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GREECE AND THE ALLIES
1914-1922
BY
G. F. ABBOTT
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
SONGS OF MODERN GREECE
MACEDONIAN FOLKLORE
THE TALE OF A TOUR IN MACEDONIA
GREECE IN EVOLUTION (ED.)
TURKEY IN TRANSITION
TURKEY, GREECE, AND THE GREAT POWERS
UNDER THE TURK IN CONSTANTINOPLE
WITH A PREFACE BY
ADMIRAL MARK KERR, C.B., M.V.O.
LATE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ROYAL HELLENIC NAVY
AND HEAD OF THE BRITISH NAVAL MISSION TO GREECE
METHUEN & CO. LTD.
36 ESSEX STREET W.C.
LONDON
First published in 1922
{v}
PREFACE
The late convulsions in Greece and Turkey, and the consequent revival
of all the mis-statements which, during the War, flowed from ignorance
or malice, render the publication of this book particularly opportune.
Mr. Abbott deals with his subject in all its aspects, and presents for
the first time to the British public a complete and coherent view of
the complicated circumstances that made Greece, during the War, the
battle-ground of rival interests and intrigues, from which have grown
the present troubles.
In this book we get a clear account of the little-understood relations
between the Greek and the Serb; of the attitude of Greece towards the
Central Powers and the Entente; of the dealings between Greece and the
Entente and the complications that ensued therefrom. Mr. Abbott traces
the evil to its source--the hidden pull of British versus French
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the open antagonism between
M. Venizelos and King Constantine.
All these subjects are of acute interest, and not the least interesting
is the last.
The persecution of King Constantine by the Press of the Allied
countries, with some few good exceptions, has been one of the most
tragic affairs since the Dreyfus case. Its effect on the state of
Europe during and since the War is remarkable. If King Constantine's
advice had been followed, and the Greek plan for the taking of the
Dardanelles had been carried out, the war would probably have been
shortened by a very considerable period, Bulgaria and Rumania could
have been kept out of the War, and probably the Russian Revolution and
collapse would not have taken place; for, instead of having Turkey to
assist Bulgaria, the Allied forces would have been between and
separating these two countries. {vi}
In this case King Constantine would not have been exiled from his
country, and consequently he would not have permitted the Greek Army to
be sent to Asia Minor, which he always stated would ruin Greece, as the
country was not rich enough or strong enough to maintain an overseas
colony next to an hereditary enemy like the Turk.
It is illuminating to remember that the Greek King's policy was fully
endorsed by the only competent authorities who had a full knowledge of
the subject, which was a purely military one. These were the late
Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, the British Admiral at the
head of the Naval Mission in Greece, and Colonel Sir Thomas Cuninghame,
British Military Attaché in Athens; but the advice tendered by these
three officers was disregarded in favour of that given by the
civilians, M. Venizelos and the Allied Ministers.
Mr. Abbott's book will do much to enlighten a misled public as to the
history of Greece during the last nine years, and many documents which
have not hitherto been before the public are quoted by him from the
official originals, to prove the case.
For the sake of truth and justice, which used to flourish in Great
Britain, I hope that this book will be read by everyone who has the
welfare of the British Empire at heart.
MARK KERR
4 _October_, 1922
{vii}
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
As this work goes to press, the British Empire finds itself forced to
vindicate its position in the East: a position purchased at the cost of
much blood and treasure during the war, to be jeopardized after the
conclusion of peace by the defeat of Greece and the defection of France.
In the following pages the reader will find the sequence of events
which have inevitably led up to this crisis: an account of transactions
hitherto obscured and distorted by every species of misrepresentation
and every known artifice for manipulating public opinion.
The volume is not a hasty essay produced to exploit an ephemeral
situation. It embodies the fruit of investigations laboriously carried
on through six years. A slight account of the earlier events appeared
as far back as the winter of 1916 in a book entitled, _Turkey, Greece,
and the Great Powers_: that was my first effort to place the subject in
its true perspective. The results were interesting. I was honoured by
the reproaches of several private and by the reprobation of several
public critics; some correspondents favoured me with their anonymous
scurrility, and some bigots relieved me of their acquaintance. On the
other hand, there were people who, in the midst of a maelstrom of
passion, retained their respect for facts.
I pursued the subject further in a weekly journal. Two of my
contributions saw the light; the third was suppressed by the
Authorities. Its suppression furnished material for a debate in
Parliament: "This is a cleverly written article," said Mr. John Dillon,
"and I cannot find in it a single word which justifies suppression.
All that one can find in it is that it states certain facts which the
Government do not like to be known, not that they injure the military
situation in the least, but that they show that the Government, in the
opinion of the writer, made certain very bad blunders." The Home
Secretary's answer was {viii} typical of departmental dialectics: "It
is inconceivable to me," he declared, "that the Government would
venture to say to the Press, or indicate to it in any way, 'This is our
view. Publish it. If you do not, you will suffer.'" What the
Government did, in effect, say to the Editor of the _National Weekly_
was: "This is not our view. Publish it not. If you do, you will
suffer."
With an innocence perhaps pardonable in one who was too intent on the
evolution of the world drama to follow the daily development of
war-time prohibitions, I next essayed to present to the public through
the medium of a book the truth which had been banned from the columns
of a magazine. The manuscript of that work, much fingered by the
printer, now lies before me, and together with it a letter from the
publisher stating that the Authorities had forbidden its publication on
pain of proceedings "under 27 (b) of the Defence of the Realm
Regulations."
And so it came about that not until now has it been possible for the
voice of facts to refute the fables dictated by interest and accepted
by credulity. The delay had its advantages: it gave the story, through
the natural progress of events, a completeness which otherwise it would
have lacked, and enabled me to test its accuracy on every point by a
fresh visit to Greece and by reference to sources previously
inaccessible, such as the Greek State Papers and the self-revealing
publications of persons directly concerned in the transactions here
related.
I venture to hope that so thorough an inquiry will convey some new
information respecting these transactions even to those who are best
acquainted with their general course. If they find nothing attractive
in the style of the book, they may find perhaps something useful,
something that will deserve their serious reflection, in the matter of
it. For let it not be said that a story starting in 1914 is ancient
history. Unless one studies the record of Allied action in Greece from
the very beginning, he cannot approach with any clear understanding the
present crisis--a struggle between Greeks and Turks on the surface, but
at bottom a conflict between French and British policies affecting the
vital interests of the British Empire.
G. F. A.
5 _October_, 1922
{ix}
_Besides information acquired at first hand, my material is mainly
drawn from the following sources_:
Greek State Papers now utilized for the first time.
_White Book_, published by the Government of M. Venizelos under the
title, "_Diplomatika Engrapha_, 1913-1917," 2nd edition, Athens, 1920.
_Orations_, delivered in the Greek Chamber in August, 1917, by M.
Venizelos, his followers, MM. Repoulis, Politis, and Kafandaris, and
his opponents, MM. Stratos and Rallis. The Greek text ("_Agoreuseis,
etc._," Athens, 1917) and the English translation ("_A Report of
Speeches, etc.,_" London, 1918), give them all, though the speech of M.
Stratos only in summary. The French translation ("_Discours, etc.,
Traduction de M. Léon Maccas, autorisée par le Gouvernement Grec,_"
Paris, 1917) curiously omits both the Opposition speeches.
Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, 1917; _Apologia_, 1919; _Semeioseis_, 1921.
The first of these publications is the ex-Premier's Reply to statements
made in the Greek Chamber by M. Venizelos and others in August, 1917;
the second is his Defence; the third is a collection of Notes
concerning transactions in which he took part. All three are of the
highest value for the eventful period of the Skouloudis Administration
from November, 1915, to June, 1916.
_Journal Officiel_, 24-30 October, 1919, containing a full report of
the Secret Committee of the French Chamber which sat from 16 June to 22
June, 1916.
Next in importance, though not inferior in historic interest, come some
personal narratives, of which I have also availed myself, by leading
French actors in the drama:
_Du Fournet_: "Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral, 1914-1916." By
Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Paris, 1920.
_Sarrail_: "Mon Commandement en Orient, 1916-1918." By General
Sarrail, Paris, 1920.
_Regnault_: "La Conquête d'Athènes, Juin-Juillet, 1917." By General
Regnault, Paris, 1920.
{x}
_Deville_: "L'Entente, la Grèce et la Bulgarie. Notes d'histoire et
souvenirs." By Gabriel Deville, Paris, 1919. The author was French
Minister at Athens till August, 1915, and the portions of his work
which deal with his own experiences are worth consulting.
_Jonnart_: "M. Jonnart en Grèce et l'abdication de Constantin." By
Raymond Recouly, Paris, 1918. Though not written by the High
Commissioner himself, this account may be regarded as a semi-official
record of his mission.
The only English publications of equal value, though of much more
limited bearing upon the subject of this work, which have appeared so
far are:
The Dardanelles Commission _Reports_ (Cd. 8490; Cd. 8502; Cmd. 371),
and the _Life of Lord Kitchener_, by Sir George Arthur, Vol. III,
London, 1920.
Some trustworthy contributions to the study of these events have also
been made by several unofficial narratives, to which the reader is
referred for details on particular episodes. The absence of reference
to certain other narratives is deliberate.
{xi}
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION - - - - - 1
CHAPTER I. - - - - - 7
CHAPTER II. - - - - - 17
CHAPTER III. - - - - - 21
CHAPTER IV. - - - - - 33
CHAPTER V. - - - - - 50
CHAPTER VI. - - - - - 65
CHAPTER VII. - - - - - 76
CHAPTER VIII. - - - - - 85
CHAPTER IX. - - - - - 95
CHAPTER X. - - - - - 105
CHAPTER XI. - - - - - 114
CHAPTER XII. - - - - - 123
CHAPTER XIII. - - - - - 139
CHAPTER XIV. - - - - - 152
CHAPTER XV. - - - - - 162
CHAPTER XVI. - - - - - 172
CHAPTER XVII. - - - - - 177
CHAPTER XVIII. - - - - - 186
CHAPTER XIX. - - - - - 200
CHAPTER XX. - - - - - 207
CHAPTER XXI. - - - - - 217
AFTERWORD - - - - - - 230
INDEX - - - - - - 239
{1}
GREECE AND THE ALLIES
1914-1922
INTRODUCTION
Ingenious scholars, surveying life from afar, are apt to interpret
historical events as the outcome of impersonal forces which shape the
course of nations unknown to themselves. This is an impressive theory,
but it will not bear close scrutiny. Human nature everywhere responds
to the influence of personality. In Greece this response is more
marked than anywhere else. No people in the world has been so
completely dominated by personal figures and suffered so grievously
from their feuds, ever since the day when strife first parted Atreides,
king of men, and god-like Achilles.
The outbreak of the European War found Greece under the sway of King
Constantine and his Premier Eleutherios Venizelos; and her history
during that troubled era inevitably centres round these two
personalities.
By the triumphant conduct of the campaigns of 1912 and 1913, King
Constantine had more than effaced the memory of his defeat in 1897.
His victories ministered to the national lust for power and formed an
earnest of the glory that was yet to come to Greece. Henceforth a halo
of military romance--a thing especially dear to the hearts of
men--shone about the head of Constantine; and his grateful country
bestowed upon him the title of {2} _Stratelates_. In town mansions and
village huts men's mouths were filled with his praise: one dwelt on his
dauntless courage, another on his strategic genius, a third on his
sympathetic recognition of the claims of the common soldier, whose
hardships he shared, and for whose life he evinced a far greater
solicitude than for his own.
But it was not only as a leader of armies that King Constantine
appealed to the hearts of his countrymen. They loved to explain to
strangers the reason of the name _Koumbaros_ or "Gossip," by which they
commonly called him. It was not so much, they would say, that he had
stood godfather to the children born to his soldiers during the
campaigns, but rather that his relations with the rank and file of the
people at large were marked by the intimate interest of a personal
companion.
In peace, as in war, he seemed a prince born to lead a democratic
people. With his tall, virile figure, and a handsome face in which
strength and dignity were happily blended with simplicity, he had a
manner of address which was very engaging: his words, few, simple,
soldier-like, produced a wonderful effect; they were the words of one
who meant and felt what he said: they went straight to the hearer's
heart because they came straight from the speaker's.
Qualities of a very different sort had enabled M. Venizelos to impose
himself upon the mind of the Greek nation, and to make his name current
in the Chancelleries of the world.
Having begun life as an obscure lawyer in Crete, he had risen through a
series of political convulsions to high notability in his native
island; and in 1909 a similar convulsion in Greece--brought about not
without his collaboration--opened to him a wider sphere of activity.
The moment was singularly opportune.
The discontent of the Greek people at the chronic mismanagement of
their affairs had been quickened by the Turkish Revolution into
something like despair. Bulgaria had exploited that upheaval by
annexing Eastern Rumelia: Greece had failed to annex Crete, and ran the
risk, if the Young Turks' experiment succeeded, of seeing the {3}
fulfilment of all her national aspirations frustrated for ever. A
group of military malcontents in touch with the Cretan leader
translated the popular feeling into action: a revolt against the reign
of venality and futility which had for so many years paralyzed every
effort, which had sometimes sacrificed and always subordinated the
interests of the nation to the interests of faction, and now left
Greece a prey to Bulgarian and Ottoman ambition. The old politicians
who were the cause of the ill obviously could not effect a cure. A new
man was needed--a man free from the deadening influences of a corrupt
past--a man daring enough to initiate a new course and tenacious enough
to push on with inexorable purpose to the goal.
During the first period of his career, M. Venizelos had been a capable
organizer of administrative departments no less than a clever
manipulator of seditious movements. But he had mainly distinguished
himself as a rebel against authority. And it was in the temper of a
rebel that he came to Athens. Obstacles, however, external as well as
internal, made a subversive enterprise impossible. With the quick
adaptability of his nature, he turned into a guardian of established
institutions: the foe of revolution and friend of reform. Supported by
the Crown, he was able to lift his voice for a "Revisionist" above the
angry sea of a multitude clamouring for a "Constituent Assembly."
All that was healthy in the political world rallied to the new man; and
the new man did not disappoint the faith placed in him. Through the
next two years he stood in every eye as the embodiment of constructive
statesmanship. His Government had strength enough in the country to
dispense with "graft." The result was a thorough overhauling of the
State machinery. Self-distrust founded on past failures vanished.
Greece seemed like an invalid healed and ready to face the future. It
was a miraculous change for a nation whose political life hitherto had
exhibited two traits seldom found combined: the levity of childhood and
the indolence of age.
For this miracle the chief credit undoubtedly belonged {4} to M.
Venizelos. He had brought to the task a brain better endowed than any
associated with it. His initiative was indefatigable; his decision
quick. Unlike most of his countrymen, he did not content himself with
ideas without works. His subtlety in thinking did not serve him as a
substitute for action. To these talents he added an eloquence of the
kind which, to a Greek multitude, is irresistible, and a certain gift
which does not always go with high intelligence, but, when it does, is
worth all the arts of the most profound politician and accomplished
orator put together. He understood, as it were instinctively, the
character of every man he met, and dealt with him accordingly. This
tact, coupled with a smile full of sweetness and apparent frankness,
gave to his vivid personality a charm which only those could appraise
who experienced it.
Abroad the progress of M. Venizelos excited almost as much interest as
it did in Greece. The Greeks are extraordinarily sensitive to foreign
opinion: a single good word in a Western newspaper raises a politician
in public esteem more than a whole volume of home-made panegyric. M.
Venizelos had not neglected this branch of his business; and from the
outset every foreign journalist and diplomatist who came his way was
made to feel his fascination: so that, even before leaving his native
shores, the Cretan had become in the European firmament a star of the
third or fourth magnitude. Reasons other than personal contributed to
enlist Western opinion in his favour. Owing to her geographical
situation, Greece depends for the fulfilment of her national
aspirations and for her very existence on the Powers which command the
Mediterranean. A fact so patent had never escaped the perception of
any Greek politician. But no Greek politician had ever kept this fact
more steadily in view, or put this obvious truth into more vehement
language than M. Venizelos: "To tie Greece to the apron-strings of the
Sea Powers," was his maxim. And the times were such that those Powers
needed a Greek statesman whom they could trust to apply that maxim
unflinchingly.
{5}
With the recovery of Greece synchronized, not by chance, the doom of
Turkey: a sentence in which all the members of the Entente, starting
from different points and pursuing different objects, concurred. The
executioners were, naturally, the Balkan States. Russia began the work
by bringing about an agreement between Bulgaria and Servia; England
completed it by bringing Greece into the League. There ensued a local,
which, in accordance with the old diplomatic prophecy, was soon to lead
to the universal conflagration. Organized as she was, Greece succeeded
better than anyone expected; and the national gratitude--the exuberant
gratitude of a Southern people--went out to the two men directly
responsible for that success: to King Constantine, whose brilliant
generalship beat the enemy hosts; and to M. Venizelos, whose able
statesmanship had prepared the field. Poets and pamphleteers vied with
each other in expatiating on the wonders they had performed, to the
honour and advantage of their country. In this ecstasy of popular
adoration the spirit of the soldier and the spirit of the lawyer seemed
to have met.
But the union was illusive and transient. Between these two men, so
strangely flung together by destiny, there existed no link of sympathy;
and propinquity only forced the growth of their mutual antagonism. The
seeds of discord had already borne fruit upon the common ground of
their Balkan exploits. Immediately after the defeat of Turkey a
quarrel over the spoils arose among the victors. King Constantine,
bearing in mind Bulgaria's long-cherished dream of hegemony, and
persuaded that no sacrifices made by Greece and Servia could do more
than defer a rupture, urged a Graeco-Servian alliance against their
truculent partner. He looked at the matter from a purely Greek
standpoint and was anxious to secure the maximum of profit for his
country. M. Venizelos, on the other hand, aware that the Western
Powers, and particularly England, wanted a permanent Balkan coalition
as a barrier against Germany in the East, and anxious to retain those
Powers' favour, was prepared to concede {6} much for the sake of
averting a rupture. Not until the Bulgars betrayed their intentions by
actual aggressions in Macedonia did he withdraw his opposition to the
alliance with Servia, which ushered in the Second Balkan War and led to
the Peace of Bucharest. He yielded to the pressure of the
circumstances brought to bear upon him; but the encounter represented
no more than the preliminary crossing of swords between two strong
antagonists.
{7}
CHAPTER I
From the moment when the rupture between Austria and Servia, in July,
1914, came to disturb the peace, Greece deliberately adopted an
attitude of neutrality, with the proviso that she would go to Servia's
assistance in case of a Bulgarian attack upon the latter. Such an
attitude was considered to be in accordance with the Graeco-Servian
Alliance. For, although the Military Convention accompanying the
Treaty contained a vague stipulation for mutual support in case of war
between one of the allied States and "a third Power," the Treaty itself
had as its sole object mutual defence against Bulgaria.[1]
In the opinion of M. Venizelos, her pact did not oblige Greece to go to
Servia's assistance against Austria, but at most to mobilize 40,000
men.[2] Treaty obligations apart, neutrality was also imposed by
practical considerations. It was to the interest of Greece--a matter
of self-preservation--not to tolerate a Bulgarian attack on Servia
calculated to upset the Balkan balance of power established by the
Peace of Bucharest, and she was firmly determined, in concert with
Rumania, to oppose such an attack with all her might. But as to
Austria, M. Venizelos had to consider whether Greece could or could not
offer her ally effective aid, and after consideration he decided that
she {8} should not proceed even to the mobilization of 40,000 men, for
such a measure might provoke a Bulgarian mobilization and precipitate
complications. For the rest, the attitude of Greece in face of
Servia's war with Austria, M. Venizelos pointed out, corresponded
absolutely with the attitude which Servia had taken up in face of
Greece's recent crisis with Turkey.[3] On that occasion Greece had
obtained from her ally merely moral support, the view taken being that
the _casus faederis_ would arise only in the event of Bulgarian
intervention.[4]
Accordingly, when the Servian Government asked if it could count on
armed assistance from Greece, M. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs
under M. Venizelos, answered that the Greek Government was convinced
that it fully performed its duty as a friend and ally by adopting,
until Bulgaria moved, a policy of most benevolent neutrality. The
co-operation of Greece in the war with Austria, far from helping, would
harm Servia; by becoming a belligerent Greece could only offer her ally
forces negligible compared with the enemy's, while she would inevitably
expose Salonica, the only port through which Servia could obtain war
material, to an Austrian attack; and, moreover, she would weaken her
army which, in the common interest, ought to be kept intact as a check
on Bulgaria.[5]
A similar communication, emphasizing the decision to keep out of the
conflict, and to intervene in concert with Rumania only should Bulgaria
by intervening against Servia jeopardize the _status quo_ established
by the Bucharest Treaty--in which case the action of Greece would have
a purely Balkan character--was made to the Greek Ministers abroad after
a Council held in the Royal Palace under the presidency of the King.[6]
This policy brought King Constantine into sharp collision with one of
the Central Powers, whose conceptions in regard to the Balkans had not
yet been harmonized. Vienna readily acquiesced in the Greek
Government's declaration that it could not permit Bulgaria to
compromise {9} the Bucharest Treaty, and since by an eventual action
against Bulgaria Greece would not quarrel with Austria, the Austrian
Government, on its part, promised to abstain from manifesting any
solidarity with Bulgaria in the event of a Graeco-Bulgarian war.[7]
Not so Berlin.
The German Emperor egotistically presumed to dictate the course which
Greece should pursue, and on 31 July he invited King Constantine to
join Germany, backing the invitation with every appeal to sentiment and
interest he could think of. The memory of his father, who had been
assassinated, made it impossible for Constantine to favour the Servian
assassins; never would Greece have a better opportunity of emancipating
herself, under the protection of the Central Powers, from the tutelage
which Russia aimed at exercising over the Balkan Peninsula; if,
contrary to the Kaiser's expectations, Greece took the other side, she
would be exposed to a simultaneous attack from Italy, Bulgaria and
Turkey, and by the same token all personal relations between him and
Constantine would be broken for ever. He ended with the words: "I have
spoken frankly, and I beg you to let me know your decision without
delay and with the same absolute frankness."
He had nothing to complain of on that score. King Constantine on 2
August replied that, while it was not the policy of Greece to take an
active part in the Austro-Servian conflict, it was equally impossible
for her "to make common cause with the enemies of the Serbs and to fall
upon them, since they are our allies. It seems to me that the
interests of Greece demand an absolute neutrality and the maintenance
of the _status quo_ in the Balkans such as it has been created by the
Treaty of Bucharest." He went on to add that Greece was determined, in
concert with Rumania, to prevent Bulgaria from aggrandizing herself at
the expense of Servia; if that happened, the balance in the Balkans
would be upset and it would bring about the very Russian tutelage which
the Kaiser feared. "This way of thinking," he concluded, "is shared by
the whole of my people."
What the Kaiser thought of these opinions was summed up in one word on
the margin, "Rubbish." This, however, was not meant for his
brother-in-law's ears. To him he {10} used less terse language. On 4
August he informed King Constantine through the Greek Minister in
Berlin that an alliance had that day been concluded between Germany and
Turkey, that Bulgaria and Rumania were similarly ranging themselves on
Germany's side, and that the German men-of-war in the Mediterranean
were going to join the Turkish fleet in order to act together. Thus
all the Balkan States were siding with Germany in the struggle against
Slavism. Would Greece alone stand out? His Imperial Majesty appealed
to King Constantine as a comrade, as a German Field Marshal of whom the
German Army was proud, as a brother-in-law; he reminded him that it was
thanks to his support that Greece was allowed to retain Cavalla; he
begged him to mobilize his army, place himself by the Kaiser's side and
march hand in hand against the common enemy--Slavism. He made this
urgent appeal for the last time, convinced that the King of Greece
would respond to it. If not, all would be over between the two
countries--this being a slightly attenuated version of another marginal
note: "I will treat Greece as an enemy if she does not adhere at once."
King Constantine's answer was tactful but final: His personal
sympathies and his political opinions, he said, were on the Kaiser's
side. But alas! that which the Kaiser asked him to do was completely
out of the question. Greece could not under any conceivable
circumstances side against the Entente: the Mediterranean was at the
mercy of the united French and British fleets, which could destroy the
Greek marine, both royal and mercantile, take the Greek islands, and
wipe Greece off the map. Things being so, neutrality, he declared, was
the only policy for Greece, and he ended up by meeting the Kaiser's
threat with a counter-threat, none the less pointed for being veiled
under the guise of an "assurance not to touch his friends among my
neighbours (i.e. Bulgaria and Turkey) as long as they do not touch our
local Balkan interests." [8]
{11}
Germany did not immediately resign herself to this rebuff. The
Kaiser's Government thought King Constantine's attachment to neutrality
reasonable--for the present; but at the same time urged Greece to enter
as soon as possible into a secret understanding with Bulgaria and
Turkey for eventual action against Servia, describing the latter
country as the bear's skin of which it would be a good stroke of
business for Greece to secure a share. The German Minister at Athens,
better acquainted with Greek views and feelings, took a less naïve
line. He did not want Greece to attack her ally, but was content to
advise that she should free herself from the ties that bound her to
Servia, and in the event of Bulgarian aggression just leave her ally in
the lurch. But, if he went less far than his chief in one direction,
he went farther in another, threatening, should Greece move on Servia's
behalf, to ask for his passport. This threat, like all the others,
failed to move the Athens Government;[9] and, unable to gain Greece as
an ally, Germany was henceforth glad enough not to have her as an enemy.
So far all those responsible for the policy of Greece appeared to be
unanimous in the decision not to be drawn prematurely into the European
cataclysm, but to reserve her forces for the defence of the Balkan
equilibrium. Under this apparent unanimity, however, lay divergent
tendencies.
King Constantine, a practical soldier, estimated that the European War
would be of long duration and doubtful issue: in this battle of giants
he saw no profit for pygmies, but only perils. At the same time, he
did not forget that Greece had in Bulgaria and Turkey two embittered
enemies {12} who would most probably try to fish in the troubled
waters. If they did so, he was prepared to fight; but to fight with a
definite objective and on a definite military plan which took into
account the elements of time, place, and resources.
The King's standpoint was shared by most Greek statesmen and soldiers
of note: they all, in varying degrees, stood for neutrality, with
possible intervention on the side of the Entente at some favourable
moment. But it did not commend itself to his Premier. Caution was
foreign to M. Venizelos's ambitious and adventurous temperament.
Military considerations had little meaning for his civilian mind.
Taking the speedy victory of the Entente as a foregone conclusion, and
imbued with a sort of mystical faith in his own prophetic insight and
star, he looked upon the European War as an occasion for Imperialist
aggrandizement which he felt that Greece ought to grasp without an
instant's delay.
It was not long before the underlying divergence came to the surface.
In the morning of 18 August, at a full Cabinet Meeting, M. Streit
mentioned that the Russian Minister had privately referred to the
possibility of Greece sending 150,000 men to fight with Servia against
the Austrians on the Danube--far away from the Greek Army's natural
base in Macedonia. On hearing this M. Venizelos impulsively declared
that he was ready to place all the Greek forces at the disposal of the
Entente Powers in accordance with their invitation. M. Streit
remonstrated that there had been no "invitation," but at most a
sounding from one of the Entente Ministers, which Greece should meet
with a counter-sounding, in order to learn to what extent the
suggestion was serious. Further, he objected that, before Greece
committed herself, it was necessary to find out where she would be
expected to fight, the conditions under which she would fight, and the
compensations which she would receive in the event of victory. As a
last resort he proposed to adjourn the discussion until the afternoon.
But M. Venizelos answered that there was no time to lose: the War would
be over in three weeks.[10] Whereupon {13} M. Streit resigned, and M.
Venizelos offered to the Entente Ministers the adhesion of Greece
forthwith.
The terms in which this offer was couched have never been divulged; but
from the French Minister's descriptions of it as made "_à titre
gracieux_" and "_sans conditions,_" [11] it seems to have been
unconditional and unqualified. On the other hand, M. Venizelos at a
later period explained that he had offered to place Greece at the
disposal of the Entente Powers, if Turkey went to war with them.[12]
And it is not improbable that the primary objective in his mind was
Turkey, who still refused to relinquish her claims to the islands
conquered by the Greeks in 1912, and had just strengthened her navy
with two German units, the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_. However that
may be, King Constantine seconded the offer, expressing himself quite
willing to join the Entente there and then with the whole of his army,
but stipulating, on the advice of the General Staff, that the Greek
forces should not be moved to any place where they could not, if need
arose, operate against Bulgaria.
The King of England telegraphed to the King of Greece, thanking him for
the proposal, which, he said, his Government would consider. The
French and Russian Governments expressed lively satisfaction, France,
however, adding: "For the moment we judge that Greece must use all her
efforts to make Turkey observe her promised neutrality, and to avoid
anything that might lead the Turkish Government to abandon its
neutrality." The British answer, when it came at last, was to the same
effect: England wished by all means to avoid a collision with Turkey
and advised that Greece also should avoid a collision. She only
suggested for the present an understanding between the Staffs with a
view to eventual action.
This suggestion was apparently a concession to Mr. Winston Churchill,
who just then had formed the opinion that Turkey would join the Central
Powers, and had arranged with Lord Kitchener that two officers of the
Admiralty should meet two officers of the War Office to work out a plan
for the seizure, by means of a Greek army, of the {14} Gallipoli
Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British fleet to the Sea of
Marmara.[13] But it no way affected the British Government's policy.
The utmost that England and France were prepared to do in order to meet
the offer of Greece, and that only if she were attacked, was to prevent
the Turkish fleet from coming out of the Dardanelles; France also
holding out some hope of financial assistance, but none of war material
on an adequate scale.[14]
Such a reception of his advances was not very flattering to M.
Venizelos--it made him look foolish in the eyes of those who had
pleaded against precipitancy; and he took the earliest opportunity to
vent his ill-humour. King Constantine, in a reply to the British
Admiralty drafted with Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, stated that he would not
fight Turkey unless attacked by her--a statement in strict consonance
with the wishes of the Entente Powers at the time. But M. Venizelos
objected. After his own declarations to the Entente Ministers, and
after the exchange of telegrams with the King of England, he told his
sovereign he did not consider this reply possible. Turkey was their
enemy, and was it wise for them to reject a chance of fighting her with
many and powerful allies, so that they might eventually have to fight
her single-handed?[15]
Thus M. Venizelos argued, in the face of express evidence that those
allies did not desire the immediate participation of Greece in a war
against Turkey--because, anxious above all things to establish close
contact with them, he wanted the offer to remain open: "a promise that,
should at any time the Powers consider us useful in a war against
Turkey . . . we would be at their disposal." [16] And he professed
himself unable to understand how a course which appeared so clear to
him could possibly be obscure to others. But he had a theory--a theory
which served him henceforward as a stock explanation of every
difference of opinion, and in which the political was skilfully mixed
{15} with the personal factor. According to this theory, when face to
face with M. Venizelos, the King seldom failed to be convinced; but as
soon as M. Venizelos withdrew, he changed his mind. This happened not
once, but many times.[17] We have here a question of psychology which
cannot be casually dismissed. M. Venizelos's persuasive powers are
notorious, and it is highly probable that King Constantine underwent
the fascination which this man had for others. But behind it all,
according to the Venizelist theory, lurked another element:
"What, I think, confuses things and begets in the mind of your Majesty
and of M. Streit tendencies opposed to those supported by me, is the
wish not to displease Germany by undertaking a war against Turkey in
co-operation with Powers hostile to her." Although M. Streit had laid
down his portfolio, he continued to be consulted by the King, with the
result, M. Venizelos complained, that the difference of opinions
between the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself was fast
developing into a divergence of courses between the Crown and the
Cabinet: such a state of things was obviously undesirable, and M.
Venizelos, "in order to facilitate the restoration of full harmony
between the Crown and its responsible advisers," offered his
resignation.[18]
M. Venizelos did not resign after all. But his letter marks an epoch
none the less. At first, as we have seen, the avowed policy of the
Premier, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the King was the
same. The difference which now emerges is that M. Venizelos desired to
throw Greece into the War immediately, without conditions and without
any invitation from the Entente, while the King and M. Streit were more
circumspect. M. Venizelos chose to interpret their circumspection as
prompted by regard for Germany, and did not hesitate to convey this
view to Entente quarters. It was, perhaps, a plausible insinuation,
since the King had a German wife and M. Streit was of German descent.
But, as a matter of fact, at the moment when it was made, King
Constantine voluntarily presented to the British Admiralty through
Admiral Kerr the plans for the taking of the Dardanelles which his
Staff had {16} elaborated, and for a long time afterwards continued to
supply the British Government, through the same channel, with
information from his secret service.[19]
[1] See Art. 1 of the Military Convention. As this article originally
stood, the promise of mutual support was expressly limited to the "case
of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Servia and Bulgaria." It
was altered at the eleventh hour at Servia's request, and not without
objections on the part of Greek military men, into a "case of war
between one of the allied States and a third Power breaking out under
the circumstances foreseen by the Graeco-Servian Treaty of Alliance."
But the only circumstances foreseen and provided for by that Treaty
relate to war with Bulgaria, and it is a question whether any other
interpretation would stand before a court of International Law, despite
the "third Power" phrase in the Military Convention. All the documents
are to be found in the _White Book_, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6.
[2] See Art. 5 of the Military Convention.
[3] _White Book_, Nos. 19, 20, 22.
[4] _White Book_, Nos. 11, 13, 14.
[5] _White Book_, No. 23.
[6] Streit to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petersburg, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome, Constantinople, Bucharest, Sofia, Nish. (No. 23,800.)
[7] _Ibid._
[8] Part of the correspondence is to be found in _Die deutschen
Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch_, by Count Mongelas and Prof. Walter
Schuking; part in the _White Book_, Nos. 24 and 26. As much
acrimonious discussion has arisen over King Constantine's last
dispatch, it is worth while noting the circumstances under which it was
sent. Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, Chief of the British Naval Mission in
Greece, relates how the King brought the Kaiser's telegram and read it
to him: "He was indignant at the interference in his country's affairs.
However, to stop such telegrams coming in daily, he determined to send
on this occasion a sympathetic answer." (See _The Times_, 9 Dec.,
1920.) The communication, therefore, was no secret from the British
Government. Nor was it from M. Venizelos; for the King's dispatch is
but a summary of an identical declaration made by M. Venizelos's
Government itself to the German Government: Streit to Greek Legation,
Berlin, 26 July/8 Aug., 1914. Though omitted from the _White Book_,
this document may now be read in the _Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, pp.
381-3.
[9] _White Book_, Nos. 28, 29, 30.
[10] My authority for this glimpse behind the scenes is M. Streit
himself.
[11] Deville, pp. 119, 128.
[12] _Orations_, pp. 93-4.
[13] _Dardanelles Commission_. _Supplement to First Report_, par. 45.
[14] Gennadius, London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 21 Aug./3 Sept.; 23 Aug./5
Sept.; Romanos, Paris, 16/29 Aug., 1914.
[15] _White Book_, No. 31.
[16] See _Orations_, p. 103.
[17] _Ibid_, pp. 41-2, 98.
[18] _White Book_, No. 31.
[19] See the Admiral's statements in the _Weekly Dispatch_, 21 Nov.,
and in _The Times_, 9 Dec., 1920. Though the plans in question were
not used, they were among the very few sources of reliable information
with which Sir Ian Hamilton left England to take up the command of the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.--_Dardanelles Commission, Final
Report_, par. 17.
{17}