importance. One of our airmen, who was sent to bomb the canal bridge
near Don, was wounded on his way there, but continued and fulfilled his
mission. Near Wytschaete, one of our aviators pursued a German aeroplane
and fired a whole belt from his machine gun at it. The Taube suddenly
swerved, righted itself for a second, and then descended from a height
of several thousand feet straight to the ground.
On the other hand, a British machine unfortunately was brought down over
Lille by the enemy's anti-aircraft guns, but it is hoped that the
aviator escaped.
_In regard to the German allegation, that the British used gas in their
attacks on Hill 60, the Eyewitness says_:
[Sidenote: British had not used gas.]
No asphyxiating gases have been employed by us at any time, nor have
they yet been brought into play by us.
* * * * *
Germany, desperate at her failure to win the rapid victories she had
anticipated on the land, resorted, in 1915, to a ruthless policy of
sinking the ships of the belligerent powers, whether or not they were
engaged on legitimate errands. This policy culminated on May 7, 1915, in
the sinking of the great transatlantic steamship the _Lusitania_, with
the loss of over a thousand men, women, and children.
SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA
THE JUDICIAL DECISION BY JUDGE J. M. MAYER
[Sidenote: The _Lusitania_ sails.]
On May 1, 1915, the British passenger-carrying merchantman _Lusitania_
sailed from New York bound for Liverpool, with 1,257 passengers and a
crew of 702, making a total of 1,959 souls on board, men, women, and
children. At approximately 2:10 on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, weather
clear and sea smooth, without warning, the vessel was torpedoed and went
down by the head in about eighteen minutes, with an ultimate tragic loss
of 1,195.
[Sidenote: Passengers and equipment.]
So far as equipment went, the vessel was seaworthy in the highest sense.
Her carrying capacity was 2,198 passengers and a crew of about 850, or
about 3,000 persons in all. She had 22 open lifeboats capable of
accommodating 1,322 persons, 26 collapsible boats with a capacity for
1,283, making a total of 48 boats with a capacity for 2,605 in all, or
substantially in excess of the requirements of her last voyage. Her
total of life belts was 3,187, or 1,959 more than the total number of
passengers, and, in addition, she carried 20 life buoys. She was classed
100 A1 at Lloyd's being 787 feet long over all, with a tonnage of 30,395
gross and 12,611 net. She had 4 turbine engines, 25 boilers, 4 boiler
rooms, 12 transverse bulkheads, dividing her into 13 compartments, with
a longitudinal bulkhead on either side of the ship for 425 feet,
covering all vital parts.
[Sidenote: The _Lusitania_ unarmed.]
The proof is absolute that she was not and never had been armed nor did
she carry any explosives. She did carry some 18 fuse cases and 125
shrapnel cases, consisting merely of empty shells without any powder
charge, 4,200 cases of safety cartridges, and 189 cases of infantry
equipment, such as leather fittings, pouches, and the like. All these
were for delivery abroad, but none of these munitions could be exploded
by setting them on fire in mass or in bulk, nor by subjecting them to
impact. She had been duly inspected on March 17, April 15, 16, and 17,
all in 1915, and before she left New York the boat gear and boats were
examined, overhauled, checked up, and defective articles properly
replaced.
[Sidenote: The drills sufficient.]
There is no reason to doubt that this part of her equipment was in
excellent order when she left New York. The vessel was under the command
of a long service and experienced Captain and officered by competent and
experienced men. The difficulties of the war prevented the company from
gathering together a crew fully reaching a standard as high as in normal
times, (many of the younger British sailors having been called to the
colors,) but, all told, the crew was good and, in many instances, highly
intelligent and capable. Due precaution was taken in respect of boat
drills while in port, and the testimony shows that those drills were
both sufficient and efficient. Some passengers did not see any boat
drills on the voyage, while others characterized the drills, in effect,
as formally superficial. Any one familiar with ocean traveling knows
that it is not strange that boat drills may take place unobserved by
some of the passengers who, though on deck, may be otherwise occupied or
who may be in another part of the ship, and such negative testimony must
give way to the positive testimony that there were daily boat drills,
the object of which mainly was to enable the men competently and quickly
to lower the boats.
[Sidenote: Emergency precautions.]
Each man had a badge showing the number of the boat to which he was
assigned, and a boat list was posted in three different places in the
ship. Each day of the voyage a drill was held with the emergency boat,
which was a fixed boat, either No. 13 on the starboard side or No. 14 on
the port side, according to the weather, the idea, doubtless, being to
accustom the men quickly to reach the station on either side of the
ship. The siren was blown and a picked crew from the watch assembled at
the boat, put on life belts, jumped into the boat, took their places,
and jumped out again.
Throughout this case it must always be remembered that the disaster
occurred in May, 1915, and the whole subject must be approached with the
knowledge and mental attitude of that time. It may be that more
elaborate and effective methods and precaution have been adopted since
then, but there is no testimony which shows that these boat drills, as
practiced on the voyage, were not fully up to the then existing
standards and practices. There can be no criticism of the bulkhead door
drills, for there was one each day.
[Sidenote: Speed reduced.]
In November, 1914, the Directors of the Cunard Company, in view of the
falling off of the passenger traffic, decided to withdraw the
_Lusitania's_ sister ship, _Mauretania_, and to run the _Lusitania_ at
three-fourths boiler power, which involved a reduction of speed from an
average of about twenty-four knots to an average of about twenty-one
knots. The ship was operated under this reduced boiler power and reduced
rate of speed for six round trips until and including the fatal voyage,
although at the reduced rate she was considerably faster than any
passenger ship crossing the Atlantic at that time. This reduction was in
part for financial reasons and in part "a question of economy of coal
and labor in time of war." No profit was expected and none was made,
but the company continued to operate the ship as a public service. The
reduction from twenty-four to twenty-one knots is, however, quite
immaterial to the controversy, as will later appear.
Having thus outlined the personnel, equipment, and cargo of the vessel,
reference will now be made to a series of events preceding her sailing
on May 1, 1915.
On February 4, 1915, the Imperial German Government issued a
proclamation as follows:
[Sidenote: The German proclamation.]
"1. The waters surrounding Great Britain and
Ireland, including the whole English Channel,
are hereby declared to be war zone. On and
after the 18th of February, 1915, every enemy
merchant ship found in the said war zone will
be destroyed without its being always possible
to avert the dangers threatening the crews and
passengers on that account.
"2. Even neutral ships are exposed to danger in
the war zone, as in view of the misuse of
neutral flags ordered on January 31 by the
British Government and of the accidents of
naval war, it cannot always be avoided to
strike even neutral ships in attacks that are
directed at enemy ships.
"3. Northward navigation around the Shetland
Islands, in the eastern waters of the North Sea
and in a strip of not less than thirty miles
width along the Netherlands coast is in no
danger.
"VON POHL,
"Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy.
"Berlin, February 4, 1915."
[Sidenote: Submarine blockade declared.]
This was accompanied by a so-called memorial, setting forth the reasons
advanced by the German Government in support of the issuance of this
proclamation, an extract from which is as follows:
"Just as England declared the whole North Sea
between Scotland and Norway to be comprised
within the seat of war, so does Germany now
declare the waters surrounding Great Britain
and Ireland, including the whole English
Channel, to be comprised within the seat of
war, and will prevent by all the military means
at its disposal all navigation by the enemy in
those waters. To this end it will endeavor to
destroy, after February 18 next, any merchant
vessels of the enemy which present themselves
at the seat of war above indicated, although it
may not always be possible to avert the dangers
which may menace persons and merchandise.
Neutral powers are accordingly forewarned not
to intrust their crews, passengers, or
merchandise to such vessels."
[Sidenote: Protests sent by the United States.]
To this proclamation and memorial the Government of the United States
made due protest under date of February 10, 1915. On the same day
protest was made to England by this Government regarding the use of the
American flag by the _Lusitania_ on its voyage through the war zone on
its trip from New York to Liverpool of January 30, 1915, in response to
which, on February 19, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, handed a memorandum to Mr. Page, the American Ambassador to
England, containing the following statement:
[Sidenote: British reply to American protest.]
"It is understood that the German Government
had announced their intention of sinking
British merchant vessels at sight by torpedoes
without giving any opportunity of making any
provisions for saving the lives of noncombatant
crews and passengers. It was in consequence of
this threat that the _Lusitania_ raised the
United States flag on her inward voyage and on
her subsequent outward voyage. A request was
made by the United States passengers who were
embarking on board her that the United States
flag should be hoisted, presumably to insure
their safety."
The British Ambassador, the Hon. Cecil Spring-Rice, on March 1, 1915,
in a communication to the American Secretary of State regarding an
economic blockade of Germany, stated in reference to the German
proclamation of February 4:
[Sidenote: British statement on the submarine blockade.]
"Germany has declared that the English Channel,
the north and west coasts of France, and the
waters around the British Isles are a war area
and has officially notified that all enemy
ships found in that area will be destroyed, and
that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger.
This is in effect a claim to torpedo at sight,
without regard to the safety of the crew or
passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag.
As it is not in the power of the German
Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in
these waters, this attack can only be delivered
by submarine agency."
[Sidenote: Submarines sink merchant ships.]
Beginning with the 30th of January, 1915, and prior to the sinking of
the _Lusitania_ on May 7, 1915, German submarines attacked and seemed to
have sunk twenty merchant and passenger ships within about 100 miles of
the usual course of the _Lusitania_, chased two other vessels which
escaped, and damaged still another.
It will be noted that nothing is stated in the German memorandum as to
sinking enemy merchant vessels without warning, but, on the contrary,
the implication is that settled international law as to visit and search
and an opportunity for the lives of passengers to be safeguarded will be
obeyed, "although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers
which may menace persons and merchandise."
As a result of this submarine activity, the _Lusitania_ on its voyages
from New York to Liverpool, beginning with that of January 30, 1915,
steered a course further off from the south coast of Ireland than
formerly.
[Sidenote: Precautions in danger zone.]
In addition, after the German proclamation of February 4, 1915, the
_Lusitania_ had its boats swung out and provisioned while passing
through the danger zone, did not use its wireless for sending messages,
and did not stop at the Mersey Bar for a pilot, but came directly up to
its berth.
The petitioner and the master of the _Lusitania_ received certain
advices from the British Admiralty on February 10, 1915, as follows:
"Vessels navigating in submarine areas should
have their boats turned out and fully
provisioned. The danger is greatest in the
vicinity of ports and off prominent headlands
on the coast. Important landfalls in this area
should be made after dark whenever possible. So
far as is consistent with particular trades and
state of tides, vessels should make their ports
at dawn."
[Sidenote: Advices from the British Admiralty.]
On April 15 and 16, 1915, and after the last voyage from New York,
preceding the one on which the _Lusitania_ was torpedoed, the Cunard
Company and the master of the _Lusitania_ received at Liverpool the
following advices from the British Admiralty:
"Confidential Daily Voyage Notice 15th April,
1915, issued under Government War Risks Scheme.
"German submarines appear to be operating
chiefly off prominent headlands and landfalls.
Ships should give prominent headlands a wide
berth.
"Confidential memorandum issued 16th April,
1915:
[Sidenote: Fast steamers follow a zigzag course.]
"War experience has shown that fast steamers
can considerably reduce the chance of
successful surprise submarine attacks by
zigzagging--that is to say, altering the course
at short and irregular intervals, say in ten
minutes to half an hour. This course is almost
invariably adopted by warships when cruising in
an area known to be infested by submarines. The
underwater speed of a submarine is very slow
and it is exceedingly difficult for her to get
into position to deliver an attack unless she
can observe and predict the course of the ship
attacked."
Sir Alfred Booth, Chairman of the Cunard Line, was a member of the War
Risks Committee at Liverpool, consisting of ship owners, representatives
of the Board of Trade and the Admiralty, which received these
instructions and passed them on to the owners of vessels, including the
Cunard Company, which distributed them to the individual masters.
[Sidenote: Advertisement in the New York papers.]
On Saturday, May 1, 1915, the advertised sailing date of the _Lusitania_
from New York to Liverpool on the voyage on which she was subsequently
sunk, there appeared the following advertisement in the New York
"Times," New York "Tribune," New York "Sun," New York "Herald," and the
New York "World," this advertisement being in all instances except one
placed directly over, under, or adjacent to the advertisement of the
Cunard Line, regarding the sailing of the _Lusitania_:
"Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic
voyage are reminded that a state of war exists
between Germany and her allies and Great
Britain and her allies. That the zone of war
includes the waters adjacent to the British
Isles. That in accordance with formal notice
given by the Imperial German Government,
vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or of
any of her allies are liable to destruction in
those waters, and that travelers sailing in the
war zone on ships of Great Britain or her
allies do so at their own risk."
"IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY,
"April 22, 1915. Washington, D. C."
This was the first insertion of this advertisement, although it was
dated more than a week prior to its publication. Captain Turner, the
master of the vessel, saw the advertisement or "something of the kind"
before sailing, and realized that the _Lusitania_ was included in the
warning. The Liverpool office of the Cunard Company was advised of the
sailing and the number of passengers by cable from the New York office,
but no mention was made of the above quoted advertisement. Sir Alfred
Booth was informed through the press of this advertisement on either
Saturday evening, May 1, or Sunday morning, May 2.
[Sidenote: _Lusitania_ justified in sailing.]
The significance and construction to be given to this advertisement will
be discussed infra, but it is perfectly plain that the master was fully
justified in sailing on the appointed day from a neutral port with many
neutral and non-combatant passengers, unless he and his company were
willing to yield to the attempt of the German Government to terrify
British shipping. No one familiar with the British character would
expect that such a threat would accomplish more than to emphasize the
necessity of taking every precaution to protect life and property which
the exercise of judgment would invite.
And so, as scheduled, the _Lusitania_ sailed, undisguised, with her four
funnels and a figure so familiar as to be readily discernible not only
by naval officers and marines, but by the ocean-going public generally.
[Sidenote: In the submarine war zone.]
The voyage was uneventful until May 6. On approaching the Irish coast on
May 6 the Captain ordered all the boats hanging on the davits to be
swung out and lowered to the promenade deckrail, and this order was
carried out under the supervision of Staff Captain Anderson, who later
went down with the ship. All bulkhead doors which were not necessary for
the working of the ship were closed, and it was reported to Captain
Turner that this had been done. Lookouts were doubled, and two extra
were put forward and one on either side of the bridge; that is, there
were two lookouts in the crow's-nest, two in the eyes of the ship, two
officers on the bridge, and a quartermaster on either side of the
bridge.
Directions were given to the engine room to keep the highest steam they
could possibly get on the boilers, and in case the bridge rang for full
speed, to give as much as they possibly could. Orders were also given
that ports should be kept closed.
[Sidenote: Wireless messages from the Admiralty.]
At 7:50 P. M., on May 6, the _Lusitania_ received the following wireless
message from the Admiral at Queenstown: "Submarines active off south
coast of Ireland," and at 7:56 the vessel asked for and received a
repetition of his message. The ship was then going at a rate of 21 knots
per hour.
At 8:30 P. M. of the same day the following message was received from
the British Admiralty:
"To All British Ships 0005:
"Take Liverpool pilot at bar and avoid
headlands. Pass harbors at full speed; steer
midchannel course. Submarines off Fastnet."
[Sidenote: The _Lusitania's_ speed reduced.]
At 8:32 the Admiralty received a communication to show that this message
had been received by the _Lusitania_, and the same message was offered
to the vessel seven times between midnight of May 6 and 10 A. M. of May
7.
At about 8 A. M. on the morning of May 7, on approaching the Irish
coast, the vessel encountered an intermittent fog, or Scotch mist,
called "banks" in seafaring language, and the speed was reduced to 15
knots. Previously the speed, according to Captain Turner's recollection,
had been reduced to 18 knots. This adjustment of speed was due to the
fact that Captain Turner wished to run the last 150 miles of the voyage
in the dark, so as to make Liverpool early on the morning of May 8, at
the earliest time when he could cross the bar without a pilot.
[Sidenote: Approaching the most dangerous waters.]
Judging from the location of previous submarine attacks, the most
dangerous waters in the _Lusitania's_ course were from the entrance to
St. George's Channel to Liverpool Bar. There is no dispute as to the
proposition that a vessel darkened is much safer from submarine attack
at night than in the daytime, and Captain Turner exercised proper and
good judgment in planning accordingly as he approached dangerous waters.
It is futile to conjecture as to what would or would not have happened
had the speed been higher prior to the approach to the Irish coast,
because, obviously, until then the Captain could not figure out his
situation, not knowing how he might be impeded by fog or other
unfavorable weather conditions.
On the morning of May 7, 1915, the ship passed about twenty-five or
twenty-six, and, in any event, at least eighteen and a half miles south
of Fastnet, which was not in sight. The course was then held up slightly
to bring the ship closer to land, and a little before noon land was
sighted, and what was thought to be Brow Head was made out.
Meanwhile, between 11 A. M. and noon, the fog disappeared, the weather
became clear, and the speed was increased to 18 knots. The course of the
vessel was S. 87 E. Mag. At 11:25 A. M. Captain Turner received the
following message:
"Submarines active in southern part of Irish
Channel, last heard of twenty miles south of
Coningbeg. Light vessel make certain
'_Lusitania_' gets this."
[Sidenote: Submarines reported by wireless.]
At 12:40 P. M. the following additional wireless message from the
Admiralty was received:
"Submarines five miles south of Cape Clear,
proceeding west when sighted at 10 A. M."
After picking up Brow Head and at about 12:40 P. M., the course was
altered in shore by about 30 degrees, to about N. 63 or 67 E. Mag.,
Captain Turner did not recall which. Land was sighted which the Captain
thought was Galley Head, but he was not sure, and therefore held in
shore. This last course was continued for an hour at a speed of 18 knots
until 1:40 P. M., when the Old Head of Kinsale was sighted and the
course was then changed back to the original course of S. 87 E. Mag.
[Sidenote: The _Lusitania_ torpedoed.]
At 1:50 P. M. the Captain started to take a four-point bearing on the
Old Head of Kinsale, and while thus engaged and at about 2:30 P. M., as
heretofore stated, the ship was torpedoed on the starboard side. Whether
one, two, or three torpedoes were fired at the vessel cannot be
determined with certainty. Two of the ship's crew were confident that a
third torpedo was fired and missed the ship. While not doubting the good
faith of these witnesses, the evidence is not sufficiently satisfactory
to be convincing.
[Sidenote: Conflicting testimony.]
[Sidenote: Probably two torpedoes.]
[Sidenote: No explosives on board.]
There was, however, an interesting and remarkable conflict of testimony
as to whether the ship was struck by one or two torpedoes, and
witnesses, both passengers and crew, differed on this point,
conscientiously and emphatically. The witnesses were all highly
intelligent, and there is no doubt that all testified to the best of
their recollection, knowledge, or impression, and in accordance with
their honest conviction. The weight of the testimony (too voluminous to
analyze) is in favor of the "two torpedo" contention, not only because
of some convincing direct testimony, (as, for instance, Adams, Lehman,
Morton,) but also because of the unquestioned surrounding circumstances.
The deliberate character of the attack upon a vessel whose identity
could not be mistaken, made easy on a bright day, and the fact that the
vessel had no means of defending herself, would lead to the inference
that the submarine commander would make sure of her destruction.
Further, the evidence is overwhelming that there was a second explosion.
The witnesses differ as to the impression which the sound of this
explosion made upon them--a natural difference due to the fact, known by
common experience, that persons who hear the same explosion even at the
same time will not only describe the sound differently, but will not
agree as to the number of detonations. As there were no explosives on
board, it is difficult to account for the second explosion, except on
the theory that it was caused by a second torpedo. Whether the number of
torpedoes was one or two is relevant, in this case, only upon the
question of what effect, if any, open ports had in accelerating the
sinking of the ship.
While there was much testimony and some variance as to the places where
the torpedoes struck, judged by the sound or shock of the explosions,
certain physical effects, especially as to smoke and blown-up debris,
tend to locate the areas of impact with some approach of accuracy.