position a few miles north of the line Compiegne-Soissons on the 29th.
[Sidenote: Right flank of German army in dangerous line of connection.]
The right flank of the Germany Army was now reaching a point which
appeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre. I
had already evacuated Amiens, into which place a German reserve division
was reported to have moved.
Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an
advance base at Le Mans. This operation was well carried out by the
Inspector General of Communications.
[Sidenote: Retirement to the Marne ordered.]
In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard Tenth and Guard
Reserve Corps of the German Army by the First and Third French Corps on
the right of the Fifth Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan to
pursue this advantage; and a general retirement to the line of the
Marne was ordered, to which the French forces in the more eastern
theatre were directed to conform.
A new Army (the Ninth) had been formed from three corps in the south by
General Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the Fifth
and left of the Fourth Armies.
While closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy on
at all points until a favorable situation was created from which to
assume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify from
day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing
to the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general
situation.
In conformity with the movements of the French forces, my retirement
continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely
pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually.
[Sidenote: Attack on British First Cavalry Brigade.]
On the 1st September, when retiring from the thickly wooded country to
the south of Compiegne, the First Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some
German cavalry. They momentarily lost a horse artillery battery, and
several officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help,
however, of some detachments from the Third Corps operating on their
left, they not only recovered their own guns, but succeeded in capturing
twelve of the enemy's.
Similarly, to the eastward, the First Corps, retiring south, also got
into some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguard
action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the Fourth Guards Brigade
suffered considerably.
[Sidenote: British forces in position south of the Marne.]
On September 3 the British forces were in position south of the Marne
between Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested
by General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as
possible, and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the
necessary dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been
effected, I was asked by the French Commander in Chief to continue my
retirement to a point some twelve miles in rear of the position I then
occupied, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine.
This retirement was duly carried out. In the meantime the enemy had
thrown bridges and crossed the Marne in considerable force, and was
threatening the Allies all along the line of the British forces and the
Fifth and Ninth French Armies. Consequently several small outpost
actions took place.
On Saturday, September 5, I met the French Commander in Chief at his
request, and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive
forthwith, as he considered conditions very favorable to success.
[Sidenote: General Joffre announces intention to take offensive.]
General Joffre announced to me his intention of wheeling up the left
flank of the Sixth Army, pivoting on the Marne and directing it to move
on the Ourcq; cross and attack the flank of the First German Army, which
was then moving in a southeasterly direction east of that river.
He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left resting
on the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army--to fill the gap between
that army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against the enemy in my
front and join in the general offensive movement.
[Sidenote: Battle begins Sunday, September 6.]
These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September 6,
at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened on
a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the left
flank of the Sixth French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Mauperthuis,
which was about the British centre, Courtecon, which was on the left of
the Fifth French Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the
Ninth Army under General Foch, and so along the front of the Ninth,
Fourth and Third French Armies to a point north of the fortress of
Verdun.
[Sidenote: Battle concluded September 10. Germans driven to the line
Soissons-Rheims.]
This battle, in so far as the Sixth French Army, the British Army, the
Fifth French Army, and the Ninth French Army were concerned, may be said
to have concluded on the evening of September 10, by which time the
Germans had been driven back to the line Soissons-Rheims, with a loss of
thousands of prisoners, many guns, and enormous masses of transport.
About September 3 the enemy appears to have changed his plans and to
have determined to stop his advance south direct upon Paris, for on
September 4 air reconnoissances showed that his main columns were moving
in a southeasterly direction generally east of a line drawn through
Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq.
On September 5 several of these columns were observed to have crossed
the Marne, while German troops, which were observed moving southeast up
the left flank of the Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be halted
and facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing
at Changis, La Ferte, Nogent, Chateau Thierry, and Mezy.
[Sidenote: German columns converging on Montmirail.]
Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on
Montmirail, while before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were located
in the neighborhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La Ferte-Gaucher,
and Dagny.
I should conceive it to have been about noon on September 6, after the
British forces had changed their front to the right and occupied the
line Jouy-Le Chatel-Faremoutiers-Villeneuve Le Comte, and the advance
of the Sixth French Army north of the Marne toward the Ourcq became
apparent, that the enemy realized the powerful threat that was being
made against the flank of his columns moving southeast, and began the
great retreat which opened the battle above referred to.
[Sidenote: Position of allies and Germans on September 6.]
On the evening of September 6, therefore, the fronts and positions of
the Allied Army were roughly as follows:
_Sixth French Army._--Right on the Marne at Meux, left toward Betz.
_British Forces._--On the line Dagny-Coulommiers-Maison.
_Fifth French Army._--At Courtagon, right on Esternay.
_Conneau's Cavalry Corps._--Between the right of the British and the
left of the French Fifth Army.
The position of the German Army was as follows:
_Fourth Reserve and Second Corps._--East of the Ourcq and facing that
river.
_Ninth Cavalry Division._--West of Crecy.
_Second Cavalry Division._--North of Coulommiers.
_Fourth Corps._--Rebais.
_Third and Seventh Corps._--Southwest of Montmirail.
[Sidenote: First and Second German army.]
All these troops constituted the First German Army, which was directed
against the French Sixth Army on the Ourcq, and the British forces, and
the left of the Fifth French Army south of the Marne.
The Second German Army (IX., X., X.R., and Guard) was moving against the
centre and right of the Fifth French Army and the Ninth French Army.
On September 7 both the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were heavily
engaged on our flank. The Second and Fourth Reserve German Corps on the
Ourcq vigorously opposed the advance of the French toward that river,
but did not prevent the Sixth Army from gaining some headway, the
Germans themselves suffering serious losses. The French Fifth Army threw
the enemy back to the line of the Petit Morin River after inflicting
severe losses upon them, especially about Montceaux, which was carried
at the point of the bayonet.
The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by his Second and Ninth
and Guard Cavalry Divisions, which suffered severely.
Our cavalry acted with great vigor, especially General De Lisle's
brigade, with the Ninth Lancers and Eighteenth Hussars.
[Sidenote: Germans retreat September 8.]
On September 8 the enemy continued his retreat northward, and our army
was successfully engaged during the day with strong rearguards of all
arms on the Petit Morin River, thereby materially assisting the progress
of the French armies on our right and left, against whom the enemy was
making his greatest efforts. On both sides the enemy was thrown back
with very heavy loss. The First Army Corps encountered stubborn
resistance at La Tretoire, (north of Rebais.) The enemy occupied a
strong position with infantry and guns on the northern bank of the Petit
Morin River; they were dislodged with considerable loss. Several machine
guns and many prisoners were captured, and upward of 200 German dead
were left on the ground.
[Sidenote: Forcing of Petit Morin September 9.]
The forcing of the Petit Morin at this point was much assisted by the
cavalry and the First Division, which crossed higher up the stream.
Later in the day a counter-attack by the enemy was well repulsed by the
First Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns again falling
into our hands.
On this day (September 8) the Second Army Corps encountered considerable
opposition, but drove back the enemy at all points with great loss,
making considerable captures.
The Third Army Corps also drove back considerable bodies of the enemy's
infantry and made some captures.
[Sidenote: British First and Second Army Corps forced passage of Marne.]
On September 9 the First and Second Army Corps forced the passage of the
Marne and advanced some miles to the north of it. The Third Corps
encountered considerable opposition, as the bridge at La Ferte was
destroyed and the enemy held the town on the opposite bank in some
strength, and thence persistently obstructed the construction of a
bridge; so the passage was not effected until after nightfall.
During the day's pursuit the enemy suffered heavy loss in killed and
wounded, some hundreds of prisoners fell into our hands and a battery of
eight machine guns was captured by the Second Division.
[Sidenote: Sixth French Army heavily engaged west of River Ourcq.]
On this day the Sixth French Army was heavily engaged west of the River
Ourcq. The enemy had largely increased his force opposing them; and very
heavy fighting ensued, in which the French were successful throughout.
The left of the Fifth French Army reached the neighborhood of Chateau
Thierry after the most severe fighting, having driven the enemy
completely north of the river with great loss.
The fighting of this army in the neighborhood of Montmirail was very
severe.
[Sidenote: British and French advance on the line of the Ourcq,
September 10.]
The advance was resumed at daybreak on the 10th up to the line of the
Ourcq, opposed by strong rearguards of all arms. The First and Second
Corps, assisted by the cavalry divisions on the right, the Third and
Fifth Cavalry Brigades on the left, drove the enemy northward. Thirteen
guns, seven machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and quantities of
transport fell into our hands. The enemy left many dead on the field.
On this day the French Fifth and Sixth Armies had little opposition.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--END OF GERMAN RETREAT AND THE
INTRENCHED LINE ON THE AISNE RIVER]
[Sidenote: First and Second German armies in full retreat.]
As the First and Second German Armies were now in full retreat, this
evening marks the end of the battle which practically commenced on the
morning of the 6th inst.; and it is at this point in the operations that
I am concluding the present dispatch.
In concluding this dispatch I must call your Lordship's special
attention to the fact that from Sunday, August 23, up to the present
date, (September 17,) from Mons back almost to the Seine, and from the
Seine to the Aisne, the army under my command has been ceaselessly
engaged without one single day's halt or rest of any kind.
[Sidenote: Continuous fighting of British from Sunday, August 23, to
September 17, from Mons to Seine and from Seine to the Aisne.]
[Sidenote: Amiens and Rheims captured.]
In the narratives preceding we have seen how the English forces
conducted themselves during the Great Retreat and at the Marne. It must
be remembered, however, that they comprised but a small proportion of
the armies opposing the Germans. The French bore the brunt of the
attack, and a French army turned the tide of battle. Beginning with the
first days of September all other military events were overshadowed by
the Great Retreat. On September 1 the Germans, in spite of French and
British resistance, had reached Senlis. On September 4th Amiens was
captured, and two days later the German army entered Rheims. In the
following narrative is shown, through the official records, how the
French armies bore themselves during the Great Retreat, the First Battle
of the Marne, and in the fighting which marked the hurried return of the
German armies to the banks of the Aisne which they had, with true
foresight, fortified with such a possible situation in mind.
HOW THE FRENCH FOUGHT
THE FRENCH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT
The first month of the campaign began with successes and finished with
defeats for the French troops. Under what circumstances did these come
about?
[Sidenote: Two principal actions.]
Our plan of concentration had foreseen the possibility of two principal
actions, one on the right between the Vosges and the Moselle, the other
on the left to the north of Verdun-Toul line, this double possibility
involving the eventual variation of our transport. On August 2, owing to
the Germans passing through Belgium, our concentration was substantially
modified by General Joffre in order that our principal effort might be
directed to the north.
From the first week in August it was apparent that the length of time
required for the British Army to begin to move would delay our action in
connection with it. This delay is one of the reasons which explain our
failures at the end of August.
[Sidenote: Mulhouse occupied.]
Awaiting the moment when the operations in the north could begin, and to
prepare for it by retaining in Alsace the greatest possible number of
German forces, the General in Chief ordered our troops to occupy
Mulhouse, (Muelhousen,) to cut the bridges of the Rhine at Huningue and
below, and then to flank the attack of our troops, operating in
Lorraine.
This operation was badly carried out by a leader who was at once
relieved of his command. Our troops, after having carried Mulhouse, lost
it and were thrown back on Belfort. The work had, therefore, to be
recommenced afresh, and this was done from August 14 under a new
command.
[Sidenote: Enemy losses.]
Mulhouse was taken on the 19th, after a brilliant fight at Dornach.
Twenty-four guns were captured from the enemy. On the 20th we held the
approaches to Colmar, both by the plain and by the Vosges. The enemy had
undergone enormous losses and abandoned great stores of shells and
forage, but from this moment what was happening in Lorraine and on our
left prevented us from carrying our successes further, for our troops in
Alsace were needed elsewhere.
On August 28 the Alsace army was broken up, only a small part remaining
to hold the region of Thann and the Vosges.
The purpose of the operations in Alsace was, namely, to retain a large
part of the enemy's forces far from the northern theatre of operations.
It was for our offensive in Lorraine to pursue still more directly by
holding before it the German army corps operating to the south of Metz.
This offensive began brilliantly on August 14. On the 19th we had
reached the region of Saarburg and that of the Etangs, (lakes,) and we
held Dieuze, Morhange, Delme, and Chateau Salins.
[Sidenote: French offensive stopped.]
On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in the
strong organization of the region, in the power of the enemy's
artillery, operating over ground which had been minutely surveyed, and,
finally, in the default of certain units.
[Sidenote: German reinforcements.]
On the 22d, in spite of the splendid behavior of several of our army
corps, notably that of Nancy, our troops were brought back on to the
Grand Couronne, while on the 23d and 24th the Germans concentrated
reinforcements--three army corps, at least--in the region of Luneville
and forced us to retire to the south.
This retreat, however, was only momentary. On the 25th, after two
vigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other from
west to east, the enemy had to fall back. From that time a sort of
balance was established on this terrain between the Germans and
ourselves. Maintained for fifteen days, it was afterward, as will be
seen, modified to our advantage.
[Sidenote: Battle of the north.]
There remained the principal business, the battle of the
north--postponed owing to the necessity of waiting for the British Army.
On August 20 the concentration of our lines was finished and the General
in Chief gave orders for our centre and our left to take the offensive.
Our centre comprised two armies. Our left consisted of a third army,
reinforced to the extent of two army corps, a corps of cavalry, the
reserve divisions, the British Army, and the Belgian Army, which had
already been engaged for the previous three weeks at Liege, Namur, and
Louvain.
The German plan on that date was as follows: From seven to eight army
corps and four cavalry divisions were endeavoring to pass between Givet
and Brussels, and even to prolong their movements more to the west. Our
object was, therefore, in the first place, to hold and dispose of the
enemy's centre and afterward to throw ourselves with all available
forces on the left flank of the German grouping of troops in the north.
[Sidenote: The offensive fails.]
On August 21 our offensive in the centre began with ten army corps. On
August 22 it failed, and this reverse appeared serious.
The reasons for it are complex. There were in this affair individual and
collective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy,
divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments, precipitate retreats, a
premature waste of men, and, finally, the inadequacy of certain of our
troops and their leaders, both as regards the use of infantry and
artillery.
In consequence of these lapses the enemy, turning to account the
difficult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from the
advantages which the superiority of his subaltern complements gave him.
[Sidenote: Enemy crosses the Sambre.]
In spite of this defeat our manoeuvre had still a chance of success, if
our left and the British Army obtained a decisive result. This was
unfortunately not the case. On August 22, at the cost of great losses,
the enemy succeeded in crossing the Sambre and our left army fell back
on the 24th upon Beaumont-Givet, being perturbed by the belief that the
enemy was threatening its right.
On the same day, (the 24th,) the British Army fell back after a German
attack upon the Maubeuge-Valenciennes line. On the 25th and 26th its
retreat became more hurried. After Landrecies and Le Cateau it fell back
southward by forced marches. It could not from this time keep its hold
until after crossing the Marne.
[Sidenote: The British retreat.]
The rapid retreat of the English, coinciding with the defeat sustained
in Belgian Luxembourg, allowed the enemy to cross the Meuse and to
accelerate, by fortifying it, the action of his right.
The situation at this moment may be thus summed up: Either our frontier
had to be defended on the spot under conditions which the British
retreat rendered extremely perilous, or we had to execute a strategic
retirement which, while delivering up to the enemy a part of the
national soil, would permit us, on the other hand, to resume the
offensive at our own time with a favorable disposition of troops, still
intact, which we had at our command. The General in Chief determined on
the second alternative.
[Sidenote: New offensive planned.]
Henceforward the French command devoted its efforts to preparing the
offensive. To this end three conditions had to be fulfilled:
1. The retreat had to be carried out in order under a succession of
counter-attacks which would keep the enemy busy.
2. The extreme point of this retreat must be fixed in such a way that
the different armies should reach it simultaneously, ready at the moment
of occupying it to resume the offensive all together.
3. Every circumstance permitting of a resumption of the offensive before
this point should be reached must be utilized by the whole of our forces
and the British forces.
[Sidenote: Counter-attacks.]
The counter-attacks, executed during the retreat, were brilliant and
often fruitful. On August 20 we successfully attacked St. Quentin to
disengage the British Army. Two other corps and a reserve division
engaged the Prussian Guard and the Tenth German Army Corps, which was
debouching from Guise. By the end of the day, after various
fluctuations, the enemy was thrown back on the Oise and the British
front was freed.
On August 27 we had also succeeded in throwing back upon the Meuse the
enemy, who was endeavoring to gain a foothold on the left bank. Our
successes continued on the 28th in the woods of Marfee and of Jaulnay.
Thanks to them we were able, in accordance with the orders of the
General in Chief, to fall back on the Buzancy-Le Chesne-Bouvellemont
line.
Further to the right another army took part in the same movement and
carried out successful attacks on August 25 on the Othain and in the
region of Spincourt.
[Sidenote: Recrossing the Meuse.]
On the 26th these different units recrossed the Meuse without being
disturbed and were able to join in the action of our centre. Our armies
were, therefore, again intact and available for the offensive.
On August 26 a new army composed of two army corps, five reserve
divisions, and a Moorish brigade was constituted. This army was to
assemble in the region of Amiens between August 27 and September 1 and
take the offensive against the German right, uniting its action with
that of the British Army, operating on the line of Ham-Bray-sur-Somme.
[Sidenote: The retreat continues.]
The hope of resuming the offensive was from this moment rendered vain by
the rapidity of the march of the German right wing. This rapidity had
two consequences, which we had to parry before thinking of advancing. On
the one hand, our new army had not time to complete its detraining, and,
on the other hand, the British Army, forced back further by the enemy,
uncovered on August 31 our left flank. Our line, thus modified,
contained waves which had to be redressed before we could pass to the
offensive.
To understand this it is sufficient to consider the situation created by
the quick advance of the enemy on the evening of September 2.
A corps of cavalry had crossed the Oise and advanced as far as
Chateau-Thierry. The First Army, (General von Kluck,) comprising four
active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne.
The Second Army, (General von Buelow,) with three active army corps and
two reserve corps, was reaching the Laon region.
The Third Army, (General von Hausen,) with two active army corps and a
reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne between the Chateau Porcien and
Attigny.
[Sidenote: The German armies.]