On 23 August, M. Venizelos returned to power as a result of the General
Elections held on June 13. The outcome of those elections proved how
great his popularity still was. True, in 1910 he had obtained 146
seats out of 182, and now only 185 out of 314. But the majority,
though diminished, remained substantial enough to show that he still
was, for most people, the man who had cleansed Greece. Nor did M.
Venizelos imperil his popularity by revealing his differences with the
King. On the contrary, in his own country, his attacks were carefully
confined to the statesmen and soldiers opposed to him: the King, M.
Venizelos proclaimed, far from sharing their narrow, unpatriotic,
pro-German views, "did not exclude exit from neutrality under given
conditions, but accepted it in principle as imposed for the serving of
the national rights." [1] By his organs, too, the King was described
as "a worthy successor of the Constantines who created the mighty
Byzantine Empire--imbued with a sense of his great national
mission--Greek in heart and mind." [2] So anxious, indeed, was M.
Venizelos not to lose votes by any display of ill-feeling against the
popular sovereign that he even took some pains to have himself
photographed calling at the Palace to inquire after the King's health.
As to policy, it is difficult to determine the part which it played in
the contest. M. Venizelos refrained from publishing any sort of
programme. His opponents asserted that a vote for Venizelos meant a
vote for war. But his most prominent supporters declared that such was
by no means the case: although, at a certain moment, he was ready to
participate in the Gallipoli enterprise, circumstances had changed, and
his future course would depend on the situation which he would find on
returning to {51} power. This vagueness, though not very helpful to
the voters, doubtless helped the voting; for there was hardly any
pro-war feeling among the masses. The noble ideals emblazoned upon the
Entente banners produced little impression on their minds. The
experience of two thousand years has taught the Greeks that Governments
never fight for noble ideals, and, if they relieve a small nation from
a foreign yoke, it is, as often as not, in order to impose a new one.
To them the War was a struggle for power and plunder between two
European groups. It was matter of common knowledge that Constantinople
had been allotted to the Russians, and the Greeks were not particularly
keen on shedding their blood in order to place a Tsar on the Byzantine
throne. Nor did the Smyrna bait attract them greatly, since it
involved parting with Cavalla. At the same time, the lurid accounts of
German frightfulness disseminated by the Entente propaganda, instead of
inflaming, damped still further their enthusiasm.[3] The Venizelist
candidates were, therefore, wise in repudiating the allegation that
their victory would inevitably mean intervention in the conflict; and,
on the whole, the people who voted for the Cretan statesman seem to
have paid a tribute to his personality rather than to his policy.
Meanwhile, Servia, under pressure from the Entente, had decided to
promise Bulgaria territorial concessions, and the communication of this
decision to the Hellenic Government formed the occasion of M.
Venizelos's first official act. Greece, he wrote in reply, not wishing
to embarrass her friend and ally at a moment when imperative necessity
forced the latter to submit to painful sacrifices, abandoned her
objections. But she would be lacking in sincerity if she failed to
tell Servia straightway that "the _raison d'être_ of the
Alliance--namely, the territorial equilibrium and the mutual guarantee
of their respective possessions--being profoundly affected by the
contemplated changes, the reciprocal obligations of the Alliance could
not survive except by virtue of a renewal." M. Passitch replied
verbally that he thought like M. Venizelos. But, as it happened, the
question did not arise; Servia's promise was coupled with so many
stipulations and reservations, that, in the opinion of the Entente
Powers, {52} it amounted almost to a refusal;[4] and the thread of the
negotiations was very soon broken by events. Destiny moved too fast
for diplomacy.
Hardly had these dispatches been exchanged, when Colonel Vlachopoulos,
the emissary of the Greek General Staff to Servia, arrived in Athens,
bringing a report of the gravest nature. After twelve months'
evasions, the Servian Minister of War had at last mentioned to him the
need for an understanding between the two Staffs, and the Servian
Director of Military Operations stated that Servia, far from being able
to contribute to a common struggle against Bulgaria the 150,000
combatants stipulated by the Graeco-Servian Convention, could not at
the moment transport to the northern parts of the Bulgarian frontier
more than one or two divisions, while as to the southern parts, which
most immediately concerned Greece, they would have to be left with the
eight regiments of 1915 conscripts--that is, raw recruits.
Simultaneously, the fear which the Greek military authorities had
expressed to their Servian colleagues in the previous spring--that
delay might prove fatal--was being realized: from all sides came
intelligence of the concentration of large Austro-German forces towards
the Danube.
In the circumstances, after studying Colonel Vlachopoulos's report, the
Greek General Staff submitted to the Government (14 September) the
opinion that for Greece to embark on a war against Bulgaria, so long as
she was not assured of the co-operation of adequate Servian forces, was
tantamount to courting annihilation; and of such co-operation there was
no prospect: the moment the Serbs found themselves faced by a superior
Austro-German army, the Greeks would have to fight the Bulgars as well
as, in all probability, the Turks alone.
As if in confirmation of this forecast, a week later (21 September),
the Hellenic Government received from Sofia the official announcement
of the conclusion of a Turco-Bulgarian agreement and of Bulgarian
mobilization; the latter measure being, according to the Bulgarian
Premier, purely precautionary: as the Austro-German {53} armies had
just begun an attack on Servia, and the theatre of war approached the
Bulgarian frontiers, his country was obliged to take up an attitude of
armed neutrality.[5]
The news threw M. Venizelos into a fever of excitement. He had,
meanwhile, become most solicitous about Greece-Servian co-operation,
and had not permitted his mind to be impressed by Colonel
Vlachopoulos's report. When Austria and Germany had their hands full
elsewhere, Servia's peril had left him cold; it set him on fire now
when they were ready to hurl their legions into the Balkan
Peninsula--when it was no longer for Greece a question of fighting
Bulgaria only, but Bulgaria and Turkey and the Central Empires. M.
Venizelos was a statesman of broad ideas, a hater of dry facts, and an
impenitent believer in his own star. For the matter of time he cared
very little; considerations of odds did not weigh with him unduly; and
he cherished a sovereign contempt for the cautious attitude of
professional soldiers and other uninspired persons. Never did these
qualities appear more vividly than on this 21st of September.
At 5 p.m. M. Venizelos went to Tatoi, the King's country residence, to
confer with him, having previously arranged that a mobilization Order
should be drawn up and presented to his Majesty for signature at 6.30
p.m., by which time he expected to have finished his conversation. The
following is a synopsis of that memorable interview based on a report
from M. Venizelos's own lips.[6]
The King readily agreed to mobilize, but firmly resisted the proposal
to enter the war, on the ground that the odds were too heavy. M.
Venizelos argued that, even if Germany had five million men available
on other fronts, she could not bring them to the Balkans, and
consequently there was no cause for fear: he spoke learnedly and at
enormous length of geographical conditions and means of transport, of
victualling, of guns and bayonets, of _morale_--he had allowed himself
an hour and a half. How the King must have felt under this harangue,
any expert who has had to listen to an amateur laying down the law to
him on his own subject may imagine. On finding his military arguments
fruitless, M. Venizelos shifted his ground; though, the military habit
being too strong, he {54} could not get away from military phraseology:
"I was then obliged," he tells us, "to bring forward my heavy
artillery."
"Majesty," I said, "I have not succeeded in persuading you. I am very
sorry; but it is my duty, as representing at this moment the
Sovereignty of the People, to tell you that you have no right to
disagree with me this time. The people by the last elections has
approved my policy and given me its confidence. It knew that the basis
of my policy was not to let Bulgaria, by crushing Servia, become too
big and crush us to-morrow. You cannot therefore at this moment depart
from this policy--unless you decide to set aside the Constitution; in
which case you must say so clearly, abrogating the Constitution by a
Decree and assuming the responsibility."
The King replied: "You know I recognize that I am bound to obey the
popular verdict when it is a question of the internal affairs of the
country; but when it is a question of foreign affairs--the great
national questions--my view is that, so long as I consider a thing
right or wrong, I must insist that it shall or shall not be done,
because I feel responsible before God."
At this utterance, M. Venizelos narrates, "I remember that a feeling of
distress came over me, and with clasped hands, I shook my head in a
melancholy manner, saying: 'Alas! we are before the theory of kingship
by the grace of God: poor Greece!'" [7] After a little, he told the
King that, in the actual circumstances, he could not undertake a
struggle for the Constitution; he could only tender his resignation.
The King expostulated: "How can you resign in the face of a Bulgarian
mobilization? In these circumstances, as you know, we must not delay
even twenty-four hours. After all, who assures us that Bulgaria will
attack Servia? It is possible that she may maintain an armed
neutrality; in which case our disagreement vanishes, and you can stay
in power and carry on your policy." Whereupon M. Venizelos withdrew
his resignation.
Of course, he was not deluded by the Sofia Government's {55}
announcement of "armed neutrality," and he was determined to go for
Bulgaria at once. But how? In his own mind, as he had already
demonstrated to the King, no doubt existed that, if the Greeks attacked
the Bulgars, they had every chance of crushing them and even of taking
their capital. But there was that General Staff by whose opinions the
King set such store. They objected Servia's inability to contribute,
as she was bound by her Military Convention to do, 150,000 combatants.
Therefore, in order to meet this objection, he said: "Don't you think
we might ask the English and the French whether they could not furnish
150,000 combatants of their own?"
"Certainly," replied the King; "but they must send Metropolitan
(European) troops, not Colonials."
By his own account, M. Venizelos did not take this as meaning that the
King had agreed, if the English and the French supplied these
reinforcements, to depart from neutrality. He left Tatoi with a clear
perception of the divergence between their respective points of view:
while they both concurred in the need of instant mobilization, one was
for a defensive and the other for an offensive policy; but, as soon
appeared, not without hopes of converting his sovereign by some means
or other.
A busy, ambitious child of fortune never lets the grass grow under his
feet:
"I returned to the Ministry at 7 p.m.," goes on the curious record,
"and telephoned to the Entente Ministers to come and see me quickly.
When they came, I informed them that a mobilization Order was being
signed at that very moment and would be published that evening; but for
our further course I needed to know if the Powers were disposed to make
good the 150,000 combatants whom Servia was obliged by our Treaty to
contribute for joint action against Bulgaria. They promised to
telegraph, and immediately dispatched an extra urgent telegram, adding
that they would let me know the answer. This happened at about 8 p.m.,
and at 8.15 there arrived M. Mercati (the Marshal of the Court) with a
message from the King, asking me not to make this _démarche_ to the
Entente. I replied that the _démarche_ had already been made." [8]
{56}
Forty-eight hours later arrived the Entente Powers' answer, that they
would send to Salonica the 150,000 men asked for. M. Venizelos, on
communicating this answer to the King, was requested by him to tell the
Entente Ministers that, so long as Bulgaria did not attack Servia, and
consequently the question of Greece going to Servia's assistance did
not arise, no troops should be sent, as their landing on Greek soil
would constitute a violation of Greek neutrality. M. Venizelos tells
us that he communicated the King's wish to the Entente Ministers, who
telegraphed it to their Governments.
King Constantine, it would seem, was left under the impression that the
affair had ended; and the general belief was that the policy of
neutrality still held good; when suddenly the report came that Allied
troops were on their way to Salonica and that Greece was expected to
assist in their landing.
The news would have astonished the Greeks in any circumstances; but the
circumstances in which it reached them were of a nature to heighten
astonishment into alarm. Just then (28 September) Sir Edward Grey
stated in the House of Commons, amid loud applause, "Not only is there
no hostility in this country to Bulgaria, but there is traditionally a
warm feeling of sympathy;" and he reiterated the Balkan policy of the
Entente--a Balkan {57} agreement on the basis of territorial
concessions. The inference which the Greeks drew from this coincidence
was that the Entente Powers were sending troops to despoil them on
behalf of the Bulgars--that they intended to bid for Bulgaria's
friendship at the twelfth hour by forcibly seizing the parts of
Macedonia which they had endeavoured in vain to persuade Greece to
yield.[9]
M. Venizelos himself carried the report to the King, inveighing, it is
said, intemperately against the Allies: "I will protest with the
greatest energy," he cried, trembling with anger. "I will protest
against this unqualifiable violation of our soil."
"Certainly," replied the King, "you must protest very energetically."
[10]
{58}
And M. Venizelos hurried off to his office and drew up the following
telegram, which, now printed for the first time, reveals many things:
"A grave misunderstanding threatens to develop between Greece and the
Entente Powers on the subject of the despatch of international troops
through Salonica to Servia. When I suggested the dispatch of 150,000
men destined to complete the Servian contingents in case of a common
struggle against Bulgaria, I did not ask this succour for Greece, but
for Servia in order to remove the objection raised against our
Alliance, said to have become null by Servia's inability to fulfil her
engagement. By accepting in principle to proceed to such dispatch the
Powers rendered above all a service to Servia and to their own cause in
the East. Likewise, I had clearly specified that, so long as Greece
was neutral, the landing of international troops at Salonica could not
have our official adhesion. Our neutrality imposed upon us to protest
for form's sake; after which matters would go on as at Moudros." [11]
{59}
"It remained for us to take all the necessary measures for facilitating
the landing and the direct passage to Servia of the international
troops, combining these operations with the needs of our own
mobilization. The Minister of Communications was to go at once to
Salonica with a number of engineers to arrange on the spot these
technical matters, very complicated from the paucity of means of
transport in Macedonia. It was understood that, before any dispatch of
troops to Salonica, we should have twenty-four hours' notice.
"Things were at this point, when the Military Governor of Salonica--on
Wednesday--received a visit from the French Consul, the Commander of a
French man-of-war, and two French officers from the Dardanelles, who
told him that, in pursuance of a pretended understanding between the
Premier and the French Minister, they were going to start
reconnaissance work for the landing of French troops and the defence of
Salonica against enemy submarines. Furthermore, on Thursday there
arrived at Salonica General Hamilton with his Staff and notified the
Governor that the Allies were going to occupy part of the town and
port, and put them in a state of defence with a view to a landing of
troops. General Moschopoulos, very firmly though very politely,
declared to them that, without orders from his Government, it would be
his painful duty to oppose any seizure of national territory.
"Such a misunderstanding inspires us with the liveliest alarm, for the
contemplated landing has not yet been definitely accepted, and after
being accepted it cannot be carried out, (1) without a preliminary
protest for form's sake, which the British Government has informed us
it does not want;[12] (2) without the absolute maintenance of the
powers of our authorities, who alone would decide the measures for the
use of the port and railways in such a manner as not to compromise the
transport and concentration of our own armies."
{60}
"Moreover, the great emotion caused in the public by the recent speech
of Sir Edward Grey compels the Royal Government to demand from the
Entente Powers certain preliminary assurances. While people here
expected to see the Powers, after the Bulgarian mobilization, proceed
to decisive acts, and at the very least to a declaration that the
territorial promises made to Bulgaria in August would be cancelled if
within a very short time she did not agree to co-operate with the
Entente, they were stupefied to see that to the most evident proof of
Bulgarian duplicity and disloyalty they replied by redoubling their
solicitude and goodwill. Sir Edward Grey's speech, followed closely by
the visits made without notice at Salonica by the representatives of
the French and British Staffs, gives birth to the fear that certain
Entente Powers may harbour the design of using the troops which would
be sent to Servia as the fittest instrument for giving practical effect
to the territorial ambitions of the Bulgars in Macedonia. Well or ill
founded, this fear exercises over people in Greece, and we have reason
to believe in Servia also, a demoralizing effect and threatens to
compromise the success of our mobilization.
"The Royal Government finds itself confronted with a situation created
much against its will, which imposes upon it the duty, in order to calm
as soon as possible the alarms of the people now in arms, of asking the
Powers to dispel the fears inspired by their attitude towards Bulgaria
by declaring, if possible, that the offers made to her are henceforth
null, and that the eventual dispatch of international troops to Servia
would in no case be turned to the detriment of the territorial
integrity of Greece and Servia. Only formal assurances in this sense
could justify in the eyes of Greek public opinion the Government which,
while protesting for form's sake, would agree to facilitate the landing
at Salonica and the passage across its territory of international
troops destined for Servia.
"Please speak to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of this
telegram." [13]
From the tenor of this interesting document we gather that, while fully
aware of the King's attitude, M. Venizelos {61} went on negotiating
with the Allies for immediate action; and that the Allies proceeded to
act before any agreement had been reached. To judge by its tone, M.
Venizelos seems to have been annoyed at the Allies' haste as at an
unwarrantable attempt to commit him irretrievably without heeding his
conditions or waiting for his definite consent: so grave a breach of
propriety could not but pain him. But, however annoyed he might be on
the surface, at bottom he was doubtless pleased: the move supplied the
best means for the conversion of his Sovereign--no argument is so
persuasive as an accomplished fact. That was what really mattered--the
manner was a detail; and it is impossible to suppose that he meant to
let his annoyance stand in the way of his high purpose.[14]
Themistocles, to whom the Cretan statesman bears some affinity, it will
be remembered, forced the Greeks to fight at Salamis by a similar
stratagem.
This, of course, does not exculpate the Allies. Their conduct merits
at least the appellation of irregular. But when foreign diplomats and
native politicians become fused into a happy family, it would be
strange, indeed, if irregularities did not occur. The whole of the
Greek story is so thoroughly permeated with the spirit of old-fashioned
melodrama that no incident, however startling, seems out of place.
What follows is something of an anticlimax. Next day, the French
Minister--from this point onwards France takes the lead and England
recedes into the second place--had the honour to announce to his
Excellency the Greek Premier the arrival at Salonica of a first
detachment of troops, declaring at the same time that the Entente
Powers sent it to assist their ally Servia, and that they counted on
Greece, who had already given them so many proofs of friendship, not to
oppose measures taken in the interest of a country to which she also
was allied.[15]
{62}
In reply, the Greek Premier had the honour to declare to his Excellency
the French Minister that, being neutral, Greece could not authorize
measures which violated her neutrality. The Hellenic Government was
therefore obliged to protest against the passage of foreign troops
through Greek territory. The circumstance that those troops were
destined solely to the assistance of Servia, who was Greece's ally,
nowise altered the case; for, before the _casus faederis_ was realized,
the neutrality of Greece could not be affected by the danger which
menaced Servia.[16]
To return from formalities to realities. On the same day (2 Oct.), the
Bulgarian forces began to mass on the Servian frontier, while the
Austro-German battalions were fighting their way across the Danube; and
on the 4th Russia launched her ultimatum on Bulgaria. This rapid
fulfilment of their own prognostications roused the Greeks to the
highest pitch of excitement. But all faith in the Entente had not yet
been extinguished. On the very day on which the Petrograd Government
delivered its tardy and ineffectual ultimatum at Sofia, at Athens the
Chamber held a historic debate, in which M. Venizelos for the first
time proclaimed that the Graeco-Servian Treaty imposed an absolute
obligation upon Greece to make war on Bulgaria and Turkey; adding--in
answer to a question, what he would do if on going to Servia's
assistance he met the German and Austrian armies--that Germany and
Austria must be fought as well, if necessary, and backing his thesis
with those appeals to honour which, whether pertinent or not, seldom
fail to move a popular audience. The debate lasted till four o'clock
in the morning and ended with a vote of confidence in M. Venizelos's
military policy--a policy which M. Venizelos, a civilian, expounded to
an assembly of civilians as a settled plan, without waiting for the
consent of the King and in defiance of the technical advice of the
General Staff. In fairness to the Chamber, it should be added that the
motion was carried on the assumption that the King was in agreement.[17]
{63}
But we know King Constantine's attitude; and if M. Venizelos hoped by
these tactics to force his hand, he was speedily undeceived. No sooner
was the debate over than the King summoned his Prime Minister and asked
him to modify his policy or to resign. Faced by such a dilemma, M.
Venizelos did the only thing he could do--he resigned; and his country
shrank back on to the solid ground of neutrality.
It was a narrow escape--how narrow became evident a few hours later.
The Allies had promised to send 150,000 combatants. Even if this
promise had been kept, the Allied force would not have been, in any
strategical sense, an adequate substitute for the Servian contingent.
For it was not in place for covering purposes or subsequent offensive
action; it was not trained to Balkan fighting; it was not equipped for
mountain warfare; and, coming to the same ports as the Greeks, it would
have delayed the process of concentration. But, be that as it may, the
promise was not kept. What is more, it could not possibly have been
kept. Politicians casting about for arguments wherewith to back their
views may leave their hearers to imagine that Great Powers keep armies
ready to be planked down at any point at a moment's notice; but the
fact is that an army, even if it can be spared from other tasks, is a
cumbrous affair to move about, requiring all sorts of tiresome
things--food, arms, ammunition--the provision of which requires, in its
turn, complicated processes, before the army is potentially effective
for the role assigned to it in the creative mind of an excited orator.
Something of the sort had, indeed, been intimated to the Hellenic
Government by the Entente Powers themselves when they wished both
Greeks and Serbs to avert Bulgarian hostility by territorial
concessions--namely, that, as after the commitment of troops to
Gallipoli, none remained to rescue Servia, there was nothing for it but
to conciliate Bulgaria. Of course, it may be asked, such being the
facts, what value had the promise of 150,000 men? This {64} is a
question which M. Venizelos would have done well to ponder, as King
Constantine and his military advisers pondered it. As it was, when
that afternoon the Allied forces turned up at Salonica, the Greek
people had the mortification to find that they amounted to 20,000. Nor
did they approach the stipulated figure for months after.
The arguments which had prevailed with many some hours before were
suddenly exploded, and to the feeling of confidence which had prompted
the Chamber's vote immediately succeeded a feeling of panic. What!
cried everybody at Athens, are we to stake our liberty--our national
existence--on such a chance: 150,000 Greeks, _plus_ 200,000
half-exhausted Serbs, _plus_ 20,000 Allies, against 200,000
Austro-Germans, _plus_ 300,000 Bulgars, _plus_ 100,000 Turks? Nay, if
the French and the English love gambling, we don't: we cannot afford
the luxury. Venizelos has allowed himself to be duped, said some;
others, Venizelos has tried to dupe us.
Such were the circumstances under which the Allies landed at Salonica.
Their action has been pronounced immoral and perfidious by some English
and even by some French critics; and as it was attended with ill
success, it brought double shame upon the contrivers.[18] Certainly,
it will not bear investigation from the standpoint of political tact:
it was the first of the many performances which little by little
alienated a friendly nation from them and discredited M. Venizelos with
his countrymen.
[1] M. Venizelos in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.
[2] _Ibid._
[3] Deville, p. 174.
[4] Venizelos to Greek Legation, Nish, 18/31 Aug.; Alexandropoulos,
Nish, 19 Aug./1 Sept.; 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 22 Aug./4 Sept., 1915.
[5] _White Book_, No. 41.
[6] _Orations_, pp. 131-8.
[7] This utterance, for the exactness of which we have to rely entirely
on M. Venizelos's memory, was the origin of the charge henceforth
brought against King Constantine that he claimed to reign by Divine
Right.
[8] According to another and ampler version of these events, it had
been agreed between the King and M. Venizelos that, while the latter
opened conversations with the British and French Ministers about the
possibility of sending 150,000 combatants, the former should
simultaneously open conversations with the German Emperor relating the
steps taken in regard to the Entente, and asking what Germany would
give for Greek neutrality. But when M. Venizelos returned to Athens,
he sent a letter to the King informing him that he had changed his mind
and that, as a responsible Minister, he could not sanction the
projected negotiations with Germany. Whereupon the King forwarded by
M. Mercati a reply that, in such a case, he retracted the permission to
approach the Entente with regard to reinforcements. See the _Balkan
Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. 387-8. Yet another version supplies some
additional details: M. Venizelos assured M. Mercati that his _démarche_
was of a strictly personal character and did not commit the State in
the least; next day he repeated this assurance to the King himself and,
at the King's instance, promised to cancel the _démarche_; and two days
afterwards the French Minister, M. Guillemin, formally declared to the
King that M. Venizelos's _démarche_ was considered as null and
void--_nulle et non avenue_.--See S. Cosmin's _Diplomatic et Presse
dans l'Affaire Grecque_ (Paris, 1921), pp. 123-4.
[9] The Greek Ministers abroad had for some time been informing their
Government of a contemplated occupation by Allied troops of the
territories which were to be ceded to Bulgaria; and the suspicion that
a dispatch of Entente Forces to Salonica might have for its object
"really to occupy for Bulgaria, until the conclusion of peace, the
territories coveted by her," has been expressed even by a French
diplomat.--See Deville, p. 129, n. 1.
[10] I venture to borrow this little scene from S. Cosmin, p. 125. M.
Venizelos at this stage of the proceedings is more eloquent than
coherent. He tells us (_Orations_, p. 139), that on informing the King
that the Allied troops were on their way to Salonica, his Majesty said:
"That's all right. Only please let your protest be in any case,
emphatic," and that he replied: "Emphatic--yes, but only up to a
certain point, considering what lies beneath." Now, as on M.
Venizelos's own showing, the King was no party to the Allies' step, it
is not very easy to see how he could have spoken to him as if the King
had a secret understanding with them. The episode is one on which more
light could be shed with advantage. The same may be said of an
allegation that King Constantine secretly informed Bulgaria that, even
in the event of an attack on Servia, she would meet with no opposition
from Greece. This allegation is supported chiefly by a telegraphic
dispatch from the Bulgarian Minister at Athens to Sofia (_White Book_,
No. 43), which somehow (it is not stated how) fell into the hands of M.
Venizelos's friends and was produced by them in the Skouloudis Inquiry.
The authenticity of this document was publicly denied by its alleged
author, and its portentous length (three large pages of close print),
as well as its unusual style render it very suspicious: it begins:
"To-day, 9th instant," and it is dated "23"--as if the author did not
know that the difference between the Old and New Calendar was 13 days.
In face of these difficulties, strong evidence would be required to
establish its genuineness: the more because that Inquiry witnessed a
number of similar curiosities--among them an alleged dispatch from the
Turkish Minister at Athens to the Grand Vizier, regarding the
conclusion of a secret Graeco-Turkish treaty. When challenged, M.
Skouloudis declared that such treaty never was even thought of and
denounced the dispatch as "from beginning to end a forgery," whereupon
nothing more was said. (See Skouloudis's _Apologia_, pp. 85-8). These
matters are of interest as illustrating the atmosphere of mistrust that
poisoned Greek politics at this period, and particularly the relations
between the King of Greece and her leading politician.
[11] In pursuance of a decision taken by the War Council on 16 Feb., a
British force was sent to Lemnos to support the naval attack on the
Dardanelles, landing at Moudros on 6 March. Greece told the British
Government that she considered the action irreconcilable with her
position as a neutral. The British Government justified it by saying
that, as Turkey had not accepted the verdict of the Powers whereby
Lemnos and the other islands conquered in 1912 were assigned to Greece,
England had the right to treat them as Turkish territory: at the same
time declaring that this did not entail any diminution of Greek
sovereignty. Thus, whilst Turkey was a friend, the British Government
had decided that these islands did not belong to her; it recognized her
claim to them when she became an enemy; but not altogether--only for
the duration of the War: it was merely a temporary expedient to meet a
temporary exigency. By the same line of reasoning, England in the
following July justified the occupation of Mytilene. The Greek answer
was that "without consenting to the occupation of part of her territory
or admitting the arguments put forward by the British Government to
justify its action from the standpoint of International Law, Greece had
to bow before an accomplished fact."--Elliot to Greek Premier, Athens,
9 March, 25 July; Minister for Foreign Affairs to Greek Legations,
London and Paris, 16/29 July, 1915.
[12] Sir Edward Grey objected to a protest because it would enable
Germany to say that we had violated Greek neutrality.--Gennadius,
London, 29 Sept., 1915.
[13] Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, Rome, 18
Sept./1 Oct. 1915. (Confidential.)
[14] "For my policy the arrival of the Anglo-French was a most material
asset. I went for war against Bulgaria and had made up my mind, if
Bulgaria attacked Servia, to fight. It was in my interest, besides the
150,000 Greek and the 200,000 Servian bayonets, to have 150,000
Anglo-French, consequently it was a political move absolutely necessary
for the prosecution of my own policy."--_Orations_, p. 140.
[15] Guillemin to Venizelos, Athens, 19 Sept./2 Oct., 1915.
[17] Venizelos to Guillemin, Athens, 19 Sept./2 Oct., 1915. This
merely formal protest--quite distinct from the confidential dispatch
given above--is the only one of which the world has hitherto been
allowed to hear.
[17] M. Venizelos had insisted that the reports spread through the
Press concerning the divergence of views between him and the Crown
should be contradicted, and, by telling the King that otherwise the
mobilization would have no effect on Bulgaria, had obtained the King's
permission to publish a _communiqué_ in which he stated that "the Crown
is in accord with the responsible Government not only as regards
mobilization but also as regards future policy."--_Orations_, p. 136.
[18] See House of Commons Debate, in _The Times_, 19 April, 1916;
Chambre des Deputés, secret debate of 20 June, 1916, in the _Journal
Officiel_, p. 77.
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