obeyed,” and discusses the doctrine of Kant, that the true self of Man,
the _Homo Noumenon_, is free, self-legislative of Law fit for Law
Universal; while as the _Homo Phenomenon_, an inhabitant of the world of
sense, he is a mere link in the chain of causes and effects, and his
actions are locked up in mechanic laws which, had he no other rank,
would ensue exactly according to the physical impulses given by the
instincts and solicitations in the sensory. But as an inhabitant (also)
of the supersensitive world his position is among the causalities which
taking their rise therein, are the intimate ground of phenomena. The
discussion in this chapter on the above proposition cannot be condensed
into any space admissible here.
The fourth Chapter seeks to determine _Why the Moral Law should be
Obeyed_. It begins thus:—
“In the last Chapter (Chapter III.) I endeavoured to demonstrate that
the pure Will, the true self of man, is by nature righteous;
self-legislative of the only Universal Law, viz., the Moral; and that
by this spontaneous autonomy would all his actions be squared, were it
not for his lower nature, which is by its constitution unmoral,
neither righteous nor unrighteous, but capable only of determining its
choice by its instinctive propensities and the gratifications offered
to them. Thus these two are contrary one to another, ‘and the spirit
lusteth against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit.’ In the
valour of the higher nature acquired by its victory over the lower, in
the virtue of the tried and conquering soul, we look for the glorious
end of creation, the sublime result contemplated by Infinite
Benevolence in calling man into existence and fitting him with the
complicated nature capable of developing that Virtue which alone can
be the crown of finite intelligences. The great practical problem of
human life is this: ‘How is the Moral Will to gain the victory over
the unmoral instincts, the _Homo Noumenon_ over the _Homo Phenomenon_,
Michael over the Evil One, Mithras over Hyle?’”
In pursuing this enquiry of how the Moral Will is to be rendered
victorious, I am led back to the question: Is Happiness “our end and
aim?” What relation does it bear to Morality as a motive?
“I have already argued, in Chapter I., that Happiness, properly
speaking, is the gratification of _all_ the desires of our compound
nature, and that moral, intellectual, affectional, and sensual
pleasures are all to be considered as integers, whose sum, when
complete, would constitute perfect Happiness. From this multiform
nature of Happiness it has arisen, that those systems of ethics which
set it forth as the proper motive of Virtue have differed immensely
from one another, according as the Happiness they respectively
contemplated was thought of as consisting in the pleasures of our
Moral, or of our Intellectual, Affectional, and Sensual natures;
whether the pleasures were to be sought by the virtuous man for his
own enjoyment, or for the general happiness of the community.
“The pursuit of Virtue for the sake of its intrinsic, _i.e._, Moral
pleasure, is designated EUTHUMISM.
“The pursuit of Virtue for the sake of the extrinsic Affectional,
Intellectual, and Sensual pleasure resulting from it, is designated
EUDAIMONISM.
“Euthumism is of one kind only, for the individual can only seek the
intrinsic pleasure of Virtue for his own enjoyment thereof.
“Eudaimonism, on the contrary, is of two most distinct lands. That
which I have called PUBLIC EUDAIMONISM sets forth the intellectual,
affectional, and sensual pleasures of _all mankind_ as the proper
object of the Virtue of each individual. PRIVATE EUDAIMONISM sets
forth the same pleasures of the _individual himself_ as the proper
object of his Virtue.
“These two latter systems are commonly confounded under the name of
‘UTILITARIAN ETHICS.’ Their principles, as I have stated them, will be
seen to be wide asunder; yet there are few of the advocates of either
who have not endeavoured to stand on the grounds of both, and even to
borrow elevation from those of the Euthumist. Thus, by appealing
alternately to philanthropy[10] and to a gross and a refined
Selfishness, they suit the purpose of the moment, and prevent their
scheme from deviating too far from the intuitive conscience of
mankind. It may be remarked, also, that the Private Eudaimonists
insist more particularly on the pleasure of a _Future Life_; and in
the exposition of them necessarily approach nearer to the Euthumists.”
I here proceeded to discuss the three systems which have arisen from the
above-defined different views of Happiness; each contemplating it as the
proper motive of Virtue: namely, 1st, Euthumism; 2nd, Public
Eudaimonism; and 3rd, Private Eudaimonism.
“1st. Euthumism. This system, as I have said, sets forth the _Moral
Pleasure_, the peace and cheerfulness of mind, and applause of
conscience enjoyed in Virtue, as the proper motive for its practice.
Conversely, it sets forth as the dissuadent from Vice, the pain of
remorse, the inward uneasiness and self-contempt which belong to it.
“Democritus appears to have been the first who gave clear utterance to
this doctrine, maintaining that Εύθυμία was the proper End of human
actions, and sharply distinguishing it from the ‘Ηδονή’ proposed as
such by Aristippus. The claims of a ‘_mens conscia recti_’ to be the
‘Summum Bonum,’ occupied, as is well known, a large portion of the
subsequent disputes of the Epicureans, Cynics, Stoics and Academics,
and were eagerly argued by Cicero, and even down to the time of
Boethius. Many of these sects, however, and in particular the Stoics,
though maintaining that Virtue alone is sufficient for Happiness (that
is, that the inward joy of Virtue is enough to constitute Happiness in
the midst of torments), yet by no means set forth that Happiness as
the sole _motive_ of Virtue. They held, on the contrary, the noblest
ideas of ‘living according to Nature,’ that is, as Chrysippus
explained it, according to the ‘Nature of the universe, the common Law
of all, which is the right reason spread everywhere, the same by which
Jupiter governs the world’; and that both Virtue and Happiness
consisted in so regulating our actions that they should produce
harmony between the Spirit in each of us, and the Will of Him who
rules the universe. There is little or no trace of Euthumism in the
Jewish or Christian Scriptures, or (to my knowledge) in the sacred
books of the Brahmins, Buddhists, or Parsees. The ethical problems
argued by the mediæval Schoolmen do not, so far as I am aware, embrace
the subject in question. The doctrine was revived, however, in the
seventeenth century, and besides blending with more or less
distinctness with the views of a vast number of lesser moralists, it
reckons among its professed adherents no less names than Henry More
and Bishop Cumberland. Euthumism, philosophically considered, will be
found to affix itself most properly on the doctrine of the ‘Moral
Sense’ laid down by Shaftesbury as the origin of our _knowledge_ of
moral distinctions, which, if it were, it would naturally follow that
it must afford also the right _motive_ of Virtue. Hutcheson, also,
still more distinctly stated that this Moral Pleasure in Virtue (which
both he and Shaftesbury likened to the æsthetic Pleasure in Beauty)
was the true ground of our choice. To this Balguy replied, that ‘to
make the rectitude of moral actions depend upon instinct, and, in
proportion to the warmth and strength of the Moral Sense, rise and
fall like spirits in a thermometer, is depreciating the most sacred
thing in the world, and almost exposing it to ridicule.’ And Whewell
has shown that the doctrine of the Moral Sense as the foundation of
Morals must always fail, whether understood as meaning a sense like
that of Beauty (which may or may not be merely a modification of the
Agreeable), or a sense like those of Touch or Taste (which no one can
fairly maintain that any of our moral perceptions really resemble).
“But though neither the true source of our _Knowledge_ of Moral
Distinctions nor yet the right _Motive_ why we are to choose the Good,
this Moral Sense of Pleasure in Virtue, and Pain in Vice, is a
psychological fact demanding the investigation of the Moralist.
Moreover, the error of allowing our moral choice to be decided by a
regard to the pure joy of Virtue or awful pangs of self-condemnation,
is an error so venial in comparison of other moral heresies, and so
easily to be confounded with a truer principle of Morals, that it is
particularly necessary to warn generous natures against it. ‘It is
quite beyond the grasp of human thought,’ says Kant, ‘to explain how
reason can be practical; how the mere Morality of the law,
independently of every object man can be interested in, can itself
beget an interest which is purely Ethical; how a naked thought,
containing in it nothing of the sensory, can bring forth an emotion of
pleasure or pain.’
“Unconsciously this Sense of Pleasure in a Virtuous Act, the thought
of the peace of conscience which will follow it, or the dread of
remorse for its neglect, must mingle with our motives. But we can
never be permitted, consciously to exhibit them to ourselves as the
ground of our resolution to obey the Law. That Law is not valid for
man because it interests him, but it interests him because it has
validity for him—because it springs from his true being, his proper
self. The interest he feels is an Effect, not a Cause; a Contingency,
not a Necessity. Were he to obey the Law merely from this Interest, it
would not be free Self-legislation (autonomy), but (heteronomy)
subservience of the Pure Will to a lower faculty—a Sense of Pleasure.
And, practically, we may perceive that all manner of mischiefs and
absurdities must arise if a man set forth Moral Pleasure as the
determinator of his Will....
“Thus, the maxim of Euthumism, ‘_Be virtuous for the sake of the Moral
Pleasure of Virtue_,’ may be pronounced false.
“2nd. Public Eudaimonism sets forth, both as the ground of our
knowledge of Virtue and the motive for our practice of it, ‘_The
Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number_.’ This Happiness, as Paley
understood it, is composed of Pleasures to be estimated only by their
Intensity and Duration; or, as Bentham added, by their Certainty,
Propinquity, Fecundity, and Purity (or freedom from admixture of
evil).
“Let it be granted for argument’s sake, that the calculable Happiness
resulting from actions can determine their Virtue (although all
experience teaches that resulting Happiness is not calculable, and
that the Virtue must at least be one of the items determining the
resulting Happiness). On the Utilitarian’s own assumption, what sort
of motive for Virtue can be his end of ‘_The Greatest Happiness of the
Greatest Number_?’
“No sooner had Paley laid down the grand principle of his system,
‘_Whatever is Expedient is Right_,’ than he proceeds (as he thinks) to
guard against its malapplication by arguing that nothing is expedient
which produces, along with _particular_ good consequences, _general_
bad ones, and that this is done by the violation of any general rule.
‘You cannot,’ says he, ‘permit one action, and forbid another without
showing a difference between them. Consequently the same sort of
actions must be generally permitted or generally forbidden. Where
therefore, the general permission of them would be pernicious, it
becomes necessary to lay down and support the rule which generally
forbids them.’
“Now, let the number of experienced consequences of actions be ever so
great, it must be admitted that the Inductions we draw therefrom can,
at the utmost, be only provisional, and subject to revision should new
facts be brought in to bear in an opposite scale....
“Further, the rules induced by experience must be not only
provisional, but partial. The lax term ‘general’ misleads us. A Moral
Rule must be either universal and open to no exception, or, properly
speaking, no _rule_ at all. Each case of Morals stands alone.
“Thus, the Experimentalist’s conclusion, for example, that ‘Lying does
more harm than good,’ may be quite remodelled by the fortunate
discovery of so prudent a kind of falsification as shall obviate the
mischief and leave the advantage. No doubt can remain on the mind of
any student of Paley, that this would have been his own line of
argument: ‘If we can only prove that a lie be expedient, then it
becomes a duty to lie.’ As he says himself of the rule (which if any
rule may do so may surely claim to be general) ‘Do not do evil that
good may come,’ that it is ‘salutary, for the most part, the advantage
seldom compensating for the violation of the rule.’ So to do evil is
sometimes salutary, and does now and then compensate for disregarding
even the Eudaimonist’s last resource—a General Rule!
“2nd. Private Eudaimonism. There are several formulas, in which this
system, (the lowest, but the most logical, of Moral heresies) is
embodied. Rutherford puts it thus: ‘Every man’s Happiness is the
ultimate end which Reason teaches him to pursue, and the constant and
uniform practice of Virtue towards all mankind becomes our duty, when
Revelation has informed us that God will make us finally happy in a
life after this.’ Paley (who properly belongs to this school, but
endeavours frequently to seat himself on the corners of the stools of
Euthumism and Public Eudaimonism), Paley, the standard Moralist of
England,[11] defines Virtue thus: ‘_Virtue is the doing good to
mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of
Everlasting Happiness_. According to which definition, the good of
mankind is the subject; the will of God the rule; and Everlasting
Happiness the motive of Virtue.’
“Yet it seems to me, that if there be any one truth which intuition
does teach us more clearly than another, it is precisely this one—that
Virtue to be Virtue must be disinterested. The moment we picture any
species of reward becoming the bait of our Morality, that moment we
see the holy flame of Virtue annihilated in the noxious gas. A man is
not Virtuous at all who is honest because it is ‘good policy,’
beneficent from love of approbation, pious for the sake of heaven. All
this is prudence not virtue, selfishness not self-sacrifice. If he be
honest for sake of policy, would he be dishonest, if it could be
proved that it were more politic? If he would _not_, then he is not
really honest from policy but from some deeper principle thrust into
the background of his consciousness. If he _would_, then it is idlest
mockery to call that honesty Virtuous which only waits a bribe to
become dishonest.
“But there are many Eudaimonists who will be ready to acknowledge that
a prudent postponement of our happiness in _this_ world cannot
constitute virtue. But wherefore do they say we are to postpone it?
Not for present pleasure or pain, that would be base; but for that
anticipation of future pleasure or pain which we call Hope and Fear.
And this, not for the Hope and Fear of this world, which are still
admitted to be base motives; but for Hope and Fear extended one step
beyond the tomb—the Hope of Heaven and the Fear of Hell.”
After a general glance at the doctrine of Future Rewards and Punishments
as held by Christians and heathens, I go on to argue:
“But in truth this doctrine of the Hope of Heaven being the true
Motive of Virtue is (at least in theory) just as destructive of Virtue
as that which makes the rewards of this life—health, wealth, or
reputation—the motive of it. Well says brave Kingsley:
‘Is selfishness for time a sin,
Stretched out into eternity celestial prudence?’
“If to act for a small reward cannot be virtuous, to act for a large
one can certainly merit no more. To be bribed by a guinea is surely no
better than to be bribed by a penny. To be deterred from ruin by fear
of transportation for life, is no more noble than to be deterred by
fear of twenty-four hours in prison. There is no use multiplying
illustrations. He who can think that Virtue is the doing right for
pay, may think himself very judicious to leave his pay in the
savings-bank now and come into a fortune all at once by and by; but he
who thinks that Virtue is the doing right for Right’s own sake, cannot
possibly draw a distinction between small bribes and large ones; a
reward to be given to-day, and a reward to be given in eternity.
“Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the belief in immortal progress
is of incalculable value. Such belief, and that in an ever-present
God, may be called the two wings of human Virtue. I look on the
advantages of a faith in immortality to be two-fold. First, it cuts
the knot of the world, and gives to our apprehension a God whose
providence need no longer perplex us, and whose immeasurable and
never-ending goodness shines ever brighter before our contemplating
souls. Secondly, it gives an importance to personal progress which we
can hardly attribute to it so long as we deem it is to be arrested for
ever by death. The man who does not believe in Immortality may be, and
often actually is, more virtuous than his neighbour; and it is quite
certain that his Virtue is of far purer character than that which
bargains for Heaven as its pay. But his task is a very hard one, a
task without a result; and his road a dreary one, unenlightened even
by the distant dawn of
‘That great world of light which lies
Behind all human destinies.’
We can scarcely do him better service than by leading him to trust
that intuition of Immortality which is written in the heart of the
human race by that Hand which writes no falsehoods.
“But if the attainment of Heaven be no true motive for the pursuit of
Virtue, surely I may be held excused from denouncing that practice of
holding out the fear of Hell wherewith many fill up the measure of
moral degradation? Here it is vain to suppose that the fear is that of
the immortality of sin and banishment from God; as we are sometimes
told the hope of Heaven is that of an immortality of Virtue and union
with Him. The mind which sinks to the debasement of any Fear is
already below the level at which sin and estrangement are terrors. It
is his weakness of will which alone hinders the Prodigal from saying,
‘I will arise and go to my Father,’ and unless we can strengthen that
Will by some different motive, it is idle to threaten him with its own
persistence.
* * * * *
“Returning from the contemplation of the lowness of aim common to all
the forms of Eudaimonism, how magnificent seems the grand and holy
doctrine of true Intuitive Morality? DO RIGHT FOR THE RIGHT’S OWN
SAKE: Love God and Goodness because they are Good! The soul seems to
awake from death at such archangel’s call as this, and mortal man puts
on his rightful immortality. The prodigal grovels no longer, seeking
for Happiness amid the husks of pleasure; but, ‘coming to himself,’ he
arises and goes to his Father, heedless if it be but as the lowest of
His servants he may yet dwell beneath that Father’s smile. Hope and
fear for this life or the next, mercenary bargainings, and labour of
eye-service, all are at end. He is a Freeman, and free shall be the
oblation of his soul and body, the reasonable, holy, and acceptable
sacrifice.
“O Living Soul! wilt thou follow that mighty hand, and obey that
summons of the trumpet? Perchance thou hast reached life’s solemn
noon, and with the bright hues of thy morning have faded away the
beautiful aspirations of thy youth. Doubtless thou hast often
struggled for the Right; but, weary with frequent overthrows, thou
criest, ‘This also is vanity.’ But think again, O Soul, whose sun
shall never set! Have no poor and selfish ambitions mingled with those
struggles and made them vanity? Have no theologic dogmas from which
thy maturer reason revolts, been blended with thy purer principle?
Hast thou nourished no extravagant hope of becoming suddenly sinless,
or of heaping up with an hour’s labour a mountain of benefits on thy
race? Surely some mistake like these lies at the root of all moral
discouragement. But mark:—
“Pure morals forbid all base and selfish motives—all
happiness-seeking, fame-seeking, love-seeking—in this world or the
next, as motives of Virtue. Pure Morals rest not on any traditional
dogma, not on history, on philology, on criticism, but on those
intuitions, clear as the axioms of geometry, which thine own soul
finds in its depths, and knows to be necessary truths, which, short of
madness, it cannot disbelieve.
“Pure Morals offer no panacea to cure in a moment all the diseases of
the human heart, and transform the sinner into the saint. They teach
that the passions, which are the machinery of our moral life, are not
to be miraculously annihilated, but by slow and unwearying endeavour
to be brought into obedience to the Holy Will; while to fall and rise
again many a time in the path of virtue is the inevitable lot of every
pilgrim therein.... Our hearts burn within us when for a moment the
vision rises before our sight of what we might make our life even here
upon earth. Faintly can any words picture that vision!
“A life of Benevolence, in which every word of our lips, every work of
our hands, had been a contribution to human virtue or human happiness;
a life in which, ever wider and warmer through its three score years
and ten had grown our pure, unwavering, Godlike Love, till we had
spread the same philanthropy through a thousand hearts ere we passed
away from earth to love yet better still our brethren in the sky.
“A life of Personal Virtue, in which every evil disposition had been
trampled down, every noble sentiment called forth and strengthened; a
life in which, leaving day by day further behind us the pollutions of
sin, we had also ascended daily to fresh heights of purity, till
self-conquest, unceasingly achieved, became continually more secure
and more complete, and at last—
‘The lordly Will o’er its subject powers
Like a thronèd God prevailed,’
and we could look back upon the great task of earth, and say, ‘It is
finished!’
“A life of Religion, in which the delight in God’s presence, the
reverence for His moral attributes, the desire to obey His Will, and
the consciousness of His everlasting love, had grown continually
clearer and stronger, and of which Prayer, deepest and intensest, had
been the very heart and nucleus, till we had found God drawing ever
nearer to us as we drew near to him, and vouchsafing to us a communion
the bliss of which no human speech may ever tell; the dawning of that
day of adoration which shall grow brighter and brighter still while
all the clusters of the suns fade out and die.
“And turning from our own destiny, from the endless career opened to
our Benevolence, our Personal Virtue, and our Piety, we take in a yet
broader view, and behold the whole universe of God mapped out in one
stupendous Plan of Love. In the abyss of the past eternity we see the
Creator for ever designing and for ever accomplishing the supremest
end at which infinite Justice and Goodness could aim, and absolute
Wisdom and Power bring to pass. For this end, for the Virtue of all
finite Intelligences, we behold Him building up millions of starry
abodes and peopling them with immortal spirits clothed in the garbs of
flesh, and endowed with that moral freedom whose bestowal was the
highest boon of Omnipotence. As ages of millenniums roll away, we see
a double progress working through all the realms of space; a progress
of each race and of each individual. Slowly and securely, though with
many an apparent retrogression, does each world-family become better,
wiser, nobler, happier. Slowly and securely, though with many a
grievous backsliding, each living soul grows up to Virtue. Nor pauses
that awful march for a moment, even in the death of the being or the
cataclysm of the world. Over all Death and Change reigns that Almighty
changeless will which has decreed the holiness and happiness of every
spirit He hath made. Through the gates of the grave, and on the ruins
of worlds, shall those spirits climb, higher and yet higher through
the infinite ages, nearer and yet nearer to Goodness and to God.”
CHAPTER
VI.
_IRELAND IN THE FORTIES._
_THE PEASANTRY._