CHAPTER IX._Roman Stoicism being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire

THE SUPREME PROBLEMS.

[Sidenote: The ‘mauvais pas.’]

=217.= In the preceding chapter we have discussed the universe from the

scientific standpoint. ‘Such,’ say the Stoics, ‘we find that the universe

is; such and such it was in the beginning, and such it will be to the

end.’ Their conclusions are reached by observation, classification,

and analysis; and yet not entirely by these, for we must admit that

there is also employed that power of scientific imagination which

the ancients call ‘divination.’ Still on the whole the investigation

has been that of the student, and the method that of speculation or

contemplation dissociated from any consideration of the usefulness of

the results attained. In the study we now undertake all this is changed.

Our philosophy proceeds to assert that the universe is good, that it is

directed by wise purpose, and that it claims the reverence and obedience

of mankind. It calls upon its adherents to view the world with moral

approval, and to find in it an ethical standard. Such conclusions

cannot be reached by purely discursive reason; but they are such as are

everywhere sought by practical men. They appeal to a side of human nature

different from that which passes judgment on the conclusions previously

reached. From the first position ‘the universe is’ to the second ‘the

universe is good’ the step is slippery. We are on the dizzy heights of

philosophical speculation, where the most experienced climbers find their

way they know not how, and can hardly hold out a hand to help those who

are in distress. The Stoic teachers did not perhaps always follow the

same track, and now and again they stumbled on the way. Reasoning often

proved a weak support, but resolution carried them through somehow to the

refuges on which their eyes were all along set.

[Sidenote: Fate, providence, and fortune.]

=218.= To the problem of the meaning and government of the universe three

answers were current in the epoch with which we are dealing. Either all

things take place by fate; or the world is ruled by a divine providence;

or else fortune is supreme[1]. These three terms are not always mutually

exclusive: Virgil speaks commonly of the ‘fates of the gods[2]’; and

‘fortune’ is frequently personified, not only in common speech, as

when the Romans spoke of the ‘fortune of the city,’ but even by a

philosopher like Lucretius, who speaks of ‘Fortune the pilot[3],’ with a

half-humorous abandonment of exactitude. The Stoics have the merit of not

only recognising fully these three powers, but also of using the terms

with relative consistency. By fate then we mean an abstract necessity,

an impersonal tendency, according to which events flow; by providence

a personal will; by fortune the absence of both tendency and purpose,

which results in a constant shifting to and fro, as when a man stands

upon a ball, and is carried this way and that[4]. All explanations, both

of general tendencies and of particular events, must ultimately resolve

themselves into one or other of these three; every constructive system

must necessarily aim at shewing that the three ultimately coincide, and

that philosophy is the guardian and guide of mankind in the understanding

of their relations one to another[5].

[Sidenote: Fate.]

=219.= The Stoics hold that ‘all things happen by fate[6].’ To this

conclusion they are brought by the same reasoning that moved the

Chaldaeans. The visible universe is, and has motion. The heavenly bodies

move incessantly in their orbits; there is no force either within or

without them that can turn them aside a hair’s breadth, or make their

pace quicker or slower. No prayers of men, no prerogatives of gods can

make them change[7]. Without cause there is no effect; and each effect

is in its turn a new cause. Thus is constructed an endless chain, in

which all things living and inanimate are alike bound. If a man knew

all the causes that exist, he could trace out all the consequences.

What will be, will be; what will not be, cannot be. This first Stoic

interpretation of the universe is that of Determinism; it reiterates and

drives home the principle that is here our starting-point, ‘the universe

is.’ ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Zeno say that all things take place

according to fate; and fate is the linked cause of things that are, or

the system by which the universe is conducted[8].’ This ‘fate’ is only

another name for ‘necessity[9]’; fates cannot be changed[10].

[Sidenote: The ‘fallacies’ of determinism.]

=220.= The doctrine of fate appears to contradict directly the belief in

human free will, and to lead up to the practical doctrine of laziness

(ἀργὸς λόγος, _ignava ratio_). Once we allow it to be true that ‘what

will be, will be,’ it becomes useless to make any effort. As at the

present time, this argument was familiar in cases of sickness. One says

to the sick person, ‘if it is your fate to recover, then you will recover

whether you call in the physician or not; and if it is your fate not to

recover, then you will not recover in either case. But it is your fate

either to recover or not to recover; therefore it will be useless to

call in the physician.’ To which another will reply: ‘you may as well

argue that if it is your fate to beget a son, you will beget one equally

whether you consort with your wife or not; therefore it will be useless

to consort with your wife[11].’ With such verbal disputes Chrysippus

delighted to deal; his reply to the ‘lazy argument’ was that certain

things go together by fate (_iuncta fato, confatalia_)[12]. Thus in the

above cases it may be determined by fate that you should both call in a

physician and recover, both consort with your wife and beget a son.

So once more when Nestor says to the watchmen by his ships:

Keep watch, my lads: let sleep seize no man’s eyes,

Lest foes, loud laughing, take us by surprize[13].

Some one then replies, ‘No, they will not, even if we sleep, if it is

predestined that the dock be not seized.’ To such an objection any one

can give the right answer: ‘all these things are equally predestined, and

go together by fate. There is no such thing as a watch kept by sleepers,

a victory won by runaways, or a harvest reaped except after sowing good

clean soil[14].’

[Sidenote: Logic of possibility.]

=221.= The doctrine of fate also seems to conflict with some of the

commonest forms of speech. For if it is correct to say ‘Either this

will happen, or it will not happen,’ it seems incorrect to say ‘it may

happen’; and still more of the past, since we must admit of any event

that ‘it has happened’ or ‘it has not happened,’ there seems no room for

the statement ‘it might have happened.’ Chrysippus however maintains

that the words ‘may’ and ‘might’ are correctly used, or (in other words)

that we may assert that it is or was ‘possible’ for things to happen,

whether or not they will happen or have happened. For example, the pearl

here is breakable, and may be broken, though fate has ordained that it

never will be broken. Cypselus might not have been tyrant of Corinth,

though the oracle at Delphi declared a thousand years before the time

that he would be[15]. This view had been sharply contested by Diodorus

the Megarian; and the controversy was summed up in the ‘master argument.’

This is stated as follows: there are three propositions in conflict

with one another in the sense that if any two of them are true, the

third is false. They are these: (i) every past event is necessary; (ii)

the impossible cannot follow on the possible; (iii) there are things

possible that neither are nor will be true. Diodorus accepted the first

two; he therefore drew the conclusion that there is nothing possible

except that which is or will be true; or in other words he denied the

existence of any category of ‘things possible’ distinct from that of

facts past or future. Cleanthes and Antipater accepted the second and

third propositions: Chrysippus accepted the first and third, but denied

the second[16]; that is he admitted that the possible thing (e.g. the

breaking of the pearl) might become the impossible because fate had

decided to the contrary. The choice intimates much; it shows that the

Stoics, however strongly they assert the rule of fate or necessity,

intend so to interpret these terms as to reconcile them with the common

use of words, that is, with the inherited belief in divine and human

will, breaking through the chain of unending cause and effect[17].

[Sidenote: Definitions of fate.]

=222.= The next step is professedly taken by way of definition of the

word ‘fate’ (εἱμαρμένη, _fatum_). Exactly as the stuff of the universe,

fire, has been explained to be no mere passive or destructive element,

but one possessed of creative force and reason, so is fate declared to

be no blind or helpless sequence of events, but an active and wise power

which regulates the universe. Fate is in fact but another name for the

Logos or World-reason. On this point all Stoic teachers are in the main

agreed. ‘Fate,’ said Zeno, ‘is a power which stirs matter by the same

laws and in the same way; it may equally well be called providence or

nature[18].’ Chrysippus gives us several alternative definitions: ‘the

essence of fate is a spiritual force, duly ordering the universe[19]’; it

is ‘the Logos of the universe[20],’ or ‘the law of events providentially

ordered in the universe[21]’; or, ‘the law by which things that have

been have been, that are are, that will be will be[22].’ But an important

difference appears between the views of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. They

are agreed that all that happens by providence also happens by fate.

But Cleanthes will not allow, as Chrysippus is prepared to do, that all

things that happen by fate happen providentially[23]. With Cleanthes the

conception of fate is wider than that of providence, just as in Virgil

the fates are more powerful than Jove. Cleanthes, being deeply conscious

of the evil existing in the universe, refused to hold providence

responsible for it. Chrysippus on the other hand identifies fate with the

deity[24].

[Sidenote: Providence.]

=223.= Providence (πρόνοια, _providentia_) differs from fate, if at

all, by including an element of personality. It is a principal dogma

of the Stoics that ‘the universe is ruled by providence.’ Cicero

indeed assures us that the word ‘providence’ is merely an abbreviation

for ‘the providence of the gods,’ and that the dogma really asserts

that ‘the universe is ruled by the gods with foresight’; and Balbus,

the Stoic advocate, in his treatise, rebukes his opponent Cotta for

having travestied the Stoic doctrine by speaking of providence as ‘a

fortune-telling hag,’ as though she were some kind of goddess governing

the world[25]. But the travesty is at least as instructive as the

exposition. If ‘providence’ is on the one hand interpreted as God’s

providence[26], it is on the other hand equivalent to Nature[27], and

again to the Mind of the universe; it is the Logos, the universal Law,

the creative force[28]; not merely an attribute, but a manifestation and

bodily presentment of deity. After the final conflagration three joining

in one will be left, Zeus, providence, and the creative fire[29]. Lastly,

if we consider the process of logical demonstration, it is from the

reality of providence that the Stoics deduce the existence of the gods;

only from the standpoint of dogmatic instruction is the order reversed.

[Sidenote: Beauty of the universe.]

=224.= The work and functions of Providence are open to our view, for

it has an aim and pathway of its own[30]. Its first aim is to create a

universe capable of enduring; next, it makes that universe complete;

thirdly, it endows it with every beauty and excellence[31]. The beauty

of the world is a favourite theme upon which Stoic orators discourse at

length; this is, in their view, the best world that could possibly have

been created[32]. This sense of beauty appears to be derived from two

sources, the admiration and awe felt in contemplating the sky, the sun

moon and stars moving in it, lofty mountains, rushing rivers, and deep

caves[33]; and the gentler delight stirred by the sight of the fertile

field, the vine-clad hill, the river-pathway, the flocks and herds,

which all subserve the convenience of man. Thus from beauty we pass to

usefulness, and the Stoics now maintain that the world has been created

and is maintained for the use of man[34]. In strict language, however,

we must say that the universe is made for the use of rational beings,

that is, for gods and men[35], that it is a home or city in which

gods and men alike have a share[36]. From the protection of providence

the animals, according to the Stoic view, are in principle entirely

excluded. Yet it did not escape notice that nature has often provided

for their comfort in particulars, giving them instincts that enable them

to maintain life, and an outward shape conformable to the conditions

of their existence[37]. And Seneca especially found that man was apt

to swell himself too greatly, as if that world were made for him, of

which only a small part is adapted for him to dwell in, and where day

and night, summer and winter would continue of themselves, even if no

man observed them[38]. On the other hand zealots like Chrysippus worked

out the detailed application of this theory in a way that provoked the

amusement of their critics[39].

[Sidenote: Particular providence.]

=225.= Providence cares for mankind in general, and therefore for the

parts of mankind, the various continents, nations, and cities. The

Stoics are also inclined to hold that it cares for the individual[40].

The difficulty of this belief is great. Busy cities are overthrown by

the earthquake; the crops of the careful farmer are blasted by the

hailstorm; Socrates is condemned to death by the Athenians; Pythagoras,

Zeno and Antiphon meet with violent ends. Yet we may not think that in

any of these cases the sufferers were hated or neglected by the gods; it

is rather an inevitable necessity that has worked their ruin. The gods

who have great things in their charge, must sometimes overlook small

matters; they must save the community by sacrificing the individual[41].

The storm may rage in the valley, yet there is peace on the mountain

heights[42]. The philosopher who is absorbed in contemplating the great

whole cannot even see the flaws in its details. ‘If the gods care for

all men,’ says Cicero’s authority, ‘it follows logically that they care

for each single man[43].’ ‘Nothing occurs on earth, nor in the heaven

above, nor in the sea, apart from thee, O God,’ sings Cleanthes[44]. ‘It

is impossible,’ says Chrysippus, ‘that even the least of particulars can

fall out otherwise than in accordance with the will of God, with his

Word, with law, with justice, and with providence[45].’

[Sidenote: Existence of evil.]

=226.= The doctrine of providence, carried to a logical extreme, leads

to the denial of the existence of evil. But the Stoics did not draw this

conclusion; had they done so, their whole treatment of ethics would have

become futile. We have therefore to scrutinize carefully the language

that they employ. If we meet with the paradox that ‘this is the best

of all possible worlds,’ we must remember that all paradoxes need for

their interpretation some sense of humour, and that the ‘best possible’

is not the same as the ‘best imaginable.’ Somewhere or other there

is, in a sense, a limitation to the sphere of providence. If again in

poetical passages we learn that ‘nothing occurs without God,’ we must

not forget the doctrine that good and evil are alike brought in the end

into harmony with the divine nature. The most exact statement of Stoic

doctrine would seem to be that evil exists indeed, but is not the equal

of the good either in intensity or in duration; it is an incident, not a

first principle of the universe[46]. From this point of view it becomes

possible to ‘plead the cause of the gods,’ to defend providence from the

heavy accusations men bring forward against it[47]. Thus the Stoics set

about to prove that, in spite of the existence of evil, the universe is

ruled by the foresight of a beneficent deity.

[Sidenote: Logical solutions.]

=227.= The first argument for the defence is logical, and is pressed

by Chrysippus. Good implies its opposite, evil. ‘There could be no

justice, unless there were also injustice; no courage, unless there were

cowardice; no truth, unless there were falsehood[48].’ Just in the same

way we find coarse wit in a comedy, which is objectionable in itself,

and yet somehow contributes to the charm of the poem as a whole[49]. The

second argument is based upon the doctrine of ‘necessary consequence’

(παρακολούθησις). The general design of the human head required that

it should be compacted of small and delicate bones, accompanying which

is the inevitable disadvantage that the head may easily be injured by

blows[50]. War is an evil, but it turns to good by ridding the world of

superfluous population[51].

In many other cases there may be explanations that are beyond our present

knowledge, just as there are many kinds of animals of which we do not yet

know the use[52].

[Sidenote: Moral solutions.]

=228.= More important are those arguments which introduce moral

considerations. In the first place the generous intentions of providence

are often thwarted by the perverseness of wicked men[53], just as many

a son uses his inheritance ill, and yet his father in bequeathing it

to him did him a service[54]. The Deity treats good men as a Roman

father his children, giving them a stern training, that they may grow

in virtue[55]; those that he loves, he hardens[56]. Earthquakes and

conflagrations may occur on earth, and perhaps similar catastrophes in

the sky, because the world needs to be purified from the wickedness that

abounds[57]. The punishment of the wicked, for instance by pestilence

and famine, stands for an example to other men, that they may learn to

avoid a like disaster[58]. Often, if the wicked have gone unpunished,

the penalty descends on their children, their grandchildren, and their

descendants[59].

[Sidenote: Divine power limited.]

=229.= The very multiplicity of these explanations or excuses betrays the

weakness of the case, and the Stoics are in the last resort driven to

admit that the Deity is neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, and that

the sphere of providence is limited by an all-encircling necessity. Thus

Chrysippus explains blunders in divination by saying that ‘the Deity

cannot know everything[60],’ and though he ascribes to the Deity all

power, yet when hard pressed he admits that he cannot do everything, and

that ‘there is a good deal of necessity in the matter[61].’ In this way

he is forced back to the position which the shrewder Cleanthes had taken

from the first[62]. After we have taken away from fate all that has life

or meaning, there remains a residuum, which we can but vaguely assign to

some ‘natural necessity[63].’ This point once granted, we realize that it

includes many of the detailed explanations previously given. Thus it is

by ‘natural necessity’ that good cannot exist without evil; that the past

cannot be altered; that the one must suffer for the many[64]; that the

good cannot always be separated from the bad[65]; that character grows

by the defiance of pain; that the individual is everywhere exposed to

disaster from tyranny, war, pestilence, famine, and earthquake.

[Sidenote: God and men allied.]

=230.= The recognition of the limitations of divine power creates a new

tie between gods and men. Men are no longer the mere instruments of

providence, they are its fellow-workers; we may even go further, and

boldly call them its fellow-sufferers[66]. God has given man what he

could, not what he would[67]; he could not change the stuff on which

he had to work[68]; if anything has not been granted to us, it could

not have been granted[69]. Under such circumstances a sensible man will

not find fault with the gods, who have done their best[70]; nor will he

make appeals to them to which they cannot respond[71]. Even less will he

quarrel with a destiny that is both blind and deaf[72].

[Sidenote: Fortune.]

=231.= In the Stoic explanation of the universe fortune plays no part; it

has no existence in the absolute sense of the term[73]. But in practical

life, and from the limited point of view of the individuals concerned,

fortune is everywhere met with. Her actions are the same as we have just

seen to be ascribed to ‘natural necessity’; storms, shipwrecks, plagues,

wars, and tyranny[74]. Fortune therefore by no means excludes causality,

but includes all events which are without meaning from the point of view

of the individual[75]; all advantages or disadvantages which he has

not personally merited, and which are not designed for his individual

discipline. So great is the sphere of Fortune, that it appears at first

that she is mistress of human life; and we may picture her as a tyrant,

mocking and merciless, without principle and without policy[76]. The

further consideration of Fortune belongs to the department of Ethics.

[Sidenote: Has God or man free will?]

=232.= The supreme problems of philosophy, in their relation to gods and

men, the fellow-citizens of this universe, centre in the question of free

will. If we grant that the divine power is to some extent less in range

than the power of necessity, does it still remain open to us to attribute

to it within that range some real choice between alternatives, something

of that individual power which common opinion attributes to kings? or

must we on the other hand regard the divinity as a mere symbol of an

unchanging law, girt with the trappings of a royalty from which all real

share in government has been withdrawn? Is man again a mere puppet under

the control either of fate or of fortune, or has he too some share in

creating the destiny to which he must submit? Supposing him to have this

power of will, is it bound up with his privilege of reason, or do the

animals also possess it?

[Sidenote: The Stoics incline towards free will.]

=233.= To such questions the Stoics do not give the direct answer ‘Yes’

or ‘No.’ The critics who wish to tie them down to one or other of the

opposing views complain that they wriggle and grow flushed and excited

about their answer[77]. They accept apparently both views as dogmas,

asserting that ‘all things take place by destiny’ and that ‘something

rests with us[78].’ To the first dogma the whole of their treatment of

physics points; but the second is required as a postulate for any science

of ethics[78a]. The Stoics were in no way disposed to cut the knot by

sacrificing one or the other of the principal parts of their philosophy.

They go back upon the terms in which the questions are propounded, and

endeavour by fresh investigation and more precise definition to do away

with the obvious contradiction. In this work they were observed to have

a bias in favour of free will[79]. The first sign of this bias we have

already noticed in the vindication of the word ‘possible[80].’ If our

eyes are fixed merely on the movement of the heavenly bodies, we shall

hardly need a term which prints on future events a character which it

denies to those that are past. The astronomer can describe to us with

equal precision an eclipse taking place a thousand years before the

battle of Salamis or a thousand years after. But the word ‘possible’

opens the door to the emotions of hope and fear, to the sense of right

and wrong, with regard to the whole range of future events. However

delicately the doctrine may be shaded, the main issue is determined when

we say of gods and men that they ‘can[81].’

[Sidenote: Proximate and principal causes.]

=234.= In order to reconcile the doctrines of causality and possibility,

we must first distinguish between outer and inner compulsion, between

‘proximate’ and ‘principal’ causes. If a boy starts a cylinder rolling

down hill, he gives it an opportunity without which it could not have

rolled; this is the proximate cause (προκαταρκτική, _proxima_). But

the cylinder would not continue rolling except by an inner compulsion,

a law within itself, by which it is the nature of cylinders to roll

downwards[82]. This is the leading or principal cause (προηγουμένη,

_antecedens_ or _principalis_). So neither in thought nor in action can

a man form a judgment, unless there be a picture (φαντασία, _visum_)

presented to his mind. The picture is a proximate cause[83]. But assent

to the picture rests with the man himself; the man himself, his reason,

his will, is the principal cause. Here we touch on the dogma which is

the foundation of ethics: ‘assent is in our power.’ Upon this rests the

right of the philosopher to praise or blame, the right of the lawgiver to

reward and punish.

[Sidenote: The divine nature immutable.]

=235.= We have to investigate further the inner compulsion, the principal

cause. With regard to the gods their own disposition is a law to them,

their character holds them to their purpose, their majesty makes their

decrees immutable[84]. This is the final answer of philosophy, even

though men cannot content themselves with it. Even amongst those most

disposed to accept Stoic principles, there is a wish that the gods

should be allowed a little _play_, a choice at any rate in small matters

not hampered by considerations of destiny and morality[85]; and upon

this issue the poet may deviate a little from the sterner creed of the

philosopher[86]. Nor must we so interpret the wisdom and benevolence of

the gods as to deny the efficacy of prayer[87].

[Sidenote: Man’s wickedness.]

=236.= In the case of men free will comes accompanied by a heavy burden

of responsibility; for by its exercise men have defied the gods and

brought evil into the world. In vain they accuse the gods and destiny,

when their own perverseness has exaggerated their destiny, as Homer bears

witness:

‘Lo you now, how vainly mortal men do blame the gods! For of us

they say comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through the

blindness of their own hearts, have sorrows beyond that which is

ordained[88].’

‘Through the blindness of their own hearts they perished,

fools[89].’

Equally in vain it is that they protest against the penalties prescribed

by the lawgiver for acts to which they allege fate has drawn them[90].

Of their wrongdoing the ‘principal cause’ lies in their own natures; if

these are from the first wholesome, the blows of fate are deadened; if

they are boorish and undisciplined, they rush of themselves into sin and

error[91]. Into the further question, whether a man is responsible for

his own nature, our authorities do not enter. It is sufficient that in

ethics a way will be pointed out, by which all men, if only they consent

to undergo the necessary training, may bring their wills into harmony

with the will of the universe. As to the animals, they act upon impulse,

but cannot be said in a strict sense to possess will, nor are they proper

subjects for praise and blame.

[Sidenote: No result without cause.]

=237.= Thus free will, which at first sight appears equivalent to the

negation of cause, is by the Stoics identified with the highest type of

cause. Action without cause (τὸ ἀναίτιον), effect which is self-caused

(τὸ αὐτόματον), are totally denied[92]. Even if a man be given the

choice between two actions which appear exactly equivalent, as when he

must begin walking either with the right or with the left foot, there is

always a cause which determines between them, though (as in all cases

of ‘chance’) it is not discernible by human reasoning[93]. In this way

destiny, cause, will are all brought into harmony; the dualism (which

after all cannot be entirely avoided) is thrust out of sight. ‘All

things take place according to destiny, but not all things according to

necessity[94]’; thus is saved the principle of free choice (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν).

In other words, the Stoic fixes his attention on the pulsating, living,

willing powers of the universe, and refuses to dwell upon any blind

non-moral unbending ‘necessity’ of things, even whilst he admits that

such necessity is there.

[Sidenote: Pons Stoicus.]

=238.= Now that the various steps have been decided upon, by which our

philosophy progresses from physics to ethics, it remains to connect them

by a pathway in the form of a chain of reasoning. We cannot affirm that

the steps have been reached by any logical process, or that the show of

reasoning makes them any safer to tread in. But the logical form is a

convenient method of impressing dogmatic instruction on the memory, and

if it cannot remove difficulties inherent in the subject-matter, it at

least so distributes them that they may be overlooked by the zealous and

defied by the adventurous. Thus then the argument runs:—

‘If all things are determined by fate, then the ordering of the

universe must be smooth and unhindered; if this is so, there

must be an ordered universe; and if so, there must be gods. Now

if there are gods, the gods are good; and if they are good,

goodness exists; and if goodness exists, so also does wisdom.

And goodness and wisdom are the same for gods and for men[95].

If this is so, there must be a science of things to be done and

to be avoided, that is of right actions and of sins. But right

actions are praiseworthy, and sins blameable. Things praiseworthy

deserve reward, and things blameable deserve punishment.

Therefore if all things are determined by fate, there must be

rewards and punishments[96].’

All this chain of argument is convincing to the man who is already a

Stoic; to his opponent it seems to display its weakness at every joint.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The three explanations are very clearly stated by Seneca; ‘dicet

aliquis—quid mihi prodest philosophia, si fatum est? quid prodest, si

deus rector est? quid prodest, si casus imperat?... quicquid est ex

his, Lucili, _vel si omnia haec sunt_, philosophandum est; sive nos

inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta

disponit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine impellit et iactat,

philosophia nos tueri debet’ Sen. _Ep._ 16, 4 and 5.

[2] e.g. _Aen._ vi 376.

[3] ‘quod procul a nobis flectat Fortuna gubernans’ _R. N._ v 108.

[4] ‘vaga volubilisque Fortuna’ Cic. _Milo_ 26, 69; ‘fortuna ... amica

varietati constantiam respuit’ _N. D._ ii 16, 43.

[5] Seneca as in note 1.

[6] Diog. L. vii 149; ‘[Stoici] omnia fato fieri dicunt’ Cic. _de Fato_

15, 33.

[7] ‘et hoc secundum Stoicos, qui omnia dicunt fato regi et semel

constituta nec a numinibus posse mutari’ Comment. in Lucan. ii 306 (Arnim

ii 924).

[8] So Diog. L. vii 149. Cicero and Seneca describe with admirable

clearness the conception of fate: ‘fieri omnia fato ratio cogit fateri.

fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἱμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque

causarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex se gignat’ Cic. _Div._ i 55,

125; ‘quid enim intellegis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium

actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 36; cf. _Ep._ 19, 6

and _N. Q._ ii 35, 2.

[9] Χρύσιππος μὴ διαφέρειν [εἶπε] τοῦ εἱμαρμένου τὸ κατηναγκασμένον Aët.

_plac._ i 27, 2.

[10] ‘Stoicorum dogma [Vergilius] ostendit, nulla ratione posse fata

mutari’ Serv. _ad Verg. Aen._ i 257 (Arnim ii 923).

[11] Orig. _cont. Cels._ ii 20 (Arnim ii 957).

[12] Cic. _de Fato_ 12, 28 to 13, 30.

[13] Hom. _Il._ xi 192 and 193.

[14] Plut. fr. 15, 3 (Stob. ii 8, 25).

[15] Cic. _de Fato_ 7, 13.

[16] Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 1 sqq.

[17] Cicero gives a humorous comment on this contention: ‘περὶ δυνατῶν

me scito κατὰ Διόδωρον κρίνειν; quapropter si venturus es, scito necesse

esse te venire: sin autem non es, τῶν ἀδυνάτων est te venire. nunc

vide, utra te κρίσις magis delectet, Χρυσιππείαne, an haec, quam noster

Diodotus non concoquebat. sed de his etiam rebus, otiosi cum erimus,

loquemur; hoc etiam κατὰ Χρύσιππον δυνατόν est’ _ad Fam._ ix 4.

[18] Aët. _plac._ i 27, 5.

[19] _ib._ i 28, 3.

[20] εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος _ib._

[21] ἤ, λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων Aët. _plac._ i 28, 3.

[22] ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ

δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται _ib._

[23] ‘ex quo fieri, ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia

sint, eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut putat

Chrysippus. alii vero, quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter

quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes’

Chalc. _in Timaeum_ 144 (Arnim ii 933).

[24] ‘Chrysippus ... deum dicit esse ... fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum

futurarum’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39.

[25] ‘a te dictum est anum fatidicam πρόνοιαν a Stoicis induci, id est

providentiam. quod eo errore dixisti, quod existimas ab his providentiam

fingi quasi quandam deam singularem, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat.

plene autem et perfecte sic dici existimato, providentia deorum mundum

administrari’ _ib._ ii 29, 73 and 74.

[26] Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων ὑπέθεντο ... διὰ πάντων διήκειν τήν πρόνοιαν

αὐτοῦ Hippolyt. _Philos._ 21, 1 (Arnim i 153).

[27] ἥντινα [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν καλεῖν Aët.

_plac._ i 27, 5.

[28] ‘talis igitur mens mundi cum sit, ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel

providentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim πρόνοια dicitur) ...’

Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 58. The term ‘nature’ is used in the same sense by

Epicurus also, though it does not harmonize very well with his theory;

‘natura gubernans’ _R. N._ v 78.

[29] ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν

ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος

οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους Plut. _comm. not._ 36, 5.

[30] ‘habet quasi viam quandam et sectam, quam sequatur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii

22, 57.

[31] _ib._ 22, 58.

[32] ‘[mundi] quidem administratio nihil habet in se, quod reprehendi

possit; ex iis enim naturis, quae erant, quod effici optimum potuit,

effectum est’ _ib._ 34, 86.

[33] _ib._ 39, 98.

[34] ‘omnia hominum causa facta esse et parata’ _ib._ ii 61, 154.

[35] ‘deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum’ _ib._ 53, 133.

[36] ‘est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut

urbs utrorumque’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 62, 154; ‘intraturus es urbem dis

hominibusque communem’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 18, 1.

[37] Cic. _N. D._ ii 47, 122.

[38] ‘neque enim omnia deus homini fecit. quota pars operis tanti nobis

committitur?’ Sen. _N. Q._ vii 30, 3; ‘nimis nos suspicimus, si digni

nobis videmur propter quos tanta moveantur’ _Dial._ iv 27, 2.

[39] Thus ‘horses assist men in fighting, dogs in hunting: lions and

leopards provide a discipline in courage: the sow is convenient for

sacrifices to the gods, who have given her a soul to serve as salt, and

keep the flesh from rotting. The peacock is created for his tail, and the

peahen accompanies him for symmetry’s sake. The flea is useful to wake us

out of sleep, and the mouse to prevent us from being careless in leaving

the cheese about.’ All these particulars are attributed to Chrysippus

(Arnim ii 1152, 1163).

[40] ‘etiam singulis a dis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet’ Cic.

_N. D._ ii 65, 164.

[41] ‘nec vero si segetibus aut vinetis cuiuspiam tempestas nocuerit,

... eum, cui quid horum acciderit, aut invisum deo aut neglectum a deo

[iudicabimus]. magna di curant, parva neglegunt’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 66, 167;

‘[universorum] maior dis cura quam singulorum est’ Sen. _Dial._ i 3, 1.