OF REASON AND SPEECH.
[Sidenote: Parts of philosophy.]
=143.= The history of Greek philosophy, even before the time of Zeno,
leads naturally to its division into the three parts of logic, physics,
and ethics[1]. The Ionic philosophers had chiefly occupied themselves
with the nature and history of the universe, that is, with the problems
of physics. The sophists were greatly concerned with questions as to the
validity of human knowledge, that is, with logic. Socrates shared this
interest, but attached greater importance to the discussion of moral
activities, that is, to ethics. It is however not clear when a formal
division into these three parts was first made. Cicero attributes it to
the immediate followers of Plato in the Academic school; others assign it
definitely to Xenocrates[2]. The Peripatetics and Stoics both adopted the
division, but whereas the former assigned to Logic an inferior position,
making it an introduction to philosophy, the Stoics insist that it is
a part of philosophy itself[3]; and that of the three parts it comes
first in the order of study, ‘as in the measuring of corn we place first
the examination of the measure[4].’ It must not however be thought that
the three parts of philosophy can be separately treated, for they are
intertwined[5]; so that in treating of Logic we shall constantly have
need to assume a general knowledge of Stoic views both on physics and
ethics. Logic is subdivided into ‘dialectic,’ which deals with reasoning,
and ‘rhetoric,’ the art of speech. The relation between reason and speech
was in ancient times, as now, a matter of perplexity; but it may be taken
as a fundamental position of Stoicism that the two should always be in
agreement.
[Sidenote: Knowledge is attainable.]
=144.= Stoicism, as one of the positive and dogmatic schools, assumes
that knowledge is attainable. Since this is the very point on which
Socrates never reached assurance, except on the one particular that
he himself knew nothing, it was a matter of primary importance to the
Stoics to make good this position; more especially since they held (this
time in agreement with Socrates) that virtue is but another form of
knowledge. Yet the Stoics could not agree with the Cynics, that true
knowledge can be imparted without a study of its method[6]. Knowledge
is, in their view, a high privilege derived by man from his divine
ancestry, and shared by him with the deity alone; and the whole duty of
man may be summed up by saying that he should keep upright his reason[7].
They therefore devoted themselves with special zeal to this part of
philosophy[8], and were accordingly nicknamed ‘the dialecticians[9].’
Their aim in this was solely the ascertainment and imparting of truth;
but the common view that their style was in consequence harsh and
repellent will be found to need considerable qualification[10].
[Sidenote: Are the senses true?]
=145.= The chief argument for the certainty of knowledge is that we
assume as much in the practical affairs of life[11]; and (as we have
already seen) Aristo found it ridiculous that his Academic neighbour
should not even know who he was[12]. Against it is the fact that men
frequently disagree even as to what they see, and commonly distinguish
between what is known to them and what ‘seems’ to be this or that. Hence
Epictetus well defines the function of dialectic as
‘a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an
inquiry into the cause of this disagreement; a condemnation and
distrust of that which only seems, and some kind of investigation
of that which seems, as to whether it rightly seems: and the
discovery of some rule (κανών)[13].’
Of all kinds of knowledge that which comes through the senses appears to
the ordinary man most worthy of confidence, and of the five senses that
of sight seems to the philosopher the most divine[14]. In consequence,
the whole controversy hinges on the question whether the eyes can be
trusted. The positivist argues that the evidence of sight is so plain and
unmistakeable that man, if he had the choice, could wish for no better
informant. The sceptic replies that nevertheless, if a straight oar be
placed partly in the water, it appears to the eyes to be bent; and that
the feathers on a dove’s neck, though really alike, appear to the eyes as
many-coloured[15]. To deal with such questions we must examine closely
the nature of sensation.
[Sidenote: Process of sensation.]
=146.= The Stoics fancifully derive the word αἴσθησις (‘sensation’) from
εἴσθεσις (‘storage’); it is therefore, strictly speaking, the process
by which the mind is stored[16]; but it is also, from an opposite point
of view, the process by which the mind reaches out towards an external
object[17]. From the object (αἰσθητόν) proceed waves which strike upon
the sense-organ (αἰσθητήριον); this impact is called a ‘sensation’
in a narrower sense. At the same time there proceeds from the mind
(which is the ruling part or ‘principate’ of the soul), a ‘spirit’ or
thrill which goes out to meet this impact; and this spirit and its
operation are also called ‘sensation[18].’ As a result of the contact
of these two waves, and simultaneously with it, there is produced in
the soul an effect like the imprint of a seal[19], and this imprint is
the φαντασία or ‘mind-picture.’ That the process may be sound, it is
necessary that the intellect be in a healthy state, and further that
the organ of sense be healthy, the object really there, and the place
and the manner in accord[20]. But we must carefully distinguish between
the single sensation and the mind-picture. A flash of light, a cry, a
touch, a smell, a thrill of pleasure or pain, is always that which the
senses declare it to be[21]; here there is no possibility of error; so
understood ‘the sensations are always true[22].’ But if we go in each
case a step further; if we say ‘that is white,’ ‘this is sweet,’ ‘this is
musical,’ ‘this is fragrant,’ ‘that is rough,’ we are now dealing with
mind-pictures, not with ‘sensations’ in the strict sense[23]. And as to
the mind-pictures we agree with the Academics that things are not always
what they seem; ‘of the mind-pictures some are true, some are false[24].’
[Sidenote: The criterion of clearness.]
=147.= In order then that we may distinguish the true mind-picture from
the false, we have need of a ‘rule’ (κανών) or ‘criterion’ (κριτήριον).
The true mind-picture is a stirring of the soul, which reveals both
what is taking place in the soul and the object which has caused this:
just as light reveals both itself and the objects that lie within
its range[25]. On the other hand the false mind-picture is an empty
twitching of a soul which is not in a healthy condition[26]; no real
object corresponds to it, but to that which appears to be an object
corresponding to it we give the name ‘phantasm[27].’ When Orestes
thinks he sees the Furies leaping upon him, though his sister assures
him that in real truth he sees nothing, the vision of the Furies is a
phantasm. The appearances of dreams are equally phantasms[28]. Now a
true mind-picture differs from that of a phantasm by being clearer;
or, in other words, the distinctive note of a true mind-picture is its
‘clearness’ (ἐνάργεια, _perspicuitas_)[29]. Clearness then is a quality
which attaches itself to a true vision in a way in which it can never
attach itself to a work of phantasy[30]. To this clearness the mind
cannot but bow[31]; it is therefore (so far as our study has proceeded)
the criterion of truth[32].
[Sidenote: Assent.]
=148.= The mind-picture as such is not within a man’s control; but
it rests with him to decide whether he will give it his ‘assent’
(συγκατάθεσις, _adsensio_ or _adsensus_)[33]. This assent is therefore
an act of the soul, in its capacity as will; and can only be rightly
exercised by a soul properly strung, that is, possessed of due tension.
Assent wrongly given leads to ‘opinion’ (δόξα, _opinio_), and all wrong
assent is error or ‘sin’ (ἁμαρτία, _peccatum_). This error may take place
in two directions, either by a hasty movement of the will (προπίπτειν),
giving assent to a picture which is not really clear; or by feebleness of
will, which leads to assent in a false direction (διαψεύδεσθαι)[34]. Even
haste however is a form of weakness, so that we may say that all opining
is a weak form of assent[35]. To ensure a right assent due attention
should be given to each of its parts; it includes (i) the intention of
mastering the object (πρόθεσις); (ii) careful attention directed to the
object, or ‘application’ (ἐπιβολή); and (iii) assent in the narrower
sense[36]. Apart from assent, three courses remain open: these are (i)
‘quiescence’ (ἡσυχάζειν, _quiescere_): (ii) ‘suspense of judgment’
(ἐπέχειν, _adsensum sustinere)_, which is a settled quiescence; and (iii)
negation[37].
[Sidenote: Comprehension.]
=149.= Close upon assent follows ‘comprehension’ (κατάληψις,
_comprehensio_): this is the ratification of the assent given, the
fixing irrevocably in the mind of the picture approved. This picture now
becomes a ‘comprehension-picture’ (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία), and as such a
unit of knowledge. We may understand thereby that the mind has grasped
the external object[38], and this is the plain meaning of Zeno’s simile;
or we may say that the object has gained a hold upon the mind, and has
left its stamp upon it. Both interpretations are consistent with Stoic
doctrine: but the former view, which represents the soul as active and
masterful, undoubtedly expresses the more adequately the meaning of the
school[39]. From this mutual grasp there follows an important physical
deduction. Since only like can grasp like, the soul must be like the
object, and the popular dualism of mind and matter is (to this extent)
at an end[40]. Still this likeness is not complete; and the soul in
sensation does not grasp the object from every point of view, but only
so far as its own nature permits in each case[41]. For this reason the
trained observer and the artist grasp far more of the object than the
ordinary man[42].
[Sidenote: From sensation to reason.]
=150.= The soul, having grasped single mind-pictures, retains its
hold upon them by memory[43]; the frequent exercise of which keeps
each picture fresh and complete[44]. As the air, when an orchestra is
performing, receives the impression of many sounds at the same time, and
yet retains the distinctive tone of each[45], so the soul by concurrent
alterations of its texture preserves its hold on the separate pictures
it has once grasped. Fresh operations of soul now supervene. First, from
the comparison of many like pictures, comes ‘experience’ (ἐμπειρία,
_experientia_)[46]; out of other comparisons, ‘similitude’ (ὁμοιότης),
as ‘Socrates’ from his portrait; and ‘analogy’ (ἀναλογία, _proportio_),
as ‘the centre of the earth’ from that of other spheres; ‘transference’
(μετάθεσις, _translatio_), as ‘eyes in the heart’; ‘composition’
(σύνθεσις, _compositio_), as ‘a Hippocentaur’; ‘opposition’ (ἐναντίωσις,
_transitio_), as ‘death’ from life; ‘deprivation’ (κατὰ στέρησιν),
as ‘a cripple[47].’ All these are based on the general principle of
likeness and unlikeness, and may be summed up under the general heading
of ‘reason’s work of comparison’ (_collatio rationis_)[48], or shortly,
of reason (λόγος)[49]. Sensation shews us the present only; but reason
brings the past and the future within our view, and points out to us the
workings of cause and effect[50].
[Sidenote: Perceptions and Conceptions.]
=151.= With the mind-pictures (φαντασίαι, _visa_) which are derived from
sensation we may now contrast the ‘notions’ (ἔννοιαι, _notiones_ or
_intellegentiae_) which are derived from the combination of sensation and
reasoning; the former correspond generally to ‘perceptions,’ the latter
to ‘conceptions’ in the language of modern philosophy[51]. But each of
the Stoic terms is also used in a wider sense which includes the other.
The sensory pictures are inscribed upon the mind as upon a blank sheet
from birth upwards; in this sense they may well be called ‘entries on
the mind’ (ἔννοια from ἐν νῷ)[52]. On the other hand the conceptions may
be called ‘rational mind-pictures’[53]; quite as much as the sensory
mind-pictures they need the prudent assent of the will before they become
‘comprehensions,’ when they are once more units capable of entering
into further combinations and becoming part of scientific knowledge.
If then for the sake of clearness we use the modern terms, we may say
that perceptions correspond generally to individual objects which have
a real existence, whilst conceptions correspond to classes of things,
which (according to the Stoics) have no real existence in themselves, but
only a sort of existence in our minds. Thus the ‘ideas’ of Plato are all
conceptions, subjectively but not objectively existent[54]. So far as our
study has gone, all conceptions are based on perceptions: therefore all
the elements of knowledge either come from sense and experience solely,
or from sense and experience combined with reasoning[55]; and the most
important reasoning process is that comparison of like perceptions which
in this philosophy takes the place of induction[56].
[Sidenote: Preconceptions.]
=152.= But even if all ‘conceptions’ are ultimately derived from
‘perceptions,’ it does not follow that in each particular case the mind
commences _de novo_ to collect and shape its material. On the contrary,
it is clear that not only all practical life, but also all philosophy,
takes for granted a great many matters which are either allowed by
general consent, or at least assumed by the thinker; and these matters
are mostly of the nature of class-conceptions. If it is stated that
‘the consul entered Rome in a chariot drawn by four horses,’ we assume
that the ideas expressed by ‘consul,’ ‘chariot,’ ‘four,’ ‘horses,’ are
matters of general consent, and we may go on to assume that the person
of the consul and the locality called ‘Rome’ are also already known to
the speaker and his hearers. The general term in the post-Aristotelian
writers for such legitimate assumptions is ‘preconception’ (πρόληψις,
_anticipatio_ or _praesumptio_). The precise meaning of this term (of
which the invention is ascribed to Epicurus[57]) appears not to be
always the same. Most commonly the ‘preconception’ is a general term
or conception, and therefore to the Stoics it is one variety of the
ἔννοια; it is ‘a mental shaping, in accordance with man’s nature, of
things general’[58]. All such preconceptions are foreshadowings of
truth, especially in so far as they correspond to the common judgment of
mankind[59]; and the art of life consists in correctly applying these
presumptions to the particular circumstances with which each individual
man has to deal[60]. If the preconceptions are rightly applied, they
become clearer by use, and thus attain the rank of true knowledge by a
process of development or ‘unravelling’ (_enodatio_)[61].
As to the nature of a preconception, there is a great difference
between Epicurus and the Stoics. Epicurus identifies all the terms
‘preconception,’ ‘comprehension,’ ‘right opinion,’ ‘conception,’ and
‘general notion,’ and maintains that each of these is nothing but memory
of a sensation frequently repeated[62]; the Stoics however hold that
preconceptions are established by the mind[63], and (so far as they
are common to all men) by the universal reason. This difference is
fundamental. Epicurus, as a materialist in the modern sense, explains
perception as a bodily function, and ‘conceptions’ of every kind as mere
echoes of such bodily functions. The Stoics on the other hand recognise
at each stage the activity of mind, and this in increasing degree as we
proceed to the higher levels of thought.
[Sidenote: Notions of inner growth.]
=153.= We now approach the most critical point in the Stoic theory of
knowledge. Is it possible for man to possess knowledge which is not
derived, either directly or indirectly, through the organs of sense?
Such a question cannot be answered by any appeal to single Stoic texts;
it needs an appreciation of the whole philosophic outlook, and upon
it depend the most vital principles of the system. Let us then first
consider, on the supposition that such knowledge exists, what its nature
is, what its content, and how it is attained by individual men. Knowledge
cut off from the sense-organs is cut off from all human individuality;
it is therefore the expression of the common reason (κοινὸς λόγος), and
its parts are ‘common notions’ (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι or προλήψεις), shared
by gods and men, but by men only so far as they are partakers of the
divine nature. The principal content of such knowledge is also clear;
it includes the conception of what is morally good, and the beliefs
that gods exist and that the world is governed by their providence[64].
Lastly, as of all general conceptions, the rudiments or rough outlines
only of these beliefs are inborn in men, by virtue of their divine
ancestry; whence they are called ‘innate notions’ (ἔμφυτοι ἔννοιαι,
_insitae notiones_)[65]. These notions in their full development are not
attainable by children at all, nor by men till they attain to reason,
that is, till they become wise men[66].
[Sidenote: ‘Proofs’ of inborn notions.]
=154.= The Stoics are naturally reluctant to admit that doctrines which
it is impious to deny are nevertheless unattainable except by perfect
wisdom; but their whole system points inevitably to this conclusion. But
there are intermediate stages between the rough inborn outlines of these
truths and their ripe completeness. As man grows in reason, he becomes
increasingly able to appreciate contributory truths, derived from the
combination of perception and reasoning, that is, by processes such as
‘analogy’ and ‘comparison,’ which point in the direction of the supreme
beliefs. In this sense, and (it is here suggested) in this sense only,
can there be ‘proofs’ (ἀποδείξεις) of these[67]. Only in the crowning
moment of that probation which is described later on, at the moment
of conversion, these truths finally flash forth, stirred up indeed by
secondary evidence, but really rooted in the man’s deepest nature[68];
they then reveal themselves to the soul with an illuminating power which
is all their own, but which carries with it the most complete conviction.
Ordinary men must meanwhile somehow make shift with reflections or pale
copies of this knowledge, to which however the name of common or inborn
notions can also be applied.
[Sidenote: The inward touch.]
=155.= The list of ‘common notions’ is doubtless not limited to the
high philosophical principles which we have mentioned; for instance it
must include such mathematical principles as ‘two and two make four,’
‘a straight line is the shortest distance between two points,’ ‘a
three-sided figure has three angles,’ and so forth. With these however
we have little direct concern. Of more interest to us is another kind of
perception[69] recognised by the Stoics as well as by other schools of
philosophy, that called the ‘inward touch’ (ἐντὸς ἁφή)[70]. By this the
soul becomes aware of its own workings, most obviously of its pleasure
and pain. The doctrine of the ‘inward touch’ is of great philosophical
importance, for it breaks down the dualism of subject and object, the
barrier between the knowing and the known. Since these are the same
in the specific cases named, the door is open to the conclusion that
everywhere there is a kinship between the two, and that without this
knowledge would be without firm foundation. By this kinship we may also
explain the fact that direct communications are made by the deity to man,
as by dreams, oracles and augury[71].
[Sidenote: Knowledge; the parts and the whole.]
=156.= Thus it appears that the elements of knowledge, according to the
Stoics, are sensations, perceptions, conceptions or notions, and general
or inborn notions. As in the other parts of the Stoic philosophy, we
shall regard this fourfold division as indicating generally the ground
covered, and not as setting up definite lines of demarcation. The same
material may be analyzed from other points of view, as for instance in
the study of words, in which we shall find a division into objects,
statements, conditional statements, and syllogisms. The elements may
also be combined in various ways. A combination or ‘system’ (σύστημα)
which is directed towards a useful or pleasurable object, such as
music or grammar, is called an ‘art’ (τέχνη, _ars_)[72]; and arts are
attainable by ordinary men. The wise man, on the other hand, is not
necessarily acquainted with the several arts; his practice is to ‘keep
quiet’ when matters are discussed which require such special knowledge.
The combination of all knowledge in one all-embracing system is
‘science’ (ἐπιστήμη, _scientia_); the only science in the full sense is
philosophy[73]; and in this system no part can be at variance with any
other part[74]. The elements of knowledge also acquire the character of
science, when they are found to be parts of this compacted system, and
therefore incapable of coming into conflict with any other part[75]; and
in particular we find the term ‘science’ predicated of comprehensions
which are firmly established and cannot be refuted by any argument[76].
In the language of Zeno’s simile, over the closed fist that grasps the
object is placed the other hand, keeping it with firmness and assurance
in its place[77]; or, to use a comparison first suggested in ridicule of
Stoicism, but which by the progress of architectural skill has since then
been made less damaging, science is like a firm and immoveable building
constructed upon a shifting foundation[78]. Finally ordinary men can
reach comprehension, but only the wise man can attain to science[79].
[Sidenote: The criterion reviewed.]
=157.= We revert to the difficult problem of the criterion of truth, that
is, the discovery of a rule by which the true can separated from the
false. Our authorities differ greatly as to what the Stoic criterion is;
and this vacillation must have placed the Stoics at a great disadvantage
in their controversy with the Academics, who maintain that there is
no criterion. The most usual statement is that the ‘comprehensive
mind-picture’ (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) is the criterion; this view is
expressly attributed to Chrysippus, Antipater, and Apollodorus[80]. As
we have seen, the meaning of this is that a true mind-picture can be
distinguished from one that is false by the note of clearness, and this
general doctrine can be traced back to Zeno[81]. It appears at first
sight to provide a criterion which can be applied by the percipient at
the moment when it is needed, and it was doubtless intended to be a
practical tool in this sense; but under the pressure of criticism the
Stoics were frequently compelled to modify it. They could not but admit
that in the case of dreams and drunken visions it is only at a later
moment that the lack of clearness can be appreciated[82]; whereas on the
other hand a picture may be perfectly clear, and yet the percipient,
because of some prepossession, may not realize this. Such was the case
when Hercules brought Alcestis from the world below; her husband Admetus
received a true mind-picture of her, but put no confidence in it, because
he knew her to be dead. It follows that no mind-picture can be implicitly
trusted for itself; for our sense organs may be clouded, or our previous
experience in conflict with it. If the Academics urged that the sure note
of clearness is not to be found in the senses[83], the Stoics admitted
as much when they now said that a true comprehensive picture must come
from a real object[84], when they added the words that ‘no objection must
arise[85]’; thus really admitting that it must be not only persuasive,
but also such as no reasoning process can shake, and such as has been
examined from all sides[86]. Thus they shifted the centre of certainty
from the single comprehension to the general field of science; they still
held to it in theory, but no longer maintained its practical application.
For this too they had the authority of the older masters. For we learn on
the authority of Posidonius that ‘some of the older Stoics’ held the true
criterion to be ‘right reason’ (ὀρθὸς λόγος)[87], and this is equivalent
to saying that only the deity and the wise man possess the secret[88]. In
a loose sense any important part of the Stoic theory of reason may be
said to be a criterion; thus Chrysippus again said that ‘the criteria are
sensation and preconception,’ and Boethus set up many criteria, as mind,
sense, science, and (in practical matters) appetite[89].
[Sidenote: General consent.]
=158.= Seeing that the full assurance of truth is not at every moment
attainable, it is necessary to be contented from time to time with
something less complete. Amongst such tests the ‘general consent of
mankind’ plays an important part, especially in connexion with the dogma
‘that gods exist.’ We may indeed well believe that this criterion was
not originally suggested by revolutionary philosophers, but rather by
conservative advocates of an established religion; and therefore we are
not surprised to see it emphasized first by Posidonius and afterwards by
Seneca[90]. General consent is however by itself no proof of truth, but
at most an indication of the presence of a ‘common notion’ in its rough
shape. If however we see that the ‘common notion’ grows stronger and more
clear every day, and if it is the more firmly held as men approach the
standard of wisdom, it becomes a strong support[91].
[Sidenote: Probability the guide of life.]
=159.= From a very early period, as we have already indicated, Stoic
teachers accepted probability as the guide of life in its details, being
perhaps aided by the happy ambiguity of the expression ‘reasonableness’
(τὸ εὔλογον), which suggests formally the pursuit of reason, but in
practice is a justification of every course of which a plausible defence
can be brought forward. Ptolemy Philopator, we are told, jestingly put
wax fruit before Sphaerus at his table, and when Sphaerus tried to eat
it cried out that he was giving his assent to a false mind-picture.
Sphaerus replied that he had not assented to the picture ‘this is
fruit,’ but only to the picture ‘this is probably fruit[92].’ Antipater
of Tarsus, when he explained that the very essence of virtue lay in
the choice of natural ends upon probable grounds[93], was felt to be
giving way to Carneades[94]. Panaetius justified the maintaining of that
which is plausible by the advocate, and Cicero, whose own conscience was
not at ease in the matter, was glad enough to quote so respectable an
authority on his own behalf[95]. In the Roman imperial period a growing
spirit of humility and pessimism led to a general disparagement of human
knowledge, centring in attacks on the trustworthiness of the senses.
So Seneca speaks of the ‘usual weakness’ of the sense of sight[96],
and Marcus Aurelius feels that ‘the organs of sense are dim and easily
imposed upon[97].’ The older Stoics had admitted the frequent errors of
the senses[98], but they had been confident they could surmount this
difficulty. Their latest disciples had lost the courage to do this, and
in consequence the practice of ‘suspension of judgment,’ which before
had been the exception[99], became with them the rule. Nevertheless
Epictetus, who alone amongst these later Stoics was an ardent student of
dialectics, held fast to the main principle that certainty is attainable.
‘How indeed’ he said ‘perception is effected, whether through the whole
body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain, for both opinions perplex me.
But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty[100].’
[Sidenote: Grammar.]
=160.= Having now dealt with the theory of knowledge, we may consider
briefly the subordinate sciences (or rather ‘arts’) of Grammar, Logic (in
the narrower sense), and Style. Here we may leave the technical divisions
and subdivisions of the Stoics; for these matters are substantially
independent of the main lines upon which the ancient philosophies
parted company, and have for us only a secondary and historical
interest. The Stoics distinguish five parts of speech: ‘name’ (ὄνομα,
_nomen_), as ‘Diogenes’; ‘class-name’ (προσηγορία, _appellatio_), as
‘man, horse’[101]; ‘verb’ (ῥῆμα, _verbum_); ‘conjunction’ (σύνδεσμος,
_coniunctio_); and ‘article’ (ἄρθρον, _articulus_). The last they define
naïvely as a little word which is all ending, and serves to distinguish
the cases and numbers[102]. To the list of the parts of speech Antipater
added the ‘mixed part’ or participle (μεσότης). The noun has four
cases (πτώσεις), the ‘upright case’ (πτῶσις εὐθεῖα, _casus rectus_;
this is of course a contradiction in terms); and the ‘oblique’ cases
(πλάγιαι), that is the ‘class’ case (γενική), the ‘dative’ (δοτική), and
the ‘effect’ case (αἰτιατική). The ῥῆμα or verb is identical with the
κατηγόρημα or ‘predicate,’ and may take the ‘active’ form (ὀρθά), the
‘passive’ (ὕπτια), or the ‘neuter’ (οὐδέτερα); some verbs also express
action and reaction, and are called ‘reflexive’ (ἀντιπεπονθότα). The
Stoics also distinguished the tenses. Time (χρόνος) being of three
kinds, past (παρῳχημένος), present (ἐνεστώς), and future (μέλλων),
we have the following tenses which are ‘definite’ (ὡρισμένοι): the
‘present imperfect’ (ἐνεστὼς ἀτελής), the ‘past imperfect’ (παρῳχημένος
ἀτελής), the ‘present perfect’ (ἐνεστὼς τέλειος), and the ‘past perfect’
(παρῳχημένος τέλειος); in addition to these we have the ‘indefinite’
tenses, the future (μέλλων), and the past indefinite, called simply
indefinite (ἀόριστος)[103].
[Sidenote: Theories of speech.]
=161.= So far we find in the Stoic system the general framework of
the grammar of the period, much of it adapted with modifications
from Aristotle. In some other details points of real grammatical or
philosophical interest are raised. Such is the controversy between
‘anomaly,’ the recognition of the individuality of each word in its
flexion, and ‘analogy,’ in which the validity of the rules of declension
and conjugation is insisted upon. Two Stoic masters, Chrysippus and
Crates of Mallos, took up the cause of ‘anomaly[104].’ Further the Stoics
held that all correct language exists by nature (φύσει), and not by
convention (θέσει), as Aristotle had maintained; the elements of language
being imitations of natural sounds[105]. Further, they held that the
natural relation between ‘things’ (σημαινόμενα, _significata_) and the
words that express them (σημαίνοντα, _significantia_) can frequently be
determined by etymology; for instance φωνή ‘voice’ is φῶς νοῦ ‘the mind’s
lamp,’ αἰών ‘age’ is ἀεὶ ὄν ‘enduring for ever[106].’ Like Heraclitus and
Aristotle, the Stoics distinguished between ‘thought’ (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος,
_ratio_) and ‘speech’ (λόγος προφορικός, _oratio_), which the Greek
word λόγος tends to confuse[107]; thought is immaterial, but speech, as
consisting of air in motion, is body[108]. Young children and animals do
not possess real speech, but only ‘a sort of speech[109].’
[Sidenote: Propositions and Syllogisms.]
=162.= Words in combination form statements, questions, wishes,
syllogisms, and so forth[110]; there is therefore no clear line drawn
between what we call syntax and logic respectively. Whenever we have
a complete combination of words expressing that which must either be
false or true, as ‘Hannibal was a Carthaginian,’ ‘Scipio destroyed
Numantia,’ we call it a ‘statement’ or ‘proposition’ (ἀξίωμα)[111]; for
phrases of all kinds we have the more general term ‘phrase’ (λεκτόν, _id
quod dicitur_)[112]. Of special interest is the conditional sentence
(συνημμένον), which has two parts, the conditional clause (ἡγούμενον) and
the contingent clause (λῆγον). The conditional or leading clause always
contains a sign (σημεῖον), by means of which we reach proof: thus in
saying ‘if it is day, it is light’ we mean that ‘day’ is a sign of light.
Proof is ‘speech on every subject gathering what is less clear from that
which is more clear[113].’ Its most important form is the syllogism, of
which Chrysippus recognises five forms:
(i) if A, then B; but A, therefore B.
(ii) if A, then B; but not B, therefore not A.
(iii) not A and B together; but A, therefore not B.
(iv) either A or B; but A, therefore not B.
(v) either A or B; but not A, therefore B[114].
All these matters admit of endless qualifications, subdivisions, and
developments, and were therefore serviceable to those Stoics who were
before all things makers of books[115]. Examples of Stoic syllogisms have
been given above[116].
[Sidenote: Fallacies.]
=163.= Closely connected with the theory of the syllogism is the enticing
subject of the ‘resolution of fallacies’ (σοφισμάτων λύσις), which the
Megarians had brought within the range of philosophy. To this subject
the Stoics gave much attention[117]. The most famous fallacy is that
of the ‘heap’ (σωρίτης, _acervus_); ‘if two are few, so are three; if
three, then four; and so forth.’ In this Chrysippus took a special
interest[118]; his reply was to keep still[119]. Another is the ‘liar’
(ψευδόμενος, _mentiens_); ‘when a man says “I lie,” does he lie or not?
if he lies, he speaks the truth; if he speaks the truth, he lies[120].’
On this subject Chrysippus wrote a treatise, which Epictetus thought not
worth reading[121]. Seneca gives us examples of other fallacies, which
also are verbal quibbles[122]. Of an altogether different kind are those
problems in which the question of determinism as opposed to moral choice
is involved. Such is the ‘reaper,’ which maintains ‘either you will reap
or you will not reap; it is not correct to say “perhaps you will reap.”’
Such again is the ‘master-argument’ of Diodorus the Megarian, directly
aimed against every moral philosophy[123]. These difficulties we shall
discuss later as touching the supreme problems which are presented to the
human reason[124].
[Sidenote: Definition.]
=164.= The scientific study of syllogisms and fallacies promises at
first sight to be a guide to truth and a way of escape from error,
but experience shews it nevertheless to be barren. It has however an
advantage in securing a careful statement of teaching, and for this
purpose was much used by Zeno and Chrysippus. The later members of the
school realized that this advantage could be more simply gained by the
practice of careful definition (ὅρος, _definitio_). Antipater thus
defined definition itself: ‘definition is an expression which elaborates
in detail without falling short or going too far[125].’ He and all other
Stoics of his time gave numerous definitions of the most important terms
used in the system, such as God, fate, providence, the supreme good,
virtue, and so forth; and these are of great value in giving precision to
their doctrine.
[Sidenote: Style.]
=165.= In considering Style we first notice the distinction between
dialectic in the narrower sense, in which statements are made in the
shortest and most precise form, and rhetoric, in which they are expanded
at length[126]. Zeno compared one to the closed fist, the other to the
open palm[127]. Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus wrote upon rhetoric,
and it appears to have become a tradition to ridicule their teaching,
chiefly on the ground of the novel terms which the Stoics introduced,
as προηγμένα, κοσμόπολις[128]. But it is exactly in these new-fangled
words that we observe one of the chief aims of the Stoic theory of style,
namely the use of words which precisely and exclusively correspond
to the objects described (κυριολογία, _proprietas verborum_), and
which therefore lead up to transparent clearness of speech (σαφήνεια,
_pellucida oratio_)[129]. To this clearness the study of grammar is
contributory; ‘barbarisms’ (faults in spelling and pronunciation) must be
avoided, with proper help from the doctrines of ‘anomaly’ and ‘analogy’;
for the Stoics learnt in time that neither of these is exclusively true.
Equally important is the avoidance of ‘solecisms,’ or faults in syntax.
In this way a pure use of language (Ἑλληνισμός, _Latinitas_) is attained;
this is largely based upon the example of older writers, such as Homer in
Greek, and Cato the elder in Latin[130], but not to such an extent as to
employ words not commonly intelligible. But little more is needed; the
Stoic will say what he has to say with ‘brevity’ (συντομία, _brevitas_);
the graces of style will be represented by ‘becomingness’ (πρέπον,
_decorum_) and ‘neatness’ (κατασκευή), the latter including euphony.
These virtues of speech are sufficient for speaking well, which is
neither more nor less than speaking truthfully[131]; for the Stoic needs
only to instruct his hearer, and will not lower himself either to amuse
him or to excite his emotions[132]. Style has three varieties, according
as it is employed in the council, in the law-courts, or in praise of
goodness and good men[133]; in the last there was no doubt greater room
allowed for that expansiveness of speech which the Stoics specially
designated as ‘rhetoric.’
[Sidenote: The Stoic orator.]
=166.= The ‘Stoic style’ was a severe intellectual and moral discipline.
The speaker was called upon under all circumstances to speak the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. He could hold back nothing
from his audience, even though his words might be offensive to their
religious opinions, their patriotic feelings, or their sense of decency;
he could add no word which would touch their sympathies or kindle their
indignation in the direction he himself might wish. He had always before
his eyes the example of Socrates’ defence before the Athenian jury and
its result. The Stoic appeared before his audience as a brave, sane, and
rather rugged speaker, painfully ill-equipped in all those arts which the
circumstances demanded[134]. Even the Stoics of the transition period,
in spite of their Academic leanings and their literary acquirements,
made this impression at Rome. Diogenes, who had himself done much to
elaborate the theory of style, was noted as a quiet and self-restrained
speaker[135]. The influence of Panaetius may be traced in his friend
Lucilius, who in his book on style is never tired of ridiculing the
artifices of rhetoricians. Then followed a succession of these reserved
speakers, which we shall trace in another chapter, leading up to Cato of
Utica, by far the best-known and the most ridiculed of them all[136].
It is not easy to form a fair judgment of the merits of the Stoic style.
It must be admitted that the works of Chrysippus are not readable; but
on the other hand Antipater, Panaetius, Posidonius, Musonius Rufus, and
Epictetus were all writers or speakers of great attractiveness[137].
[Sidenote: Paradox.]
=167.= In connexion with style we may call attention to the important
function of paradoxes (παράδοξα, _inopinata_), that is, propositions
contrary to common opinion. Since all philosophies conflict with common
opinion, they must necessarily include many paradoxes[138]. The chief
Stoic paradoxes are those which were borrowed directly from the Cynic
school, and indirectly from the teaching of Socrates[139]: and Cicero
devotes a special work to their defence. He includes the following: (i)
that only what is honourable is good; (ii) that virtue is sufficient
for happiness; (iii) that right actions and offences are equal; (iv)
that all foolish men are mad; (v) that the wise man alone is free and
every foolish man a slave; (vi) that the wise man alone is rich. These
of course include the very pith and marrow of Stoic ethics; and the form
is calculated to arrest the attention of the crowd and to challenge
defiantly its cherished opinions. The Stoics of literary taste and social
position usually shew some distaste for paradoxes, and prefer to state
their teaching in ways more obviously reasonable. But it should hardly
be necessary to explain that no paradox is complete in itself, but each
needs to be interpreted according to the principles of the school which
propounds it. In proportion as the doctrines of any school win general
recognition, its paradoxes tend to find ready acceptance, and may
ultimately become truisms[140].
The treatment of myths as allegories[141] may also be considered as
the use of a kind of paradox; this we shall find it most convenient to
discuss in connexion with Stoic views upon the nature of the gods.
[Sidenote: Dangers of logic.]
=168.= The study of logic is at first sight dismal and repulsive; when
progress has been made in it, it seems illuminating; in the end it
becomes so alluring, that the would-be philosopher may easily be lost
for ever in its mazes[142]. The early Stoics had pressed this discipline
upon their pupils; those of the Roman period, themselves (with the
exception of Epictetus) weak dialecticians, never cease to warn their
hearers against its fascinations. So Seneca tells us that many logical
inquiries have nothing to do with real life[143]; and that the older
Stoics had wasted much time over them[144]; Epictetus complains that
his hearers never get beyond the resolving of syllogisms[145], and M.
Aurelius thanks the gods that he never wasted his time in this way[146].
[Sidenote: Stoic and Academic logic.]
=169.= It was a favourite contention of Cicero, adopted from his teacher
Antiochus, that the Stoic dialectic was no original system, but only a
modification of the views of the old Academy[147]. Such a conclusion
seems partly due to the fact that the Stoics of his own time had
largely borrowed from the Academic system in detail; and partly to the
overlooking by Antiochus of an essential difference of spirit between
the two schools. Plato is speculative, Zeno positive; Plato plays
with a dozen theories, Zeno consistently adheres to one. Plato ranks
the mind high, Zeno the will; Plato bases his system on the general
concept, Zeno on the individual person or object. It would seem that
no contrast could be more complete. Nor does Zeno’s theory agree with
that of Epicurus. Both indeed are positive teachers, and hold that the
senses are messengers of truth. But here Epicurus stops, whilst Zeno
goes on. We have to understand rightly the functions and limitations of
the senses, or we shall quickly glide into error; we have also to learn
that the senses are but servants, and that the mind rules them as a
monarch by divine right, coordinating the messages they bring, shaping
them according to its own creative capacity, even adding to them from
the material it has derived from its source. The Stoic theory is in
fact a bold survey of the results of the reflection of the human mind
upon its own operations; it has, as we might expect, many gaps, a good
deal of overlapping description, and some inconsistencies. To sceptical
objections it is of course unable to give answers which are logically
satisfactory; but its general position proved acceptable to men who
sought in philosophy a guide to practical life.
[Sidenote: Questions of temperament.]
=170.= In the approximation between Stoicism and the Academy which
characterizes the first century B.C., the Stoic logic obtained in the
end the upper hand; and the logic of the so-called ‘old Academy’ founded
by Antiochus is in all essentials that of the Stoics. Nevertheless the
objections urged against it by Cicero represent not only his reason
but also his sentiments. The positive system appears at its best in
the education of children; and even at the present day the theory of
knowledge which is tacitly adopted in schools is substantially that
of the Stoics. It leads to careful observation, earnest inquiry, and
resolute choice; and thus lays the foundation of solidity of character.
But it must be admitted that it also works in the direction of a certain
roughness and harshness of disposition. Not only is the Stoically-minded
man lacking in sympathy for beliefs different from his own, which he
is bound to regard as both foolish and wicked; but he is also blind to
that whole side of the universe which cannot be reduced to syllogistic
shape. Thus we may account for the indifference or hostility with which
most Stoics regarded both literature and art[148]. The Academic, on the
other hand, even if he lacked moral firmness and saw too clearly both
sides of every question, was saved by his critical powers from extreme
assertions and harsh personal judgments, and had a delicate appreciation
of the finer shadings of life. Thus behind the formal differences of
the two schools there lies a difference of character. We have long
since learnt that the fundamental questions between the two schools are
incapable of solution by the human mind, and we can therefore appreciate
the one without condemning the other. In practical life each theory has
its appropriate sphere; but the Romans were hardly in the wrong when in
matters of doubt they leaned towards the Stoic side.
FOOTNOTES
[1] ‘[veteres illi Platonis auditores] totam philosophiam tres in partes
diviserunt; quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus’ Cic. _Fin._
iv 2, 4.
[2] Sext. _math._ vii 16 (Arnim ii 38).
[3] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἄντικρυς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀπεφαίνοντο Philopon. _ad Anal._ pr.
f. 4a; Stein, _Psychologie_ ii 93. See also Arnim ii 49 and 49a.
[4] Epict. _Disc._ i 17, 6.
[5] Diog. L. vii 40.
[6] ἀρέσκει οὖν [τοῖς Κυνικοῖς] τὸν λογικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν ... καὶ τὴν
ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι Diog. L. vi 103 and 105.
[7] τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος· τί τέλος; μή
τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον Epict. _Disc._ iv 8,
12.
[8] ‘Stoici ... cum vehementer amaverint artem disputandi’ Aug. _Civ. De._
viii 7.
[9] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 66.
[10] See below, §§ 164, 165.
[11] ‘hi, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi ... totam vitam evertunt
funditus’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 10, 31.
[12] See above, § 93.
[13] Epict. _Disc._ ii 11, 13.
[14] ‘Stoici deum visum vocantes, quod optimum putabant’ Chalc. _in Tim._
266 (Arnim ii 863).
[15] Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.
[16] Arnim ii 458.
[17] ‘mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est,
naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii
10, 30. On the other hand the Epicureans treat the senses as bodily, and
sensation as automatic.
[18] αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς τό τε ἀφ’ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα
ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον, καὶ ἡ δι’ αὐτῶν κατάληψις ... καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ
αἴσθησις καλεῖται Diog. L. vii 52.
[19] Cleanthes called it ‘imprint’ (τύπωσις); Chrysippus, lest the word
imprint should be interpreted too mechanically, called it ‘alteration’
(ἀλλοίωσις) Sext. _math._ vii 227, 372 (Arnim ii 56); ‘visum objectum
imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem’ Cic. _de
Fato_ 19, 43.
[20] Sext. _math._ vii 424 (Arnim ii 68); ‘ita est maxima in sensibus
veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes, et omnia removentur quae obstant et
impediunt’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.
[21] ‘idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui
in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acrius’ _ib._
[22] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς Aët. _plac._ iv 9, 4;
‘[sensuum] clara iudicia et certa sunt’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.
[23] ‘sequuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam
modo sensibus, ut haec: “illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,
hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.” animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non
sensibus’ _ib._ 7, 21.
[24] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν
ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς Aët. _plac._ iv 9, 4 (Arnim ii 78); ‘Zeno
nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia [dixit]’ Cic. _N. D._ i 25, 70.
[25] φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἐν
αὑτῷ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· ... καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὑτὸ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ φαντασία δείκνυσιν ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς
αὐτήν Aët. _plac._ iv 12, 1 (Arnim ii 54). The object which causes the
φαντασία is technically called the φανταστόν, but also ὑπάρχον Sext.
_math._ vii 426.
[26] διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς Aëtius _plac._ iv 12, 4.
[27] _ib._ 12, 5.
[28] φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας, οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους
Diog. L. vii 50.
[29] ‘visis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum quae
propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur’ Cic.
_Ac._ i 11, 41; cf. § 105.
[30] On this point the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno hinged;
see above, § 84.
[31] ‘necesse est animum perspicuis cedere’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 12, 38.
[32] ‘perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim ut ipsa per
sese ea quae sint nobis, ita ut sunt, indicet’ _ib._ 14, 45.
[33] ‘adsensio nostra erit in potestate’ Cic. _Fat._ 19, 43; ‘adsensio
non [potest] fieri nisi commota viso; tamen id visum proximam causam
[habet], non principalem’ _ib._ 18, 42; ‘[Zeno] adsensionem adiungit
animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam’ Cic. _Ac._ i
11, 40.
[34] διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσον, τὴν δὲ
ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ Stob. ii 7, 11 m (Pearson, Z. fr. 15): cf. Plut. _Sto.
rep._ 47, 10.
[35] ‘opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam adsensionem’ Cic. _Tusc.
disp._ iv 7, 15; ‘opinio quae [est] imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque
communis’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 41; so Sext. _math._ vii 151 (Arnim ii 90).
[36] Epict. _Disc._ i 21, 2.
[37] _ib._ i 18, 1; Sext. _math._ vii 416.
[38] ἔστι δὲ αἴσθησις ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν Nem. _nat. hom._ vii p. 175
M (Stein, _Psych._ ii 135).
[39] Cicero’s point of view appears to be that the mind-picture grasps
the object: ‘[visum] cum acceptum iam et adprobatum esset, [Zeno]
comprehensionem appellabat, similem eis rebus quae manu prehenderentur’
Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 41. See further Stein, _Psych._ ii 174, and R. D. Hicks,
_Stoic and Epicurean_, p. 71.
[40] This view is expressed by Posidonius, who bases it on Plato’s
_Timaeus_: ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ
φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτως ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς
ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου Sext. Emp. _math._ vii 93. See also
below, § 266.
[41] ‘comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse [Zenoni] et fidelis
videbatur; non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia
nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 42.
[42] Diog. L. vii 51; ‘quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in
eminentia, quae nos non videmus!’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 20.
[43] μνήμη θησαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν Sext. _math._ vii 373 (Arnim i 64);
‘[mens] alia visa sic arripit, ut his statim utatur; alia quasi recondit,
e quibus memoria oritur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 10, 30.
[44] ‘quicquid frequens cogitatio exercet et renovat, memoriae nunquam
subducitur; quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit’ Sen.
_Ben._ iii 2, 3.
[45] So substantially Chrysippus argued. See Sext. _math._ vii 231.
[46] ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνῆμαι γένωνται, τότε φαμὲν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν
Aët. _plac._ iv 11, 2.
[47] Diog. L. vii 52.
[48] The details of this list are variously given: e.g. ‘cum rerum
notiones in animo fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit, aut
coniunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis’ Cic. _Fin._ iii
10, 33.
[49] Diog. L. vii 52.
[50] ‘homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia
cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones
non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit atque
adnectit futuras; facile totius vitae cursum videt’ Cic. _Off._ i 4, 11.
[51] So Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 79.
[52] ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ
χάρτην· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται Aët. _plac._ iv
11, 1. The metaphor of the _tabula rasa_ can be traced back to Plato and
Aristotle, but in this application was first used by Cleanthes. Locke
presumably borrowed it from the Stoics. It must not be thought that this
metaphor implies passivity on the part of the soul; as the Stoics use
it, the soul is from the beginning actively cooperating in obtaining
impressions. See Stein, _Psych._ ii pp. 112 sqq., note 230.
[53] τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν ... οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, καθάπερ αἱ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων Diog. L. vii 51.
[54] οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν Aët.
_plac._ i 10, 5 (Arnim i 65); cf. Diog. L. vii 61.
[55] πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ
ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως Sext. _math._ viii 56 (Arnim ii
88); cf. Diog. L. vii 52 and 53.
[56] ‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 10,
30.
[57] Cic. _N. D._ i 17, 44.
[58] ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου Diog. L. vii 54;
‘notionem appello quam Graeci tum ἔννοιαν tum πρόληψιν; ea est insita et
praecepta cuiusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens’ Cic. _Top._ 7,
31; ‘nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam
nec quaeri disputarive potest’ _Ac._ ii 7, 21. See also Aët. _plac._ iv
11, 3. If the concept can only be reached by special training, it must
not be called πρόληψις.
[59] ‘There are certain things which men who are not altogether perverted
see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the
mind is named common sense (κοινὸς νοῦς)’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 6, 8. See
also below, § 158.
[60] ‘We need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the
preconception of what is reasonable or unreasonable to the several things
conformably with nature’ Epict. _Disc._ i 2, 6.
[61] See Cic. _Top._ above, note 58.
[62] Diog. L. x 33.
[63] ‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit; ex quibus
efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας tum προλήψεις vocant’
Cic. _Ac._ ii 10, 30. As to the possibility of distinguishing the two
terms see Prof. Reid’s note.
[64] See notes to the next section.
[65] ‘rerum plurimarum obscuras necessarias intelligentias enudavit
[qu. incohavit?], quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae’ Cic. _Leg._ i
9, 26; ‘quae in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, incohatae
intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur’ _ib._ i 10, 30; ‘As to
good and evil, beautiful and ugly ... and what we ought to do and what we
ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate
idea of them?’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 11, 3.
[66] ὁ δὲ λόγος ... ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν
πρώτην ἑβδομάδα Aët. _plac._ iv 11, 4; περὶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα
ἔννοια γίνεται καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ _ib._ v 23, 1.
[67] ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται ... λόγῳ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων,
ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους Diog. L. vii 52; ‘collatione
rationis boni notio facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum
naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni
pervenit’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 33; ‘nobis videtur observatio collegisse et
rerum saepe factarum inter se collatio: per analogian nostri intellectum
et honestum et bonum iudicant. noveramus corporis sanitatem; ex hac
cogitavimus esse aliquam et animi. noveramus corporis vires; ex his
collegimus esse et animi robur’ Sen. _Ep._ 120, 4; ‘de bonis ac malis
sensus non iudicat; quid utile sit, quid inutile, ignorat. non potest
ferre sententiam, nisi in rem praesentem perductus est; ratio ergo
arbitra est bonorum ac malorum’ _ib._ 66, 35.
[68] φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν Diog. L. vii 53.
[69] For the classification as a sensation see above, § 146.
[70] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τήνδε (sc. Aristotelis) τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ‘ἐντὸς ἁφὴν’
προσαγορεύουσι, καθ’ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα Aët. _plac._ iv
8, 7; ‘quid de tactu, et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut
doloris aut voluptatis?’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 20. This feeling, if mistaken
for the perception of an external object, is an ‘empty twitching’:
φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν· ὃ δὴ κυριώτερον διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς παρ’ αὐτοῖς
καλεῖται Sext. _math._ vii 241 (Arnim ii 64). See further Hicks, _Stoic
and Epicurean_, p. 110.
[71] ‘visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur,
quaeque oraculis auspiciis extis declarentur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 15, 47.
[72] Arnim ii 93 and 95; ‘ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una
aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7,
22; ‘ex quibus [perceptis] collatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque
efficimus, partim ad usum vitae, partim ad oblectationem necessariis’ _N.
D._ ii 59, 148.
[73] Arnim ii 95.
[74] πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται Epict. _Disc._ i 22, 1.
[75] εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου·
ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων Stob. ii 7, 5 l (see
also Wachsmuth’s crit. note).
[76] ‘scientiam ... quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam
stabilem quoque atque immutabilem esse censemus’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 8,
23; ‘quod erat sensu comprehensum ... si ita erat comprehensum ut
convelli ratione non posset, scientiam [Zeno] nominabat’ _ib._ i 11,
41; ‘quamcunque vero sententiam probaverit [sapiens], eam sic animo
comprensam habebit, ut ea quae sensibus’ _ib._ ii 37, 119.
[77] See above, § 77.
[78] Plut. _comm. not._ 47, 4.
[79] Sext. _math._ vii 151 (Arnim ii 90); ‘scientiam, cuius compotem nisi
sapientem esse neminem’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 145.
[80] Diog. L. vii 54, as in note 84 below.
[81] See especially Pearson, Zeno fr. 11; and above, § 84.
[82] ‘omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa
cogitatione informantur, ... sive in quiete, sive per vinum, sive per
insaniam. nam ab omnibus eiusmodi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus
tenere debemus, abesse dicemus.... itaque, _simul ut experrecti_ sumus
[ex somno], visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus, ut ea quae in foro
gessimus’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 17, 51.
[83] ‘[ab Academia disputatum est], non inesse [in sensibus] propriam,
quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam’ _ib._ ii 32, 103; ‘dicunt
[Academici] hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non
eodem modo falsum etiam possit videri’ _ib._ 11, 33.
[84] κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι
τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος
Diog. L. vii 54. This view is attributed to Zeno himself: ‘visum [Zeno
ita definiit] ex eo, _quod esset_, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et
effictum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 24, 77.
[85] οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα Sext.
_math._ vii 253.
[86] φαντασία πιθανὴ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ περιωδευμένη Sext. _math._ vii
181. Such was the definition of Carneades (Schmekel, p. 344).
[87] Diog. L. vii 54 (see § 80, note 68).
[88] ‘posse eum [sapientem] falsa a veris distinguere’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 21,
67.
[89] Diog. L. vii 54. See on this point Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, p.
70.
[90] ‘multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apud nos
veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam deos esse _inter
alia_ hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est ... neminem
invenies, qui non putet et sapientiam bonum et sapere bonum’ Sen. _Ep._
117, 6.
[91] ‘opinionum commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat’ Cic. _N.
D._ ii 2, 5.
[92] Diog. L. vii 177.
[93] οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν Plut.
_comm. not._ 27, 9.
[94] ἐκεῖνον [τὸν Ἀντίπατρον] ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον, εἰς ταύτας
καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὑρεσιλογίας _ib._ 27, 15.
[95] ‘iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi; patroni nonnunquam
verisimile, etiam si minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere ... non
auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio’ Cic. _Off._ ii
14, 51.
[96] ‘visus noster solita imbecillitate deceptus’ Sen. _N. Q._ i 2, 3.
[97] _To himself_, v 33.
[98] See above, §§ 146, 147.
[99] ‘sapientem aliquando sustinere adsensionem’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 17, 53.
[100] Epict. _Disc._ i 27, 17.
[101] The distinction between ‘name’ and ‘class-name’ was due to
Chrysippus: see Sandys, _Classical Scholarship_, i p. 144.
[102] Diog. L. vii 58.
[103] For these and further particulars see Sandys, _Classical
Scholarship_, i ch. ix; R. Schmidt, _Stoicorum Grammatica_, pp. 18 sqq.
[104] ‘Crates, nobilis grammaticus, fretus Chrysippo, homine acutissimo,
qui reliquit περὶ ἀνωμαλίας III libros, contra analogiam atque
Aristarchum est nixus’ Varro _L. L._ ix 1 (Arnim ii 151).
[105] Orig. _cont. Celsum_ i 24 (Arnim ii 146).
[106] Varr. _L. L._ vi 11 (Arnim ii 163).
[107] See Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 73, n. 2; Aristotle’s distinction is
between τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγον and τὸν ἔξω λόγον.
[108] ‘vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt eamque esse dicunt ictum aera’
A. Gellius, _N. A._ v 15, 6.
[109] ‘hunc [qui primo dicitur iam fari] Chrysippus negat loqui, sed ut
loqui; ... sic in corvis, cornicibus, pueris primitus incipientibus fari,
verba non esse verba’ Varro _L. L._ vi 56 (Arnim ii 143).
[110] Diog. L. vii 63 to 78.
[111] Varro translates this by ‘proloquium’ (Gell. _N. A._ xvi 8, 8),
Cicero provisionally by ‘pronuntiatum’ (_Tusc. disp._ i 7, 14).
[112] A statement or proposition is therefore a phrase ‘complete in
itself’ (λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές) A. Gellius _N. A._ xvi 8, 4.
[113] Diog. L. vii 45.
[114] _ib._ 80 and 81.
[115] ‘ex iis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur’ Cic. _Top._ 14,
57.
[116] § 83.
[117] ἔλυε δὲ [Ζήνων] σοφίσματα, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικήν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν
δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς Plut. _Sto. rep._ 8, 2.
[118] ‘inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi’ Pers. _Sat._ vi 80.
[119] ‘placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, tria pauca sint
anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere’ Cic.
_Ac._ ii 29, 93. Cf. Sext. _math._ vii 416.
[120] ‘si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris an verum dicis?’
Cic. _Ac._ ii 29, 95.
[121] Epict. _Disc._ ii 17, 34.
[122] ‘mus syllaba est. mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit
... o pueriles ineptias!’ Sen. _Ep._ 48, 6 and 7; ‘quod non perdidisti,
habes; cornua autem non perdidisti; cornua ergo habes’ _ib._ 49, 8.
[123] Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 1 sqq.
[124] See below, §§ 220, 221.
[125] Diog. L. vii 60.
[126] ‘omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et
interrogantem discissa; hanc διαλεκτικήν, illam ῥητορικήν placuit vocari’
Sen. _Ep._ 89, 17.
[127] Cic. _Orator_ 32, 113.
[128] ‘scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes. Chrysippus etiam; sed sic, ut
si quis obmutescere cupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides quo
modo loquantur; nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 3, 7.
[129] Diog. L. vii 59.
[130] ‘uni M. Porcio me dedicavi atque despondi atque delegavi’ Front. et
Aur. _Ep._ ii 13.
[131] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν Anon. _ad Herm.
Rhet. Gr._ vii 8. Hence speech was a virtue; ‘[Stoicis] hanc habeo
gratiam, quod soli ex omnibus eloquentiam virtutem ac sapientiam esse
dixerunt’ Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 65.
[132] ‘fuerunt et clari quidam auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris
officium docere; namque et effectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant,
primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem
a veritate pelli misericordia gratia similibusque non oporteret, et
voluptatem audientium petere ... vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur’
Quint. _Inst. or._ v Prooem.
[133] Diog. L. vii 42.
[134] ‘orationis genus habent [Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum;
sed, ut in oratore, exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi,
obscurum, inane, ieiunum, attamen eiusmodi quo uti ad vulgus nullo modo
possit’ Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 66.
[135] ‘dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria’ A. Gellius, _N. A._ vi 14, 10.
[136] See below, chap. xvi.
[137] See Smiley, _Latinitas_ and Ἑλληνισμός.
[138] ‘Philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion, as
Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason’ Epict. _Disc._ iv
1, 173; ‘where is the wonder if in philosophy many things which are true
appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?’ _ib._ i 25, 33.
[139] ‘ista παράδοξα quae appellant, maxime videntur esse Socratica’ Cic.
_Parad._ Prooem. 4.
[140] ‘nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile’ Cic.
_Parad._ Prooem. 3; ‘Stoica paradoxa, quorum nullum esse falsum nec tam
mirabile quam prima facie videtur, adprobabo’ Sen. _Ep._ 87, 1.
[141] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., pp. 354-370.
[142] A. Gellius, _N. A._ xvi 8, 16 and 17.
[143] ‘quaedam exercendi tantum ingenii causa quaeruntur, et semper extra
vitam iacent’ Sen. _Ben._ vi 1, 1.
[144] ‘multum illis temporis verborum cavillatio eripuit et captiosae
disputationes, quae acumen inritum exercent’ _Ep._ 45, 5.
[145] ‘We terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able
to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the
hypothetical syllogism’ Epict. _Disc._ iv 4, 14.
[146] ‘Thanks [to the gods] too that, in spite of my ardour for
philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, or sit poring
over essays or syllogisms, or become engrossed in scientific speculation’
M. Aurelius _To himself_ i 17.
[147] ‘verum esse arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat,
correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam
putandam [Stoicorum rationem]’ Cic. _Ac._ i 12, 43.
[148] ‘tunc intellegere nobis licebit, quam contemnenda miremur,
simillimi pueris, quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est. quid ergo inter
nos et illos interest, ut Ariston ait, nisi quod nos circa tabulas et
statuas insanimus, carius inepti? illos reperti in litore calculi leves
delectant, nos ingentium maculae columnarum’ Sen. _Ep._ 115, 8. This tone
is clearly derived from Cynism, as the reference to Aristo indicates.
A modern Cynic is still more sweeping in his condemnation: ‘all the
nastiness and stupidity which you call science and art’ (Count Leo
Tolstoy in the _Westminster Gazette_, Sept. 3, 1910).