RELIGION.
[Sidenote: Philosophy crystallized.]
=239.= We now turn from the supreme problems of philosophy to the
formulation of religious belief and practice. A complete change comes
over the spirit of our study. Until now we have been reaching out to
observe, to define in words, to coordinate in a monistic system every
object, every statement, every generalisation of which the human mind
can rightly take account. We have kept eyes and ears open to learn from
the East and from the West, from the idealist and the materialist, from
the poet and from the critic. At last we have reached our highest point
in the dogmas of the providential ordering of the universe and the moral
obligation of the individual man; dogmas which, as we have seen, are
expounded in logical form, but are essentially such as logic can neither
establish nor refute. Stoicism, having once breathed in the mountain air
of supreme principles, now begins to descend to the plains of common
life, and to find the due application of its theories in the ordering
of practical affairs. The theory of religion is treated as the first
stage in this downward path; it is the adaptation of philosophy to the
language of social life and individual aspiration. By ‘religion’ we mean
here the theory of the existence and character of the gods; the practice
of ceremonies in their honour and of prayers for their favour; and
further, the theory and practice of divination. Upon all these questions
philosophy sits as the supreme judge: external authority, embodied in the
traditions of Greece and Rome respectively, may claim consideration, but
not submission, from the intellect.
[Sidenote: Historical changes of view.]
=240.= In this attitude of the Stoics towards religion we can easily
distinguish certain historical changes. Zeno represents in the main the
critical temper; his tone is revolutionary and atheistic; he contemplates
the entire subversion of existing religious practices to make room for
a purer system. The principles of Cleanthes are the same, but finer
expression in a more cheerful spirit; he has no bitterness as to the
present, and much confidence in the future. With Chrysippus there sets in
a tide of reconciliation; the ingenuities of etymology and allegorical
interpretation are set to work to prove that the old religion contains,
at least in germ, the substance of the new. The practical dangers of
this method are obvious, and have not escaped the notice of the critics
of Stoicism. It may be well to smoothe the path of the convert by
allowing him to use old formulas and practices with a new meaning; it
is not so easy to excuse the acceptance of a purely formal conversion,
by which philosophy enrols as its nominal adherents men who give it no
real submission, and increases its numbers at the cost of its sincerity.
Posidonius stands out as the type of this weakness; with him begins
the subordination of philosophic principle to religious sentiment. In
the first period of Roman Stoicism the struggle was acute; many of
the Stoics had the courage to defy the inherited prejudices of their
fellow-countrymen, others bowed before the storm. Those who condemn the
Stoics in a body as having sacrificed their convictions, in order that
they might hold the honoured and lucrative positions of defenders of
the national religion[1], show a lack both of sympathy and of critical
discernment. All through the Roman period the Stoics held in theory
a definite and consistent position, which will be expounded in this
chapter; in the application of their principles to practical problems
they showed that variation of standard and temperament which history has
always to record even of societies of honourable and intelligent men.
But it must be admitted that as the Stoics increase in numbers, their
devotion to vital principles grows weaker, till at last we recognise in
Marcus Aurelius both the most critical of Stoic thinkers, and the man in
whom the powers of thought are most definitely subjected to the play of
old associations and prejudices.
[Sidenote: Dogmas of natural religion.]
=241.= The theoretic teaching of the Stoics upon theology follows a very
definite programme. Four dogmas need to be established: (i) that gods
exist; (ii) that they are living, benevolent, and immortal; (iii) that
they govern the universe; and (iv) that they seek the good of men. To
each of these dogmas is attached a series of ‘proofs,’ such as are still
in vogue as ‘evidences of natural religion[2].’ The whole of this body
of teaching may be treated by us as an exposition in popular language
of the central dogma that ‘the universe is ordered by providence.’ We
have therefore first to consider whether the language used is really
appropriate to the philosophic position, or whether it concedes too much
to accepted beliefs. Secondly we have to consider whether the ‘proofs’
employed really correspond to the monistic point of view as understood
by the Stoics, or whether dualisms abandoned in principle are regaining
their old position in connexion with practical problems. Now the third
and fourth dogmas, so far as they add to the first two, import nothing
more than the general doctrine of providence. The first two dogmas,
taken together, substitute for the abstract term ‘providence’ the more
concrete, and (as we should phrase it) the more personal conception of a
‘god’ or ‘gods.’ The supreme question of the Stoic religion is therefore
whether these terms are rightly used; and it falls into two parts, the
use of the singular ‘god,’ carrying with it associations derived from
Persism and Judaism; and the use of the plural ‘gods,’ which carries
with it a qualified approval of the polytheism of the Greek and Roman
pantheons. In accordance with the general principles of our philosophy,
the wider question must be first determined.
[Sidenote: The ‘nature’ of gods.]
=242.= The ‘gods,’ according to the Stoics, form a ‘natura,’ a department
of the universe, a category including one or more individuals. Hence
the title of Cicero’s work, ‘de natura deorum’; that is, ‘of the class
of beings called gods.’ Each department of philosophy, according to the
Stoic interpretation, brings us in the end into touch with this world of
deities. In dialectics we are led up to the supreme Reason, the Logos
or Word, whose divine being permeates the universe[3]. Metaphysics point
us to Body in the purest form[4]; to Spirit which reaches from end to
end of the universe[5]; to a first Cause, a Cause of causes, the initial
link in the unending chain of events[6]. If we look to the elements in
their unceasing interchange, we find deity in all things that shift
and suffer metamorphosis, in water, in earth, and in air[7]; how much
more then in fire, which in one aspect is the purest of the elements,
and in another is the creative rational substance from which the whole
universe issues[8]? God is indeed the universe, and all that is in it,
though not in the pantheistic sense that he is evenly diffused throughout
all things[9]. Look towards this earth, which lies at the centre of
the world-order; even in its most repulsive contents, in its grossest
matter, there is deity[10]. Lift up your eyes to the heavens; God is
the all-encircling sea of fire called Aether[11]; he is sun[12] and
stars[13]. Consider the universe in its history; God is its creator[14],
its ruler, its upholder[15]. Analyze it; he is its soul[16], its
mind[17]. Strain your sight to perceive the meaning of all things: he is
fate[18]; he is nature[19]; he is providence; he is necessity[20]. And if
we look forward to the problems of politics and ethics, we must say that
God is the Universal Law that calls for the reverence of gods and men
as a community[21], and equally demands, under the name of conscience,
the unhesitating obedience of the individual[22]. Lastly, in the history
of mankind, in its great men and useful discoveries, the Stoic masters
recognised the element of divinity[23]. In the language of to-day, God is
the pole in which all the parallels of human inquiry merge, the _x_ of
the problem of the universe, the unknown that is known in his works.
[Sidenote: Unity of God.]
=243.= That God is one is a doctrine which the Stoics take over from
the Cynics[24] (who therein follow Socrates), and from the general
opinion; without making this a formal dogma, they constantly assume it
tacitly by using the term ‘God’ (ὁ θεός, _deus_). With equal readiness
they accept in use plural and abstract nouns for the same conception,
as _di immortales_, _vis divina_. The interpretation of this apparent
conflict of language must be found in the general principles of the Stoic
monism. Just as the elements are four, and yet are all the creative fire
in its changing shapes: just as the virtues are many, and yet there is
but one Virtue appearing under different circumstances: so there is but
one Deity, appearing under many names[25]. This view the assailants of
Stoicism reduce to the absurdity that some Stoic gods are created and
mortal, whilst others are uncreated[26]; and again that Zeus is worse
than a Proteus, for the latter changed into a few shapes only and those
seemly, whilst Zeus has a thousand metamorphoses, and there is nothing so
foul that he does not in turn become[27]. No one however who is familiar
with the many points of view from which Greek philosophers approach the
problem of ‘the one and the many’ will be readily disturbed by this
rather superficial criticism.
[Sidenote: Zeus.]
=244.= In its practical application the belief in the one-ness of God
assimilated itself to the worship of the Greek Ζεύς and the Latin Jove or
Juppiter. It would be impossible within the limits of this work to trace
the growth of monotheistic feeling in the Greco-Roman world in connexion
with the names of these two deities, which in the mythologies are members
of societies. We have already suggested that the most direct impulse came
from Persism: but in connexion with Roman history it is important to
notice that a similar impulse arrived through the Tuscan religion[28].
The nature of the Stoic worship of Zeus is abundantly illustrated by the
_Hymn_ of Cleanthes[29]; the intimate sense of companionship between
Zeus and his worshipper comes to light, perhaps with a tinge of Cynic
sentiment, in all the discourses of Epictetus. A special emphasis is laid
on the fatherhood of Zeus. This attribute could be traced back to the
poems of Homer, and is prominent throughout Virgil’s _Aeneid_[30]. It can
be explained in connexion with the growth of all living substances[31],
but has a more lofty meaning in that man alone shares with the gods the
inheritance of reason[32]. But the Homeric association of Zeus with
mount Olympus entirely disappears in Stoicism in favour of the Persian
conception of a god dwelling in heaven[33]. Further the Stoics agree with
the Persians that this god must not be thought of as having the form of
any animal or man[34]; he is without form[35], but capable of assuming
all forms[36].
[Sidenote: Definition of ‘god.’]
=245.= In the Stoic system the conception of godhead as one and supreme
much exceeds in importance the conception of a multiplicity of gods.
We may therefore reasonably consider at this point the four dogmas of
the Stoic theology. The first point to be examined is the definition of
the word ‘god.’ As adopted by the Stoic school generally it runs thus:
‘a rational and fiery spirit, having no shape, but changing to what it
wills and made like to all things[37].’ This definition corresponds
satisfactorily to the Stoic system of physics; but even so we must notice
that the statement ‘God is necessity[38]’ is an exaggeration, since
‘necessity’ is entirely devoid of the qualities of reasonableness and
plasticity. We find a different definition in Antipater of Tarsus, which
is emphasized by the Stoics of the transition period generally:—‘God is
a living being, blessed, imperishable, the benefactor of mankind[39].’
This definition points clearly the way to the Stoic system of religion.
The difference between the two definitions marks then the step that
has here to be taken. There is an accentuation of the property of
personality; we pass from a ‘rational spirit’ to a ‘living being.’ There
is the addition of a moral quality; we pass from a plastic substance to
a beneficent will. The existence of deity in the first sense has been
displayed to us by our whole analysis of the universe; it is with regard
to the existence of deity in the second sense that we need the constant
support of the dogma of providence, expounded in the technical proofs
which we now proceed to examine.
[Sidenote: Gods exist: the proof from consent.]
=246.= The first Stoic dogma is ‘that gods exist’; and of this the first
and most familiar ‘proof’ is that which depends upon common consent.
Amongst all men and in all nations there is a fixed conviction that gods
exist; the conception is inborn, indeed we may say graven on the minds
of all men[40]. To this proof the Stoics attach the highest possible
importance; but its justification, as we have seen, presents great
difficulties[41]. Cleanthes, the most religiously minded of the early
Stoics, had not troubled to conceal his contempt for the opinions of the
crowd[42]; and the ridiculous belief in Tartarus[43] is as widespread as
that in the gods. Here then we must distinguish; it is not sufficient
that a conception should be universal, if it appeals most to foolish
folk, and even so is decaying[44]. We must not however at this moment
inquire into the causes of this belief[45]; for this is to pass from
the question at issue to other proofs of the dogma. It seems clear that
the value of this particular proof depends upon the Stoic doctrine of
‘inborn conceptions,’ which we have already discussed[46]. Without
going over the whole ground again, the substance of the argument as
applied to the present question may be thus stated. The mind of each
individual man is by descent akin to the universal reason (κοινὸς λόγος,
_universa ratio_)[47]. Therefore all men carry with them from their
birth predispositions in favour of certain preconceptions; and the
fact that these preconceptions are common to all is evidence of their
divine origin. These predispositions by the growth and training of the
individual on the one hand, by his contact with the outer world on the
other hand through the organs of sense, ripen into reason. Now all men
are born with a predisposition to explain what is beyond their own
reasoning powers by the hypothesis of a living and reasoning agent. The
belief in gods is therefore a ‘preconception’; and if it is confirmed
by growth and experience, it must be of divine origin and therefore
self-proving. In the language of our own times, the belief in deity
cannot be dispensed with as a working hypothesis; its omission lames
human reason.
[Sidenote: The proof of the ‘higher Being.’]
=247.= The second proof ‘that gods exist’ is particularly associated
with the name of Chrysippus; it may be summed up by saying ‘there must
be a Being higher than man.’ We begin by assuming that reason is the
highest power in the universe[48]; an axiom which is always subject to
limitation on account of the existence of ‘natural necessity.’ According
to the Stoics, reason is common to gods and men; if, for the sake of
argument, this is denied, then reason is possessed by men alone, for
we can certainly find no better name than ‘god’ for higher reasoning
beings[49]. If then there exists something greater than human reason can
produce, it must be the work of some reasoning being greater than man,
that is, it must be the work of the gods. But the heavenly constellations
are such a work; therefore they are the work of the gods, and therefore
gods exist[50]. To this argument two others are supplementary. First,
human reason itself must be derived from some source, and what other can
we name but the deity[51]? Secondly, if there are no gods, man must be
the supreme being; but such a claim is an arrogant infatuation[52]. The
same arguments are attributed in substance to Zeno[53]; nay, so cogent
are they that they are in part accepted even by Epicurus[54].
[Sidenote: The proofs from the elements and the universe.]
=248.= There follow two proofs connected with gradations in the scale
of being. Earth and water are the two lower and grosser elements; and
since temperament depends greatly upon climate, we find that men and the
animals are all of somewhat heavy character. Air and fire are the higher
and more refined elements; how then can we think otherwise than that they
are the home of more lofty beings[55]? Then again the universe is either
a simple or a composite body. That it is not composite is shown by the
harmony (συμπάθεια, _concentus_) of its parts; it is therefore simple. A
simple body must be held together by spirit in some one of its grades,
either as unity, growth, or soul. Bodies held together merely by unity,
like stones or logs, admit of very simple changes only; but the universe
admits of every kind of change and development, and yet keeps together;
it must therefore be held together by spirit in its highest grade, that
is by soul and by reason. Being a whole, it must be greater than its
parts, and include all that its parts possess. But a nature greater than
man, and possessing soul and reason, is god[56].
[Sidenote: The proof from providence.]
=249.= The proof from the good gifts of providence has been already
given in substance; we may however notice the sharp reply given to
Epicurus, who maintains that the wondrous contrivances of the Creator
for the benefit of man result from the chance clashings of particles.
‘As well contend,’ replies the Stoic, ‘that words and verses come from
the chance shifting of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet, and that
the poems of Ennius could be produced by shaking together a sufficient
quantity of these in a box, and then pouring them out on the ground!
Chance would hardly produce a single verse[57].’ The terrors of the
universe, its storms, earthquakes, deluges, pestilences and wars, which
seem to militate against this proof, are themselves turned into a fourth
proof[58]. A further proof, which depends on the contemplation of the
movements of the heavenly bodies[59], we have sufficiently considered in
connexion with the influence of Chaldaean and Persian thought.
[Sidenote: The proof from worship.]
=250.= There remain two proofs, which at first sight may appear
singular, but are nevertheless very strongly urged, the proofs from
worship and divination; which according to the Stoics are practices
that must be justified, but cannot be justified without the postulate
of the existence of gods. The proof from worship is best known in the
paradoxical form, ‘if there are altars, there are gods,’ which is
attributed to Chrysippus[60]. This proof is fused by Seneca with the
proof from general consent[61]; but its true character seems to be
different. ‘Without gods there can be no piety, for piety is the right
worship of the gods. Without gods there can be no holiness, for holiness
is a right attitude towards the gods. Without gods there can be no
wisdom, for wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine[62]. But
without piety, holiness, and wisdom a reasonable philosophy cannot be
constructed. Therefore gods exist.’ The argument in its simplest form is
attributed to Zeno himself. ‘It is reasonable to honour the gods. But it
is not reasonable to honour the non-existent. Therefore gods exist[63].’
[Sidenote: The proof from divination.]
=251.= The final argument is that from divination; which is remarkable
in view of the close association between divination and astrology,
and the derivation of the latter from a scientific system which finds
no place for divine interpositions. But both in Greece and Rome the
forecasting of the future had long been reconciled with theology, upon
the hypothesis that the gods warn men for their good of coming events. In
accepting the truth of divination the Stoics were following the Socratic
tradition[64]. This belief was accepted by all the great Stoic masters,
and was a ‘citadel’ of their philosophy[65]. It is true that on this
point Panaetius exercised the privilege of a suspense of judgment[66];
but all the more did his pupil, the pious Posidonius, lay stress upon
the subject, on which he composed five books[66], of which the spirit
is preserved to us in Cicero’s books _de Divinatione_[67]. To Roman
writers their inherited State practice of augury, with its elaborate
though half-forgotten science, was long a motive for maintaining
this belief[68]; but the ancient reputation of the oracle at Delphi
maintained its hold still more persistently, and was abandoned with
even greater reluctance[69]. Nevertheless the whole group of beliefs
was quietly pushed aside by the Romans of the times of the empire, if
we may judge from the words of Epictetus—‘what need have I to consult
the viscera of victims and the flight of birds, and why do I submit when
he (the diviner) says “it is for your interest?” Have I not within me a
diviner[70]?’
[Sidenote: Divine qualities.]
=252.= Our next enquiry is ‘of what kind are the gods?’ ‘what are
their qualities?’ Here the Stoics break more decidedly with tradition.
Antipater of Tarsus, as we have seen, defined the deity as ‘a living
being, happy, immortal and benevolent towards men[71].’ It is clear
that this description can only be applied in its fulness to the supreme
deity, for all other gods are destined to pass away in the general
conflagration[72]. That the supreme deity is possessed of life and of
reason has already been assumed in the proofs of his existence; but
we have here a reaffirmation of Stoic doctrine as against those that
hold that the world is governed by blind destiny and chance. In stating
that the gods are happy the Stoics agree with Epicurus; but according
to them this happiness consists not in rest, but in activity. In this
distinction the whole difference between the Stoic and Epicurean ideals
of happiness, that is, between their ethical ends, comes into sight.
The Stoics affirm that the gods are occupied, and that with matters
of the greatest concern: and that any other conception is unworthy of
them[73]. That the activity of the gods has for its aim the happiness
of men is plainly the doctrine of providence; and in making benevolence
an attribute of deity[74] the Stoics turn their backs for ever upon the
belief in gods that are greedy, jealous, mischievous, and haughty; that
is, not merely on such deities as were still a part of the creed of the
rustic[75], but also such as had provided the problems of the whole of
Greek tragedy, and given the opportunity for the stinging attacks of
Epicurus on religion[76]. In examining these attributes of the gods we
have anticipated the enquiries which belong to the third and fourth
categories; namely as to the disposition and the relativity of the gods.
Incidentally we have obtained an excellent illustration of the logical
importance of definition and the four categories. Definition implies in
advance what is contained in each of the categories, and each category
contains implicitly what is contained in the other three; but the logical
mechanism enables us so to express the doctrine that it is for ever fixed
on the memory. Nor can we easily imagine that the world will ever forget
this conception of a Supreme God, in his essence a living all-wise Being;
in his attributes immortal, immutable[77], active and benevolent; in his
disposition occupied in contemplating and controlling his great work the
universe, and in his relation to his creatures constantly concerned for
their comfort and happiness.
[Sidenote: Stoicism and the old mythology.]
=253.= It must by this time be plain that the whole atmosphere of Stoic
religion was alien to that in which the gods of the Greek and Roman
mythology had taken root. The nominal absorption of these gods in the
Stoic system has therefore no theoretical importance; it was a work of
political adaptation. The Stoics themselves doubtless believed that
they were restoring the original meaning of the pantheon, and freeing
it from corruptions for which the poets were responsible. The original
meaning was also, in their judgment, the true meaning. Public opinion
was already in revolt against the old theology, both on scientific and
on moral grounds. The current tales of the gods were both incredible and
revolting[78]; the worship of them too often an attempt to silence the
voice of conscience[79]. The Stoics proposed to make the myths symbols of
scientific truths, and the ritual an incentive to honest living. Their
interpretation was in the main physical; the gods represent respectively
the heavenly bodies, the elements, the plants; the amours of the gods
represent the continuous work of the great creative forces of nature. To
a lesser extent explanations are found in society and in history. These
interpretations are greatly assisted by etymologies, according to the
doctrine of dialectics that wisdom lies hid in words. The whole process
may seem to the modern critic puerile, because the practical occasion for
it has passed away; but there are still to be found thinkers who hold
that by such processes alone it is possible for human thought to progress
without civil society being disrupted.
[Sidenote: The Stoic metamorphoses.]
=254.= According to this system Juppiter becomes the fiery heaven, the
chief of the elements, the source of all life[80]; Juno is the softer
air, into which the fire enters to become the germinating seed[81].
Thus she is called sister as a fellow-element[82], and wife as an
instrument in the creative process. From a slightly different point of
view Chrysippus interpreted Zeus as God, and Hera as matter; and their
union as the commencement of the Creation, when God spread throughout
matter the seed Logoi[83]. So again Hephaestus (Vulcan) represents fire;
Poseidon (Neptune) is the sea; Dis (Pluto) and Rhea alike stand for the
earth[84]. Demeter (Ceres) again is the corn-land[85], and Persephone
(Proserpine) the growing crop; as such she is lost to her mother and
lamented by her for six months in every year[86]. Apollo is the sun,
Luna or Diana the moon[87]; Cronus, son of Earth and Heaven, is Chronos
(χρόνος) or Time, and he is said to devour his children, because all that
is begotten of time is in turn consumed by time[88]. Athene or Minerva
is the daughter of Zeus, to whom he has given birth without a partner,
because she is the divine Reason by which he made the universe[89].
Chrysippus wrote at length on the allegorical interpretation of the three
Graces[90]; and the work of Cornutus entirely consists of expositions of
this system.
Other gods are recognised by the Stoics as personifications of actions
or feelings; Eros (Cupid), Aphrodite (Venus) and Pothos (regret) of
feelings; Hope (Ἐλπίς, _Spes_), Justice (Δίκη, _Iustitia_) and Wise Law
(Εὐνομία) of actions[91]. So in particular Ares (Mars) stands for war, or
the setting of array against array.
[Sidenote: Minor deities.]
=255.= We have already noticed that the gods that are borrowed from the
popular mythology do not possess the divine attribute of immortality;
and in some of them the attribute of benevolence is not prominent.
There was thus a constant tendency to assign them to an order of nature
of lower rank than the deity. Such an order was already constituted by
the popular belief, adopted by the Stoics, that the whole universe is
full of spirits or daemons, some kindly, others mischievous. Highest in
the former class stand the divine messengers, who everywhere throughout
the universe keep watch over the affairs of men and bring report thereof
to God[92]. This was a widespread belief, most in harmony with the
principles of Persism, but also met with in the Rigveda[93] and in the
poems of Hesiod[94]. These watchmen are however not the spies of a cruel
tyrant, but the officers of a benevolent sovereign; we find them early in
Roman literature identified with the stars[95], and this may account for
the special recognition of the twins Castor and Pollux, as kindly daemons
that protect sailors from shipwreck[96]. There are also spirits which
are careless, idle, or mischievous[97]; these the deity may employ as
his executioners[98]. A daemon which is solely the embodiment of an evil
or mischievous principle, such as the Druh of Persism or the Satan of
Judaism, is however not to be found in the Stoic system. Amongst daemons
are also to be recognised the souls of men parted from their bodies,
some good and some evil[99]. All beliefs of this kind are specially
characteristic of the type of Stoicism introduced by Posidonius[100].
We may specially note the belief in the Genius which accompanies each
man from his birth to his death, (and which closely corresponds to the
guardian angel of Persism,) because of the special vogue it obtained in
the Roman world[101].
[Sidenote: Deified men.]
=256.= The Stoics never failed to close their list of deities with
the recognition of men raised to the sky for their services to their
fellow-men. Such were Hercules, who rid the earth of monsters; Castor and
Pollux; Aesculapius the inventor of medicine; Liber the first cultivator
of the vine, and (amongst the Romans) Romulus the founder of the city.
These are deities established by the laws of each city[102]. The Stoics
do not raise their own leaders to this position, but (as we shall see in
dealing with the question of the ‘wise man’) they assign to them almost
equal honours. This part of their theory appears to open the door to
great practical abuses, since it might be used to justify the claims of
the sovereigns of Egypt to be honoured as gods during their lifetime, and
those of the Roman emperors that their predecessors should be worshipped
as such after their death. But it does not seem that such an abuse
actually occurred; and this part of the theory of gods always seems to
have been regarded by the Stoics rather as an explanation of historical
facts than as a principle of civic submission.
[Sidenote: Worship.]
=257.= Questions as to the worship of the gods belong strictly to the
department of politics, so far as public worship is concerned, and of
ethics, so far as individuals are concerned. It may however be convenient
to anticipate the discussion of them, since we cannot properly appreciate
the Stoic views of religion apart from their practical application. We
must therefore notice that Stoicism in its beginnings, in accordance with
its Cynic origin, was revolutionary, unorthodox, in the popular language
atheistic. Not only did it follow the principles of Persism in condemning
altogether the worship of images, but it also poured scorn upon the
building of temples and the offering of sacrifices. Thus Zeno in his book
on ‘the State’ forbids the making of temples and images, because they are
unworthy of the deity[103]; an idea which the Romans recognised as not
altogether strange to their own history, seeing that for a hundred and
seventy years (presumably during the Etruscan supremacy) no images had
been known at Rome[104]. The Stoic condemnation of sacrifice is mostly
expressed by silence, but it finds words in Seneca[105]. Although they
thus denounced in principle the whole existing system of public worship,
the Stoics did not feel themselves prevented from taking part in it as a
seemly and ancient custom[106]; and the Roman Stoics took a special pride
in the reputation of the city for attention to ‘religion,’ that is to
say, to the ritual observances due to the gods[107].
[Sidenote: Stoic hymnology.]
=258.= Meanwhile the Stoics actively developed their own ideal of
worship, namely the rendering of praise and honour to the gods by means
of hymns. ‘It is reasonable,’ said Zeno, ‘to honour the gods[108].’
The hymn of Cleanthes shows the form in which this honour could find
expression, and though in the main it is an outburst of individual
conviction, yet it contains the germ of public hymnology[109]. The value
of music in public worship was recognised by Diogenes of Babylon[110].
Posidonius laid it down that the best and most pious worship of the
gods is to honour them with pure mind and voice[111]. Epictetus speaks
continually in this spirit, and gives us examples of prose hymnology:
‘great is God, who has given us implements with which we shall cultivate
the earth[112]’; ‘I give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me
to join in this thy assemblage of men, and to see thy works, and to
comprehend this thy administration[113].’ Thus ought we ‘to sing hymns to
the deity, and bless him, and tell of his benefits[114].’
[Sidenote: Prayer.]
=259.= Prayer to the gods may be taken as more characteristic of private
and individual worship, though the paradox is worthy of attention that
men should ask nothing of the gods that they cannot ask publicly[115].
The whole problem of prayer is so fully and admirably treated upon Stoic
lines by Juvenal in his Tenth Satire, that nothing can be added to his
exposition but the evidence that his teaching is in fact Stoic. Let
us then enter the temples and listen to men’s prayers. First they beg
the doorkeeper for admission, though the deity is equally near to them
outside; then they raise their hands to the sky, or press their mouths
close to the ear of an image[116]. To the unlistening deity they pour
out wishes so shameful that they could not let a fellow-man share their
secret[117]. Decrepit old men babble prayers for long life, and make
themselves out younger than they are[118]. Another prays for riches[119],
or for some other thing that will do him harm[120]. Undertakers pray
for a busy season[121]. Parents and nurses (and these are the nearest
to innocence) pray for the success of their children in life[122]. They
may be excused, but the thoughtful man should know that the advantages
for which friends have prayed have often in the end proved a man’s
destruction[123]. He should examine his own heart, and recognise that
his prayers till now have been unworthy and foolish[124]. Since the gods
wish us well, let us leave it to them to choose what is best for us[125].
‘Look up to God, and say:—deal with me for the future as thou wilt: I am
of the same mind as thou art. I am thine, I refuse nothing that pleases
thee[126].’ ‘Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you
wish; but wish the things that happen to be as they are: and you will
have a tranquil flow of life[127].’
[Sidenote: Self-examination.]
=260.= Prayer so regarded becomes not merely an act of resignation, in
which a man ceases to battle against a destiny that is too strong for
him; it is a daily examination of his soul, to know whether it is in
tune with the purposes of the universe. This examination is a religious
exercise, never to be omitted before sleep. It is inculcated both by
Seneca and Epictetus. ‘How beautiful’ says Seneca, ‘is this custom of
reviewing the whole day! how quiet a sleep follows on self-examination!
The mind takes its place on the judgment-seat, investigates its own
actions, and awards praise or blame according as they are deserved[128].’
And Epictetus adopts the verses ascribed to Pythagoras:
‘Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes
Before each daily action thou hast scanned;
What’s done amiss, what done, what left undone;
From first to last examine all, and then
Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice[129].’
[Sidenote: Religious duty.]
=261.= We are now in a position to sum up in technical language[130] the
obligations of religion freed from superstition[131]. Our duty towards
the gods is rightly to believe in them, to acknowledge their greatness
and benevolence, to submit to them as the creators and rulers of the
universe[132]. We may not light lamps in their honour on sabbath-days,
nor crowd round their temples in the early hours of the morning; we may
not offer Jove a towel nor Juno a mirror[133]. Our service to them is to
make ourselves like to them; he who would win their favour, must be a
good man[134]. Wheresoever they call us, we must follow with gladness,
for they are wiser than we[135]. Without God we must attempt nothing,
but we must always reflect, examine ourselves, and seek to learn the
divine will[136]. We came here when it pleased God, and we must depart
when he shall please[137]. ‘So live,’ says the Stoic teacher, ‘with your
fellow-men, as believing that God sees you: so hold converse with God, as
to be willing that all men should hear you[138].’
FOOTNOTES
[1] e.g. Theodor Mommsen, _Roman History_ iii 432 (Dickson’s translation).
[2] ‘omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis immortalibus quaestionem
in partes quattuor. primum docent esse deos; deinde quales sint; tum,
mundum ab iis administrari; postremo, consulere eos rebus humanis’ Cic.
_N. D._ ii 1, 3.
[3] ‘λόγον, quem deum [Zeno] nuncupat’ Lact. _ver. sap._ 9 (Arnim i 160);
‘rationem deum vocat Zeno’ Min. Felix 19, 10 (_ib._); ‘[Zeno] rationem
quandam, per omnem naturam rerum pertinentem, vi divina esse adfectam
putat’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.
[4] ἀρχὴν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον, ὑπέθεντο ὅ τε
Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων Hippol. _Phil._ 21 (Arnim ii 1029).
[5] τὸ δι’ ὅλου κεχωρηκὸς πνεῦμα θεὸν δογματίζουσιν Theoph. _Autol._ i 4
(Arnim ii 1033).
[6] ‘ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent’ Sen. _Ben._ iv
7, 2; ‘hic est causa causarum’ _N. Q._ ii 45, 2.
[7] ‘[Chrysippus ait] ea quae natura fluerent et manarent [divina esse],
ut aquam et terram et aera’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39.
[8] ‘[Chrysippus] deum ait ignem praeterea esse’ _ib._; ‘et deum ipsum
ignem putavit [Zeno]’ August. _adv. Ac._ iii 17, 38 (Arnim i 157); τὸν
θεὸν πῦρ νοερὸν εἰπόντες Euseb. _pr. ev._ 15 (Arnim ii 1050).
[9] οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν Diog.
L. vii 148; ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14,
37; ‘vis illum vocare mundum? non falleris’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 45, 3; ‘quid
est deus? quod vides totum et quod non vides totum; solus est omnia’
_ib._ i Prol. 13; ‘Iuppiter est quodcunque vides quocunque moveris’ Lucan
_Phars._ ix 580.
[10] Arnim ii 1037 and 1039.
[11] ‘Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus’ Cic.
_Ac._ ii 41, 126.
[12] ‘Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat’ _ib._
[13] ‘[Zeno] astris idem [sc. vim divinam] tribuit’ _N. D._ i 14, 36;
‘[Cleanthes] divinitatem omnem tribuit astris’ _ib._ 14, 37.
[14] ‘tibi licet hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare’ Sen. _Ben._ iv
7, 1.
[15] ‘rectorem custodemque universi’ _N. Q._ ii 45, 1; ‘stant beneficio
eius omnia’ _Ben._ iv 7, 1.
[16] Arnim i 532.
[17] ‘[Chrysippus] ait vim divinam esse positam in universae naturae
animo atque mente’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39; ‘quid est deus? mens universi’
Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 13; cf. Arnim i 157.
[18] Arnim iii Ant. 35; ‘hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris, non mentieris’
Sen. _Ben._ iv 7, 2.
[19] ‘quid aliud est natura quam deus?’ _ib._ 1.
[20] ‘[Chrysippus] deum dicit esse necessitatem rerum futurarum’ Cic. _N.
D._ i 15, 39; cf. Arnim ii 1076.
[21] οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον | οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον
ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν Cleanthes _Hymn_ 38, 39; ‘naturalem legem [Zeno] divinam
esse censet’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.
[22] ‘[Chrysippus] legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae
atque magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse’ _ib._ 15, 40.
[23] ‘[Chrysippus] homines etiam eos, qui immortalitatem essent consecuti
[deos dicit esse]’ _ib._ 15, 39; ‘Persaeus ... inventa ipsa divina dicit’
_ib._ 15, 38.
[24] ‘Antisthenes populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse [dicit]’
_ib._ i 13, 32.
[25] κύδιστ’ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε ... Ζεῦ Cleanthes _Hymn_ 1 and 2;
‘Stoici dicunt non esse nisi unum deum et unam eandemque potestatem, quae
pro ratione officiorum variis nominibus appellatur’ Servius _ad Verg.
Georg._ i 5 (Arnim ii 1070).
[26] οἱ μὲν γενητοὶ εἶναι καὶ φθαρτοὶ [λέγονται], οἱ δ’ ἀγένητοι Plut.
_Sto. rep._ 38, 5 (quoting from Chrysippus).
[27] Galen _qual. inc._ 6 (Arnim ii 1056).
[28] ‘ne hoc quidem [illi altissimi viri] crediderunt, Iovem, qualem
in Capitolio et in ceteris aedibus colimus, mittere manu fulmina, sed
eundem quem nos Iovem intellegunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum
ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne
convenit ... idem Etruscis visum est’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 45, 1 and 3.
[29] See above, § 97.
[30] ‘hominum sator atque deorum’ _Aen._ i 254, and so _passim_.
[31] ‘tum pater omnipotens fecundis imbribus Aether | coniugis in gremium
laetae descendit, et omnes | magnus alit, magno commixtus corpore, fetus’
Virgil _Georg._ ii 335-327.
[32] This seems undoubtedly to be the meaning underlying the corrupt text
of Cleanthes _Hymn_ 4; Pearson well compares κοινωνίαν δ’ ὑπάρχειν πρὸς
ἀλλήλους (scil. θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων) διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν Euseb. _praep.
ev._ xv 15. See above, § 97.
[33] οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον
Diog. L. vii 138; ..., ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου
ψυχῆς Corn. _N. D._ 8.
[34] [Χρύσιππός φησι] παιδαριωδῶς λέγεσθαι καὶ γράφεσθαι καὶ πλάττεσθαι
θεοὺς ἀνθρωποειδεῖς, ὃν τρόπον καὶ πόλεις καὶ ποταμούς Philod. _de piet._
11 (Arnim ii 1076); ‘est aliquid in illo Stoici dei, iam video; nec cor
nec caput habet’ Sen. _Apoc._ 8, 1.
[35] ‘Stoici negant habere ullam formam deum’ Lact. _de ira_ 18 (Arnim ii
1057).
[36] In connexion with the association of God with the universe we may
say (but only in a secondary sense) that God has spherical form; ἰδίαν
ἔχει μορφὴν τὸ σφαιροειδές Frag. Herc. p. 250 (Arnim ii 1060); ‘quae vero
vita tribuitur isti rotundo deo?’ Cic. _N. D._ i 10, 24.
[37] πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν, μεταβάλλον δ’ εἰς ὃ
βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν Aët. _plac._ i 6, 1.
[38] See above, § 242, note 20.
[39] θεὸν νοοῦμεν ζῷον μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ εὐποιητικὸν ἀνθρώπων
Plut. _Sto. rep._ 38, 3. A similar definition is given in Diog. L. vii
147 as indicating the view of the Stoics generally.
[40] ‘inter omnes omnium gentium sententia constat; omnibus enim innatum
est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 4, 12; ‘nec
ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos
deos credat’ Sen. _Ep._ 117, 6.
[41] See above, § 158.
[42] οὐ γὰρ πλῆθος ἔχει συνετὴν κρίσιν οὔτε δικαίαν | οὔτε καλήν
Cleanthes apud Clem. Al. _Strom._ v 3 (Arnim i 559).
[43] See below, § 294.
[44] ‘videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate
extabuisse ... quae [enim] anus tam excors inveniri potest, quae illa
quae quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta, extimescat? opinionum
enim commenta delet dies’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 2, 5.
[45] As for instance Cicero does (following Posidonius) _N. D._ ii 5, 13.
[46] See above, § 158.
[47] ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου
Sext. _math._ ix 93, see § 149.
[48] See the next note.
[49] ‘si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in
eo enim solo ratio est, qua nihil potest esse praestantius’ Cic. _N. D._
ii 6, 16.
[50] ‘si enim’ inquit [Chrysippus] ‘est aliquid in rerum natura, quod
potestas humana efficere non possit; est certe id, quod illud efficit,
homine melius. atqui res caelestes ab homine confici non possunt. est
igitur id, quo illa conficiuntur, homine melius. id autem quid potius
dixeris quam deum?’ _ib._
[51] ‘et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam [mundi] mentem, et
eam quidem acriorem et divinam, existimare debemus. unde enim haec homo
arripuit? ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates’ _ib._ 18.
[52] ‘esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se
putet, insipientis arrogantiae est’ _ib._ 16.
[53] See above, § 83.
[54] ‘placet enim illi [sc. Epicuro] esse deos, quia necesse sit
praestantem esse aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius’ Cic. _N. D._ ii
17, 46. See however Mayor’s note.
[55] ‘tantum vero ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque
rerum caelestium ... si non deorum immortalium domicilium putes, nonne
plane desipere videare? an ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse
meliora, terram autem esse infimam, quam crassissimus circumfundat aer?’
etc. Cic. _N. D._ ii 6, 17. For the original argument of Chrysippus see
Sext. _math._ ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014).
[56] ‘haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus
profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu
continerentur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 7, 19. Here cf. Sext. _math._ ix 78 to 85
(Arnim ii 1013).
[57] Cic. _N. D._ ii 37, 93.
[58] The third in the exposition of Cleanthes: ‘tertiam [causam
dixit Cleanthes esse], quae terreret animos fulminibus tempestatibus
... pestilentia terrae motibus’ _ib._ 5, 14.
[59] ‘quartam causam esse, eamque vel maximam, conversionem caeli’ _ib._
5, 15.
[60] Arnim ii 1019.
[61] ‘[non] in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent adloquendi surda
numina et inefficaces deos, nisi nossemus illorum beneficia’ Sen. _Ben._
iv 4, 2.
[62] Sext. _math._ ix 123 (Arnim ii 1017).
[63] _ib._ 133 (Arnim i 152). Pearson (Z. 108) describes the argument as
a ‘transparent sophistry’; but at the present time there is a widespread
tendency towards its revival; see Höffding, _Philosophy of Religion_, ch.
iii.
[64] Xen. _Mem._ i 1, 2.
[65] Cic. _Div._ i 5, 9 and 6, 10.
[66] _ib._ 3, 6; Diog. L. vii 149.
[67] Divination is based upon the συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων (_continuatio
coniunctioque naturae_), Cic. _Div._ ii 69, 142. See also Epict. _Disc._
i 14, and above, § 248.
[68] ‘[Tuscis] summa est fulgurum persequendorum scientia’ Sen. _N. Q._
ii 32, 2.
[69] ‘non ullo saecula dono | nostra carent maiore deum, quam Delphica
sedes | quod siluit’ Lucan _Phars._ v 111-113; cf. 86-96.
[70] Epict. _Disc._ ii 7, 3 and 4. The Stoic belief in divination is very
severely criticized by Zeller: ‘these vagaries show in Stoicism practical
interests preponderating over science’ _Stoics_, etc. p. 280. But the
belief in μαντική is traced back to Zeno and Cleanthes, who were hardly
‘practical’ men in the sense in which Zeller seems to use the word.
[71] See above, § 245.
[72] See above, § 209.
[73] Cic. _N. D._ ii 30, 77.
[74] ‘[di immortales] nec volunt obesse nec possunt. natura enim illis
mitis et placida est’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 27, 1; ‘di aequali tenore bona sua
per gentes populosque distribuunt, unam potentiam sortiti, prodesse’
_Ben._ vii 31, 4.
[75] ‘Faune, Nympharum fugientum amator, | per meos fines et aprica rura
| lenis incedas, abeasque parvis | aequus alumnis’ Hor. _C._ iii 18, 1-4.
[76] ‘tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum’ Lucr. _R. N._ i 102.
[77] ‘Does the Zeus at Olympia lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed
as becomes him who is ready to say—Irrevocable is my word and shall not
fail’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 26 (quoting from Hom. _Il._ i 526).
[78] ‘sic vestras hallucinationes fero quemadmodum Iuppiter ineptias
poetarum, quorum alius illi alas imposuit, alius cornua; alius adulterum
illum induxit et abnoctantem, alius saevum in deos, alius iniquum in
homines, alius parricidam et regni alieni paternique expugnatorem’ Sen.
_Dial._ vii 26, 6.
[79] This feeling finds expression at Rome as far back as the times of
Hannibal; ‘hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum, | Iovem se placare
posse donis, hostiis; | et operam et sumptum perdunt’ Plaut. _Rud._ 22 to
24.
[80] ‘[Chrysippus] disputat aethera esse eum, quem homines Iovem
appellarent’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 40.
[81] ‘aer autem, ut Stoici disputant, Iunonis nomine consecratur ...
effeminarunt autem eum Iunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo mollius’
_ib._ ii 26, 66.
[82] ‘quoniam tenuitate haec elementa paria sunt, dixerunt esse germana’
Serv. _ad Verg. Aen._ i 47 (Arnim ii 1066).
[83] Rival philosophers in the earlier times, and the church fathers
later, concurred in reviling Chrysippus because he extended this
principle of interpretation to a ‘disgraceful’ representation found in
Argos or Samos, in which Hera receives the divine seed in her mouth;
yet Christian antiquity was about to absorb the similar notion of
the conception of the Virgin Mary through the ear (‘quae per aurem
concepisti’ in an old Latin hymn). Chrysippus of course rightly estimated
the absurdity of criticising cosmic processes as if they were breaches of
social decency, and by so doing relieved the pious souls of his own day
from a real source of distress. See Arnim ii 1071-1074.
[84] Cic. _N. D._ ii 26, 66.
[85] _ib._ i 15, 40 and ii 26, 66.
[86] ‘Proserpinam, quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a
matre fingunt’ _ib._
[87] _ib._ 27, 68.
[88] καὶ ὁ χρόνος δὲ τοιοῦτόν τί ἐστι· δαπανᾶται γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ
γινόμενα ἐν αὐτῷ Cornutus _N. D._ 6. The castration of Uranus by Cronus
is thus explained by the Stoics: ‘caelestem naturam, id est igneam,
quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis, quae
coniunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 24, 64.
[89] Justin _Apol._ i 64 (Arnim ii 1096).
[90] Sen. _Ben._ i 3, 9.
[91] Aët. _plac._ i 6, 13.
[92] φασὶ δὲ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας,
ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων Diog. L. vii 151.
[93] ‘ásya [váruṇasya] spáśo ná ní miṣanti bhūrṇayaḥ’ Rigv. ix 73, 4.
[94] τρὶς γὰρ μυρίοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ | ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς
φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων Hes. _Op. et Di._ 252, 253; see also § 33.
[95] ‘et alia signa de caelo ad terram accidunt; | qui’st imperator divum
atque hominum Iuppiter, | is nos per gentis hic alium alia disparat, |
hominum qui facta mores pietatem et fidem | noscamus’ Plaut. _Rud._ 8-12.
[96] καὶ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ τὸ τοὺς Διοσκούρους ἀγαθούς τινας εἶναι δαίμονας
“σωτῆρας εὐσέλμων νεῶν” Sext. _math._ ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014); ‘clarum
Tyndaridae sidus ab infimis | quassas eripiunt aequoribus rates’ Hor.
_C._ iv 8, 31 and 32.
[97] φαύλους δαίμονας ἀπέλιπε Χρύσιππος Plut. _def. orac._ 17.
[98] καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οἴονται φιλόσοφοι φαῦλα δαιμόνια
περινοστεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίοις χρῶνται κολασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ
ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους _qu. Rom._ 51.
[99] Arnim ii 1101.
[100] ‘Posidonius censet homines somniare, quod plenus aer sit
immortalium animorum’ Cic. _Div._ i 30, 64.
[101] ‘Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum | naturae deus humanae,
mortalis in unum | quodque caput’ Hor. _Ep._ ii 2, 187-189; ‘sepone in
praesentia, quae quibusdam placent, uni cuique nostrum paedagogum dari
deum, ex eorum numero quos Ovidius ait “de plebe deos”’ Sen. _Ep._ 110,
1; ‘Zeus has placed by every man a guardian, every man’s daemon, to whom
he has committed the care of the man; a guardian who never sleeps, is
never deceived’ Epict. _Disc._ i 14, 12. M. Aurelius identifies this
daemon with the principate (_To himself_ v 27).
[102] Aët. _plac._ i 6, 9 and 15; Cic. _N. D._ ii 24, 62.
[103] Arnim i 264. The feeling is reflected by Lucan: ‘estne dei sedes,
nisi terra et pontus et aër, | et caelum et virtus? superos quid
quaerimus ultra?’ _Phars._ ix 578-9.
[104] ‘Varro dicit antiquos Romanos plus annos centum et septuaginta
deos sine simulacro coluisse: “quod si adhuc mansisset, castius di
observarentur”’ August. _Civ. De._ iv 31.
[105] ‘ne in victimis quidem deorum est honor’ Sen. _Ben._ i 6, 3.
[106] ‘To make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits
according to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor
scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do’
Epict. _Manual_ 31, 5.
[107] ‘si conferre volumus nostra cum externis; ceteris rebus aut pares
aut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione, id est cultu deorum, multum
superiores’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 3, 8.
[108] See above, § 250.
[109] ὄφρ’ ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ, | ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα
διηνεκές, ὡς ἐπέοικε _Hymn_ 36, 37.
[110] περὶ τοίνυν τῆς διὰ τ(ῶν μου)σικῶν (τ)οῦ θείου τει(μῆς εἴρη)ται μὲν
αὐτάρκως καὶ πρότερον Philod. _mus._ iv 66 (Arnim iii Diog. 64).
[111] ‘cultus autem deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque
sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra
incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 28, 71.
[112] Epict. _Disc._ i 16, 17.
[113] _ib._ iii 5, 10.
[114] _ib._ i 16, 15.
[115] See above, § 121.
[116] ‘non sunt ad caelum elevandae manus, nec exorandus aedituus, ut nos
ad aurem simulacri admittat; prope est a te deus’ Sen. _Ep._ 41, 1.
[117] ‘turpissima vota dis insusurrant; si quis admoverit aurem,
conticescent’ _ib._ 10, 5.
[118] Sen. _Dial._ x 11, 1.
[119] _ib._ xi 4, 2.
[120] _Ben._ ii 14, 5.
[121] _ib._ vi 38, 1.
[122] _Ep._ 32, 4.
[123] ‘etiamnunc optas, quod tibi optavit nutrix tua aut paedagogus aut
mater? o quam inimica nobis sunt vota nostrorum!’ Sen. _Ep._ 60, 1.
[124] ‘se quisque consulat et in secretum pectoris sui redeat et
inspiciat, quid tacitus optaverit. quam multa sunt vota, quae etiam sibi
fateri pudet! quam pauca, quae facere coram teste possimus!’ _Ben._ vi
38, 5.
[125] This sentiment we can trace back to the time of Plautus: ‘stulti
hau scimus frustra ut simus, quom quid cupienter dari | petimus nobis:
quasi quid in rem sit possimus noscere’ Plautus _Pseud._ 683-5.
[126] Epict. _Disc._ ii 16, 42.
[127] _Manual_ 8.
[128] Sen. _Dial._ v 36, 2. He describes his practice with naïve detail:
‘cum sublatum e conspectu lumen est et _conticuit uxor_ moris mei iam
conscia, totum diem meum scrutor’ _ib._ 3.
[129] Epict. _Disc._ iii 10, 2 and 3 (Long’s transl.).
[130] ‘quomodo sint di colendi, solet praecipi’ Sen. _Ep._ 95, 47.
[131] ‘non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam maiores nostri
superstitionem a religione separaverunt’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 28, 71.
[132] ‘primus est deorum cultus deos credere, deinde reddere illis
maiestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, sine qua nulla maiestas est; scire
illos esse, qui praesident mundo’ Sen. _Ep._ 95, 50.
[133] _ib._ 95, 47.
[134] ‘vis deos propitiare? bonus esto. satis illos coluit, quisquis
imitatus est’ _ib._ 95, 50.
[135] ‘You must believe that you have been placed in the world to obey
them, and to yield to them in everything which happens, and voluntarily
to follow it as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence’ Epict.
_Manual_ 31, 1.
[136] _Disc._ iii 22, 53 (compare Long’s transl. ii p. 83).
[137] _ib._ iii 26, 30.
[138] ‘sic vive cum hominibus, tanquam deus videat; sic loquere cum deo,
tanquam homines audiant’ Sen. _Ep._ 10, 5.