THE LAW FOR HUMANITY.
[Sidenote: The Right Law.]
=302.= The department of Ethics contains two divisions: ethics (in the
stricter sense) which is concerned with the action of the individual;
and politics, which has to do with the order of the State. It has been
maintained that in Stoicism the latter is altogether subordinated, and
that the central aim of this philosophy is to erect a shelter for the
individual[1]. The truth of this view is more than doubtful. Stoic ethics
are not based on the needs of the individual, but on the demands of the
supreme Law. ‘If there is a universe, then there is a universal law,
bidding us do this and refrain from that.’ ‘If there are gods, there
is virtue[2].’ We have already noticed that Zeno’s earliest work was
‘on the State[3],’ and that it is an attempt to show how a state can
be ordered by wise laws. The whole theory of the Logos leads up to the
same point. The same eternal Wisdom through which the primal stuff took
shape is, in another function, the Right Rule (ὀρθὸς λόγος, _vera ratio_)
which commands and forbids[4]. Right Rule and Common Law (κοινὸς νόμος,
_lex communis_) are terms of identical meaning, by which a standard of
supreme authority is set up[5]; State law and conventional morality,
though always of narrower range, and often of inferior purity, are yet
a reflection of universal Law. The moral law must therefore first be
studied in its bearings on man as a political and social animal.
[Sidenote: The Cosmopolis.]
=303.= The root-principle of the Stoic State is that it is world-wide, a
cosmopolis. This title arose from the practice, attributed to Socrates
and Diogenes (as well as others), of replying to the current question ‘Of
what city are you?’ by the answer ‘Of the universe[6].’ We must therefore
regard ourselves as members not of a clan or city, but of a world-wide
society[7]. In this society all distinctions of race, caste and class
are to be subordinated to the sense of kinship and brotherhood[8]. This
principle is equally opposed to the nationalist prejudices which rank
Hellene above barbarian, to philosophical theories (such as that of
Aristotle) which distinguish intelligent peoples fitted by nature to
rule and others only fitted to obey[9], and to ideal states (such as
that of Plato) in which a ruling class is to be developed by artifice
and schooling. Only the brute animals are excluded from this community,
for they are not possessed of reason; they have therefore no rights,
but exist for the service of men[10]. All human beings are capable
of attaining to virtue, and as such are natural-born citizens of the
Cosmopolis[11]. Loyalty to this state, however, in no wise hinders a due
loyalty to existing states which may be regarded as partial realizations
of it. Socrates submitted to the laws of Athens even when they bade him
die; Zeno and Cleanthes declined the citizenship of that famous city,
lest they should be thought to hold cheap the places of their birth[12];
and amongst the Romans Seneca frequently insists that every man is born
into two communities, the Cosmopolis and his native city[13].
[Sidenote: The law of nature.]
=304.= The world-state is not held together either by force or by
state-craft, but by goodwill. We must be able say ‘Love is god there,
and is a helpmate to make the city secure[14].’ This feeling of love and
friendship grows up naturally between wise men, because they partake
in the reason of the universe; so that we may equally well say that
the bond of the state is the Logos (_ratio atque oratio_)[15]. Since
reason and the universal law exist in the community from the beginning,
law does not need to be created; it exists of itself, and by natural
growth (φύσει)[16]. The writing down of laws is only a stage in their
development[17].
[Sidenote: Zeno’s revolutionary views.]
=305.= The theory of the world-state, as first sketched by Zeno, found no
place for any of the cherished institutions of the Athens in which it was
preached. In the heavenly city must be neither temples nor images[18];
so far the aims of the Persian invader are to be carried out. The reason
given is far from flattering to the artistic pride of the Athenians, for
they are told that their magnificent buildings and statues of world-wide
renown are only the work of common builders and workmen[19]. Nor must
there be law-courts[20] or gymnasia. The practice of hearing both sides
in a law-court is unreasonable, because if the plaintiff has proved his
case it is useless to hear the defendant, and if he has not proved it,
it is superfluous[21]. The training of the youth in grammar, music, and
gymnastic is worthless[22], for the true education is in virtue. Coined
money, as in modern communistic Utopias, should not be required either
for commerce or for travel[23].
[Sidenote: Women to be in common.]
=306.= With regard to the position of women Zeno, agreeing to some extent
with Plato, asserted the startling doctrine that ‘women should be in
common, and men should mate with them as they pleased[24].’ That Zeno
was suggesting, even for an imaginary state, any sort of loose living,
need not for a moment be supposed; his continence was notable[25]; he
expressly approves of marriage[26]; and the members of his school were
honourably known by their aversion to adultery[27]. But Zeno could not
base his theory of the relation of the sexes merely upon established
practice. We may assume that he observed that in the world of animals and
of birds mating was free[28], whereas in human society it was encumbered
by national prejudices, class privilege, and personal jealousy; and
in particular that woman was regarded as a chattel, contrary to the
fundamental principle of his state[29]. By his doctrine of ‘free mating’
he aimed at the root of these evils. The gradual abolition at Rome of the
restrictions on ‘connubium’ illustrates the application of his principle,
just as the prohibition of ‘miscegenation’ in modern America illustrates
its denial. Zeno may well have perceived how deeply the potentiality
of marriage affects all social relations, and it is probable that the
progress of Stoicism did much to break down the racial barriers that
existed in Zeno’s time, but which had almost completely disappeared five
centuries later throughout the civilized world. Another application of
his doctrine is found in the life of Cato of Utica[30]. But its general
meaning is clear: marriage exists not by nature, but by institution
(θέσει); its law is human and mutable, but nevertheless within proper
limits is one that may not be transgressed. By the side of the text of
Zeno we still have the authorized comment of Epictetus[31].
[Sidenote: Incest no abomination.]
=307.= The Stoics did not shrink from insisting upon the abstract
principle of the community of women even in an extreme case in which
their doctrine encountered a violent prejudice. No natural law, they
maintained, prohibits marriage relationship between near relatives[32].
The tale of Oedipus and Jocasta, which is so prominent a theme in the
great Athenian tragedies, appears to Zeno to be a matter about which too
much ado has been made[33]. For suppose the case that all the world
were destroyed by flood except one man and his daughter; would it not be
better that he should beget children by her, and that the whole human
race should not perish[34]? In this reference to the traditional flood we
may readily trace one reason why the Stoics insisted on their principle.
For at the beginning of human history we are compelled to postulate
an Adam and an Eve, a human pair related in their birth and at the
same time united as parents of the race[35]. Go back to the beginnings
of the universe; there too we must postulate the same combination of
relationships, and so only can we understand the poets when they speak of
Hera as ‘wife and sister of Zeus[36].’
[Sidenote: Burial a convention.]
=308.= Perhaps even more shocking to Hellenic feeling was Zeno’s
indifference to the treatment of the dead, Burial was to him no sacred
duty to the departed one; it was equally right to throw the body to
the fire, as the Indians, or to the vultures, as the Persians[37]. Nor
is there any need to condemn those nations amongst which the dead are
eaten by their own relatives[38], for all these things are matters not
of principle but of convenience, and to eat human flesh may still be
desirable if circumstances require it[39], as for instance in shipwreck,
or if a limb is amputated[40]. The problem of the disposal of the dead
became a favourite subject of discussion in Stoic circles. Chrysippus
wrote at length on the subject, comparing the customs of various nations
as well as the habits of animals, in order to ascertain the law of
nature. He reaches the conclusion that dead bodies should be disposed of
in the simplest possible way, not being regarded as of more importance
than the hair or nail-parings from which we part in life[41]. Cicero
shortly sums up this discussion in the _Tusculan disputations_, and draws
the conclusion that whilst the living must consider what it is fitting
for them to do, to the dead man it is a matter totally indifferent[42].
In the imperial period this consideration is of importance as showing
that the tyrant has no power after death[43].
[Sidenote: Slavery.]
=309.= The Stoic view of slavery can readily be inferred. Without
proposing the immediate abolition of this social institution, the Stoics
treated it as essentially contrary to nature[44]. The earliest teachers
seem to have passed over the subject in silence; Panaetius (as might be
expected from his social position), justified slavery by the arguments
of Plato and Aristotle in exceptional cases: ‘all those who through the
infirmity of their nature are unfit to govern themselves, are rightly
made slaves’[45]. According to this theory we may speak of a ‘natural
slave’ (φύσει δοῦλος), who as such can no more have rights in the
community than the lower animals. The true Stoic theory appears however
to be formulated by a definition of Chrysippus, who says that a slave
is a ‘labourer hired for life[46].’ This definition makes of slavery a
contract, to which there are two parties; and Seneca rightly uses this
definition to argue that the relations of master to slave are those of
man to man, and that as the master may wrong his slave, so the slave may
do a service to his master[47]. All this is really implied in the dogma
that ‘women and slaves may become philosophers,’ as is realized by the
Church Father Lactantius[48].
[Sidenote: Constitutions.]
=310.= The Stoic principles of politics may be realized under any form
of government, and the theory of Constitutions, like that of grammar,
belongs to a neutral ground on which philosophers of different schools
may work in harmony. The Peripatetics appear first to have taken up this
study; of the Stoics Diogenes of Babylon[49], who himself acted as a
political representative of Athens, is stated to have shown interest in
this subject; and after him Panaetius developed a complete theory, of
which the substance is preserved for us in Cicero’s _de Re publica_[50].
According to this theory, which Cicero puts in the mouth of Scipio
Africanus, surrounded by Roman Stoics of distinction such as Laelius,
Tubero, and Furius Philo, the best constitution is one in which the
elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are combined, though
a bias remains in favour of monarchy[51]. This mixed constitution,
according to the teaching of Panaetius and his pupil Polybius, is best
illustrated in the Roman state[52]; whereas tyranny, the perversion
of monarchy, is the worst of all governments. By such reasoning the
Roman nobles of the first century B.C. and the first century A.D. alike
persuaded themselves easily that Stoic teaching supported the position
of the republican party. But in fact they were maintaining Peripatetic
theories of government, and the real Stoic theory was far more in accord
with that practice of the principate, according to which all citizens
are treated with respect, and the government of them is placed in the
hands of men selected for their personal merit. We shall discuss the
whole question of the relation of Stoicism to Roman politics in a later
chapter[53]; but we may notice here that those Stoics practically
abandoned the theory of providence who looked into the history of their
own times with the intention of seeing nowhere the ‘king,’ and everywhere
the ‘tyrant.’ On the other hand the practical statesmen who set about
to re-create Roman law on the principle of substituting everywhere human
rights for class privileges were men thoroughly imbued with the Stoic
spirit, whether or not they were avowed disciples of this philosophy.
[Sidenote: The citizen.]
=311.= We must therefore maintain that the true Stoic state, whether it
be called monarchy or democracy, calls for a revolt against nationalism,
antiquity, custom, pride, and prejudice; and a new construction based
upon universal reason and individual liberty. For the realization of this
state it is first necessary to build up the individual, to fill his mind
with the conception of reason and love, to strengthen his will to a true
independence: for it is not buying or selling that makes the slave, but
the will within[54]. All are in truth slaves except the wise man; for
freedom is the power of directing one’s own actions[55]. Here then we
pass from the community to the individual, from politics to ethics in the
narrower sense.
[Sidenote: The supreme good.]
=312.= For the individual man the ethical problem is to bring himself, a
part of nature, into harmony with the whole. Whether we think of destiny,
of providence, of the gods, or of the state, success for the individual
is to agree and to cooperate; to struggle and to rebel is to fail.
This success is the end (τέλος) for which man exists, the supreme good
(_summum bonum_), the ultimate good (_ultimum bonorum_), that towards
which all other right action works, whilst it works itself for no other
end[56]. Its name in the individual is virtue (ἀρετή, _virtus_), and
it is an active and firmly-established disposition of the soul[57]. It
follows from the monistic principle that the end for man is one, and that
virtue is one; but nevertheless each is capable of being regarded in many
aspects. The harmony of the ethical end with other parts of the Stoic
philosophy is marked by such phrases as ‘life according to nature[58],’
the rule ‘keep company with God[59],’ and the identification of virtue
and reason[60].
[Sidenote: Consistency with nature.]
=313.= Because virtue is one thing and not many, it makes a man’s life
one consistent whole, and stands in sharp contrast to the changing and
undecided ways of the crowd. Virtue is therefore frequently defined
as consistency in life[61], an even steady course of action[62],
self-consistency[63], a principle in agreement with its applications[64].
The opposite of virtue is the unending restlessness and indecision of
the man in the crowd[65]. Accordingly we are told that the earliest
Stoics thought it a sufficient definition of wisdom or virtue that it
was something simple[66]; and similarly Zeno said that the end of life
was ‘to live consistently[67].’ To this short definition the words ‘with
nature’ were soon added[68], whereby the distinctiveness of the original
definition was diminished: for all the philosophical schools are agreed
that the right life must be guided by nature (φύσει), not by convention
(θέσει). From the time of Chrysippus the relation of right living to
nature was further analyzed. Chrysippus defined the ‘nature’ referred
to as ‘universal and human nature[69],’ thereby further approximating
to the teaching of rival schools; but on the other hand he gave this
new and more characteristic explanation ‘to live virtuously is to live
according to scientific knowledge of the phenomena of nature, doing
nothing which the Universal Law forbids, which is the Right Reason which
pervades all things, and is the same as Zeus, the Lord of the ordering
of this world[70].’ Diogenes of Babylon introduced the words ‘to take
a reasonable course in choosing or refusing things in accordance with
nature[71].’ Antipater’s definition is ‘to live with preference for what
is natural, and aversion to what is against nature[72],’ thus throwing
the stress on the doctrine of the ‘things of high degree[73].’ Panaetius
made a distinct step forward when he admitted the claims of universal
nature to be supreme, but (subject to them) held that each man should
follow the pointings of his individual nature[74]; this teaching however
comes rather near to naming a twofold end. Cicero follows Panaetius in
his _de Officiis_[75], but in the _de Finibus_ adheres more closely to
Chrysippus[76], and Seneca agrees with him in laying stress on the need
of scientific knowledge of natural events[77]. In the main therefore
‘life according to nature’ means to the Stoics life in accordance with
the general movement of the universe, to which the particular strivings
of the individual must be subordinated.
[Sidenote: Obedience to God.]
=314.= From the religious standpoint virtue is willing cooperation with
the deity, in preference to that unwilling cooperation to which even
evil-doers are forced. This conception, first set forth by Cleanthes in a
poem that we have quoted above[78], is enforced by Seneca and Epictetus
also in varying phrases. ‘I do not obey God,’ says Seneca, ‘I agree with
him. I go with him heart and soul, and not because I must[79].’ With a
slight change of language this leads us to the paradox that ‘obedience
to God is liberty[80].’ ‘I have placed my impulses,’ says Epictetus,
‘in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is
my will too. Is it his will that I should obtain anything? It is my
wish also. Does he not wish it? I do not wish it[81].’ The personal
bent of Epictetus leads him to develope this idea in the direction of
suffering rather than of acting. ‘If the good man had foreknowledge of
what would happen, he would cooperate towards his own sickness and death
and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him
in accordance with the universal arrangement[82].’ The proof that this
must be so rests on the unity of the Divine and individual purposes:
‘Good cannot be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted
another thing[83].’
[Sidenote: Social duty.]
=315.= It is not perhaps quite so clearly stated that the virtue of the
individual is that disposition which will make him the best possible
member of society, that is, the best possible citizen of the Cosmopolis.
Yet this is everywhere implied. In the first place the wise man will
take part in the life of the community[84], he will marry and bring up
children[85]. In the second place the virtue of man differs first from
the corresponding quality in the animals in that man is formed by nature
for social union; hence his reason only comes into play simultaneously
with the recognition that he is a member of a community, and as such
bound to prefer the good of the whole to that of a part. ‘Nature,’ says
Panaetius, ‘through reason unites man to man, so that they have a common
bond in conversation and life; it induces men to approve and take part
in public gatherings and festivals, and to collect the materials for a
social and cultivated life for themselves, their children, and all whom
they hold dear[86].’
[Sidenote: Health of soul.]
=316.= Virtue, as a disposition of the soul[87], reflects all the aspects
in which the soul itself is regarded. Since the principate is both wisdom
and will, so virtue is wisdom, according to the paradox of Socrates
and the Cynics[88]. Because virtue is wisdom, it can be taught[89]; in
fact, it can only be acquired by teaching; and equally evil-doing can be
cured by teaching[90]. But no less virtue is will. Cleanthes emphasized
this aspect, and identified virtue both with the Socratic ‘strength
of character’ and with the Stoic ‘tone[91].’ In so far as virtue is
will, it is to be acquired by constant practice[92]. A true judgment is
endangered by hasty assent; a healthy will by slackness of the soul’s
sinews. In the Stoic system vigour and strength of mind is everywhere
identified with the ‘true tone’ (εὐτονία)[93]; the possibility of
overstrain is not considered. But in the development of the ideal we have
two varying aspects of virtue presented to us. At one moment we see the
man of action, engaged in the thick of the battle, sun-browned, dusty,
horny-handed[94]; with this model before him we find Musonius objecting
altogether to relaxation of moral tone as being equivalent to its
loss[95]. At another moment we see the man of quiet conviction, who goes
his way unmoved in the face of the howls of the mob or the threats of
the tyrant[96]; he is distinguished by a mental calm[97] which no storms
can shake. Any discrepancy between these views is finally reconciled by
introducing a comparison between the soul and the body. The philosophers
had at all times been greatly influenced by the theories and practice
of the physicians; and they were proud to call themselves physicians of
the soul.’ Chrysippus spent much time in comparing diseases of the soul
to those of the body[98]. Equally there must be a healthy state of the
soul corresponding to that of the body, in which all its parts are in
harmony[99]. Hence in the Stoic prayer health of soul is asked for, side
by side with health of body[100]; and Seneca bases a singularly complete
statement of the Stoic conception of happiness upon a permanently healthy
condition of the mind[101].
[Sidenote: Virtue lies in intention.]
=317.= Virtue is a state of the mind, a disposition of the soul; it
is not an act. Hence the bent of the mind (_inclinatio_), its aim
(_intentio_), its desire (βούλησις, _voluntas_) is everything; the
performance through the organs of the body is nothing[102]. This Stoic
dogma is to-day so familiar in divinity, law, and society that it is
not easy to realize how paradoxical it seemed when first stated. By its
proclamation the Stoics defied the whole system of _tabu_ by which the
ancient world prohibited certain acts as in themselves dangerous and
detestable; a system still in force in many departments of life and
theoretically defended by the ‘intuitive system of morals.’ The defenders
of _tabu_ were bitterly affronted, and indignantly asked questions which
mostly concerned the sexual relations, with regard to which _tabu_
appears to have been at the time most vigorous. ‘Is there nothing wrong
in cannibalism? in foul language? in incest? in the accursed relations
with boy favourites (παιδικά)?’ To these questions firm-minded Stoics
were bound to give a negative answer, thereby laying themselves open
to the charge of being defenders of immorality. This charge however is
never to be taken seriously; the high practical morality of the Stoics
placed them beyond reproach. But it was also easy to raise a laugh by
quotations from these austere moralists which sounded like a defence
of licentiousness. The solution of the difficulty in each individual
case follows exactly the same lines as in politics; and there is the
same divergence of method between the early Stoics, who assert their
principles at all costs, and those of the transition period, who are
intent upon adapting them to the existing conditions of society. Here we
need only discuss the questions of principle, as we deal with questions
affecting practical life in another chapter[103].
[Sidenote: Tabus.]
=318.= The principal _tabus_ affecting the individual have to do with
cannibalism, the sexual relations, nudity, and obscenity. Of the first we
have already spoken; the other three appeared to the Stoics partly due
to inherited prejudices, partly to the theory that the body is in itself
vile and corrupt. Of neither point of view could the Stoics approve.
Hence their repeated assertions that no sexual act, whether commonly
described as natural or as unnatural, is _in itself_ to be condemned,
but only according as it is seemly or unseemly for the individual[104].
It was perhaps unnecessary to explain to Greeks that the naked body is
in itself no offensive sight, but doubtless the Stoics had to make this
clear to their Oriental pupils; Zeno at any rate laid down the principle
when he said that men and women should wear the same clothes (meaning
such as nature requires for warmth and not such as fashion prescribes),
and hide no part of the body[105]. As to decency of language, it did
not occur to the Stoics to discuss this question in connexion with the
history of literature. Since truth is always good, and the very purpose
of language is to express truth, a wise man will always say straight out
what he needs to say[106].
[Sidenote: Virtue in its applications.]
=319.= Up to this point we find a broad resemblance between the ethical
principles of the Stoics and the Cynics. Both assert the sole supremacy
of virtue, ridicule traditional prejudices, and bid defiance to external
circumstances. But there is at the same time divergence. To the Cynics
virtue stands out as alone, needing no theory, and by itself in the
universe. To the Stoics virtue is but one expression of that universal
reason which is equally at work in the universe and in the human mind.
The Stoics are therefore under the obligation of bringing virtue into
touch with circumstances, the soul into harmony with the body. From this
arises their doctrine that virtue is bound up with the study both of
universal and of individual nature, and that amongst things indifferent
there are some that the good man must seek, and others that he must
avoid. The critics of Stoicism, both ancient and modern, regard this
doctrine as an afterthought[107], suggested by practical difficulties,
and alien from the original teaching of Zeno. This seems to be a
misapprehension. Undoubtedly Zeno had said: ‘some things are good,
some are evil, some indifferent. Good are wisdom, temperance, justice,
fortitude, everything that is virtue or an aspect of virtue; evil are
folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, everything that is vice or an
aspect of vice. Indifferent are life and death, glory and disgrace, pain
and pleasure, riches and wealth, disease, health, and so forth[108].’ But
there is a difference between a principle and its application; and this
very list of things indifferent indicates by its contrasts an underlying
difference, though it is not the difference between good and evil. Zeno
was therefore quite consistent in proceeding to examine the nature of
this difference.
[Sidenote: Worth and Unworth.]
=320.= This secondary difference is termed by the Stoics a difference
of worth (ἀξία, _aestimatio_)[109]. Health, life, riches, have positive
worth in greater or less degree; disease, death, poverty, have negative
worth (ἀπαξία, _inaestimabile_)[110]. Between these lie things that are
absolutely indifferent, as, for example, whether the number of hairs on
one’s head is odd or even[111], or whether we take up one or the other of
two coins that have the same general appearance and the same stamp[112].
Even here a slight distinction has to be made; as to whether the hairs
on the head are odd or even in number we have not the slightest concern;
but in the matter of the coins we must make a choice, and that quickly.
Let us then settle the matter anyhow, by chance as common folk say; ‘for
a reason that is not clear to us,’ as the Stoics say, not willing to
admit an effect without a cause, and yet leaving the matter much where it
was[113]. And now as to the things that have ‘worth’; it is clear that
in some sense they are ‘according to nature,’ and in the same sense
those things that have ‘negative worth’ are opposed to nature[114]; and
the former in some way approximate to the character of the good[115]. It
is then necessary to describe them by some term other than ‘good.’ Zeno
selected the term προηγμένον ‘of high degree,’ which Cicero translates
variously by _producta_, _promota_, _praecipua_, _praelata_, and
_praeposita_. This term, we are told, Zeno borrowed from court life: ‘for
no one would think of calling a king “of high degree,” but only those
who are of a rank next to his, though far below[116].’ The opposites
were described as ἀποπροηγμένα (_remota_, _reiecta_) ‘things of low
degree[117].’ Seneca, who states the theory with great clearness[118],
commonly uses the handier terms _commoda_ (‘advantages’) and _incommoda_
(‘disadvantages’)[119]. In their treatment of the separate matters which
fall under these divisions the Stoics were in close agreement with the
Peripatetic theory of natural ends (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν)[120]: but their
loyalty to their own school came into question, if they actually termed
them ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ as Chrysippus thought permissible if sufficient
precautions were taken[121], and as Seneca often describes them in his
less careful moods[122].
[Sidenote: The aim of virtue.]
=321.= The advocates of Stoicism maintain that the theory of
‘advantages’ is essential to their system, because without it virtue
has no meaning, and practical life no guide[123]; whereas as soon as
this theory is established, we can assign to virtue the permanent
and distinctive character, that it aims at securing ‘advantages’ and
avoiding ‘disadvantages[124].’ Now we are able to enlarge, though we do
not alter, our definition of the supreme good; the ‘consistent life,’
the ‘life consistent with nature,’ is the ‘life which is accompanied by
a true knowledge of the things that happen by nature’; to which words
we now add ‘choosing those things which are in accordance with nature,
and avoiding those things which are against nature[125].’ Nevertheless,
virtue consists wholly in the aiming at the mark, and not at all in the
hitting it. As the true sportsman finds all his pleasure in throwing
his quoit according to the rules of the game, and in aiming his arrow
at the centre of the target, but cares not in the least (so it would
seem) whether he succeeds[126]; so the wise man, even though (by those
circumstances which he cannot control, and which in this connexion we
call ‘the play of fortune’) he gain no ‘advantage’ at all, but suffer
dishonour, captivity, mutilation, and death, still possesses the supreme
good, still is as completely happy as though he enjoyed all things. This
is the Stoic doctrine of the ‘sufficiency of virtue,’ expressed in the
language of paradox, but nevertheless the central point of their whole
ethical system; and its force is really intensified by the doctrine of
‘advantages,’ which to a superficial critic appears to relax it.
[Sidenote: Sufficiency of virtue.]
=322.= The doctrine of the sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια, _sufficientia_) of
virtue was consistently taught by the Stoics of all periods, though
in ever-varying phraseology. Zeno adopted the Cynic phrase ‘virtue is
sufficient for happiness,’ or in other words ‘virtue needs but herself
for a happy life[127].’ Chrysippus maintains that there are only three
logical views as to the supreme good, that it is virtue or pleasure or
both[128], and for himself he chooses the first. Happiness therefore is
not made greater if advantages are added to virtue; or rather, virtue
does not permit addition (_accessio_)[129]. In the transition period
Antipater of Tarsus is said to have faltered, and to have attributed a
little importance, though very little, to external advantages[130]; but,
as we have seen above[131], his definition of the supreme good is in full
accord with the general teaching of the school. Panaetius and Posidonius
held to the orthodox doctrine both in word and deed, if we may trust
the direct statements of Cicero[132]; nevertheless they were so anxious
to assimilate their expressions to those of ordinary life, that the
conclusion could easily be drawn that in their hearts they too attached
importance to external goods[133]. One authority indeed states that
they held health, strength, and estate to be ‘needful’ for happiness,
thus abandoning the sufficiency of virtue[134]; but in the absence of
direct quotation we shall hardly be willing to accept this statement as
implying anything different from the distinction of Chrysippus, viz. that
‘the wise man _needs_ nothing, but _has use_ for everything[135].’ But
any faltering shown by the transition writers was more than made good
by the zeal of the teachers under the principate. Seneca enforces the
paradox in a score of phrases; in the form of a proverb ‘virtue is its
own reward[136]’; in rhetorical exuberance ‘virtue can defy death, ill
fortune, and tyranny[137]’; it is ‘independent even of the deity[138]’;
and ‘no circumstances can increase or impair its perfection[139].’
Epictetus often dwells on the same theme[140], and the whole work of
Marcus Aurelius is a meditation upon it[141]. Nor is the dogma merely
scholastic; the teachers of the Roman period lay special emphasis on the
practical importance of upholding the ideal of virtue, as alike single
and complete in itself[142].
[Sidenote: Virtue and the virtues.]
=323.= But virtue, though single in its essence, is manifold in its
applications; though it can only be possessed as a whole, it is attained
by stages. By this amplification of the Stoic doctrine the way is
prepared for that adaptation of ethical doctrine to varieties of
circumstance which will be the special subject of our next chapter. By
the side of virtue stand ‘the virtues,’ sometimes conceived as virtue
herself endowed with various qualities[143], more often as virtue at
work in different spheres of action. In this way virtue assumes in turn
the shape of each one of the four virtues as commonly understood, namely
Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness[144]; we may, if we please,
reckon with a smaller or greater number[145]; yet we must always remember
that the virtues are so knit together, that he who truly possesses one,
possesses all[146]. Virtue again is displayed in single acts, each of
which (whatever its sphere) is a ‘right action’ (κατόρθωμα, _recte
factum_)[147]. In proportion as virtue is displayed in its various
qualities and spheres, and in successive right actions, it gains itself
a larger field; it cannot be said to increase, but it is in a way spread
out and broadened[148].
[Sidenote: How virtue is won.]
=324.= Virtue, as it is displayed in individual men, has also a history.
This follows clearly from Stoic principles, since virtue is an aspect of
reason, and children are not possessed of reason[149]. Virtue therefore
comes by training, not by birth[150]; by art, not by nature[151]. In
the period that precedes the attainment of virtue, there exist states
of the soul which are the semblances and the forerunners of virtue; and
he who is on his way towards wisdom, and whom we call ‘the probationer’
(προκόπτων, _proficiens_[152]), by learning and practice comes daily
nearer to his goal, till in the crowning moment he wins it as a whole;
for virtue is no sum of lesser dispositions reached by a gradual
addition of item to item, but a thing complete in itself[153]. Can
virtue thus won be lost at a later time? Virtue, it may seem, is not
really such, unless it is indestructible; and the Cynics and the earlier
Stoics taught accordingly that virtue cannot be lost[154], that it is a
‘possession for ever.’ In this point, as in so many others, Chrysippus
yielded to criticism, and admitted that virtue might be lost through
intoxication or indigestion[155], to which causes might well be added the
failure of the reason through insanity or old age[156]. But in spite of
these difficulties the general feeling of the Stoic school held firmly to
the doctrine that virtue once acquired is acquired for ever[157].
[Sidenote: Wise men.]
=325.= Virtue and vice are not mere theories of the philosopher; they
exist and can be studied in human shape, in the wise and foolish men of
myth, history, and society. The lesson of virtue in particular can best
be learnt by considering virtuous men[158]. Here the Stoics followed
closely the teaching of their predecessors the Cynics[159]. As the best
of models they accepted Hercules, the man rightly deemed a god[160],
who travelled over all the world, purging it of every lawlessness, and
bringing with him justice, holiness, and peace[161]. Next comes Ulysses,
who like Hercules was untiring in his labours, triumphant over pain,
and a conqueror throughout all the world[162]; an example to all men
of endurance and vigour[163]. To barbarians Cyrus, king of Persia, was
a like example to prove that suffering is a good[164]. Many such are
counted amongst the philosophers; first Heraclitus, not for his insight
into nature, but for his control over his passions[165]; then Socrates,
who in life and death was equally a model as a man and as a citizen[166].
Diogenes the Cynic is worthy of special honour, for he was so filled
with love for mankind and obedience to God, that he willingly undertook
a life of labour and bodily suffering, and thus won himself the true
freedom[167], and became truly happy, truly divine[168]. Zeno the most
temperate of philosophers[169], and Cleanthes[170] the most enduring,
were men of like type within the Stoic school itself.
[Sidenote: Wise Romans.]
=326.= To the list of wise men recognised by the Greeks the Romans were
proud to add other names from their own history, thereby associating
their philosophic principles with patriotic pride. From their mythology
Aeneas was selected, the man who crushes his desires that he may loyally
cooperate with the destiny of his people; from the times of the republic
Scipio Africanus minor and his gentle companion Laelius[171]; whilst
in Publius Rutilius Rufus a Roman could be found who, like Socrates,
would not when on his trial consent to any other defence than a plain
statement of the facts, in which he neither exaggerated his own merits
nor made any plea for mercy[172]. But amongst all Romans Cato of Utica
was pre-eminent[173]. If Cicero, as a contemporary and a colleague in
political life, was little liable to illusions as to his character and
success, his testimony to Cato’s sincerity is all the more valuable[174];
nor can we believe that Cato’s voluntary death would so soon and so
greatly have stirred Roman feeling, had it not come as the climax of a
life worthily spent[175]. The period of the principate brought to the
front both men and women whose fearless lives and quiet self-approved
deaths proved them to be worthy successors to the heroes of the past; and
at the same time we notice a disposition to find some at least of the
elements of the heroic character in simple uneducated folk, as in the
soldier, the athlete, and the gladiator, so that these too serve in their
degree as models for those that seek wisdom[176].
[Sidenote: Wise men are few.]
=327.= The founders of Stoicism never doubted that wise men had existed
and did exist; they looked forward to a time not far distant when
there should be a Cosmopolis in which every citizen should be wise.
This robust belief was not maintained by their successors. According
to Chrysippus, only one or two wise men have ever existed[177]; and he
expressly denies that he himself or any of his acquaintance are amongst
the number[178]. The Stoics of the transition period avoided the topic
as troublesome[179]; and their opponents naturally pressed it on them
all the more. Zeno had said ‘It is reasonable to honour the gods: it is
not reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore the gods exist.’
This was now parodied: ‘It is reasonable to honour wise men: it is not
reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore wise men exist.’ If
this argument was unsatisfactory, as we are told[180], to the Stoics,
because they had not yet discovered their wise man anywhere, we are not
surprised to find that sometimes they refer him to the golden age[181],
at other times convert him into an ideal[182]. The Stoics under the Roman
principate re-affirmed vigorously the existence of the wise man[183].
Seneca however admits that his appearance is as rare as that of the
phoenix[184], and altogether disclaims any such character for himself
individually[185]. Epictetus is far more true to the spirit of the old
doctrine, when he not only abstains from any morbid depreciation of his
own character, but also urges his pupils never to give up the hope of
reaching perfection[186].
[Sidenote: The glory of virtue.]
=328.= Thus the Stoics founded their moral ideal on the triple basis of
the good citizen, the healthily-disposed soul, and the examples of wise
men. In impressing this part of their system on their pupils, they made
little use of definitions or syllogisms, but all the more they resorted
to rhetorical description. As in their physics the Logos became almost
a person, so here the picture of Virtue is drawn, as by Prodicus in the
old allegory of the choice of Hercules, drawing men to her not by the
pleasures she offers but by her majesty and beauty[187]. Cleanthes in
particular heaps epithets of praise on virtue[188]; more usually it is
sufficient to insist that virtue is good, praiseworthy, and expedient.
That ‘the wise man is a king[189]’ almost ceases to be a paradox, since
the soul is rightly compared to a kingdom; that he is rich, handsome,
free, and invincible can equally be argued on Stoic principles[190]. To
carry such statements further seems to savour of pedantry, to ridicule
them at any stage is easy. Yet the statement that seems the boldest of
all, that ‘the wise man is happy even on the rack[191],’ was many a time
verified by the experience of individual Stoics[192]. That the wise man
is a god, though subject to the limitations of mortality, is maintained
without hesitation[193].
[Sidenote: Stoic ethics.]
=329.= The Stoic morality differs not only in form and in its reasoned
basis, but in substance, both from the popular morality of the time and
the ideals of rival philosophical schools. The Stoic heroes differ from
those of Homer by a world-age; they possess what the Romans called
_humanitas_, powers of reasoning and of sympathizing unknown to an age of
warriors. The Epicurean sage was not, as popular criticism and that of
many Stoics unjustly described him, a man of gross tastes and reckless
selfishness; but he was essentially easy-going and a quietist, little
inclined to risk his peace of mind by meddling with the troubles of
others. To the Cynics the Stoics owed much in their principles, to the
Academics (as we shall see) much in their application of them; they stood
between the two, more reasonable and judicious than the former, firmer
in principle than the latter, possessed of a breadth of outlook which
neither of these schools could claim.
FOOTNOTES
[1] e.g. Zeller, _Stoics_ etc. pp. 16, 17; Stein _Psych._ ii p. 141.
[2] See Alex. Aph. _de fato_, chs. 35 and 37 (Arnim ii 1003 and 1005).
[3] See above, § 75.
[4] λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ
ποιητέον Alex. Aph. 35, p. 207, 8 B; cf. Diog. L. vii 88.
[5] ‘Chrysippus sic incipit: ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ
ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν ... κανόνα εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων’
Marcianus i p. 11, 25 (Arnim iii 314); ‘lex est ratio summa, insita in
natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria’ Cic.
_Leg._ i 6, 18.
[6] ‘Socrates cum rogaretur cuiatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit.
totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ v
37, 108; [Διογένης] ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη “κοσμοπολίτης” ἔφη Diog. L. vi
63; so Epict. _Disc._ i 9, 1.
[7] Arnim i 262; ‘patriam meam esse mundum sciam’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 20, 5.
[8] ‘membra sumus corporis magni; natura nos cognatos edidit’ _Ep._ 95,
52.
[9] ‘quaecunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. quod argumenti
satis est, nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere’ Cic. _Leg._ i 10, 29
and 30.
[10] ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα διὰ τὴν
ἀνομοιότητα Diog. L. vii 129; ‘quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse
vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis’ Cic. _Fin._
iii 20, 67. The honour of being the first to recognise the principle of
consideration for our dumb partners belongs to the Hindus.
[11] ‘nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus ad
virtutem pervenire non possit’ Cic. _Leg._ i 10, 31; ‘if the mind-element
is common to us all, so likewise is that reason which makes us rational;
and therefore too that reason which bids us do or leave undone; and
therefore the world-law; therefore we are fellow-citizens and share a
common citizenship’ M. Aurel. _To himself_ iv 4.
[12] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 4, i.
[13] ‘duas respublicas animo conplectamur, alteram magnam et vere
publicam, qua di atque homines continentur; ... alteram, cui nos
adscripsit condicio nascendi’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 4, 1. So too Epictetus:
‘What is a man? a part of a state, of that first which consists of gods
and men; then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image
of the universal state’ _Disc._ ii 5, 26.
[14] ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἔφη [ὁ Ζήνων] τὸν Ἔρωτα θεὸν εἶναι, συνεργὸν
ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν Athen. xiii 12 (Arnim i 263);
‘salva autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest’
Sen. _Dial._ iv 31, 7.
[15] ‘eius [societatis humanae] vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae
conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate’ Cic.
_Off._ i 16, 50.
[16] φύσει τε τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει, ὡς καὶ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν
ὀρθὸν λόγον, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος Diog. L. vii 128; ‘ius esse natura
[Stoici censent]’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 21, 71.
[17] ‘non tum denique lex incipit esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta
est’ Cic. _Leg._ ii 5, 10.
[18] ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἱκοδομεῖν Plut. _Sto. rep._ 6, 1; ἀπαγορεύει ἀγάλματα
τεκταίνειν Theod. _Aff._ iii 74 (Arnim i 264).
[19] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 6, 1.
[20] Diog. L. vii 33.
[21] Plutarch, in quoting this argument, makes the telling rejoinder that
upon the same principle Zeno need not have published an answer to Plato’s
Republic; _Sto. rep._ 8, 1.
[22] Diog. L. vii 32. This particular condemnation was not uncongenial
to the Stoics of the principate, and may partly account for the decay
of literature in imperial Rome. But Chrysippus had meanwhile supplied
the needed qualification that these studies are useful as a training
preliminary to virtue; see Diog. L. vii 129, and cf. § 336.
[23] Diog. L. vii 33. Probably usury was also condemned by Zeno, as it
was by Seneca: ‘quid computationes et venale tempus et sanguinolentae
centesimae?’ Sen. _Ben._ vii 10, 4.
[24] Diog. L. vii 131.
[25] ‘More continent than Zeno’ became a proverb at Athens; _ib._ 27.
[26] _ib._ 121.
[27] ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ τοῦ Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες Origen
_cont. Celsum_, vii 63 (Arnim iii 729).
[28] This principle is stated by Chrysippus: πρὸς τὰ θηρία φησὶ δεῖν
ἀποβλέπειν Plut. _Sto. rep._ 22, 1.
[29] The essential equality of the sexes in Stoic theory is illustrated
in the development of Roman law: ‘led by their theory of natural law, the
[Roman] jurisconsults had evidently ... assumed the equality of the sexes
as a principle of their code of equity’ Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 154. Cf.
on the whole subject Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, bk v ch. 13: e.g. ‘to the
common Greek sentiment exclusive personal appropriation [of women] and
the resulting inequality in ownership was as yet very far from seeming so
much of a law of nature, or meeting with such unconditional acceptance as
... in modern times’ (vol. iii p. 119).
[30] See § 431.
[31] ‘What then, are not women common by nature? So I say also. Is not
the theatre common to the citizens? When then they have taken their
seats, come (if you think proper) and eject one of them!’ Epict. _Disc._
ii 4, 8.
[32] καὶ μητράσι [Χρύσιππος] λέγει συνέρχεσθαι καὶ θυγατράσι καὶ υἱοῖς
Diog. L. vii 188. A Church Father has caught the point better; εἶπον ὅτι
τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς
καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν Origen _cont. Cels._ iv 45
(Arnim iii 743). For the Persian view see Diog. L. Prol. 8.
[33] Arnim i 256.
[34] Origen, as above.
[35] See below, § 478.
[36] See above, § 254.
[37] Arnim i 253.
[38] _ib._ i 254.
[39] Diog. L. vii 121.
[40] Arnim iii 748.
[41] Arnim iii 752. For the same view in earlier times see Gomperz,
_Greek Thinkers_, i p. 403.
[42] i 45, 108.
[43] ‘ille divinus animus egressurus hominem, quo receptaculum suum
conferatur, ignis illud exurat an terra contegat, an ferae distrahant,
non magis ad se iudicat pertinere quam secundas ad editum infantem’ Sen.
_Ep._ 92, 34; ‘But you will be cast out unburied ... If the corpse is I,
I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more
properly’ Epict. _Disc._ iv 7, 31.
[44] For a plain statement to this effect we have to look to Philo:
ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως δοῦλος οὐδείς _Sept. et fest. di._ p. 283 M (Arnim
iii 352).
[45] ‘est genus iniustae servitutis, cum hi sunt alterius, qui sui
possunt esse’ Cic. _Rep._ iii 25, 37.
[46] ‘servus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercennarius est’ Sen.
_Ben._ iii 22, 1; ‘non male praecipiunt, qui [servis] ita iubent uti, ut
mercennariis: operam exigendam, iusta praebenda’ Cic. _Off._ i 13, 41.
[47] ‘potest [servus] dare beneficium domino, si a domino iniuriam
accipere’ Sen. _Ben._ iii 22, 3.
[48] ‘quod si natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices
et rusticos et mulieres doceri, ut sapiant: populumque [sapientium] ex
omni lingua et condicione et sexu et aetate conflari. senserunt hoc adeo
Stoici, qui et servis et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt’ Lact.
_Div. inst._ iii 25 (Arnim iii 253).
[49] See above, § 110.
[50] Schmekel, _Phil. d. mittleren Stoa_, pp. 63, 69.
[51] ‘eorum nullum ipsum per se separatum probo; anteponoque singulis
illud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus. sed si unum ac simplex probandum
sit, regium probem atque inprimis laudem’ Cic. _Rep._ i 35, 54; ‘optimus
civitatis status sub rege iusto est’ Sen. _Ben._ ii 20, 2.
[52] ‘memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio
... optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum, quem maiores nostri nobis
reliquissent’ Cic. _Rep._ i 21, 34.
[53] See below, ch. xvi.
[54] Arnim iii 354.
[55] Diog. L. vii 121.
[56] τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται καθηκόντως, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται
οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα Stob. ii 7, 3 b.
[57] ‘virtus nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens’ Sen. _Ep._
113, 2; ‘virtus est adfectio animi constans conveniensque’ Cic. _Tusc.
disp._ iv 15, 34.
[58] In numerous variations: for the present it is sufficient to quote
Cicero’s phrase ‘convenienter naturae vivere’ _Fin._ iii 9, 31, etc., and
from Seneca ‘virtus secundum naturam est; vitia inimica et infesta sunt’
_Ep._ 50, 8. Cf. also ‘we ought to go to be instructed, in order that we
may maintain our minds in harmony with the things that happen’ Epict.
_Disc._ i 12, 17.
[59] ‘[virtus] habebit illud in animo vetus praeceptum: deum sequere’
Sen. _Dial._ vii 15, 5.
[60] ‘ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._
iv 15, 34.
[61] ‘virtutis definitio est—habitus consentiens vitae’ Comm. _in Lucan._
ii 380 (Arnim iii 199).
[62] ‘perfecta virtus aequalitas [est] ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans
sibi’ Sen. _Ep._ 31, 8.
[63] ‘ante omnia hoc cura, ut constes tibi’ _ib._ 35, 4.
[64] ‘virtus convenientia constat: omnia opera eius cum ipsa concordant
et congruunt’ _ib._ 74, 30.
[65] ‘[stultitia] semper incipit vivere: quam foeda [est] hominum
levitas cottidie nova vitae fundamenta ponentium, novas spes in exitu
incohantium! quid est turpius quam senex vivere incipiens?’ _ib._ 13, 16
and 17.
[66] ‘Zeno is erat qui ... id appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex
quoddam et solum et unum bonum’ Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 36. So Seneca: ‘quid est
sapientia? semper idem velle atque idem nolle’ Sen. _Ep._ 20, 5.
[67] See above, § 81.
[68] Whether by Zeno (Diog. L. vii 87), or by Cleanthes (Stob. ii 7, 6 a:
Arnim i 552) is a matter of no importance.
[69] See above, § 108. The emphasis on individual nature is sometimes
still greater; ἡ ἀρετὴ τελειότης ἐστὶ τῆς ἑκάστου φύσεως Galen _plac.
Hipp. et Plat._ v 5, p. 468 K (from Chrysippus).
[70] Diog. L. vii 87 and 88.
[71] Stob. ii 7, 6 a. See also above, § 258.
[72] Stob. ii 7, 6 a.
[73] See below, § 320.
[74] Παναίτιος τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμὰς τέλος
ἀπεφήνατο Clem. Al. _Strom._ ii 21, 129.
[75] ‘sic est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus;
ea tamen conservata, propriam naturam sequamur’ _Off._ i 31, 110.
[76] ‘vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent’
_Fin._ iv 6, 14.
[77] ‘huc et illud accedit, ut perfecta virtus sit aequalitas ac tenor
vitae per omnia consonans sibi, quod non potest esse nisi rerum scientia
contingit et ars, per quam humana ac divina noscantur; hoc est summum
bonum’ Sen. _Ep._ 31, 8.
[78] See above, § 98.
[79] ‘non pareo deo, sed adsentior. ex animo illum, non quia necesse est,
sequor’ Sen. _Ep._ 96, 2.
[80] ‘deo parere libertas est’ _Dial._ vii 15, 7.
[81] Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 89 and 90.
[82] _ib._ ii 10, 5.
[83] _ib._ iii 7, 7.
[84] ‘Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam sapiens, nisi si quid impedierit’
Sen. _Dial._ viii 3, 2; πολιτεύσεσθαί φασι τὸν σοφόν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος
Diog. L. vii 121.
[85] See § 306, note 26.
[86] Cic. _Off._ i 4, 12.
[87] τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναί φασι ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὑτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν
βίον Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.
[88] [ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη] πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι Xen. _Mem._ iii 9, 5; see
also above, §§ 48, 52.
[89] διδακτήν τε εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ
Ποσειδώνιος Diog. L. vii 91.
[90] ‘They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by
thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Show them
their errors, and you will see how they desist from their errors’ Epict.
_Disc._ i 18, 3 and 4.
[91] See above, § 177, note 28.
[92] ‘If you would be a good reader, read; if a writer, write. Generally,
if you would make anything a habit, do it; if you would not make it a
habit, do not do it’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 18, 2 and 4; ‘nihil est quod non
humana mens vincat, et in familiaritatem adducat adsidua meditatio’ Sen.
_Dial._ iv 12, 3.
[93] ὧν κατορθοῦσιν [ἄνθρωποι], ἡ ὀρθὴ κρίσις ἐξηγεῖται μετὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν
ψυχὴν εὐτονίας Chrys. ap. Galen _plac. H. et Plat._ iv 6, p. 403 K (Arnim
iii 473).
[94] ‘virtutem convenies ... pro muris stantem, pulverulentam, coloratam,
callosas habentem manus’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 7, 3.
[95] ‘Saturnalia Athenis agitabamus hilare prorsum et modeste, non (ut
dicitur) “remittentes animum,” nam “remittere” inquit Musonius “animum
quasi amittere est”’ Gellius, _N. A._ xviii 2, 1.
[96] ‘iustum ac tenacem propositi virum | non civium ardor prava
iubentium, | non vultus instantis tyranni | mente quatit solida’ Hor.
_C._ iii 3, 1-4.
[97] ‘hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci εὐθυμίαν vocant; ego
tranquillitatem voco’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 3.
[98] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 10, 23.
[99] ‘ut enim corporis temperatio, cum ea congruunt inter se ex quibus
constamus, sanitas, sic animi dicitur, cum eius iudicia opinionesque
concordant, eaque animi est virtus’ _ib._ 13, 30.
[100] ‘roga bonam mentem, bonam valetudinem animi, deinde tunc corporis’
Sen. _Ep._ 10, 4; ‘orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano’ Juv.
_Sat._ x 356.
[101] ‘beata est vita conveniens naturae suae, quae non aliter contingere
potest, quam si primum sana mens est et in perpetua possessione sanitatis
suae, deinde fortis et vehemens, tum pulcherrima ac patiens, apta
temporibus, corporis sui pertinentiumque ad id curiosa non anxie’ Sen.
_Dial._ vii 3, 3.
[102] ‘actio recta non erit, nisi fuerit recta voluntas’ Sen. _Ep._ 95,
57; ‘gratus potest esse homo voluntate’ _Ben._ ii 31, 1; ‘sic timere,
sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est, etiam sine effectu’
Cic. _Fin._ iii 9, 32; ‘The being of the good is a certain kind of will
(προαίρεσις); the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What then
are externals? Material for the will’ Epict. _Disc._ i 29, 1 and 2.
[103] See below, § 383.
[104] Arnim i 250.
[105] Diog. L. vii 33.
[106] ‘placet Stoicis, suo quamque rem nomine appellare. sic enim
disserunt, nihil esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu’ Cic. _Fam._ ix 22, 1.
See further below, § 344.
[107] ‘postea tuus ille Poenulus, causam non obtinens repugnante natura,
verba versare coepit et primum rebus iis, quas non bonas dicimus,
concessit ut haberentur † aestimabiles, et ad naturam accommodatae’
_Fin._ iv 20, 56; ‘the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by
the admission of προηγμένα’ Zeller, _Stoics_, p. 290. The true note is
struck by Rendall, _Introd._ p. xlv: ‘the course of Stoic ethics is, in
fact, the progressive enlargement and clarification of the Cynic ideal
of conduct, under the stress of that larger conception of “nature” which
was inherent in Stoic monism. The full content and interpretation of the
formula was only gradually realised. Its deeper implications unfolded
themselves through life even more than through thought, and find their
fullest exposition in the pages of the Roman Stoics.’
[108] Stob. ii 7, 5 a.
[109] ‘aestimatio, quae ἀξία dicitur’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 34. Posidonius
seems to have practically substituted ἀξίαν ἔχοντα for προηγμένα, but in
strict usage the latter term is narrower, and includes only such things
as have measurable worth.
[110] ‘inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum,
aliquid tamen quo differrent esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia
aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum’ _ib._ 15, 50; τῶν δὲ ἀξίαν
ἐχόντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν, τὰ δὲ βραχεῖαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν
ἀπαξίαν ἐχόντων ἃ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἃ δὲ βραχεῖαν Stob. ii 7, 7
g; ‘quae essent sumenda ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris’
Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 37.
[111] Stob. ii 7, 7.
[112] Arnim iii 122.
[113] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 23, 6.
[114] ‘cetera autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum
naturam dicebat [Zeno], alia naturae esse contraria. his ipsis alia
interiecta et media numerabat’ Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 36.
[115] τὸ προηγμένον συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει Stob. ii 7, 7 g.
[116] ‘[hoc] Zeno προηγμένον nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa
factis tamen nominibus ac novis. “ut enim,” inquit, “nemo dicit in regia
regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id enim est προηγμένον),
sed eos qui in aliquo honore sint, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut
secundus sit, ad regium principatum”’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 15, 51.
[117] ‘quae pluris, ea praeposita appellabat; reiecta autem, quae
minoris’ _Ac._ i 10, 37; ‘quae appellemus vel promota et remota, vel, ut
dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta’ _Fin._ iii 16,
52.
[118] ‘quis porro sapientum, nostrorum dico, quibus unum est bonum
virtus, negat etiam haec, quae indifferentia vocamus, habere in se
aliquid pretii et alia aliis esse potiora? quibusdam ex iis tribuitur
aliquid honoris, quibusdam multum’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 22, 4.
[119] ‘itaque commoda vocentur, et ut nostra lingua loquar, producta’
_Ep._ 74, 17.
[120] See above, § 82.
[121] ‘bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est; quod contra, malum;
nec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis’
Cic. _Fin._ v 29, 89; cf. Arnim iii 137.
[122] ‘sunt animi bona, sunt corporis, sunt fortunae; illa animi bona a
stulto ac malo submoventur’ Sen. _Ben._ v 13, 1.
[123] ‘deinceps explicatur differentia rerum; quam si non ullam esse
diceremus, et confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone; neque ullum
sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur; cum inter res eas quae ad vitam
degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum delectum
haberi oporteret’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 15, 50.
[124] ‘virtutis hoc proprium [est], earum rerum quae secundum naturam
sint, habere delectum’ _ib._ 4, 12.
[125] ‘relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum
rerum quae natura eveniant, selegentem quae secundum naturam, et si quae
contra naturam sunt, reicientem; id est, convenienter congruenterque
naturae vivere’ _ib._ 9, 31 (after Posidonius).
[126] ‘ut si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere
talum, ut rectus assistat; qui ita talis erit iactus, ut cadat rectus,
praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem; qui aliter, contra. neque tamen
illa praepositio ad eum quem dixi finem pertinebit: sic ea, quae sunt
praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque
nihil pertinent’ _ib._ 16, 54; compare also 6, 22; ‘non est turpe non
consequi, dummodo sequaris’ Sen. _Ben._ v 5, 3.
[127] αὐτάρκη τε εἶναι αὐτὴν [τὴν ἀρετὴν] πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν Diog. L.
vii 127; ‘a Zenone hoc magnifice tanquam ex oraculo editur: virtus ad
bene vivendum se ipsa contenta est’ Cic. _Fin._ v 27, 79; cf. Pearson,
_Fragments_, p. 19.
[128] ‘testatur saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae
defendi possint, de finibus bonorum; aut enim honestatem esse finem aut
voluptatem aut utrumque’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 45, 138.
[129] ‘crescere bonorum finem non putamus’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 14, 48;
‘honestum nullam accessionem recipit’ Sen. _Ep._ 66, 9; ‘summum bonum
nec infringitur nec augetur; in suo modo permanet, utcunque se fortuna
gessit. utrum maiorem an minorem circulum scribas, ad spatium eius
pertinet, non ad formam’ _ib._ 74, 26 and 27.
[130] See above, § 110.
[131] See above, § 313.
[132] ‘cum [Panaetius] sit is, qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod
honestum sit’ Cic. _Off._ iii 3, 12; ‘solebat narrare Pompeius se, cum
Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, audire voluisse Posidonium; sed
cum audivisset eum graviter esse aegrum, quod vehementer eius artus
laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere ... itaque eum
graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum
esset, cubantem disputavisse: cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur,
saepe dixisse: “nihil agis, dolor: quamvis sis molestus, nunquam te esse
confitebor malum”’ _Tusc. disp._ ii 25, 61; cf. Sen. _Ep._ 87, 35.
[133] See above, § 114.
[134] Diog. L. vii 128.
[135] ‘sapientem nulla re egere, et tamen multis ei rebus opus esse’ Sen.
_Ep._ 9, 14.
[136] ‘[virtus] ipsa pretium sui’ _Dial._ vii 9, 4; ‘recte factorum verus
fructus [est] fecisse’ _Clem._ i 1, 1; ‘virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis
est’ _Ep._ 81, 20.
[137] ‘sapienti non nocetur a paupertate, non a dolore, non ab aliis
tempestatibus vitae; ipse semper in actu est; in effectu tunc maximus,
cum illi fortuna se obposuit’ _ib._ 85, 37.
[138] ‘virtutem nemo unquam deo acceptam rettulit ... iudicium hoc
omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse
sapientiam’ Cic. _N. D._ iii 36, 86 and 88; ‘aequum mi animum ipse
parabo’ Hor. _Ep._ i 18, 112; ‘monstro, quod ipse tibi possis dare’ Juv.
_Sat._ x 363.
[139] See note 129.
[140] ‘Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is
good and just? Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be
good and happy?’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 24, 51 and 52.
[141] ‘What does not make the man himself worse, does not make his life
worse either, nor injure him, without or within’ _To himself_ iv 8.
[142] ‘nec summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se
viderit dissimile meliori’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 15, 1; ‘No man is able to
make progress when he is wavering between opposite things; but if you
have preferred this (one thing) to all things, if you choose to attend to
this only, to work out this only, give up everything else’ Epict. _Disc._
iv 2, 4.
[143] Chrysippus wrote a book περὶ τοῦ ποιὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς; see Arnim
iii 256.
[144] See below, §§ 335-350.
[145] Diog. L. vii 92.
[146] τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα
πάσας ἔχειν Diog. L. vii 125; ‘quicquid honeste fit, una virtus facit,
sed ex consilii sententia’ Sen. _Ep._ 67, 10; ‘virtutibus inter se
concordia [est]’ _Clem._ i 5, 3.
[147] ‘videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus; id autem est
perfectum officium’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 18, 59; ‘rectum, quod κατόρθωμα
dicebas’ _ib._ iv 6, 15.
[148] ‘quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere; attamen utrumque
eorum fundi quodammodo et quasi dilatari putant’ _ib._ iii 15, 48.
[149] See above, § 153, note 66.
[150] ‘scit [sapiens] neminem nasci sapientem sed fieri’ Sen. _Dial._ iv
10, 6.
[151] ‘non dat natura virtutem; ars est bonum fieri’ _Ep._ 90, 44.
[152] Zeno probably took over the term προκοπή from the Peripatetics, see
Diog. L. vii 127; its implications he adapted to Stoic principles. See
Plut. _prof. virt._ 12.
[153] ‘hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum
ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum’
Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 34.
[154] Stob. ii 7, 11 g; Diog. L. vii 127.
[155] τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος ἀποβλητήν ... διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν _ib._
[156] See above, § 289.
[157] ‘semel traditi nobis boni perpetua possessio est; non dediscitur
virtus. contraria enim mala in alieno haerent, ideo depelli et exturbari
possunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 50, 8. Just in the same spirit we say that a new
language or (say) the art of swimming, if once learnt, is learnt ‘for
good.’
[158] ‘aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est, ac semper ante oculos
habendus, ut sic tanquam illo spectante vivamus, et omnia tanquam illo
vidente faciamus’ Sen. _Ep._ 11, 8, quoting however from Epicurus.
[159] ‘Heracles was the model whom [Antisthenes] and the other Cynics
held up for imitation, the patron saint, so to speak, of the school.
Antisthenes wrote a dialogue entitled “Heracles” and, with this for
guidance, his followers delighted to tell again the story of the hero’s
laborious and militant life, identifying, by ingenious allegories, the
foul monsters which he vanquished with the vices and lusts that beset the
souls of men’ Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii p. 151; ‘the more generous
Cynics aver that the great Heracles also, as he became the author of
other blessings, so also left to mankind the chief pattern of this
(Cynic) life’ Julian, _Or._ vi p. 187, 3 (Mayor on Juv. _Sat._ x 361). So
also in Buddhism: ‘besides the ideal King, the personification of Power
and Justice, another ideal has played an important part in the formation
of early Buddhist ideas regarding their master. It was the ideal of a
perfectly Wise Man, the personification of Wisdom, the Buddha’ Rhys
Davids, _Hibbert Lectures_, p. 141.
[160] ‘Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio
caelestium collocavit’ Cic. _Off._ iii 5, 25.
[161] ‘Hercules nihil sibi vicit: orbem terrarum transiit non
concupiscendo sed vindicando, quid vinceret; malorum hostis, bonorum
vindex, terrarum marisque pacator’ Sen. _Ben._ i 13, 3. See also the
brilliant descriptions in Epict. _Disc._ iii 24.
[162] ‘Ulixen et Herculem ... Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt,
invictos laboribus, contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrarum’
Sen. _Dial._ ii 2, 1. Yet there is something to be said on the other
side: ‘Ulysses felt a desire for his wife, and wept as he sat on a
rock.... If Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man’ Epict.
_Disc._ iii 24, 18.
[163] So Horace, quite in the Stoic spirit: ‘rursus quid virtus et quid
patientia possit, | utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen’ Hor. _Ep._ i
2, 17 and 18.
[164] Diog. L. vi 1, 2.
[165] ‘By acting thus Heraclitus and those like him were deservedly
divine, and were so called’ Epict. _Manual_ 15.
[166] ‘praeclara est aequabilitas in omni vita, et idem semper vultus
eademque frons, ut de Socrate accepimus’ Cic. _Off._ i 26, 90; ‘Socrates
... violated nothing which was becoming to a good man, neither in making
his defence nor by fixing a penalty on himself; nor even in the former
part of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier’ Epict.
_Disc._ iii 24, 61.
[167] See above, § 17.
[168] ‘si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de
deorum immortalium statu’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 8, 5; ‘By acting thus Diogenes
... was deservedly divine, and was so called’ Epict. _Manual_ 15.
[169] See above, § 306, note 25.
[170] δεύτερος Ἡρακλῆς ὁ Κλεάνθης ἐκαλεῖτο Diog. L. vii 170; ‘Learn how
those live who are genuine philosophers: how Socrates lived, who had a
wife and children; how Diogenes lived, and how Cleanthes, who attended to
the school and drew water’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 26, 23.
[171] ‘aut Cato ille sit aut Scipio aut Laelius’ Sen. _Ep._ 25, 6; ‘elige
remissioris animi virum Laelium’ _ib._ 11, 10.
[172] ‘nam cum esset ille vir [P. Rutilius Rufus] exemplum, ut scitis,
innocentiae, cumque illo nemo neque integrior esset in civitate neque
sanctior, non modo supplex iudicibus esse noluit, sed ne ornatius quidem
aut liberius causam dici suam, quam simplex ratio veritatis ferebat’ Cic.
_de Or._ i 53, 229; cf. Sen. _Dial._ i 3, 4 and 7; and see further, § 430.
[173] ‘Catonem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortales
dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus saeculis’ Sen. _Dial._ ii 2, 1.
[174] ‘ego te [Cato] verissime dixerim peccare nihil’ Cic. _Mur._ 29, 60.
[175] ‘Catonis nobile letum’ Hor. _C._ i 12, 35 and 36; and see below, §
430.
[176] ‘nobis quoque militandum est’ Sen. _Ep._ 51, 6; ‘This is the true
athlete. Great is the combat, divine is the work’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 18,
28. See also below, § 402.
[177] Euseb. _pr. ev._ vi 8, 13; Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 28, p. 199, 16 B.
[178] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 31, 5.
[179] ‘qui sapiens sit aut fuerit, ne ipsi quidem solent dicere’ Cic.
_Ac._ ii 47, 145. Thus Panaetius made no reference to the wise man;
whilst Posidonius only defended his possible existence in the future
(Schmekel, pp. 213, 278).
[180] Sext. _math._ ix 133.
[181] See above, § 214.
[182] Even if Cicero is not the creator of the conception of an ‘ideal
character,’ nowhere else can we find its meaning so clearly expressed.
So of the wise man; ‘iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere
fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus,
quem quaerimus certe, et confidere sibi debet, et suae vitae et actae et
consequenti, et bene de se iudicare’ _Fin._ iii 8, 29.
[183] ‘non est quod dicas hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri’ Sen.
_Dial._ ii 7, 1.
[184] ‘ille alter [sapiens primae notae] fortasse tanquam phoenix semel
anno quingentesimo nascitur’ _Ep._ 42, 1, cf. Alex. Aphr. p. 34, n. 2;
‘scit [sapiens] paucissimos omni aevo sapientes evadere’ Sen. _Dial._ iv
10, 6.
[185] See above, § 126.
[186] ‘Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improving
himself, attending to nothing except to reason. But you, though you are
not yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates’
Epict. _Manual_ 50. Epictetus did not however ignore failures: ‘we
[Stoics] say one thing, but we do another; we talk of the things which
are beautiful, but we do what is base’ _Disc._ iii 7, 18.
[187] See above, § 42.
[188] See above, § 98.
[189] This is again a Socratic paradox: βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς
τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν Xen. _Mem._
iii 9, 10.
[190] Cic. _Fin._ iii 22, 75 and 76.
[191] ‘eorum, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit, uti
in omnibus tormentis conservetur beata vita sapienti’ _ib._ iii 13, 42;
Arnim iii 585, 586; ‘shew me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and
happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Shew him; I desire, by
the gods, to see a Stoic’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 24.
[192] See below, §§ 431, 439.
[193] ‘bonus tempore tantum a deo differt’ Sen. _Dial._ i 1, 5; ‘sapiens
excepta mortalitate similis deo’ _ib._ ii 8, 2; and see above, § 274.