CHAPTER XI.

THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL.

[Sidenote: Man a part of the universe.]

=262.= From the contemplation of the universe as a whole, both from the

purely scientific standpoint in the study of physics, and from the more

imaginative point of view in the dogmas of religion, we now pass on to

the more intimate study of the individual man, consisting of body and

soul. In its main outlines the Stoic theory has already been sketched.

Thus it follows from the monistic standpoint that man is not ultimately

an ‘individual’ or unit of the universe; for the universe itself is

the only true unit, and a man is a part of it which cannot even for a

moment break itself off completely from the whole. It is therefore only

in a secondary and subordinate sense, and with special reference to the

inculcation of ethics, that we can treat Zeno or Lucilius as separate

and independent beings. Again, when we say that man ‘consists of body

and soul,’ we are merely adopting popular language; for body and soul

are ultimately one, and differ only in the gradation of spirit or tone

which informs them. Then we have already learnt in dialectics that

the highest power of man is that of ‘assent’ or free choice, which is

displayed in every exercise of reason; and the same power, though in a

different aspect, is at work in every moral act. The doctrine of the

universe is based upon the postulate that it is a living rational being

on the largest scale; and it follows, that each man is a ‘microcosm,’

and contains in himself a complete representation of the universe in

miniature. Lastly, we see that man takes his place in the universe, a

little lower than gods and daemons, and as greatly higher than animals

as these in their turn surpass plants and inanimate objects; and that his

nature, considered as composite, includes all the varying gradations of

spirit to which these orders correspond within the universe. In all his

parts alike the divine element is immanent and it binds them together in

a coherent unity (συμπάθεια τῶν μέρων). It remains for us to put together

from these and like points of departure a complete picture of human

nature.

[Sidenote: The soul’s kingdom.]

=263.= To indicate the general trend of Stoic thought on this subject

we propose the title ‘the kingdom of soul.’ Starting with the popular

distinction between body and soul, we find that the biologist and the

physician alike are preoccupied with the study of the body, that is,

of physiology. Only as an afterthought and supplement to their work

are the functions of soul considered; and they are treated as far as

possible by the methods suggested by the study of the body. All this is

reversed in the Stoic philosophy. The study of the soul stands in the

front, and is treated by methods directly suggested by observation of the

soul’s functions. The body is not entirely ignored, but is considered of

comparatively small importance. Further, the soul itself is manifold,

and is likened to a State, in which all is well if the governing part

have wisdom and benevolence proportionate to its power, and if the lower

parts are content to fulfil their respective duties; but if the balance

of the State is upset, all becomes disorder and misery[1]. Lastly, this

kingdom is itself a part of a greater whole, namely of the Cosmopolis or

universal State. By the comparison with a kingdom we are also directed

towards right moral principle. For as the citizen of Corinth or Sparta

ought not to repine because his city is of less grandeur than Athens, so

no man should be anxious because his external opportunities are limited.

He has a kingdom in his own mind and soul and heart. Let him be content

to find his happiness in rightly administering it.

[Sidenote: Man a picture of the universe.]

=264.= The doctrine that man is a representation or reflection of the

universe is of unknown antiquity. It seems to be clearly implied by

the teaching of Heraclitus, in so far as he lays it down that both

the universe and man are vivified and controlled by the Logos[2]. The

technical terms ‘macrocosm’ (μέγας κόσμος) and ‘microcosm’ (μικρὸς

κόσμος), are, as we have seen, employed by Aristotle[3]. But even if we

suppose that this conception is a commonplace of Greek philosophy, it

is in Stoicism alone that it is of fundamental importance, and knit up

with the whole framework of the system. And accordingly we find that all

the Stoic masters laid stress upon this principle. The words of Zeno

suggest to Cicero that ‘the universe displays all impulses of will and

all corresponding actions just like ourselves when we are stirred through

the mind and the senses[4].’ Cleanthes used the dogma of the soul of the

universe to explain the existence of the human soul as a part of it[5].

Chrysippus found a foundation for ethics in the doctrine that man should

study and imitate the universe[6]. Diogenes of Babylon says boldly that

God penetrates the universe, as soul the man[7]; and Seneca that the

relation of God to matter is the same as that of the soul to the body[8].

It is little wonder therefore if by Philo’s time the analogy had become a

commonplace, and philosophers of more than one school were accustomed to

say that ‘man is a little universe, and the universe a big man[9].’ God

is therefore the soul of the universe[10]; on the other hand the soul is

God within the human body[11], a self-moving force encased in relatively

inert matter, providence at work within the limitations of natural

necessity.

[Sidenote: Soul and body.]

=265.= The dualism of body and soul appears in a sharply defined shape

in Persism, and upon it depends the popular dogma of the immortality of

the soul, which (as we have already noticed) reached the Greco-Roman

world from a Persian source[12]. It appears to be rooted in the more

primitive ways of thinking termed ‘Animism’ and ‘Spiritism,’ in which

men felt the presence both in natural objects and within themselves of

forces which they conceived as distinct beings. According to this system

a man’s soul often assumes bodily shape, and quits his body even during

life, either in sleep or during a swoon; sometimes indeed it may be seen

to run away and return in the shape of a mouse or a hare. At death it is

seen to leave the man as a breath of air, and to enter the atmosphere.

But besides his soul a man possesses a shadow, a likeness, a double,

a ghost, a name; and all these in varying degrees contribute to form

what we should call his personality. In the animistic system the soul

survives the man, and why not? But this survival is vaguely conceived,

and only credited so far as the evidence of the senses supports it. Its

formulation in the doctrine of immortality belongs to a more advanced

stage of human thought[13].

[Sidenote: Soul and body are one.]

=266.= This dualistic conception could be and was incorporated in the

Stoic system to the same extent as the dualism of God and matter, but no

further. Ultimately, as we have already learnt, soul and body are one;

or, in the language of paradox, ‘soul is body[14].’ This follows not only

from the general principles of our philosophy, but also specifically

from observation of the facts of human life. ‘The incorporeal,’ argued

Cleanthes, ‘cannot be affected by the corporeal, nor the corporeal by

the incorporeal, but only the corporeal by the corporeal. But the soul

is affected by the body in disease and in mutilation, and the body by

the soul, for it reddens in shame and becomes pale in fear: therefore

the soul is body[15].’ And similarly Chrysippus argues: ‘death is the

separation of soul from body. Now the incorporeal neither joins with

nor is separated from body, but the soul does both. The soul therefore

is body[16].’ This doctrine is commonly adduced as evidence of the

‘materialism’ of the Stoics: yet the Stoics do not say that ‘soul is

matter,’ and (as we shall see) they explain its workings upon principles

quite different to the laws of physics or chemistry. The essential unity

of body and soul follows also from the way in which we acquire knowledge

of them. For we perceive body by the touch; and we learn the workings of

the soul by a kind of touch, called the inward touch (ἐντὸς ἁφή)[17].

[Sidenote: Mind, soul and body.]

=267.= Having realised that the division of man into soul and body is not

ultimate, we may more easily prepare ourselves to make other divisions. A

division into three parts, (i) body, (ii) soul or life (ψυχή, _anima_),

and (iii) mind (νοῦς, _animus_), was widely accepted in Stoic times, and

in particular by the school of Epicurus; the mind being that which man

has, and the animals have not[18]. The Stoics develope this division by

the principle of the microcosm. Mind is that which man has in common with

the deity; life that which he has in common with the animals; growth

(φύσις, _natura_), that which he has in common with the plants, as for

instance is shown in the hair and nails[19]. Man also possesses cohesion

(ἕξις, _unitas_) but never apart from higher powers. Further these four,

mind, soul, growth, and cohesion, are not different in kind, but all are

spirits (πνεύματα) which by their varying degrees of tension (τόνος,

_intentio_) are, to a less or greater extent, removed from the divine

being, the primal stuff. In this sense man is not one, nor two, but

multiple, as the deity is multiple[20].

[Sidenote: The soul is fire and air.]

=268.= The soul in its substance or stuff is fire, identical with the

creative fire which is the primal stuff of the universe[21]. But the

popular conception, according to which the soul is air or breath, and is

seen to leave the body at death, is also not without truth[22]. There is

a very general opinion that the soul is a mixture of fire and air, or is

hot air[23]. By this a Stoic would not mean that the soul was a compound

of two different elements, but that it was a variety of fire in the first

stage of the downward path, beginning to form air by relaxation of its

tension: but even so this form of the doctrine was steadily subordinated

to the older doctrine of Heraclitus, that the soul is identical with

the divine fire. Formally the soul is defined, like the deity himself,

as a ‘fiery intelligent spirit[24]’; and in this definition it would

seem that we have no right to emphasize the connexion between the word

‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα) and its original meaning ‘breath,’ since the word has

in our philosophy many other associations. It is further a Stoic paradox

that ‘the soul is an animal,’ just as God is an animal. But the soul and

the man are not on that account two animals; all that is meant is that

men and the brutes, by reason of their being endowed with soul, become

animals[25].

[Sidenote: The temperaments.]

=269.= According to another theory, which is probably not specifically

Stoic, but derived from the Greek physicians, the soul is compounded of

all four elements in varying proportion, and the character of each soul

(subject, in the Stoic theory, to the supreme control of reason[26]) is

determined by the proportion or ‘temperament’ (κρᾶσις, _temperatura_) of

the four elements. There are accordingly four temperaments, the fervid,

the frigid, the dry, and the moist, according to the preponderance of

fire, air, earth, and water respectively[27]. Dull and sleepy natures

are those in which there is an excess of the gross elements of earth and

water[28]; whilst an excess of cold air makes a man timorous, and an

excess of fire makes him passionate[29]. These characters are impressed

upon a man from birth and by his bodily conditions, and within the limits

indicated above are unalterable[30]. The ‘temperaments’ have always been

a favourite subject of discussion in popular philosophy[31].

[Sidenote: The soul’s parts.]

=270.= The characteristic attribute of the soul is that it is self-moved

(αὐτοκίνητον)[32]. Although in this point the Stoics agree with Plato,

they do not go on to name life as another attribute, for they do not

agree with the argument of the _Phaedo_ that the soul, having life

as an inseparable attribute, is incapable of mortality. We pass on

to the dispositions of the soul, which correspond to its ‘parts’ in

other philosophies, and are indeed often called its parts. But the

soul has not in the strict sense parts[33]; what are so called are its

activities[34], which are usually reckoned as eight in number, though

the precise reckoning is of no importance[35]. The eight parts of the

soul are the ruling part or ‘principate[36],’ the five senses, and the

powers of speech and generation. The seven parts or powers other than the

principate are subject to it and do its bidding, so that the soul is, as

we have called it, a kingdom in itself. These seven parts are associated

each with a separate bodily organ, but at the same time each is connected

with the principate. They may therefore be identified with ‘spirits

which extend from the principate to the organs, like the arms of an

octopus[37],’ where by a ‘spirit’ we mean a pulsation or thrill, implying

incessant motion and tension. The principate itself, that is the mind,

is also a spirit possessed of a still higher tension; and the general

agreement of the Stoics places its throne conveniently at the heart and

in the centre of the body[38]. Accordingly Posidonius defined the soul’s

parts as ‘powers of one substance seated at the heart[39].’

[Sidenote: Aspects of the principate.]

=271.= If we now fix our attention on the principate itself, we find it

no more simple than the universe, the deity, the man, or the soul. In

particular it resembles the deity in that, although essentially one, it

is called by many names. It is the soul in its reasoning aspect, the

reason, the intellect (λογικὴ ψυχή, νοῦς, διάνοια)[40]; it is also the

‘ego,’ that is, the will, the energy, the capacity for action[41]. It is

in one aspect the divinity in us, world-wide, universal; in another the

individual man with his special bent and character; so that we may even

be said to have two souls in us, the world-soul and each man’s particular

soul[42]. The principate becomes also in turn each of the other functions

or parts of the soul, for each of them is an aspect of the principate

(ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον)[43]. In addition the principate has many titles

of honour, as when Marcus Aurelius terms it the Pilot[44], the King and

Lawgiver[45], the Controller and Governor[46], the God within[47].

[Sidenote: The principate as reason.]

=272.= Although for the purpose of discussion we may distinguish between

reason and will, they are in fact everywhere intermingled. Thus the

principate as the reasoning part of the soul includes the powers of

perception, assent, comprehension, and of reason in the narrower sense,

that is, the power of combining the various conceptions of the mind, so

as ultimately to form a consistent system[48]. But amongst these powers

assent is equally an act of the will; and on the other hand the judgments

formed by the reasoning mind are not purely speculative, but lead up to

action; so that it is the reasoning power which must be kept pure, in

order that it may duly control the soul’s inclinations and aversions,

its aims and shrinkings, its plans, interests and assents[49]. If in

the Stoic theory the greater emphasis always appears to be laid on the

reason, it is the more necessary in interpreting it to bear in mind that

we are speaking of the reason of an active and social being.

[Sidenote: The principate as will.]

=273.= The maintenance of the principate as will in a right condition

is the problem of ethics; and it is important to understand what this

right condition is. The answer is to be found in a series of analogies,

drawn from all departments of philosophy. Thus from the standpoint of

physics the right condition is a proper strain or tension, as opposed to

slackness or unsteadiness[50]. In theology it is the agreement of the

particular will with the divine or universal will[51]. From the point of

view of the will itself it is the strength and force (ἰσχὺς καὶ κράτος)

of the will, the attitude that makes a man say ‘I can[52].’ Again it

is that state of the soul which corresponds to health in the body[53];

and in a quiet mood the Stoic may describe it as a restful and calm

condition[54]. Finally, if the soul as a whole is compared to a State,

the principate in its function as the will may at its best be compared to

a just and kind sovereign; but if this aim is missed, it may turn into a

greedy and ungovernable tyrant[55].

[Sidenote: The principate, divine and human.]

=274.= The principate, as it is of divine origin[56], and destined, as

we shall see, to be re-absorbed in the deity, may rightly be called god:

it is a god making its settlement and home in a human body[57]: it keeps

watch within over the moral principle[58]. In the language of paradox we

may say to each man, ‘You are a god[59].’ Of this principle we see the

proof in that man interests himself in things divine[60], and in it we

find the first incentive to a lofty morality[61]. As however the deity

is not conceived in human form, and is not subject to human weaknesses,

there comes a point at which, in the study of the human principate,

we part company with the divine; and this point we reach both when

we consider the principate with regard to its seven distinctly human

manifestations, and when we consider its possible degradation from the

standard of health and virtue. We now turn to the seven parts or powers

of the human soul which are subordinate to the reasoning faculty.

[Sidenote: Powers of the principate.]

=275.= The first five powers of the principate are those which are

recognised in popular philosophy as the ‘five senses.’ To materialistic

philosophers nothing is plainer than that these are functions of the

body; is it not the eye which sees, and the ear which hears[62]? This

the Stoic denies. The eye does not see, but the soul sees through the

eye as through an open door. The ear does not hear, but the soul hears

through the ear. Sensation therefore is an activity of the principate,

acting in the manner already described in the chapter on ‘Reason and

Speech[63].’ The soul is actively engaged, and sends forth its powers

as water from a fountain; the sense-organs are passively affected by

the objects perceived[64]. Subject to this general principle, sensation

(αἴσθησις, _sensus_) may be variously defined. It is ‘a spirit which

penetrates from the principate to the sensory processes’; it includes

alike the mind-picture (φαντασία, _visum_), that is, the first rough

sketch which the mind shapes when stimulated by the sense-organ; the

assent (συγκατάθεσις, _adsensus_), which the mind gives or refuses

to this sketch; and the final act of comprehension (κατάληψις,

_comprehensio_) by which this assent is sealed or ratified[65]. Of these

the middle stage is the most important, so that we may say paradoxically

‘sense is assent[66].’ Only in a secondary and popular way can we use the

word sensation to denote the physical apparatus of the sensory organs

(αἰσθητήρια), as when we say of a blind man ‘he has lost the sense of

sight[67].’

[Sidenote: The five senses.]

=276.= The nature of sensation is more particularly described in the

case of sight and hearing. In the first case there proceed from the

eyes rays, which cause tension in the air, reaching towards the object

seen[68]; this tension is cone-shaped, and as the distance from the

pupil of the eye increases, the base of the cone is increased in size,

whilst the vigour of the sight diminishes. This human activity effects

vision of itself in one case; for we say ‘darkness is visible,’ when

the eye shoots forth light at it, and correctly recognises that it is

darkness[69]. But in complete vision there is an opposing wave-motion

coming from the object, and the two waves become mutually absorbed:

hence Posidonius called sight ‘absorption’ (σύμφυσις)[70]. Similarly,

in the case of hearing, the pulsation (which, as we have seen, comes

in the first instance from the principate) spreads from the ear to the

speaker, and (as is now more distinctly specified) from the speaker to

the hearer; this reverse pulsation being circular in shape, like the

waves excited on the surface of a lake by throwing a stone into the

water[71]. Of the sensations of smell, taste and touch we only hear that

they are respectively (i) a spirit extending from the principate to the

nostrils, (ii) a spirit extending from the principate to the tongue, and

(iii) a spirit extending to the surface of the body and resulting in the

easily-appreciated touch of an object[72].

[Sidenote: Other activities.]

=277.= The Stoic account of the functions of the soul displayed in the

ordinary activities of life is either defective or mutilated; for even a

slight outline of the subject should surely include at least breathing,

eating (with drinking), speech, walking, and lifting. We need not

however doubt that these, equally with the five senses, are all ‘spirits

stretching from the principate’ to the bodily organs. This is expressly

stated of walking[73]. Of all such activities we must consider voice to

be typical, when it is described as the sixth function of the soul. Voice

is described as ‘pulsating air[74],’ set in motion by the tongue[75];

but we can trace it back through the throat to some source below, which

we can without difficulty identify with the heart, the seat of the

principate[76]. The voice is indeed in a special relationship to the

principate, since the spoken word is but another aspect of the thought

which is expressed by it[77].

[Sidenote: Procreation.]

=278.= The seventh and last of the subordinate powers of the soul,

according to the Stoics, is that of procreation. This part of their

system is of great importance, not only for the study of human nature,

but even in a higher degree for its indirect bearing upon the question

of the development of the universe through ‘procreative principles’

(σπερματικοὶ λόγοι), or, as we have termed them above, ‘seed powers[78].’

That all things grow after their kind is of course matter of common

knowledge; no combination of circumstances, no scientific arrangement

of sustenance can make of an acorn anything but an oak, or of a hen’s

egg anything but a chicken. But in the common view this is, at least

primarily, a corporeal or material process; whereas the Stoics assert

that it is not only a property of the soul, but one so primary and

fundamental that it must be also assumed as a first principle of physical

science. Before approaching the subject from the Stoic standpoint, it may

be well to see how far materialistic theories, ancient and modern, can

carry us.

[Sidenote: Heredity.]

=279.= Lucretius finds this a very simple matter:

‘Children often resemble not only their parents, but also their

grandparents and more remote ancestors. The explanation is that

the parents contain in their bodies a large number of atoms,

which they have received from their ancestors and pass on to

their descendants. In the chance clashing of atoms in procreation

Venus produces all kinds of effects, bringing about resemblances

between children and their forebears, not only in the face and

person, but also in the look, the voice, and the hair[79].’

This account has a generally plausible sound until we bear in mind that

it is the fundamental property of atoms that, though their own variety

is limited, they can form things in infinite variety by changes in their

combination and arrangement. They are like the letters out of which

words, sentences, and poems are made up; and we can hardly expect to

reproduce the voice or the spirit of an Aeschylus by a fresh shuffling of

the letters contained in the _Agamemnon_. On the contrary, seeing that

the atoms contained in the bodies of parents have largely been drawn

from plants and animals, we could confidently reckon upon finding the

complete fauna and flora of the neighbourhood amongst their offspring.

Lucretius in effect postulates in his theory that particular atoms have

a representative and creative character, passing from father to child in

inseparable association with the marks of the human race, and endowed

with a special capacity of combining with other like atoms to form the

substratum of specifically human features. In giving his atoms these

properties he is insensibly approximating to the Stoic standpoint.

[Sidenote: Modern theories.]

=280.= Modern biologists deal with this subject with the minuteness of

detail of which the microscope is the instrument, and with the wealth of

illustration which results from the incessant accumulation of ascertained

facts. But they are perhaps open to the criticism that where they reach

the borders of their own science, they are apt to introduce references

to the sciences of chemistry and physics as explaining all difficulties,

even in regions to which these sciences do not apply. The following

account is taken from one of the most eminent of them:

‘Hertwig discovered that the one essential occurrence in

impregnation is the coalescence of the two sexual cells and

their nuclei. Of the millions of male spermatozoa which swarm

round a female egg-cell, only one forces its way into its

plasmic substance. The nuclei of the two cells are drawn

together by a mysterious force which we conceive as a _chemical

sense-activity akin to smell_, approach each other and melt

into one. So there arises through the sensitiveness of the two

sexual nuclei, _as a result of erotic chemotropism_, a new cell

which unites the inherited capacities of both parents; the

spermatozoon contributes the paternal, the egg-cell the maternal

characteristics to the primary-cell, from which the child is

developed[80].’

In another passage the same author sums up his results in bold language

from which all qualifications and admissions of imperfect knowledge have

disappeared:

‘Physiology has proved that all _the phenomena of life may be

reduced to chemical and physical processes_. The cell-theory

has shown us that all the complicated phenomena of the life of

the higher plants and animals may be deduced from the simple

physico-chemical processes in the elementary organism of the

microscopic cells, and the material basis of them is the plasma

of the cell-body[81].’

[Sidenote: Their inadequacy.]

=281.= These utterances may be considered typical of modern materialistic

philosophy in its extreme form. We may nevertheless infer from the

references to a ‘mysterious force,’ ‘chemical sense-activity akin to

smell,’ and ‘erotic chemotropism,’ that the analogies to biological

facts which the writer finds in chemical science stand in need of

further elucidation. We may notice further that the ‘atom’ has entirely

disappeared from the discussion, and that the ‘material basis’ of the

facts is a ‘plasma’ or ‘plasmic substance,’ something in fact which

stands related to a ‘protoplasm’ of which the chemical and physical

sciences know nothing, but which distinctly resembles the ‘fiery creative

body’ which is the foundation of the Stoic physics. Further we must

notice that the old problem of ‘the one and the many’ reappears in this

modern description; for the cell and its nucleus are neither exactly one

nor exactly two, but something which passes from two to one and from

one to two; further the nuclei of the two cells, being drawn together,

coalesce, and from their union is developed a ‘new cell’ which unites

the capacities of its ‘parents.’ Modern science, therefore, although it

has apparently simplified the history of generation by reducing it to

the combination of two units out of many millions that are incessantly

being produced by parent organisms, has left the philosophical problem of

the manner of their combination entirely unchanged. In these microscopic

cells is latent the whole physical and spiritual inheritance of the

parents, whether men, animals or plants, from which they are derived;

just as the atoms of Epicurus possess the germ of free will[82], so the

cells of Haeckel smell and love, struggle for marriage union, melt away

in each other’s embrace, and lose their own individuality at the moment

that a new being enters the universe.

[Sidenote: Creation and procreation.]

=282.= If then the phenomena of reproduction are essentially the same,

whether we consider the relations of two human beings or those of

infinitesimal elements which seem to belong to another order of being,

we are already prepared for the Stoic principle that the creation of

the universe is repeated in miniature in the bringing into life of each

individual amongst the millions of millions of organic beings which

people it. From this standpoint we gain fresh light upon the Stoic theory

of creation, and particularly of the relation of the eternal Logos to

the infinite multitude of procreative principles or ‘seed-powers.’

Again, it is with the general theory of creation in our minds that we

must revert to the Stoic explanation of ordinary generation. This is to

him no humble or unclean function of the members of the body; it is the

whole man, in his divine and human nature, that is concerned[83]. The

‘procreative principle’ in each man is a part of his soul[84]; ‘the seed

is a spirit’ (or pulsation) ‘extending from the principate to the parts

of generation[85].’ It is an emanation from the individual in which one

becomes two, and two become one. Just as the human soul is a ‘fragment’

of the divine, so is the seed a fragment torn away, as it were, from the

souls of parents and ancestors[86].

[Sidenote: Motherhood.]

=283.= In the seed is contained the whole build of the man that is

to be[87]. It is therefore important to know whether the procreative

principle in the embryo is derived from one or both parents, and if the

latter, whether in equal proportion. The Stoics do not appear to have

kept entirely free from the common prepossession, embodied in the law of

paternal descent, according to which the male element is alone active

in the development of the organism; and so they allege that the female

seed is lacking in tone and generative power[88]. On the other hand

observation appeared to them to show that children inherit the psychical

and bodily qualities of both parents, and the general tendency of their

philosophy was towards the equalization of the sexes. On the whole the

latter considerations prevailed, so that the doctrine of Stoicism, as of

modern times, was that qualities, both of body and soul, are inherited

from the seed of both parents[89]; wherein the possibility remains open,

that in particular cases the debt to one parent may be greater than to

the other[90].

[Sidenote: Impulses.]

=284.= The Stoic psychology is in its fundamental principles wholly

distinct from that of Plato; which does not at all prevent its exponents,

and least of all those like Panaetius and Posidonius who were admirers of

Plato, from making use of his system as an auxiliary to their own. Plato

divided the soul into three parts; the rational part, the emotional (and

volitional) part, and the appetitive[91]. Both the two latter parts need

the control of the reason, but the emotional part inclines to virtue,

the appetitive to vice[92]. The rational part, as with the Stoics, is

peculiar to man; the other two are also possessed by the animals, and

the appetitive soul even by plants. The Stoics do not however seriously

allow any kinship between virtue and the emotions, and they deal with

this part of the subject as follows. Nature has implanted in all living

things certain impulses which are directed towards some object. An

impulse towards an object is called ‘appetite’ (ὁρμή, _appetitus_ or

_impetus_); an impulse to avoid an object is called ‘aversion’ (ἀφορμή,

_alienatio_)[93]. In man appetite should be governed by reason; if

this is so, it becomes ‘reasonable desire’ (ὄρεξις εὔλογος, _recta

appetitio_)[94]; if otherwise, it becomes ‘unreasonable desire’ (ὄρεξις

ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ) or ‘concupiscence’ (ἐπιθυμία, _libido_). To living things

lower in the scale than man terms that are related to reason can of

course not apply.

[Sidenote: Will and responsibility.]

=285.= Practical choice is, according to the Stoics, exactly analogous

to intellectual decision. Just as the powers of sensation never deceive

us[95], so also the impulses are never in themselves irrational[96].

An impulse is an adumbration of a course of action as proper to be

pursued[97]; to this the will gives or refuses its assent[98]. It is the

will, and the will only, which is liable to error, and this through want

of proper tone and self-control. If there is this want, it appears in a

false judgment, a weak assent, an exaggerated impulse; and this is what

we call in ethics a perturbation[99]. A healthy assent leads up to a

right action: a false assent to a blunder or sin. Hence we hold to the

Socratic paradox that ‘no one sins willingly’ (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει);

for the true and natural will cannot sin; it must first be warped to a

false judgment and weakened by slackness of tone. We can equally use the

paradox that ‘every voluntary action is a judgment of the intellect,’

or (in few words) that ‘virtue is wisdom’ (φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή). In such

views we find a starting-point for dealing with the problems of ethics,

including those of the ethical ideal or supreme good, its application to

daily duties, and its failure through ignorance or weakness of soul.

[Sidenote: The body.]

=286.= We pass on to consider the body, but at no great length; partly

because many functions often considered as bodily are by the Stoics

treated as belonging to the soul (as sensations and impulses), partly

because the study of the body is rather the task of the physician than

of the philosopher. In the body we may notice separately (i) the bones,

sinews, and joints, constituting the framework on which the whole is

built up; (ii) the surface, including beauty of outline and features, and

(iii) the complexion, which suffuses a glow over the surface and most

attracts the attention[100]. No absolute distinction can be made between

body and soul. Generally speaking, we may say that body is composed of

the two grosser elements, earth and water, whilst soul (as we have seen)

rests on the two higher elements of air and fire[101]; of the gradations

of spirit body possesses distinctively (but not exclusively) that of

coherence (ἕξις), whilst it shares with the soul the principle of growth

(φύσις)[102]. Yet these contrasts are after all only secondary. As surely

as soul is body so body is soul, and divinity penetrates into its

humblest parts. In its practical applications Stoicism dwells so little

on the body that the wise man seems hardly conscious of its existence.

[Sidenote: ‘The flesh.’]

=287.= Side by side with the strictly Stoic view of the body we find

in all the Roman literature another conception which is strongly

dualistic, and which we cannot but think to be drawn from some non-Stoic

source[103]. According to this view the body, often called the ‘flesh,’

is essentially evil[104]; it is the prison-house of the soul[105],

the source of corruption of the will[106], the hindrance to a clear

insight of the intelligence. In the language picturesquely adopted in

the _Pilgrim’s Progress_ (after St Paul), it is a burden which the

enlightened man longs to shake off[107]. For the body so understood we

find abusive names; it is the husk in which the grain is concealed[108],

the ass from which the owner should be ready to part at any moment[109].

This language tends to be exaggerated and morbid, and leads in practice

to asceticism[110]. It appealed in ancient as in modern times to a

widespread sentiment, but is not reconcileable with the main teaching of

the Stoic philosophy.

[Sidenote: Dignity of the body.]

=288.= According to the true Stoic view, the body is a dwelling-place

or temple inhabited for a time by the principate, its divinity[111].

Therefore the body as such is deserving of respect, even of

veneration[112]. In particular the erect form of the human body is a

mark of divine favour, by which it is hinted that man is fitted to

contemplate the operations of the heavens[113]. The whole framework of

the body, from the organs of sensation to those by which we breathe,

swallow, and digest, is a masterpiece of divine skill, and an evidence of

the care of providence for man[114]. And even as an architect provides

that those parts of the house which are offensive to sight and smell

should be out of sight, so has nature hidden away those parts of the

body which are necessarily offensive, at a distance from the organs of

sense[115]. The Stoic conception of the dignity of the body is symbolized

in practical ethics by the culture of the beard, in which is latent the

broad principle of attention to the cleanliness and healthy development

of every part of the body.

It is a mark of the Oriental associations of Stoicism that this respect

for the body is never associated with the Hellenic cult of the body as

displayed in art and gymnastics.

[Sidenote: Junction of soul and body.]

=289.= Having now studied man in all his parts, it is time to consider

how those parts are compacted together, how man grows and decays, and

what varieties of mankind exist. First then the principate is combined

with the lower functions of the soul, and every part of the soul, by the

process of interpenetration (σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖ)[116]; or (from a

slightly different point of view) upon body which has cohesion (ἕξις)

is overlaid growth, on growth soul, and on soul reason; so that the

higher tension presupposes the lower, but not _vice versa_. In the act

of generation the soul loses its higher tensions; and consequently the

embryo possesses neither human nor animal soul, but only the principles

of cohesion and growth. It is in fact a vegetable[117], but necessarily

differs from other vegetables in having the potentiality of rising to

a higher grade of spirit[118]. At the moment of birth its growth-power

(φύσις) is brought into contact with the cold air, and through this

chill it rises to the grade of animal life, and becomes soul (ψυχή from

ψῦξις)[119]. This etymological theory provokes the ridicule of opponents,

who do not fail to point out that soul, standing nearer to the divine

fire than growth, ought to be produced by warmth rather than by coolness;

but the Stoics probably had in mind that contact with either of the two

higher elements must raise the gradation of spirit. The infant, according

to this theory, is an animal, but not yet a man; it has not the gift of

reason[120]. To attain this higher stage there is need both of growth

from within, and of association with reasonable beings without; in

these ways reason may be developed in or about the seventh year[121].

In the whole of its growth the soul needs continually to be refreshed

by the inbreathing of air, and to be sustained by exhalations from the

blood[122]. Here we touch upon one of those fundamental doctrines of the

system, derived by Zeno from Heraclitus[123], which bind together the

great and the little world. Just as the heavenly bodies are maintained by

exhalations from the Ocean[124], so the soul is dependent upon the body

for its daily food. Hence follows the important consequence that weakness

and disease of the body react upon the soul; the philosopher must keep

his body in health for the soul’s good, if for no other reason[125]. If

the Stoics in discussing problems of ethics constantly maintain that the

health of the soul is independent of that of the body, such statements

are paradoxical and need qualification[126].

[Sidenote: Sleep and death.]

=290.= The mutual action of body and soul is most readily illustrated by

sleep. The Stoics do not hold, as the Animists do, that the soul quits

the body in sleep; nor do they agree with another popular view, that the

soul then quits the extremities of the body and concentrates itself at

the heart[127]. Sleep is due to a relaxation, contraction, or weakening

of the spirit[128]; a lowering of its grade, which nevertheless is

clearly no sign of ill health. In old age there is often an imperfection

of the reason, and this is also seen in the sick, the tired, and the

anaemic[129]. In death there is a complete relaxation of tone in the

breath that we can feel, that is, in such spirit as belongs to the

body[130]; there follows the separation of soul from body.

[Sidenote: The beyond.]

=291.= We are thus brought to the critically important question of the

existence of the soul after death. On this point we shall not expect to

find that all Stoic teachers agree in their language. In Zeno himself we

shall be sure to find that variety of suggestion which is accounted for

by his eagerness to learn from all sources; and later writers will also

differ according to their respective inclinations either to draw strictly

logical conclusions from the Stoic physics, or to respect the common

opinion of mankind and to draw from it conclusions which may be a support

to morality[131]. These variations need not discourage us from the

attempt to trace in general outline the common teaching of the school.

We have already seen that the various parts of the Stoic system are not

bound together by strictly logical processes; where two conclusions

appear contradictory, and yet both recommend themselves to the judgment,

the Stoics are not prepared to sacrifice either the one or the other, but

always seek to lessen, if they cannot altogether remove, the difficulties

which stand in the way of accepting both. On the other hand, we need

not too readily admit the charge of insincerity, whether it is found in

the candid admission of its temptations by Stoic teachers[132], or in

the less sympathetic criticisms of ancient or modern exponents of the

system[133].

[Sidenote: The Stoic standpoint.]

=292.= On certain points all Stoic teachers seem to be agreed; first

that the soul is, as regards its substance, imperishable; secondly,

that the individual soul cannot survive the general conflagration[134];

lastly, that it does not of necessity perish with the body[135]. The

first two dogmas follow immediately from the fundamental principles of

the Stoic physics, and point out that every soul will find its last home

by being absorbed in the divine being. The third dogma leaves play for

ethical principles; subject to the monistic principle of an ultimate

reconciliation, there is room for some sharp distinction between the

destiny of good and bad souls, such as stands out in the Persian doctrine

of rewards and punishments after death. And so we find it generally held

that the souls of the good survive till the conflagration, whilst those

of the wicked have but a short separate existence, and those of the

lower and non-rational animals perish with their bodies[136]. If this

difference in duration will satisfy the moral sense, the nature of the

further existence of the soul may be determined on physical principles.

[Sidenote: The released soul.]

=293.= In the living man the soul, as we have already seen reason to

suppose, derives its cohesion (ἕξις) and shape from its association with

the body. Separated from the body, it must assume a new shape, and what

should that be but the perfect shape of a sphere[137]? Again, the soul

being compounded of the elements of air and fire must by its own nature,

when freed from the body, pierce through this murky atmosphere, and rise

to a brighter region above, let us say to that sphere which is just below

the moon[138]. Here then souls dwell like the stars, finding like them

their food in exhalations from the earth[139]. Here they take rank as

daemons or heroes (of such the air is full), and as such are joined in

the fulfilment of the purposes of divine providence[140]. Yet it must

be admitted that this bright destiny, if substantiated by the laws of

physics, is also subject to physical difficulties. Suppose for instance

that a man is crushed by the fall of a heavy rock; his soul will not be

able to escape in any direction, but will be at once squeezed out of

existence[141]. To fancies of this kind, whether attractive or grotesque,

we shall not be inclined to pay serious attention.

[Sidenote: Tartarus.]

=294.= In this general theory hope is perhaps held out before the eyes

of good souls, but there is little to terrify the wicked, even if it be

supposed that their souls neither survive so long, nor soar so high, as

those of the good[142]. As against it we are told by a Church Father that

Zeno accepted the Persian doctrine of future rewards and punishments, and

with it the primitive belief in an Inferno in its crudest form[143]. We

must agree with the first English editor of the fragments of Zeno that

‘it is hardly credible that Zeno can have attached any philosophical

importance to a theory stated in these terms[144]’; they can at the

best only have occurred in some narration in the style of the Platonic

myths, intended to illustrate a principle but not to convey a literal

truth[145]. For just as the whole Hellenistic world, including the

Stoics, stood aloof from the Persian doctrine of a spirit of evil, so

it firmly rejected the dogma of a hell. Lucretius makes it a principal

argument in favour of the philosophy of Epicurus that it drives out of

men’s hearts the fear of Tartarus[146]; but writers partly or wholly

Stoic are not less emphatic. ‘Ignorance of philosophy,’ says Cicero, ‘has

produced the belief in hell and its terrors[147].’ In the mouth of the

representative of Stoicism he places the words ‘Where can we find any

old woman so silly as to believe the old stories of the horrors of the

world below?[148]’ ‘Those tales’ says Seneca ‘which make the world below

terrible to us, are poetic fictions. There is no black darkness awaiting

the dead, no prison-house, no lake of fire or river of forgetfulness, no

judgment-seat, no renewal of the rule of tyrants[149].’

[Sidenote: Purgatory of Virgil.]

=295.= Of far more importance to us is the theory of purgatory familiar

through the description in Virgil’s _Aeneid_:

‘In the beginning the earth and the sky, and the spaces of night,

Also the shining moon, and the sun Titanic and bright

Feed on an inward life, and, with all things mingled, a mind

Moves universal matter, with Nature’s frame is combined.

Thence man’s race, and the beast, and the feathered creature that

flies, 5

All wild shapes that are hidden the gleaming waters beneath.

Each elemental seed has a fiery force from the skies,

Each its heavenly being, that no dull clay can disguise,

Bodies of earth ne’er deaden, nor limbs long destined to death.

Hence their fears and desires, their sorrows and joys; for their

sight, 10

Blind with the gloom of a prison, discerns not the heavenly light.

Nor, when life at last leaves them, do all sad ills, that belong

Unto the sinful body, depart; still many survive

Lingering within them, alas! for it needs must be that the long

Growth should in wondrous fashion at full completion arrive. 15

So due vengeance racks them, for deeds of an earlier day

Suffering penance; and some to the winds hang viewless and thin,

Searched by the breezes; from others the deep infection of sin

Swirling water washes, or bright fire purges, away.

Each in his own sad ghost we endure; then, chastened aright, 20

Into Elysium pass. Few reach to the fields of delight

Till great time, when the cycles have run their courses on high,

Takes the inbred pollution, and leaves to us only the bright

Sense of the heaven’s own ether, and fire from the springs of the

sky[150].’

Although we cannot accept Virgil as a scientific exponent of Stoic

teaching, yet there is much reason to suppose that he is here setting

forth a belief which met with very general acceptance in our school,

and of which the principle is that the sufferings of the disembodied

are not a punishment for past offences, but the necessary means for the

purification of the soul from a taint due to its long contact with the

body.

[Sidenote: Probable Stoic origin.]

=296.= The language in which Virgil first describes the creation and

life of the universe closely resembles that of Stoicism; the phrases

‘elemental seed,’ ‘fiery force,’ ‘heavenly being’ might be used by any

Stoic teacher. The conception of the body as a ‘prison-house,’ even

though it does not express the most scientific aspect of Stoic physics,

was nevertheless, as we have seen, familiar to Stoics of the later

centuries. The ethical conception, again, of the doctrine of purgatory is

exactly that of which the Stoics felt a need in order to reconcile the

dualism of good and evil souls with the ultimate prevalence of the divine

will. Again, we can have no difficulty in supposing that Virgil drew his

material from Stoic sources, seeing that he was characteristically a

learned poet, and reflects Stoic sentiment in many other passages of his

works[151]. We have also more direct evidence. The Church Father whom we

have already quoted not only ascribes to the Stoics in another passage

the doctrine of purgatory, but expressly quotes this passage from Virgil

as an exposition of Stoic teaching. And here he is supported to some

extent by Tertullian, who says that the Stoics held that the souls of the

foolish after death receive instruction from the souls of the good[152].

Finally, we have the doctrine definitely accepted by Seneca[153].

[Sidenote: Views of Greek Stoics.]

=297.= We may now consider more particularly the views and feelings of

individual Stoic teachers. It appears to us accordingly that Zeno left

his followers room for considerable diversity of opinion, and quoted

the Persian doctrine because of its suggestiveness rather than for its

literal truth. Of Cleanthes we are told that he held that all souls

survived till the conflagration, whilst Chrysippus believed this only

of the souls of the wise[154]. Panaetius, although a great admirer of

Plato, is nevertheless so strongly impressed by the scientific principle

that ‘all which is born must die,’ that he is here again inclined to

break away from Stoicism, and to suspend his judgment altogether as to

the future existence of the soul[155]; the belief in a limited future

existence was meaningless to a philosopher who disbelieved in the

conflagration. Of the views of Posidonius we have the definite hint,

that he taught that the ‘air is full of immortal souls[156]’; and

this is in such harmony with the devout temper of this teacher that we

may readily believe that he enriched the somewhat bare speculations of

his predecessors by the help of an Oriental imagination, and that he

introduced into Stoicism not only the doctrine of daemons but also that

of purgatory, holding that souls were both pre-existent and post-existent.

[Sidenote: View of Seneca.]

=298.= In the period of the Roman principate the question of the

future existence of the soul acquires special prominence. Seneca is

criticized on the ground that he affects at times a belief which he

does not sincerely entertain, partly in order to make his teaching

more popular, partly to console his friends in times of mourning. The

facts stand otherwise. At no time does Seneca exceed the limits of the

accepted Stoic creed; he bids his friends look forward to the period of

purgation[157], the life of pure souls in the regions of the aether, and

the final union with the divine being. It is after purgation that the

soul by the refinement of the elements of which it is built forces its

way to higher regions[158]; it finds a quiet and peaceful home in the

clear bright aether[159]; it has cast off the burden of the flesh[160];

it is parted by no mountains or seas from other happy souls[161]; it

daily enjoys free converse with the great ones of the past[162]; it

gazes on the human world below, and on the sublime company of the stars

in its own neighbourhood[163]. At a later epoch all blessed souls will

be re-absorbed in the primal elements[164], suffering change but not

forfeiting their immortal nature[165]. The somewhat exuberant language

of Seneca has frequently been adopted by Christian writers, to express a

belief which is not necessarily identical[166]; but for the associations

thus created Seneca must not be held responsible.

[Sidenote: Personality cannot survive.]

=299.= With the decay of interest in the Stoic physics there begins a

tendency to overlook the intermediate stage of the soul’s life, and to

dwell solely on its final absorption; whilst at the same time it is urged

from the ethical standpoint that no possible opinion as to the soul’s

future should disturb the calm of the virtuous mind. On one further, but

important, point the Stoic teaching becomes clearer. In no case is the

soul that survives death to be identified with the man that once lived.

Cut off from all human relations, from the body and its organs, and from

its own subordinate powers[167], it is no longer ‘you,’ but is something

else that takes your place in the due order of the universe. In all

this the Stoic doctrine remains formally unchanged; but its expression

is now so chastened that it seems only to give a negative reply to the

inherited hope, and the chief comfort it offers is that ‘death is the

end of all troubles.’ This change of tone begins in Seneca himself; it

is he who says to the mourner ‘your loved one has entered upon a great

and never-ending rest[168]’; ‘death is release from all pain and its

end[169]’; ‘death is not to be. I know all its meaning. As things were

before I was born, so they will be after I am gone[170].’ ‘If we perish

in death, nothing remains[171].’ In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius this

new tone rings out much more clearly; if we like so to speak, more

unrelentingly. To the characteristic passages from these writers which

are quoted above[172] may be added the following, perhaps the most

precise of all:

‘If souls survive death, how can the air hold them from all

eternity? How, we reply, does earth hold the bodies of generation

after generation committed to the grave? Just as on earth, after

a certain term of survival, change and dissolution of substance

makes room for other dead bodies, so too the souls transmuted

into air, after a period of survival, change by processes of

diffusion and of ignition, and are resumed into the seminal

principle of the universe, and in this way make room for others

to take up their habitation in their stead. Such is the natural

answer, assuming the survival of souls[173].’

Such are the last words of Stoicism, not wholly satisfying either to

knowledge or to aspiration, but assuredly based on a wide outlook and a

keen discrimination.

[Sidenote: Men and women.]

=300.= The whole nature of man, as discussed up to this point, is

common to every individual born into the world, with some exceptions

dependent on age or temperament which have been explained incidentally.

It remains to discuss shortly the important differences which result

from sex, nationality, and location. There seems every reason to believe

that the equality of men and women, though at the time seemingly

paradoxical, was generally accepted by the earlier Stoics, and adopted

as a practical principle in Stoic homes. The whole treatment of human

nature by the Stoics applies equally to man and woman, and points to

the conclusion that as moral agents they have the same capacities and

the same responsibilities[174]. Seneca in writing to a great lady of

philosophical sympathies states this as his firm conviction[175], and

the lives of many Stoic wives and daughters (to whom we shall refer

in a later chapter)[176] showed it to have a firm basis in fact. We

need attach no great importance to those more distinctively masculine

views which Seneca occasionally expresses, to the effect that woman is

hot-tempered, thoughtless, and lacking in self-control[177], or to the

Peripatetic doctrine that man is born to rule, women to obey[178]; for

these sentiments, however welcome to his individual correspondents, were

not rooted in Stoic theory nor exemplified in the Roman society of his

own days.

[Sidenote: Class and race.]

=301.= It follows with equal certainty from the early history of

Stoicism, and in particular from the doctrine of the Cosmopolis, that

differences of class and race were hardly perceived by its founders. For

this there was further historical cause in the spread of Hellenistic

civilisation, which was of an entirely catholic spirit and welcomed

disciples from all nationalities[179]. The doctrine of Aristotle, that

some nations are by nature fitted only for slavery, finds no echo in

the Stoic world[180]. There we look in vain for any trace of that

instinctive feeling of national difference, that sensitiveness to race

and colour, which can easily be recognised in the early history of

Greece and Rome, and which has become so acute in the development of

modern world-politics. The Roman Stoics, as we shall see later, might

individually be proud of advantages of birth, but they never associated

this feeling with their philosophy. Here and there, however, we find

signs of a scientific interest in the question of differences of national

character, which are generally ascribed to the influences of climate.

Seneca, for instance, remarks that the inhabitants of northern climates

have characters as rude as their sky; hence they make good fighters, but

poor rulers[181]. Yet when he contemplates the northern barbarians, his

mind is mainly occupied by admiration; and, like other pro-Germans of the

period, he foresees with prophetic clearness a danger threatening the

Roman empire. ‘Should the Germans once lay aside their fierce domestic

quarrels, and add to their courage reason and discipline, Rome will

indeed have cause to resume the virtues of its early history[182].’

The roots of true greatness of soul, then, lie deeper than in literary

culture or philosophic insight. It is a part of the irony of history

that Stoicism, which aimed above all things at being practical, should

diagnose so correctly the growing weakness of the Roman world, and yet

fail to suggest any remedy other than a reversion to an epoch in which

philosophy was unknown.

FOOTNOTES

[1] ‘rex noster est animus: hoc incolumi cetera manent in officio,

parent, obtemperant; cum ille paullum vacillavit, simul dubitant. ubi

vero impotens, cupidus, delicatus est, fit tyrannus; tunc eum excipiunt

adfectus impotentes’ Sen. _Ep._ 114, 24.

[2] See L. Stein _Psych._ i p. 206.

[3] See above, § 68.

[4] ‘natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et

appetitiones, quas ὁρμάς Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic

adhibet ut nosmetipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus’ Cic. _N. D._ ii

22, 58.

[5] τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου διήκειν, ἧς μέρος μετέχοντας ἡμᾶς

ἐμψυχοῦσθαι Hermias _irris. gent. phil._ 7 (Arnim i 495).

[6] ‘ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum’ Cic.

_N. D._ ii 14, 37.

[7] τὸν κόσμον περιέχειν τὸν Δία καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ψυχήν Philod. _piet._

15 (Arnim iii _Diog._ 33).

[8] ‘quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod

est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 24.

[9] Philo _rer. div._ i 494 M (Stein _Psych._ i 207).

[10] See above, § 242.

[11] See below, § 274.

[12] See above, § 11.

[13] On the whole subject see Tylor, _Anthropology_, ch. xvi; _Primitive

Culture_, chs. xi-xvii; Jevons, _Introd. to the history of Religion_, ch.

v.

[14] See above, § 174.

[15] Nemes. _nat. hom._ ii 85 and 86 (Arnim i 518).

[16] _ib._ 99 (Arnim ii 790).

[17] Here we come into close touch with modern ways of thinking. The soul

is the self as known subjectively and from within, as appealed to in the

argument of Descartes ‘cogito, ergo sum.’ The body is the self as known

objectively and from without, first in our neighbours who obstruct our

efforts (‘officium quod corporis exstat, | officere atque obstare’ Lucr.

_R. N._ i 337, 8), and then by analogy in ourselves. The Stoic theory

then asserts that subjective and objective knowledge are ultimately the

same, both being activities of the same Logos. See above, § 149.

[18] The distinction is most clearly made by Juvenal: ‘sensum a caelesti

demissum traximus arce, | cuius egent prona et terram spectantia. mundi |

principio indulsit communis conditor illis | tantum animas, nobis animum

quoque, mutuus ut nos | adfectus petere auxilium et praestare iuberet’

_Sat._ xv 146-150.

[19] See above, § 206.

[20] See above, § 203.

[21] ‘Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 10, 19.

[22] ‘spiritum quippe animam esse Zenon quaerit hactenus; quo recedente

a corpore moritur animal, hoc certe anima est. naturali porro spiritu

recedente moritur animal; naturalis igitur spiritus anima est’ Chalc. _in

Tim._ 220 (Arnim i 138).

[23] ‘probabilius enim videtur, tale quiddam esse animum, ut sit ex

igni atque anima temperatum’ Cic. _N. D._ iii 14, 36; cf. Arnim ii 786.

This view was accepted by Panaetius: ‘is animus ... ex inflammata anima

constat, ut potissimum videri video Panaetio’ _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42.

The ‘fire’ and ‘air’ here referred to are not the ordinary elements:

οὐ γὰρ πᾶν πῦρ οὐδὲ πᾶν πνεῦμα ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. μετά τινος οὖν

ἔσται εἴδους ἰδίου καὶ λόγου καὶ δυνάμεως καί, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, τόνου

Alex. Aphr. _de anima_ p. 115, 6 (Arnim ii 785). See further Stein

_Psychologie_ i pp. 101 to 103.

[24] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πνεῦμα νοερὸν θερμόν [τὴν ψυχήν] Aët. _plac._ iv 3, 3.

[25] ‘animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat, ut simus animalia;

et cum ab illo animalia hoc nomen traxerint’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 2; ‘et

animus meus animal est et ego animal sum; duo tamen non sumus. quare?

quia animus mei pars est’ _ib._ 5.

[26] Tertullian deals with this point as against Valentinian heretics;

_de an._ 21.

[27] ‘cum elementa sint quattuor, ignis aquae aeris terrae, potestates

pares his sunt, fervida frigida arida atque umida; eadem animalium

hominumque discrimina sunt’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 19, 1 and 2; ‘cuius [in

homine] elementi portio praevalebit, inde mores erunt’ _ib._ 2.

[28] ‘languida ingenia et in somnum itura inertibus nectuntur elementis’

_ib._ i 5, 9.

[29] ‘iracundos fervida animi natura faciet; frigidi mixtura timidos

facit’ _ib._ iv 19, 2.

[30] ‘quaecunque adtribuit condicio nascendi et corporis temperatura,

haerebunt’ _Ep._ 11, 6.

[31] For a treatment of the subject on modern lines see Ribot, _The

emotions_, chs. xii and xiii; and the works of Fouillée, Paulhan, and

other French writers. For the earlier history see Summers on Sen. _Ep._

11, 3, and Stein _Psych._ i p. 175.

[32] ψυχή ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς σῶμα λεπτομερὲς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον

κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους Galen _def. med._ 29 (Arnim ii 780); ‘nosmetipsi

qui animis movemur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 58; ‘humanus animus agilis est et

pronus ad motus’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 11.

[33] μία ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, ὡς τὴν αὐτήν πως ἔχουσαν ποτὲ μὲν

διανοεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ὀργίζεσθαι [qu. ὀρέγεσθαι?] ποτὲ δ’ ἐπιθυμεῖν παρὰ

μέρος Alex. Aph. _de anima_ p. 118 (Arnim ii 823).

[34] ‘huiusmodi autem non tam partes animae habebuntur quam vires et

efficaciae et operae’ Tert. _de an._ 14. They may also be called the

soul’s qualities: οἱ ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφοι τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις

ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας συμβιβάζουσι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὡς οὐσίαν

προϋποκειμένην ταῖς δυνάμεσι τιθέασι Stob. i 49, 33.

[35] See above, § 79; for other divisions Tert. _de an._ 14 (Arnim i

144), Cic. _Off._ i 28, 101, and generally Stein, _Psych._ i p. 123.

[36] On this translation see § 101, note 81.

[37] [ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ] ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέταται διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων

προσφερῶς ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις Aët. _plac._ iv 4, 4.

[38] Arnim ii 838. Since many philosophers think the mind seated in the

head, Chrysippus collects many arguments to the contrary; for instance

that women say, when they don’t agree with a statement, ‘it won’t go

down,’ pointing all the while to the heart, Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._

iii 5, p. 323 K (Arnim ii 892). Further that καρδία is derived from

κράτησις, the heart being the seat of government _ib._ (Arnim ii 896).

He could support his view by thousands of quotations from the poets. On

the other hand we find the suggestion that the principate resides in our

spherical heads, as in a universe (Aët. _plac._ iv 21, 4). This latter

view may be due to Academic influence (Schmekel, p. 259).

[39] δυνάμεις μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁρμωμένης Galen _plac. Hipp. et

Plat._ p. 51 K.

[40] τὸ λογιστικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὃ καὶ ἰδίως ἡγεμονικὸν καλεῖται

Alex. Aphr. _de an._ p. 98, 24 (Arnim ii 839). In this direction

Epictetus defines the rational faculty as ‘that which contemplates both

itself and all other things’ _Disc._ i 1, 4.

[41] τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο [τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν] δεικνύντες Galen _plac.

Hipp. et Plat._ ii 2 p. 215 K.

[42] ‘intellegendum est etiam, duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse

personis, quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus

rationis; altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa’ Cic. _Off._ i

30, 107.

[43] Arnim ii 823.

[44] _To himself_ vii 64.

[45] _ib._ iv 12.

[46] _ib._ v 27.

[47] _ib._ iii 5, v 10, xii 1; so too Epictetus ‘God is within, and your

daemon is within’ _Disc._ i 14, 14.

[48] See above, §§ 146-156.

[49] ἔργα δὲ ψυχῆς ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, παρασκευάζεσθαι,

ἐπιβάλλεσθαι, συγκατατίθεσθαι. τί ποτ’ οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις

ῥυπαρὰν παρέχον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὰ μοχθηρὰ κρίματα

αὐτῆς Epict. _Disc._ iv 11, 6 and 7.

[50] ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν ἢ μή

Stob. ii 7 5b 4; ‘quaerimus quomodo animus semper secundo cursu eat’ Sen.

_Dial._ ix 2, 4; ‘quidam se domi contrahunt, dilatant foris ac extendunt;

vitium est haec diversitas et signum vacillantis animi ac nondum habentis

tenorem suum’ _Ep._ 20, 3.

[51] See above, § 96.

[52] ‘satis natura homini dedit roboris, si illo utamur; nolle in causa

est, non posse praetenditur’ Sen. _Ep._ 116, 8.

[53] ‘animi motus eos putemus sanissimos validissimosque, qui nostro

arbitrio ibunt, non suo ferentur’ _Dial._ iv 35, 2.

[54] ‘hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci εὐθυμίαν vocant, ego

tranquillitatem voco’ _ib._ ix 2, 3.

[55] _Ep._ 114, 24 (see above, § 263, note 1).

[56] ‘non est [mens] ex terreno et gravi concreta corpore, ex illo

caelesti spiritu descendit’ _Dial._ xii 7, 7; ‘ratio nihil aliud est quam

in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa’ _Ep._ 66, 12.

[57] ‘animus, sed hic rectus bonus magnus ... quid aliud voces hunc quam

deum in corpore humano hospitantem?’ _ib._ 31, 11.

[58] ‘sacer inter nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum

observator [et] custos’ _ib._ 41, 2.

[59] ‘deum te igitur scito esse: si quidem deus est qui viget, qui

sentit, qui meminit’ Cic. _Rep._ vi (_Somn. Scip._) 24, 26.

[60] Physics, and in particular astronomy, is meant: ‘[animus] hoc habet

argumentum divinitatis suae, quod illum divina delectant; nec ut alienis

sed ut suis interest’ Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 12; cf. Horace _Ep._ i 12,

14-19.

[61] ‘When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising

yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are

nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying

about a god with you, and you know it not.’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 12.

[62] ‘dicere porro, oculos nullam rem cernere posse, | sed per eos animum

ut foribus spectare reclusis, | difficile est’ Lucr. _N. D._ iii 360-362;

cf. Arnim ii 862. See also Cic. _N. D._ iii 4, 9, and Mayor’s valuable

note. Modern psychologists side with the Stoics.

[63] See above, § 146, note 18.

[64] τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἐν τῷ

ἡγεμονικῷ Aët. _plac._ iv 23, 1.

[65] See above, § 146, note 18.

[66] αἰσθητικῇ γὰρ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσίς ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις Porph. _de

anima_ (Arnim ii 74); ‘dicunt Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus esse’ Cic.

_Ac._ ii 33, 108.

[67] αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται ... καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ’ ἥν

τινες πηροὶ γίνονται Diog. L. vii 52.

[68] ‘Stoici causas esse videndi dicunt radiorum ex oculis in ea, quae

videri queunt, emissionem aerisque simul intentionem’ Gell. _N. A._ v

16, 2; ‘Stoici videndi causam in nativi spiritus intentione constituunt,

cuius effigiem coni similem volunt’ Chalc. _Tim._ 237 (Arnim ii 863).

[69] Arnim ii 869.

[70] Ποσειδώνιος γοῦν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ὄψιν) σύμφυσιν ὀνομάζει Aët. _plac._

iv 13, 3.

[71] Diog. L. vii 158.

[72] Arnim ii 836.

[73] ‘Cleanthes [ambulationem] ait spiritum esse a principali usque in

pedes permissum’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 23.

[74] ‘vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt, eamque esse dicunt ictum aera’

Gellius _N. A._ v 15, 6.

[75] ‘quid enim est vox nisi intentio aeris, ut audiatur, linguae formata

percussu?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6, 3.

[76] ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖθεν ἐκπέμπεται, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ φωνή. ἡ δὲ φωνὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν

κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν τόπων ἐκπέμπεται, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς ἐκ κάτωθεν μᾶλλον Galen.

_plac. Hipp. et Plat._ ii 5 p. 205 Müller.

[77] See above, § 161.

[78] See above, § 178.

[79] Lucr. _R. N._ iv 1214-1220.

[80] E. Haeckel, _Welträthsel_ (Volksausg.) p. 30. The italics are those

of the author of this book.

[81] _ib._ _Anmerkungen_, p. 158.

[82] Though Lucretius laughs at the idea of attributing laughter and

tears to the elements (‘hac ratione tibi pereunt primordia rerum: | fiet,

uti risu tremulo concussa cachinnent, | et lacrumis salsis umectent ora

genasque’ _R. N._ i 917-919), yet he attributes to them the essential

power of free-will: ‘si ... nec declinando faciunt primordia motus |

principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, | unde est haec, inquam,

fatis avolsa voluntas?’ _R. N._ ii 253-257.

[83] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ὅλου καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς φέρεσθαι τὰ σπέρματα

Aët. _plac._ v. 11, 3; ‘When you consort with your wife ... you are

carrying about a god with you’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 12.

[84] μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ... τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς λόγους Diog. L.

vii 157.

[85] τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς] τὸ μὲν λέγεται σπέρμα, ὅπερ καὶ

αὐτὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῶν παραστατῶν Aët.

_plac._ iv 21, 4; cf. Diog. L. vii 159.

[86] τὸ δὲ σπέρμα φησὶν ὁ Ζήνων εἶναι ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ _ἀπόσπασμα_ καὶ

τοῦ σπέρματος τοῦ τῶν προγόνων κέρασμα καὶ μῖγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν

συνεληλυθός Euseb. _pr. ev._ xv 20, 1 (Arnim i 128). That the separation

or ‘tearing away’ (ἀπόσπασμα) is not complete or absolute seems to follow

from the general principles of Stoic physics: see above § 262.

[87] ‘in semine omnis futuri hominis ratio comprehensa est’ Sen. _N. Q._

iii 29, 3.

[88] ‘utrum ex patris tantummodo semine partus nascatur, ut ... Stoici

scripserunt’ Censor. _di. nat._ 5; cf. Diog. L. vii 159, Aët. _plac._ v

5, 2.

[89] The evidence for this is mainly indirect. [ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης] οὐ

μόνον, φησίν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν

ψυχήν Nemes. _nat. hom._ ii 85 and 86 (Arnim i 518); ‘quod declaret

eorum similitudo, qui procreentur; quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in

corporibus appareat’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79.

[90] προΐεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα σπέρμα· κἂν μὲν ἐπικρατήσῃ τὸ τῆς

γυναικός, ὅμοιον εἶναι τὸ γεννώμενον τῇ μητρί, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρός, τῷ

πατρί Aët. _plac._ v 11, 4.

[91] See above, § 63.

[92] ‘inrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam

ambitiosam impotentem positam in adfectionibus, alteram humilem languidam

voluptatibus deditam’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 8.

[93] ‘appetitio (eam enim esse volumus ὁρμήν), qua ad agendum impellimur,

et id appetimus quod est visum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 8, 24.

[94] This is termed by Panaetius ὄρεξις simply; the term ἐπιβολή is also

used: see § 272, note 49.

[95] See above, § 146.

[96] Zeller (_Stoics_, p. 243) states that man has irrational as well as

rational impulses. This seems to be incorrectly expressed.

[97] φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθήκοντος Stob. ii 7, 9.

[98] ‘omne rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei

inritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc

impetum. quid sit adsensio dicam. oportet me ambulare: tunc demum ambulo,

cum hoc mihi dixi et adprobavi hanc opinionem meam’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 18.

[99] δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος Diog.

L. vii III; ‘omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione’

Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 7, 14; ἀσθενῆ δὲ λέγουσι συγκατάθεσιν, ὅταν μηδέπω

πεπεικότες ὦμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς Galen _de peccatis_ ii 1 p. 59 K (Arnim iii

172); ἔστι δ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ... ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα Diog. L. vii

110.

[100] ‘in corpore nostro ossa nervique et articuli, firmamenta totius et

vitalia, minime speciosa visu, prius ordinantur; deinde haec, ex quibus

omnis in faciem adspectumque decor est. post haec omnia qui maxime oculos

rapit, color, ultimus perfecto iam corpore adfunditur’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 1,

2.

[101] See above, § 268.

[102] ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ iii 1

p. 251 M, quoting Chrysippus (Arnim ii 885).

[103] Schmekel traces the introduction of this doctrine to Posidonius,

and finds in it the starting-point of the later mysticism, _Philos. d.

mittl. Stoa_, pp. 400 sqq. See also L. Stein, _Psych._ i 194.

[104] ‘nos corpus tam putre sortiti’ Sen. _Ep._ 120, 17; ‘inutilis caro

et fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis, ut ait Posidonius’ _ib._ 92,

10.

[105] ‘haec quae vides ossa circumiecta nobis, nervos et obductam cutem,

voltumque et ministras manus, et cetera quibus involuti sumus, vincula

animorum tenebraeque sunt. obruitur his animus, effocatur, inficitur,

arcetur a veris et suis in falsa coniectus. omne illi cum hac carne

grave certamen est’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 24, 5; ‘corpusculum hoc, custodia et

vinculum animi’ _ib._ xii 11, 7.

[106] ‘What am I? a poor miserable man with my wretched bit of flesh.

Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us become like wolves’

Epict. _Disc._ i 3, 5 and 7.

[107] ‘corpus hoc animi pondus et poena est’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 16; ‘quantum

per moras membrorum et hanc circumfusam gravem sarcinam licet’ _Dial._

xii 11, 6; ‘corporis velut oneris necessarii non amator sed procurator

est’ _Ep._ 92, 33.

[108] ‘Epicurus placed the good in the husk’ Epict. _Disc._ i 23, 1.

[109] ‘You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded. When

the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass,

pack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder’ _ib._ iv 1, 79 and 80.

[110] In particular to the practice of self-mutilation, with which Seneca

is disgusted: ‘cottidie comminiscimur, per quae virilitati fiat iniuria

... alius genitalia excidit’ Sen. _N. Q._ vii 31, 3.

[111] ‘nec domum esse hoc corpus, sed hospitium et quidem breve

hospitium’ Sen. _Ep._ 120, 14; ‘hoc [corpus] natura ut quandam vestem

animo circumdedit’ _ib._ 92, 13.

[112] ‘inter me teque conveniet corpus in honorem animi coli’ _ib._ 92,

1. In the same spirit Seneca writes in condemnation of the gladiatorial

conflicts ‘homo sacra res homini’ _ib._ 95, 33.

[113] ‘[natura] voltus nostros erexit ad caelum’ _ib._ 94, 56; ‘[natura]

... ut ab ortu sidera in occasum labentia prosequi posset, sublime fecit

[homini] caput et collo flexili imposuit’ _Dial._ viii 5, 4. See also

Mayor on Juv. _Sat._ xv 147.

[114] Cic. _N. D._ ii 54 to 58.

[115] ‘quae partes corporis, ad naturae necessitatem datae, adspectum

essent deformem habiturae atque turpem, eas [natura] contexit atque

abdidit’ _Off._ i 35, 127.

[116] In the Epicurean system atoms of soul are dispersed amongst atoms

of body, there being a mixture of the two, which however does not go

beyond juxtaposition; in the Stoic system soul permeates body. The Stoic

explanation is frequently referred to by opponents as a _reductio ad

absurdum_: τῷ λέγοντι τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα ἕπεται τὸ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν

Alex. Aphr. _Arist. Top._ ii 93 (Arnim ii 798). The relation of the

principate to the man as a whole is also called σύστασις (_constitutio_);

‘constitutio est principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus’ Sen.

_Ep._ 121, 10.

[117] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ μέρος αὐτὸ [τὸ ἔμβρυον] τῆς γαστρός, οὐ ζῷον Aët.

_plac._ v 14, 2; τὸ βρέφος ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ φύσει τρέφεσθαι [Χρύσιππος]

νομίζει καθάπερ φυτόν Plut. _Sto. rep._ 41, 1.

[118] Stein, _Psych._ i p. 115.

[119] ὅταν δὲ τεχθῇ, ψυχούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλειν καὶ

γίνεσθαι ζῷον Plut. as above.

[120] ‘infans nondum rationalis [est]’ Sen. _Ep._ 121, 14; ‘tu me

expertem rationis genuisti, onus alienum’ _Ben._ iii 31, 2.

[121] See above, § 153, note 66.

[122] διασῴζεσθαι λέγουσιν αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν ψυχὴν] ἔκ τε τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως

τοῦ αἵματος καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰσπνοὴν ἑλκομένου [ἀέρος] Galen _comm.

Hipp._ 6 (Arnim ii 782); τρέφεσθαι ἐξ αἵματος τὴν ψυχήν, οὐσίαν δ’ αὐτῆς

ὑπάρχειν τὸ πνεῦμα _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ ii 8 (Arnim i 140); ‘poor soul

itself mere exhalation of the blood’ M. Aurel. _To himself_ v 33.

[123] Ζήνων τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος·

... ‘καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται.’ ἀναθυμίασιν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως

τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων Ar. Did. fr. 39, 2 and 3 (Diels); the

reference to Heraclitus is not necessarily an exact quotation by Zeno,

see Bywater’s critical note on fr. 42; on the other side Diels’ note on

fr. 12. L. Stein is of opinion that the Stoics missed the meaning of

Heraclitus whilst accepting his terminology; see _Psych._ i, note 182.

[124] See above, § 200.

[125] See § 316, note 100.

[126] καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] ἔφασαν μηδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἢ

ὠφελεῖσθαι ἢ βλάπτεσθαι Theod. _Gr. aff. cur._ 11; see generally the

discussion by Stein, _Psych._ i pp. 139, 140.

[127] Plut. fr. (_de an._) 6, 3.

[128] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸν μὲν ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἀνέσει τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος

Aët. _plac._ v 23, 4, cf. Plut. _Qu. conv._ IV ii 4, 6; ‘contrahi autem

animum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere, et id ipsum esse

dormire’ Cic. _Div._ ii 58, 119. See also above, § 177.

[129] ‘senes difficiles et queruli sunt, ut aegri et convalescentes, et

quorum aut lassitudine aut detractione sanguinis exhaustus est calor’

Sen. _Dial._ iv 19, 4.

[130] ὅταν δὲ παντελὴς γένηται ἡ ἄνεσις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος, τότε

γίγνεσθαι θάνατον Aët. _plac._ v 23, 4.

[131] ‘cum animarum aeternitatem disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos

habet consensus hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium’ Sen. _Ep._

117, 6.

[132] ‘iuvabat de aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo mehercules credere.

credebam enim me facile opinionibus magnorum virorum rem gratissimam

promittentium magis quam probantium’ Sen. _Ep._ 102, 2; cf. Cic. _Tusc.

disp._ i 11, 24.

[133] So especially L. Stein: ‘um nun ihre Philosophie populär und

mundgerecht zu machen, liessen sich die Stoiker zuweilen zu Äusserungen

herbei, die dazu angethan waren, ihr ganzes philosophisches System

umzustossen’ _Psych._ i 149. Further their Scottish critic: ‘thus did

the later Stoicism try to meet the claims of the human heart, which the

earlier Stoicism had to a large extent ignored’ W. L. Davidson, _The

Stoic creed_, p. 98; again ‘die Lehre von der Fortdauer der Seele ... war

nur für die grosse Menge berechnet’ H. A. Winckler, _Stoicismus_, p. 50.

Zeller is much more judicial, _Stoics_, pp. 217-222.

[134] ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ὅλου [ψυχὴν] ἀΐδιον, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς

συμμίγνυσθαι ἐπὶ τελεύτῃ εἰς ἐκείνην Ar. Did. fr. 39, 5.

[135] τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γενητήν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν· οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ

σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ’ ἑαυτήν

ib. 6; ‘Stoici ... diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant’ Cic. _Tusc.

disp._ i 31, 77.

[136] τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων [ψυχὴν διαμένειν] μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως

τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσούς τινας χρόνους· ... τὰς δὲ τῶν

ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῷων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασι Ar. Did. fr. 39,

6 and 7.

[137] Arnim ii 815.

[138] [αἱ ψυχαὶ] λεπτομερεῖς οὖσαι καὶ οὐχ ἧττον πυρώδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις

εἰς τοὺς ἄνω μᾶλλον τόπους κουφοφοροῦσι ... τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην οἰκοῦσι

τόπον Sext. _math._ ix 71 to 73 (Arnim ii 812); Ar. Did. fr. 39, 4; ‘si

[animae] permanent et conservant habitum suum, ... necesse est ferantur

ad caelum et ab his perrumpatur et dividatur crassus hic et concretus

aer; calidior enim est vel potius ardentior animus, quam est hic aer’

Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42; ‘itaque sublimantur animae sapientes ...

apud Stoicos sub lunam’ Tert. _de an._ 54 (Arnim ii 814).

[139] τροφῇ τε χρῶνται οἰκείᾳ τῇ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσει ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ

ἄστρα Sext. _math._ ix 73; ‘fortium animas existimant in modum siderum

vagari in aere’ Comm. _in Lucan._ ix 6 (Arnim ii 817).

[140] εἰ οὖν διαμένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, δαίμοσιν αἱ αὐταὶ γίγνονται Sext.

as in note 138; φασὶ δὲ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας καὶ ἤρωας, τὰς

ὑπολελειμμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχάς Diog. L. vii 151; ‘plenus [est] aer

immortalium animorum’ Cic. _Div._ i 30, 64, quoting from Posidonius.

[141] ‘[Stoici] existimant animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere

non posse et statim spargi’ Sen. _Ep._ 57, 7; Seneca himself rejects this

opinion.

[142] Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πάσας [τὰς ψυχὰς] ἐπιδιαμένειν μέχρι τῆς

ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνον Diog. L. vii 157.

[143] ‘esse inferos Zenon docuit et sedes piorum ab impiis esse

discretas; et illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones,

hos vero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis atque in caeni voraginibus

horrendis’ Lactant. _Div. inst._ vii 7, 13 (Arnim i 147); ‘reliquas

animas ad inferos deiciunt’ Tert. _de an._ 54. Cf. Cic. fr. 240, 6.

[144] Pearson, _Fragments_, p. 146.

[145] So Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_ ii p. 29 note.

[146] ‘et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, | funditus

humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo, | omnia suffuscans mortis nigrore, neque

ullam | esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit’ _R. N._ iii 37-40.

[147] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 16, 36.

[148] _N. D._ ii 2, 5.

[149] ‘cogita illa, quae nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, fabulam esse;

nullas imminere mortuis tenebras nec carcerem nec flumina igne flagrantia

nec oblivionis amnem nec tribunalia ... [nec] ullos iterum tyrannos.

luserunt ista poetae et vanis nos agitavere terroribus’ Sen. _Dial._ vi

19, 4. Here we have the opposite extreme to the statement in note 131.

[150] Virgil _Aen._ vi 724-747 (transl. by Lord Bowen). For the

corresponding description of Paradise, see _ib._ 638-644. The

substance of this discussion is drawn from Hirzel’s full note in his

_Untersuchungen_ ii pp. 25-31.

[151] For instance _Georg._ iv 221 sqq. See also below, §§ 434, 435.

[152] ‘impias vero [animas Stoici dicunt] ... habere aliquid

imbecillitatis ex contagione carnis, cuius desideriis ac libidinibus

addictae ineluibilem quendam fucum trahant labemque terrenam, quae cum

temporis diuturnitate penitus inhaeserit, eius naturae reddi animas, ut

... cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, quae peccatis inusta sensum

doloris attribuit. quam sententiam poeta sic explicavit—“quin et supremo

etc.”’ Lact. _Div. inst._ vii 20, 9 and 10 (Arnim ii 813); ‘[Stoicos]

miror, quod † imprudentes animas circa terram prosternant, cum illas

a sapientibus multo superioribus erudiri adfirment’ Tert. _de an._ 54

(Arnim i 147, reading ‘prudentes’ on his own conjecture). On the other

hand Augustine (_Civ. De._ xxi 13) ascribes the doctrine to ‘Platonici

quidam’ and Comm. Luc. ix 9 (p. 291 Us.) to Pythagoras. See Schmekel, p.

105.

[153] ‘facillimum ad superos iter est animis cito ab humana conversatione

dimissis. facilius quicquid est illud obsoleti inlitique eluunt’ Sen.

_Dial._ vi 23, 1; ‘[filius tuus] paulum supra nos commoratus, dum

expurgatur et inhaerentia vitia situmque omnem mortalis aevi excutit’

_ib._ 25, 1.

[154] Diog. L. vii 157.

[155] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79.

[156] See above, §§ 254, 293; for the teaching of Posidonius as to the

pre-existence of the soul, see Schmekel, p. 250.

[157] See above, § 296.

[158] ‘animus beneficio subtilitatis suae erumpit’ Sen. _Ep._ 57, 8.

[159] ‘ibi illum aeterna requies manet e confusis crassisque pura et

liquida visentem’ _Dial._ vi 24, 5.

[160] ‘emissis [animis] meliora restant onere detracto’ _Ep._ 24, 18.

So in the Burial Service ‘the souls of the faithful, after they are

delivered from the burden of the flesh, are in joy and felicity.’

[161] ‘non illos interfusa maria discludunt nec altitudo montium;

tramites omnium plani’ _Dial._ vi 25, 3.

[162] ‘ad excelsa sublatus inter felices currit animas, Scipiones

Catonesque, interque contemptores vitae et mortis beneficio liberos’

_ib._ 1.

[163] ‘rerum naturae spectaculo fruitur et humana omnia ex superiore loco

despicit, divina vero propius intuetur’ _ib._ xi 9, 3.

[164] ‘nos quoque, felices animae atque aeterna sortitae, parva ruinae

ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur’ _ib._ vi 26, 7.

[165] ‘[animus], si superstes est corpori, nullo genere [perire potest],

quoniam nulla immortalitas cum exceptione est’ _Ep._ 57, 9.

[166] See Winckler, _Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums_, p. 52.

[167] ‘haec sunt ignorantis, cum de aeternitate animorum dicatur, de

mente dici, non de partibus iis, in quibus aegritudines irae libidinesque

versentur’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 33, 80.

[168] ‘excepit illum magna et aeterna pax’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 19, 6.

[169] ‘mors dolorum omnium exsolutio est et finis’ _ib._ 19, 5.

[170] ‘mors est non esse. id quale sit, iam scio. hoc erit post me, quod

ante me fuit’ _Ep._ 54, 4.

[171] ‘mors nos aut consumit aut exuit; ... consumptis nihil restat’ _ib._

24, 18.

[172] See above, §§ 140 and 141.

[173] M. Aurel. _To himself_ iv 21.

[174] See below, § 306. Cleanthes wrote a book to show that ‘virtue is

the same in men and women’; see Diog. L. vii 103.

[175] ‘quis dixit naturam maligne cum muliebribus ingeniis egisse, et

virtutem illarum in artum retraxisse? par illis, mihi crede, vigor,

par ad honesta, libeat, facultas est; dolorem laboremque ex aequo, si

consuevere, patiuntur’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 16, 1.

[176] See below, §§ 431, 439, 444, 446.

[177] ‘muliebre est furere in ira’ Sen. _Clem._ i 5, 5; ‘[mulier]

aeque imprudens [atque] animal est, et nisi scientia accessit et multa

eruditio, ferum, cupiditatum incontinens’ _Dial._ ii 14, 1.

[178] ‘utraque turba [_i.e._ sexus] ad vitae societatem tantundem

[confert], sed altera pars ad obsequendum, altera imperio nata [est]’

_ib._ 1, 1.

[179] See below, § 303.

[180] See below, § 309.

[181] ‘fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos, qui mitiore caelo

utuntur. in frigora septentrionemque vergentibus immansueta ingenia sunt’

Sen. _Dial._ iv 15, 5. So too Lucan: ‘omnis in Arctois populus quicunque

pruinis | nascitur, indomitus bellis et mortis amator’ _Phars._ viii

363-6.

[182] ‘agedum illis corporibus illis animis luxum opes ignorantibus da

rationem, da disciplinam: ut nihil amplius dicam, necesse erit certe

nobis mores Romanos repetere’ Sen. _Dial._ iii II, 4.