THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS.
[Sidenote: Physics.]
=171.= Under the general heading of Physics the ancients included a
number of subjects which in modern times form independent branches
of philosophy. Cleanthes subdivided the subject into Physics proper
and Theology[1]. Here it will be convenient to make a larger number
of subdivisions, so as to treat separately of (i) the Foundations of
Physics, generally called (after Aristotle’s treatise) ‘Metaphysics’;
(ii) Physics proper, that is, the account of the Universe and its
history; (iii) the final problems involved in the history of the
Universe, such as its government by Divine Providence, the Existence
of Evil, Free-will, and Chance; (iv) the problems of Religion, such as
the existence of gods, their number, character, and claims on mankind;
and (v) the nature of Man, including the modern subjects of Psychology
and Physiology, and to some extent of Anthropology also, treated by the
Stoics as a Kingdom governed by the Soul. According to Stoic principles
these subjects cannot be separated one from the other, or from the other
parts of philosophy; and therefore in treating each one we shall, as
before, assume a general knowledge of all the others. The Stoics laid
great stress upon the study of Physics, as the only sound basis for
a scientific rule of human conduct; and some of them (beginning with
Chrysippus), having especial regard to the elevated dignity of the study
of Theology, were disposed to rank this branch of philosophy as the
highest and last of its three principal divisions[2]. We shall however,
in accordance with a view more generally held, reserve the last place for
Ethics[3].
[Sidenote: Fundamental Conceptions.]
=172.= To the earlier Greek philosophers, as we have already seen, it
appeared that a single bold intuition was enough, or almost enough, to
discover a sufficient foundation upon which to construct a reasoned
account of all things. Thus the Ionic philosophers took up as such a
foundation one or more of the elements of air, fire, and water. But as
soon as these three, together with earth, were recognized as ‘elements’
existing side by side, it became necessary to dig deeper, so as to
secure a foundation for these as well. Thus Democritus resolved all
four into ‘atoms’ and ‘void’; his theory was taken over by Epicurus,
and remains to this day not only the most popular solution of the
problem, but also that which (till quite recently) was tacitly assumed
as the basis of all scientific investigation. Anaxagoras, working on
different lines, began his account of the universe with ‘mind’ on the
one hand and a primal conglomerate ‘matter’ on the other; a doctrine
evidently based upon the popular dualism of soul and body, and still
the basis of all transcendental philosophy and established religious
conceptions. This Aristotle varied by assuming rather an ‘active’ and a
‘passive’ principle, force which works and matter upon which it works.
Besides these conceptions many others need to be considered, which if
not absolutely fundamental, are nevertheless matters of discussion in
all philosophical schools, as those of motion, space, time, soul, body,
God, the universe, cause, effect, will and necessity. In this way the
original inquiry into the foundation of the universe developes into a
general study of fundamental conceptions; and it is at this stage that it
is taken over and dealt with by Stoicism, which adds to the list certain
conceptions on which it lays a special stress and to which it gives a
characteristic colour; such are those of ‘body,’ ‘spirit,’ and ‘tone.’
[Sidenote: The Stoic monism.]
=173.= The fact that the Stoics use from time to time the language of
other schools or of popular speculation does not necessarily imply
that this language is an adequate statement of their doctrine; and we
frequently[4] find that the discussion of particular problems seems
to be based on dualisms, though these are in the end subordinated
to monistic statements. Thus in logic we have already noticed the
sharp contrast between the perceiving mind and the external object
of perception (αἰσθητόν, ὑπάρχον); nevertheless mind and object are
ultimately declared to be akin[5]. So in particular the popular dualism
of ‘soul’ and ‘body’ is often accepted by the Stoics, and yet as steadily
superseded by the paradox that ‘soul is body.’ The reason given for
this is that ‘body is that which acts and is acted upon[6]’; and this
statement in the end overrides the Aristotelian distinction of force and
matter, active principle and passive principle. ‘Body,’ as conceived by
the Stoics, is the one ultimate element, the foundation and beginning
of the universe; it contains within itself the capacity of action, and
nothing but ‘body’ has this capacity. Body, and nothing but body, exists
in the true sense; that certain other things have a quasi-existence (as
we shall see later in this chapter) is an embarrassment which only brings
into clearer relief this distinctive feature of the system. The Stoic
‘body,’ though it is also called ‘matter’ (ὕλη, _materia_), must not
be confused with the ‘matter’ of modern philosophy, which has derived
from Aristotle the implication of passivity[7]; much more closely it
corresponds with the ‘stuff’ by which modern monistic philosophers denote
the substratum of mind and body alike. To call the Stoics ‘materialists’
will generally prove misleading; it is the Epicurean system, to which the
Stoics were sharply opposed, which (as we have seen)[8] corresponds to
modern materialism.
[Sidenote: The nature of ‘body.’]
=174.= The conception of ‘body’ therefore replaces in the Stoic system
the various elements which the Ionic philosophers assumed as the basis
of the universe, and combines both parts of such dualistic elements
as were assumed by Democritus, Anaxagoras and Aristotle. Since it is
the foundation of all things it must be capable of taking very various
shapes. In logic we have met with it under the name of the ‘substratum’
(τὸ ὑπάρχον, _id quod est_)[9], but it none the less includes the
‘subject’ or feeling and reasoning mind. In the universe as a whole it
is ‘essence’ (οὐσία, _essentia_); in its parts it is ‘matter’ (ὕλη,
_silva_)[10]; but it also appears, possessed of intelligence, as the
deity[11], and again is identified with ‘breath’ or ‘spirit[12],’ and
through this with the human soul[13]. Even in ethics it has its place;
for all causes are bodily, and not least ‘the good’ and the respective
virtues, all of which are bodies, for they act upon body[14]; similarly
the emotions such as anger and melancholy, are of the nature of body[15].
[Sidenote: Motion, space and time.]
=175.= The Stoic ‘body’ in all its transformations is active and alert.
It contains in itself the principle or power of movement; for though we
observe that one body is set in motion by another, yet this could not be
the case unless in the beginning there had been a body which had movement
of itself[16]. As to the nature of the primal movement, the Stoics
agree with Anaximenes that it may be described as alternate rarefaction
and condensation. Rarefaction is a wave or ‘spirit’ spreading from the
centre to the extremities; condensation is a contrary movement from the
extremities to the centre[17]. The extension of body is ‘space,’ which
therefore does not exist of itself, but only as a function of body[18].
Where there is no body (and body is limited), there is no space, but only
the ‘boundless void’ beyond the universe[19]; of this we cannot say that
it ‘exists’; rather it ‘not exists.’ Time also does not exist of itself,
but only in the movement of body[20]. Neither space nor time existed
before the universe, but have been all along bound up with it[21].
[Sidenote: Body comprises life and thought.]
=176.= In almost every particular we find a sharp contrast between
the Stoic conception of ‘body’ and the Epicurean ‘atom.’ The atom is
extremely small and entirely unchangeable; ‘body’ is immensely large
and in a high degree plastic. Atoms alternate with void; but ‘body’
spreads continuously throughout the entire universe; it can never be
torn apart or show a gap[22]. Atoms move downwards in parallel straight
lines; ‘body’ moves from the centre to the circumference, and thence
returns to the centre. Two atoms can never occupy the same space; but
‘body’ everywhere moves through body, penetrating it and combining with
it throughout its whole extent[23]. The atom is a convenient hypothesis
within the range of modern physical and chemical science; the conception
of ‘body’ gains force as we enter the region of biology. For life also
is a movement which proceeds from a warm centre (and warmth is body
rarefied), and extends towards a circumference which is in comparison
gross and cold[24]. Going further, we find that ‘body’ and its functions
are so interpreted as to provide a key to the activities of the human
reason and will.
[Sidenote: Tone or tension.]
=177.= To the central conception of body are attached in the Stoic
system various supplementary conceptions, which serve to bring into
clearer view its nature and powers. Of these the most characteristic
is that of ‘tone’ or ‘strain’ (τόνος, _intentio_). This term appears
originally to have expressed muscular activity[25], and was next used
by the Cynics to denote that active condition of the soul which is the
true end of life; ‘no labour,’ said Diogenes, ‘is noble, unless its end
is tone of soul[26].’ Although we cannot trace the term ‘tone’ directly
to Zeno, we find that he explains sleep as a relaxation of the soul,
substantially agreeing with later writers who call it a ‘relaxation of
the sensory tone around the soul[27].’ With Cleanthes the word becomes
fairly common, first in the ethical application, in which ‘tone’ is ‘a
shock of fire, which if it be strong enough to stir the soul to fulfil
its duties is called strength and force[28],’ and then in physics to
explain the unceasing activity of the universe[29], personified by
Hercules in Stoic allegorical theology[30]. In later writers tone becomes
constantly associated with the ‘spirit’ or ‘thrill’ which explains both
the unity and the movement of all things[31], so that ‘tone of spirit’ or
‘thrill-tone’ (πνευματικὸς τόνος, _intentio spiritus_) explains to us
the operations of body and mind alike[32].
[Sidenote: The seed power.]
=178.= Body however is not only active but creative; there is inherent
in it a power, which is that of the ‘seed’ (σπέρμα, _semen_), and which
is most conspicuously illustrated in the seed of animals and plants. It
is the characteristic of seed that from a small beginning it developes a
great plan, and that this plan never changes[33]. This plan or purpose
is named by the Stoics its ‘reason’ or ‘word’ (λόγος), and at this point
Stoicism incorporates the doctrine of the ‘Word’ or universal reason with
which it became acquainted through Heraclitus. The ‘Word’ or ‘seed-power’
(λόγος σπερματικός) of the universe is one; it is the primal fire in
its work of creation; it is Zeus the Creator who moulds gross matter
into the things that are to be[34]; it is wisdom which plies matter
as it will[35]. But there are also in individual objects, animate and
inanimate, indestructible seed-powers, countless in number, displayed
alike in growth, procreation, and purpose[36]; these seed-powers are, as
it were, spirits or deities, spread throughout the universe, everywhere
shaping, peopling, designing, multiplying; they are activities of fiery
spirit working through tension[37] in its highest development. But the
seed-power of the universe comprehends in itself all the individual
seed-powers; they are begotten of it, and shall in the end return to it.
Thus in the whole work of creation and re-absorption[38] we see the work
of one Zeus, one divine Word, one all-pervading spirit[39].
[Sidenote: Cause.]
=179.= Closely akin to the theory of ‘seed-powers’ and the Word is that
of ‘cause’ (αἰτία, _causa_). Aristotle had already explained this term
in connexion with cosmogony, laying down that, in order that a universe
may come into being, three ‘causes’ are required; matter, without which
nothing can be made; a workman, to make things; and the form or shape,
which is imposed on every work as on a statue. To these may be added a
fourth cause, the purpose of the work. Thus to produce a statue we need
the bronze, the artist, the design, and the fee. Grammatically these
causes may be expressed by the help of prepositions, as the _ex quo_, _a
quo_, _in quo_ and _propter quod_[40]. To this theory of multiple causes
the Stoics oppose the doctrine of a single ‘first cause,’ the maker of
the universe. This first cause can be none other than the primal creative
fire in a new aspect; equally it is the creative Word.
It seems well to translate here in full the argument of Seneca on
this point, for it stands almost alone as an example of his powers in
continuous exposition:
The Stoic dogma is that there is one cause only, the maker.
Aristotle holds that cause is threefold. ‘The first cause,’ he
says, ‘is the material itself, for without it nothing can be
made. The second cause is the maker. The third is the design,
which is impressed on every single work as on a statue;’ this
Aristotle calls the εἶδος. I will now explain what he means.
The bronze is the first cause of a statue; for it could never
have been made, had there not been stuff to be cast or wrought
into shape. The second cause is the sculptor; for the bronze
could never have been brought into the shape of a statue without
the artist’s touch. The third cause is the design; for the
statue would not be called the ‘javelin-man’ or the ‘crowned
king’ had not such a design been impressed upon it.
There is besides a fourth cause, the purpose. What is purpose?
It is that which induced the sculptor to undertake the work, the
aim that he had in view. It may have been money, if he intended
to sell it; or glory, if he wished to make himself a name; or
religious feeling, if he proposed to present it to a temple. That
for the sake of which a thing is done is therefore also a cause;
for you cannot think it right in making up a list of causes to
omit something, apart from which the thing would never have been
made.
Thus Aristotle postulates a multiplicity of causes; but we
maintain that the list is either too long or too short.
If we hold that everything, apart from which the thing would
never have been made, is a cause of its making, then the list is
too short. We ought to reckon time as a cause, for nothing can be
made without time. We ought to reckon space as a cause; for if
there is no room for a thing to be made, it will certainly not
be made. Movement too should be placed in the list; for without
movement nothing can be produced or destroyed; without movement
there can be neither art nor change.
We Stoics look for a first and general cause. Such a cause must
be single, for the stuff of the universe is single. We ask what
that cause is, and reply that it is the creative reason, the
deity. The various causes in the list that has been made are
not a series of independent causes, but are all variations of a
single cause, namely ‘the maker[41].’
[Sidenote: Causation and free-will.]
=180.= Although the ‘first cause’ and the ‘Word’ are thus formally
identified, their associations in connexion with cosmogony are very
different. For whereas the ‘Word’ suggests reason and purpose, and leads
up to the dogma that the universe is governed by divine providence, the
term ‘cause’ suggests the linking of cause and effect by an unending
chain, the inevitable sequence of events which leaves no room for effort
or hope. These terms therefore point to the supreme problems of Fate and
divine Purpose, Determinism and Free-will, and as such will be discussed
in a later chapter[42]. Here it is sufficient to note that the Stoics
not only accept, but insist upon the use of terms suggesting both points
of view, and look therefore beyond their immediate opposition to an
ultimate reconciliation; and that the importance attached to the doctrine
of a ‘single and general cause’ by no means excludes a multiplicity of
individual causes depending upon it, and capable of classification
according to their relative importance[43].
[Sidenote: The categories.]
=181.= Thus the conception of ‘body,’ so simple to the plain man,
becomes to the philosopher manifold and intricate. Its interpretation
is to some extent brought into harmony with common speech through the
doctrine of the ‘categories’ based upon Aristotle’s teaching[44].
But whereas Aristotle endeavoured in his categories to classify the
various but independent classes of existences, the Stoics considered
the different aspects in which the one primary body might be studied.
The first two categories, those of ‘substance’ (ὑποκείμενον) and of
‘quality’ (ποιόν), agree with those of Aristotle[45], and clearly
correspond to the grammatical categories of noun and adjective. The
third category is that of ‘disposition’ (πὼς ἔχον), as ‘lying down’
or ‘standing[46].’ The fourth is that of ‘relative position’ (πρός τί
πως ἔχον), as ‘right’ and ‘left,’ ‘son’ and ‘father[47].’ Some of the
categories are further subdivided[48]; but enough is here stated to shew
the object of the analysis, which in practice may have been useful in
securing some completeness in the discussion of particular conceptions.
Of ‘substances’ the Stoics, like others, say that they ‘exist,’ and are
‘bodies’; of qualities they boldly say the same[49]. But they do not
consistently apply the same terms to disposition and relative position;
in this direction they are at last led, like other philosophers, to speak
of things which ‘do not exist.’ They could not take the modern view that
all such discussions are verbal entanglements, of which no solution is
possible, because they believed that there was a natural harmony between
words and things. We on the other hand shall be little inclined to follow
their analysis into its manifold details[50].
[Sidenote: Substance.]
=182.= The analysis of the first two categories, those of Substance and
Quality, leads us at once to the profoundest problems of Metaphysics;
and even if we allow that the difficulty is primarily grammatical, and
resolves itself into a discussion of the functions of Substantive and
Adjective, it is none the less inextricably interwoven with all our
habits of thought. It would be unreasonable to expect from the Stoics
perfectly clear and consistent language on this point; they absorb into
their system much from popular philosophy, and much from the teaching
of Aristotle in particular. The view which is distinctively Stoic is
that Substance and Quality are both body[51], but in two different
aspects. The terms ‘body’ and ‘substance’ refer to the same reality,
but do not describe it with the same fulness. Yet because the very word
‘substance’ (οὐσία) suggests existence, the Stoics are drawn also to
speak of ‘substance without quality’ (ἄποιος οὐσία), and seem to identify
it with a dead ‘matter’ (ὕλη), or ‘substratum’ (ὑποκείμενον), as though
life must be introduced into it from without[52]. This is practically
the view of Aristotle, embodied in the phrase ‘matter without quality
is potentially body’[53]; but just so far as terms of this kind imply a
dualistic explanation of the universe, they are not really reconcileable
with the fundamental principles of Stoicism, and they must therefore be
understood with reservations. It may often seem that the three terms
‘body,’ ‘substance,’ ‘matter,’ are practically interchangeable, but they
are of different rank. For body exists eternally of itself; whereas
substance and matter, except when loosely used as equivalents of body,
do not exist of themselves, but substance always in association with
quality[54], and matter always in association with force. Further we may
distinguish between ‘substance’ in general, or ‘first matter,’ which
is a ‘substratum’ (ὑποκείμενον) to the universe, and the ‘matter’ of
particular things[55]. The former never grows greater or less, the latter
may alter in either direction[56].
[Sidenote: Quality.]
=183.= Quality (ποιότης, τὸ ποιόν, _qualitas_) constitutes the second
category. It is defined by the Stoics as a difference in a substance
which cannot be detached from that substance, but makes it ‘such and
such,’ as for instance ‘sweet,’ ‘round,’ ‘red,’ ‘hot[57].’ Qualities, say
the Stoics, are bodies[58]. This paradoxical statement may be understood
in two ways; first, in that qualities do not exist independently,
but are aspects of ‘body’ which possesses quality; secondly, in that
qualities are bodies in a secondary sense. We may consider it evidence
of the second point of view that language describes the qualities by
nouns, as ‘sweetness,’ ‘rotundity,’ ‘redness,’ ‘heat’; and indeed it
is not so long since our own chemists described heat as a ‘substance’
under the name of ‘caloric.’ This point of view is carried to an extreme
when the Stoics say ‘qualities are substances,’ thus throwing the first
two categories into one[59]. Much stronger is the tendency towards
Aristotle’s views, so that as substance becomes identified with dead
matter, quality is explained as the movement, tension, or current which
endows it with life. Hence the Stoics say ‘the movement of rarefaction is
the cause of quality[60]’; ‘matter is a dull substratum, qualities are
spirits and air-like tensions[61]’; ‘quality is a spirit in a certain
disposition[62]’; ‘the air-current which keeps each thing together is
the cause of its quality[63].’ All these expressions must however be
interpreted in the light of the Stoic theory as a whole. Finally we
notice that, corresponding to the two kinds of substance, general and
particular, there are two kinds of quality, as shewn in the ‘generically
qualified’ (κοινῶς ποιόν) and the ‘individually qualified’ (ἰδίως ποιόν);
for instance, heat in the universe and heat in particular objects[64].
[Sidenote: Disposition.]
=184.= The third category is that of ‘disposition’ (πὼς ἔχοντα, _res
quodammodo se habens_). It differs from quality in its variableness;
for a brave man is always brave, and fire is always hot; but a man
is sometimes standing, sometimes lying; fire is sometimes lambent,
sometimes still. Qualities therefore appear to correspond generally to
the συμβεβηκότα (_coniuncta_) of Epicurus, in that they can never be
separated from a body[65]; and dispositions rather with the συμπτώματα
(_eventa_), which come and go[66]. The third category appears to be used
by the Stoics in a very wide sense, and to correspond to several of
the categories of Aristotle[67]. Disposition is attached to quality as
quality is attached to substance[68]; and though dispositions are not
expressly termed bodies, yet we must consider them to be, as the terms in
the Greek and Latin sufficiently indicate, bodies in particular aspects.
In the further applications of Stoic theory disposition as defined above
appears to be replaced in Greek by the term ἕξις. But this term is
used in two different senses. In the first place it is the movement of
rarefaction and condensation, by which a spirit or thrill passes from the
centre of an object to the extremities, and returns from the extremities
to the centre[69]; in this sense it is translated in Latin by _unitas_,
and takes bodily form as an air-current[70]. This force, when it requires
a further motive power in the direction of development, becomes the
principle of growth (φύσις, _natura_), and is displayed not only in the
vegetable world, but also in animals, as in particular in the hair and
nails[71]. Growth when it takes to itself the further powers of sensation
and impulse becomes soul (ψυχή, _anima_), and is the distinctive mark of
the animal world[72].
In a rather different sense ἕξις or temporary condition is contrasted
with διάθεσις or ‘permanent disposition.’ In this sense the virtues are
permanent dispositions of the soul, because virtue is unchanging; the
arts are temporary conditions. The virtues belong to the wise man only,
the arts to the ordinary man. This distinction however does not hold its
ground in the Roman period, the word _habitus_ (representing ἕξις), our
‘habit,’ being used in both senses[73]. The virtues are bodies, being
dispositions of the soul which is bodily[74].
[Sidenote: Relative position.]
=185.= The fourth category, that of ‘relative position’ (πρός τί
πως ἔχον) appears to be of less importance than the others[75]. Its
characteristic is that it may disappear without altering that to which
it belongs. Thus that which is on the right hand may cease to be so by
the disappearance of that which was on its left; a father may cease to
be such on the death of his son[76]. It seems difficult to describe
the fourth category as one consisting of ‘body,’ but at least it is a
function of body. Also it does not appear that ‘relative position’ can
be predicated of the universe as a whole; it is peculiar to individual
objects, but works towards their combination in a larger whole. The
fourth category has an important application in practical ethics in
the doctrine of daily duties, for these are largely determined by the
relative positions (σχέσεις) of the parties concerned: such are the
duties of a king to his people, a father to his son, a slave to his
master[77].
[Sidenote: Combination.]
=186.= Having fully considered bodies and their relationships, we
proceed to consider their combination. In ordinary experience we meet
with three kinds of combination; juxtaposition (παράθεσις), as in a
mixture of various kinds of grain; mixture (μῖξις), when solid bodies
are interfused, as fire and heat, or fusion (κρᾶσις), when fluids are
interfused, as wine poured into the sea; chemical mixture (σύγχυσις),
when each of the two bodies fused disappears[78]. Of these the second
in its most completed form (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων, _universa fusio_) is
of high importance. For in this way we find that soul is fused with
body[79], quality with substance[80], light with air[81], God with
the universe[82]. Aristotle admits that there is this mixture between
substance and qualities; but as both of these are to the Stoics bodies,
and so too are the members of the other pairs quoted, the Stoic doctrine
must be summed up in the paradox ‘body moves through body[83].’ This
also follows from the Stoic doctrine that there is no void in the
universe. Correspondingly the sum total of body in its various aspects
and mixtures completes the whole (ὅλον), which is identical with
the ‘world-order’ or ‘universe’ (κόσμος)[84]. It seems likely that
this important conception had been reached in very early times by the
Chaldaean astronomers; it was definitely propounded by Pythagoras[85],
had been taken up by Socrates[86] and the Sophists[87], and was in Stoic
times generally accepted both in popular philosophy and in scientific
investigation.
[Sidenote: Quiddities.]
=187.= Up to this point the Stoic system has been guided by a determined
monism. Body is; that which is not body is not. Yet in the end the Stoics
feel compelled to speak of certain things which are not body (ἀσώματα,
_incorporalia_). In the first instance there is the void beyond the
universe[88]. It is possible to dispute as to whether void may more
correctly be said to exist or not to exist; but at least it is a part
of nature[89], and we need some term like ‘the all’ (τὸ πᾶν) to include
both the universe and the void beyond[90]. Next we have to deal with
statements (λεκτά), and mental conceptions of every kind, which stand
as a class in contrast with the real objects to which they may or may
not respectively correspond[91]. Lastly, the Stoics included space and
time, which they had previously explained as functions of body, in the
list of things not bodily[92]. Having thus reached the two main classes
of ‘bodies,’ and ‘things not bodily,’ the monistic principle can only
be saved by creating a supreme class to include both. Let this then be
called the existent (τὸ ὄν, _quod est_)[93], or, if it be objected that
things incorporeal do not exist[94], we may use the name ‘quiddities’
(τινά, _quid_)[95]. In this way the monistic theory, though a little
damaged in vitality, is again set on its feet so far as the ingenious use
of words can help.
[Sidenote: Statements.]
=188.= The language of the Stoics with regard to the phenomena of speech
and thought is not always easy to follow, and perhaps not altogether
consistent. On the one hand, attaching high importance to the reasoning
power, they desire to include its operations in that which is real and
bodily. Thus the ‘mind-pictures’ and indeed all mental conceptions are
bodily and even ‘animal,’ in the sense that they are operations of
body[96]; and truthfulness, ignorance, science and art are all bodies in
the sense that they are dispositions of the soul, which is bodily[97].
But ‘phrases’ (λεκτά) are definitely incorporeal, and with them appear to
be ranked all mental conceptions and general ideas; about these there is
a question, not merely whether they exist or not, but whether they may
even be classed in the most general class of all as ‘quiddities[98].’
Nor can we call general conceptions true or false[99]; though of some
of them, as of Centaurs, giants, and the like, we may say that they are
formed by false mental processes[100]. Finally statements are either
true or false, but are not to be called existent. The whole discussion
therefore ends with the broad distinction between the object, which may
be real or ‘existent,’ and the predication which may be ‘true’; and the
attempt to unite these two conceptions is not persisted in[101].
[Sidenote: Force and matter.]
=189.= Although the Stoics aim consistently at the monistic standard,
they make frequent use of dualistic statements, some of which we have
already noticed. The Latin writers often contrast soul and body from
the standpoint of ethics[102]; and we meet in all the Stoic writers,
and often in unguarded language, the favourite Aristotelian dualism
of force and matter, or (what comes to the same thing) the active and
passive principles. ‘Zeno’ (we are told) ‘laid down that there are two
principles in the universe, the active and the passive. The passive is
matter, or essence without quality; the active is the Logos or deity
within it[103].’ So also Cleanthes and Chrysippus taught[104]; and in the
Roman period Seneca regarded this as a well-understood dogma of the whole
school[105]. But even if direct evidence were lacking, the whole bearing
of the philosophy would shew that this dualism is also surmounted by an
ultimate monism. God and matter are alike body; they cannot exist the one
apart from the other[106]. Of this Cicero, speaking for the Stoics, gives
a proof; matter could never have held together, without some force to
bind it; nor force without matter[107]. We must not therefore be led by
the term ‘principles’ (ἀρχαί, _principia_) to think of force and matter
in any other way than as two aspects of primary body, separable as mental
conceptions, inseparable as physical realities. The interpretation is
essentially the same, whether the Stoics speak of God and the universe,
matter and cause, body and tension, or substance and quality, and has
been already discussed with some fulness under these separate headings.
[Sidenote: The elements.]
=190.= The position of the four ‘elements’ (στοιχεῖα, _elementa_) is
similar; these are in the Stoic philosophy subdivisions of the two
principles just discussed. For fire and air are of the nature of cause
and movement; water and earth of receptivity and passivity[108]. Body
is therefore made up of the four elements mixed[109], or perhaps rather
of the elementary qualities of heat and cold, dry and wet, which they
represent[110]. The doctrine of primary or elemental qualities had been
taught before, first by Anaximenes, then by Hippocrates the physician,
and by Aristotle[111]; the list of the four elements is traced back to
Empedocles. For Aristotle’s ‘fifth element’ Zeno found no use[112].
[Sidenote: Conclusion.]
=191.= Such are the fundamental conceptions or postulates with which
the Stoics approach the problems of physics. It is not necessary for
our purpose to compare their merit with those of Aristotle, or to set a
value on the debt that Zeno and his successors owed to the founder of
the Peripatetic school. Still less do we suggest that the Stoics have
perfectly analyzed the contents of the universe, or have even produced an
orderly and rounded scheme. But at least it seems clear that their work
shews intellectual power, and that speculation is not necessarily less
profound because it is pursued with a practical aim[113]. The founders
of the Stoic philosophy had a wide reach; they took all knowledge to be
their province; and they worked persistently towards the harmonization of
all its parts.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Diog. L. vii 41.
[2] Arnim ii 42 and 44.
[3] Diog. L. vii 40.
[4] Perhaps necessarily: on the definition of monism, see above, § 35,
note 22.
[5] See above, §§ 149, 153.
[6] ‘[Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea [natura],
quae expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut
quod efficeretur, posse esse non corpus’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 39; ‘cui tanta
vis est, ut inpellat et cogat et retineat et iubeat, corpus est’ Sen.
_Ep._ 106, 9.
[7] See above, § 67.
[8] § 43.
[9] See above, § 157, note 84.
[10] ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι Clem. Alex. _Strom._ ii p. 436
(Arnim ii 359); διδόασι δὲ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῇ [τῇ ὕλῃ] Plot. _Enn._ ii 4, 1
(Arnim ii 320). οὐσία in this sense is also called πρώτη ὕλη, see § 182,
note 52.
[11] τὸν θεὸν ... σῶμα νοερὸν ... ποιοῦντες Plut. _comm. not._ 48, 2.
[12] ‘vides autem tanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia,
quanto tenuior est’ Sen. _Ep._ 50, 6.
[13] ‘et hoc [animus] corpus est’ _ib._ 106, 4.
[14] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ Aët. _plac._ i
11, 5; ‘placet nostris quod bonum est, corpus esse’ Sen. _Ep._ 117, 2;
‘quaeris, bonum an corpus sit. bonum facit, prodest enim. quod facit,
corpus est’ _ib._ 106, 4.
[15] ‘non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint, tanquam ira,
amor, tristitia. si dubitas, vide an voltum nobis mutent, an frontem
adstringant, an faciem diffundant, an ruborem evocent, an fugent
sanguinem. quid ergo? tam manifestas notas corpori credis imprimi nisi a
corpore?’ _ib._ 106, 5.
[16] ‘dicimus non posse quicquam ab alio moveri, nisi aliquid fuerit
mobile ex semet’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 8; ‘is ardor, qui est mundi, non
agitatus ab alio, neque externo pulsu, sed per se ipse ac sua sponte
[movetur]’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 11, 31.
[17] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ ... κίνησιν τὴν μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν τίθενται, τὴν
μὲν (sc. πυκνωτικὴν) ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω Simpl. _Arist. cat._
p. 74; ‘tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem
concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium’ Censorinus _de die nat._
p. 75 (Zeller, p. 128).
[18] τόπον δ’ εἶναι ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀπεφαίνετο τὸ κατεχόμενον δι’ ὅλου ὑπὸ
ὄντος Ar. Did. fr. 25 Diels (Arnim ii 503).
[19] κενὸν μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸ οἷόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι, μὴ κατεχόμενον
δὲ Sext. _math._ x. 3 (Arnim ii 505); τὸ μὲν οὖν κενὸν ἄπειρον
εἶναι λέγεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦτ’ εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τόπον
πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σῶμα ἄπειρον εἶναι Ar. Did. (as note 18).
[20] Χρύσιππος διάστημα [τὸν χρόνον εἶπε] τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως Simpl.
_Arist. cat._ p. 88 l (Arnim ii 510); οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωϊκῶν [χρόνου
οὐσίαν] αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν Aët. _plac._ i 22, 7.
[21] χρόνος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου ἀλλ’ ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ γέγονεν ἢ μετ’ αὐτόν
Philo _de mundi op._ § 26 (Arnim ii 511).
[22] The question is thus stated by Seneca: ‘[quaeramus] continua sit
omnis et plena materia ... an diducta, et solidis inane permixtum sit’
Sen. _Dial._ viii 4, 2; and answered as follows ‘nihil usquam inane est’
_N. Q._ iii 16, 5. Cf. Arnim i 95 and ii 425.
[23] σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο καὶ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν Hipp. _Phil._
21 (Arnim ii 469).
[24] ‘animus ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri video
Panaetio’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42. The principle is however not
carried out in the Stoic universe, in which the heat resides in the
periphery, and the central earth is cold.
[25] νέων τι δρᾶν μὲν εὐτονώτεραι χέρες Eur. fr. 291 quoted by Corn. 31
(Arnim i 514); ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν
νευροῖς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστί Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.
[26] Epict. _Fr._ 57.
[27] See below, § 290.
[28] ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ... εἰπὼν ὅτι πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, κἂν ἱκανὸς
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ
κράτος Plut. _Sto. rep._ 7, 4.
[29] Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησι ... τὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία τόνον μὴ
παύεσθαι Stob. i 17, 3.
[30] Ἡρακλῆς δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις τόνος, καθ’ ὃν ἡ φύσις ἰσχυρὰ καὶ
κραταιά ἐστι Cornutus 31.
[31] ‘quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem
quam spiritus?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 8.
[32] ‘quid est illi [animo] motus nisi intentio?’ _ib._ ii 6, 6; ‘quid
cursus et motus omnis, nonne intenti spiritus operae sunt? hic facit vim
nervis, velocitatem currentibus’ _ib._ ii 6, 4.
[33] καταβληθὲν τὸ σπέρμα ἀναπληροῖ τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους καὶ ἐπισπᾶται
τὴν παρακειμένην ὕλην καὶ διαμορφοῖ Simpl. _Ar. cat._ Ο γ β.
[34] οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον [τὸν Δία] σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου ...
εὐεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν Diog. L. vii
136; τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν _ib._ 134.
[35] ‘ratio materiam format et quocunque vult versat’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 2.
Cf. Tert. _Apol._ 21.
[36] ἀφθάρτους [τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους] ἐποίησαν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς
Proclus _in Parm._ iv 135. See further Stein, _Psychologie der Stoa_, i
p. 49; Heinze, _Lehre vom Logos_, pp. 107-127.
[37] ‘The original impulse of providence gave the origin and first
momentum to the cosmic ordering of things, by selecting certain germs
of future existences, and assigning to them productive capacities of
realisation, change, and phenomenal succession.’ M. Aurelius, _To
himself_ ix 1.
[38] ‘ad initia deinde rerum redit [sapientia] aeternamque rationem [sc.
τὸν λόγον] toti inditam, et vim omnium seminum [sc. τῶν σπερματικῶν
λόγων] singula proprie figurantem’ Sen. _Ep._ 90, 29. See also the
interpretation of the picture of Samos, § 254, note 83.
[39] ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βάδιζον ἐπὶ γενέσεις κόσμου
ἐμπεριειληφὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διήκει
δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου Athen. _Supp._ 6, 7 B (Pearson Z. 45).
[40] See above, § 67.
[41] Sen. _Ep._ 65, 4 to 6, 11 and 12.
[42] See below, ch. ix.
[43] ‘causarum enim,’ inquit [Chrysippus], ‘aliae sunt perfectae et
principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae’ Cic. _de Fato_ 18, 41.
[44] See above, § 66.
[45] οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ ... ποιοῦνται τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα
καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα Simpl. _Arist. cat._ f 16
Δ (Arnim ii 369).
[46] Plotinus _Ennead._ vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).
[47] Simpl. _Arist. cat._ f 42 Ε (Arnim ii 403).
[48] For a fuller statement see Zeller, pp. 97-100.
[49] See § 183.
[50] For the position of ‘things not existent’ in the Stoic system see
further below, § 187.
[51] σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία Diog. L. vii 150; ἔφησε δὲ ὁ
Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι Stob. i
11, 5 c.
[52] οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην· ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ
ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται Diog. L. vii 150; ὕλην, σῶμα ὥς φασιν οὖσαν Plot.
_Enn._ ii p. 114 (Arnim ii 375).
[53] ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη, ἣν δυνάμει σῶμα Ἀριστοτέλης φησί Dexipp. _Arist. cat._
p. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).
[54] See Plutarch, _comm. not._ 50, 6.
[55] ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον πᾶσιν ἡ πρώτη ὕλη, τισὶ δὲ ὑποκείμενον
γιγνομένοις ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατηγορουμένοις ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης
Dexippus _Arist. cat._ p. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).
[56] Diog. L. vii 150.
[57] Simplic. _Arist. cat._ p. 57 Ε (Arnim ii 378).
[58] ὁ περὶ τῶν ποιοτήτων λόγος καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἁπάντων, ἅ φασιν
εἶναι Στωϊκῶν παῖδες σώματα Galen _qual. incorp._ 1 xix, p. 463 K (Arnim
ii 377).
[59] τὰς δὲ ποιότητας αὖ πάλιν οὐσίας καὶ σώματα ποιοῦσι Plut. _comm.
not._ 50, 1.
[60] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ κίνησιν [τὴν μανωτικήν see above, note 17] τοῦ ποιὸν
εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν Simpl. _Arist. cat._ p. 68 Ε (Arnim ii 452).
[61] τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν
ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις
εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα Plut. _Sto. rep._ 43, 4.
[62] ἀναιροῖτο ἂν τὸ τὴν ποιότητα εἶναι πνεῦμά πως ἔχον Alex. Aph.
_Arist. Top._ iv p. 181 (Arnim ii 379).
[63] τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστι Plut. _Sto. rep._
43, 2.
[64] Zeller, pp. 103-107.
[65] ‘pondus uti saxi, calor ignis, liquor aquaï, | tactus corporibus
cunctis’ Lucr. _R. N._ i 454, 455.
[66] ‘servitium contra, paupertas, divitiaeque, | ... cetera quorum |
adventu manet incolumis natura abituque, | haec soliti sumus, ut par est,
eventa vocare’ _ib._ 456-9.
[67] εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ
οἱ Στωϊκοί Dexipp. _Arist. cat._ p. 34, 19 (Arnim ii 399).
[68] τὰ μὲν ποιὰ περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα, τὰ ἰδίως δὲ πὼς ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ
ποιὰ Plot. _Enn._ vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).
[69] ἡ δὲ [ἕξις] ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ἀναστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό Philo _quod deus_, § 35
(Arnim ii 458).
[70] οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναι [Χρύσιππός] φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων
γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα Plut. _Sto. rep._ 43, 2; ‘esse autem unitatem in
aere vel ex hoc intellegi potest, quod corpora nostra inter se cohaerent.
quid est enim aliud quod teneret illa, quam spiritus?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6,
6.
[71] ἡ δὲ φύσις διατείνει καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτά. καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν δέ ἐστιν ἐοικότα
φυτοῖς, ὄνυχές τε καὶ τρίχες· ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ φύσις ἕξις ἤδη κινουμένη Philo
_Leg. Alleg._ ii § 22 (Arnim ii 458).
[72] ψυχὴ δέ ἐστι φύσις προσειληφυῖα φαντασίαν καὶ ὁρμήν. αὔτη κοινὴ καὶ
τῶν ἀλόγων ἐστίν _ib._
[73] ‘voluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit; habitus
porro animi non erit in optimo, nisi totius vitae leges perceperit’ Sen.
_Ep._ 95, 57.
[74] ‘virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens’
_ib._ 113, 2.
[75] ‘Relative position’ must be distinguished from ‘correlation’ (πρός
τι). Such terms as ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter,’ ‘living’ and ‘dead’ are said to
be correlated. Simpl. _Arist. cat._ p. 42 Ε (Arnim ii 403).
[76] Simpl. as in last note.
[77] See below, § 337.
[78] So Ar. Did. fr. 28, and, more exactly, Alex. Aph. _de mixt._ p. 216,
14 Br. (Arnim ii 473). Another division is as follows: ‘quaedam continua
esse corpora, ut hominem; quaedam esse composita, ut navem; quaedam ex
distantibus, tanquam exercitus, populus, senatus’ Sen. _Ep._ 102, 6.
[79] οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ... διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας, ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι συνεχώρουν σῶμα διὰ σώματος
χωρεῖν Simpl. _Arist. phys._ p. 530, 9 (Arnim ii 467).
[80] Arnim ii 411 and 467.
[81] τὸ φῶς δὲ τῷ ἀέρι ὁ Χρύσιππος κιρνᾶσθαι λέγει Alex. Aph. _de mixt._
p. 216, 14 (Arnim ii 473).
[82] ‘Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel
per favos’ Tertull. _adv. Hermog._ 44; and see below, § 207.
[83] Note 2 above.
[84] ὅλον μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον Achill. _Is._ 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii
523).
[85] See Rendall, _M. Aurelius_ Introd. p. xxix.
[86] ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων Xen. _Mem._ iv 3, 13.
[87] _ib._ i 1, 11.
[88] See below, § 193.
[89] ‘in rerum, inquiunt, natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt; et haec
autem, quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur’ Sen. _Ep._ 58, 15.
[90] ὅλον μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον· πᾶν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ κενοῦ Achill.
_Isag._ 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii 523).
[91] Sen. as above.
[92] τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων τέσσαρα εἴδη καταριθμοῦνται, ὡς λεκτὸν καὶ κενὸν καὶ
τόπον καὶ χρόνον Sext. _math._ x 218 (Arnim ii 331).
[93] ‘etiam nunc est aliquid superius quam corpus. dicimus enim quaedam
corporalia esse, quaedam incorporalia, quid ergo erit ex quo haec
deducantur? illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium imposuimus, “quod est”’
Sen. _Ep._ 58, 11.
[94] οἱ Στωϊκοί, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι
ἀσώματον Sext. _math._ viii 258.
[95] ἐκεῖνοι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] νομοθετήσαντες αὑτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων
λέγεσθαι ... τὸ τὶ γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασιν εἶναι, κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ
σωμάτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ἀσωμάτων Alex. Aphr. _Arist. Top._ iv p.
155 (Arnim ii 329); ‘primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur “quid”’ Sen.
_Ep._ 58, 15.
[96] ‘animalia sunt omnia, quae cogitamus quaeque mente complectimur;
sequitur ut multa milia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris,
et singuli multa simus animalia. non sunt, inquit, multa, quia ex uno
religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 3 and 9
(Seneca himself does not agree with this way of speaking).
[97] ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστιν παρ’ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ
δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικόν ... τὸ δὲ
ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχε Sext. _math._ vii 38 (Zeller, p. 129).
[98] τὰ ἐννοήματά φασι μήτε τινὰ εἶναι μήτε ποιά, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ
ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς Ar. Did. fr. 40 (Diels).
[99] οὔτε ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαὶ [φαντασίαι] Sext. _math._
vii 246.
[100] ‘haec ... quae animo succurrunt, tanquam Centauri, gigantes, et
quicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit,
quamvis non habeat substantiam’ Sen. _Ep._ 58, 15.
[101] οὐδὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν τὸν χρόνον, τὸ κατηγόρημα, τὸ ἀξίωμα, τὸ
συνημμένον, τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον· οἷς χρῶνται μὲν μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων,
ὄντα δὲ οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι Plut. _comm. not._ 30, 12.
[102] See below, § 287.
[103] δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον,
κ.τ.λ. Diog. L. vii 134.
[104] _ib._; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ἄποιον ὕλην
Sext. _math._ ix 11 (Arnim ii 301).
[105] ‘dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex
quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. materia iacet iners, res ad
omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat; causa autem, id est ratio,
materiam format et quocunque vult versat’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 2; ‘universa ex
materia et ex deo constant. deus ista temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem
sequuntur. potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus,
quam materia patiens dei’ _ib._ 23.
[106] ἄλλων δὲ καὶ ποιητικὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἀπολειπόντων, ἀχώριστον δὲ ταύτην
τῆς ὕλης, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοί Syrianus _Arist. met._ (Arnim ii 308).
‘Stoici naturam in duas partes dividunt, unam quae efficiat, alteram quae
se ad faciendum tractabilem praebeat. in illa prima esse vim sentiendi,
in hac materiam; nec alterum sine altero [esse] posse’ Lact. _Div. inst._
vii 3.
[107] ‘neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi
contineretur, neque vim sine ulla materia’ Cic. _Ac._ i 6, 24.
[108] Arnim ii 418; ‘e quibus [elementis] aer et ignis movendi vim habent
et efficiendi; reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico
et terram’ Cic. _Ac._ i 7, 26.
[109] κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκούς, ἐκ τῆς τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κράσεως γινομένου
τοῦ σώματος Justin _de res._ 6 (Arnim ii 414).
[110] ὅσα τοίνυν σώματα πρῶτον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχει ποιότητας, ἐκεῖνα
στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς σαρκός· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ
καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ Galen _const. art. med._ i p. 251 K (Arnim ii 405).
[111] Galen _meth. med._ i 2, X p. 15 K (Arnim ii 411).
[112] See below, § 196.
[113] Cf. Mahaffy’s _Greek Life and Thought_; ‘it is quite wrong to
suppose that these thinkers [Zeno and Epicurus], busy as they were with
practical life, despised or avoided speculation. Their philosophical
theories demand hard reading and hard thinking’ p. 137.