CHAPTER V._Roman Stoicism being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire

THE STOIC SECT IN ROME.

[Sidenote: Growth of the Stoic ‘sect.’]

=112.= In the third century B.C. Stoicism won adherents slowly and one

by one, as individuals were convinced by reasoning and example. In the

second century its progress became more rapid, for it was reinforced

by inheritance and social influence. Fathers handed down its doctrine

to their sons, and teachers to their pupils. Groups of men united by

a common respect for the school and its founders began to associate

together, not only at Athens, but also (as we may well infer from the

list of names given at the end of the last chapter) at such centres as

Pergamus, Babylon, Seleucia, Tarsus, Sidon, and even Alexandria[1].

Thus out of the school there grew up the ‘sect’ (_secta_); that is, a

society of men drawn from different nations and ranks, but sharing the

same convictions, united by a bond of brotherhood, and feeling their

way towards mutual consolation and support; a company going through

life on the same path, and prepared to submit to a common authority[2].

The spread of the sect was rapid though quiet; and as we cannot expect

to trace its history from place to place, we are unable to say when

first it found adherents at Rome. But early in the second century B.C.

Rome entered into close political relations with two of the most highly

civilized states of Asia Minor, Pergamus and Rhodes; and through the men

of learning and taste who were associated with these communities Stoicism

was introduced to the ruling class at the centre of the new empire,

to win there an easy conquest which proved no slight compensation for

the political subordination of the states from which its emissaries had

sprung.

[Sidenote: Panaetius.]

=113.= We have already noticed[3] that the Stoic Crates, the head of

the library established at Pergamus, visited Rome in 159 B.C. and there

gave lectures on literature, in which he may perhaps have taken occasion

to expound at least the chief doctrines of the Stoic school. Only a few

years later, in 155 B.C., the celebrated embassy from Athens, which

included the heads of three of the chief philosophical schools at that

time, arrived in Rome. Diogenes of Seleucia represented the Stoics,

Critolaus the Peripatetics, and Carneades the Academic school; and all

three expounded their respective theories before enormous audiences. We

are told that Diogenes made a good impression by his sober and temperate

style[4]. Thus the way was prepared for the more permanent influence

of PANAETIUS of Rhodes (circ. 189-109 B.C.)[5]. He was a gentleman of

position in the wealthy and well-governed island state, and in early

youth pursued his studies at Pergamus, so that he was probably attracted

to the school by Crates[6]. From Pergamus he passed to Athens, where he

found established the three teachers already named, and attached himself

to Diogenes[7], and after his death to his successor Antipater[8].

His writings shew that he was also much influenced by the teaching

of Carneades. But more than any of his predecessors he appreciated

philosophy in its literary form. Plato, the ‘Homer of philosophers,’

he held in veneration[9]; from Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus

and Dicaearchus he constantly quoted[10]. His admiration for these

philosophers greatly influenced his style, and caused him to reject the

stiff and paradoxical form used by his predecessors[11]; it also led to

the surrender of some characteristic Stoic doctrines in favour of the

teaching of Plato and Aristotle[12]. His studies extended to every branch

of philosophy, including astronomy[13] and politics[14]. The latter

interest brought him into association with Polybius the historian, with

whom he held frequent discussions as to the best form of government; the

two learned and experienced Greeks agreed in their admiration for the

constitution of Rome[15]. Panaetius visited Rome, and there became the

intimate friend of Scipio Africanus minor: this friendship must have

begun before the year 140 B.C., when Panaetius accompanied Scipio on a

mission to settle the affairs of the East[16]; it lasted till the death

of Scipio in 129 B.C. Round Scipio and his Greek friends Polybius and

Panaetius there gathered a society of the noblest and most intelligent

men of Rome; and in this circle the Latin language as well as Greek

philosophy found a new birth. At the time of Scipio’s death Panaetius

became the head of the Stoic school at Athens, and held this position

till his own death twenty years later[17]. Amongst his friends and pupils

were men who took a leading part in the government of their native

cities[18].

[Sidenote: His ethical teaching.]

=114.= Panaetius may well be regarded as the founder of Roman Stoicism,

and is of special interest to us as the writer of the treatise (περὶ

καθήκοντος) which Cicero has freely translated in his _de Officiis_. He

sets before us Stoicism as the school which will train the scholar,

the gentleman, and the statesman, whilst he shrinks from those bolder

doctrines, borrowed from the Cynic school, which conflict with that

which is conventional, or, as their opponents say, with that which is

becoming. The central doctrine that virtue is knowledge, and is the sole

and sufficient good, he accepts as the plain teaching of nature; and with

it the paradox that the wise man never errs[19]. Yet even these maxims

are somewhat toned down as he expresses them; and external advantages

appear to him worthy of pursuit, not only as giving a meaning to virtue

and providing a field for its exercise, but also for their own sake, so

long as they do not conflict with virtue[20]; and he perhaps hesitated

to assert positively that ‘pain is no evil[21].’ In his treatises the

figure of the wise man is withdrawn to the background; he is practically

concerned only with the ‘probationer’ (ὁ προκόπτων), who is making some

advance in the direction of wisdom. This advance is not made by acts of

perfect virtue, but by regular performance of ‘services’ (καθήκοντα,

_officia_), the simple and daily duties which come in the way of the good

citizen[22]. Further, scientific investigation must not become the main

end of life, as perhaps it seemed to Aristotle; it is permitted only as

a recreation in the well-earned intervals between the calls of active

life[23].

[Sidenote: His views on physics.]

=115.= It does not appear that Panaetius devoted much attention to

logic[24]; on the other hand he was much occupied with that part of

philosophy which deals with the history of the universe and its

government by divine providence[25]. The Heraclitean theory he appears

to have left altogether on one side; for he rejected the theory of

the conflagration[26], as Boethus had done before him, accepting the

objection of Carneades that ‘if everything turned into fire, the fire

would go out for lack of fuel[27].’ He therefore joined the Peripatetics

in holding that the universe is immortal[28]; but since again Carneades

has shown that ‘no living thing is immortal,’ it follows that the world

is not an animal, nor is the deity its soul[29]. Upon all these subjects

Panaetius ceased to maintain Stoic doctrines; and, alone amongst Stoic

teachers, he ‘suspended his judgment’ as to the reality of divination[30].

[Sidenote: Concession in ethics.]

=116.= Similar concessions to his opponents mark his treatment in detail

of ethics. Thus he takes from Aristotle the view that ‘virtue is a

mean between two vices’; and this doctrine, so alien from true Stoic

principle, forms the basis of the treatment which we find adopted in

the _de Officiis_. The theory of the four ‘cardinal virtues,’ Wisdom,

Justice, Courage, and Soberness, was probably common property at

this time; but whereas in Cynism Courage and in the earlier Stoicism

Wisdom are the dominant virtues, in the theory of Panaetius Soberness,

identified with decorum, far exceeds the rest in practical importance.

Thus the triumph won by Panaetius for the name of Stoicism was purchased

by the sacrifice not only of its physics, but very largely of its ethics

also; and the success of the new system might not unfairly be described

as a victory of literature over logic, of reasonableness over reason,

and of compromise over consistency. However this may be, Panaetius

undoubtedly succeeded in presenting Greek philosophy to his Roman

friends in a form in which it recommended itself alike to their reasoning

powers and to their moral sense.

[Sidenote: Posidonius.]

=117.= The virtual, though not the nominal, successor of Panaetius was

POSIDONIUS of Rhodes[31] (circ. 135-51 B.C.[32]), who after studying

under Panaetius at Athens travelled widely, finally settling at Rhodes,

and there took an active part in political life. Like his master, he was

a devoted student of Plato, and he wrote a commentary on the _Timaeus_.

In this commentary he developes a new theory of the universe, which he

asserts to be that which Plato had learnt from the Pythagoreans, and to

be at root the same as that taught by the Stoics. The starting-point is

the μονάς or unit; from this are evolved the numbers and the elements

by a principle of flux, as in the system of Heraclitus[33]. The unity

and the first of the numbers, the two, differ as force and matter; so

that the dualism of Aristotle is here definitely subordinated to a

supreme monism. This study of Posidonius is therefore incidentally of

high importance as a side-light on Stoic metaphysics and cosmology. In

addition he wrote on almost all the principal divisions of philosophy,

thus acquiring a brilliant reputation, particularly in the eyes of the

philosophic nobles of Rome. Cicero made his acquaintance at Rhodes in

78 B.C., and refers to him more often in his works than to any other of

his instructors[34]. Pompey, in the midst of his eastern campaigns, put

himself to much trouble to visit him[35]. Amongst his Roman visitors and

admirers were also Velleius, Cotta, and Lucilius[36]. A century later,

Seneca looked back to him as one of those who had made the largest

contribution to philosophy[37].

[Sidenote: His teaching.]

=118.= As compared with the more scientific Panaetius, Posidonius marks

a reaction in favour of the religious side of Stoicism[38]. Thus it

comes about that Cicero bases on his work ‘on gods’ (περὶ θεῶν) his own

statement of the Stoic theology in the second book of his _de Natura

deorum_[39]. Posidonius restores the theory of Divination, as to which

Panaetius had held the gravest doubts[40]. He strongly asserts the divine

origin of the soul, and accepts the Persian view that in this life it is

imprisoned in the body[41]. He affirmed the future conflagration[42], and

found this theory not inconsistent with a belief in the pre-existence and

the immortality of the individual soul.

In physics and logic alike Posidonius upholds the doctrine of the Logos,

and it appears that it passed directly from him to Philo of Alexandria,

and so into Judaeo-Christian speculation. In ethics he maintained the

sufficiency of virtue[43], and re-defined it in the spirit of Cleanthes

rather than of Chrysippus[44]. In the practical application of such

doctrines to cases of conscience he disliked the lax views of Diogenes,

and sided rather with Antipater and Panaetius[45]. Finally he held that

the ideal Republic had already been achieved in the golden age, when the

wise had ruled for the protection and happiness of their subjects[46].

[Sidenote: Hecato.]

=119.= HECATO of Rhodes was also a pupil of Panaetius: he wrote books on

ethics and casuistry which were largely used by Cicero and by Seneca,

both of whom frequently refer to him by name. In laying the foundations

of his ethics he distinguishes between the ‘theoretic virtues,’ such

as Wisdom, Justice, Courage and Soberness, which call for the assent

of the individual, and are possessed only by the wise man, and the

corresponding ‘non-theoretic virtues,’ which are dispositions of body

found also amongst the unwise; as health which corresponds to temperance,

and so forth[47]. By this extension of the conception of virtue the

doctrine of its sufficiency is rendered easy of acceptance[48]. In the

practical application of his theory he laid great stress on the doctrine

of ‘relations’ (σχέσεις), that is on duties towards parent, wife, child,

slave, country, and so forth[49]. In order to be in a position to perform

these duties a man is entitled to care for his own life and property[50].

He need not be too careful to provide for his slaves if provisions are

dear[51]; nor should he too hastily give up for another his chance of

escape from a shipwreck[52]. Hecato therefore seems rather to side with

Diogenes in questions of casuistry, taking a lax view where Antipater and

Panaetius would be inclined to a more altruistic standpoint.

[Sidenote: The unsectarian philosopher.]

=120.= The three teachers of Rhodes appear to us as men of great learning

and of wide interests, and not without original force; on the other hand

we cannot say that they made any very large contributions towards the

discussion of the great problems of philosophy. Apart from them we find

little trace of creative ability in the school during the first century

B.C. There were however numerous teachers occupied in expounding and

defending the doctrines of the school, and their special interest lay in

the controversies between the Porch and the Academy. From these there

resulted a temporary fusion of the two schools. Their respective names

and dogmas remained unaltered; but attention was no longer given to the

great differences of principle which divided them. Learning, politics,

and social influences alike were at work, not to solve the great

controversies, but to throw a mist over them. From these circumstances

there emerged the type which we now call the ‘eclectic,’ but which

the Romans called simply the ‘philosopher’; that is, the man who drew

practical wisdom from all sources alike, binding himself to the dogmas of

no school, but winning his way by aptness of discourse and sympathy of

manner to social importance[53]. We have but a limited interest at the

present day in these ephemeral reputations; the type is still with us,

both in the preacher whose sympathies are given with equal readiness to

half-a-dozen warring denominations, and in the politician who emphasizes

his connexion by birth with three or four nationalities and as many

grades of society. Nor are we called upon to question the usefulness of

this blurring of differences. We must however remark that so far as our

immediate subject is concerned, the fusion was equivalent to a defeat

of Stoicism by the Academy. That nothing can be definitely proved; that

a man may choose his principles at the bidding of his fancy; that an

argument may be sufficiently sound for practical purposes even when there

exists a counter-argument of almost equal strength; that the problems of

dialectics, physics, and ethics may be discussed separately, instead of

being treated as parts of one whole; all these are the points for which

the Academic contended with as much consistency as his system allowed,

and which every philosopher, whether or not he called himself a Stoic,

conceded when he began to combine the teachings of diverse systems.

[Sidenote: Lesser Stoics.]

=121.= After the death of Panaetius the school at Athens appears to have

been conducted by DARDANUS and MNESARCHUS, both of Athens, jointly[54];

later we find at its head DIONYSIUS of Cyrene, who enjoyed a great

reputation as a mathematician, and was a vigorous opponent of Demetrius

the Epicurean[55]. About the same time[56] ATHENODORUS the elder of

Tarsus (circ. 130-60 B.C.) became librarian at Pergamus; he made use of

his position to erase from Zeno’s works those passages (probably from the

_Republic_) which were repugnant to the Stoic teaching of his own time;

he was however detected and the passages in question were restored[57].

It appears also that he counselled withdrawal from the vexations of

public life, a policy by no means consistent with the teaching of Zeno,

and for which he is rebuked by Seneca[58]. From him we first hear the

practical precept which both Seneca and Juvenal echo, to ask nothing of

the gods that you cannot ask openly[59]. In his old age he left Pergamus

and came to reside at Rome with M. Porcius Cato in B.C. 70. Amongst the

younger friends of Cato were ANTIPATER of Tyre, who wrote on practical

ethics, and died at Athens about 45 B.C.[60]; and APOLLONIDES, with whom

he conversed on the subject of suicide shortly before his death[61]. From

DIODOTUS Cicero received instruction in Stoicism before 88 B.C.[62];

he conceived a great affection for him, and invited him to live in his

house[63]: he remained there till his death in 59 B.C., when he left

Cicero a considerable property[64]. In his old age he was blind, but

he continued his studies, and in particular that of mathematics, as

ardently as ever[65]. APOLLONIUS of Tyre wrote a biography of Zeno,

from which Diogenes Laertius often quotes[66]. To this period perhaps

belongs HIEROCLES, who was bitterly opposed to Epicurus on account of his

choosing pleasure as the end of life, and still more for his denial of

providence[67].

[Sidenote: Cicero.]

=122.= We have little reason to regret that only fragments at most remain

to us of the works of these philosophers, since CICERO presents to us a

comprehensive view not only of the doctrines they professed, but also

of the criticisms which their opponents passed upon them, and again of

the replies they made to these criticisms. In carrying out this work for

Stoicism and its rival systems Cicero not only created the philosophic

terminology of the future by his translations of technical terms from

Greek into Latin, but also established a new style of philosophic

discussion. By the friendly tone of his dialogues, placed in the mouths

of men whose common interest in Greek studies made the divergencies of

the schools to which they belonged a secondary matter; by the amplitude

of his style, which gives itself time and space to approach a difficult

conception from many points of view; and by the simplicity of his

language and illustrations, which assumes that every philosophical

contention can be plainly and forcibly put before the average man of

letters, he has set an example of the art of exposition which has perhaps

not been surpassed since[68]. His most systematic expositions of Stoic

doctrine are as follows. In the _Academica_ a general view of Zeno’s

teaching is given by M. Varro (i 10, 35 to 11, 42), and the Stoic logic,

as accepted by Antiochus[69], is defended by L. Licinius Lucullus (ii

1, 1 to 19, 63). In the _de Natura deorum_ (bk ii) the Stoic physics

is explained by Q. Lucilius Balbus; in the _de Finibus_ (bk iii) the

Stoic ethics by M. Porcius Cato, as the most distinguished Roman who has

adopted them as a standard of life. In the _de Officiis_ Cicero adopts

the form of a letter addressed to his son when studying at Athens, and

avowedly adapts the substance of the work of Panaetius already mentioned,

supplementing it from a memorandum of the teaching of Posidonius which

was specially prepared for him by ATHENODORUS CALVUS[70]; this book

deals with ethics mainly in its practical applications. In many of

his other works, such as the _de Amicitia_, _de Senectute_, _Tusculan

disputations_, _de Fato_, _de Divinatione_, and _Paradoxa_, Cicero makes

use of Stoic material without giving professedly an exposition of the

Stoic system.

[Sidenote: Areius Didymus.]

=123.= The school to which Cicero finally attached himself was that

founded by ANTIOCHUS of Ascalon (circ. 125-50 B.C.)[71], who under

the name of the ‘old Academy’ taught doctrines which were practically

indistinguishable from those of the diluted Stoicism which now

prevailed, avoiding only the dogmatic temper and a few of the paradoxes

of the Stoics[72]. This appears to have been the prevailing tone of

philosophical discussion from the fall of the Republic to the death

of Augustus. Brutus (the ‘tyrannicide’), though family and political

associations have linked his name with that of Cato, was in his

philosophical opinions a follower of Antiochus[73]. Not very different

were probably the views of two teachers, nominally Stoics, who held

high positions in the household of Augustus. ATHENODORUS the younger of

Tarsus (possibly the same as the Athenodorus Calvus mentioned in the last

section) was a pupil of Posidonius, and whilst teaching at Apollonia

counted amongst his pupils Julius Caesar’s great-nephew Octavius, who

was afterwards to become the emperor Augustus. Octavius took his teacher

with him to Rome, and he had the credit of exercising a restraining

influence on his patron. In B.C. 30 he was sent in his old age to reform

the government of his native city Tarsus. He appears to have written

chiefly on popular moral subjects[74]. AREIUS DIDYMUS of Alexandria[75],

who was for a longer period installed in the household of Augustus[76],

is of interest to us as the first of those who made excerpts from the

works of earlier writers, and to him we owe most of the Stoic fragments

found in the work of Stobaeus. He probably depended in the first instance

on the writings of Antiochus of Ascalon. He was instrumental in saving

his native town Alexandria when taken by Augustus in B.C. 30. It is

probable enough that his ‘Epitome’ was prepared for the use of Augustus,

and provided the material for philosophical discussions at the banquet,

such as those to which Horace so often refers[77]. Seneca tells us that

he was acquainted with the inmost thoughts of the family of Augustus, and

reports the language in which he consoled Livia upon the death of her

son Drusus[78] (B.C. 9). He was succeeded by THEON of Alexandria, also a

Stoic, who took a special interest in physiology.

[Sidenote: Attalus.]

=124.= We know from Horace that in the time of Augustus Stoic

philosophers were found not only at the court, but also in the public

lecture-room, and at the street-corners. Such were Stertinius[79],

of whom the commentators say that he was the author of 120 books on

Stoicism[80]; Crispinus[81], said to have been a bad poet[82]; and

Damasippus[83]. In Horace’s amusing sketches we find the Stoic as he

appeared to the unconverted. He has sore eyes, or else a troublesome

cough[84]; he presses his teaching upon his hearers unreasonably and

unseasonably. But in the reign of Tiberius we find these popular

lecturers held in very high esteem. One of the most eminent was ATTALUS,

of whom Seneca the philosopher gives us a glowing account. Seneca was

the first each day to besiege the door of his school, and the last to

leave through it. This philosopher must have exercised an extraordinary

influence over the young men of his time. In his mouth the paradox ‘the

wise man is a king’ seemed a modest statement; his pupils were half

disposed to regard him as a god[85]. When he declaimed on the misery of

human life, a deep pity for their fellow-men fell upon them; when he

extolled poverty, they felt disposed to renounce their wealth; when he

recommended the simple life, they readily abandoned the use of meat and

wine, of unguents and of warm baths[86]. Seneca quotes from him in full

an address on the vanity of wealth, which shews his teaching to be very

similar to that of the more famous Musonius[87]. He attached a special

value to the discipline which hardships bring with them[88]. He incurred

the dislike of Seianus, who defrauded him of his property and reduced him

to the position of a peasant[89].

[Sidenote: Cornutus.]

=125.= Our attention is next attracted by L. ANNAEUS CORNUTUS (circ.

20-66 A.D.), who was born in Africa, and entered the house of the Annaei,

presumably as a slave. There he received his freedom, and became the

teacher of the two poets Persius and Lucan; of these the former has left

us an attractive account of his personality[90]. He wrote in Greek, and

one of his works, ‘On the Nature of the Gods,’ is still extant. This book

is a development of the system which we see followed by Cicero in the

_de Natura deorum_ (based upon Posidonius), by which a reconciliation is

effected between the Stoic physics and the popular mythology. By means of

etymology and allegory, all that is incredible or offensive in the old

legends of the gods is metamorphosed into a rationalistic explanation of

the phenomena of the universe. Thus Zeus is the soul of the universe,

because he is the cause of life in all living things, Zeus being derived

from ζῆν ‘live.’ Apollo is the sun, and Artemis the moon: Prometheus

the providence that rules in the universe. Pan is the universe. Cronos

consumes all his offspring except Zeus, for time consumes all except

what is eternal. Hera, the air (Ἥρα from ἀήρ) is sister and wife of

Zeus, because the elements of fire and air are intimately associated.

The popularity of such a treatise goes far to explain to us the close

connexion now becoming established between the Stoic philosophy and the

practices of Roman religion.

[Sidenote: Seneca.]

=126.= Roughly contemporary with Annaeus Cornutus, but perhaps rather

older, was the famous Latin writer L. ANNAEUS SENECA (circ. 4 B.C.-65

A.D.). Born in Corduba in Spain, he may have inherited simple tastes

from his provincial origin; but it was the eloquence of Attalus which

moved him to a deliberate choice of the philosophic life[91]. Under

this influence he was at one time tempted to throw away his wealth;

whilst the Pythagorean philosopher Sotion induced him to become for a

time a vegetarian[92]. To the end of his days he adhered to the ‘simple

life’; he felt an aversion to wine, oysters, and all luxurious food; he

discarded hot baths and soft chairs as debilitating; and of perfumes he

would have only the best, that is, none at all[93]. He was an ardent

lover of books, and appears to us as the last Roman who made a systematic

study of Stoicism in the original authorities, and thus grasped the

system in its full extent. He did not however claim, like his teacher

Attalus, to be a wise man; far from that, he laments that he is still in

the deep waters of wickedness[94]. In an age when a governmental career

was freely open to talent, Seneca’s powers and industry carried him to

high political station, and greatly increased his inherited wealth. He

played a part in the court of Claudius, and in time became the tutor,

and ultimately the minister, of Nero. He did not possess the zeal of a

reformer, and doubtless tolerated many an abuse, and often bowed his head

before power even when linked with tyranny[95]. But if he did not imitate

the unbending stiffness of Cato, we have still no reason to credit the

personal calumnies that pursued him at court. Had his career as a whole

been a discredit to his philosophical profession, we may feel sure that

Juvenal would never have overlooked so sensational a contrast. For the

last few years of his life he resigned political power, that he might

devote himself to what he deemed a more important task, the exposition

of the practical teaching of Stoicism[96]. Finally he was, or appeared

to be, drawn into a plot against the emperor, and was called upon in

consequence to put an end to his life.

[Sidenote: His style.]

=127.= The literary style of Seneca was severely criticized by critics

almost contemporary with him. Gellius tells us that in his time it was

by many not thought worth while to read his writings, because the style

was found to be vulgar, the matter characteristic of half-educated men,

the argument petty and exaggerated[97]. Quintilian finds that much of

his work is admirable, but much also is tainted by a striving for cheap

effect and a want of solid knowledge[98]; and he thinks him in no way

comparable to Cicero[99]. This judgment is generally maintained in the

world of modern scholarship, with the result that Seneca’s works are

not read in our schools and universities, and are little known even to

professional scholars. On the other side we may set the extraordinary

popularity of Seneca both in his own times[100] and in those of the

Renascence. It is possible to argue that his style represents the true

tendency of the Latin language in his day, and that it is in the direct

line towards the modern style of French prose, generally considered the

best in the world. As regards his matter it is not possible to deny

that he repeats the same moral teaching many times in slightly altered

form[101], and that he seldom gives us a continuous or thorough treatment

of any important subject[102]. His writings may well be compared with

articles in our periodical literature and the hebdomadal productions

of our pulpits; they aim at immediate effect rather than at the slow

building up of ordered knowledge. Just for that reason they admirably

illustrate for us Stoicism in its practical application to daily life;

and the extraordinary popularity which they enjoyed for many centuries

seems to shew that they are in touch with deeply-rooted instincts of

humanity.

[Sidenote: His independence.]

=128.= Seneca claims to be an independent thinker, only adopting the

views of Stoic masters because their arguments convince him[103]. Still

he does not use the liberty he claims to assert any new principles, but

only to deviate occasionally in the direction of popular views. Thus he

frequently adopts some dogma of Epicurus or some Cynic paradox to point a

moral, and appears unconscious of the deep-lying differences which keep

these schools apart from Stoicism; and only in reply to some challenge

does he state with any care the Stoic position. This is particularly

the case with the problem of wealth, which both Epicurean and Cynic

disparage, but the true Stoic is called upon to defend as a ‘thing of

high degree.’ Yet when Seneca is called upon to defend his own possession

of wealth he states his case with admirable clearness.

[Sidenote: Weakening of Stoicism.]

=129.= It is perhaps partly due to his style that it appears at times

as if Seneca’s hold on Stoic doctrine was often weak. He has no real

belief in conviction and scientific knowledge: ‘if we try to be exact

everywhere, we shall need to keep silence; for there is something to be

said against most statements[104].’ For the detailed Stoic system of

logic he feels only contempt[105]. In physics however his interest is

keen, probably under the influence of his favourite Posidonius: he sets

forth with great clearness the theory of tone (τόνος, _intentio_)[106]:

he eloquently maintains the existence of gods, abandoning the

traditional proofs, and basing his conviction upon the moral sense in

man[107]: he holds firmly to the doctrine of the conflagration[108].

Still we have constant reason to doubt whether these beliefs are linked

together in his mind by any consistent principle. His ethics are marked

by a similar weakness: the Socratic ‘strength and force’ is wanting,

and is replaced by a spirit of quietism and resignation. The important

position which he has filled in Roman politics awakens no enthusiasm

in himself, nor does the greatness of the Roman empire excite his

admiration. His heart is in his books; to them he gives up entirely

his closing years. His wise man will not go out of the way to mix in

politics; rather he will carefully consider how he may avoid the dangers

of social strife[109]. This enfeebled moral teaching is found also in

the successors of Seneca, and in modern literature is constantly quoted

as true Stoic doctrine. But though Seneca’s philosophy finds him many an

excuse for his retirement, he would have been a more faithful disciple of

Zeno and Cleanthes if he had borne the burden of public life to the end.

[Sidenote: Musonius.]

=130.= To the same period as Seneca belongs C. MUSONIUS RUFUS, in whom

however we observe distinctly, what we may conjecture had also been

the case with Attalus, that ethical teaching is becoming divorced from

philosophical theory, and so the Cynic standpoint approached. Musonius

was a preacher with a singular impressiveness of address. Speaking

from the heart on matters of direct moral import, he won respect even

from those who were least willing to be guided by him. He disdained

the applause of his hearers, desiring instead to see each one tremble,

blush, exult, or stand bewildered according as the address affected

him[110]. ‘If you have leisure to praise me,’ he said to his pupils, ‘I

am speaking to no purpose.’ ‘Accordingly,’ said one of them, ‘he used to

speak in such a way that every one who was sitting there supposed that

some one had accused him before Rufus: he so touched on what was doing,

he so placed before the eyes every man’s faults[111].’ Amongst his pupils

were Aulus Gellius the antiquarian, Epictetus, and a certain Pollio who

made a collection of his sayings (ἀπομνημονεύματα Μουσωνίου), of which

extracts have been preserved for us by Stobaeus. They consist of moral

maxims (χρεῖαι) such as ‘Live each day as if your last[112],’ ‘Nothing

is more pleasurable than temperance[113],’ and discourses or ‘diatribes’

(διατριβαί) dealing with subjects such as discipline, endurance,

marriage, obedience to parents, and so forth[114]. In elevation of

standard these writings stand higher than those of the early Stoics; and

the influence of Musonius was so great that we may almost regard him as a

third founder of the philosophy.

[Sidenote: His part in politics.]

=131.= In public life Musonius played a conspicuous part; he was the Cato

of his generation, trusted by all parties for his absolute rectitude

of character, and respected for his fearlessness; but he was much less

out of touch with the real conditions of the Roman world. When in A.D.

62 Rubellius Plautus found himself unable to quiet Nero’s suspicions of

his loyalty, it was believed that Musonius encouraged him to await his

end calmly, rather than attempt rebellion[115]. After the conspiracy of

Piso, Musonius was banished from Rome by Nero, together with most of the

eminent personalities of the capital[116]. On Nero’s death he returned

to Rome, and when the armies of Vespasian and Vitellius were fighting in

the suburbs of the city, the senate sent delegates to propose terms of

peace. Musonius joined them, and ventured to address the common soldiers,

expatiating on the blessings of peace, and sternly reproving them for

carrying arms. He was roughly handled and forced to desist. Tacitus

speaks severely of this unseasonable display of philosophy[117]; and

certainly Rome would not have been the gainer if the issue had remained

undecided[118]. But that such an attempt was possible in defiance of all

military discipline speaks much both for the courage of the speaker and

for the respect in which his profession was held. Musonius continued to

play an honourable part in public life during the reign of Vespasian, and

retained the confidence of the emperor even at a time when his advisers

secured his assent to a measure for expelling other philosophers from the

capital[119].

[Sidenote: Euphrates and Dio.]

=132.= In the reigns of Titus and his successors pupils and converts

of Musonius played not inconspicuous parts in public life. Amongst

them was one EUPHRATES, of Tyre or Epiphania (circ. 35-118 A.D.),

who in his day won all hearts and convinced all judgments. ‘Some

persons,’ says Epictetus, one of his fellow-pupils, ‘having seen a

philosopher, and having heard one speak like Euphrates—and yet who can

speak like him?—wish to be philosophers themselves[120].’ Pliny made

his acquaintance in his native land, and was filled with affection for

the man. He found his style dignified and sublime; but especially he

noticed its sweetness, which attracted even his opponents. His personal

appearance was even more charming; he was tall, handsome, and the

proprietor of a long and venerable beard. His private life was beyond

reproach, and he was devoted to the education of his family of two

sons and one daughter[121]. He appears to have completely achieved the

reconciliation of philosophy with worldly success.

More ascetic in temper was DIO of Prusa (circ. 40-117 A.D.), who was

first an opponent but afterwards a follower of Musonius[122]. A Stoic in

theory, a Cynic in practice, he assumed the shabby cloak, and wandered

as a physician of souls. His eloquence succeeded in calming a mutiny of

soldiers which followed on the death of Domitian, and won for him from

a following generation the title of the ‘golden-mouthed.’ He was held in

high honour both by Nerva and by Trajan. A large number of his harangues

are still extant.[123]

[Sidenote: Epictetus.]

=133.= The influence of such teachers was at any rate widespread, and if

we suspect that Stoicism was already losing its intensive force as it

extended the sphere of its influence, in this it did but obey what we

shall see to be its own law of creative activity[124]. We still have to

consider the two teachers who are of all the most famous and the most

familiar; not however because they most truly express the substance of

Stoicism, but because they have most deeply touched the feelings of

humanity. These are EPICTETUS of Hierapolis (circ. 50-130 A.D.) and

Marcus Aurelius, who later succeeded to the principate. The contrast

between their positions has often excited comment, since Epictetus was

born a slave, and only obtained his freedom in mature years, that is,

after the death of Nero in 68 A.D. In reality it is characteristic of

the times that so many men of foreign and even servile origin rose to

positions of eminence and became the associates and teachers of men

of high official rank. In the great slave households, in particular,

of imperial Rome unequalled opportunities lay open to talent; the

‘educational ladder’ was everywhere set up to encourage the youth to make

the best of his gifts. Further, just as young nobles were frequently

enamoured of slave girls, so far superior to the ladies of their own

class in wit, gentleness of manners, and loyalty in the face of all

terrors and temptations[125]; so their elders found a delight in the

company of the thoughtful and intellectual men who came to the front

through the competition of the slave schools. Thus the emperor Claudius

chose his ministers amongst his freedmen, provoking thereby the sneers

of the Roman aristocracy, but greatly advancing the good government of

the Roman empire; and it was Epaphroditus, himself a freedman of Nero,

who sent the young Epictetus to study at the feet of Musonius Rufus.

Epictetus was a man of warm feelings and clear head; his addresses,

recorded for us by his hearer Arrian, serve admirably to stimulate

the domestic virtues and to keep alive the religious spirit; but his

teaching lacks the force which befits the training of a statesman or a

king. In logic he inclines too much to suspense of judgment, in ethics

to resignation. But he did not altogether miss the Socratic force: in

his youth he had gone about inquiring of his neighbours if their souls

were in good health, and even when they replied ‘What is this to you, my

good man? Who are you?’ he had persisted in giving trouble. Only when

they raised their hands and gave him blows had he recognised that there

was something wanting in his method[126]. Other young philosophers, he

felt, lacked this energy, and were men of words, not deeds[127]. Like

other philosophers, he was expelled from Rome by Domitian in A.D. 89,

when he retired to Nicopolis; there he gave lectures till the time of his

death[128].

[Sidenote: His Cynism.]

=134.= Epictetus was a vigorous opponent of the group of young

philosophers who delighted to display their talent upon the intricacies

of the Stoic logic, and in his early youth he was taken to task by

his teacher Musonius for underrating this part of philosophy[129]. He

came however to see the great importance of a thorough training in the

methods of reasoning, so that in practical life a man should distinguish

the false from the true, as he distinguishes good coins from bad. In

physics he lays stress chiefly on theology, and the ‘will of God’ fills

a large place in his conception of the government of the world. In his

treatment of practical ethics he makes free use of illustrations from

the social life of his own day: he finds examples of Socratic strength

in the athlete and the gladiator; and he makes it clear that the true

philosopher is not (as many believe the Stoics to hold) a man devoid

of natural feeling, but on the contrary affectionate and considerate

in all the relations of life. He has a special respect for the Cynic,

who appears in his lectures not as the representative of a differing

philosophical system, but as philanthropist, teacher, comforter, and

missionary. There is indeed in the addresses of Epictetus a complete

fusion of Stoicism with Cynism; and we trace in them pictures not only

of the Cynic system as a whole, but also of individual teachers like

Antisthenes and Diogenes, profoundly different from and much more human

than the representations of them familiar through other literature; they

are in fact pictures of Cynic teachers passed down or idealized by the

members of their own sect. By their side stand the pictures of Ulysses

the sage and Heracles the purger of the world, as they must have been

described from generation to generation by Cynic orators to their hearers

amongst the poor and the unhappy.

[Sidenote: Arrian.]

=135.= In the second century A.D. the professed teachers of Stoicism

must have been very numerous; with the death of Domitian persecution had

passed away. The philosophers were everywhere held in high esteem, and

in turn their whole influence was used in support of the existing state

of society and the official religion. In the early part of the century

FLAVIUS ARRIANUS (circ. 90-175 A.D.) is the most eminent of Stoics; and

it was noted that his relation to his teacher Epictetus much resembled

that of Xenophon to Socrates. To him we owe the publication of the

‘discourses’ (διατριβαί) which he heard Epictetus deliver. In A.D. 124,

when lecturing at Athens, he won the favour of the emperor Hadrian, and

was appointed by him to high public offices, in which he shewed himself

a wise administrator and a skilful general; in A.D. 130 he received the

consulship; and later he withdrew to his native town of Nicomedia in

Bithynia, where he filled a local priesthood and devoted himself to the

production of works on history and military tactics. To Stoic doctrine he

made no direct contribution.

[Sidenote: Rusticus.]

After Arrian had given up the teaching of philosophy for public life

Q. JUNIUS RUSTICUS succeeded to the position he left vacant. To him,

amongst other teachers belonging to various philosophical schools, was

entrusted the education of the future emperor M. Aurelius, who gives us

the following picture of the teaching he received:

‘From Rusticus, I first conceived the need of moral correction

and amendment; renounced sophistic ambitions and essays

on philosophy, discourses provocative to virtue, or fancy

portraitures of the sage or the philanthropist; learned to

eschew rhetoric and poetry and fine language; not to wear full

dress about the house, or other affectations of the kind; in my

letters to keep to the simplicity of his own, from Sinuessa, to

my mother; to be encouraging and conciliatory towards any one who

was offended or out of temper, at the first offer of advances

upon their side. He taught me to read accurately, and not to

be satisfied with vague general apprehension; and not to give

hasty assent to chatterers. He introduced me to the memoirs of

Epictetus, presenting me with a copy from his own stores[130].’

In Rusticus we may confidently trace a successor of the school of

Musonius and Epictetus.

[Sidenote: Marcus Aurelius.]

=136.= M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS PIUS (121-180 A.D.) is commonly spoken

of as ‘the philosopher upon the throne,’ but this description may

be misleading. Aurelius was in the first instance a Roman prince;

to the institutions of Rome and to his own position as their chief

representative he owed his chief allegiance. He was undoubtedly an

apt pupil of the courtly philosophers by whom he was surrounded; he

deliberately chose philosophy in preference to rhetoric, and of the

various schools of philosophy his judgment ranked Stoicism highest. He

was fairly well instructed, but by no means learned, in its doctrines; he

adhered with sincerity, but without ardour, to its practical precepts. In

the leisure hours of a busy life it was his comfort and his relaxation

to express his musings in the form of philosophic reflections. But his

attitude towards Stoicism is always that of a judge rather than that of

an advocate; and much that the school received as convincing reasoning he

rejected as ingenious pleading. Hence a large part of Stoic doctrine, and

almost the whole of its detailed instruction, disappears from his view;

but we have the advantage that the last of the Stoic writers brings out

into clearer relief those features of this philosophy which could still

rivet attention in his own time, and which therefore form part of the

last message of the ancient world to the coming generations.

[Sidenote: His belief in the cosmos.]

=137.= It follows at once from the judicial attitude of Marcus Aurelius

that he cannot countenance the Stoic claim to certainty of knowledge. The

objection of opponents that the wise man, who alone (according to Stoic

theory) possesses such knowledge, is nowhere to be found, is sustained:

‘Things are so wrapped in veils, that to gifted philosophers

not a few all certitude seems unattainable. Nay to the Stoics

themselves such attainment seems precarious; and every act of

intellectual assent is fallible; for where is the infallible

man[131]?’

Yet Aurelius does not relapse into scepticism. One doctrine at least

is so convincing that he cannot for a moment doubt it; it does after

all shine forth as true by its own light. It is that all things are

ultimately one, and that man lives not in a chaos, but in a cosmos:

‘All things intertwine one with another, in a holy bond; scarce

one thing is disconnected from another. In due coordination they

combine for one and the same order. For the world-order is one

made out of all things, and god is one pervading all, and being

is one, and law is one, even the common reason of all beings

possessed of mind, and truth is one: seeing that truth is the

one perfecting of beings one in kind and endowed with the same

reason[132].’

From the belief in a cosmos he is led on to a trust in Providence;

theoretically, because the doctrine of the chance clashing of atoms is

out of harmony with the belief in ultimate unity; practically, because

in such a conviction only man can find a starting-point for his own

activity. The choice is to him all-important; either Fortune or Reason is

king, and claims allegiance from all.

‘Is it the portion assigned to you in the universe, at which

you chafe? Recall to mind the alternative—either a foreseeing

providence, or blind atoms—and all the abounding proofs that the

world is as it were a city[133].’

‘The world is either a welter of alternate combination and

dispersion, or a unity of order and providence. If the former,

why crave to linger on in such a random medley and confusion? why

take thought for anything except the eventual “dust to dust”?

why vex myself? do what I will, dispersion will overtake me. But

on the other alternative I reverence, I stand steadfast, I find

heart in the power that disposes all[134].’

[Sidenote: His piety.]

=138.= Aurelius makes full use of the Stoic proofs of the existence

of the gods, but it soon appears to us that his attachment to the

established religion was not in any way founded upon philosophical

arguments. In discussing this point he displays a certain heat which we

have not yet had occasion to notice:

‘If indeed they [the gods] take no thought for anything at all—an

impious creed—then let us have done with sacrifice and prayer and

oaths, and all other observances by which we own the presence and

the nearness of the gods[135].’

Finally, he breaks away altogether from philosophy and rests his

convictions on personal experience:

‘To those who press the question, “Where have you seen the gods,

whence your conviction of their existence, that you worship them

as you do?” I reply—first, they are visible even to the bodily

eye; secondly, neither have I set eyes upon my soul, and yet

I do it reverence. So it is with the gods; from my continual

experience of their power, I have the conviction that they exist,

and yield respect[136].’

One further argument he held in reserve; the sword, the cross, and the

stake for the ‘atheists’ who refused to be convinced. He was, after all,

a king[137].

[Sidenote: Ethics.]

=139.= In ethics, Aurelius states the main principles of Stoicism with

clearness; but he altogether ignores the Stoic paradoxes, and does not

trouble himself with any detailed theory of the virtues and vices.

Firmness of character is to him the supreme good.

‘Be like the headland, on which the billows dash themselves

continually; but it stands fast, till about its base the boiling

breakers are lulled to rest. Say you, “How unfortunate for me

that this should have happened”? Nay rather, “How fortunate,

that in spite of this, I own no pang, uncrushed by the present,

unterrified at the future!” The thing might have happened to any

one, but not every one could have endured it without a pang[138].’

But in spite of these doctrines, we trace throughout his pages a tinge

of melancholy. Too apt a pupil of Epictetus, he had learnt from him the

principles of submission and resignation, but he had not acquired the

joyous confidence of an older period, through which the wise man, even

if a slave, felt himself a king. Rather, though a king, he felt himself

in truth a slave and a subject to the universe that was his master. He

would not go against the universal order, but he hardly felt the delight

of active cooperation. In this sense he represents to us the decadence

of Stoicism, or (to put it more correctly) Stoicism coloured by the

decadence of Rome.

[Sidenote: Absorption of the soul.]

=140.= On the question of continued existence after death Aurelius takes

up and emphasizes the teaching of Epictetus, ignoring the fact that other

Stoic teachers, from Zeno to Seneca, had taken larger views or at least

allowed themselves an ampler language. There had been, indeed, a change

in the point of view. The early Stoics, occupied with the question of

physics, had insisted upon the indestructibility of substance, and the

reuniting of the ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα) with the all-pervading spirit from

which it came at the beginning. The Roman school concerned itself more

with the question of individuality and personality. Accepting fully the

principle that that which is born must die, it comes to the definite

conclusion that that which we trace from the mother’s womb through

infancy and youth, through success and failure in life, through marriage

and the family ties onwards to weakness and dotage, must reach its end

in death. The ‘I’ cannot survive the body. The future existence of the

soul, if such there be, is no longer (as with Seneca) a matter of joyful

expectation, but of complete indifference.

Epictetus had expressed this with sufficient clearness:

‘Death is a change, not from the state which now is to that which

is not, but to that which is not now. Shall I then no longer

exist? You will not exist, but you will be something else, of

which the world now has need; for you also came into existence,

not when you chose, but when the world had need of you[139].’

Aurelius constantly repeats the doctrine in varied forms:

‘You exist but as a part inherent in a greater whole. You will

vanish into that which gave you being; or rather, you will be

re-transmuted into the seminal and universal reason[140].’

‘Death put Alexander of Macedon and his stable boy on a par.

Either they were received into the seminal principles of the

universe, or were alike dispersed into atoms[141].’

[Sidenote: Preparation for death.]

=141.= The saddened outlook of Marcus Aurelius upon life harmonizes

well with the resignation with which he contemplates a death, which for

himself individually will be the end. Hence it is that his reflections so

often make the thought of death a guiding principle of ethics; he who has

learnt to look forward calmly to his last act has learnt thereby to abide

patiently all the troubles which postpone it. Thus the last message of

the princely philosopher, as of his predecessor, is that men should ‘bear

and forbear’:

‘Contemn not death, but give it welcome; is not death too a part

of nature’s will? As youth and age, as growth and prime, as

the coming of teeth and beard and grey hairs, as begetting and

pregnancy and the bearing of children, as all other operations

of nature, even such is dissolution. Therefore the rational man

should not treat death with impatience or repugnance or disdain,

but wait for it as one of nature’s operations[142].’

‘O for the soul ready, when the hour of dissolution comes, for

extinction or dispersion or survival! But such readiness must

proceed from inward conviction[143].’

‘Serenely you await the end, be it extinction or transmutation.

While the hour yet tarries, what help is there? what, but to

reverence and bless the gods, to do good to men, “to endure and

to refrain”? and of all that lies outside the bounds of flesh and

breath, to remember that it is not yours, nor in your power[144].’

[Sidenote: His yearnings.]

=142.= Aurelius was no teacher of Stoicism in his time: his thoughts

are addressed to himself alone[145]. But the happy accident that has

preserved this work, which for nine centuries was lost to sight[146],

enables us to obtain a view of this philosophy from which otherwise we

should have been shut out. We do not go to Aurelius to learn what Stoic

doctrine was; this is taken for granted throughout the book; but we can

see here how it affected a man in whom the intellectual outlook was

after all foreshortened by sympathies and yearnings which had grown up

in his nature. The traditional criticism of the school as being harsh,

unsympathetic, unfeeling, breaks to pieces as we read these ‘thoughts’;

rather we find an excess of emotion, a surrender to human weakness. A

study of Stoicism based on the works of Aurelius alone would indeed

give us but a one-sided picture; but a study in which they were omitted

would certainly lack completeness. He is also our last authority. In the

centuries which succeeded, other waves of philosophic thought washed

over Stoicism, and contended in turn with more than one religion which

pressed in from the East. Yet for a long time to come Stoic principles

were faithfully inculcated in thousands of Roman homes, and young men

taught in childhood to model their behaviour upon the example of Zeno,

Cleanthes, and Epictetus formed the salt of the Roman world. If in riper

years they joined, in ever increasing numbers, the Christian church, they

brought with them something which the world could not afford to lose.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Dill, _Roman Society_, p. 340.

[2] ‘omnis natura habet quasi viam quandam et sectam quam sequatur’

Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 57. ‘est tuae prudentiae sequi eius auctoritatem,

cuius sectam atque imperium secutus es’ _ad Fam._ xiii 4, 2. ‘The sense

of the word has been obscured by a false popular etymology which has

connected the word with the Latin _secare_ ‘to cut,’ Skeat, _Etymological

Dictionary_, p. 537.

[3] See above, § 111.

[4] ‘dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria’ A. Gellius _N. A._ vi (vii) 14,

10.

[5] For a full account of his life and teaching see Schmekel,

_Philosophie der mittleren Stoa_, pp. 1-9.

[6] Strabo xiv 5, 16.

[7] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 51.

[8] ‘discipulus Antipatri Panaetius’ Cic. _Div._ i 3, 6.

[9] ‘credamus igitur Panaetio a Platone suo dissentienti? quem omnibus

locis divinum, quem sapientissimum, quem sanctissimum, quem Homerum

philosophorum appellat’ _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79.

[10] _Fin._ iv 28, 79.

[11] ‘tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem

sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit’ _ib._

[12] ἦν γὰρ ἰσχυρῶς φιλοπλάτων καὶ φιλοαριστοτέλης, ἀ[λλὰ κ]αὶ

παρ[ενέδ]ωκε τῶν Ζηνων[είω]ν τι δι[ὰ τὴ]ν Ἀκαδημίαν καὶ [τὸν Περίπ]ατον.

Ind. Herc. col. 61, quoted by Schmekel, p. 379.

[13] ‘quam vellem Panaetium nostrum nobiscum haberemus! qui cum cetera,

tum haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere’ Cic. _Rep._ i 10, 15.

[14] ‘ain’ tandem? etiam a Stoicis ista [de optima republica] tractata

sunt? non sane, nisi a [Diogene Stoico] et postea a Panaetio’ _Leg._ iii

6, 14.

[15] See below, § 310, note 52.

[16] ‘[accepi] Publi Africani in legatione illa nobili Panaetium unum

omnino comitem fuisse’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 2, 5.

[17] This date is determined on circumstantial evidence by Schmekel, pp.

2, 3.

[18] ‘Scylax Halicarnasseus, familiaris Panaeti, excellens in astrologia,

idemque in regenda sua civitate princeps’ Cic. _Div._ ii 42, 88.

[19] ‘omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae

cupidinem; in qua excellere pulchrum putamus; labi autem, errare,

nescire, decipi, et malum et turpe ducimus’ _Off._ i 6, 18; ‘cum sit is

[Panaetius], qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod honestum sit, quae autem

huic repugnent specie quadam utilitatis, eorum neque accessione meliorem

vitam fieri, neque decessione peiorem’ _ib._ iii 3, 12.

[20] ‘quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, id habet hanc, ut opinor,

sententiam, cum virtute congruere semper, cetera autem, quae secundum

naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent’ _Off._ iii 3,

13.

[21] ‘Panaetius, cum ad Q. Tuberonem de dolore patiendo scriberet ...

nusquam posuit non esse malum dolorem’ _Fin._ iv 9, 23; see however

below, § 322, note 132.

[22] See below, ch. xiii.

[23] ‘cuius [veri investigationis] studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra

officium est. virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit; a qua tamen

fit intermissio saepe, multique dantur ad studia reditus’ Cic. _Off._ i

6, 19.

[24] He was however a skilled grammarian; see Schmekel, p. 207.

[25] He wrote a book ‘on providence’; how far he or Posidonius is

Cicero’s authority for the treatment of the subject in _Nat. de._ ii has

been much disputed; on this point see Schmekel, p. 8, n. 4.

[26] ‘id de quo Panaetium addubitare dicebant, ut ad extremum omnis

mundus ignesceret’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 46, 118.

[27] Schmekel, p. 309, and below, § 211.

[28] Παναίτιος πιθανωτέραν εἶναι νομίζει καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρέσκουσαν αὑτῷ τὴν

ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τὴν τῶν ὅλων εἰς πῦρ μεταβολήν Ar. Did. fr. 36

(Diels).

[29] Schmekel, p. 309.

[30] ‘vim esse divinandi [Panaetius] dubitare se dixit’ Cic. _Div._ i 3,

[31] He came from Apamea in Syria, but is often described as ‘of Rhodes,’

as the latter part of his life was spent there.

[32] Schmekel, pp. 9, 10.

[33] _ib._ p. 428.

[34] Reid, _Cic. Acad._ Introd. p. 5.

[35] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ ii 25, 61.

[36] _N. D._ i 44, 123; ii 34, 88.

[37] ‘ecce Posidonius, ut mea fert opinio, ex his qui plurimum

philosophiae contulerunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 90, 20.

[38] See below, § 195.

[39] Also the _de Divinatione_ and the first half of _Tusc. disp._ i;

Schmekel, p. 98, etc.

[40] ‘de divinatione libros edidit ... quinque noster Posidonius’ Cic.

_Div._ i 3, 6.

[41] ‘animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt, disiunguntque se a societate

divina, vinclis corporis impediti’ _ib._ 49, 110.

[42] ‘deflagrationem futuram aliquando caeli atque terrarum’ _ib._ 49,

111.

[43] See § 322, note 132.

[44] ὁ Ποσειδώνιος [τὸ τέλος εἶναι εἶπε] τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων

ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν Clem. _Strom._ ii p. 416 B (Schmekel, p. 270); see

also below, § 321, note 125.

[45] Schmekel, p. 62.

[46] See below, § 214.

[47] Diog. L. vii 90; Schmekel, pp. 291, 292.

[48] Diog. L. vii 127.

[49] Schmekel, p. 294.

[50] See below, § 352.

[51] ‘plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium quaestionum;

sitne boni viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non alere? in

utramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad extremum utilitate officium

dirigit magis quam humanitate’ Cic. _Off._ iii 23, 89.

[52] _ib._ 23, 90.

[53] ‘nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri, | quo me cunque rapit

tempestas, deferor hospes’ Hor. _Ep._ i 1, 14 and 15.

[54] ‘qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 22, 69;

cf. _de Or._ i 11, 45.

[55] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 52 (Schmekel, p. 16); but see Pauly-Wissowa

s. v.

[56] i.e. the earlier part of the first century B.C.

[57] Diog. L. vii 34.

[58] ‘mihi nimis videtur submisisse temporibus se Athenodorus, nimis cito

refugisse’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 4, i.

[59] ‘apud Athenodorum inveni:—tunc scito esse te omnibus cupiditatibus

solutum cum eo perveneris, ut nihil deum roges, nisi quod rogare possis

palam’ _Ep._ 10, 5. But it is possible that the quotations are from the

younger Athenodorus.

[60] Cic. _Off._ ii 24, 86; but some think that Cato’s friend was an

earlier Antipater.

[61] Plutarch, _Cato minor_ 65-67 and 69.

[62] Reid, _Academics_, p. 2.

[63] ‘Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi, qui mecum vivit

tot annos, qui habitat apud me, quem et admiror et diligo?’ Cic. _Ac._ ii

36, 115.

[64] _ad Att._ ii 20, 6.

[65] _Tusc. disp._ v 39, 113.

[66] vii 1, 2, 24 and 28.

[67] ‘verba haec Hieroclis Stoici, viri sancti et gravis: ἡδονὴ τέλος,

πόρνης δόγμα· οὐκ ἔστιν πρόνοια, οὐδὲ πόρνης δόγμα’ A. Gellius, _N. A._

ix 5, 8.

[68] For a fair-minded estimate of Cicero’s services to philosophy see

Reid, _Academics of Cicero_, pp. 10-28.

[69] See next section.

[70] ‘de tertio [cum utile et honestum inter se pugnare videantur] nihil

scripsit [Panaetius]. eum locum Posidonius persecutus. ego autem et eius

librum arcessivi, et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi, ut ad me τὰ κεφάλαια

mitteret’ Cic. _ad Att._ xvi 11, 4. ‘Athenodorum nihil est quod hortere;

misit enim satis bellum ὑπόμνημα’ _ib._ 14, 4.

[71] He was head of the Academy at Athens, where Cicero heard him in the

year 79-78 B.C., and was patronized by Lucullus.

[72] ‘eadem dicit quae Stoici’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 22, 69. ‘erat, si perpauca

mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus’ _ib._ 42, 132. See further J. S. Reid,

_Academics of Cicero_, Introd. pp. 15-19, and notes to _Ac._ ii 39, 123

and 40, 126.

[73] ‘Brutus tuus, auctore Aristo et Antiocho, non sentit hoc [sc. nihil

esse, nisi virtutem, bonum]’ _Tusc. disp._ v 8, 21. ‘si addubitas, ad

Brutum transeamus, est enim is quoque Antiochius’ _ad Att._ xiii 25, 3.