Two tasks now lay before the Allies in the East: to help Servia, and to
attack Turkey, who had entered the War on 31 October. Both enterprises
were "under consideration"--which means that the Entente Cabinets were
busy discussing both and unable to decide on either. Distracted by
conflicting aims and hampered by inadequate resources, they could not act
except tentatively and in an experimental fashion.
At the beginning of November the representatives of France, England, and
Russia at Athens collectively seconded a Servian appeal for assistance to
M. Venizelos, which the Greek Premier met with a flat refusal. He gave
his reasons: such action, he said, would infallibly expose Greece to
aggression from Bulgaria, and it was more than probable that an automatic
agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey might engage the Greek army in a
struggle with the forces of three Powers at once. Even if the attack
came from Bulgaria alone, he added, the Greek army needed three weeks to
concentrate at Salonica and another month to reach the theatre of the
Austro-Servian conflict, and in that interval the Bulgarian army,
invading Servia, would render impossible all contact between the Greek
and Servian armies. The Entente Ministers endeavoured to overcome these
objections by assuring M. Venizelos that Bulgaria could not possibly
range herself against Russia, France, and England; and besides, they
said, their Governments could ask Rumania to guarantee Bulgarian
neutrality. M. Venizelos replied that, if the co-operation of Bulgaria
with Rumania and Greece were secured, then the Greeks could safely assist
Servia in an effective manner; or the next best thing might be an
undertaking by Rumania to guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria; and he
proceeded to ascertain the Rumanian Government's views on the subject.
He learnt that, in {22} answer to a question put to the Rumanian Premier
by the Entente Ministers at Bucharest, "whether he would undertake to
guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria towards Greece if the latter Power
sent succour to the Serbs," M. Bratiano, while professing the greatest
goodwill towards Greece and the Entente, declined to give any such
undertaking.[1] Add another important fact to which the Greek Government
had its attention very earnestly drawn about this time--that not only
Servia, but even Belgium, experienced the greatest difficulty in
procuring from France the munitions and money necessary for continuing
the struggle.[2]
In the circumstances, there was no alternative for M. Venizelos but to
adopt the prudent attitude which on other occasions he was pleased to
stigmatize as "pro-German." True, his refusal to move in November was
hardly consistent with his eagerness to do so in August; but, taking into
account his temperament, we must assume that he had made that rash _à
titre gracieux_ offer blindfold. Events had not borne out his
predictions of a speedy victory, and, though his faith in the ultimate
triumph of the Entente remained unshaken, he had come to realize that,
for the present at any rate, it behoved Hellas to walk warily.[3]
Some ten weeks passed, and then (23 January, 1915) Sir Edward Grey again
asked M. Venizelos for assistance to Servia in the common interest; as
Austria and Germany seemed bent on crushing her, it was essential that
all who could should lend her their support. If Greece ranged herself by
Servia's side as her ally, the Entente Powers would willingly accord her
very important territorial concessions on the Asia Minor Coast. The
matter was {23} urgent, for, were Servia crushed, though the ultimate
defeat of Austria and Germany would not be thereby affected, there would
during the War come about in the Balkans accomplished facts which would
make it difficult or even impossible for either Servia or Greece to
obtain afterwards arrangements as favourable as those actually in view.
Conversely, the immediate participation of Greece and Rumania in the War
would, by bringing about the defeat of Austria, secure the realization of
Greek, Rumanian and Servian aspirations. To render such participation
effective, it was desirable that Bulgaria should be assured that, if
Servian and Greek aspirations elsewhere were realized, she would obtain
satisfactory compensations in Macedonia, on condition that she came in or
at least maintained a not malevolent neutrality. But the question of
compensations affected chiefly Servia: all he asked of M. Venizelos on
that point was not to oppose any concessions that Servia might be
inclined to make to Bulgaria.
Whether this semi-official request amounted to a proposal or was merely
in the nature of a suggestion is hard to determine. But M. Venizelos
seems to have understood it in the latter sense, for in speaking of it he
made use of the very informal adjective "absurd." No one, indeed, could
seriously believe that Bulgaria would be induced to co-operate, or even
to remain neutral, by the hypothetical and partial promises which Sir
Edward Grey indicated; and with a potentially hostile Bulgaria in her
flank Greece could not march to Servia's aid. So M. Venizelos, under the
impulse of ambition, set his energetic brain to work, and within a few
hours produced a scheme calculated to correct the "absurdity" of the
British notion, to earn the gratitude of the Entente to himself, and an
Asiatic Empire for his country. It was nothing less than a complete
reversal of his former attitude: that Greece should not only withdraw her
opposition to concessions on the part of Servia, but should voluntarily
sacrifice Cavalla to the Bulgars, provided they joined the Allies
forthwith. This scheme he embodied in a lengthy memorandum which he
submitted to the King.
M. Venizelos recognized how painful a sacrifice the cession of Cavalla
would be, and therefore he had to use very strong arguments to commend it
to his Majesty. In the {24} first place, he emphasized the imperative
need of helping Servia, since, should Servia be crushed, the
Austro-German armies might be tempted to advance on Salonica, or Bulgaria
might be invited to take possession of Servian Macedonia, in which case
Greece would have either to let the Balkan balance of power go by the
board, or, in accordance with her Treaty, go to Servia's assistance under
much more disadvantageous conditions. In the second place, he argued
that the sacrifice of Cavalla was well worth making, since Greece would
eventually receive in Asia Minor compensations which would render her
greater and more powerful than the most sanguine Greek could even have
dreamt a few years before; and in Macedonia itself the loss of Cavalla
could be partially compensated for by a rectification of frontiers
involving the acquisition from Servia of the Doiran-Ghevgheli district.
In the event of Bulgaria accepting Cavalla and the Servian concessions as
the price of her alliance, M. Venizelos argued that the outcome would be
a reconstructed League of the Balkan States which would not only ensure
them against defeat, but would materially contribute to the victory of
the Entente Powers: even the ideal of a lasting Balkan Federation might
be realized by a racial readjustment through an interchange of
populations. Should Bulgarian greed prove impervious, Greece must secure
the co-operation of Rumania, without which it would be too risky for her
to move.[4]
Sacrifices of territory, in King Constantine's opinion, were out of the
question; but he thought that, if Rumania agreed to co-operate, it might
be possible for Greece to go to Servia's assistance, as in that case
Bulgaria could perhaps be held in check by Rumanian and Greek forces left
along her northern and southern frontiers. The Bucharest Government was
accordingly sounded, and returned an answer too evasive to justify
reliance on its co-operation. So M. Venizelos fell back on the scheme of
buying Bulgarian co-operation by the cession of Cavalla, and submitted a
second memorandum to the King.
If the first of these documents was remarkable for its optimism, the
second might justly be described as a {25} masterpiece of faith pure and
undefiled by any contact with sordid facts. Its theme is the magnitude
of the compensations which Greece might expect in return for her entry
into the War: "I have a feeling," says the author, "that the concessions
in Asia Minor suggested by Sir Edward Grey can, especially if we submit
to sacrifices to the Bulgars, assume such dimensions as to double the
size of Greece. I believe that if we demanded"--he specifies in detail a
vast portion of Western Asia Minor--"our demand would probably be
granted." He calculated that the surface of this territory exceeds
125,000 (the figure was soon raised to 140,000) square kilometres, while
the area to be ceded in Macedonia did not exceed 2,000 square kilometres,
and that loss would be further halved by the acquisition from Servia of
the Doiran-Ghevgheli district, which covered some 1,000 square
kilometres. Thus, in point of territory, Greece would be giving up a
hundred and fortieth part of what she would be getting. In point of
population also Greece would be receiving twenty-five times as much as
she would be sacrificing--an accretion of 800,000 as against a loss of
30,000 souls; and that loss could be obviated by obliging Bulgaria to buy
up the property of the Cavalla Greeks, who, he had no doubt, would gladly
emigrate _en masse_ to Asia Minor, to reinforce the Greek element there.
How was it possible to hesitate about seizing such an opportunity--an
opportunity for the creation of a Greece powerful on land and supreme in
the Aegean Sea--"an opportunity verily presented to us by Divine
Providence for the realization of our most audacious national
ideals"--presented to-day and never likely to occur again?
M. Venizelos did not doubt but that a transaction which appeared so
desirable and feasible to him must appear equally desirable and feasible
to others: and great was his surprise to find that such was by no means
the case. The General Staff, he complained, "seem, strangely, not
attracted strongly by these views." And the same might be said of
everyone who judged, not by the glow of prophetic insight, but by a cold
examination of facts. When Asia Minor was first mentioned to the Greek
Minister in London, that shrewd diplomat answered: "Greece would not
commit such a folly, for the day she set foot in {26} Asia Minor she
would find herself up against Great Powers as well as against Turkey."
[5] At Athens to this objection were added others not less weighty. The
General Staff pointed out that Greece had neither the men nor the money
required for the permanent occupation and efficient administration of
that distant region. They feared both the difficulties of defending
those Turkish territories in Asia and the danger of future attack from
Bulgaria in Europe. In short, they held that Greece by embarking on what
they aptly termed a Colonial policy would be undertaking responsibilities
wholly incommensurate with her resources.[6]
Dangers and difficulties! cried M. Venizelos: can you allow such things
to stand in the way of national ideals? And he proceeded to demolish the
obstructions: the administrative success achieved in Macedonia proved
that the resources of Greece were equal to fresh responsibilities; the
Turks of Asia Minor--after the total disappearance of the Ottoman Empire,
which he deemed inevitable--would become contented and law-abiding Greek
subjects, and at all events the local Greek population would in a very
short space of time supply all the forces needed to maintain order in
Asia, leaving the main Greek army free for the defence of the European
frontiers. During that brief period of transition, he thought it easy to
form an agreement with the Entente Powers for military assistance against
a Bulgarian attack, or, even without the Entente, "should the Bulgars be
so demented by the Lord as to attempt aggression, I have not the
slightest doubt that Servia, moved by her treaty obligations, her
interests, and her gratitude for our present aid, would again co-operate
with us to humble Bulgarian insolence." [7]
Thus at a moment's notice M. Venizelos became an impassioned advocate of
the policy of which he had hitherto been an impassioned opponent, and he
would have us believe that the King, persuaded by his eloquence,
authorised him to carry out his new plan. Be that as it may, M.
Venizelos did not avail himself of this permission. {27} For almost
simultaneously came the news of a Bulgarian loan contracted in the
Austro-German market--an event which made him abandon all hopes of
conciliating Bulgaria and profiting by the British overture. During the
months when the revival of the Balkan League was perhaps still
practicable, he had combated the only expedient which might have given it
a chance of realization: by the time he became a convert, it was too late.
The Balkan situation remained as it was before Sir Edward Grey's
suggestion: so much so that, when a few days later the Entente Powers
again asked Greece to go to Servia's relief, offering her as security
against the Bulgarian danger to transport to Macedonia a French and a
British division, M. Venizelos, considering such security insufficient,
again refused;[8] a refusal which, justified though it was, gave great
umbrage.[9]
While the Greek Premier was going through these mental evolutions, the
scene of Entente activity shifted: and his flexible mind perforce veered
in a new direction.
As far back as 3 November, the outer forts of the Dardanelles had been
subjected to a brief bombardment with the object of testing the range of
their guns; and by 25 November the idea of a serious attack on the
Straits had engaged the attention of the British War Council. But no
decision was arrived at until January, when Russia, hard pressed by the
Turks on the Caucasus, begged for a demonstration against them in some
other quarter. In compliance with this appeal, the British War Council
then decided to attempt to force the Dardanelles by means of the Navy
alone. After the failure of the naval attack of 19 February, however, it
was realized that the operations would have to be supplemented by
military action;[10] and as the magnitude of the enterprise became
clearer and the troops at the disposal of England and France were very
limited, the need of securing Balkan allies became more obvious.
From the first greater importance was attached to Bulgarian co-operation
than to Greek. Even the grant of {28} a loan to Sofia by the Central
Powers appears to have produced little or no impression upon those
concerned. Long afterwards it was admitted as a self-evident proposition
that belligerents do not lend to neutrals without being satisfied that
their money will not be used against themselves. But at the time, after
a momentary shock, the Entente Governments were deluded, either by
Bulgarian diplomacy or by their own wishes, into the belief that
"Bulgaria would not commit the stupidity to refuse the advantages
offered." [11] Nor, in thus reckoning on enlightened bad faith, were
they alone. M. Venizelos, who a moment before had declared that the loan
had opened his eyes to the fact "that Bulgaria was definitely committed
to the Central Powers," now felt quite sure that, "notwithstanding the
loan, Bulgaria was capable of betraying her then friends and turning
towards those who promised her greater profits." [12] Anxious,
therefore, to forestall the Bulgars, and concerned by the thought that he
had been obliged on three occasions to decline requests from the Entente,
he spontaneously proposed, on 1 March, to offer three Greek divisions for
the Dardanelles expedition, stating that this proposal was made with King
Constantine's assent.[13]
As a matter of fact, neither the King nor his General Staff approved of
M. Venizelos's strategy. Having made a systematic study of the
Dardanelles problem, they judged that the Allies' enterprise, even under
the most skilful handling, presented but few chances, and those chances
had been discounted in advance by utter want of skilful handling: the
bombardment of the Straits in the previous November had given the Turks
warning of the blow and ample time to prepare against it--and the Turks
were no longer the happy-go-lucky fellows upon whose inefficiency one
might formerly have counted; they now mounted guard over the gates of
their capital equipped with German guns and commanded by German officers.
The enterprise was likely to become more hazardous still by arousing the
jealousy of the Bulgars. If, therefore, Greece did join in, besides all
the other risks, she would expose herself to a {29} Bulgarian assault;
and with a considerable portion of her forces engaged in Gallipoli, and
no prospect either of Servian or of Rumanian assistance, how was she to
face that assault?
The King's disapproval was known to no one better than to M. Venizelos
himself. But, for all that, he felt entitled to tell the British
Minister at Athens that he had the King's assent. Here is his own
explanation: "The King was opposed to the enterprise. I sought another
interview in order to speak to him again on the subject, and took with me
a third memorandum"--which has never been published, and cannot yet be
published. "I asked him to let me read it to him, for in it were set
forth fully all the arguments which, in my opinion, imposed co-operation.
I read it. I saw that the King became agitated. For--I must do him that
justice--he rarely remained unconvinced when face to face with me. So
profound was the emotion with which I spoke, so powerful were the
arguments which I used that the King, greatly moved, said to me: 'Well,
then, in the name of God.' That is, he assented." [14]
However, the General Staff remained unconvinced; and Colonel Metaxas, a
brilliant soldier, then Acting-Chief of the Staff, resigned as a protest
against military proposals being made by a Greek minister to other
countries without previous consultation with the military experts of his
own. M. Venizelos, on his part, was indignant that mere soldiers should
presume to meddle with the plans of statesmen; his view being that the
Staff's business was simply to carry out the policy of the Government.
Nevertheless, impressed by this resignation, he suggested the meeting of
a Crown Council composed of all the ex-Premiers, that their opinions
might be heard. The Council met on 3 March and again on 5 March. At the
first sitting M. Venizelos admitted that the objections of the military
experts, without altering his own convictions, might still inspire doubt
as to which policy was preferable: neutrality or intervention. Should
the policy of neutrality be adopted, it must be carried on by a new
Cabinet, to which he would accord his parliamentary support. At the
second sitting he endeavoured to remove the objections of the military
experts by reducing his proposed contribution to the {30} Gallipoli
expedition from three divisions to one, which should be replaced in the
existing cadres by a division of reserves, so as to leave the Greek Army
practically intact against a possible attack from Bulgaria. And having
thus modified the conditions of intervention, he refused to entertain any
other policy or to support a Cabinet pledged to neutrality.[15]
Momentarily infected by the Cretan's enthusiasm, nearly all present urged
upon the King the acceptance of his proposal; one of them, M. Rallis,
even going so far as to say: "Sire, pray consider that you have a
Government clothed with the full confidence of the nation. Let it carry
out its policy. Else, you will incur undue responsibility." The King's
answer was: "If you wish it, I will abdicate." [16] He would rather give
up his crown than assume the responsibility of sanctioning a policy which
his whole military training and experience told him was insane and
suicidal: how justly, the event soon showed. The losses of men and ships
which Gallipoli cost far exceeded the whole of Greece's military and
naval resources; and if that cost proved more than embarrassing to
England and France, it would have literally ruined Greece. M. Rallis and
the other ex-Premiers in less than a fortnight gratefully recognised the
justness of the King's opposition to their views,[17] and thenceforth
parted company with M. Venizelos.
Meanwhile M. Venizelos hastened from the Palace to the British Legation,
and, "in order to save time till he could make an official _démarche_,"
he made to the Entente Ministers there assembled a semi-official
communication to this effect: "Following the natural evolution of its
policy of solidarity with the Entente Powers, the Royal Government has
judged that the Dardanelles operations afford it a favourable occasion to
translate its sentiments into deeds by abandoning its neutrality and
offering its co-operation in that enterprise with the whole of its Fleet
and one division of its army." All this, "though the King {31} has not
yet given his adhesion." [18] His hurry arose from the belief that the
Allies would reach Constantinople in a few days.
But the General Staff still remained unconvinced. Yes, they said, one
division to begin with; but what if the Allies get stuck in the Straits,
as we believe they will be, and call upon us for more? And, once we join
them, how can we refuse to supply their needs? We shall be incurring
unlimited liabilities. So the King, who had full confidence in his
military advisers, and who could not bring himself to look upon the
Gallipoli adventure as a "serious enterprise," [19] declined his adhesion
to M. Venizelos's plan; and M. Venizelos resigned in wrath (6 March).
Then came the Entente replies to his communication; from which it
appeared that, as in August, 1914, so now the impetuous Cretan ran ahead
of the Powers: that, whilst he was inveighing against everyone who would
not let Greece co-operate with them, they had not yet even agreed as to
whether they desired her co-operation.
England regarded the communication as a merely preliminary and
preparatory step, and waited for a definite proposal after the King's
decision, when she would consult with her allies. France and Russia
insisted on the impossibility of Greece limiting her participation to a
war against Turkey alone: to be an effective partner of the Entente,
Greece must be prepared to fight Austria and Germany also. France added
that the question of the participation of Greece in the Dardanelles
enterprise could not be a useful subject of discussion between the Allies
until a definite decision by the Greek Government was taken. Russia did
not even envisage the usefulness of such a discussion. M. Sazonow
pointedly declared that he did not consider Greek co-operation in the
Dardanelles at all necessary, that the question of the Straits and of
Constantinople ought to be settled by the Entente Powers alone without
the intervention of third parties, and that Russia did not desire the
entry of a Greek army into Constantinople, though she had no objection to
its operating against Smyrna or elsewhere.[20]
{32}
Some days later, it is true, M. Delcassé affirmed that he had overcome
Russia's repugnance;[21] but, though it is probable that Russia, yielding
to pressure, would have accepted the participation of Greek troops, she
made no secret of her satisfaction at not having had to do so: "We
heartily consent to your receiving large compensations in Asia Minor,"
said the Russian Minister at Athens, in the presence of his British
colleague, to a high official of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
"But as to Constantinople, we prefer that you should not come there; it
would afterwards be painful for you and disagreeable for everybody to
turn you out." [22]
M. Venizelos knew these views perfectly well, and did not covet
Constantinople: what he coveted, so far as material gains went, were the
large compensations in Asia Minor.[23] There lay the chief objective of
his strategy, and its net outcome was to widen the breach between him and
those elements in the country which still believed that the policy of
Greece must be governed by the solid necessities of the Balkan situation,
not by nebulous visions of Imperialist expansion.
[1] Psycha to Venizelos, Bucharest, 23 Oct./6 Nov.; Venizelos to Greek
Legations, London, Bordeaux, Petersburg, 24 Oct./7 Nov., 1914.
[2] Romanos, Bordeaux, 19 Nov., 1914.
[3] He explained, three years afterwards, that at the time of making his
offer of 18 Aug., 1914, he bore in mind "the impossibility of going to
Servia's assistance on account of the danger from Bulgaria."--_Orations_,
p. 93. But precisely similar was the objection to going against Turkey
without a guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality: only the Bulgars, in the one
case, would have been on Greece's left flank and in the other on the
right. The truth seems to be that the vision of M. Venizelos lacked the
penetration which, in matters of this sort, can only come from long study
and reflection.
[4] First Memorandum, 11/24 Jan., in the _Nea Hellas_, 21 March (O.S.),
1915.
[5] Gennadius, London, 10 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.
[6] _Orations_, p. 43.
[7] Second Memorandum, 17/30 Jan., in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.),
1915.
[8] See his own statement in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.
[9] Dragoumis, Petrograd, 16 Feb., 1915.
[10] Dardanelles Commission, First Report, pp. 14-5, 31-3; Final Report,
pp. 6-8.
[11] Deville, pp. 163, 215.
[12] _Orations_, pp. 103, 104.
[13] Dardanelles Commission, Supplement to First Report, p. 3.
[14] _Orations_, pp. 105-6.
[15] See Extracts from the Crown Council Minutes, in the _Balkan Review_,
Dec., 1920, pp. 384-5, which supplement M. Venizelos's very meagre
account of these proceedings in _Orations_, pp. 107-8.
[16] _Orations_, pp. 266-7.
[17] _Ibid_, pp. 267-8.
[18] Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, 20 Feb./5
March, 1915.
[19] _Orations_, p. 267.
[20] Gennadius, London, 21 Feb.; Sicilianos, Paris, 22 Feb.; Dragoumis,
Petrograd, 22 Feb. (O.S.), 1915.
[21] _White Book_, No. 37.
[22] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, Athens. 25 Feb./10 March,
1915.
[23] _Orations_, pp. 108, 113-14.
{33}