had become unbreathable. We were near to being asphyxiated when my
adjutant, Major Collard, had the idea of taking off the top of the
shutter, which gave us a little air. I was, however, obsessed by the
idea of placing part of the garrison in safety, and I told my comrade I
desired to reach the counter-escarpment. I managed to pass the gap and
reach the ditch, which I crossed. What was my amazement when I perceived
that the fort was blown up, and that the front was strewn with ruins,
forming a quay reaching from the escarpment to the counter-escarpment.
Some soldiers were running to and fro upon it. I took them for Belgian
gendarmes and called to them. But I was being suffocated, giddiness
seized upon me, and I fell to the ground. When I came to, I found myself
in the midst of my comrades, who tried to come to my aid. Among them was
a German major, who gave me a glass of water to drink. As I learnt
afterwards, it was then about 6.30 p.m. I was placed in an ambulance
carriage and transported to Liege.
"I was taken, but I had not yet surrendered."
* * * * *
[Sidenote: Surrender of Namur.]
Following the capture of Liege the German armies made rapid progress
through Belgium. After several sharp engagements with Belgian troops,
which resisted with heroic tenacity, the Germans on August 19 took
Louvain, and then began the deliberate system of atrocities which
horrified the civilized world. The most valuable parts of the city,
including many beautiful and important edifices, were burned, citizens
were killed and tortured, and the utmost brutality was practiced, under
the excuse that German troops had been fired upon by citizens of the
town. On August 17 Brussels had been abandoned by the Belgian Government
which withdrew to Antwerp. The former city was surrendered without
resistance. In the meantime the French had hurried their armies to
assist the Belgian forces and, joined by the available troops of the
English Expeditionary Force, they encountered the Germans at Charleroi.
On August 23 the great fortress of Namur was surrendered under the fire
of the heavy German artillery, and on the following day, the Allied
armies were defeated at Charleroi, and began the Great Retreat toward
Paris which was to continue to the banks of the Marne. The French armies
were under the command of General Joffre, while Sir John French
commanded the British Expeditionary Force. In the following narrative
General French describes the heroic performances of his gallant troops
during the terrible ordeal.
THE GREAT RETREAT
SIR JOHN FRENCH
The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was
effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its
destination in this country well within the scheduled time.
[Sidenote: Disposition of British forces.]
The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday,
September 21st, and I was able to make dispositions to move the force
during Saturday, the 22d, to positions I considered most favorable from
which to commence operations which the French Commander in Chief,
General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in
prosecution of the campaign.
The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Conde on the
west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as
follows:
From Conde to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and to
the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The
Fifth Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.
In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the cavalry
division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or
move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward
reconnoissance was intrusted to Brigadier General Sir Philip Chetwode
with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send
forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.
[Sidenote: Advance on Soignies.]
During the 22d and 23d these advanced squadrons did some excellent work,
some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took
place in which our troops showed to great advantage.
2. At 6 A. M. on August 23, I assembled the commanders of the First and
Second Corps and cavalry division at a point close to the position and
explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to
be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the
immediate situation in front of us.
From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that
little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's army corps, with
perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position; and I was
aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed
in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue
opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observations of my
aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate.
[Sidenote: Attack on Mons line.]
About 3 P. M. on Sunday, the 23d, reports began coming in to the effect
that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in
some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was
being particularly threatened.
The commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high
ground south of Bray, and the Fifth Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche,
moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.
[Sidenote: Germans gain passages of the Sambre.]
The right of the Third Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons,
which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the commander
of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient
too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behind
Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 P. M., I
received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph,
telling me that at least three German corps, viz., a reserve corps, the
Fourth Corps and the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front,
and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the
direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French
divisions and the Fifth French Army on my right were retiring, the
Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of
the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur.
3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position,
I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitred. This
position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extended
west to Jenlain, southeast of Valenciennes, on the left. The position
was reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings
made the siting of trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire
in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good
artillery positions.
[Sidenote: British retire to Maubeuge position.]
When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German
threatening on my front reached me, I endeavored to confirm it by
aeroplane reconnoissance; and as a result of this I determined to effect
a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th.
A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout
the night and at daybreak on the 24th the Second Division from the
neighborhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake
Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the First and Second
Divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in the
neighborhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second
Corps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The Third Division
on the right of the corps suffered considerable loss in this operation
from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.
The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially intrenched
themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to
withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further
loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 P. M. Toward midday the
enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.
I had previously ordered General Allenby with the cavalry to act
vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavor to take the pressure
off.
[Sidenote: General Allenby supports Fifth Division.]
About 7:30 A. M. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles
Fergusson, commanding the Fifth Division, saying that he was very hard
pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message
General Allenby drew in the cavalry and endeavored to bring direct
support to the Fifth Division.
During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the Second
Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyze the
further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on
his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up
by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the Ninth Lancers and
the Eighteenth Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the
brigade.
The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the line of
communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22d and
23d. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south
of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.
[Sidenote: Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien suffers great losses.]
With the assistance of the cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled
to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of
the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great
losses in doing so.
At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west
of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the
fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the Nineteenth Brigade in position
between Jenlain and Bry, and the cavalry on the outer flank.
4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as
was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of
the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his
intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not
a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.
I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat
exhausted and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped,
therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me
effecting my object.
The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only
owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion
of the troops.
The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a
position in the neighborhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered
to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5:30 A. M.
[Sidenote: General Allenby covers west flank.]
Two cavalry brigades, with the divisional cavalry of the Second Corps,
covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the cavalry
division, with the Nineteenth Brigade, the whole under the command of
General Allenby, covered the west flank.
The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday,
the 23d, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigade
of artillery with divisional staff were available for service.
I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his right
south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south
of La Chaprie. In this position the division rendered great help to the
effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position.
Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le
Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been
partially prepared and intrenched, I had grave doubts--owing to the
information I had received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy
against me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.
[Sidenote: Retirement of French troops on right.]
Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my
exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II.) to
envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I
determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could
put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my
troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and
reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the corps commanders to
continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could toward the general
line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.
The cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the
retirement.
Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued
its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of
the Foret de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had
intended that the corps should come further west so as to fill up the
gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and
could not get further in without rest.
[Sidenote: British brigade in Landrecies.]
[Sidenote: French reserve divisions support First Corps.]
The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9:30 P. M.
a report was received that the Fourth Guards Brigade in Landrecies was
heavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who were
coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought
most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in
issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss
has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the
same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his First
Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent
urgent messages to the commander of the two French reserve divisions on
my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they
eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the
skillful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from an
exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were
able at dawn to resume their march south toward Wassigny on Guise.
By about 6 P. M. the Second Corps had got into position with their right
on Le Cateau, their left in the neighborhood of Caudry, and the line of
defense was continued thence by the Fourth Division toward Seranvillers,
the left being thrown back.
During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the cavalry became a good deal
scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby had
succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.
The Fourth Division was placed under the orders of the general officer
commanding the Second Army Corps.
On the 24th the French cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions
under General Sordet, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way
back from Bavai, which was my "Poste de Commandement" during the
fighting of the 23d and 24th, I visited General Sordet, and earnestly
requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction
from his army commander to act on my left flank, but said that his
horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered
me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was
unable for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most
critical day of all, viz., the 26th.
[Sidenote: British Second Corps and Fourth Division heavily attacked.]
At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of
his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second
Corps and the Fourth Division.
At this time the guns of four German army corps were in position against
them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it
impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face
of such an attack.
I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavors to break off the action
and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me
to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable
of movement.
The French cavalry corps, under General Sordet, was coming up on our
left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to
do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank;
but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to
intervene in any way.
There had been no time to intrench the position properly, but the troops
showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.
[Sidenote: British artillery outmatched by four to one.]
The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a
splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.
At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be
avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to
commence it about 3:30 P. M. The movement was covered with the most
devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had itself
suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the further
retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of
this most difficult and dangerous operation.
Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an
energetic pursuit.
[Sidenote: General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien cited for conspicuous
service.]
I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British
troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable
services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army
under my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have been
accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness,
intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct
the operation.
[Sidenote: British retreat holding on line Noyon-Chauny-La Fere.]
The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the
27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line
Noyon-Chauny-La Fere, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's
pursuit.
On the 27th and 28th August I was much indebted to General Sordet and
the French cavalry division which he commands for materially assisting
my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on
Cambrai.
General D'Amade also, with the Sixty-first and Sixty-second French
Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighborhood of Arras on the
enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British
forces located there.
[Sidenote: End of four days' battle at Mons.]
This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at
Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23d August, and which really constituted a
four days' battle.
At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present dispatch.
[Sidenote: Serious losses in British forces.]
I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British forces have
suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the
fact that the British Army--only two days after a concentration by
rail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German army
corps.
It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the
two general officers commanding army corps; the self-sacrificing and
devoted exertions of their staffs; the direction of the troops by
divisional, brigade, and regimental leaders; the command of the smaller
units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed
by non-commissioned officers and men.
[Sidenote: Royal Flying Corps cited for admirable work.]
I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable
work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their
skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have
furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has
been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at
constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every
kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.
Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in
destroying five of the enemy's machines.
I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance I
received from the General and Personal Staffs at Headquarters during
this trying period.
[Sidenote: Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, Major General
Wilson, Brigade General Hon. Lambton cited for admirable work.]
Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff;
Major General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under them
have worked day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill,
self-sacrifice, and devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by me
to Brigadier General Hon. W. Lambton, my Military Secretary, and the
personal Staff.
[Sidenote: Major General Sir William Robertson cited for admirable
work.]
In such operations as I have described the work of the Quartermaster
General is of an extremely onerous nature. Major General Sir William
Robertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficulties
with his characteristic energy, skill, and determination; and it is
largely owing to his exertions that the hardships and sufferings of the
troops--inseparable from such operations--were not much greater.
[Sidenote: Major General Sir Nevil Macready.]
Major General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant General, has also been
confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection with
disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He has
been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult situations
which arose.
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
SIR JOHN FRENCH
17th September, 1914.
My Lord: In continuation of my dispatch of September 7, I have the honor
to report the further progress of the operations of the forces under my
command from August 28.
On that evening the retirement of the force was followed closely by two
of the enemy's cavalry columns, moving southeast from St. Quentin.
The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the Third and
Fifth Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme General Gough, with the Third
Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans of the Guard with considerable
loss.
[Sidenote: General Chetwode routs German attack.]
General Chetwode, with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, encountered the
eastern column near Cerizy, moving south. The brigade attacked and
routed the column, the leading German regiment suffering very severe
casualties and being almost broken up.
The Seventh French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up from
the south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th it nearly completed its
detrainment, and the French Sixth Army got into position on my left, its
right resting on Roye.
The Fifth French Army was behind the line of the Oise, between La Fere
and Guise.
[Sidenote: Vigorous pursuit of retreating German forces.]
The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous; some five or six German
corps were on the Somme, facing the Fifth Army on the Oise. At least two
corps were advancing toward my front, and were crossing the Somme east
and west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were opposing the Sixth
French Army on my left.
This was the situation at 1 o'clock on the 29th, when I received a visit
from General Joffre at my headquarters.
I strongly represented my position to the French Commander in Chief, who
was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He told
me that he had directed the Fifth French Army on the Oise to move
forward and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking
pursuit. He also told me of the formation of the Sixth French Army on my
left flank, composed of the Seventh Army Corps, four reserve divisions,
and Sordet's corps of cavalry.
[Sidenote: Short retirement towards Compiegne-Soissons.]
I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further short
retirement toward the line Compiegne-Soissons, promising him, however,
to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him.