Immediately after the resignation of M. Venizelos it was decided to
dissolve the Chamber and to have General Elections, in which for the
first time the territories conquered in 1912-13 would participate.
Meanwhile, the King called upon M. Gounaris, a statesman of
considerable ability, though with none of the versatility of mind and
audacity of character which distinguished his predecessor, to carry on
the Government and to preside over the elections. Under ordinary
circumstances these would have taken place at once. But owing to the
need of preparing electoral lists for the new provinces, they were
delayed till 13 June, and owing to a serious illness of King
Constantine which supervened--causing intense anxiety throughout the
nation and bringing political life to a standstill--two more months
passed before the new Parliament met. The interval proved fruitful in
developments of far-reaching importance.
On its accession to power, the new Government issued a _communiqué_,
announcing that it would pursue the policy adopted at the beginning of
the War: a policy of neutrality qualified by a recognition of the
obligations imposed by the Servian Alliance, and a determination to
serve the interests of Greece without endangering her territorial
integrity.[1] And as the Entente representatives at Athens expressed a
certain disappointment at not finding in the _communiqué_ any allusion
to the Entente Powers,[2] M. Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
in order to remove all uneasiness on that score, instructed the Greek
representatives in London, Paris, and Petrograd to assure the
respective Governments categorically that the new Ministry did not
intend to depart in any way from the pro-Entente attitude dictated by
hereditary sentiments and interests alike. The only {34} difference
between the Venizelos and the Gounaris Cabinets--the difference which
brought about the recent crisis and the change of Government--was one
regarding the danger of immediate action, but did not affect the basis
of Greek policy.[3]
That, by all the evidence available, was the truth. M. Gounaris
thought as M. Venizelos thought, as King Constantine thought, as,
indeed, every Greek capable of forming an opinion on international
affairs thought--namely that, if Greece were to fight at all, interest
and sentiment alike impelled her to fight on the side of the
Entente.[4] The only question was whether she should enter the field
then, and if so, on what conditions.
M. Venizelos persisted in declaring that the Dardanelles expedition
presented "a great, a unique opportunity," which he prayed, "God grant
that Greece may not miss." [5] His successors had no wish to miss the
opportunity--if such it was. But neither had they any wish to leap in
the dark. M. Gounaris and his colleagues lacked the Cretan's infinite
capacity for taking chances. Even in war, where chance plays so great
a part, little is gained except by calculation: the enterprise which is
not carefully meditated upon in all its details is rarely crowned with
success.
And so when, on 12 April, the representatives of the Entente signified
to M. Gounaris their readiness to give Greece, in return for her
co-operation against Turkey, the "territorial acquisitions in the
vilayet of Aidin," suggested {35} to his predecessor, M. Gounaris tried
to ascertain exactly the form of the co-operation demanded and the
extent of the "territorial acquisitions in the vilayet of Aidin"
offered. The British Minister replied as to the first point that,
having no instructions, he was unable to give any details; and as for
the second, that it referred to the "very important concessions on the
Asia Minor coast" mentioned in Sir Edward Grey's communication of
January. On being further pressed, he said it meant "Smyrna and a
substantial portion of the hinterland"--a definition with which his
Russian and French colleagues were inclined to concur, though both said
that they had no instructions on the subject. Then M. Gounaris asked
whether their Excellencies had transmitted to their respective
Governments M. Venizelos's interpretation of Sir Edward Grey's offer
regarding its geographical limits. The British Minister replied that
he had no official knowledge of that interpretation; he had only heard
of it semi-officially and had transmitted it to his Government, but had
received no answer. The Russian Minister replied that he had
transmitted nothing on the subject to his Government, as he had been
informed of it in but a vague way by the late Cabinet. The French
Minister stated that the subject had never been mentioned to him, and
consequently he had not been in a position to make any communication to
his Government.[6] Thus the grandiose Asiatic dominion of which M.
Venizelos spoke so eloquently dwindled to "Smyrna and a substantial
portion of the hinterland."
However, the King, the General Staff, and the Cabinet went on with
their work, and were joined by Prince George, King Constantine's
brother, who had come from Paris to Athens for the express purpose of
discussing with the Government the question of entering the war against
Turkey on the basis of guarantees to be determined by negotiations of
which Paris might be the centre. In that order of ideas, they had
already indicated as the best guarantee the simultaneous entry of
Bulgaria, who, according to news from the Entente capitals, was on the
point of joining. But this condition having proved {36}
unrealisable--Bulgaria refusing to be bought except, if at all, at a
price of Greek territory which Greece would on no account pay--they
dropped it and set about considering by what other combinations they
could come in without compromising their country's vital interests.
The upshot of their deliberations was a proposal, dated 14 April, to
the following effect:
If the Allies would give a formal undertaking to guarantee during the
War, and for a certain period after its termination, the integrity of
her territories, Greece would join them with all her military and naval
forces in a war against Turkey, the definite objective of which would
be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; for, unless the Ottoman
Empire disappeared, the Greek hold on Smyrna would not be very firm.
It was further stipulated that the Allies should define the territorial
compensations as well as the facilities regarding money and war
material which they would accord Greece in order to enable her to do
her part of belligerent efficiently. On these conditions Greece would
assume the obligation to enter the field as soon as the Allies were
ready to combine their forces with hers. All military details were to
be settled between the respective Staffs and embodied in a joint
Military Convention, with this sole reservation that, if Bulgaria
continued to stand out, the Greek Army's sphere of action could not be
placed outside European Turkey. In an explanatory Note added a few
days later, at the instance of the General Staff, stress was laid upon
the ambiguous attitude of Bulgaria, on account of which the opinion was
expressed that the Allies should be prepared to contribute forces
which, combined with the Greek, would equal the united Turkish and
Bulgarian forces, and that the sphere of Greek action should be limited
to the west of the Gallipoli Peninsula; but it was agreed that, if the
Allies wished it, they should have the military assistance of Greece on
the Gallipoli Peninsula too, provided that they landed their own troops
first.[7]
Of these proposals, which were not put forward as final, but rather as
a basis of discussion, the Entente Powers did not condescend to take
any notice. Only unofficially {37} the Greek Minister in Paris, on
approaching M. Delcassé, was told that, since the Hellenic Government
viewed the Dardanelles enterprise in a different light from them, an
understanding seemed impossible and discussion useless; for the rest,
that enterprise, for which England had desired the co-operation of the
Greeks, was now carried on without them, and the situation was no
longer the same as it was some days before. Alarmed by this snub, and
anxious to dissipate any misunderstandings and doubts as to its
dispositions towards the Entente, the Hellenic Government assured M.
Delcassé that it continued always animated by the same desire to
co-operate and would like to make new proposals, but before doing so it
wished to know what proposals would be acceptable. M. Delcassé replied
that he could not even semi-officially say what proposals would be
acceptable.[8] But M. Guillemin, his former collaborator and later
French Minister at Athens, then on a flying visit there, advised M.
Zographos to abandon all conditions and take pot luck with the Allies.
This notion succeeded to the extent that Greece proposed to offer to
enter the war against Turkey with her naval forces only, reserving her
army for her own protection against Bulgaria.[9] The Entente Powers
intimated through M. Delcassé that they would accept such an offer,
provided it was made without any conditions.[10] Before deciding,
Greece wanted to be assured that the integrity of her territory during
the War and in the treaty of peace would be respected, that all the
necessary money and material would be forthcoming, and that the
compensations in Asia Minor allotted to her would represent
approximately the area indicated by M. Venizelos. If it was found that
on these three points the Hellenic Government interpreted the
intentions of the Entente Powers correctly, it would immediately submit
a Note in which the three points would be mentioned as going of their
own accord, so that the official reply of the Entente might cover, not
only the offer, but also its interpretation thus formulated.[11] {38}
M. Delcassé refused to listen to any points: Greece, he insisted
irritably, should enter the alliance without conditions, coupling her
offer simply with "hopes to have the benefit of full solidarity with
her allies, whence results a guarantee of her territorial integrity,"
and "entrusting the full protection of her vital interests to the three
Entente Powers." The formula was not incompatible with the best
construction which one chose to put upon it; and Prince George--who had
returned to Paris directly after the first offer and acted as a
personal representative of King Constantine, together with the official
representative of the Hellenic Government--warmly advocated its
adoption, pleading that, if Greece did come in without delay and
without conditions, she might safely trust the Allies.[12]
Whether Prince George's plea sprang from blind faith or from
far-sighted fear, is a question upon which the sequel may throw some
light; for the present enough to state that it produced no effect. In
a matter concerning the integrity of national territory acquired so
dearly, King Constantine felt that he could not afford to allow any
ambiguity or uncertainty: he was willing to waive the other two points,
but not that. He therefore begged his brother to see M. Poincaré and
solicit in his name the President's help to secure that indispensable
assurance. "The essential thing," he said, "is that the Entente Powers
should give us a solemn promise that they will respect and make others
respect, until the re-establishment of peace, our territorial
integrity, and that they will not permit any damage to it by the future
Peace Treaty. Remark to him that Greece has the right to be astonished
that friendly Powers ready to accept her as an ally decline to explain
themselves clearly with her." [13] What was in the King's mind may be
seen from the President's answer: The Powers did not wish to give a
formal pledge in as many words lest the Bulgars should be stirred to
{39} hostile action on realizing that Cavalla was lost to them.[14]
Prince George, in reporting M. Poincaré's reply, added that the fear of
any damage being inflicted on Greek territorial integrity by the future
Peace Treaty was completely devoid of foundation; that, having himself
expressed this fear, he had been answered: "How can you imagine that we
could dispose of any part whatever of the territory of an allied State
without its consent?" [15]
These fair words failed to reassure the Hellenic Government, which,
after mature reflection, concluded that the formula suggested by M.
Delcassé did not sufficiently safeguard Greece against combinations
likely to affect her territorial integrity. Its misgivings, which
sprang in the first instance from the refusal of an explicit promise,
were strengthened by the reason given by M. Poincaré for that refusal.
Consequently, it regretted that the Entente Powers did not see their
way to come to an understanding for a collaboration which both sides
desired, and repeated the assurance of a most benevolent neutrality
towards them.[16]
The Greek position was plain: Greece made proposals which constituted a
break with the policy pursued deliberately since the beginning of the
War--proposals for an active partnership, and in return put forward
conditions which ultimately narrowed down to a mere pledge that she
should not, as the end of it all, find herself robbed of Cavalla.
There were certain things she could do and, therefore, wished to do.
There were certain things she could not do, and must be assured that
she would not be made to do them. The Entente Powers, on the other
hand, would bind themselves to nothing: which is preferable, they said
in effect, the elaborate letter of a bargaining bond, or the spirit of
spontaneous co-operation; a legal obligation or the natural union of
hearts? What Greece needs, rather than rigid clauses with a seal and a
signature, is the steady, unwavering sympathy of her friends. If you
come with us in a courageous forward campaign for the {40} liberation
of the world and righteousness, how could we fail to be with you in
every single question affecting compensations or the integrity of your
territories? That's all very fine, said the Greeks. But----
The mistrust of the Greeks was only too well founded. Although
Bulgaria received arms from Austria and allowed the free passage of
German munitions which enabled Turkey to carry on the defence of
Gallipoli, the Entente Powers, satisfied with her Premier's
explanations and professions of sympathy, would not give up the hope of
seeing her on their side. Indeed, they were more hopeful than ever; M.
Poincaré told Prince George he would not be surprised to see that
happen "in two or three days," [17] and the British Minister at Sofia,
being less hopeful and giving proofs of perspicacity, was replaced.
About the same time it came to the knowledge of the Entente Governments
that the Greek General Staff had resumed its efforts to induce the
Servian military authorities to concert measures for their mutual
safety, pointing out that, the moment Bulgarian troops crossed the
Servian frontier, it would be too late. Whereupon both Servia and
Greece were sternly warned against wounding Bulgarian
susceptibilities--and threatened with the displeasure of the Powers,
who wanted to maintain between the Balkan States good fellowship--by
the unhappy project which was once more to the fore. And ere the end
of May both States learnt that their territories were actually on offer
to Bulgaria.
They received the intelligence as might have been expected. The
Servian Premier, after consulting with the King, the Crown Prince, the
Cabinet, and all prominent statesmen, informed the representatives of
the Entente that Servia, in spite of her desire to meet the wishes of
her friends and allies, could not agree to put herself in their hands:
the Constitution forbade the cession of territory without the sanction
of the National Assembly. He asked them to understand that this
decision was final, and that no future Servian Government could be
counted upon to {41} give a different answer, seeing that the present
Government embraced every political party.[18]
Not less uncompromising was the attitude of Greece. When the news
reached Athens from Paris, the Hellenic Government could hardly believe
it: "It is so contrary to the principles of justice and liberty
proclaimed by the Entente Powers--it seems to us absolutely impossible
to despoil a neutral State, and one, too, whose friendly neutrality has
been so consistently useful to the Allies, in order to buy with its
territories the help of a people which has hitherto done all it could
to help the enemies of the Entente. By what right, and on what ground
could they mutilate our country? The opinions once expressed by M.
Venizelos, and since abandoned even by their author, do not constitute
a sufficient ground for spoliation. The whole thing is an unthinkable
outrage: it shows that our fears were justified and our demand for a
guarantee was absolutely indispensable." [19]
France, through M. Delcassé, and England, through Lord Crewe, sought to
dispel these fears by formally disclaiming any intention to press upon
Greece a mutilation to which she objected, and explaining that the
eventual cession of Cavalla was only envisaged on condition that she
should consent of her own accord. M. Zographos, however, who had done
his best to bring Greece in on reasonable terms, convinced of his
failure, resigned; and after his departure the Gounaris Government
would permit itself no further discussion upon the subject of
intervention.
During the lull that ensued, the Greek General Staff once more, in
June, approached the Servian Government with detailed suggestions for a
common plan against Bulgaria, dwelling on the necessity of a
preliminary concentration of sufficient Servian troops along the
Graeco-Serbo-Bulgarian frontier to counterbalance the Bulgarian
advantage in rapidity of mobilization. These steps proved as barren as
all the preceding: while Servia would not try to conjure the Bulgarian
peril by the sacrifices which the Entente recommended, she could not
provide against it by entering into arrangements with Greece which the
Entente disapproved.
{42}
Matters came to a head on 3 August, when the British Minister at Sofia
made to the Bulgarian Government a formal offer of Cavalla and an
undefined portion of its hinterland, as well as of Servian territory in
Macedonia, stating that Great Britain would bring pressure to bear on
those countries, and make the cession to them of any compensations
elsewhere conditional on their consent to this transaction.
The shock lost nothing of its intensity by being long anticipated. M.
Passitch, the Servian Premier, in an interview with the Greek Minister
at Nish, expressed his profound dismay at the corner into which Servia
was driven; much as she resented this proposal, the fact that she was
entirely dependent on the Entente--whose high-handed methods he did not
fail to criticize--forced her to give it consideration.
If Servia had been dismayed, Greece was enraged. M. Gounaris addressed
a strongly-worded remonstrance to the British Minister at Athens,
reminding him that in May his Government had protested against the
offer of Greek territory to Bulgaria, and that both Lord Crewe and M.
Delcassé had disavowed any intention to bring the least pressure to
bear upon Greece, who had thus the right to count on her independence
being respected. The Entente Powers, he went on, thought they could
promise Bulgaria an agreement in which their own will took the place of
Greece's consent, with the idea of exacting her acceptance afterwards.
But they were greatly mistaken. The Hellenic Government, voicing the
unanimous sentiments of the people as well as its own judgment,
repelled with indignation the idea of making the national heritage an
object of a bargain; and while thanking the Entente Powers for the
courtesy which inspired their notification, it protested in the most
energetic and solemn manner against the injury which they proposed to
inflict upon the independence and integrity of Greece in defiance of
international law.
In reply, the British Government quietly informed the Hellenic
Government that the Entente Powers still hoped that Greece would come
into line with their policy, and that, as soon as Bulgaria had accepted
their offer, they would submit a concrete proposal dealing in detail
with {43} the surrender of Cavalla and defining precisely the Asiatic
concessions which Greece would receive in exchange.[20]
This brings the relations of the Entente Powers with M. Gounaris's
Government to an end. It is a strange record. We have, to begin with,
the curious reception of his first offer--the whole Greek Army, the
intervention of which might have turned the Gallipoli tragedy into a
victory. Doubtless, there were reasons for declining so considerable a
reinforcement. We know that, although Russia had modified her
objection to Greek participation, she still regarded the presence of a
large Greek force in European Turkey with disfavour; that the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was not agreeable to France; that
the Allies could not at that time afford the military contingents
stipulated by the Greek General Staff. There will be no disposition to
underrate the complexities of the situation, or want of sympathy for
those upon whom fell the task of finding a solution satisfactory to all
the Powers concerned. But, though these complexities might be good
reasons for not accepting the Gounaris offer, they were hardly reasons
for not acknowledging it, even in the interest of ordinary courtesy.
Then came the sterile pourparlers through Paris. Here, again,
political difficulties explain without justifying the attitude of the
Entente Powers. Their refusal of the guarantee demanded by Greece as
an essential condition of her entry into the war was, of course, a
natural result of their Bulgarian policy--a policy for which very
little could be said. Time perhaps was, at the beginning of the War,
when Bulgaria might have been won; for it is not necessary to adopt the
Graeco-Servian view that she had from the first decided to join the
enemies of the Entente and that no amount of reasonable concessions
would have satisfied her ambition; the Bulgars are a practical people,
and there was at Sofia a pro-Entente party which might have prevailed,
if the Entente Powers had, without delay, defined the proposed
concessions and proceeded to press Greece and Servia to make them--to
expect from either {44} State a voluntary self-mutilation was to expect
a miracle. By not doing so, by shilly-shallying at Athens, Nish, and
Sofia, they only lost the confidence of Greeks and Serbs without
gaining the confidence of the Bulgars, who could hardly take seriously
proposals so vague in their formulation and so uncertain of their
fulfilment. If, on the other hand, the Allies were unable to define
the concessions or afraid to shock public opinion by forcing them upon
Greece and Servia, then they ought to have dropped their hopeless
scheme, without wasting valuable time, and worked on the lines of
Graeco-Servian co-operation against Bulgaria. Instead, they squashed,
as we saw, every attempt which the Greek General Staff made to that end.
But it is not the only aberration with which history will charge our
statesmen and diplomats.
Greece was going through an internal crisis; and those who know Greece
will know what that means. In private life no people is more
temperate, more moderate, than the Greek: a sense of measure always
seasons its pleasures, and even the warmest passions of the heart seem
to obey the cool reflections of the brain. In public life, by way of
compensation, the opposite qualities prevail; and as citizens the
Greeks display an astonishing lack of the very virtues which
distinguish them as men. The spirit of party burns so hot in them that
it needs but a breath to kindle a conflagration. That spirit, whose
excesses had, several times in the past, brought the fundamental
principles of the Constitution into question, and the country itself to
the brink of ruin, was once again at work. Former friends had become
deadly enemies: the community was rent with dissensions and poisoned
with suspicions. Preposterous falsehoods were freely scattered and
readily snatched at on both sides: the side of M. Venizelos and the
side of M. Gounaris. Politicians who had been eclipsed by the Cretan's
brilliance, came forth now to regain their lustre at his expense. For
like all men who have played leading parts on the world's stage, M.
Venizelos had gathered about him as much animosity as admiration; and
hate is more enterprising than love.
M. Venizelos and his partisans were at least as resourceful as their
opponents. The Cretan had never been able to bear contradiction. If
his greatness had created him {45} many enemies, his pettiness had
created him more. His tone of prophetic and impeccable omniscience was
vexatious at all times, but particularly galling at this agitated
period. It was now his constant cry that the situation called for the
work of a statesman and not of an international lawyer or strategist.
There were times when he declaimed this thesis in so violent a fashion
that no self-respecting man could work with him. He had lost all the
able collaborators of the great Reconstruction era, and nothing could
make him forgive these "apostates." Everybody who could not see eye to
eye with him was to M. Venizelos a traitor. It was impossible for M.
Venizelos to admit that others besides himself might be actuated by
patriotic as well as by personal motives; that he did not possess an
exclusive patent of sincerity any more than of vanity. He found it
easier to believe that the alpha and the omega of their policy was to
undo him. He would undo them--even at the cost of the cause he had at
heart: to see Greece openly on the side of the Entente. It is not that
he thought less of the cause, but he thought more of himself. His
egoism was of that heroic stature which shrinks from nothing. His
nature impelled him to this labour; his privileged position as the
particular friend of the Entente supplied him with the means.
M. Venizelos had taken a long stride towards that end when he
insinuated that King Constantine's disagreement with him was due to
German influence. Henceforth this calumny became the cardinal article
of his creed, and the "Court Clique" a society for the promotion of the
Kaiser's interests abroad and the adoption of the Kaiser's methods of
government at home. M. Streit, though no longer a member of the
Cabinet, was represented as its mainspring: a secret counsellor who
wielded the power, while he avoided the title, of Minister; M.
Gounaris, though in name a Prime Minister, was in reality a mere
instrument of the sovereign's personal policy--so were the members of
the General Staff--so was, in fact, everyone who held opinions at
variance with his own: they all were creatures of the Crown who tried
to hide their pro-Germanism under the mask of anti-Venizelism. Their
objections to his short-sighted and wrong-headed Asiatic
aspirations--objections the soundness of which has been amply {46}
demonstrated by experience--were dictated by regard for Germany, the
patron of Turkey. Their offers to fight for the dissolution of
Germany's protégé were not genuine: the conditions which accompanied
them were only designed to make them unacceptable. The Entente should
beware of their bad faith and learn that M. Venizelos was the only
Greek statesman that could be trusted.[21]
The Powers who had long since adopted M. Venizelos found it convenient
to adopt all his theories. M. Delcassé, when called upon to explain
why the Greek offer met with such scant ceremony, did so by saying that
it came from M. Gounaris, who was the instrument of the personal policy
of the sovereign, and who combated among the electors M. Venizelos, the
champion of rapprochement with the Entente; that the proposal for the
dispatch of large contingents to the East, involving as it did a
depletion of the Western Front, was calculated to please the imperial
brother-in-law of King Constantine; that the territorial guarantee
demanded by Greece would have become known to Bulgaria, thrown her into
the arms of Germany, and precipitated her against Servia, whom King
Constantine intended to leave to her fate; the trick was too gross to
deceive the Allies, and they gave it the reception it deserved.
Likewise in squashing the Greek efforts to concert with Servia measures
for mutual safety against Bulgaria, while there was yet time, the
Allies, said M. Delcassé, acted on the advice of M. Venizelos, who told
them that the Graeco-Servian Treaty was purely defensive: that it did
not provide for action unless Bulgaria attacked; and what a misfortune
if Servia, by such measures, should appear to take an initiative which
would give Bulgaria an excuse for the aggression she meditated.
Therefore, they bade Servia devote her whole attention to the security
of her Austrian frontier and not play Bulgaria's game by furnishing her
with a pretext for attack.[22]
{47}
On this side of the Channel the inventions of M. Venizelos, it would
seem, were accepted as discoveries with equal solemnity. During the
Paris pourparlers, according to the French Ambassador in London at all
events, England was much annoyed by the Greek Government's hesitations,
which she attributed to King Constantine's opposition, and asked
herself whether she could either then or in the future treat with a
country governed autocratically. She was persuaded that Greece lay
under the influence of Germany, and asked herself whether she could in
future support a country which let itself be guided by Powers whose
interests were absolutely contrary to her own.[23]
The Entente Ministers at Athens, as was natural, had greater
opportunities of displaying their solidarity with M. Venizelos. They
would perhaps have been better advised had they followed the example of
their colleagues at Rome. It can hardly be questioned that the
discreet and decorous aloofness of the Entente diplomats from the
long-protracted struggle between the Italian advocates of war and
neutrality, assisted by Prince von Bülow's indiscreet and indecorous
participation in that struggle, facilitated a decision in our favour:
nothing does so much to alienate a high-spirited nation as an attempt
on the part of outsiders to direct its internal affairs. In Greece the
need for discretion was even more imperative. All controversy at such
a juncture was injudicious. But if preference had to be shown, it
would have been better to have taken the King's side, for all that was
valuable to us from the military point of view rallied round him; and,
in any case, since the hopes of the Venizelists for oversea expansion
depended on the goodwill of the Sea Powers, {48} they were tied to us
securely enough: so if the land school represented by the General Staff
could have been satisfied, the country would have remained united and
on our side. Instead of adopting this sane attitude, the local agents
of the Entente ostentatiously associated themselves with the
Venizelists and boycotted the others, thus gratuitously contributing to
a cleavage from which only our enemies could profit.
And that was not all. Having begun by endeavouring to influence the
Greeks, they ended by being entirely influenced by them. Forgetting
that no correct perception of facts or estimate of motives is possible
without a certain mental detachment, they allowed themselves to be
swallowed up, as it were, in the atmosphere of suspicion and slander
generated by party friction: they ceased to have any eyes, ears, or
minds of their own; they saw and heard just what M. Venizelos willed
them to see and hear, and thought just as M. Venizelos willed them to
think. If the King refused to enter the War, his refusal was inspired
by the desire to serve the Kaiser; if he offered to do so, his offers
were prompted by the desire to dish M. Venizelos.[24]
Hence, every proposal made to the Entente by M. Venizelos's successors
was rejected. Greece was kept out of the Allies' camp, and Servia was
sacrificed. For it should be clearly understood that the fate of
Servia was decided in the months of June and July, 1915, not only by
the development of the Germano-Bulgarian plan, but also by the failure
of all co-operative counter-measures on the part of the Serbs, Greeks,
and Entente Powers while time was still available. If only there had
been anyone of sufficient authority and independence of view to
correlate and compose the clashing interests of the moment, a gallant
ally might have been saved from destruction. But those best qualified
to judge of what was coming, and in a position to frame the
corresponding policy, had been driven into reserve by the storm of
calumny, whereby their motives were misconstrued, their counsels
derided, and their authority undermined; so that in the general uproar
their voices were scarcely heard. And there were none--or {49} very
few--to act as intermediaries; for the personnel of the Entente
Legations, "wholly believing a lie," had withdrawn in a body from all
intercourse with them, had nicknamed them "Boches," and were accustomed
to assess as concocted in Berlin every notion that emanated from them.
Even the few members of those Legations who had the moral courage to
walk the streets without blinkers were subjected to every form of
odious insinuation and attack. Venizelos in office, out of office, on
matters technical or lay, to him and to him only would anyone listen,
and as he knew rather less about the rudiments of the military art than
most people, and refrained from consulting those that did, the results
were not difficult to predict.
Yet, as late as June, the elements of a good plan were ready to hand in
abundance. The General Staff was, as stated, continuing its efforts
for co-operation with the Serbs. The King, though too ill to conduct
business, would have assented to any military proposal put forward by
the General Staff. The people would have followed the King as one man.
And the enemy were not ready. All that was necessary was to study with
attention and sympathy the advice of the experts: to call the soldiers
of the countries concerned to council, and to inaugurate a joint
campaign. It was not done--and it is difficult to say now to whom the
failure proved most disastrous--to Servia, to Greece, or to the Entente
Powers. But for this failure a proportionate share of blame must be
laid upon those who, instead of striving to heal divisions in Greece,
did everything they could to foment them.
[1] _White Book_, No. 34.
[2] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, 25 Feb./10 March, 1915.
[3] _White Book_, No. 35.
[4] The best proof is to be found in the Venizelist _White Book_, No.
36,--an exhaustive memorandum by M. Streit on the probabilities of the
War, dated 13/26 March, 1915. It is both striking and illuminating
that, while in dealing with the attitude of Bulgaria, the author
considers three alternatives: (1) Bulgaria in alliance with the
Entente. (2) Bulgaria as neutral. (3) Bulgaria as an enemy of the
Entente. In dealing with the attitude of Greece he does not for a
single moment contemplate more than two alternatives: (1) Greece as an
ally of the Entente. (2) Greece as neutral. Further, in the course of
the argument which follows, M. Streit discusses a possible
understanding between Greece on the one part and Rumania and Bulgaria
on the other, with the object either of a common neutrality or, failing
that, of a simultaneous entry into war in favour of the Entente, "on
whose side alone we can range ourselves."
[5] See the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.
[6] _Conversation entre le Président du Conseil et les Ministres des
Puissances de la Triple Entente, 30 mars/12 avril, 1915_.
[7] Zographos to Greek Minister, Paris, 1/14 April, with the Proposal
of same date; _Orations_, pp. 67-9.
[8] Romanos, Paris, 17/30 April, 1915.
[9] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 18 April/1
May, 1915.
[10] Romanos, Paris, 4 May (N.S.), 1915.
[11] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 22 April/5 May, 1915.
[12] Prince George to Zographos, Paris, 24 April/7 May, 1915.
[13] King Constantine to Prince George, 27 April/10 May, 1915. From
this document we also learn that on 7/20 April, M. Poincaré had assured
the Prince that such a guarantee would certainly be given to Greece,
"_pour la période de la guerre et durant la période des négociations de
la paix_."
[14] Prince George to King Constantine, 28 April/11 May, 1915.
[15] _Ibid._
[16] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 30
April/13 May, 1915.
[17] Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915.
M. Delcassé, then and for months afterwards, strove to gain over
Bulgaria _coûte que coûte_, deploring the possession of Cavalla by
Greece. See Deville, pp. 163, 218.
[18] Alexandropoulos, Nish, 15/28 May, 1915.
[19] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 15/28 May, 1915.
[20] Communication of Entente Powers to Greek Premier, 21 July/3 Aug.;
Greek Premier's reply (No. 8118); Alexandropoulos, Nish, 23 July/5
Aug.; 25 July/7 Aug.; Communication by British Minister at Athens, 23
July/5 Aug., 1915.
[21] See the _Nea Hellas_, 20, 21 March (O.S.), 1915; _Orations,
passim_.
[22] _Journal Officiel_, p. 76. To appreciate the community of
sentiments between M. Venizelos and M. Delcassé fully, one must compare
the above statement with that in _Orations_, pp. 68-9. The differences
are equally instructive. The Venizelist orator, prudently suppresses
from a Greek audience the fact that his Chief frustrated the General
Staff's efforts to co-operate with Servia; he boldly surmises, on the
other hand, that behind the General Staff's stipulations as to the
sphere of Greek military action lurked the _arrière pensée_ to confront
the Allies with the risk of provoking Bulgaria, whom they still
regarded as a potential friend: so the stipulations were, as they were
intended to be, unacceptable. Again, while M. Delcassé, addressing a
French audience nervous about the Western Front, reckoned that the
Entente contingents demanded by the Greek General Staff would amount to
at least 600,000 or 800,000 men, M. Politis, less fantastically,
estimates them at 450,000 men: this force, which Greece deemed
necessary for success, it will be seen, was not far removed from that
which France and England eventually wasted in failure.
[23]Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915.
[24] See M. Poincaré's statement to the _Matin_, reproduced in the
_Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, p. 386; Deville, pp. 161, 168-9.
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