Before proceeding any further with the development of the position in
Greece, it will be well to cast a glance on the attitudes maintained by
the other Balkan States and the views entertained towards them by the
Entente Powers. One must know all the possible combinations on the
Balkan chess-board before one can profitably study or estimate the real
place of the Greek pawn.
Bulgaria proclaimed her firm intention to remain neutral; but, to judge
from the Greek diplomatic representatives' reports, there was every
indication that she only awaited a favourable opportunity, such as some
brilliant military success of the Central Powers, in order to invade
Servia without risk. Meanwhile, well-armed irregular bands, equipped by
the Bulgarian Government and commanded by Bulgarian officers "on
furlough," made their appearance on the Servian frontier, and the
Bulgarian Press daily grew more hostile in its tone.[1]
Alarmed by these symptoms, the Greek General Staff renewed the efforts
which it had been making since the beginning of 1914, to concert plans
with the Servian military authorities for common action in accordance
with their alliance, and asked the Servian Minister of War if, in case
Bulgaria ordered a general mobilization, Servia would be disposed to
bring part of her forces against her, so as to prevent the concentration
of the Bulgarian army and give the Greek army time to mobilize. The
reply was that, if Bulgaria did order mobilization, the Serbs were
obliged to turn against her with all their available forces. Only, as
Austria had just started an offensive, nobody could know how many forces
they would have available--perhaps they could face the situation with the
25,000 or 30,000 men in the new provinces; but, in {18} any case, it did
not seem that Bulgaria meant to mobilize, or, if she did, it would be
against Turkey. A little later, in answer to another Greek step, M.
Passitch, the Servian Premier, after a conference with the military
chiefs, stated that, as long as there was no imminent danger from
Bulgaria, Servia could not draw troops from the Austrian frontier,
because of her engagements towards the Entente, and that, should the
danger become imminent, Servia would have to consult first the
Entente.[2] By Entente, he meant especially Russia, for M. Sazonow had
already told the Greek Minister at Petrograd that it was all-important
that the Servian army should be left free to devote its whole strength
against the Austrians.[3]
Rumania, on whose co-operation Greece counted for restraining Bulgaria
and preserving the balance established by the Treaty of Bucharest,
maintained an equivocal attitude: both belligerent groups courted her,
and it was as yet uncertain which would prevail.[4] For the present
Rumanian diplomacy was directed to the formation of a Balkan _bloc_ of
neutrality--between Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece--which might
enable those four States to remain at peace with each other and the whole
world, exempt from outside interference. The first step to the
realization of this idea, the Rumanian Government considered, was a
settlement of the differences between Greece and Turkey; and, in
compliance with its invitation, both States sent their plenipotentiaries
to Bucharest.
The only result of this mission was to enlighten the Hellenic Government
on Turkey's real attitude. At the very first sitting, the Turkish
delegate, Talaat Bey, in answer to a remark that the best thing for the
Balkan States would be to keep out of the general conflagration, blurted
out: "But Turkey is no longer free as to her movements"--an avowal of the
Germano-Turkish alliance which the Greeks already knew from the Kaiser's
own indiscretions. After that meeting, in a conversation with the
Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which that gentleman reported to
the Greeks, Talaat said that, in his opinion, Greece could ignore her
Servian alliance, for, {19} as things stood, she might find herself at
war, not only with Bulgaria, but also with Turkey--a contingency not
foreseen when that alliance was made. From these utterances the Greeks
derived a clear impression that Talaat acted on a plan drawn up in
Berlin.[5] For the rest, the despatch of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_
to Constantinople, followed by the continued arrival of German officers
and sailors for the Ottoman Navy, spoke for themselves. M. Sazonow
shared the Greek conviction that Turkey had made up her mind, and that no
amount of concessions would avail: "It is," he said to the Greek Minister
at Petrograd, "an abscess which must burst." [6] The Greeks had even
reason to suspect that Turkey was secretly negotiating an agreement with
Bulgaria, and on this point also the information of the Russian
Government confirmed theirs.[7]
It was his intimate knowledge of the Balkan situation that had inspired
King Constantine's proposal to the Entente Powers in August for common
action against Turkey, qualified with the stipulation of holding Bulgaria
in check. The proposal took cognizance of Balkan difficulties and might
perhaps have solved them, had it been accepted: an advance of the Greek
army on Thrace, combined with a naval attack by the British Fleet, early
in September, might have settled Turkey, secured Bulgaria's neutrality,
if not indeed her co-operation, or forced her into a premature
declaration of hostility, and decided Rumania to throw in her lot with us.
But the Entente Powers were not yet ripe for action against Turkey: they
were still playing--with what degree of seriousness is a delicate
question--for the neutrality of Turkey, and for that Greek neutrality was
necessary. As to Bulgaria, our diplomacy harboured a different project:
the reconstruction of the Balkan League of 1912 in our favour, on the
basis of territorial concessions to be made to Bulgaria by Servia and
Greece, who were to be compensated by dividing Albania between them.
Greece also had from England an alternative suggestion--expansion in Asia
Minor: a vague and {20} unofficial hint, destined to assume imposing
dimensions later on. At this stage, however, the whole project lacked
precise outline. One plan of the reconstructed League included
Rumania--who also was to make concessions to Bulgaria and to receive
compensations at the expense of Austria; and the League was to be brought
into the field on the side of the Entente. Another plan had less
ambitious aims: Servia and Greece by conciliating Bulgaria were to
prevent a combination of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, or of Bulgaria
and Turkey, on the side of the Central Powers. The more sanguine plan
was especially cherished by Great Britain; the other by Russia, who
feared a Rumano-Bulgaro-Turkish combination against her. But the
key-stone in both was Bulgaria, whose co-operation, or at least
neutrality, was to be purchased at the cost of Servia and Greece.[8]
Meanwhile, the less serious the Entente Powers' hopes for Turkey's
neutrality, the more lively their anxiety must have been about Bulgaria's
attitude; and it is not improbable that in repelling King Constantine's
offer, they were actuated not so much by the wish to avoid Turkish
hostility--the reason given--as by the fear lest the stipulation which
accompanied his offer, if accepted, should provoke Bulgaria.
Highly speculative as this project was, it might have materialized if
Serbs and Greeks were willing to pay the price. But neither Serbs nor
Greeks would think of such a thing. At the mere report that they were
about to be asked to cede Cavalla, the Greeks went mad, and M. Venizelos
himself, though he favoured the reconstruction of the Balkan League,
loudly threatened, if the demand was formulated, to resign. Whereupon,
his consternation having been transmitted to the Entente capitals, he
received an assurance that no demand of the sort would be made[9]--for
the present.
[1] Naoum, Sofia, 11, 20 Aug. (O.S.); Alexandropoulos, Nish, 19 July, 19
Aug. (O.S.), 1914.
[2] Alexandropoulos, Nish, 31 July, 19, 26 Aug. (O.S.) 1914.
[3] Dragoumis, Petersburg, 20 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.
[4] Politis, Bucharest, 27 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.
[5] Politis, Bucharest, 15 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.
[6] Dragoumis, Petersburg, 17 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.
[7] Dragoumis, _ibid._
[8] Gennadius, London, 8, 10, 15, 23 Aug.; Romanos, Paris, 31 July, 16
Aug.; Dragoumis, Petersburg, 31 July, 12, 20 Aug.; Naoum, Sofia, 31 July,
11, 20, 23 Aug.; Alexandropoulos, Nish, 18 Aug.; Papadiamantopoulos,
Bucharest, 25 July (O.S.), 1914.
[9] Venizelos to Greek Legations, Petersburg, Bordeaux, London, 2 Sept.
(O.S.), 1914.
{21}