CHAPTER XIII._Roman Stoicism being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire

DAILY DUTIES.

[Sidenote: From principles to practice.]

=330.= As in our study of the Stoic philosophy we turn aside from the

supreme problems of the universe, such as gather round the questions

of the divine purpose, the existence of evil, and unfettered choice,

our way becomes easier. Our new problems, dealing with the constitution

of the human soul, and the ideals of human life in the state and in

the individual, are perhaps not simpler in themselves, but they are of

narrower range, and in finding our way over the first rough ground we

learn to tread with some assurance, so that we now feel ourselves, as it

were, on a downward path. For all that, the problems of the universal

law and the perfect man must still be compared to mountain tops, if not

to the highest peaks of all. But from this point on we steadily descend

towards the plains, to that common and practical life by which the worth

of philosophy is tested. We no longer gaze on the same bright sunlight or

breathe the same invigorating air; philosophy enters a region of mists

and shadows, and even learns to adapt her language to new neighbours. But

her meaning is the same as before, and the pathway to the heights is not

closed behind her.

[Sidenote: The daily round.]

=331.= The region we have now reached is that of ‘daily duties,’ by

which phrase we propose to translate here the Greek καθήκοντα and the

Latin _officia_[1]. This word is defined by Zeno as meaning ‘that which

it comes in one’s way to do[2],’ and its quiet sound at once brings

it into contrast with the proud claims of Virtue. The contrast is in

fact great. Virtue, displaying itself in Right Action, is only possible

for reasoning beings, that is, for gods and men; and within our view

it is only attained, if at all, by the wise man. But daily duty is

common to the wise and the unwise[3]; it not only extends to children,

but also to the unreasoning animals[4] and to plants[5]. Virtue always

contemplates the Universal law; for daily duty it is sufficient to follow

the individual nature[6]. Virtue cannot even be understood except by the

trained philosopher, whilst the principles of daily duty may be explained

to the simple. To use a comparison from mathematics, daily duty is the

projection of virtue upon the plane of ordinary life. Between the two

there always remains an assured correspondence. Each Right Action which

Virtue achieves is at the same time the performance of a daily duty, and

that in the most complete manner[7]; each daily duty performed by the

unwise is a step by which he may in the end climb to Wisdom[8].

[Sidenote: First laws of nature.]

=332.= The subject of ‘daily duties’ was treated both by Zeno[9] and

by Cleanthes[10], and is implied in the theory of Stoic ethics as a

whole; it has also a special relation to the doctrine of advantages

and disadvantages. Nevertheless the Stoics do not directly say that

daily duty consists in the seeking of advantages, but that it is based

upon primary ends which nature sets up (πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, _principia

naturae_)[11]. This phrase indicates the source of this part of the

Stoic philosophy; it marks teaching common to the Peripatetic school

and the Academy, and accepted by Zeno from his teacher Polemo[12]. We

are not informed how Zeno and Cleanthes elaborated this subject; and

when we find it taken up in earnest, the spirit of the Academy is firmly

established. Thus the Stoic demand for certain knowledge is here set

aside; and we are told that the standard of daily duty is ‘that which

when done can reasonably be defended[13]’; which definition closely

corresponds with the definition of the supreme good by Diogenes of

Babylon ‘to take a reasonable course in the choice of things according

to nature[14].’ Thus strong will and assured conviction are no longer

required; the door is thrown open for convention, opportunism, and

respectability. The daring moral theories and bold paradoxes of the

founders of Stoicism tend to disappear from sight, and are replaced

by shrewd good sense and worldly wisdom: in short, by the doctrine of

‘making the best of both worlds.’ The subject was therefore congenial

to Panaetius, who was both a practical statesman and an admirer of

Plato and Aristotle; and it was from this standpoint that Stoicism so

rapidly won its way with the Roman nobility of the last century of the

republic. Panaetius’ book περὶ καθηκόντων was the basis of Cicero’s work

_de Officiis_, which is the only systematic treatise which we possess

on Stoic ethics, and therefore generally the most convenient source of

information. As however this work leans very strongly towards Peripatetic

views, it will frequently be necessary to refer to other authorities,

amongst which Cicero’s _de Finibus_ best represents the older Stoics, and

Seneca and Epictetus the Stoics of the Roman principate.

[Sidenote: From the animals to man.]

=333.= It is no departure from the fundamental principles of Stoicism

when we learn that the ‘first lessons of nature’ are those which are

imprinted upon every animal at its birth[15]; Zeno himself had sought

for the natural law of marriage by a like method[16]. The first natural

lesson is that each animal seeks, not indeed pleasure as the Epicureans

hold, but its own preservation and the maintenance of its life in its

completeness[17]. At a later stage is imparted the desire of sexual union

for procreation’s sake, and with it some kind of affection for each

one’s offspring[18]. But nature’s best lessons are reserved for man; as

to look into the future, and regard life as a whole[19]; to interest

himself in his fellows, to attend public festivities, and to procure

the amenities of a civilized life for himself and those dependent upon

him[20]; in spare hours, to acquire information on points of historical

or philosophical interest[21]; in riper life to claim freedom, and to

refuse to submit to any arbitrary commands[22]; and finally, to perceive

in all things harmony and beauty, and to avoid any disturbance of it by

wilful action[23]. ‘Such,’ says Cicero, ‘is the picture of a beautiful

life; and could we see it with our eyes (as Plato says), great would be

our desire to possess Wisdom for a bride[24].’

[Sidenote: Wavering as to the standard.]

=334.= In this general sketch we miss a clear ethical standard. The

first lessons of nature may easily be perverted, so far as they are

common to men and animals, for they point towards the acts of eating,

drinking, and sexual union, all of which are associated by the ordinary

man with pleasure in a vicious sense. Hence arises a danger (from which

many Stoics do not keep clear), that we may fall into the terrible error

of the Epicureans, and hold that pleasure itself is a first law of

nature[25]. It is therefore necessary to lay it down that man should aim

specially at those results which are characteristic of human nature, that

is at the development of powers which he does not share with the lower

animals. So far the Academy and the Porch might travel together. But

the only, higher capacities recognised by the Stoics are reason and the

political sense, which is an aspect of the universal reason; such matters

as antiquarian interests and the appreciation of beauty could only be

introduced under Academic influence. The last, however, as we shall see,

is to become with Panaetius the predominant consideration[26].

[Sidenote: The four virtues.]

=335.= From the enunciation of general principles we pass on to the

separate virtues. Virtue in the strict sense can only be possessed by

the wise man; he therefore alone can practise the virtues; nevertheless

we may use this and like terms in a secondary sense to describe those

adumbrations or reflections of virtue which fall within the reach

of the ordinary man[27]. The classification of the virtues varies.

Panaetius divided virtue into two parts, theoretical and practical, and

Seneca follows him on this point[28]. It was perhaps Chrysippus who

distinguished between virtues that are ‘arts’ (τέχναι) and which are

based on theoretical principles, and those which are ‘acquirements’

(δυνάμεις), being attained by practice[29]. But generally speaking the

division of Virtue into the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Justice,

Courage, and Soberness is accepted as sufficient; by subdivision the

number of virtues may be increased to any extent; and in scholastic

classifications of virtue we find lists which have multiplicity for their

direct aim[30].

[Sidenote: Wisdom.]

=336.= Wisdom (φρόνησις, _prudentia_) is considered by Zeno not only

as the first of the virtues, but as the foundation of all; so that

Courage is wisdom in suffering, Justice is wisdom in distribution, and

Soberness is wisdom in enjoyment[31]. His successors treated Science

(ἐπιστήμη, _scientia_) as the parent virtue[32], thus placing Wisdom

side by side with the other cardinal virtues, yet losing the point

of Zeno’s genealogy. The writers of the later periods desired to

recognise separately contemplative wisdom, and therefore introduced

as a subdivision of the first cardinal virtue ‘Speculation’ (σοφία,

_sapientia_)[33]. But the Stoics generally held that all wisdom must

justify itself by practical results. The study of the so-called

‘liberal arts’ has a value for children, for it prepares the way for

virtuous training[34]. Logic is needed to protect us against fallacious

reasoning[35], and physics that we may rightly understand the universe

and its providential government, upon which the conception of duty

depends[36]; in this sense we may speak of logic and physics as virtues,

that is, as subdivisions of the virtue of wisdom[37]. The study of

physics is also admirable because it elevates the soul[38]. Geometry,

law, and astrology are useful in the several professions[39]. But study

when carried to excess, as by antiquarians, bookworms, and other learned

time-wasters, is nothing but folly[40].

[Sidenote: Justice.]

=337.= The second cardinal virtue is Justice (δικαιοσύνη, _iustitia_), of

which Chrysippus drew a striking allegorical picture. ‘She is of virgin

form, to show that she is incorruptible and does not give way to bad

men; ... of firm and fierce aspect, ... inspiring fear in the wicked,

confidence in the good; her eyes are keen-sighted, her bearing is at

once sad and awe-inspiring[41].’ Cicero distinguishes Justice in the

narrower sense from ‘Beneficence.’ Justice proper is a political virtue,

and consists in respect for the rights and property of individuals.

By nature indeed all things are common; but since they have become

private property by occupation, conquest, law, contract, and so forth,

individuals may keep their own, provided they do not forget that they

have always the duty of contributing to the common good[42], and that

even slaves have reasonable claims upon them[43]. Beneficence needs

the guidance of principle, and must be determined by considerations of

person and occasion. The claims of persons upon us depend on propinquity;

country, parents, wife and children must be first considered, then

other relatives, then fellow-citizens, lastly men in general[44]. The

consideration of the degrees of propinquity (σχέσεις) was a favourite

subject with Epictetus, and a useful defence against those who maintained

that the Stoic sage was lacking in natural affection[45]. The virtue of

Justice appealed specially to the statesman in both its applications, and

is dealt with fully by Panaetius, and by Cicero after him.

[Sidenote: Courage.]

=338.= The third cardinal virtue is Courage (ἀνδρεία, _fortitudo_),

which retains the tradition of the ‘strength and force’ of Socrates.

This again, according to Cicero, has two parts, one passive, which

consists in despising fortune and its buffets, and is in harmony with

the picture of the wise man as usually drawn; the other part, which we

may call Greatness of Soul (μεγαλοψυχία, _magnitudo animi_) is shown

in the undertaking of great enterprises. The virtue of Courage is

characteristically Stoic, and may be considered, like its counterpart

Wisdom, as the foundation and source of all the virtues; the knowledge

of good and evil can only be attained by the soul that is duly strung

to vigorous resolution[46]. The Stoics of the principate perhaps insist

most of all on this virtue, which alone makes men independent of all that

it lies with Fortune to give and to take away. The man of courage will

therefore detach himself from fortune’s gifts; he will treat them as

household furniture lent to him which may be at any moment recalled[47].

[Sidenote: Death not to be feared.]

=339.= Courage appears in its highest development in the face of tyranny

and death. It is the tyrant’s boast that he has men in his power: but

the brave man is an exception. His rank and his property may be taken

away; he may be subjected to the torture; his life may be forfeited; but

the soul, that is the man himself, is beyond the tyrant’s reach[48]. To

pain he answers ‘if I can bear it, it will be light; if I cannot bear

it, it cannot be long[49].’ Amidst all the extremities of fire and rack

men have been found who never groaned, never begged for mercy, never

answered a question, and indeed laughed heartily[50]. Of death the Stoic

has no fear; not only is it no evil, but it is to be welcomed as part

of the course of nature[51]; it is the best of friends, for it offers a

release from all troubles, and in particular from the oppression of the

tyrant[52]. We do not indeed deny that normally life is an advantage,

that nature’s first lesson is self-preservation, and that death in

itself is a thing terrible to contemplate[53]; but life is not the more

desirable for its length[54]; and when old age begins to shatter the

powers of the mind, and to degrade the man to the life of a vegetable,

nature is calling him to quit his mortal body[55]. At no period is life

worth purchasing at the cost of the loss of honour, without which it

loses its savour[56]. The philosopher therefore will not merely see with

calm confidence the approach of death; he will go forward to meet it of

his own free will, if only he is assured that reasonable choice points

that way.

[Sidenote: Reasonable departure.]

=340.= The doctrine of ‘reasonable departure’ (εὔλογος ἐξαγωγή,

_rationalis e vita excessus_) plays a prominent part in the Stoic ethics.

It cannot rightly be described as the recommendation of suicide; for

the Stoics do not permit a man to pass sentence of death upon himself,

but only to cooperate in carrying out the decree of a higher power. The

doctrine is intended in the first instance to justify death gloriously

met in fighting for one’s country or one’s friends; next when intolerable

pain or incurable disease plainly indicates the will of the deity[57];

in the development of Roman history a third reason was found in the

loss of political freedom[58]. These reasons are not added to, but only

systematized, when we are told that it is an ‘ordinary duty’ to quit

life when a man’s natural advantages (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν) are outweighed by

the corresponding disadvantages[59]; for amongst ‘natural advantages’

are included in this connexion all those considerations of which an

honourable man will rightly take account; and the calculation may equally

lead him to the conclusion that, in spite of old age and suffering, and

though he has never attained to true wisdom, his simple duty is to wait

quietly in life[60].

[Sidenote: Its dangers.]

=341.= The practice of ‘reasonable departure’ was largely recommended

to the Stoics by the examples of Socrates (whose death they regarded as

voluntary[61]) and of Cato[62]; and it was at first no small matter of

pride to them to find that these examples found imitators, and that their

system thus showed its power over the greatest of the terrors that beset

humanity. But under the Roman principate ‘free departure’ soon became

so common that it was a reproach rather than a glory to its advocates,

a social disease pointing to morbidity of soul rather than to healthy

resolution[63]. Hence the philosophers turned from recommendation

to reproof. ‘A brave and wise man must not flee from life, but quit

it,’ says Seneca[64]; ‘nothing is more disgraceful than to long for

death’[65]. ‘Friends,’ says Epictetus, ‘wait for God; when he shall give

you the signal, then go to him[66].’

[Sidenote: Courage is active.]

=342.= The ‘free departure’ is the most striking illustration of passive

courage, but even before it was abused Cicero at least had perceived the

attraction which this attitude of soul possesses, and its opposition to

the spirit of active enterprise which he calls Greatness of Soul, and

which he advocates perhaps more on Academic than on Stoic lines. Still

the Stoics had already defined Courage as ‘virtue fighting in the front

rank in defence of justice[67].’ A good man must indeed regard power and

wealth as things indifferent; but he is to be blamed if he makes this an

excuse for avoiding public life, and leaving to others magistracies at

home or commands in the wars[68]. In the old world the love of glory and

praise on the one hand, angry feeling against enemies on the other, has

led men to seek these positions; but now they should seek them at home

that they may have a wide field for the exercise of their virtues[69],

and in the wars in order that all war may be brought to an end[70]. By

the older Stoics this Greatheartedness was advocated by precept and

example: Zeno had said that the wise man should take part in public

life[71], and his hearers Persaeus and Philonides had taken service

under Antigonus Gonatas[72], and Sphaerus with Cleomenes III, king of

Sparta[73]. We shall see later how large was the part played in Roman

political life by men who were Stoics or inclined to Stoicism, in an age

in which there was a strong current of fashion in favour of a quiet life.

We must therefore recognise in Courage, fully as much as in Wisdom or

Justice, a political as well as a private virtue.

[Sidenote: Soberness.]

=343.= The fourth cardinal virtue is Soberness (σωφροσύνη,

_temperantia_). Of this there are various definitions, and amongst them

that it is the principle which regulates our natural appetites so that

they are neither in excess nor in defect[74]. From Cicero’s point of

view Soberness embraces all the virtues, for it is in the due regulation

of the impulses that virtue consists. The standard to be attained is a

healthy state of the soul; and this is to be judged, upon the analogy

of the body, by the canon of that which is beautiful, symmetrical, and

becoming (πρέπον, _decorum_)[75]. ‘Just as bodily beauty is symmetry

established between the limbs mutually, and also between each and the

whole body, so beauty of the soul is symmetry between the reasoning power

and its parts, and mutually between each of those parts[76].’ Although

this is in principle a doctrine accepted by the whole Stoic school,

yet in its application we may easily find an entirely new departure,

that is, if the appeal is made to an artistic standard which depends

upon the taste of the individual. The door is then thrown open to an

abandonment of the Cynico-Stoic theory of life according to reason, and

to the acceptance of the standard of good feeling, which may easily be

so stretched as to include existing prejudices and conventions. This

danger is realized in Cicero’s treatment of the virtue of ‘decorum,’

which in its distinctive sense is defined as having the element of

‘gentlemanliness’ in itself[77]. It begins with respect for the feelings

and opinions of others[78]; it avoids all rough games and obscene

jests[79]; it makes choice of a profession adapted to the natural

character of the individual[80]; it observes, as the actor does, the

proprieties of youth and age, rich and poor, citizen and foreigner[81];

it prescribes dignity as fitting for men, gracefulness for women[82]. In

particular decorum is displayed in modesty (_verecundia_). This is shown

by keeping out of sight those parts of the body which nature, though she

could not dispense with them, has concealed and covered; in attending

to their functions with the utmost secrecy; and in referring both to

these parts of the body and to their uses by words that do not properly

describe them[83].

[Sidenote: Cynism or ‘decorum’?]

=344.= Cicero’s treatment of ‘decorum’ is so full of good sense that his

_de Officiis_ was the most widely-known textbook of Greco-Roman ethics

in medieval schools, and has retained its importance in the classical

public schools of the present day. But its logical justification on Stoic

principles is far from easy. We are therefore not surprised to find that,

just as Zeno and the main body of his followers had proclaimed in advance

that such doctrine was false in principle and ridiculous in detail, so

conversely the followers of Panaetius found it necessary expressly to

repudiate the teaching of a large number of Stoics[84]. We have in fact

here a sharp conflict between the cultured and Platonizing Stoics on the

one side, and the general feeling of the school on the other. Cicero

elsewhere treats it as an accepted Stoic doctrine that ‘the wise man

will blurt things straight out[85]’; and the theory of ‘gentlemanly

professions’ can never have appealed to any large social circle. In the

period of the principate we find the theory of ‘decorum,’ as a whole,

abandoned. Seneca, personally as sensitive as Cicero himself, recognises

the absurdity of wasting time in hinting at a plain meaning[86], nor does

he limit his choice of illustration even when addressing a lady of high

social position[87]. We must look then in some other direction than the

_de Officiis_ for a duly proportioned exposition of the Stoic virtue of

Soberness.

[Sidenote: The appetites.]

=345.= Reverting to the definitions of this virtue, we find, amongst

those that are generally accepted, first, that it is ‘the science of

things that are to be sought or avoided or neither[88]’; secondly, that

it is ‘concerned with the human appetites[89].’ Now the term ‘appetite’

or ‘impulse’ (ὁρμή, _appetitus_) includes in the Stoic philosophy all

those first movements of the soul which draw us on towards some object,

and which are adumbrations of right conduct requiring revision and

control by reason. But it seems clear that Soberness has little to do

with those higher impulses that are characteristic of man, such as the

love of knowledge or of society, since other virtues are concerned with

these. It remains that Soberness is the virtue which is concerned with

the appetites common to men and the lower animals, which we may shortly

call the ‘lower appetites’; they are, as we have already stated, the

desires of eating, drinking, and sexual union. It is just in this sphere

that Pleasure arises, in the sense in which it is condemned by the Cynics

and popular moralists[90]. We may therefore shortly define Soberness

as a right disposition of soul in relation to Pleasure. Its peculiar

characteristic is that it is in the main a negative virtue, displaying

itself in abstinence from indulgence[91].

[Sidenote: Two views of Pleasure.]

=346.= In order then rightly to understand the virtue of Soberness, we

need a clear idea of the attitude of the Stoics towards Pleasure. Zeno,

as we have seen, whilst definitely placing Pleasure in the category of

things indifferent, had nevertheless allowed it to be understood that

it might be an advantage (προηγμένον), and the seeking after it natural

(κατὰ φύσιν)[92]; and this is stated to have been the express teaching of

Hecato, Apollodorus, and Chrysippus[93]. To other Stoics this appeared

to be a disastrous concession to Epicurean views. Cleanthes, who had

scornfully described the ideal of Epicurus by the picture of Pleasure

enthroned as queen, with the Virtues submissively attending as her

handmaidens[94], interpreted the word ‘indifferent’ more strictly; he

refused to admit that pleasure was ‘natural’ or possessed any worth[95].

In this view he was supported by a great many Stoics, and practically by

Archedemus, when he said that pleasure was natural but valueless, like

the hairs under the armpit[96]. Hence followed the acceptable conclusion

that no sensible man would pay much attention to so trivial a matter[97].

Thus the one word ‘indifferent’ came to include two views which were

substantially opposed, the one inclining to the Academic standpoint, and

the other to Cynism.

[Sidenote: Pleasure an aftergrowth, or an evil.]

=347.= From this contradiction an escape was sought by making a

distinction. In one sense pleasure is an affection of the body, namely

a tickling (_titillatio_) of organs of sense, most readily illustrated

in the eating of dainties. This kind of pleasure, even if it is not an

advantage naturally sought, yet has some likeness to one; though it is

not directly to be aimed at, yet it may be welcomed when nature grants

it to us as an extra[98]. This new view practically coincides with

that of Aristotle, who calls pleasure an ‘aftergrowth’ (ἐπιγέννημα,

_accessio_), which of itself follows on virtuous action, and is attached

to it as the scent to a flower[99]. But much more commonly, in ethical

discussions, ‘pleasure’ denotes the excitement which is more strictly

termed ‘hilarity’ (ἔπαρσις, _sublatio animi_), and is the unhealthy

condition of the soul when it is unduly attracted to an object of

choice[100]. For this mischief Cicero suggests the Latin term _laetitia_,

which is perhaps not altogether adequate[101]. This ‘pleasure’ may be

unreservedly condemned as not merely indifferent, but actually contrary

to nature[102]; whilst the virtuous and natural disposition is that of

the man who not only contemplates toil and pain with calm mind, but

actually welcomes them as possible stepping-stones towards his own true

advantage[103].

[Sidenote: Active soberness.]

=348.= Although the prevailing tendency in Stoic teaching is to consider

Soberness as a negative virtue, and as opposed to the perturbation of

Hilarity, there is not wanting some recognition of its positive side. For

Soberness also demands that there shall be a healthy activity of the soul

in matters such as eating, drinking, and the relations of sex; abstinence

is not in itself an end, and if pursued out of season is both a folly

and a fault. But this point of view is not adequately treated by any

Stoic writer. Panaetius in discussing daily duties omitted to consider

the proper care of the body, as was afterwards noticed by Antipater of

Tyre; and Cicero gets little further than a general recommendation of

common sense and self-restraint in all the circumstances of life[104].

The Romans of the principate were disposed to leave the matter to the

physician, suggesting only that food should suffice to allay hunger,

drink to put an end to thirst, and clothing to keep away cold[105]; but

it is probable that popular moral discourses stopped short of this, and

favoured some amount of endurance as a discipline for the soul[106].

[Sidenote: Sober love.]

=349.= With regard to the relations of sex, the Socratic tradition was

favourable to a more positive treatment. Accordingly the Stoics (not

without some feeling that they are adopting a paradoxical position)

assert that love (ἔρως, _amor_) is an essential, both for the maintenance

of the State[107] and for the character of the good man. Zeno had laid

it down that ‘the wise man will love[108].’ We must, however, make a

sharp distinction between love as the desire of sexual union, and the

higher Love (ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή) which is defined anew as ‘an effort to make

friends suggested by a beautiful object[109].’ Upon this impulse, which

is natural in the widest sense, is based friendship in the young, and the

more lasting tie between husband and wife. By imposing self-restraint

on the man, and inviting the woman to share the lessons of philosophy,

the Stoics introduced a new relation between husband and wife based upon

equality and comradeship[110]. A notable precedent was furnished by the

Cynic community, when the witty and learned Hipparchia joined Crates

in the life of the beggar-preacher[111]; and Roman Stoicism supplies

us with numerous instances of the same companionship[112]. Under such

conditions marriage is no longer a matter of free choice; it is a civic

duty incumbent on the young Stoic. The Stoics of the Roman principate

well perceived the danger that threatened the society in which they lived

through the growing practice of celibacy[113].

[Sidenote: Of marriage.]

=350.= The Stoic attitude towards marriage is well illustrated by the

following extract from a discourse by Antipater of Tarsus:

‘A youth of good family and noble soul, who has a sense of social

duty, will feel that no life and no household is complete without

wife and child. He will also bear in mind his duty towards the

State, for how can that be maintained unless, as the fathers

decay and fall away like the leaves of a fine tree, the sons

marry in the flower of their age, and leave behind them fresh

shoots to adorn the city, thereby providing for its protection

against its enemies? He will look upon marriage also as a duty

towards the gods; for if the family dies out, who will perform

the accustomed sacrifices?

Besides this he who knows nothing of wife and child has not

tasted the truest joys of affection. For other friendships are

like platefuls of beans or other like mixtures of juxtaposition,

but the union of man and wife is like the mixing of wine and

water, or any other case of penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων); for

they are united not only by the ties of substance and soul and

the dearest bond of children, but also in body. Other alliances

are for occasion, this is bound up with the whole purpose of

life, so that the parents on each side gladly allow that the wife

should be first in her husband’s affection, and the husband in

his wife’s.

But in these days of dissolution and anarchy all things change

for the worse and marriage is thought a hard thing; and men

call the celibate life divine because it gives opportunity for

licentiousness and varied pleasures, and they bar the door

against a wife as against an enemy. Others have their fancy

taken by beauty or dowry, and no longer look for a wife who is

piously brought up and obedient and a good manager; nor do they

trouble to instruct their wives in these matters. But if a man

would attend to the warnings of philosophers, of all burdens a

lawful wife would be the lightest and sweetest. Such a man would

have four eyes instead of two, and four hands instead of two, to

supply all his needs: and if he desired leisure to write books or

take part in politics, he could hand over the whole business of

housekeeping to his partner[114].’

[Sidenote: Advantages sought.]

=351.= The four cardinal virtues, however widely they are interpreted, do

not exhaust the field of daily duties. All objects that are ‘advantages’

(προηγμένα) are _prima facie_ such that the good man aims at securing

them; although if sufficient reason appears, he will entirely forego

them. The advantages of the soul, good natural disposition, ‘art,’

and ‘progress’ are discussed elsewhere in this chapter; as advantages

of the body are reckoned life, health, strength, good digestion,

good proportions, and beauty; whilst external advantages are wealth,

reputation, noble birth, and the like[115]. In all the details there is

a lack of exactitude and of agreement amongst the teachers. According to

Seneca, men may reasonably wish for tallness[116], and there is a kind

of beauty (not dependent on youth) of which women may be proud without

blame[117]. Fine clothes make no one the better man, but a certain

degree of neatness and cleanliness in dress is an advantage[118]. For

nobility the Stoics have little regard; all men are derived through an

equal number of degrees from the same divine origin; virtue is the true

nobility[119]. Good name (δόξα, _gloria_) is commonly reckoned amongst

‘advantages’[120]; but Chrysippus and Diogenes are said to have taught

that a good man need not move a finger for the sake of reputation, unless

some advantage can be obtained by it. Later teachers, influenced (as we

are told) by the criticisms of Carneades, made it absolutely plain that

they reckoned good name (apart from anything attainable by it) as an

advantage, and they even considered it natural that a man should think

of posthumous reputation[121]. The general feeling of the school seems

to be that the approval of others is too uncertain to be a fitting aim;

its place is taken by the approval of ‘conscience.’ This term, which

originally expressed the burden of a guilty secret, became in the Roman

period modified in meaning, and could thus express the approval awarded

to a man by his inner and personal consciousness, even when all the world

disapproves his acts: this self-approval is closely akin to peace of

mind[122].

[Sidenote: Wealth.]

=352.= On no subject would it be easier to find apparently contradictory

views amongst Stoic writers than on that of wealth. To decry wealth

and praise poverty is to some extent a commonplace with all the

philosophical schools; and with Seneca in particular this was so frequent

a practice[123] that his hearers found some inconsistency between his

words and his deeds; for he was, as is well known, a rich man. But the

position of the school is clear. ‘Riches are not a good’ is a Stoic

paradox, emphasized in a hundred forms, and by every teacher[124]; but

nevertheless they are an ‘advantage,’ and thus are rightly aimed at by

the good man[125]. To the wealthy Stoics generally, and to the Romans of

the republican period especially, the maintenance of the family property

(_res familiaris_) was a duty of high importance; and the wasting of

it in wholesale largess, a serious misdeed[126]. The Stoic view was

sufficiently summed up in a proverb borrowed from Epicurus or one of his

followers: ‘he who feels the need of wealth least, can make the best

use of it[127].’ Although Panaetius did not write a special chapter on

the acquisition and use of wealth[128], yet his views on the latter

point are made sufficiently plain in his treatment of the virtue of

Justice[129]. The justification of wealth lies in the intention to use

it well, and this was a favourite subject with Hecato of Rhodes[130].

As to its acquisition and investment, Cicero is content to refer us

to the high-principled men who conduct the financial affairs of the

capital[131].

[Sidenote: Liberty.]

=353.= Amongst those popular terms which hold an ambiguous place in the

Stoic philosophy we must reckon ‘liberty’ (ἐλευθερία, _libertas_). In one

sense liberty is a condition of soul such as characterizes the free-born

citizen in contrast to the slave; this liberty differs but little from

the virtue of Greatness of Soul already described[132], and in its full

meaning is a good, which the wise man alone can possess[133]. But in

another sense liberty is an external advantage, sometimes defined as

‘the power of living as you wish[134],’ and as such eagerly desired by

the slave; more often perhaps it is conceived as ‘the right of saying

what you please[135].’ In this sense liberty is equivalent to the

παῤῥησία which was the watchword of the democracy of Athens, and was the

equally cherished privilege of the nobility of Rome[136]; in a slightly

different sense it was the boast of the Cynic missionary. The Stoics take

a middle position; whilst all recognise that some sort of liberty is a

precious privilege[137], and are prepared on occasion to sacrifice life

or position for its sake[138], there are not wanting voices to remind us

that it is unreasonable to speak out one’s mind without regard to persons

or circumstances[139], that the wrath of tyrants ought not lightly to be

provoked[140], and that the most terrible of all oppressors is the soul

that has lost its self-control[141].

[Sidenote: Disadvantages.]

=354.= Just as virtue chooses advantages in accordance with natural

laws, so it refuses disadvantages in accordance with a disinclination

(ἔκκλισις, _alienatio_), which is equally natural and right so long

as it is controlled by reason[142]. Since to every advantage there is

opposed a corresponding disadvantage, to choose the one is necessarily

to refuse the other; and the doctrine of ‘reasonable refusal’ is that of

reasonable choice in its negative form. It will therefore be sufficient

to give a formal statement of the theory. Disadvantages, or things that

have negative value (ἀπαξία), may be subdivided according as they are

disadvantages in themselves, as an ungainly figure; or as they bring

about other disadvantages, as shortness of ready money; or for both

reasons, as bad memory or ill-health[143]. They may also be subdivided

into three classes, according as they affect the soul, the body, or

things external. Disadvantages of the soul are such things as inborn

vulgarity or dulness of wit; of the body, ill-health, and dulness of the

organs of sensation; of external things, poverty, loss of children, and

the contempt of our neighbours[144].

[Sidenote: Healthy affections.]

=355.= Since the virtues are permanent dispositions (διαθέσεις) of the

soul, rooted in firm principles in which the wise man never wavers,

but to which none else can attain, some other name is required to

describe those more passing but yet wholesome moods which stand in

contrast with the evil ‘affections’ or perturbations of the soul which

will be discussed in our next chapter. A beginning is made in this

direction with the three ‘good affections’ (εὐπάθειαι, _constantiae_,

_sapientis affectiones_). Here a new use of terms is introduced.

Strictly speaking an ‘affection’ is an evil state of soul; but as we

have no corresponding word for a good and calm condition, the use of

the word ‘affection’ is extended in this direction[145]. Each of these

‘good affections’ is introduced to us in contrast with a perturbation

to which it bears a superficial resemblance. Thus contrasted with Fear

is ‘Caution’ (εὐλάβεια, _cautio_), which is right avoidance, and is

entirely consistent with Courage rightly understood. Subdivisions of

Caution are (i) ‘Shame’ (αἰδώς, _verecundia_), the avoidance of deserved

blame, and (ii) ‘Sanctity’ (ἁγνεία) the avoidance of offences against the

gods[146]. Contrasted with Greed is ‘Readiness’ (βούλησις, _voluntas_),

the reasonable stretching out after future advantages[147]; contrasted

with Hilarity is Joy (χαρά, _gaudium_), the reasonable appreciation of

present advantages[148]. Both Readiness and Joy are entirely consistent

with Soberness rightly understood. To the perturbation of Grief no good

affection is named as bearing any resemblance; but we need not for that

reason question but that the wise man may entertain some quiet form

of sympathy for the troubles of others, and of regret for the blows

which fortune deals to him in political disappointment or personal

bereavement[149].

The ‘good affections’ are possessed by the wise man only[150]; but not

all wise men possess them, nor any at all times[151]. On the other

hand it is a daily duty to approximate to them, so that on this ground

the good citizen enters into competition with the wise man on not

altogether uneven terms[152]. The whole doctrine of ‘good affections’

may be conceived as an answer to those who accuse the Stoic of lack of

feeling[153]; for the much derided ‘apathy’ of the school is substituted

the doctrine of ‘eupathy.’ Wisdom is not to be compared to the surface of

a frozen sea, but to that of a rippling river. The lectures of Musonius

and Epictetus bring out on every point the meaning of ‘eupathy’ in its

various applications.

[Sidenote: The ethical motive.]

=356.= We have now sketched the Stoic system of daily duties in its main

features, and this sketch will be made more complete in many particulars

in the course of the next two chapters. To the modern reader the question

here suggests itself—what compelling force has this system? what motive

is supplied to the ordinary man for thus planning out his life? To this

question the ancient philosophers did not directly address themselves;

nevertheless their answers are implied in their teaching as a whole.

Thus the Stoics would doubtless reply, first, that daily duties are

prescribed to us by reason[154]; not perhaps always by reason in its

highest sense, to which we must not appeal in every individual action,

but at least by the spirit of reasonableness (εὐλογιστία). Secondly, that

the common opinion of mankind, growing daily stronger, recommends them;

they are, as we have seen from the beginning, things that it comes in

our way to do, that every good citizen and good man will be sure to do.

As to future rewards and punishments, though these are not excluded by

Stoicism, they are certainly never pressed as motives for right living.

But the strongest of all motives is undoubtedly the mental picture of

the wise man, the vision of that which is ‘absolutely good.’ Critics may

urge: ‘it is a picture that never has been or will be realized in men’s

lives, a vision of that which is very far off and which you will never

see or touch.’ This the Stoics hardly care to deny, but the difficulty

does not disturb them. The vision attracts by its own beauty, the hope

of attainment is cherished by all but the worst[155]. We have spoken of

the ‘ordinary man,’ or, as the Stoics put it, of ‘us who are not wise

men.’ But, strictly speaking, there is no room for the ordinary man in

the system, but only for the ‘probationer’ (προκόπτων, _proficiens_). It

remains for us to trace the upward path from daily duty to virtue, along

which every good man is endeavouring to advance.

[Sidenote: Progress.]

=357.= The doctrine of progress (προκοπή, _progressio_) is not peculiar

to Stoicism, but it is nevertheless an essential feature of it[156].

Critics may indeed dispute as to whether virtue has ever been in practice

attained; but the Stoic must hold fast to the ethical principles that

‘virtue can be taught[157]’ and that ‘virtue is an art[158].’ Every

man has from birth a capacity for acquiring virtue[159], which varies

in degree according to his natural disposition of soul[160]; on this

foundation every man builds by concurrent learning and practice[161].

The child is greatly helped if he possesses the trait of ‘modesty’

(αἰδώς, _verecundia_), which is essentially a readiness to defer to

others and to learn from those who are older and wiser[162]; though

later it may turn to ‘false shame,’ which is a hindrance[163]. He will

then learn to understand and perform his daily duties; and as his

character ripens, this performance will daily become easier and more

pleasurable to him[164], more certain and more steady in itself. And now

daily duties come near to Right Actions, which are indeed daily duties

perfected (τέλειον καθῆκον, _perfectum officium_), and complete in every

point[165]. In order to rise to this higher standard the good man must

first perform his duty in all particulars[166]; he must do so with

regularity and in harmony with the order of nature[167]; he will then

need only a certain fixity, conviction, and stability to pass into the

ranks of the wise[168].

[Sidenote: Conversion.]

=358.= The stages of progress are variously expounded by Stoic

writers[169]; but on one principle all are agreed. Progress is not a

half-way stage between vice and virtue, as the Peripatetics teach[170];

it is a long preparation, to be followed by a change sudden and complete

(μεταβολή, _conversio_)[171]. The final step, by which a foolish man

becomes in an instant wise, is different in kind to all that have gone

before. This position is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that

‘the good is not constituted by addition[172],’ and is enforced by

various illustrations. The probationer is like a man who has long been

under water; little by little he rises to the surface, but all in a

moment he finds himself able to breathe. He is like a puppy in whom

the organ of sight has been for days past developing; all at once he

gains the power of vision[173]. Just so when progress reaches the end

there dawns upon the eyes of the soul the complete and dazzling vision

of the good, of which till now only shadows and reflections have been

perceived. For a moment he is wise, but does not even yet realize his

own wisdom; then again in a moment he passes on to the complete fruition

of happiness[174].

[Sidenote: Duty.]

=359.= Thus from the lowlier conception of ‘daily duties’ we have again

climbed upwards to the supreme ethical end, to absolute goodness, which

is Virtue in her full royalty and the Universal Law (κοινὸς νόμος) as it

appeals to the individual man. In this connexion the ideal is familiar

in modern times under the name of Duty. The ancient Stoics perhaps never

quite reached to any such complete formulation of their ethical theory

in a single word; but their general meaning is perfectly expressed by

it. Just as the Socratic paradoxes mark the quarrel of philosophy with

outworn ideas expressed in conventional language, so its reconciliation

with the general opinion is marked by those newly-coined terms such as

‘conscience’ and ‘affection’ which are now familiar household words. We

cannot indeed demonstrate that ‘Duty exists,’ any more than we can that

deity or providence exists; but we may well say that without it ethical

discussion would in our own day be hardly possible. The following stanzas

from Wordsworth’s ‘Ode to Duty,’ based upon a Stoic text[175], may be a

useful reminder, not only of the dominant position of this conception in

modern thought, but also of the continued tendency of the human mind to

express its supreme convictions in anthropomorphic language.

‘Stern daughter of the Voice of God!

O Duty! if that name thou love

Who art a light to guide, a rod

To check the erring, and reprove:

Thou who art victory and law

When empty terrors overawe:

From vain temptations dost set free;

And calm’st the weary strife of frail humanity!

Stern Lawgiver! yet thou dost wear

The Godhead’s most benignant grace;

Nor know we anything so fair

As is the smile upon thy face:

Flowers laugh before thee on thy beds

And fragrance in thy footing treads:

Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;

And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong.

To humbler functions, awful Power!

I call thee: I myself commend

Unto thy guidance from this hour;

O let my weakness have an end!

Give unto me, made lowly wise,

The spirit of self-sacrifice;

The confidence of Reason give;

And in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live!’[176]

FOOTNOTES

[1] The English term, like so many we have to use, is an imperfect

translation; in discussing such questions as marriage and death we speak

instead of ‘ordinary’ or ‘simple’ duties.

[2] κατωνομάσθαι δ’ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ‘κατά

τινας ἥκειν’ τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης Diog. L. vii 108.

[3] ‘est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis’ Cic. _Fin._

iii 18, 59.

[4] Stob. ii 7, 8.

[5] Diog. L. vii 107.

[6] Stob. ii 7, 8.

[7] τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα

λέγεσθαι Stob. as above; ‘[sapiens] iudicat, cum agit, officium illud

esse’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 18, 59.

[8] See below, §§ 357, 358.

[9] Diog. L. vii 4.

[10] _ib._ 175.

[11] ‘omnia officia eo [referuntur], ut adipiscamur principia naturae’

Cic. _Fin._ iii 6, 22.

[12] ‘Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia

naturae acceperat’ _ib._ iv 16, 45.

[13] καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν Diog.

L. vii 107; ‘est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti

probabilis ratio reddi possit’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 17, 58; ‘ratio [non] debet

agere quidquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere’ _Off._ i

29, 101; ‘huic respondebimus, nunquam exspectare nos certissimam rerum

comprehensionem, quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio; sed ea ire, qua

ducit verisimilitudo, omne hac via procedit officium’ Sen. _Ben._ iv 33,

2; and see above, § 159.

[14] See above, § 110.

[15] ‘quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico

bonum sed initium boni’ Sen. _Ep._ 124, 7.

[16] See above, § 306.

[17] ‘placet his, simul atque natum sit animal, ipsum sibi conciliari et

commendari ad se conservandum, et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia

sunt eius status, diligenda’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 5, 16; the maintenance of a

complete life is illustrated by the desire to avoid the loss of a limb

or deformity, _ib._ 17. ‘Universally (be not deceived) every animal is

attached to nothing so much as to its own interest’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 22,

15.

[18] ‘commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus

procreandi causa, et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sunt’ Cic. _Off._

i 4, 11.

[19] _ib._

[20] _ib._ 12.

[21] Cic. _Off._ i 4, 13.

[22] _ib._

[23] _ib._ 14.

[24] ‘formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem honesti vides;

quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret

sapientiae’ _ib._ 5, 14.

[25] ‘in principiis autem naturalibus plerique Stoici non putant

voluptatem esse ponendam: quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne si

voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur,

multa turpia sequantur’ _Fin._ iii 5, 17. Yet Cicero, still writing as

a Stoic, can say: ‘[beluae] nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque

feruntur omni impetu’ _Off._ i 30, 105. See below, §§ 346, 347.

[26] See below, §§ 343, 344.

[27] ‘in iis, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem

perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt’ Cic.

_Off._ iii 3, 13; ‘vivitur cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, si sunt

simulacra virtutis’ _ib._ i 15, 46; ‘est autem quaedam animi sanitas,

quae in insipientem etiam cadat, cum curatione medicorum turbatio mentis

aufertur’ _Tusc. disp._ iv 13, 30.

[28] Diog. L. vii 92; ‘in duas partes virtus dividitur, in

contemplationem veri et actionem’ Sen. _Ep._ 94, 45.

[29] ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας (leg. τέχνας Hirz. ii

482) εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων· ἄλλας δὲ

ἐπιγίνεσθαι ταύταις, οὐκ ἔτι τέχνας οὔσας, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινάς, ἐκ τῆς

ἀσκήσεως περιγιγνομένας Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.

[30] For the virtues recognised by Chrysippus and others see Arnim iii

262-293; we find a sufficiently long list in Seneca: fortitudo, fides,

temperantia, humanitas, simplicitas, modestia ac moderatio, frugalitas et

parsimonia, clementia, _Ep._ 88, 29 and 30.

[31] Plut. _virt. mor._ 2; _de fort._ 2; _Sto. rep._ vii 1.

[32] Thus φρόνησις became ἐπιστήμη ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ

οὐδετέρων Stob. ii 7 5 b 1, cf. Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 37 (Arnim iii 283).

[33] ‘omnis cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus

honestis aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versatur’ Cic. _Off._

i 6, 19; ‘natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et

actioni’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 5, 1.

[34] ‘quid ergo? nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia? ad alia multum,

ad virtutem nihil. quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus? quia

animum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant’ _Ep._ 88, 20.

[35] ‘sine hac arte (sc. dialectica) quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci

fallique posse’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 21, 72.

[36] ‘qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei proficiscendum est ab

omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione’ _ib._ 22, 73.

[37] ‘ad eas virtutes dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque

ambas virtutum nomine appellant’ _ib._ 21, 72.

[38] ‘ad hoc nobis proderit inspicere rerum naturam. primo discedemus a

sordidis; deinde animum ipsum, quo summo magnoque opus est, seducemus

a corpore; deinde in occultis exercitata subtilitas non erit in aperta

deterior’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii Praef. 18.

[39] ‘quae omnes artes [sc. astrologia, geometria, ius civile] in veri

investigatione versantur, cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra

officium est’ Cic. _Off._ i 6, 19.

[40] ‘est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium ... in res conferunt

non necessarias’ _ib._ 6, 18.

[41] A. Gellius, _N. A._ xiv 4, 4.

[42] Cic. _Off._ i 7, 21 and 22.

[43] _ib._ 13, 41.

[44] ‘principes sint patria ac parentes; proximi liberi, totaque domus,

quae spectat in nos solos; deinde bene convenientes propinqui’ Cic.

_Off._ i 17, 58.

[45] ‘I ought not to be free from affections (ἀπαθής) like a statue, but

I ought to maintain the relations (σχέσεις) natural and acquired, as a

pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 2,

4; ‘Duties are usually measured by relations (ταῖς σχέσεσι). Is a man

a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all

things. Does a brother wrong you? Maintain then your own position towards

him’ _Manual_ 30. All the duties of relationship on the one side imply

corresponding duties on the other side; ‘invicem ista, quantum exigunt,

praestant, et parem desiderant regulam, quae (ut ait Hecaton) difficilis

est’ Sen. _Ben._ ii 18, 2.

[46] ‘[fortitudo] scientia est distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid

non sit’ _Ep._ 85, 28; ‘quomodo igitur Chrysippus? fortitudo est,

inquit, scientia rerum perferendarum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac

perferendo, summae legi parens sine timore’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 24, 53.

[47] ‘quicquid est hoc, Marcia, quod circa nos ex adventicio fulget,

liberi honores opes, ampla atria et exclusorum clientium turba referta

vestibula, clara nobilis aut formosa coniunx ceteraque ex incerta et

mobili sorte pendentia, alieni commodatique adparatus sunt; nihil horum

dono datur; collaticiis et ad dominos redituris instrumentis scena

adornatur’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 10, 1; ‘victrix fortunae sapientia’ Juv.

_Sat._ xiii 20.

[48] ‘cum potentes et imperio editi nocere intendent, citra sapientiam

omnes eorum impetus deficient’ Sen. _Dial._ ii 4, 1.

[49] ‘levis est, si ferre possum; brevis est, si ferre non possum’ _Ep._

24, 14.

[50] ‘inter haec tamen aliquis non gemuit. parum est, non rogavit. parum

est, non respondit. parum est: risit, et quidem ex animo’ _ib._ 78, 19.

[51] ‘mors optimum inventum naturae’ _Dial._ vi 20, 1; ‘fortem posce

animum, mortis terrore carentem, | qui spatium vitae extremum inter

munera ponat | naturae’ Juv. _Sat._ x 357-9.

[52] ‘caram te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 20, 3;

‘nullo nos invida tanto | armavit natura bono, quam ianua mortis | quod

patet’ Silius _Pun._ xi 186-8; ‘adeo mors timenda non est, ut beneficio

eius nihil timendum sit’ Sen. _Ep._ 24, 11.

[53] ‘[mors] quin habeat aliquid in se terribile, ut et animos nostros,

quos in amorem sui natura formavit, offendat, nemo dubitat’ _ib._ 36, 8.

[54] So Heraclitus had said ‘unus dies par omni est’ _ib._ 12, 7; ‘ut

prorogetur tibi dies mortis, nihil proficitur ad felicitatem: quoniam

mora non fit beatior vita, sed longior’ _Ben._ v 17, 6.

[55] ‘si [senectus] coeperit concutere mentem, si partes eius convellere,

si mihi non vitam reliquerit sed animam, prosiliam ex aedificio putri ac

ruenti’ _Ep._ 58, 35.

[56] ‘melius nos | Zenonis praecepta docent; nec enim omnia, quaedam |

pro vita facienda putant’ Juv. _Sat._ xv 106 to 108.

[57] Diog. L. vii 130. Ingenious members of the school found five good

reasons for voluntarily quitting life, resembling the causes for breaking

up a banquet. As the guests part, because of (i) a sudden need, such as

the arrival of a friend, (ii) revellers breaking in and using violent

language, (iii) the food turning bad, (iv) the food being eaten up, or

(v) the company being drunk; so the wise man will depart, because of

(i) a call to sacrifice himself for his country, (ii) tyrants doing him

violence, (iii) disease hindering the use of the body, (iv) poverty, (v)

madness, which is the drunkenness of the soul. See Arnim iii 768.

[58] Notably in the case of Cato.

[59] ‘in quo plura sunt, quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est

in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria, aut fore videntur,

huius officium est e vita excedere’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 18, 60.

[60] ‘perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui iidem miseri sint, officium

esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerum, quas secundum

naturam esse dicimus’ _ib._ iii 18, 61.

[61] He might easily have obtained acquittal by a judicious defence: Xen.

_Mem._ iv 4, 4.

[62] ‘Catoni gladium adsertorem libertatis extorque: magnam partem

detraxeris gloriae’ Sen. _Ep._ 13, 14.

[63] ‘ille adfectus multos occupavit, libido moriendi’ _ib._ 24, 25;

‘quid ergo? non multos spectavi abrumpentes vitam? ego vero vidi, sed

plus momenti apud me habent qui ad mortem veniunt sine odio vitae, et

admittunt illam, non adtrahunt’ _ib._ 30, 15.

[64] _ib._ 24, 25.

[65] _ib._ 117, 22.

[66] Epict. _Disc._ i 9, 16.

[67] ‘probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt

propugnantem pro aequitate’ Cic. _Off._ i 19, 62.

[68] _ib._ 21, 71.

[69] _ib._ 26, 92.

[70] _ib._ 23, 80.

[71] ‘Zenon ait; accedet ad rempublicam [sapiens], nisi si quid

impedierit’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 3, 2.

[72] See above, §§ 89, 90.

[73] See above, § 91.

[74] ‘efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi obediant, eamque

neque praecurrant, nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque

tranquilli atque omni perturbatione animi careant’ Cic. _Off._ i 29, 102.

[75] ‘hoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latine _decorum_ potest; Graece

enim πρέπον dicitur; huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari’

_ib._ i 27, 93.

[76] Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4; ‘ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum

cum coloris quadam suavitate, ea quae dicitur pulchritudo; sic in animo

opinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia, cum firmitate quadam

et stabilitate, pulchritudo vocatur’ _Tusc. disp._ iv 13, 31.

[77] ‘id decorum [volunt] esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in

eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali’ _Off._ i

27, 96.

[78] ‘adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines, et

optimi cuiusque et reliquorum’ _ib._ 28, 99; ‘to order myself lowly and

reverently to all my betters’ English Church Catechism.

[79] Cic. _Off._ i 29, 104.

[80] ‘id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. suum

quisque igitur noscat ingenium’ _ib._ 31, 113-4. Retail trading, and all

the arts that subserve luxury, are illiberal; agriculture is the most

truly liberal: _ib._ 42, 150 and 151.

[81] _ib._ 34, 122-124.

[82] ‘venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem’ _ib._ 36,

130. In the same spirit Epictetus says ‘we ought not to confound the

distinctions of the sexes’ _Disc._ i 16, 14.

[83] Cic. _Off._ i 35, 127.

[84] ‘nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene

Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea quae re turpia non sint,

verbis flagitiosa ducamus; illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus

appellemus suis’ _ib._ i 35, 128; ‘Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam

alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis eiusmodi forte casus inciderit,

ut id faciendum sit: alii nullo modo’ _Fin._ iii 20, 68.

[85] ‘habes scholam Stoicam, ὁ σοφὸς εὐθυῤῥημονήσει. ego servo et servabo

(sic enim adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. itaque tectis verbis ea ad te

scripsi, quae apertissimis agunt Stoici’ _Fam._ ix 22, 5. See also above,

§ 318.

[86] ‘rem ineptissimam fecero, si nunc verba quaesiero, quemadmodum dicam

illum matelam sumpsisse’ Sen. _Ben._ iii 26, 2.

[87] _Dial._ vi 20, 3.

[88] σωφροσύνην δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων

Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.

[89] τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου _ib._ 7, 5 b 2.

[90] μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην was the expression of Antisthenes, see

Diog. L. vi 3; ‘voluptas est ... res humilis, membrorum turpium aut

vilium ministerio veniens’ Sen. _Ben._ vii 2, 2.

[91] ‘intellegitur appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse’ Cic.

_Off._ i 29, 103.

[92] See above, § 319. It does not seem possible to accept Pearson’s view

(on Z. fr. 128) that Zeno intended πόνος to be the προηγμένον, and ἡδονή

the ἀποπροηγμένον; but both he and his successors undoubtedly recognised

the value of πόνος (toil) as a discipline. The following remarks

communicated to the writer by Mr Pearson throw much light on a really

difficult question. ‘Even the Cynics are forced to admit that not all

“pleasure” is to be condemned (the evidence is in Zeller’s _Socratics_,

p. 308), but the only form of it which deserves consideration is that

which is the result and after-effect of πόνος. In other words, it may

be argued that true pleasure is the cessation of pain (Plat. _Phileb._

44 B). The glorification of Heracles the toilsome hero corresponds; but

pleasure as understood by the vulgar is unhesitatingly to be rejected.

Zeno was the inheritor of all this, and, if he ever said that ἡδονή was

προηγμένον, his remark can only have applied to the ἀπονία-ἡδονή; and

such certainly was the view of Chrysippus (Plut. _Sto. rep._ 30, 2).’

In the passage here referred to from Plutarch ἀπονία takes the place of

ἡδονή as a προηγμένον; so also in Stob. ii 7, 7 e and Cic. _Fin._ iii 15,

51. See further §§ 347, 371.

[93] ἡδονή as an advantage is contrasted with πόνος (suffering) as a

disadvantage in the list attributed to these writers in Diog. L. vii 102.

[94] Cic. _Fin._ ii 21, 69.

[95] Κλεάνθης μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν [ἡδονὴν] εἶναι μήτ’ ἀξίαν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ

βίῳ Sext. _math._ xi 74 (Arnim iii 155).

[96] Arnim iii 136, 155.

[97] ‘sit impudens, si [voluptas] pluris esse contendat dulcedinem

corporis, et titillationem, ex eave natam laetitiam, quam gravitatem

animi’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 1, 1; ‘quis mortalium per diem noctemque titillari

velit?’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 5, 4; ‘quidni ista bene penset cum minutis et

frivolis et non perseverantibus corpusculi motibus?’ _ib._ 4, 4.

[98] ‘voluptas habet quiddam simile naturali bono’ Cic. _Leg._ i 11, 31;

‘[voluptas] condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit’

_Off._ iii 33, 120; ‘voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non

ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere, gratiora

nobis illius faceret accessio’ Sen. _Ep._ 116, 3; ‘[virtus voluptatem]

non praestat, sed et hanc; nec huic laborat, sed labor eius, quamvis

aliud petat, hoc quoque adsequetur’ _Dial._ vii 9, 1. That this view was

held by Chrysippus appears from Diog. L. vii 86 (cf. Arnim iii 229 a);