THE UNIVERSE.
[Sidenote: Study of the heavens.]
=192.= In including in their system the study of the physical universe
the Stoics broke daringly with Socrates and his faithful followers the
Cynics. These had joined with the ignorant and the prejudiced[1] in
ridiculing those whose eyes were always turned up towards the sky, whilst
they saw nothing of things that were nearer at hand and concerned them
more closely. But it was not for nothing that the most highly civilised
nations of antiquity, Egyptians, Chaldaeans, and Babylonians, had studied
the starry heavens, mapped out the constellations, measured the paths of
the wandering stars, predicted eclipses, reckoned with the tides, the
seasons, and the winds; with the result that their successors defied
the common opinion by declaring the earth to be a sphere, and to hold
inhabitants whom they called Antipodes, because they walk with their feet
turned up towards ours[2]. All this body of knowledge, called generically
the knowledge of the sky (though it included the whole physical geography
of the earth), had impressed and fascinated the Eastern world. It seemed
that as the eyes were raised to the sky, so the mind of man was elevated
and made ampler and nobler[3], leaving behind it the petty contentions
and rivalries of common life; and further that true knowledge had surely
been reached, when the positions of the heavenly bodies and the eclipses
of sun and moon could be predicted so long before with unfailing
accuracy. These feelings are now commonplaces of literature, and were
fully shared by the Stoics. ‘Is not the sun,’ says Seneca, ‘worthy of our
gaze, the moon of our regard? When the sky displays its fires at night,
and countless stars flash forth, who is not absorbed in contemplation of
them? They glide past in their company, concealing swift motion under the
outward appearance of immobility. We comprehend the movements of a few of
them, but the greater number are beyond our ken. Their dignity fills all
our thoughts[4].’ In the golden age which preceded our iron civilisation
‘men lay at nights in the open fields, and watched the glorious spectacle
of the heavens. It was their delight to note the stars that sank in one
quarter and rose in another. The universe swept round them, performing
its magnificent task in silence[5].’ ‘Their order never changes, spring
and autumn, winter and summer succeed according to fixed laws[6].’ And in
the same tone writes the Stoic poet: ‘unshaken the lights of heaven ever
move onwards in their proper orbit[7].’ The emotion roused in the Stoic
by the contemplation of the sky was thus identical with that expressed in
Judaic poetry by the ‘Song of the Three Holy Children[8],’ and in more
modern times by Addison’s famous hymn[9].
[Sidenote: The world-order.]
=193.= The phenomena of earth and heaven combined, in the general
opinion of intelligent men, to show the existence of a ‘world-order’ or
‘universe[10].’ The Stoics accepted this conception in their physics
from Heraclitus, who had declared that ‘neither god nor man created
this world-order,’ as in their ethics from Diogenes, the ‘citizen of
the universe[11].’ They therefore needed only to adjust an established
notion to their own physical postulates. We observe at once that the
very conception of an ordered whole differentiates that whole from the
absolute totality of all things. The universe is indeed on the one hand
identified with the substance of all things (οὐσία τῶν ὅλων), but only as
a thing made individual by the possession of quality (ἰδίως ποιόν)[12],
and necessarily one[13]. It is self-created; and it may therefore be
identified with its creator, the deity[14]; it also includes all that
is bodily[15]; but outside there remains the boundless void[16]. It is
therefore defined by Chrysippus as ‘the combination of heaven and earth
and all natures that are in them,’ or alternatively as ‘the combination
of gods and men and all that is created for their sake[17].’
[Sidenote: Its position.]
=194.= The Stoic conception of the universe is therefore that of a
continuous body, having a definite outline, and stationed in the
boundless void. That the universe has shape the Stoics deduce from its
having ‘nature’ (φύσις), that is, the principle of growth, displayed in
the symmetry of its parts[18]; and its shape is the perfect shape of a
sphere[19]. Within this sphere all things tend towards the middle[20];
and we use the terms ‘down’ meaning ‘towards the middle,’ and ‘up’
meaning thereby from the middle[21]. The Peripatetics are therefore
needlessly alarmed, when they tell us that our universe will fall down,
if it stands in the void; for, first, there is no ‘up’ or ‘down’ outside
the universe; and, secondly, the universe possesses ‘unity’ (ἕξις)[22]
which keeps it together[23]. And here we see the folly of Epicurus, who
says that the atoms move downwards from eternity in the boundless void;
for there is no such thing as ‘downwards’ in that which is unlimited[24].
Further, the universe is divided into two parts, the earth (with the
water and the air surrounding it) which is stable in the middle, and the
sky or aether which revolves around it[25].
[Sidenote: The heliocentric theory.]
=195.= Thus early in their theory the Stoics were led to make two
assertions on questions of scientific fact, in which they opposed the
best scientific opinion of their own time. For many authorities held
that the earth revolved on its axis, and that the revolution of the sky
was only apparent. Such were HICETAS of Syracuse[26], a Pythagorean
philosopher, whose views were quoted with approval by Theophrastus, and
later ECPHANTUS the Pythagorean, and HERACLIDES of Pontus[27]. From the
point of view of astronomical science this view seemed well worthy of
consideration, as Seneca in particular emphasizes[28]. Other astronomers
had gone further, declaring that the sun lay in the centre, and that
the earth and other planets revolved round it. Theophrastus stated that
Plato himself in his old age had felt regret that he had wrongly placed
the earth in the centre of the universe; and the heliocentric view was
put forward tentatively by ARISTARCHUS of Samos, and positively by
the astronomer SELEUCUS, in connexion with the theory of the earth’s
rotation[29]. For this Cleanthes had said that the Greeks should have
put Aristarchus on trial for impiety, as one who proposed to disturb
‘the hearth of the universe[30].’ This outburst of persecuting zeal,
anticipating so remarkably the persecution of Galileo, was effective
in preventing the spread of the novel doctrine. Posidonius was a great
astronomer, and recognised the heliocentric doctrine as theoretically
possible[31]; indeed, as one who had himself constructed an orrery,
shewing the motion of all the planets[32], he must have been aware of its
superior simplicity. Nevertheless he opposed it vigorously on theological
grounds, and perhaps more than any other man was responsible for its
being pushed aside for some 1500 years[33]. The precise ground of the
objection is not made very clear to us, and probably it was instinctive
rather than reasoned. It could hardly be deemed impious to place the sun,
whom the Stoics acknowledged as a deity, in the centre of the universe;
but that the earth should be reckoned merely as one of his attendant
planets was humiliating to human self-esteem, and jeopardised the
doctrine of Providence, in accordance with which the universe was created
for the happiness of gods and men only.
[Sidenote: The elements.]
=196.= Having determined that the earth is the centre of the universe,
and the sun above it, the way is clear to incorporate in the system the
doctrine of the four elements (στοιχεῖα, _naturae_)[34], which probably
had its origin in a cruder form of physical speculation than the
doctrine of the heavenly bodies. As we have seen above[35], the elements
are not first principles of the Stoic physics, but hold an intermediate
position between the two principles of the active and the passive on the
one hand, and the organic and inorganic world on the other. Earth is
the lowest of the elements, and also the grossest; above it is placed
water, then air, then fire; and these are in constant interchange, earth
turning to water, this into air, and this into aether, and so again in
return. By this interchange the unity of the universe is maintained[36].
The transition from one element to the next is not abrupt, but gradual;
the lowest part of the aether is akin to air[37]; it is therefore of no
great importance whether we speak with Heraclitus of three elements, or
with Empedocles of four. The two grosser elements, earth and water, tend
by nature downwards and are passive; air and fire tend upwards and are
active[38]. Zeno did not think it necessary to postulate a fifth element
as the substance of soul, for he held that fire was its substance[39].
[Sidenote: Fire and breath.]
=197.= Fire, heat, and motion are ultimately identical, and are the
source of all life[40]. Thus the elemental and primary fire stands
in contrast with the fire of domestic use; the one creates and
nourishes, the other destroys[41]. It follows that fire, though it
is one of the four elements, has from its divine nature a primacy
amongst the elements[42], which corresponds to its lofty position in
the universe[43]; and the other elements in turn all contain some
proportion of fire. Thus although air has cold and darkness as primary
and essential qualities[44], nevertheless it cannot exist without some
share of warmth[45]. Hence air also may be associated with life, and it
is possible to retain the popular term ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα, _spiritus_)
for the principle of life. In the development of the Stoic philosophy
we seldom hear again of air in connexion with coldness; and between the
‘warm breath’ (_anima inflammata_) and the primary fire there is hardly
a distinction; we may even say that ‘spirit’ has the highest possible
tension[46].
[Sidenote: God in the stone.]
=198.= Air on its downward path changes to water. This change is
described as due to loss of heat[47], and yet water too has some heat
and vitality[48]. Even earth, the lowest and grossest of the elements,
contains a share of the divine heat; otherwise it could not feed living
plants and animals, much less send up exhalations with which to feed
the sun and stars[49]. Thus we may say even of a stone that it has a
part of the divinity in it[50]. Here then we see the reverse side of the
so-called Stoic materialism. If it is true that God is body, and that
the soul is body, it is equally true that even water, the damp and cold
element, and earth, the dry and cold element, are both penetrated by the
divinity, by the creative fire without the operation of which both would
fall in an instant into nothingness[51].
[Sidenote: The heavenly bodies.]
=199.= We return to the consideration of the heavenly bodies. These are
set in spheres of various diameter, all alike revolving around the earth.
The succession we find described in Plato’s _Timaeus_[52]; the moon is
nearest to the earth, then comes the sun, then in order Venus, Mercury,
Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. This theory was taken up by Aristotle and
after him by Eudoxus, from whom it passed to Aratus and Chrysippus[53].
A tradition derived from Chaldaean sources gave a different order,
setting Venus and Mercury nearer to the earth than the sun; and this
order was accepted by the middle Stoics, that is to say by Panaetius and
Posidonius, the latter placing Venus nearer to the earth, and therefore
further from the sun, than Mercury[54]. The moon, like the earth, obtains
her light from the sun, being crescent-shaped when nearest to him,
full-orbed when furthest away. Her distance from the earth is two million
stadia (250,000 miles); when she lies between the earth and the sun she
eclipses his light, but when she is on the side of the earth directly
away from the sun she is herself eclipsed[55]. Her phases are explained
by her position relative to the sun[56]. The sun is 60 millions of miles
from the earth[57]; his diameter is 37½ times as large as that of the
earth[58]; he appears larger when on the horizon because his rays are
refracted through the thick atmosphere[59]. The planets, whether they
revolve round the earth or the sun, are falsely called ‘wandering stars,’
since their orbits have been fixed from all eternity[60]. The fixed stars
revolve round the earth at such a distance that the earth, when compared
with it, is merely the central point[61]. All the heavenly bodies are,
like the earth, of spherical form[62]. Finally Seneca, in advance of
the school, declared the comets to be a regular part of the celestial
world[62a].
[Sidenote: Cruder theories.]
=200.= Whilst the Stoics generally were in sympathy with the best
astronomical teaching of their time, they combined with it many views
based on much cruder forms of observation. Even Seneca thinks it bold to
suggest that the sun is not a little larger than the whole earth[63];
and it is commonly held that not only the sun and moon, but also
the heavenly bodies generally, feed upon moist exhalations from the
Ocean[64]. Cleanthes in particular seems to have viewed the astronomers
with suspicion. He alone regarded the moon not as a sphere, but as
a hemisphere with the flat side turned towards us[65]; the stars he
considered to be conical[66]. These views, very probably derived from
Heraclitus, seem to point to the conception of the sky or aether as a
single fixed fiery sphere, in which the heavenly bodies only differ from
the surrounding element by containing more closely packed masses of fiery
matter[67]; a conception which harmonizes far more closely with the Stoic
theory of the elements than the doctrines which are astronomically more
correct. Cleanthes also explained that the sun could not venture to
travel beyond his solstitial positions, lest he should be out of reach of
his terrestrial food[68]. And Cleanthes and Posidonius agree that the sun
keeps within the ‘torrid zone’ of the sky, because beneath it flows the
Ocean, from which the sun sucks up his nutriment[69].
[Sidenote: Deity of the stars.]
=201.= From the relation of the heavenly bodies to the element of fire
the Stoics draw the conclusion that they are animated, reasoning,
self-determined, and divine; in short, that they are gods[70]. This
godhead pertains particularly to the sun[71]. Of this doctrine Cleanthes
is especially the upholder[72], deeming that the sun is the ruling power
in the universe, as reason in man[73]. It is not clear whether the Stoics
derived their theory of the divinity of the heavenly bodies from logical
deduction, or whether they were here incorporating some Eastern worship.
In favour of the latter point of view is the consideration that at this
time the association of Mithra with the sun was probably making some
progress in the Persian religion, and that the popular names of the seven
days of the week, following the names of the sun, moon, and five planets,
must have been already current.
[Sidenote: Deity of the universe.]
=202.= But in the Stoic system this doctrine is overshadowed by the
paradox that the universe itself is a rational animal, possessed of
free-will and divine. This is the teaching of all the masters of the
school, beginning with Zeno himself. It appeared to him to follow
logically from two principles, the first that the universe possesses
a unity, the second that the whole is greater than its parts. ‘There
cannot be a sentient part of a non-sentient whole. But the parts of the
universe are sentient; therefore the universe is sentient[74].’ ‘The
rational is better than the non-rational. But nothing is better than
the universe; therefore the universe is rational[75].’ ‘The universe is
one[76]’; we must not therefore think of it as of an army or a family,
which comes into a kind of existence merely through the juxtaposition of
its members. By the same reasoning the universe possesses divinity[77].
Upon this favourite Stoic text is based the frequent assertion of modern
commentators that the philosophy is pantheistic[78]; but the more central
position of Stoicism is that the deity bears the same relation to the
universe as a man’s soul to his body[79], and the universe is therefore
no more all divine than a man is all soul. This view is expressed with
great clearness by Varro, who says: ‘As a man is called wise, being wise
in mind, though he consists of mind and body; so the world is called God
from its soul, though it consists of soul and body[80].’ The Stoics are
however in strong conflict with the Epicureans and all philosophers who
hold that the world is fundamentally all matter, and that soul and mind
are developments from matter. ‘Nothing that is without mind can generate
that which possesses mind,’ says Cicero’s Stoic[81], in full opposition
to modern popular theories of evolution. Further, just as it may be
questioned in the case of man whether the soul is situated in the head
or in the heart, so in the case of the universe we may doubt whether its
soul, or rather its ‘principate,’ is in the sun, as Cleanthes held[82],
or in the sky generally, as Chrysippus and Posidonius maintain[83], or in
the aether, as Antipater of Tyre taught[84].
[Sidenote: The earth’s inhabitants.]
=203.= In the study of the universe we are not called upon merely to
consider the earth as a member of the celestial company; we have to
contemplate it as the home of beings of various ranks, which also display
to us the principle of orderly arrangement. Preëminent amongst the
inhabitants of the earth stands man, who is distinguished by being the
sole possessor of the faculty of reason, and in addition owns all those
capacities which are shewn in beings of lower rank. The nature of man
constitutes so large a part of philosophy that we must reserve its full
consideration for a special chapter[85]; and must restrict ourselves
here to treating of lower beings, which fall into the three orders of
animals, plants, and inanimate beings. But since each of the higher
orders possesses all the properties of every order that stands lower, the
study of the orders inferior to man is also the study of a large part of
human nature. The number and classification of these orders are not to
be treated mechanically. From one point of view gods and men form one
class, the rational, as opposed to every kind of non-rational being. On
the other hand, from the standpoint with which we are rather concerned
at this moment, gods, men, and animals are subdivisions of the order of
animate beings, below which stand the plants, and lower still things
without life. Animals, as the name indicates, possess life or soul; the
two lower orders possess something corresponding to soul, but lower in
degree. The general term which includes soul in the animal and that
which corresponds to it in the plants and in lifeless bodies is ‘spirit’
(πνεῦμα); soul therefore is the highest type of ‘spirit.’
[Sidenote: The animals have not reason]
=204.= To the dumb animals the Stoics consistently deny the faculty of
reason; and this position must have seemed to them self-evident, since
the same word Logos expresses in the Greek both reason and speech. In
the Latin the point was no longer so clear; still the words ‘ratio’
and ‘oratio,’ if not identical, appeared to be connected by a natural
association. Since the animals then are necessarily unreasoning, those
acts of animals which appear to show reason must be explained in some
other way. A dog pursues a wild animal by its scent; it must therefore be
admitted that in a way the dog recognises that ‘this scent is the sign
of the wild animal[86]’; still he is incapable of expressing this belief
in the form of a correct syllogism. The industry of the ant is disposed
of in a more summary way; this animal shows a ‘restless helplessness,’
climbing up and down straws in meaningless industry; many men however are
no wiser[87]. For their young the animals have a certain feeling, yet
their grief at losing them is comparatively short-lived[88]. In spite,
however, of these limitations the animal world is one part of the wonders
of nature, and is deserving of our admiration; all animals have strong
affection for their young so long as these need their protection[89], and
the dog deserves special recognition both for his keen intelligence and
for his loyalty towards his master[90].
[Sidenote: but a sort of reason.]
=205.= To define more accurately the nature of animals we must to some
extent anticipate the discussion of human nature in a later chapter,
which follows the same general lines: for in every point the animals
are like men, but inferior. They possess soul, but without reason[91];
by soul we here mean the twin powers of observation and of independent
movement[92]. In a rough way the animals also possess a ruling part[93].
Their power of observation enables them to distinguish what is healthful
to them from that which is injurious; their power of movement shapes
itself into pursuit of the healthful and avoidance of the injurious[94].
They possess also properties which resemble the human feelings, such as
anger, confidence, hope, fear; but they do not in a strict sense possess
the same feelings as men[95]. As they cannot attain to virtue, neither
can they fall into vice[96].
[Sidenote: Plant life.]
=206.= From the animals we pass to the plants. These seem to have soul,
because they live and die[97]; yet they have not soul in any strict sense
of the word. It will therefore be better not to use this word, but to
speak of the ‘growth-power’ (φύσις)[98]. The governing part is situated
in the root[99]. The growth of plants both in size and in strength is
very remarkable, inasmuch as little seeds, which at first find themselves
place in crevices, attain such power that they split huge rocks and
destroy noble monuments, thus illustrating what is meant by tone or
tension; for it is a spirit which starts from the governing part (the
root) and spreads to the trunk and branches, conveying a force equally
strong to construct and to destroy[100]. From another point of view we
may say that the seed contains the Logos or law of the fully developed
plant, for under no possible circumstances can any other plant grow from
that seed except the plant of its kind[101].
[Sidenote: Cohesion.]
=207.= Lowest in the scale come inanimate objects, such as stones[102].
Yet even these have a property which corresponds to soul, and which keeps
them together in a particular outward form or shape; this property we
call ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις, _unitas_)[103]; like soul itself, it is a spirit
pervading the whole[104], and again it is the Logos of the whole. An
external force cannot impart this unity: so that the water contained in
a glass is not an ‘inanimate object’ in this sense[105]. In this lowest
grade of ‘spirit’ we read in Stoicism the antithesis of the materialism
of Epicurus, who postulates for his ‘atoms’ the fundamental property of
indivisibility, and can only account for the coherence of the bodies
formed from them by supplying them with an elaborate system of ‘hooks and
eyes,’ which was a frequent subject of derision to his critics. Epicurus
makes the indivisibility of the smallest thing his starting-point, and
from it constructs by degrees a compacted universe by arithmetical
combination; the Stoics start from the indivisibility of the great
whole, and working downwards explain its parts by a gradual shedding of
primitive force. God is in fact in the stone by virtue of his power of
universal penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων)[106].
[Sidenote: Gradations of spirit.]
=208.= No existing thing can possess one of the higher grades of spirit
without also possessing all the lower. Stones therefore have cohesion,
plants growth and cohesion, animals soul growth and cohesion; for these
are not different qualities which can be combined by addition, but
appearances of the same fundamental quality in varying intensity. Man
clearly possesses cohesion, for he has an outward shape; there does not
however seem to be any part of him which has merely cohesion. But in
the bones, the nails, and the hair are found growth and cohesion only,
and these parts grow as the plants do. In the eyes, ears and nose, are
sensation, as well as growth and cohesion; that is, there is soul in the
sense in which the animals possess soul. It is the intelligence only
which in man possesses soul in the highest grade[107].
[Sidenote: The conflagration.]
=209.= This universe, in spite of its majesty, beauty and adaptation,
in spite of its apparent equipoise and its essential divinity, is
destined to perish. ‘Where the parts are perishable, so is the whole;
but the parts of the universe are perishable, for they change one into
another; therefore the universe is perishable[108].’ Possibly this
syllogism would not have appeared so cogent to the Stoics, had they not
long before adopted from Heraclitus the impressive belief in the final
conflagration, familiar to us from its description in the ‘second epistle
of Peter[109].’ According to this theory, the interchange of the elements
already described[110] is not evenly balanced, but the upward movement is
slightly in excess. In the course of long ages, therefore, all the water
will have been converted into air and fire, and the universe will become
hot with flame[111]. Then the earth and all upon it will become exhausted
for want of moisture, and the heavenly bodies themselves will lose their
vitality for want of the exhalations on which they feed. Rivers will
cease to flow, the earth will quake, great cities will be swallowed up,
star will collide with star. All living things will die, and even the
souls of the blest and the gods themselves will once more be absorbed in
the fire, which will thus regain its primitive and essential unity[112].
Yet we may not say that the universe dies, for it does not suffer the
separation of soul from body[113].
[Sidenote: Is the universe perishable?]
=210.= In connexion with the doctrine of the conflagration the Stoics
were called upon to take sides upon the favourite philosophic problem
whether the universe is perishable, as Democritus and Epicurus hold,
or imperishable, as the Peripatetics say[114]. In replying to this
question, as in the theory as a whole, they relied on the authority
of Heraclitus[115]. The word universe is used in two senses: there is
an eternal universe (namely that already described as the universal
substance made individual by the possession of quality[116]),
which persists throughout an unending series of creations and
conflagrations[117]. In another sense the universe, considered in
relation to its present ordering, is perishable[118]. Just in the same
way the word ‘city’ is used in two senses; and that which is a community
of citizens may endure, even though the collection of temples and houses
also called the ‘city’ is destroyed by fire[119].
[Sidenote: Dissentient Stoics.]
=211.= The doctrine of the conflagration was not maintained by all Stoic
teachers with equal conviction. Zeno treated it with fulness in his book
‘on the universe[120]’; and Cleanthes and Chrysippus both assert that
the whole universe is destined to change into fire, returning to that
from which, as from a seed, it has sprung[121]. In the transition period,
owing to the positive influence of Plato and Aristotle, and the critical
acumen of Carneades, many leading Stoics abandoned the theory[122].
Posidonius however, though a pupil of Panaetius (the most conspicuous of
the doubters[123]), was quite orthodox on this subject; though he pays
to his master the tribute of asserting that the universe is the most
permanent being imaginable[124], and that its existence will continue
through an immense and _almost_ unlimited period of time[125]. In the
Roman period the conflagration is not only an accepted dogma, but one
that makes a strong appeal to the feelings. For with the conflagration
there comes to an end the struggle of the evil against the good; and
the Deity may at last claim for himself a period of rest, during which
he will contemplate with calmness the history of the universe that has
passed away[126], and plan for himself a better one to follow[127].
[Sidenote: The reconstruction.]
=212.= Upon the conflagration will follow the reconstruction of the world
(παλιγγενεσία, _renovatio_), which will lead again to a conflagration;
the period between one conflagration and the next being termed a ‘great
year’ (περίοδος, _magnus annus_). The conception of the ‘great year’ was
borrowed by the Stoics from the Pythagoreans[128], and leads us back
ultimately to astronomical calculations; for a great year is the period
at the end of which sun, moon and planets all return to their original
stations[129]. The phenomena of the sky recur in each new period in the
same way as before; and hence we readily infer that all the phenomena
of the universe, including the lives of individuals, will recur and
take their course again. Although this doctrine appears only slightly
connected with the general Stoic system, it was an accepted part of it:
and Seneca expresses an instinctive and probably universal feeling when
he says that few would willingly repeat their past histories, if they
knew they were so doing[130].
[Sidenote: Creation.]
=213.= We have put off till the end of this chapter the discussion of
the Stoic theory of Creation, because it is in fact one of the least
defined parts of the system. According to the theory of the great year
creation is not a single work, but a recurring event; and therefore in
one sense the history of the universe has neither beginning nor end.
It would however be a mistake to suppose that this point of view was
always present to the minds of Stoic teachers. The question of the
beginning of things is of primary importance to every philosophy, and
the Stoics approached it from many points of view, popular, scientific,
mythological and theological, and gave a number of answers accordingly.
To the orthodox Stoic all these answers are ultimately one, though the
language in which they are expressed differs greatly; whilst the critic
of Stoicism would assert that they are derived from different sources and
are fundamentally irreconcileable. Seneca suggests four answers to the
question ‘Who made the universe?’ It may be an omnipotent deity; or the
impersonal Logos; or the divine Spirit working in all things by tension;
or (lastly) destiny, that is, the unalterable succession of cause and
result[131]. These answers we may examine in order.
[Sidenote: The golden age.]
=214.= The view that ‘God made the world’ is that of the theology which
was now everywhere becoming popular; and it is usually associated,
even when expounded by Stoic teachers, with dualistic views. Before
the creation there existed a chaos, matter without shape, dark and
damp[132]; the Deity formed a plan, and brought life order and light into
the mass: from ‘chaos’ it became ‘cosmos’[133]. This deity is the same
that is commonly named Ζεύς[134] or Jove, and is called the ‘father of
gods and men.’ The universe so created was at first happy and innocent,
as is expressed in the tradition of the Golden Age. Men lived together
in societies, willingly obeying the wisest and strongest of their
number[135]; none were tempted to wrong their neighbours. They dwelt
in natural grottos or in the stems of trees, and obtained nourishment
from tame animals and wild fruits. Little by little they made progress
in the arts, and learnt to build, to bake, and to make use of metals.
These views were especially developed by Posidonius, who believed that in
the Mysians of his day, who lived on milk and honey, and abstained from
flesh-meat, he could still trace the manners of this happy epoch[136].
It seems probable that it was from Posidonius, rather than from the
Pythagoreans, that Varro derived his picture of the Golden Age, which has
become familiar to us in turn through the version given by Ovid in his
_Metamorphoses_[137].
[Sidenote: Older stoic theory.]
=215.= These conceptions however are only familiar in the later forms
of Stoicism. The teaching of the founders of Stoicism is on this matter
monistic, and is based upon the teaching of Heraclitus that the world
was in the beginning a creative fire, which was alike the creator and
the material of creation. The process of creation (διακόσμησις) may be
regarded as identical with that of the mutation of the elements on the
downward path[138]; with the special note that when the stage of water is
reached[139] the deity assumes the shape of the seed Logos (σπερματικὸς
λόγος)[140], and begets in the first instance the four elements[141];
then, from a combination of these, trees and animals and all other
things after their kind[142]. Yet even this statement is simplified if
we regard the original fire as itself containing the seed Logoi of all
things that are to be created[143]. To this is to be added that all this
is well ordered, as in a duly constituted state[144]. From this point
of view the Cosmos is a Cosmopolis, and we reach the border of the
investigations which deal with the moral government of the universe, and
the political organization of mankind.
[Sidenote: Summary.]
=216.= We may sum up the history of the universe according to the Stoics
somewhat in the following way. Body is neither burden on the soul nor its
instrument, but all body is of itself instinct with motion, warmth, and
life, which are essentially the same. This motion is not entirely that of
contraction, or immobility would result; nor entirely that of expansion,
else the universe would be scattered into the far distance[145]. One of
these motions constantly succeeds the other, as Heraclitus says ‘becoming
extinguished by measure, and catching light by measure[146]’; as when a
swimmer with all his strength can just hold his own against the force of
the stream, or a bird straining its pinions appears to rest suspended
in the air[147]. At the beginning of each world-period expansion or
tension is supreme, and only the world-soul exists. Next the fiery breath
begins to cool, the opposing principle of contraction asserts itself,
the universe settles down and shrinks; the aether passes into air, and
air in its turn to water. All this while tension is slackening, first
in the centre, lastly even in the circumference; yet the vital force
is not entirely quenched; beneath the covering of the waters lurks the
promise of a new world. The fire still unextinguished within works upon
the watery mass or chaos until it evolves from it the four elements as
we know them. On its outer edge where it meets the expansive aether, the
water rarefies until the belt of air is formed. All the while the outward
and inward movements persist; particles of fire still pass into air, and
thence into water and earth. Earth still in turn yields to water, water
to air, and air to fire (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω). Thus by the interaction of
conflicting tendencies an equilibrium (ἰσονομία) is established, and the
result is the apparent permanence of the phenomenal world[148]. Finally
the upward movement becomes slightly preponderant, water becomes absorbed
in air and air transformed into fire, once more the conflagration results
and all the world passes into the fiery breath from which it came[149].
FOOTNOTES
[1] As, for instance, Aristophanes in the _Clouds_.
[2] ‘vos etiam dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae,
qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos Antipodas
vocatis’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123.
[3] ‘cum tu, inter scabiem tantam et contagia lucri, | nil parvum sapias
et adhuc sublimia cures; | quae mare compescant causae; quid temperet
annum; | stellae sponte sua iussaene vagentur et errent’ Hor. _Ep._ i 12,
14-17.
[4] Sen. _Ben._ iv 23, 2 to 4.
[5] ‘in aperto iacentes sidera superlabebantur et insigne spectaculum
noctium. mundus in praeceps agebatur silentio tantum opus ducens
... libebat intueri signa ex media caeli parte vergentia, rursus ex
occulto alia surgentia’ _Ep._ 90, 42.
[6] ‘[vides] ordinem rerum et naturam per constituta procedere. hiems
nunquam aberravit. aestas suo tempore incaluit. autumni verisque, ut
solet, facta mutatio est. tam solstitium quam aequinoctium suos dies
rettulit’ _N. Q._ iii 16, 3.
[7] ‘caelestia semper | inconcussa suo volvuntur sidera lapsu’ Lucan
_Phars._ ii 267, 8.
[8] ‘O all ye Works of the Lord, bless ye the Lord; praise and exalt him
above all for ever’ Daniel iii 57 to 82.
[9] ‘The spacious firmament on high, | with all the blue ethereal sky, |
and spangled heavens, a shining frame, | their great Original proclaim,’
etc. J. Addison (1728).
[10] See above, § 186.
[11] See below, § 303.
[12] καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας Diog. L. vii 138.
[13] ὅτι θ’ εἷς ἐστιν [ὁ κόσμος] Ζήνων τέ φησιν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ
Χρύσιππος _ib._ 143.
[14] λέγεται δὲ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεός Stob. i 21, 5.
[15] οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἕνα κόσμον ἀπεφήναντο, ὃν δὴ τὸ πᾶν ἔφασαν εἶναι
καὶ τὸ σωματικόν Aët. _plac._ i 5, 1.
[16] See § 187, note 90; Seneca however thinks there may be more outside
the universe than void; ‘illud scrutor, quod ultra mundum iacet, utrumne
profunda vastitas sit an et hoc ipsum terminis suis cludatur; qualis sit
habitus exclusis’ _Dial._ viii 5, 6.
[17] Ar. Did. fr. 31.
[18] Arnim ii 534.
[19] Arnim ii 547.
[20] μέρη δέ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ γῆ, ὕδωρ, ἀήρ, πῦρ, ἃ πάντα νεύει ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον
Achilles _Isag._ 9 (Arnim ii 554). But according to another view only
earth and water, being naturally heavy, tend towards the middle; whereas
air and fire, being naturally light, tend from it; _ib._ 4 (Arnim ii
555). See § 196.
[21] Arnim ii 557.
[22] See above, § 184.
[23] Arnim ii 540. The universe, being ‘body,’ possesses ‘up’ and ‘down,’
‘front’ and ‘back,’ and all the other relations, according to the fourth
category.
[24] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 44, 1.
[25] Ar. Did. fr. 31, quoting from Chrysippus. So Cornutus 1; ὁ οὐρανὸς
περιέχει κύκλῳ τὴν γῆν.
[26] ‘Hicetas Syracosius caelum solem lunam stellas supera denique omnia
stare censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri, quae cum
circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici
omnia, quae si stante terra caelum moveretur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123, on
which see Prof. Reid’s note.
[27] Plut. _plac. phil._ iii 13, 3. The question of priority in the
statement of this theory has been much discussed in recent years; and
it is contended that Hicetas and Ecphantus never existed except as
characters in dialogues composed by Heraclides of Pontus, the true
discoverer. See H. Steigmüller, _Archiv der Geschichte der Philosophie_,
Berlin 1892; Otto Voss, _de Heraclidis Pontici vita et scriptis_,
Rostock, 1896; Tannery, _Pseudonymes antiques_ (Revue des études
grecques, 1897).
[28] ‘pertinebit hoc excussisse, ut sciamus utrum mundus terra stante
circumeat an mundo stante terra vertatur. fuerunt enim qui dicerent nos
esse, quos rerum natura nescientes ferat’ Sen. _N. Q._ vii 2, 3. Seneca
however appears for himself to reject the doctrine: ‘scimus praeter
terram nihil stare, cetera continua velocitate decurrere’ _Ep._ 93, 9.
[29] Plut. _qu. Plat._ viii 1, 2 and 3; Aët. _plac._ ii 24, 8 and iii 17,
9.
[30] Plut. _fac. lun._ 6, 3.
[31] Simplic. _Arist. phys._ p. 64.
[32] ‘si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc,
quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae
conversiones idem efficiunt in sole et in luna et in quinque stellis
errantibus, quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus’ Cic. _N.
D._ ii 34, 88.
[33] Schmekel, p. 465.
[34] ‘in rerum natura elementa sunt quattuor’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii 12, 3.
[35] See above, § 190.
[36] ‘ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aer, ex aere aether; deinde retrorsum
vicissim ex aethere aer, ex aere aqua, ex aqua terra infima. sic naturis
his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum deorsum ultro citro commeantibus,
mundi partium coniunctio continetur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 32, 84.
[37] ‘necesse est ut et imus aether habeat aliquid aeri simile, et summus
aer non sit dissimilis imo aetheri, quia non fit statim in diversum
ex diverso transitus; paulatim ista in confinio vim suam miscent, ut
dubitare possis an aer an hic iam aether sit’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 14, 2; cf.
iv 10.
[38] Arnim ii 555. But see above, § 194, note 20.
[39] ‘de naturis autem sic [Zeno] sentiebat, ut in quattuor initiis rerum
illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensum et mentem effici
rebantur, non adhiberet: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae
quidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque sensus.’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 39; cf.
_Fin._ iv 5, 12.
[40] ‘sic enim se res habet, ut omnia quae alantur et crescant,
contineant in se vim caloris: sine qua neque ali possent neque crescere.’
_N. D._ ii 9, 23 and 24; ‘caloris [natura] vim [habet] in se vitalem, per
omnem mundum pertinentem’ _ib._
[41] ‘hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et
consumptor omnium; contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia
conservat alit auget sustinet sensuque afficit’ _ib._ ii 15, 41. Cicero
is quoting from Cleanthes (fr. 30 P); the teaching of Zeno was the same
(fr. 71 B).
[42] τὸ δὲ [πῦρ καὶ] κατ’ ἐξοχὴν στοιχεῖον λέγεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
πρώτου τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολήν Ar. Did. fr. 21; ‘Stoici
ignem, ... unum ex his quattuor elementis, et viventem et sapientem et
ipsius mundi fabricatorem ..., eumque omnino ignem deum esse putaverunt’
Aug. _Civ. De._ viii 5.
[43] ‘[ignem] natura sursum vocat; in illo igne purissimo nihil est quod
deprimatur’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 13, 1 and 2.
[44] οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ τῷ ἀέρι τὸ πρώτως ψυχρὸν ἀποδιδόντες Plut. _prim.
frig._ 9, 1; ‘aer frigidus per se et obscurus’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 10.
[45] ‘ipse vero aer, qui natura est maxime frigidus, minime est expers
caloris’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 10, 26; ‘aer nunquam sine igne est. detrahe illi
calorem; rigescet, stabit, durabitur’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii 10, 4.
[46] ‘quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem
quam spiritus?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 8. Aristotle held that air was warm
(Arnim ii 431).
[47] ‘detrahe [aeri] calorem; transiet in humorem’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii 10, 4.
[48] ‘est aliquid in aqua vitale’ _ib._ v 5, 2.
[49] ‘non esse terram sine spiritu palam est ... illo dico vitali et
vegeto et alente omnia. hunc nisi haberet, quomodo tot arbustis spiritum
infunderet non aliunde viventibus, et tot satis?... totum hoc caelum,
... omnes hae stellae ..., hic tam prope a nobis agens cursum sol ...
alimentum ex terra trahunt’ _ib._ vi 16, 1 and 2.
[50] Philod. _de ira_ p. 77 Gomp.
[51] ‘ex quo concluditur, calidum illud atque igneum in omni fusum esse
natura’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 10, 28.
[52] cap. xi, p. 38 D.
[53] Schmekel, pp. 463, 4.
[54] _ib._ p. 464.
[55] Diog. L. vii 145 and 146; Posidonius is his general authority, but
the theory of the solar eclipse he refers to Zeno.
[56] ‘[lunae] tenuissimum lumen facit proximus accessus ad solem,
digressus autem longissimus quisque plenissimum’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 19, 50.
[57] Pliny, _Nat. hist._ ii 21.
[58] Such was the calculation of Posidonius; see Mayor’s note on Cic.
_N. D._ ii 36, 92. The sun’s diameter is in fact three times as large as
Posidonius thought.
[59] This explanation has so plausible a sound that it may not be
superfluous to remark that it is scientifically valueless.
[60] Cic. _N. D._ ii 20, 51.
[61] ‘persuadent enim mathematici terram in medio mundo sitam ad universi
caeli complexum quasi puncti instar obtinere, quod κέντρον illi vocant.’
_Tusc. disp._ i 17, 40.
[62] Diog. L. vii 144 and 145.
[62a] ‘ego nostris non adsentior; non enim existimo cometen subitaneum
ignem sed inter aeterna opera naturae’ _N. Q._ vii 21, 1.
[63] ‘omni terrarum ambitu non semel maior’ Sen. _N. Q._ vi 16, 2.
[64] Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρέφεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἐκ τῆς ἐπιγείου
ἀναθυμιάσεως Aët. _plac._ ii 17, 4; ‘[sidera] marinis terrenisque
umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis [aluntur]’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 16, 43;
‘totum hoc caelum ... halitu terrarum [sustinetur]’ Sen. _N. Q._ vi 16, 2.
[65] Ar. Did. fr. 34; for the text and interpretation see Hirzel, pp.
121, 122.
[66] Aët. _plac._ ii 14, 1 and 2.
[67] ‘solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quae
oriantur in ardore caelesti, qui aether vel caelum nominatur’ Cic. _N.
D._ ii 15, 41.
[68] Cic. _N. D._ iii 14, 37.
[69] ‘ideo enim, sicut et Posidonius et Cleanthes adfirmant, solis meatus
a plaga, quae usta dicitur, non recedit, quia sub ipsa currit Oceanus’
Macrob. _Sat._ i 23, 2.
[70] ‘hac mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem
divinitas, quae ex mobilissima purissimaque aetheris parte gignuntur; ...
totaque sunt calida atque perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime animantia
esse et sentire atque intellegere dicantur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 15, 39.
[71] Sen. _Ben._ vii 31, 3.
[72] ‘Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat’ Cic. _Ac._ ii
41, 126.
[73] Diog. L. vii 139.
[74] ‘idemque [Zeno] hoc modo: “nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest
esse sentiens. mundi autem partes sentientes sunt: non igitur caret sensu
mundus”’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 8, 22.
[75] ‘quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non
utitur. nihil autem mundo melius: ratione igitur mundus utitur’ _ib._ 8,
21; see also § 83.
[76] Diog. L. vii 143; ‘haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus
mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato
spiritu continerentur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 7, 19. This unity of the universe
is technically termed συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων, ‘consentiens conspirans
continuata cognatio rerum’ (Cic. as above). It was denied by Panaetius
(Schmekel, pp. 191, 192).
[77] ‘est ergo in eo virtus: sapiens est igitur et propterea deus’ Cic.
_N. D._ ii 14, 39; ‘quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini
aliquid existere, qui dei pars est? totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum
est et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 30.
[78] ‘From what has been said it follows that the Stoics admitted
no essential difference between God and the world. Their system was
therefore strictly pantheistic’ Zeller, p. 156.
[79] ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει
τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτόν, καὶ αὔτη καλεῖται Ζεύς Cornutus 2.
[80] Varro Fr. i 27 b (Aug. _Civ. De._ vii 6).
[81] ‘nihil quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se
potest animantem compotemque rationis’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 8, 22.
[82] See above, § 101.
[83] Diog. L. vii 139.
[84] _ib._
[85] See below, chap. xi.
[86] Sext. _math._ viii 270 (Arnim ii 727).
[87] ‘inconsultus illis vanusque cursus est, qualis formicis per arbusta
repentibus, quae in summum cacumen, deinde in imum inanes aguntur.
his plerique similem vitam agunt, quorum non immerito quis “inquietam
inertiam” dixerit’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 12, 3.
[88] _ib._ vi 7, 2.
[89] ‘quid dicam, quantus amor bestiarum sit in educandis custodiendisque
eis, quae procreaverunt, usque ad eum finem, dum possint se ipsa
defendere?’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 51, 129.
[90] ‘canum vero tam fida custodia, ... quid significat?’ _ib._ 63, 158.
[91] δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἕξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ Plut.
_virt. mor._ 12.
[92] τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεώς τε καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινήσεως [αἰτίαν ὀνομάζομεν]
ψυχήν Galen _adv. Iul._ v (Arnim ii 718).
[93] ‘omnem naturam necesse est ... habere aliquem in se principatum, ut
in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 11,
29; ‘ipsum principale parum subtile, parum exactum. capit ergo visus
speciesque rerum quibus ad impetus evocetur, sed turbidas et confusas’
Sen. _Dial._ iii 3, 7 and 8.
[94] ‘bestiis [natura] et sensum et motum dedit, et cum quodam appetitu
accessum ad res salutares, a pestiferis recessum’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 12, 34;
and so again, _ib._ 47, 122.
[95] ‘irasci quidem non magis sciunt quam ignoscere; muta animalia
humanis adfectibus carent, habent autem similes illis quosdam impetus’
Sen. _Dial._ iii 3, 5 and 6.
[96] ‘[ira], cum sit inimica rationi, nusquam nascitur, nisi ubi rationi
locus est’ _ib._ 3, 4.
[97] ‘sunt quaedam quae animam habent nec sunt animalia. placet enim
satis et arbustis animam inesse; itaque et vivere illa et mori dicimus’
Sen. _Ep._ 58, 10; cf. _N. Q._ vi 16, 1.
[98] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὐδὲ ψυχὴν ὅλως ὀνομάζουσι τὴν τὰ φυτὰ διοικοῦσαν,
ἀλλὰ φύσιν Galen _de Hipp. et Plut._ vi. 561 K (Arnim ii 710). Aristotle
had used the term θρεπτικὴ ψυχή in the same sense. So too Cicero: ‘iis
quae [gignuntur] e terra natura nihil tribuit amplius quam ut ea alendo
atque augendo tueretur’ _N. D._ ii 12, 33.
[99] _ib._ ii 11, 29.
[100] ‘parvula admodum semina ... in tantum convalescunt ut ingentia saxa
disturbent et monumenta dissolvant. hoc quid est aliud quam intentio
spiritus?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6, 5; and again ‘quid aliud producit fruges et
segetem imbecillam ac virentes exigit umbras ac distendit in ramos quam
spiritus intentio et unitas?’ _ib._ ii 6, 6. See also Cic. _N. D._ ii 32,
81.
[101] Arnim ii 713.
[102] ‘quaedam anima carent, ut saxa; itaque erit aliquid animantibus
antiquius, corpus scilicet’ Sen. _Ep._ 58, 10.
[103] This use of ἕξις must be kept distinct from that which is
contrasted with διάθεσις, as _habitus_ from _dispositio_: see above, §
184.
[104] ἑκτικὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστι πνεῦμα τὸ συνέχον τοὺς λίθους Galen _introd.
s. med._ xiv p. 726 K (Arnim ii 716).
[105] ‘[unitas corporum] ad naturam corporis [refert], nulla ope externa,
sed unitate sua cohaerentis’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 2, 4.
[106] Alex. _de mixt._ p. 226, 24-30 Bruns (Arnim ii 1048); Lucian
_Hermot._ 81. See above, § 186.
[107] This gradation of soul-power is most clearly explained by Varro;
‘idem Varro tres esse adfirmat animae gradus in omni universaque natura;
unum qui omnes partes corporis, quae vivunt, transit et non habet sensum
sed tantum ad vivendum valetudinem; hanc vim in nostro corpore permanare
dicit in ossa ungues capillos, sicut in mundo arbores sine sensu ...
crescunt et modo quodam suo vivunt; secundum gradum animae, in quo sensus
est; hanc vim pervenire in oculos aures nares os tactum; tertium gradum
esse animae summum, quod vocatur animus, in quo intellegentia praeminet;
hoc praeter hominem omnes carere mortales’ Aug. _Civ. De._ vii 23.
[108] Diog. L. vii 141.
[109] ‘The heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements
shall be dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that
are therein shall be burned up.’ 2 Peter iii 10.
[110] See above, § 196.
[111] The theory of the conflagration appears to have been attached to
the Stoic system from without, and the logical contention is obviously
weak. For if the upward movement is in excess, the earth should disappear
before the water. It should also always be remembered that the fire that
finally remains is not the destructive, but a constructive element.
[112] ‘ex quo eventurum nostri putant id, ... ut ad extremum omnis mundus
ignesceret, cum humore consumpto neque terra ali posset neque remearet
aer; cuius ortus, aqua omni exhausta, esse non posset: ita relinqui nihil
praeter ignem, a quo rursum animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret, atque
idem ornatus oriretur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 46, 118. ‘cum tempus advenerit,
quo se mundus renovaturus extinguat, viribus ista se suis caedent et
sidera sideribus incurrent et omni flagrante materia uno igne quicquid
nunc ex disposito lucet ardebit. nos quoque felices animae atque aeterna
sortitae, parva ruinae ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur’
Sen. _Dial._ vi 26, 6.
[113] οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνῄσκειν τὸν κόσμον Plut. _Sto. rep._ 39, 2.
[114] ‘[quaeramus] immortalis sit mundus, an inter caduca et ad tempus
nata numerandus’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 4, 31.
[115] ‘Heraclitus after all his speculations on the conflagration of the
universe’ _To himself_ (Rendall’s transl.), iii 3. Aristotle interpreted
Heraclitus in the same way; thus he paraphrases fr. 26 (B), 66 (D); πάντα
τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινέει καὶ καταλήψεται as follows: Ἡράκλειτός φησιν
ἅπαντα γίγνεσθαί ποτε πῦρ _Met._ xi 10.
[116] See above, § 193.
[117] Clem. Al. _Strom._ v 14 (Arnim ii 590) relying on fr. 20 (B), 30
(D). Philo _inc. mund._ p. 222, 2 (Arnim ii 620).
[118] Clem. Al. as before, relying on fr. 21 (B), 31a (D); φθαρτὸς μέν [ὁ
κόσμος] ὀ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν, Philo as above.
[119] Ar. Did. fr. 29.
[120] Diog. L. vii 142.
[121] Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν
οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ Ar. Did. fr. 36.
[122] See above, § 109.
[123] See above, § 115. For a full discussion of the motives of this
change see Schmekel, pp. 304-318.
[124] ‘ita stabilis mundus est atque ita cohaeret ad permanendum, ut
nihil ne excogitari quidem possit aptius’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 45, 115.
[125] ‘[mundi partium coniunctio] certe perdiuturna [est,] permanens ad
longinquum et immensum paene tempus’ _ib._ 33, 85.
[126] ‘[Iuppiter,] resoluto mundo et dis in unum confusis paulisper
cessante natura adquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus’ Sen. _Ep._
9, 16. On the relation of Ζεύς to the ἐκπύρωσις see Alex. _de mixt._ p.
226, 16 B; Philo _inc. mund._ c. 14, 15.
[127] ‘[conflagratio] fit, cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri’
_N. Q._ iii 28, 7.
[128] Zeller, p. 166.
[129] Cic. _N. D._ ii 20, 51: see also Schmekel, p. 241.
[130] ‘veniet iterum, qui nos in lucem reponat dies; quem multi
recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret’ Sen. _Ep._ 36, 10. Socrates and Plato
will live again, their friends and fellow citizens will be the same, and
they will be again treated as before; Nemes. _nat. hom._ p. 277 (Arnim
ii 625). This theory is plainly not reconcileable with Seneca’s hope of
better things (see note 127). See also Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, pp.
33 sqq.
[131] ‘quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille deus est potens omnium,
sive incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus
per omnia maxima et minima aequali intentione diffusus, sive fatum et
immutabilis causarum inter se cohaerentium series’ Sen. _Dial._ xii 8, 3.
[132] This chaos the Stoics identified with the watery stage which
preceded the creation of earth in the history of the elements: see
Pearson on Zeno fr. 112, 113.
[133] Seneca’s writings are penetrated with this conception: ‘hoc
universum ... dies aliquis dissipabit et in confusionem veterem
tenebrasque demerget’ _Dial._ xi 1, 2; cf. _Ep._ 65, 19.
[134] Δία δ’ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν, ὅτι δι’ αὐτὸν γίνεται καὶ σώζεται τὰ πάντα
Cornutus 2.
[135] ‘illo ergo saeculo, quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse
regnum Posidonius iudicat’ Sen. _Ep._ 90, 5.
[136] Strabo vii 296. See generally Schmekel, pp. 288-290.
[137] Ov. _Met._ xv 96-142; Schmekel p. 288.
[138] κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεὸν] τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν
οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ Diog. L. vii 136.
[139] This stage, at which the whole universe is water, even though the
four elements have not yet been created, reflects the popular tradition
as to Chaos as in the last section: see Pearson p. 102. For the process
of creation as described by Cleanthes see Pearson p. 252.
[140] See above, § 178.
[141] καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὔτω καὶ τοῦτον,
σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου ... ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα
στοιχεῖα Diog. L. vii 136.
[142] εἶτα κατὰ μῖξιν τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη _ib._ 142.
[143] τὸ μέντοι πρῶτον πῦρ εἶναι καθαπερεί τι σπέρμα, τῶν ἁπάντων ἔχον
τοὺς λόγους Arist. apud Euseb. _praep. ev._ xv (Arnim i 98).
[144] ταύτῃ δὲ πάντα διοικεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ὑπέρευ, καθάπερ ἐν
εὐνομωτάτῃ τινὶ πολιτείᾳ _ib._
[145] Galen _de trem._ 6 VII, p. 616 K (Arnim ii 446).
[146] ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα Heracl. Fr. 20 (B), 30 (D).
[147] Galen _de musc._ i 7 and 8 (Arnim ii 450).
[148] ἐκπύρωσιν μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δυναστείαν τῶν ἄλλων
ἐπικρατήσαντος, διακόσμησιν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἰσονομίαν
ἣν ἀντιδιδόασιν ἀλλήλοις Philo _an. sac._ II 242 M (Arnim ii 616).
[149] This concluding section is based upon a note, which was prepared by
Mr A. C. Pearson for an edition of Chrysippus now abandoned, and which
has been kindly placed by him at my disposal.