Houston R. Co., 132 La. 88; Dixon _v._ Swift, 98

Me. 207; Patten _v._ Bartlett, 111 Me. 409; Elie _v._ Lewiston R. Co.,

112 Me. 178; Plummer _v._ Dill, 156 Mass. 426; Gauley _v._ Hall, 168

Mass. 513; Cowen _v._ Kirby, 180 Mass. 504; Norris _v._ Nawn

Contracting Co., 206 Mass. 58; Lepnick _v._ Gaddis, 72 Miss. 200;

Glaser _v._ Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180; Davis _v._ Ringolsky, 143 Mo.

App. 364; Bryant _v._ Missouri R. Co., 181 Mo. App. 189; True _v._

Meredith Creamery, 72 N. H. 154; Flanagan _v._ Atlantic Asphalt Co.,

37 App. Div. 476; Buchtel College _v._ Martin, 25 Ohio Cir. Ct. R.

494; Smith _v._ Sunday Creek Co., 74 W. Va. 606; Ross _v._ Kanawha R.

Co., 76 W. Va. 197; Hupfer _v._ National Distilling Co., 114 Wis. 279;

Muench _v._ Heinemann, 119 Wis. 441 _Accord_. See also Blossom _v._

Poteet, 104 Tex. 230 (wife bringing husband’s dinner to mill where he

was employed); Southwestern Cement Co. _v._ Bustillos, (Tex. Civ.

App.) 169 S. W. 638 (child bringing lunch to employee).

But compare Mandeville Mills _v._ Dale, 2 Ga. App. 607; Furey _v._ New

York Central R. Co., 67 N. J. Law, 270; Gorr _v._ Mittlestaedt, 96

Wis. 296.

Footnote 163:

That is, 155 Mass.

Footnote 164:

McClain _v._ Bank, 100 Me. 437; Moffatt _v._ Kenny, 174 Mass. 311

_Accord_.

Hanson _v._ Spokane Water Co., 58 Wash. 6 _Contra_. Compare Buckingham

_v._ Fisher, 70 Ill. 121.

_Liability to one who has business with an abutting owner who has a

right to use the way_: see Cavanagh _v._ Block, 192 Mass. 63.

_As to what constitutes an implied invitation_, see Bryan _v._

Stewart, 194 Ala. 353; Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Slaughter, 167 Ind. 330;

Pittsburgh R. Co. _v._ Simons, 168 Ind. 333; Stanwood _v._ Clancey,

106 Me. 72; Kalus _v._ Bass, 122 Md. 467; Walker _v._ Winstanley, 155

Mass. 301; Plummer _v._ Dill, 156 Mass. 426; Chenery _v._ Fitchburg R.

Co., 160 Mass. 211; Tracey _v._ Page, 201 Mass. 62; Shaw _v._ Ogden,

214 Mass. 475; Romana _v._ Boston R. Co., 218 Mass. 76; Allen _v._

Yazoo R. Co., 111 Miss. 267; Black _v._ Central R. Co., 85 N. J. Law,

197; Heskell _v._ Auburn Light Co., 209 N. Y. 86.

Footnote 165:

The statement has been much abridged.

Footnote 166:

Anderson _v._ Robinson, 182 Ala. 615; Hedskin _v._ Gillespie, 33 Ind.

App. 650; Shackford _v._ Coffin, 95 Me. 69; Rolfe _v._ Tufts, 216

Mass. 563; Brady _v._ Klein, 133 Mich. 422; Korach _v._ Loeffel, 168

Mo. App. 414 (but see Graff _v._ Lemp Brewing Co., 130 Mo. App. 618;

Marcheck _v._ Klute, 133 Mo. App. 280); Dustin _v._ Curtis, 74 N. H.

266; Schick _v._ Fleischhauer, 26 App. Div. 210; Stelz _v._ Van Dusen,

93 App. Div. 358; Kushes _v._ Ginsberg, 99 App. Div. 417; Boden _v._

Scholtz, 101 App. Div. 1; Mitchell _v._ Stewart, 187 Pa. St. 217;

Davis _v._ Smith, 26 R. I. 129 _Accord_. See also Clyne _v._ Helmes,

61 N. J. Law, 358. Compare Miles _v._ Janvrin, 196 Mass. 431, 200

Mass. 514; Flanagan _v._ Welch, 220 Mass. 186.

Sontag _v._ O’Hare, 73 Ill. App. 432; Schwandt _v._ Metzger Oil Co.,

93 Ill. App. 365 (but see Cromwell _v._ Allen, 151 Ill. App. 404);

Good _v._ Von Hemert, 114 Minn. 393; Glidden _v._ Goodfellow, 124

Minn. 101; Keegan _v._ Heileman Brewing Co., 129 Minn. 496; Merchants

Cotton Press Co. _v._ Miller, 135 Tenn. 187; Lowe _v._ O’Brien, 77

Wash. 677 _Contra_. See Moore _v._ Steljes, 69 Fed. 518.

_Liability where landlord makes repairs negligently_: see Mann _v._

Fuller, 63 Kan. 664; Gill _v._ Middleton, 105 Mass. 477; Thomas _v._

Lane, 221 Mass. 447; Finer _v._ Nichols, 175 Mo. App. 525; Carlon _v._

City Sav. Bank, 85 Neb. 659; Wynne _v._ Haight, 27 App. Div. 7;

Marston _v._ Frisbie, 168 App. Div. 666; Flam _v._ Greenberg, (App.

Div.) 158 N. Y. Supp. 670; Wilcox _v._ Hines, 100 Tenn. 538.

Footnote 167:

See Hutchinson _v._ The Newcastle, York, & Berwick Railway Company, 5

Exch. 343; Wiggett _v._ Fox, 11 Exch. 832.—Reporter’s Note.

Footnote 168:

Whether the result in the above case is correct is a question not yet

decided in most of the United States, and upon which conflicting

opinions have been expressed. See Hart _v._ Cole, 156 Mass. 475;

KNOWLTON, J., in Coupe _v._ Platt, 172 Mass. 458, 459; Bigelow on

Torts, 7th ed., pp. 362, 363, sections 740–743, 8th ed., p. 158;

Burdick on Torts, 3d ed., sect. 555; 2 Shearman & Redfield on

Negligence, 4th ed., sect. 706; Barman _v._ Spencer, (Ind.) 49 N. E.

9, 11, 12; Beard _v._ Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153; Land _v._ Fitzgerald, 68

N. J. Law, 28.

Footnote 169:

Pennebaker _v._ San Joaquin Light Co., 158 Cal. 579; Lunt _v._ Post

Printing Co., 48 Col. 316; Gibson _v._ Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 37 Ill.

App. 344; Thrift _v._ Vandalia R. Co., 145 Ill. App. 414; Woodruff

_v._ Bowen, 136 Ind. 431; Hamilton _v._ Minneapolis Desk Co., 78 Minn.

3; New Omaha Electric Light Co. _v._ Anderson, 73 Neb. 84; Woods _v._

Miller, 30 App. Div. 232; Eckes _v._ Stetler, 98 App. Div. 76; Houston

R. Co. _v._ O’Leary, (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 601 _Accord_. But see

Wilson _v._ Great Southern Tel. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1041.

_Liability to police officer or other person in by permission of law_:

see Casey _v._ Adams, 234 Ill. 350; Eckels _v._ Maher, 137 Ill. App.

45; Blatt _v._ McBarron, 161 Mass. 21; Racine _v._ Morris, 136 App.

Div. 467; Woods _v._ Lloyd, (Pa.) 16 Atl. 43; Burroughs Adding Machine

Co. _v._ Fryar, 132 Tenn. 612; Greenville _v._ Pitts, 102 Tex. 1.

But compare Kennedy _v._ Heisen, 182 Ill. App. 200; Parker _v._

Barnard, 135 Mass. 116; Learoyd _v._ Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315; Pickwick

_v._ McCauliff, 193 Mass. 70.

_Liability to volunteer salvor in case of fire_: see Kohn _v._ Lovett,

44 Ga. 251; Gibson _v._ Leonard, 143 Ill. 182.

_Liability to person who has contractual right to inspect the

premises_: see Dashields _v._ Moses, 35 App. D. C. 583.

Footnote 170:

The authorities on all sides of the question raised in this cause are

collected and discussed in the cases that follow. See also Pollock,

Torts, 6 ed., 496–497; Piggott, Torts, 231–232; 1 Jaggard, Torts,

904–909; Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, 6 ed., 511–522; Salmond, Torts, 4

ed., 415–424; Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts, 44

Am. Law Reg. 341.

Footnote 171:

The statement of facts by the reporter is omitted.

Footnote 172:

The statement of facts is omitted.

Footnote 173:

Arguments omitted.

Footnote 174:

See an elaborate criticism of George _v._ Skivington, L. R. 5 Ex. 1,

in Blacker _v._ Lake, 106 Law Times Rep. (N. S.) 533, 537.

Footnote 175:

_Liability of abstracter to third party_ injured by mistake or

omission in abstract of title: see Thomas _v._ Guarantee Title & Trust

Co., 81 Ohio St. 432; Bremerton Development Co. _v._ Title Trust Co.,

67 Wash. 268.

_Liability of water company to injured citizen_ where it has failed to

provide water for extinguishment of fires according to its contract

with the municipality: see Sunderland, Liability of Water Companies

for Fire Losses, 3 Mich. Law Rev. 442; Kales, Liability of Water

Companies for Fire Losses—Another View, 3 Mich. Law Rev. 501; note in

19 Green Bag, 129–133.

Footnote 176:

Part of case omitted; also arguments.

On the subject of this section the student may read profitably,

Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 Harvard Law Rev. 233; Clark, Tort

Liability for Negligence in Missouri, Bull. of Univ. of Mo. Law

Series, No. 12, pp. 25–43.

Footnote 177:

1 Q. B. 29, 36.

Footnote 178:

Chicago R. Co. _v._ Levy, 160 Ill. 385; Toledo R. Co. _v._ Brannagan,

75 Ind. 490; Cincinnati R. Co. _v._ Butler, 103 Ind. 31 (but changed

in case of injuries to the person, Acts of 1899, p. 58, Burns’ Ann.

St. § 362); Greenleaf _v._ Illinois R. Co., 29 Ia. 14 (but changed in

case of actions against a common carrier, Suppl. to the Code, 1913, §

3593 _a_); Brown _v._ Illinois R. Co., 123 Ia. 239; Dickey _v._ Maine

Tel. Co., 43 Me. 492; Planz _v._ Boston R. Co., 157 Mass. 377 (but

changed by Acts of 1914, ch. 553); Mynning _v._ Detroit R. Co., 67

Mich. 677; Curran _v._ Warren Chemical Mfg. Co., 36 N. Y. 153; City

_v._ Nix, 3 Okl. 136; Bovee _v._ Danville, 53 Vt. 183 _Accord_.

_Contra_, contributory negligence an affirmative defence: Inland

Coasting Co. _v._ Tolson, 139 U. S. 551; Montgomery Gaslight Co. _v._

Montgomery R. Co., 86 Ala. 372; Texas R. Co. _v._ Orr, 46 Ark. 182;

Atchison _v._ Wills, 21 App. D. C. 548; MacDougall _v._ Central R.

Co., 63 Cal. 431; Moore _v._ Lanier, 52 Fla. 353; City _v._ Hudson, 88

Ga. 599; Hopkins _v._ Utah R. Co., 2 Idaho, 300; St. Louis R. Co. _v._

Weaver, 35 Kan. 412; Hocum _v._ Weitherick, 22 Minn. 152; Buesching

_v._ St. Louis Gaslight Co., 73 Mo. 219; Nelson _v._ City, 16 Mont.

21; O’Brien _v._ Omaha Water Co., 83 Neb. 71; Valley _v._ Concord R.

Co., 68 N. H. 546; New Jersey Exp. Co. _v._ Nichols, 33 N. J. Law 434;

Jordan _v._ City, 112 N. C. 743; Carr _v._ Minneapolis R. Co., 16 N.

D. 217; Grant _v._ Baker, 12 Or. 329; Beatty _v._ Gilmore, 16 Pa. St.

463; Carter _v._ Columbia R. Co., 19 S. C. 20; Houston R. Co. _v._

Cowser, 57 Tex. 293; Richmond Granite Co. _v._ Bailey, 92 Va. 554;

Johnson _v._ Bellingham Imp. Co., 13 Wash. 455; Fowler _v._ Baltimore

R. Co., 18 W. Va. 579; Hoth _v._ Peters, 55 Wis. 405.

Footnote 179:

As to contributory negligence as a bar to an action for damage caused

in part by defendant’s failure to perform a duty imposed on him by

statute, see Bishop, Commentaries on the Written Laws, §§ 117, 117

_a_, § 131, pars. 2, 3, § 134, pars. 3,4, § 139, par. 1; Kelley _v._

Killourey, 81 Conn. 320; Catlett _v._ Young, 143 Ill. 74; Shultz _v._

Griffith, 103 Ia. 150; Hussey _v._ King, 83 Me. 568; Wadsworth _v._

Marshall, 88 Me. 263; Schutt _v._ Adair, 99 Minn. 7; Quimby _v._

Woodbury, 63 N. H. 370; Kilpatrick _v._ Grand Trunk R. Co., 72 Vt.

263.

Footnote 180:

Only so much of the case is given as relates to a single point.

Footnote 181:

Remainder of opinion omitted.

Start, J., in LaFlam _v._ Missisquoi Pulp Company, 74 Vt. 125. 143:

“The defendants, by their second request, asked for an instruction

that if, by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence upon the part

of the plaintiff, he would not have been injured, he cannot recover.

The court instructed the jury, that, if the plaintiff’s want of

ordinary care or his negligence contributed in any material degree to

the happening of the accident, he is not entitled to recover, even

though the defendants were negligent. This was in accordance with the

rule as it has sometimes been stated by this court. In Magoon _v._

Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 67 Vt. 184, 31 Atl. 156, and in Hill _v._

New Haven, 37 Vt. 507, 88 Am. Dec. 613, it is said that, if the

negligence or carelessness of the person injured contributes in any

material degree to the production of the injury complained of, he

cannot recover; but in Reynolds _v._ Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 64 Vt.

66, 24 Atl. 134, 33 Am. St. Rep. 908, the holding is that, if the

negligence of the plaintiff contributes in the _least_ degree to the

accident, there can be no recovery. We think this is the correct rule,

and that the instruction should have conformed to it. The use of the

word ‘material’ left the jury at liberty to consider the degree of the

plaintiff’s negligence, which is not considered permissible in

jurisdictions where the doctrine of contributory negligence prevails.

To allow jurors to consider so-called degrees of negligence would, in

effect, nullify this doctrine. 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, (2d ed.) 379.”

“Negligence contributing as an efficient cause of injury will defeat

an action therefor, irrespective of the quantum of negligence of the

respective parties.” Jaggard, J., in O’Brien _v._ St. Paul City R.

Co., 98 Minn. 205, 207–208.

“An effect often has many proximate, and many remote, causes. If the

negligence of the plaintiff was one of the proximate causes of the

injury,—if it directly contributed to the unfortunate result,—he

cannot recover, even though the negligence of the defendant also

contributed to it.” Sanborn, J., in Missouri Pac. R. Co. _v._ Moseley,

57 Fed. 921, 925.

“While purporting to give a legal definition of contributory

negligence, this instruction demands that such negligence shall be

found the sole and direct cause of the accident—an interpretation at

war with the term ‘contributory’ itself.” Reyburn, J., in Hanheide

_v._ St. Louis Transit Co., 104 Mo. App. 323, 330.

“... if it appears that his [plaintiff’s] negligence has contributed

as an efficient cause to the injury of which he complains, the court

will not undertake to balance the negligence of the respective parties

for the purpose of determining which was most at fault. The law

recognizes no gradations of fault in such case, and where both parties

have been guilty of negligence, as a general rule, there can be no

recovery. There is really no distinction between negligence in the

plaintiff and negligence in the defendant, except that the negligence

of the former is called ‘contributory negligence.’” Whittle, J., in

Richmond Traction Co. _v._ Martin’s Adm’r, 102 Va. 209, 213.

“... there was a lack of ordinary care on his [the deceased’s] part,

and where this occurs, contributing proximately to the injury, this

lack will prevent a recovery, though the negligence of the other party

may have much more contributed thereto.” Beard, C. J., in Memphis Gas

& Electric Co. _v._ Simpson, (Tenn.) 109 S. W. 1155, 1158.

American Woolen Co. _v._ Stewart, (C. C. A.) 217 Fed. 1; Birmingham R.

Co. _v._ Bynum, 139 Ala. 389; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Musgrove, 113 Ark.

599; Denver R. Co. _v._ Maydole, 33 Col. 150; Robinson _v._ Huber,

(Del.) 63 Atl. 873; O’Keefe _v._ Chicago R. Co., 32 Ia. 467;

Pennsylvania R. Co. _v._ Roney, 89 Ind. 453; Atchison R. Co. _v._

Henry, 57 Kan. 154; Mann _v._ City, 154 Ky. 154; Marble _v._ Ross, 124

Mass. 44; Mynning _v._ Detroit R. Co., 59 Mich. 257; Hurt _v._ St.

Louis R. Co., 94 Mo. 255; Village _v._ Holliday, 50 Neb. 229;

Pennsylvania R. Co. _v._ Righter, 42 N. J. Law, 180; St. Louis R. Co.

_v._ Elsing, 37 Okl. 333; Weaver _v._ Pennsylvania R. Co., 212 Pa. St.

632; Weir _v._ Haverford Electric Co., 221 Pa. St. 611; McLean _v._

Atlantic R. Co., 81 S. C. 100; McDonald _v._ International R. Co., 86

Tex. 1; Hazen _v._ Rutland R. Co., 89 Vt. 94; Chesapeake R. Co. _v._

Lee, 84 Va. 642; Franklin _v._ Engel, 34 Wash. 480; Tesch _v._

Milwaukee R. Co., 108 Wis. 593 _Accord_.

Footnote 182:

“The doctrine of comparative negligence no longer exists in this

state.” Wilkin, J., in City _v._ Holcomb, 205 Ill. 643, 646.

“The intrinsic difficulty of the subject of contributory negligence

has led to three distinct lines of decisions. In England and a

majority of the States of the Union, the negligence of the plaintiff

which contributes to the injury is held to be an absolute bar to the

action. In the States of Illinois and Georgia the doctrine of

comparative negligence has been adopted, that is, if on comparing the

negligence of the plaintiff with that of the defendant, the former is

found to be slight and the latter gross, the plaintiff may recover. In

this State we hold that although the injured party may contribute to

the injury by his own carelessness or wrongful conduct, yet if the act

or negligence of the party inflicting the injury was the proximate

cause of the injury, the latter will be liable in damages, the

negligence or wrongful conduct of the party injured being taken into

consideration, by way of mitigation, in estimating the damages. In

other words, if defendant was guilty of a wrong by which plaintiff is

injured, and plaintiff was also in some degree negligent or

contributed to the injury, it should go in mitigation of damages, but

cannot justify or excuse the wrong. East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia

Railroad Company _v._ Fain, 12 Lea, 35. At the same time we hold that

if a party by his own gross negligence bring an injury upon himself,

or proximately contribute to such injury, he cannot recover; neither

can he recover in cases of mutual negligence where both parties are

equally blamable. Id. The principal difference between our rule and

the English rule, as modified by the more recent decisions, is in

allowing the damages to be mitigated by the conduct of the injured

party. In this respect our rule meets the objection which Mr.

Thompson, in his notes on contributory negligence, makes to the

construction put by some of the courts on the English rule, or to the

application of the rule in particular cases. ‘It is,’ he says,

‘nothing more than a declaration that although both parties have been

guilty of negligence contributing to the injury, the party who

suffered the damage is to be completely exonerated, and the other

party is not to be exonerated to any extent; the former is to recover

of the latter without any abatement on account of his own share of the

fault, all the damages which he has suffered.’ ‘This is,’ he adds,

‘manifest injustice; and yet it is practiced every day in the courts

of England and in those of nearly every State in the Union.’ 2

Thompson on Neg. 1155. Our rule, moreover, is merely an adaptation of

the law which prevails in civil actions for assault and battery, where

the conduct of the plaintiff in the way of provocation is always

admissible in evidence to mitigate the damages. Jackaway _v._ Dula, 7

Yer. 82; Chambers _v._ Porter, 5 Cold. 273, 280; Suth. on Dam. 745.”

Cooper, J., in Louisville R. Co. _v._ Fleming, 14 Lea, (Tenn.) 128,

135. But see Southern R. Co. _v._ Pugh, 97 Tenn. 624.

Footnote 183:

This refers to § 8657: “Every common carrier by railroad while

engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories,

or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or

Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States

or Territories and any foreign nation or nations....”

Footnote 184:

See also Florida, Comp. L., 1914, § 3149; Georgia, Park’s Annotated

Code, 1914, §§ 2781 (2332), 2783; Iowa, Supplement to Code, 1913, §

2071; Kansas, Laws of 1911, ch. 239, § 2; Maine, Pub. L. 1910, c. 258,

§ 4; Mississippi, Laws of 1910, c. 135; Nebraska, Rev. St. 1915, §§

6054, 7892; Nevada, Rev. L. § 5651 (employees in mines); Ohio, Page &

Adams, Ann. Gen. Code, §§ 6245–1, 9018; South Dakota, Laws of 1907, c.

219, § 2; Texas, McEachin’s Civ. St. art. 6649; Virginia, Acts of

1916, ch. 444, § 2; Wisconsin, Stat. 1915, ch. 87, § 1816 (3).

Compare Arkansas, Kirby’s Dig. § 6654; Illinois, R. S. c. 114, § 231;

Indiana, Burns’ Ann. St. § 5277 _c_; Missouri, R. S. (1909) §§ 3164,

3172.

Footnote 185:

American Workmen’s Compensation Acts often provide that if the

employer does not elect to act under the statute, he shall be liable

to an action at law by the injured employee in which contributory

negligence shall be no defence. See, for example, Ohio, Page & Adams,

Annotated Gen. Code, § 1465–60.

Footnote 186:

Portions of opinion omitted. Argument for appellant omitted.

Footnote 187:

PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (6 ed.) II, § 899: “It

frequently happens that one who suffers damage through the fault of

another is not himself exempt from all fault; he has concurred in the

accident and shares responsibility therefor with the other. In this

case there is what we call in practice _faute commune_. This community

of fault diminishes the responsibility of the principal author of

damage who now only owes a partial reparation.”

GERMAN CIVIL CODE, § 254: “If any fault of the injured party has

contributed in causing the injury, the obligation to compensate the

injured party and the extent of the compensation to be made depends

upon the circumstances, especially upon how far the injury has been

caused chiefly by the one or the other party.

“This applies also even if the fault of the injured party consisted

only in an omission to call the attention of the debtor to the danger

of an unusually serious injury which the debtor neither knew nor ought

to have known, or in an omission to avert or mitigate the injury....”

[The word “debtor” is used here in the Roman sense, meaning the person

bound in any sort of obligation—here the delictual obligation to make

reparation for an injury due to fault.]

Footnote 188:

See The Drumlanrig, [1911] A. C. 16; Steamship Devonshire _v._ Barge

Leslie, [1912] A. C. 634; St. Louis Packet Co. _v._ Murray, 144 Ky.

815. But compare Murphy _v._ Diamond, 3 La. Ann. 441; New York Towboat

Co. _v._ New York R. Co., 148 N. Y. 574; Union Steamship Co. _v._

Nottingham, 17 Grat. 115.

Footnote 189:

The book cites Carth. 194 and 451 in the margin, which references do

not bear on the point here in question.—Reporter’s note.

Footnote 190:

The usual mode of citation is 1 Q. B.

Footnote 191:

“The other instruction was in these words: ‘There is another

qualification of this rule of negligence, which it is proper I should

mention. Although the rule is that, even if the defendant be shown to

have been guilty of negligence, the plaintiff cannot recover if he

himself be shown to have been guilty of contributory negligence which

may have had something to do in causing the accident; yet the

contributory negligence on his part would not exonerate the defendant,

and disentitle the plaintiff from recovering, if it be shown that the

defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have

avoided the consequences of the plaintiff’s negligence.’

“The qualification of the general rule, as thus stated, is supported

by decisions of high authority, and was applicable to the case on

trial.” Gray, J., in Inland Coasting Co. _v._ Tolson, 139 U. S. 551,

558.

“Although the defendant’s negligence may have been the primary cause

of the injury complained of, yet an action for such injury cannot be

maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be

traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured;

subject to this qualification, which has grown up in recent years

(having been first enunciated in Davies _v._ Mann, 10 M. & W. 546)

that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat

the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of

reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the

injured party’s negligence.” Lamar, J., in Grand Trunk R. Co. _v._

Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 429.

Footnote 192:

The statement of facts and portions of the opinion are omitted.

Footnote 193:

174 U. S. 379.

Footnote 194:

The statement of facts is condensed, and the arguments of counsel and

part of the opinion are omitted.

Footnote 195:

Only a portion of the opinion is printed.

Footnote 196:

The statement of facts is abridged from the statement in the opinion

and from the statement made by the reporter. The citations of counsel

are omitted.

Footnote 197:

“... The wagon so loaded coming to the bridge and being unable to pass

underneath it, the train stopped, and those who had charge of it,

without looking to ascertain the cause of the stoppage, gave momentum

to the engine to such an extent that the wagon with its load knocked

the bridge down.” Statement of facts in opinion of Bramwell, B., L. R.

9 Exch. 72. Compare statement in L. R. 10 Exch. 102.

Footnote 198:

Printed papers in the case.

Footnote 199:

L. R. 9 Ex. 71.

Footnote 200:

L. R. 10 Ex. 700.

Footnote 201:

Arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 202:

L. R. 9 Ex. at 72.

Footnote 203:

See also Cayzer _v._ Carron, 9 App. Cas. 873; McDermaid _v._ Edinburgh

Tramways Co., 22 Sc. L. R. 13.

Footnote 204:

Only a portion of the opinion is printed.

Footnote 205:

This opinion of CARPENTER, J., was given in the Circuit Court; and was

quoted by MOORE, J., in his dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court.

Footnote 206:

“We shall immediately see, moreover, that independent negligent acts

of A and B may both be proximate in respect of harm suffered by Z,

though either of them, if committed by Z himself, would have prevented

him from having any remedy for the other. Thus it appears that the

term ‘proximate’ is not used in precisely the same sense in fixing a

negligent defendant’s liability and a negligent plaintiff’s

disability.” Pollock, _Torts_, 6th ed. 447.

“... In determining whether the cause of the accident is proximate or

remote, the same test must be applied to the conduct of the injured

party as is to be applied to the defendant. The conduct of the latter

cannot be judged by one rule and that of the former by some other

rule.”—O’BRIEN, J., in Rider _v._ Syracuse R. Co., 171 N. Y. 139, 154.

[An instruction as to the meaning of the word “proximately” intimates]

“that there is a difference between the meaning of the word when

applied to the defendant and when applied to the plaintiff. There is

no such difference. Contributory negligence on the part of the

plaintiff must bear the same proximate relation to the result as the

actionable negligence of the defendant. It need not be the sole cause,

and it may contribute but slightly, but it must be a proximate cause

in the same sense that the defendant’s negligence must be proximate.”

WINSLOW, J., in Boyce _v._ Wilbur Lumber Co., 119 Wis. 642, 649–650.

Footnote 207:

The statement has been abridged and the arguments and part of the

opinion are omitted.

Footnote 208:

Compare Rider _v._ Syracuse R. Co., 171 N. Y. 139.

Footnote 209:

The statement of facts and argument of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 210:

The statement of facts, arguments and parts of the opinions are

omitted.

Footnote 211:

See also Bruggeman _v._ Illinois R. Co., 147 Ia. 187, 204–214;

Anderson _v._ Minneapolis R. Co., 103 Minn. 224; Cavanaugh _v._ Boston

R. Co., 76 N. H. 68; Scholl _v._ Belcher, 63 Or. 310, 323; Underwood

_v._ Old Colony R. Co., 33 R. I. 319. As to the requirement of a “new

act of negligence” see Rider _v._ Syracuse R. Co., 171 N. Y. 139.

Footnote 212:

Statement abridged. Only part of opinion is given.

Footnote 213:

Statement omitted, also a large part of opinion.

Footnote 214:

85 N. C. 310.

Footnote 215:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 216:

The statement has been abridged and the arguments and part of the

opinion are omitted.

Footnote 217:

See also Weitzman _v._ Nassau R. Co., 33 App. Div. 585; Green _v._

Metropolitan R. Co., 42 App. Div. 160.

Footnote 218:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 219:

In Kierzenkowski _v._ Philadelphia Traction Co., 184 Pa. St. 459, the

plaintiff was a girl three years old, who had been knocked down by one

of defendant’s horse cars. The court (_inter alia_) instructed the

jury, in substance, as follows:—

The law does not allow that children of this age can be guilty of

contributory negligence; but you are obliged to consider the case as

to the negligence alone of the defendant. If you were driving along

the street with your horse and wagon, and a child runs under the feet

of the horses and is killed, you are not responsible; not because the

child is guilty of contributory negligence, but because you are not

guilty of negligence. If it is an unavoidable accident, you are not

responsible. If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that

the child suddenly and unexpectedly appeared in the vicinity of the

track under such circumstances that the driver of the car could not

have discovered its presence in time to avoid the accident, the

verdict must be for the defendant.

An exception to the charge was overruled.

Footnote 220:

Birmingham R. Co. _v._ Brantley, 141 Ala. 614; Baltimore Traction Co.

_v._ Wallace, 77 Md. 435; Lassiter _v._ Raleigh R. Co., 133 N. C. 244;

Memphis R. Co. _v._ Haynes, 112 Tenn. 712 _Accord_.

“Let us view this subject in a more concrete form. The last railroad

statistics I have been able to find were issued by the Interstate

Commerce Commission for the year 1906.

[The learned judge then copies a table from the report referred to and

proceeds.]

It will be observed that while the road mileage and train mileage in

Canada are each ten per cent of the entire road system and the entire

train mileage, the number of trespassers injured or killed in that

country was only three per cent of the total number; while in this

State the road mileage is twenty-six per cent of the total road

mileage and the train mileage twenty-five per cent of the total train

mileage, forty-eight per cent of the total number of trespassers

injured or killed were injured or killed in Missouri.

Illinois has thirty per cent of the road mileage and thirty-two per

cent of the train mileage, and only twenty per cent of the total

number of trespassers injured or killed were injured or killed in that

State.

It is important to know both the train mileage and the road mileage,

for the reason the greater number of trains that are run over a given

road mileage the greater number of fatalities to trespassers will

result. The train mileage, therefore, in the various States offers the

most accurate basis for comparison.

A computation will show that one trespasser was killed for every

eighty-one miles of road in Canada; for every seventeen miles in

Michigan; for every forty-two miles in Ohio; for every thirty-one

miles in Indiana; for every forty-six miles in Illinois; for every

seventeen miles in Missouri; and for every forty-one miles in Iowa.

It will be observed that the number of miles for each trespasser

killed in Missouri and Michigan is the same. This results, however,

from the fact that the line from Chicago, St. Louis, and other points

converging at Montpelier, Ohio, and thence all the traffic eastward

goes over the one hundred and five miles of line located in the State

of Michigan. The effect of this is also shown in the train mileage.

Thus, while Michigan has only four per cent of road mileage, it has

one-third or six per cent of the train mileage. The population along

the Michigan mileage is very dense; about five miles of the line from

Delray to Detroit run through a very densely populated

district—practically a city.

It should also be noted that while Illinois has greater road and train

mileage than Missouri, only sixteen trespassers were injured or killed

while walking on tracks in that State, where thirty-nine persons were

killed or injured while walking on the track in Missouri. If we also

consider the more dense population of Illinois, the figures become

more startling. And if we should extend these figures in the same

proportion to all of the railroads of the State and country, we would

then see the appalling number of trespassers killed and injured

annually on account of this inhuman doctrine, which is approximately

7750.

In so far as I have been able to ascertain, the courts of all the

other States than this hold that persons who walk upon railroad tracks

do so at their peril, and I am thoroughly satisfied and convinced that

this fact accounts for the small number of fatalities to track-walkers

in those States as compared with Missouri; and by parity of reasoning

I am also convinced that if said section 1105 was strictly enforced,

as it should be, the contrast between those States and this would not

be near so great as it is now; and that if we had a statute like that

of Canada, making it a crime for persons to walk upon railroad tracks,

then the percentage of fatalities to track-walkers in this State would

fall still lower than what it is in any of the States mentioned. Such

a policy and such a statute would exclude from the railroads all

pedestrians, and thereby save this great sacrifice of life and limb,

as well as the pecuniary loss incident thereto.” WOODSON, J.

(dissenting), in Murphy _v._ Wabash Railroad Company, 228 Mo. 56, 88,

108.

See also the observations of Professor Clark in University of Missouri

Bulletin, Law Series, No. 12, 34–39.

Footnote 221:

Birmingham Light & Power Co. _v._ Jones, 146 Ala. 277; Indianapolis R.

Co. _v._ Boettcher, 131 Ind. 82 _Accord_.

Footnote 222:

Southern R. Co. _v._ Svendsen, 13 Ariz. 111; Kramm. _v._ Stockton R.

Co., 10 Cal. App. 271; Nehring _v._ Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109;

Central R. Co. _v._ Moore, 5 Ga. App. 562; Heidenreich _v._ Bremner,

260 Ill. 439; Kansas R. Co. _v._ Whipple, 39 Kan. 531; Schoolcraft

_v._ Louisville R. Co., 92 Ky. 233; La Barge _v._ Pere Marquette R.

Co., 134 Mich. 139; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Ault, 101 Miss. 341; Brendle

_v._ Spencer, 125 N. C. 474; Goodwin _v._ Atlantic R. Co., 82 S. C.

321; Bolin _v._ Chicago R. Co., 108 Wis. 333 _Accord_.

Footnote 223:

Carrington _v._ Louisville R. Co., 88 Ala. 472; Wood _v._ Los Angeles

R. Co., 172 Cal. 15; Rowen _v._ New York R. Co., 59 Conn. 364; Florida

R. Co. _v._ Hirst, 30 Fla. 1; Louisville R. Co. _v._ McCoy, 81 Ky.

403; Davis _v._ Saginaw Bay R. Co., 191 Mich. 131 _Accord_. Compare

Magar _v._ Hammond, 171 N. Y. 377.

“Mere negligence which gives a cause of action is the doing of an act,

or the omission to act, which results in damage, but without intent to

do wrong or cause damage. To constitute a wilful injury, there must be

design, purpose, intent to do wrong and inflict the injury. Then there

is that reckless indifference or disregard of the natural or probable

consequence of doing an act, or omission of an act, designated whether

accurately or not, in our decisions, as ‘wanton negligence,’ to which

is imputed the same degree of culpability and held to be equivalent to

wilful injury. A purpose or intent to injure is not an ingredient of

wanton negligence. Where either of those exist, if damage ensues, the

injury is wilful. In wanton negligence, the party doing the act, or

failing to act, is conscious of his conduct, and without having the

intent to injure, is conscious, from his knowledge of existing

circumstances and conditions, that his conduct will likely or probably

result in injury. These are the distinctions between simple

negligence, wilful injury, and that wanton negligence which is the

equivalent of wilful injury, drawn and applied in our decisions. A

mere error of judgment as to the result of doing an act or the

omission of an act, having no evil purpose or intent, or consciousness

of probable injury, may constitute simple negligence, but cannot rise

to the degree of wanton negligence or wilful wrong....” Coleman, J.,

in Birmingham R. Co. _v._ Bowers, 110 Ala. 328, 331.

“The mere intentional omission to perform a duty or the intentional

doing of an act contrary to duty, although such conduct be culpable

and result in injury, without further averment, falls very far short

of showing that the injury was intentionally or wantonly inflicted.

Unless there was a purpose to inflict the injury, it cannot be said to

have been intentionally done; and unless an act is done, or omitted to

be done, under circumstances and conditions known to the person, that

his conduct is likely to, or probably will result in injury, and

through reckless indifference to consequences, he consciously and

intentionally does a wrongful act, or omits an act, the injury cannot

be said to be wantonly inflicted. These principles have been

frequently declared by this court....” Coleman, J., in Memphis R. Co.

_v._ Martin, 117 Ala. 367, 382.

Central R. Co. _v._ Newman, 94 Ga. 560; Lafayette R. Co. _v._ Adams,

26 Ind. 76; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Bills, 118 Ind. 221; Alger _v._

Duluth-Superior Traction Co., 93 Minn. 314; Jensen _v._ Denver R. Co.,

44 Utah, 100; Boggess _v._ Chesapeake R. Co., 37 W. Va. 297; Astin

_v._ Chicago R. Co., 143 Wis. 477 _Contra_. But see Jaggard, J.,

dissenting, in Anderson _v._ Minneapolis R. Co., 103 Minn. 224, 230.

“For a motorman to be inattentive to the way ahead of him is so

palpably negligent that it partakes of the nature of a reckless and

wanton act. Therefore a defendant in an action of this character will

not be heard to say that its motorman did not see the situation of the

injured person where it was open to his view nor did not realize the

peril where the indications would have disclosed it to any reasonable

mind. Charged with the knowledge of the peril of another that could

have been obtained by the use of ordinary care, a failure on the part

of a motorman to make every reasonable effort to avoid injuring the

endangered person would be in the highest degree wrongful, since it

would be negligence committed with the knowledge that another

certainly and immediately would be injured thereby. The principles of

right and justice do not tolerate the idea that the negligence of the

person imperilled involved in his act of placing himself in position

to be injured without giving proper heed to his own safety can

coöperate with the negligence of one who comprehending his danger or

being in a position to comprehend it by the use of ordinary care and

having at hand the means and opportunity of avoiding it, fails to

reasonably employ them and by such failure inflicts an injury. Such

negligence engrosses the entire field of culpability and eliminates

contributory negligence as a factor in the production of the injury.

It logically follows from the principles stated that the issue of

negligence in the performance of the humanitarian duty must be

governed by the rules applicable to ordinary negligence. The

determinative question in all such cases is, did the operators of the

car use ordinary care to ascertain the peril of the plaintiff and to

avoid the injury after they discovered it or should have discovered

it? In some of the decisions of the Supreme Court the idea appears to

be expressed that in order to find a defendant guilty of a breach of

the humanitarian rule the elements of wantonness and wilfulness must

appear in its conduct, but as we have attempted to show the mere

failure to observe ordinary care in situations of this character is of

itself a wanton act since it is abhorrent not only to fundamental

principles of law but to the dictates of common humanity. The views

expressed are supported by the weight of authority in this state,

including the most recent decisions of the Supreme and Appellate

courts....” Johnson, J., in Cole _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 121 Mo.

App. 605, 611.

Footnote 224:

Only a portion of the opinion is printed.

Footnote 225:

Statement of facts abridged. Arguments omitted. Only such portion of

the two opinions of Dixon, C. J., are given as relate to one question.

The dissenting opinion of Paine, J., is omitted.

Footnote 226:

Vaughan _v._ Taff Vale R. Co., 3 H. & N. 743; Leroy Fibre Co. _v._

Chicago R. Co., 232 U. S. 340; Flynn _v._ San Francisco R. Co., 40

Cal. 14; Fitch _v._ Pacific R. Co., 45 Mo. 322; Salmon _v._ Delaware

R. Co., 38 N. J. Law, 5; Philadelphia R. Co. _v._ Schultz, 93 Pa. St.

341 _Accord_. But see Collins _v._ New York R. Co., 5 Hun, 499.

In Leroy Fibre Co. _v._ Chicago R. Co., _supra_, Holmes, J.,

(concurring in the result) said:

“If a man stacked his flax so near to a railroad that it obviously was

likely to be set fire to by a well-managed train, I should say that he

could not throw the loss upon the road by the oscillating result of an

inquiry by the jury whether the road had used due care. I should say

that although of course he had a right to put his flax where he liked

upon his own land the liability of the railroad for a fire was

absolutely conditioned upon the stacks being at a reasonably safe

distance from the train. I take it that probably many, certainly some,

rules of law based on less than universal considerations are made

absolute and universal in order to limit those over-refined

speculations that we all deprecate, especially where such rules are

based upon or affect the continuous physical relations of material

things. The right that is given to inflict various inconveniences upon

neighboring lands by building or digging, is given, I presume, because

of the public interest in making improvement free, yet it generally is

made absolute by the common law. It is not thought worth while to let

the right to build or maintain a barn depend upon the speculations of

a jury as to motives. A defect in the highway, declared a defect in

the interest of the least competent travellers that can travel

unattended without taking legal risks, or in the interest of the

average man, I suppose to be a defect as to all. And as in this case

the distinction between the inevitable and the negligent escape of

sparks is one of the most refined in the world, I think that I must be

right so far, as to the law in the case supposed.

If I am right so far, a very important element in determining the

right to recover is whether the plaintiff’s flax was so near to the

track as to be in danger from even a prudently managed engine. Here

certainly, except in a clear case, we should call in the jury. I do

not suppose that any one would call it prudent to stack flax within

five feet of the engines or imprudent to do it at a distance of half a

mile, and it would not be absurd if the law ultimately should

formulate an exact measure, as it has tended to in other instances;

(Martin _v._ District of Columbia, 205 U. S. 135, 139) but at present

I take it that if the question I suggest be material we should let the

jury decide whether seventy feet was too near by the criterion that I

have proposed. Therefore, while the majority answer the first

question, No, on the ground that the railroad is liable upon the facts

stated as matter of law, I should answer it Yes, with the proviso that

it was to be answered No, in case the jury found that the flax,

although near, was not near enough to the trains to endanger it if the

engines were prudently managed, or else I should decline to answer the

question because it fails to state the distance of the stacks.

I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my view

depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as

it is civilized. See Nash _v._ United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376, 377.

Negligence is all degree—that of the defendant here degree of the

nicest sort; and between the variations according to distance that I

suppose to exist and the simple universality of the rules in the

Twelve Tables or the Leges Barbarorum, there lies the culture of two

thousand years.”

Where inflammable matter is brought upon land and kept near the track,

see Erickson _v._ Pennsylvania R. Co., (C. C. A.) 170 Fed. 572;

Southern R. Co. _v._ Wilson, 138 Ala. 510; Railway Co. _v._ Fire

Ass’n, 55 Ark. 163; Cleveland R. Co. _v._ Scantland, 151 Ind. 488;

Boston Excelsior Co. _v._ Bangor, 93 Me. 52; Peter _v._ Chicago R.

Co., 121 Mich. 324; Kalbfleisch _v._ Long Island R. Co., 102 N. Y.

520; Southern R. Co. _v._ Patterson, 105 Va. 6, in accord with the

principal case. See also Ross _v._ Boston R. Co., 6 All. 87.

Macon R. Co. _v._ McConnell, 27 Ga. 481; Coates _v._ Missouri R. Co.,

61 Mo. 38 (but see Mo. Rev. St. 1909, § 3151); Murphy _v._ Chicago R.

Co., 45 Wis. 222 _Contra_.

Compare Alabama R. Co. _v._ Fried, 81 Miss. 314; Louisville R. Co.

_v._ Short, 110 Tenn. 713; San Antonio R. Co. _v._ Home I. Co., (Tex.

Civ. App.) 70 S. W. 999.

Footnote 227:

Statement of case abridged. Arguments omitted.

Footnote 228:

116 U. S. 366.

Footnote 229:

Little _v._ Hackett, 116 U. S. 366; Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Friel, (C.

C. A.) 77 Fed. 126; Georgia R. Co. _v._ Hughes, 87 Ala. 610; Little

Rock R. Co. _v._ Harrell, 58 Ark. 454; Thompson _v._ Los Angeles R.

Co., 165 Cal. 748; Fujise _v._ Los Angeles R. Co., 12 Cal. App. 207;

Woodley _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 19 D. C. 542; Baltimore R. Co. _v._

Adams, 10 App. D. C. 97; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Hines, 183 Ill. 482;

Chicago R. Co. _v._ Leach, 215 Ill. 184; Pittsburgh R. Co. _v._

Spencer, 98 Ind. 186; Miller _v._ Louisville R. Co., 128 Ind. 97;

Chicago R. Co. _v._ Groves, 56 Kan. 601; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Case,

9 Bush, 728; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Molloy, 122 Ky. 219; Holzab _v._

New Orleans R. Co., 38 La. Ann. 185; Roby _v._ Kansas City R. Co., 130

La. 880; Consolidated Gas Co. _v._ Getty, 96 Md. 683; Cuddy _v._ Horn,

46 Mich. 596; Galloway _v._ Detroit Ry., 168 Mich. 343; Flaherty _v._

Minneapolis R. Co., 39 Minn. 328; Colton _v._ Willmar R. Co., 99 Minn.

366; Gulf R. Co. _v._ Barnes, 94 Miss. 484; Becke _v._ Missouri R.

Co., 102 Mo. 544; Sluder _v._ St. Louis Transit Co., 189 Mo. 107;

Bennett _v._ New Jersey R. Co., 36 N. J. Law, 225; New York R. Co.

_v._ Steinbrenner, 47 N. J. Law, 161; Colegrove _v._ New York R. Co.,

20 N. Y. 492; Webster _v._ Hudson R. Co., 38 N. Y. 260; Arctic Fire

Ins. Co. _v._ Austin, 69 N. Y. 470; Lewis _v._ Long Island R. Co., 162

N. Y. 52; Ward _v._ International R. Co., 206 N. Y. 83; Crampton _v._

Ivie, 124 N. C. 591; Covington Transfer Co. _v._ Kelly, 36 Ohio St.

86; Chickasha R. Co. _v._ Marshall, 43 Okl. 192; Dean _v._

Pennsylvania R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 514; Bunting _v._ Hogsett, 139 Pa.

St. 363; Markham _v._ Houston Navigation Co., 73 Tex. 247; Gulf R. Co.

_v._ Pendry, 87 Tex. 553; New York R. Co. _v._ Cooper, 85 Va. 939;

Croft _v._ Northwestern Steamship Co., 20 Wash. 175 _Accord_.

Footnote 230:

Statement abridged. Greater part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 231:

Elyton Land Co. _v._ Mingea, 89 Ala. 521; Birmingham R. Co. _v._

Baker, 132 Ala. 507; Hot Springs R. Co. _v._ Hildreth, 72 Ark. 572;

Farley _v._ Wilmington R. Co., 3 Pennewill 581; Porter _v._

Jacksonville Electric Co., 64 Fla. 409; Roach _v._ Western R. Co., 93

Ga. 785; West Chicago R. Co. _v._ Dougherty, 209 Ill. 241; Nonn _v._

Chicago R. Co., 232 Ill. 378; Yeates _v._ Illinois R. Co., 241 Ill.

205; Cincinnati R. Co. _v._ Cook, 44 Ind. App. 303; Larkin _v._

Burlington R. Co., 85 Ia. 492; Withey _v._ Fowler, 164 Ia. 377; City

_v._ Hatch, 57 Kan. 57; Williams _v._ Withington, 88 Kan. 809; City

_v._ Bott, 151 Ky. 578; State _v._ Boston R. Co., 80 Me. 430; Denis

_v._ Lewiston R. Co., 104 Me. 39; Philadelphia R. Co. _v._ Hogeland,

66 Md. 149; United Railways _v._ Biedler, 98 Md. 564; Randolph _v._

O’Riordan, 155 Mass. 331; McKernan _v._ Detroit R. Co., 138 Mich. 519;

Follman _v._ City, 35 Minn. 522; Dickson _v._ Missouri R. Co., 104 Mo.

491; Petersen _v._ St. Louis Transit Co., 199 Mo. 331; Farrar _v._

Metropolitan R. Co., 249 Mo. 210; Loso _v._ County, 77 Neb. 466; Noyes

_v._ Town, 64 N. H. 361; Noonan _v._ Consolidated Traction Co., 64 N.

J. Law, 579; Dyer _v._ Erie R. Co., 71 N. Y. 228; Geary _v._

Metropolitan R. Co., 84 App. Div. 514; Robinson _v._ Metropolitan R.

Co., 91 App. Div. 158; Ward _v._ Brooklyn R. Co., 119 App. Div. 487;

Morris _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 63 App. Div. 78; Terwilliger _v._

Long Island R. Co., 152 App. Div. 168; Kammerdiener _v._ Rayburn, 233

Pa. St. 328; Sieb _v._ Central Traction Co., 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 228;

Wilson _v._ Puget Sound R. Co., 52 Wash. 522 _Accord_.

See McLaughlin _v._ Pittsburgh R. Co., 252 Pa. St. 32.

Footnote 232:

Davis _v._ Chicago R. Co., (C. C. A.) 159 Fed. 10; Rebillard _v._

Minneapolis R. Co., 216 Fed. 503; Ewans _v._ Wilmington R. Co., 7

Pennewill 458; Brannen _v._ Kokomo Road Co., 115 Ind. 115; Holden _v._

Missouri R. Co., 177 Mo. 456; Brickell _v._ New York R. Co., 120 N. Y.

290; Caminez _v._ Brooklyn R. Co., 127 App. Div. 138; Doctoroff _v._

Metropolitan R. Co., 55 Misc. 215; Southern R. Co. _v._ Jones, 118 Va.

685; Wilson _v._ Puget Sound R. Co., 52 Wash. 522; Warth _v._ Jackson

County Court, 71 W. Va. 184 _Accord_.

See Atlantic R. Co. _v._ Ironmonger, 95 Va. 625.

Footnote 233:

City _v._ Thuis, 28 Ind. App. 523; Bush _v._ Union R. Co., 62 Kan.

709; Yarnold _v._ Bowers, 186 Mass. 396; Peabody _v._ Haverhill R.

Co., 200 Mass. 277; Lundergan _v._ New York R. Co., 203 Mass. 460;

Fogg _v._ New York R. Co., 223 Mass. 444; Marsh _v._ Kansas City R.

Co., 104 Mo. App. 577; Meenagh _v._ Buckmaster, 26 App. Div. 451;

Cunningham _v._ Erie R. Co., 137 App. Div. 506 _Accord_.

_Driver known to be incompetent_, see: Cahill _v._ Cincinnati R. Co.,

92 Ky. 345.

_Passenger unknown to driver_, see: Cincinnati R. Co. _v._ Wright, 54

Ohio St. 181.

Footnote 234:

Pyle _v._ Clark, (C. C. A.) 79 Fed. 744; Dale _v._ Denver Tramway Co.,

(C. C. A.) 173 Fed. 787; North Alabama Traction Co. _v._ Thomas, 164

Ala. 191; Lininger _v._ San Francisco R. Co., 18 Cal. App. 411;

Tonsley _v._ Pacific Electric Co., 166 Cal. 457; Parmenter _v._

McDougall, 172 Cal. 306; Denver Tramway Co. _v._ Armstrong, 21 Col.

App. 640; Sampson _v._ Wilson, 89 Conn. 707; Metropolitan R. Co. _v._

Powell, 89 Ga. 601; Southern R. Co. _v._ King, 128 Ga. 383: Chicago R.

Co. _v._ Condon, 121 Ill. App. 440; Dudley _v._ Peoria R. Co., 153

Ill. App. 619; Town _v._ Musgrove, 116 Ind. 121; Lake Shore R. Co.

_v._ Boyts, 16 Ind. App. 640; Nisbet _v._ Town, 75 Ia. 314; Hubbard

_v._ Bartholomew, 163 Ia. 58; Corley _v._ Atchison R. Co., 90 Kan. 70;

Bevis _v._ Vanceburg Tel. Co., 121 Ky. 177; Illinois R. Co. _v._

Wilkins, 149 Ky. 35; Sykes _v._ Maine R. Co., 111 Me. 182; United R.

Co. _v._ Cram, 123 Md. 332; Chadbourne _v._ Springfield R. Co., 199

Mass. 574; Ingalls _v._ Lexington R. Co., 205 Mass. 73; Alabama R. Co.

_v._ Davis, 69 Miss. 444; Mittelsdorfer _v._ West Jersey R. Co., 77 N.

J. Law, 698; Weber _v._ Philadelphia R. Co., 88 N. J. Law, 398;

Robinson _v._ New York R. Co., 66 N. Y. 11; Noakes _v._ New York R.

Co., 121 App. Div. 716; Zimmerman _v._ Union R. Co., 28 App. Div. 445;

Mack _v._ Town, 98 App. Div. 577; Jerome _v._ Hawley, 147 App. Div.

475; Duval _v._ Atlantic R. Co., 134 N. C. 331; Ouverson _v._ City, 5

N. D. 281; Toledo R. Co. _v._ Mayers, 93 Ohio St. 304; Tonseth _v._

Portland R. Co., 70 Or. 341; Little _v._ Central Tel. Co., 213 Pa. St.

229; Walsh _v._ Altoona R. Co., 232 Pa. St. 479; Wachsmith _v._

Baltimore R. Co., 233 Pa. St. 465; Trumbower _v._ Lehigh Transit Co.,

235 Pa. St. 397; Hermann _v._ Rhode Island Co., 36 R. I. 447; Latimer

_v._ County, 95 S. C. 187; Turnpike Co. _v._ Yates, 108 Tenn. 428;

Missouri R. Co. _v._ Rogers, 91 Tex. 52; Lochhead _v._ Jensen, 42 Utah

99; Atwood _v._ Utah R. Co., 44 Utah 366 _Accord_.

Kneeshaw _v._ Detroit R. Co., 169 Mich. 697; Colborne _v._ United R.

Co., 177 Mich. 139; Granger _v._ Farrant, 179 Mich. 19 (but compare

Hampel _v._ Detroit R. Co., 138 Mich. 1); Whittaker _v._ City, 14

Mont. 124; Omaha R. Co. _v._ Talbot, 48 Neb. 627; Prideaux _v._. City,

43 Wis. 513; Otis _v._ Town, 47 Wis. 422; Ritger _v._ City, 99 Wis.

190; Lightfoot _v._ Winnebago Traction Co., 123 Wis. 479; Lauson _v._

Town, 141 Wis. 57 _Contra_.

As to whether the negligence of an agent or servant will be imputed to

a principal or employer not personally culpable, see also: Siegel _v._

Norton, 209 Ill. 201; Moore _v._ Stetson, 96 Me. 197; Bjbjian _v._

Woonsocket Rubber Co., 164 Mass. 214; Philip _v._ Heraty, 135 Mich.

446; Fero _v._ Buffalo R. Co., 22 N. Y. 209.

_Contributory negligence of agent or servant in sole charge of the

property injured_, see: Kennedy _v._ Alton Traction Co., 180 Ill. App.

146; Toledo R. Co. _v._ Goddard, 25 Ind. 185; Louisville R. Co. _v._

Stommel, 126 Ind. 35; Young _v._ County, 137 Ia. 515; Dunn _v._ Old

Colony R. Co., 186 Mass. 316; La Riviere _v._ Pemberton, 46 Minn. 5;

Johnson _v._ Atchison R. Co., 117 Mo. App. 308; Page _v._ Hodge, 63 N.

H. 610; Smith _v._ New York R. Co., 4 App. Div. 493; Puterbaugh _v._

Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 484; Hawley _v._ Sumpter R. Co., 49 Or. 509.

Compare Gress _v._ Philadelphia R. Co., 228 Pa. St. 482 (care of

injured child delegated to another child, whose negligence

contributed).

As to when negligence of the servant is imputed to the master, see

also: Sims _v._ Macon R. Co., 28 Ga. 93 (slave); Read _v._ City, 115

Ga. 366; Potter _v._ Ft. Wayne Traction Co., 43 Ind. App. 427; City

_v._ Bott, 151 Ky. 578; Markowitz _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 186 Mo.

350; Moon _v._ St. Louis Transit Co., 237 Mo. 425; Reed _v._

Metropolitan R. Co., 58 App. Div. 87; Wood _v._ Coney Island R. Co.,

133 App. Div. 270; Crampton _v._ Ivie, 126 N. C. 894. Compare Snyder

Ice Co. _v._ Bowron, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 550.

_Whether husband’s negligence will be imputed to the wife_, see:

McFadden _v._ Santa Ana R. Co., 87 Cal. 464; Basler _v._ Sacramento

Gas Co., 158 Cal. 514; Joliet _v._ Seward, 86 Ill. 402; Yahn _v._

Ottumwa, 60 Ia. 429 (see also Nesbit _v._ Garner, 75 Ia. 314; Willfong

_v._ Omaha R. Co., 116 Ia. 548); Denton _v._ Missouri R. Co., 90 Kan.

51; Livingston _v._ Philley, 155 Ky. 224; Ploetz _v._ Holt, 124 Minn.

169; Moon _v._ St. Louis Transit Co., 237 Mo. 425; Johnson _v._

Springfield Traction Co., 176 Mo. App. 174; Hajsek _v._ Chicago R.

Co., 68 Neb. 539, 5 Neb. Unoff. 67; Pennsylvania R. Co. _v._

Goodenough, 55 N. J. Law, 577; Horandt _v._ Central R. Co., 78 N. J.

Law, 190; Carlisle _v._ Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440.

_Imputed negligence as between fellow servants_, see: Nonn _v._

Chicago R. Co., 232 Ill. 378; Ford _v._ Hine, 237 Ill. 463; Paducah

Traction Co. _v._ Sine, (Ky.) 111 S. W. 356; City _v._ Heitkemper, 169

Ky. 167; Earp _v._ Phelps, 120 Md. 282; Siever _v._ Pittsburgh R. Co.,

252 Pa. St. 1; Landry _v._ Great Northern R. Co., 152 Wis. 379;

Sommerfeld _v._ Chicago R. Co., 155 Wis. 102.

_Whether bailor barred by contributory negligence of bailee_, see:

Svea Ins. Co. _v._ Vicksburgh R. Co., 153 Fed. 774; Henderson _v._

Chicago R. Co., 170 Ill. App. 616; Welty _v._ Indianapolis R. Co., 105

Ind. 55; Illinois R. Co. _v._ Sims, 77 Miss. 325; Spelman _v._ Delano,

177 Mo. App. 28; Forks Township _v._ King, 84 Pa. St. 230; Gibson _v._

Bessemer R. Co., 226 Pa. St. 198; Texas R. Co. _v._ Tankersley, 63

Tex. 57.

_Consignor and consignee_, see McCarthy _v._ Louisville R. Co., 102

Ala. 193.

_Lessor and lessee_, see Higgins _v._ Los Angeles Gas Co., 159 Cal.

651; Contos _v._ Jamison, 81 S. C. 488.

Footnote 235:

See Alabama R. Co. _v._ Hanbury, 161 Ala. 358; Louisville R. Co. _v._

Armstrong, 127 Ky. 367; Beaucage _v._ Mercer, 206 Mass. 492; Ward _v._

Meads, 114 Minn. 18; Schron _v._ Staten Island R. Co., 16 App. Div.

11; Christopherson _v._ Minneapolis R. Co., 28 N. D. 128; Wentworth

_v._ Town, 90 Vt. 60; Washington R. Co. _v._ Zell, 118 Va. 755.

According to the decision in Shindelus _v._ St. Paul City R. Co., 80

Minn. 364, if any of the young men of the party in the Koplitz case

had sued the city, the negligence of Gibbons would have been imputed

to them.

Compare Laurence _v._ Sioux City, 172 Ia. 320; Scheib _v._ New York R.

Co., 115 App. Div. 578; Kansas City R. Co. _v._ Durrett, (Tex. Civ.

App.) 187 S. W. 427.

Footnote 236:

Statement abridged. Arguments omitted; also portions of opinion.

Footnote 237:

Chicago R. Co. _v._ Kowalski, (C. C. A.) 92 Fed. 310; Pratt Coal Co.

_v._ Brawley, 83 Ala. 371; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Rexroad, 59 Ark. 180;

Daley _v._ Norwich R. Co., 26 Conn. 591; Jacksonville Electric Co.

_v._ Adams, 50 Fla. 429; Ferguson _v._ Columbus R. Co., 77 Ga. 102;

Chicago R. Co. _v._ Wilcox, 138 Ill. 370; Evansville _v._ Senhenn, 151

Ind. 42 (overruling earlier cases _contra_); Ives _v._ Welden, 114 Ia.

476; Union R. Co. _v._ Young, 57 Kan. 168 (older cases _contra_);

South Covington R. Co. _v._ Herrklotz, 104 Ky. 400; Westerfield _v._

Levis, 43 La. Ann. 63; Shippy _v._ Au Sable, 85 Mich. 280; Mattson

_v._ Minnesota R. Co., 95 Minn. 477 (overruling older cases _contra_);

Westbrook _v._ Mobile R. Co., 66 Miss. 560; Winters _v._ Kansas City

R. Co., 99 Mo. 509; Neff _v._ City, 213 Mo. 350; Huff _v._ Ames, 16

Neb. 139; Warren _v._ Manchester R. Co., 70 N. H. 352; Bottoms _v._

Seaboard R. Co., 114 N. C. 699; Bellefontaine R. Co. _v._ Snyder, 18

Ohio St. 399; Erie R. Co. _v._ Schuster, 113 Pa. St. 412; Whirley _v._

Whiteman, 1 Head, 610; Galveston R. Co. _v._ Moore, 59 Tex. 64;

Robinson _v._ Cone, 22 Vt. 213; Norfolk R. Co. _v._ Ormsby, 27 Grat.

455; Dicken _v._ Liverpool Coal Co., 41 W. Va. 511 _Accord_.

Meeks _v._ So. Pac. R. Co., 52 Cal. 602; O’Brien _v._ McGlinchy, 68

Me. 552; Baltimore R. Co. _v._ McDonnell, 43 Md. 534; Wright _v._

Malden R. Co., 4 All. 283; Cotter _v._ Lynn R. Co., 180 Mass. 145 (but

see Mass. Acts 1914, c. 553); Hartfield _v._ Roper, 21 Wend. 615;

Parishi _v._ Eden, 62 Wis. 272; Kuchler _v._ Milwaukee Electric Co.,

157 Wis. 107 _Contra_.

As to the limits of the rule in the jurisdictions that follow

Hartfield _v._ Roper, see McNeil _v._ Boston Ice Co., 173 Mass. 570;

O’Brien _v._ McGlinchy, 68 Me. 552; Ihl _v._ Forty-Second Street

Ferry, 47 N. Y. 317; McGarry _v._ Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104.

Footnote 238:

Savannah Electric Co. _v._ Dixon, (Ga.) 89 S. E. 373; Smith _v._

Marion Bottle Co., 84 Kan. 551 _Accord_.

Footnote 239:

At common law, no civil action could be maintained for wrongfully

causing the death of a human being. Following the English act of 1846,

known as Lord Campbell’s Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93) statutes in all

jurisdictions now provide an action for the benefit of specified

relatives of a deceased person against one who tortiously caused his

death. In Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act, 2 Edition, 1913, these

statutes are printed in full in the appendix. The book also contains

an analytical table of the statutes.

Sometimes the relatives are authorized to sue in person; while in

other statutes it is provided that the action shall be brought by an

administrator of the estate of the deceased. But, even under the

latter class of statutes, the sum recovered does not usually become a

part of the general assets of the estate available for the payment of

creditors (unless, perhaps, in the absence of any relatives). In some

instances the statute provides that an action can be brought only in

case the person killed could have maintained an action if death had

not ensued. But, even where the statute does not contain an explicit

provision of the above nature, the courts generally hold that

contributory negligence on the part of the deceased bars the statutory

action. The question remains: Will the contributory negligence of the

sole beneficiary bar the action, either where he is personally

plaintiff, or where he is plaintiff in his capacity as administrator

of the deceased, or where the plaintiff is a third person suing in the

capacity of administrator?

The statutes of a few states may, perhaps, be construed as proceeding

upon the theory that a right of action is vested in the deceased, and

that provision is now made for the survival of such right of action.

Footnote 240:

Wymore _v._ Mahaska County, 78 Ia. 396. The material provisions of the

statute involved in that case were:—