struck on the starboard side somewhere abreast of No. 2 boiler room and
the other, on the same side, either abreast of No. 3 boiler room or
between No. 3 and No. 4. From knowledge of the torpedoes then used by
the German submarines, it is thought that they would effect a rupture of
the outer hull thirty to forty feet long and ten to fifteen feet
vertically.
[Sidenote: Flooding of boiler rooms and coal bunkers.]
Cockburn, senior Second Engineer, was of opinion that the explosion had
done a great deal of internal damage. Although the lights were out,
Cockburn could hear the water coming into the engine room. Water at once
entered No. 1 and No. 2 boiler rooms, a result necessarily attributable
to the fact that one or both of the coal bunkers were also blown open.
Thus, one torpedo flooded some or all of the coal bunkers on the
starboard side of Nos. 1 and 2 boiler rooms, and apparently flooded both
boiler rooms.
The effect of the other torpedo is not entirely clear. If it struck
midway between two bulkheads, it is quite likely to have done serious
bulkhead injury. The _Lusitania_ was built so as to float with two
compartments open to the sea, and with more compartments open she could
not stay afloat. As the side coal bunkers are regarded as compartments,
the ship could not float with two boiler rooms flooded and also an
adjacent bunker, and, therefore, the damage done by one torpedo was
enough to sink the ship.
To add to the difficulties, all the steam had gone as the result of the
explosions, and the ship could not be controlled by her engines.
Little, senior Third Engineer, testified that in a few seconds after the
explosion the steam pressure fell from 190 to 50 pounds, his explanation
being that the main steam pipes or boilers had been carried away.
[Sidenote: Engines disabled.]
The loss of control of and by the engines resulted in disability to stop
the engines, with the result that the ship kept her headway until she
sank. That the ship commenced to list to starboard immediately is
abundantly established by many witnesses.
[Sidenote: The ship's behavior in going down.]
Some of the witnesses, (Lauriat and Adams, passengers; Duncan, Bestic,
and Johnson, officers,) testified that the ship stopped listing to
starboard and started to recover and then listed again to starboard
until she went over.
This action, which is quite likely, must have resulted from the inrush
of water on the port side. There can be no other adequate explanation
consistent with elementary scientific knowledge; for, if the ship
temporarily righted herself, it must have been because the weight of
water on the two sides was equal or nearly so. The entry of water into
the port side must, of course, have been due to some rupture on that
side. Such a result was entirely possible, and, indeed, probable.
The explosive force was sufficiently powerful to blow debris far above
the radio wires--i. e., more than 160 feet above the water. The boiler
rooms were not over sixty feet wide, and so strong a force could readily
have weakened the longitudinal bulkheads on the port side in addition to
such injury as flying metal may have done. It is easy to understand,
therefore, how the whole pressure of the water rushing in from the
starboard side against the weakened longitudinal bulkheads on the port
side would cause them to give way and thus open up some apertures on the
port side for the entry of water. Later, when the water continued to
rush in on the starboard side, the list to starboard naturally again
occurred, increased and continued to the end. As might be expected, the
degree of list to starboard is variously described, but there is no
doubt that it was steep and substantial.
[Sidenote: Ports had all been ordered closed.]
A considerable amount of testimony was taken upon the contention of
claimants that many of the ship's ports were open, thus reducing her
buoyancy and substantially hastening her sinking. There is no doubt that
on May 6 adequate orders were given to close all ports. The testimony is
conclusive that the ports on Deck F (the majority of which were dummy
ports) were closed. Very few, if any, ports on E deck were open, and, if
so, they were starboard ports in a small section of the first class in
the vicinity where one of the torpedoes did its damage. A very limited
number of passengers testified that the portholes in their staterooms
were open, and if their impressions are correct, these portholes,
concerning which they testified, were all, or nearly all, so far above
the water that they could not have influenced the situation.
[Sidenote: Sinking not affected by open ports.]
There was conflicting testimony as to the ports in the dining room on D
deck. The weight of the testimony justifies the conclusion that some of
these ports were open--how many it is impossible to determine. These
ports, however, were from twenty-three to thirty feet above water, and
when the gap made by the explosion and the consequent severe and sudden
list are considered, it is plain that these open ports were not a
contributing cause of the sinking, and had a very trifling influence, if
any, in accelerating the time within which the ship sank.
From the foregoing the situation can be visualized. Two sudden and
extraordinary explosions, the ship badly listed so that the port side
was well up in the air, the passengers scattered about on the decks and
in the staterooms, saloons and companion ways, the ship under headway
and, as it turned out, only eighteen minutes afloat--such was the
situation which confronted the officers, crew, and passengers in the
endeavor to save the lives of those on board.
[Sidenote: Calm heroism of the passengers.]
The conduct of the passengers constitutes an enduring record of calm
heroism with many individual instances of sacrifice and, in general, a
marked consideration for women and children. There was no panic, but
naturally, there was a considerable amount of excitement and rush and
much confusion, and, as the increasing list rendered ineffective the
lowering of the boats on the port side, the passengers, as is readily
understandable, crowded over on the starboard side.
The problem presented to the officers of the ship was one of exceeding
difficulty, occasioned largely because of the serious list and the
impossibility of stopping the ship or reducing her headway.
[Sidenote: Lookouts sighted the torpedo.]
[Sidenote: Boats ordered lowered.]
The precaution of extra lookouts resulted in a prompt report to the
Captain, via the bridge, of the sighting of the torpedo. Second Officer
Heppert, who was on the bridge, immediately closed all watertight doors
worked from the bridge, and the testimony satisfactorily shows that all
watertight doors worked by hand were promptly closed. Immediately after
Captain Turner saw the wake of the torpedo there was an explosion and
then Turner went to the navigation bridge and took the obvious course,
i. e., had the ship's head turned to the land. He signaled the engine
room for full speed astern, hoping thereby to take the way off the ship,
and then ordered the boats lowered down to the rail and directed that
women and children should be first provided for in the boats. As the
engine room failed to respond to the order to go full speed astern, and
as the ship was continuing under way, Turner ordered that the boats
should not be lowered until the vessel should lose her headway, and he
told Anderson, the Staff Captain, who was in charge of the port boats,
to lower the boats when he thought the way was sufficiently off to allow
that operation. Anderson's fidelity to duty is sufficiently exemplified
by the fact that he went down with the ship.
[Sidenote: The officers display courage and skill.]
Jones, First Officer, and Lewis, Acting Third Officer, were in charge of
the boats on the starboard side and personally superintended their
handling and launching. Too much cannot be said both for their courage
and skill, but, difficult as was their task, they were not confronted
with some of the problems which the port side presented. There, in
addition to Anderson, were Bestic, Junior Third Officer, and another
officer, presumably the Second Officer. These men were apparently doing
the best they could and standing valiantly to their duty. Anderson's
fate has already been mentioned, and Bestic, although surviving, stuck
to his post until the ship went down under him. The situation can
readily be pictured even by a novice.
With the ship listed to starboard, the port boats, of course, swung
inboard. If enough man power were applied, the boats could be put over
the rail, but then a real danger would follow. Robertson, the ship's
carpenter, aptly described that danger in answer to a question as to
whether it was possible to lower the open boats on the port side. He
said:
[Sidenote: Port boats could not be lowered.]
"No. To lower the port boats would just be like drawing a crate of
unpacked china along a dock road. What I mean is that if you started to
lower the boats you would be dragging them down the rough side of the
ship on rivets which are what we call "snap-headed rivets"--they stand
up about an inch from the side of the ship, so you would be dragging the
whole side of the boat away if you tried to lower the boats with a
15-degree list."
That some boats were and others would have been seriously damaged is
evidenced by the fact that two port boats were lowered to the water and
got away, (though one afterward filled,) and not one boat reached
Queenstown.
Each boat has its own history, (except possibly Boats 2 and 4,) although
it is naturally difficult, in each case, to allocate all the testimony
to a particular boat.
[Sidenote: Accidents in lowering.]
There is some testimony, given in undoubted good faith, that painted or
rusted davits stuck out, but the weight of the testimony is to the
contrary. There were some lamentable occurrences on the port side, which
resulted in spilling passengers, some of whom thus thrown out or injured
went to their death. These unfortunate accidents, however, were due
either to lack of strength of the seaman who was lowering, or possibly,
at worst, to an occasional instance of incompetency due to the personal
equation so often illustrated, where one man of many may not be equal to
the emergency. But the problem was of the most vexatious character. In
addition to the crowding of passengers in some instances was this
extremely hazardous feat of lowering boats swung inboard from a tilted
height, heavily weighted by human beings, with the ship still under way.
It cannot be said that it was negligent to attempt this, because,
obviously, all the passengers could not be accommodated in the starboard
boats.
[Sidenote: Six boats get away from starboard.]
On the starboard side, the problem, in some respects, was not so
difficult, while, in others, troublesome conditions existed quite
different from those occurring on the port side. Here the boats swung so
far out as to add to the difficulty of passengers getting in them, a
difficulty intensified by the fact that many more passengers went to the
starboard side than to the port side and, also that the ship maintained
her way. Six boats successfully got away. In the case of the remaining
boats, some were successfully lowered but later met with some
unavoidable accident, and some were not successfully launched (such as
Nos. 1, 5, and 17) for entirely explainable reasons which should not be
charged to inefficiency on the part of the officers or crew.
[Sidenote: Collapsible boats cut loose.]
The collapsible boats were on the deck under the open lifeboats, and
were intended to be lifted and lowered by the same davits which lowered
the open boats after the open boats had gotten clear of the ship. It was
the duty of the officers to get the open boats away before giving
attention to the collapsible boats, and that was a question of time.
These boats are designed and arranged to float free if the ship should
sink before they can be hoisted over. They were cut loose and some
people were saved on these boats.
It is to be expected that those passengers who lost members of their
family or friends, and who saw some of the unfortunate accidents, should
feel strongly and entertain the impression that inefficiency or
individual negligence was widespread among the crew. Such an impression,
however, does an inadvertent injustice to the great majority of the
crew, who acted with that matter-in-fact courage and fidelity to duty
which are traditional with men of the sea. Such of these men, presumably
fairly typical of all, as testified in this court, were impressive not
only because of inherent bravery, but because of intelligence and
clear-headedness, and they possessed that remarkable gift of simplicity
so characteristic of truly fearless men who cannot quite understand why
an ado is made of acts which seem to them merely the day's work.
Mr. Grab, one of the claimants and an experienced transatlantic
traveler, concisely summed up the situation when he said:
"They were doing the best they could--they were very brave and working
as hard as they could without any fear. They didn't care about
themselves. It was very admirably done. While there was great confusion,
they did the best they could."
[Sidenote: Captain Turner's comment on the crew.]
It will unduly prolong a necessarily extended opinion to sift the
voluminous testimony relating to this subject of the boats and the
conduct of the crew and something is sought to be made of comments of
Captain Turner, construed by some to be unfavorable but afterward
satisfactorily supplemented and explained, but if there were some
instances of incompetency they were very few and the charge of
negligence in this regard cannot be successfully maintained.
In arriving at this conclusion, I have not overlooked the argument
earnestly pressed that the men were not sufficiently instructed and
drilled; for I think the testimony establishes the contrary in the light
of conditions in May, 1915.
I now come to what seems to be the only debatable question of fact in
the case, i. e., whether Captain Turner was negligent in not literally
following the Admiralty advices and, also, in not taking a course
different from that which he adopted.
[Sidenote: The Captain's judgment free.]
The fundamental principle in navigating a merchantman, whether in times
of peace or of war, is that the commanding officer must be left free to
exercise his own judgment. Safe navigation denies the proposition that
the judgment and sound discretion of the Captain of a vessel must be
confined in a mental straitjacket. Of course, when movements are under
military control, orders must be strictly obeyed, come what may. No such
situation, however, was presented either to the Cunard Steamship Co. or
Captain Turner. The vessel was not engaged in military service nor under
naval convoy. True, she was, as between the German and British
Governments, an enemy ship as to Germany, but she was unarmed and a
carrier of not merely noncombatants, but, among others, of many citizens
of the United States, then a neutral country, at peace with all the
world.
[Sidenote: Admiralty advices considered.]
In such circumstances the Captain could not shield himself automatically
against error behind a literal compliance with the general advices or
instructions of the Admiralty, nor can it be supposed that the
Admiralty, any more than the Cunard Steamship Co., expected him so to
do. What was required of him was that he should seriously consider and,
as far as practicable, follow the Admiralty advices and use his best
judgment as events and exigencies occurred; and if a situation arose
where he believed that a course should be pursued to meet emergencies
which required departure from some of the Admiralty advices as to
general rules of action, then it was his duty to take such course, if in
accordance with his carefully formed deliberate judgment. After a
disaster has occurred, it is not difficult for the expert to show how it
might have been avoided, and there is always opportunity for academic
discussion as to what ought or ought not to have been done; but the true
approach is to endeavor, for the moment, to possess the mind of him upon
whom rested the responsibility.
[Sidenote: Enemy obligations in care of merchant ships.]
Let us now see what that responsibility was and how it was dealt with.
The rules of naval warfare allowed the capture and, in some
circumstances, the destruction of an enemy merchant ship, but, at the
same time, it was the accepted doctrine of all civilized nations (as
will be more fully considered infra) that, as Lord Mersey put it, "there
is always an obligation first to secure the safety of the lives of those
on board."
The responsibility, therefore, of Captain Turner, in his task of
bringing the ship safely to port, was to give heed not only to general
advices advanced as the outcome of experience in the then developing
knowledge as to submarine warfare, but particularly to any special
information which might come to him in the course of the voyage.
[Sidenote: Advices of the Admiralty.]
Realizing that if there was a due warning, in accordance with
international law, and an opportunity, within a limited time, for the
passengers to leave the ship, nevertheless that the operation must be
quickly done, Captain Turner, on May 6, had taken the full precautions,
such as swinging out the boats, properly provisioned, which have been
heretofore described. The principal features of the Admiralty advices
were (1) to give the headlands a wide berth; (2) to steer a midchannel
course; (3) to maintain as high a speed as practicable; (4) to zigzag,
and (5) to make ports, if possible, at dawn, thus running the last part
of the voyage at night.
[Sidenote: Fastnet given a wide berth.]
The reason for the advice as to keeping off headlands was that the
submarines lurked near those prominent headlands and landfalls to and
from which ships were likely to go. This instruction Captain Turner
entirely followed in respect of Fastnet, which was the first point on
the Irish coast which a vessel bound from New York to Liverpool would
ordinarily approach closely, and, in normal times, the passing would be
very near, or even inside of Fastnet. The _Lusitania_ passed Fastnet so
far out that Captain Turner could not see it. Whether the distance was
about twenty-five miles, as the Cunard Steamship Co. contends, or about
eighteen and one-half miles, as the claimants calculate, the result is
that either distance must be regarded as a wide berth, in comparison
with the customary navigation at that point, and, besides, nothing
happened there. At 8:30 P. M. on May 6 the message had been received
from the British Admiralty that submarines were off Fastnet, so that
Captain Turner, in this regard, not only followed the general advices,
but the specific information from the Admiralty.
At 11:25 A. M. on May 7 Captain Turner received the wireless from the
Admiralty plainly intended for the _Lusitania_, informing him that
submarines (plural) were active in the southern part of the Irish
Channel and when last heard of were twenty miles south of Coningbeg
Light Vessel. This wireless message presented acutely to the Captain
the problem as to the best course to pursue, always bearing in mind his
determination and the desirability of getting to the Liverpool Bar when
it could be crossed while the tide served and without a pilot. Further,
as was stated by Sir Alfred Booth, "The one definite instruction we did
give him with regard to that was to authorize him to come up without a
pilot." The reasons for this instruction were cogent and were concisely
summed up by Sir Alfred Booth during his examination as a witness as
follows:
[Sidenote: The Mersey sandbar.]
"It was one of the points that we felt it necessary to make the Captain
of the _Lusitania_ understand the importance of. The _Lusitania_ can
only cross the Liverpool Bar at certain states of the tide, and we
therefore warned the Captain, or whoever might be Captain, that we did
not think it would be safe for him to arrive off the bar at such a time
that he would have to wait there, because that area had been infested
with submarines, and we thought therefore it would be wiser for him to
arrange his arrival in such a way, leaving him an absolutely free hand
as to how he would do it, that he could come straight up without
stopping at all. The one definite instruction we did give him with
regard to that was to authorize him to come up without a pilot."
The tide would be high at Liverpool Bar at 6:53 on Saturday morning, May
8. Captain Turner planned to cross the bar as much earlier than that as
he could get over without stopping, while at the same time figuring on
passing during the darkness the dangerous waters from the entrance of
St. George's Channel to the Liverpool Bar.
[Sidenote: The Captain decides to work inshore.]
Having thus in mind his objective, and the time approximately when he
intended to reach it, the message received at 11:25 A. M. required that
he should determine whether to keep off land approximately the same
distance as he was when he passed Fastnet, or to work inshore and go
close to Coningbeg Lightship. He determined that the latter was the
better plan to avoid the submarines reported in midchannel ahead of him.
[Sidenote: Taking a bearing.]
When Galley Head was sighted the course was changed so as to haul closer
to the land, and this course was pursued until 1:40 P. M., at which time
Captain Turner concluded that it was necessary for him to get his
bearings accurately. This he decided should be done by taking a
four-point bearing, during which procedure the ship was torpedoed. It is
urged that he should have taken a two-point bearing or a cross bearing,
which would have occupied less time, but if, under all the conditions
which appealed to his judgment as a mariner, he had taken a different
method of ascertaining his exact distance and the result would have been
inaccurate, or while engaged in taking a two-point bearing the ship had
been torpedoed, then somebody would have said he should have taken a
four-point bearing. The point of the matter is that an experienced
Captain took the bearing he thought proper for his purposes, and to
predicate negligence upon such a course is to assert that a Captain is
bound to guess the exact location of a hidden and puzzling danger.
[Sidenote: Testimony about the ship's speed.]
Much emphasis has been placed upon the fact that the speed of the ship
was eighteen knots at the time of the attack instead of twenty-four, or,
in any event, twenty-one knots, and upon the further fact (for such it
is) that the ship was not zigzagging as frequently as the Admiralty
advised or in the sense of that advice.
Upon this branch of the case much testimony was taken, (some in camera,
as in the Wreck Commissioners' Court,) and, for reasons of public
interest, the methods of successfully evading submarines will not be
discussed. If it be assumed that the Admiralty advices as of May, 1915,
were sound and should have been followed, then the answer to the charge
of negligence is twofold: (1) that Captain Turner, in taking a
four-point bearing off the Old Head of Kinsale, was conscientiously
exercising his judgment for the welfare of the ship, and (2) that it is
impossible to determine whether, by zigzagging off the Old Head of
Kinsale or elsewhere, the _Lusitania_ would have escaped the German
submarine or submarines.
As to the first answer I cannot better express my conclusion than in the
language of Lord Mersey:
[Sidenote: Lord Mersey's opinion.]