THE PREACHING OF STOICISM.
[Sidenote: The companions of Zeno.]
=88.= During the later years of his life Zeno gathered round him a number
of men of practical and speculative capacity, not unworthy of comparison
with the companions of Socrates. His death dissolved the immediate
tie between them. Some took an active part in the work of government;
others followed their teacher’s example, and became the founders of
independent schools of thought; a few devoted themselves to strengthening
and extending Zeno’s system; and many were doubtless engaged in useful
employment of which no record has reached us. Zeno’s work had not yet
been exposed to the test of time, and another century was to pass before
it could be seen that the Stoic school was to be of permanent importance.
Towards the schools of the Cynics, the Megarians, and the Academics,
from which its principles were so largely derived, the attitude of
the hearers of Zeno was that of a friendly interchange of opinions,
in which sharp controversy stopped short of enmity; the followers of
Aristotle (the Peripatetics) continued to be but slightly distinguished
from the Academics. But all these schools appear to have united in
opposition to the Cyrenaics and Epicureans; the champions of virtue
could hold no communings with the advocates of pleasure. Individual
teachers who practically reverted to Cynic or Academic teaching still
called themselves Stoics: but the only one of Zeno’s hearers who adopted
Cyrenaic views was contemptuously branded as ‘the deserter[1].’
[Sidenote: Persaeus.]
=89.= The most intimate companion[2] of Zeno was PERSAEUS of Citium
(circ. 300-243 B.C.). He was the fellow-townsman of Zeno, and, as good
authorities assert, at first his personal servant (οἰκέτης)[3] and
afterwards his fellow-lodger. On the recommendation of Zeno he took
service, together with Aratus the poet, with Antigonus Gonatas, king of
Macedonia[4]. Here he was often twitted as to the Stoic paradoxes. King
Antigonus sent him messengers announcing the loss of his wife, child,
and property, and found that he was not entirely indifferent to external
circumstances[5]. He adapted himself easily to court life, and is said to
have written a treatise on the theory of the banquet, in which he did not
rise above the moral standard of his neighbours[6]. Nor did he disdain
to hoax Aristo of Chius, who held strongly to the paradox that ‘the wise
man never opines’; he first sent him money by one of two twins, and
then sent another to demand it back[7]. Another Socratic paradox, that
‘the wise man is sure to be a good general,’ he endeavoured to maintain
by his personal example[8]. Antigonus placed him in command of the
acropolis at Corinth, which was nevertheless taken by Aratus of Sicyon in
243 B.C. According to one account, Persaeus was wounded in the attack,
and afterwards put to death by the conqueror[9]; others relate that he
escaped to Cenchreae[10]. As a philosopher he is of little importance;
but Cicero mentions that he not only maintained that amongst the gods
were men raised to the sky for their services to mankind (which was an
accepted Stoic doctrine), but also that objects useful to man had been
deified[11].
[Sidenote: Aratus.]
=90.= Two other companions of Zeno also took service under Antigonus,
apparently at the same time. Of these PHILONIDES of Thebes[12] is
otherwise unknown to us. The other was ARATUS of Soli in Cilicia, author
of the well-known poem _The Phaenomena_, an astronomical treatise
afterwards translated into Latin by Cicero, and largely used by Virgil
in his _Georgics_. The poems of Aratus had a wide influence, and were
probably the source from which so many Stoic conceptions reached Virgil.
The most interesting part for us is the Introduction, in which he
interprets Zeus in Stoic fashion as the deity who dwells in sea and land,
in markets and streets: whose family is mankind; and whose providence has
set the stars in the heaven to regulate the seasons of the year and to
be a guide to the farmer and the sailor[13]. The spirit of this poem is
closely akin to that of the hymn of Cleanthes.
[Sidenote: Sphaerus.]
=91.= Still another hearer of Zeno took a prominent part in political
life. SPHAERUS from the Bosphorus (circ. 250 B.C.) was attracted to
Cleomenes III, king of Sparta, who under his influence reintroduced the
laws of Lycurgus in his city, and particularly those which referred to
the education of the youth and the taking of meals in common[14]. With
these he combined the plan of a monarchy after the Stoic model, in which
the sovereign was to side with the poor against the rich[15]. But in 221
B.C. Cleomenes suffered a crushing defeat, and was compelled to take
refuge with Ptolemy III (Euergetes), king of Egypt. Sphaerus found his
way to the same court. The death of Ptolemy III left Cleomenes in the
position of a disregarded suppliant[16]; but Sphaerus appears to have
found a congenial home in Alexandria, now the centre of Hellenistic
learning, and doubtless introduced the Stoic philosophy in the circle
that gathered round the Museum[17]. He gained a special reputation by the
excellence of his definitions[18]. From an anecdote related of him we
must infer that whilst adhering to Zeno’s doctrine that the wise man will
not opine, he accepted reasonable assurance (τὸ εὔλογον) as a sufficient
guide in daily life[19]. He appears to have laid special stress upon
the unity of virtue, maintaining that the separate virtues are but
appearances of virtue or knowledge in different spheres of action[20].
[Sidenote: Herillus.]
=92.= HERILLUS of Carthage (circ. 250 B.C.) is frequently referred to
by Cicero as teaching doctrines hardly distinguishable from those of
the Academy, in that he made knowledge the highest good[21], and taught
that separate from it, yet with claims of their own, there existed
inferior ends of action (ὑποτελίδες)[22]. It does not, however, appear
clearly that he differed much from Zeno. Sphaerus, as we have seen, had
defined the virtues as being ‘knowledge displayed in different spheres of
action,’ and the aim of Herillus, ‘to live according to the standard of
life accompanied by knowledge[23],’ points in the direction of practical
rather than of speculative wisdom. His ‘subordinate aims’ appear also
to correspond with Zeno’s ‘things of high degree’ (προηγμένα), and are
defined as being the first states to which an animal is attracted upon
birth, as food, life, strength (πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν)[24]; they serve only
for ‘ends’ (τέλη) for men who have not yet attained to wisdom[25]. This
doctrine corresponds closely to the Stoic doctrine as developed somewhat
later[26].
[Sidenote: Aristo.]
=93.= ARISTO of Chios (circ. 250 B.C.) departed more decidedly from
Zeno’s teaching, falling back generally on Cynic views. He was no
favourite of Zeno, who called him a chatterbox[27]: and in later life
he was accused of becoming a flatterer of Persaeus when the latter was
in power[28], and of luxury in his personal habits[29]. But his success
as a teacher was great, and he formed a body of followers who called
themselves Aristonians.
He appears to have supported Zeno vigorously as to the doctrine of
‘comprehension’; and if on this subject he was worsted for the moment
by Persaeus[30], he retaliated on some Academic by asking: ‘do you see
who is sitting next you?’ The Academic replied ‘I do not.’ ‘Are you
blind, then,’ said Aristo; ‘where are your eyes[31]?’ Still he considered
any systematic study of dialectics to be a mere waste of time; like
spiders’ webs, which seem to display much skill, but are of no use[32].
With regard to physics he was openly agnostic[33]; of the nature of the
gods he thought we could know nothing, not even whether the deity were
animate or no[34]. Ethics alone remained; but this part of philosophy he
reduced by omitting all practical precepts, as introducing the element
of uncertainty[35]. In ethics proper he rejects the theory of ‘things of
high degree’ (προηγμένα), observing that this term does not harmonize
with the treatment of advantages as ‘indifferent,’ but comes dangerously
near to calling them ‘good[36].’ Virtue, or rather knowledge, is, as he
maintains, the only good; and all that lies between good and evil is
alike indifferent[37]. The highest good may therefore be defined as a
state of indifference (ἀδιαφορία) towards all such things[38].
Aristo was however once more in agreement with Stoic doctrine when he
maintained the unity of virtue. ‘The soul,’ he said, ‘has one power only,
that of reasoning; one virtue only, the knowledge of good and evil. When
we need to choose the good and avoid the evil, we call this knowledge
Soberness; when we need to do good and not evil, we call it Wisdom;
Courage, when it is bold and cautious at the right moments; and when it
gives every man his due, Justice[39].’ But in deciding his action the
wise man will be bound by no theories: he can do whatever comes into
his head, provided only he keep himself free from distress, fear and
greed[40].
The popularity of these views was repressed by the activity of
Chrysippus; in Cicero’s time they were, in cultivated society,
extinct[41]. But from the numerous references to Aristo in literature
it is clear that his teaching was by no means forgotten; and when there
took place the revival of the Cynic tone which we see illustrated in the
writings of Epictetus and M. Aurelius, Aristo is again treated with high
respect[42].
[Sidenote: Eratosthenes.]
=94.= An eminent pupil of Aristo was ERATOSTHENES of Cyrene, the
grammarian, whom he won over from the Cyrenaic school. Eratosthenes
undoubtedly represented the spirit of his teacher and of the Cynic
school towards which he inclined, when he vehemently repudiated the
prejudice which then divided mankind into Hellenes and barbarians[43].
He was invited by Ptolemy III (Euergetes) to be chief librarian of the
Museum at Alexandria, and tutor to the crown-prince, and has left us an
epigram in honour of this great patron of learning and philosophy[44].
Amongst other followers of Aristo we hear specially of APOLLOPHANES of
Antiochia[45].
[Sidenote: Dionysius.]
=95.= Alone amongst the hearers of Zeno DIONYSIUS of Heraclea abandoned
his principles, and went over from the camp of virtue to that of
pleasure. A painful disease of the eyes had made him abandon the doctrine
that ‘pain is no evil[46].’ His secession was used by Antiochus as an
argument against the doctrine of comprehension or certain knowledge[47].
That his life after he became a Cyrenaic was openly scandalous[48]
we need not too readily believe: such accusations may easily be mere
deductions from his supposed philosophic principles. Dionysius appears to
have been a particular friend and admirer of the poet Aratus[49].
Of the less important hearers of Zeno we have the names of, amongst
others, ATHENODORUS of Soli[50], CALLIPPUS of Corinth[50], POSIDONIUS
of Alexandria[50], and ZENO of Sidon[50]. The last, if he existed, must
be kept distinct from other Zenos, such as Zeno of Tarsus the pupil of
Chrysippus, and Zeno of Sidon the Epicurean philosopher.
[Sidenote: Cleanthes.]
=96.= We come last amongst Zeno’s hearers to CLEANTHES of Assos in Asia
Minor (331-232 B.C.), who succeeded Zeno as head of the school when
already advanced in years, and presided over it for a whole generation.
In personal character he was a worthy successor of Socrates, Diogenes,
and Zeno. He was trained in hardship and willing endurance[51]; and if he
did not quickly understand, yet all he learnt was deeply impressed upon
him[52]. He studied Zeno’s life even more attentively than his doctrines;
lived with him, watched his hours of retirement, inquired whether his
actions corresponded to his teaching[53]. Himself a man of the people, he
ardently desired to spread his convictions amongst the many, and chose
verse as the best means to express clearly his meaning and win access
to men’s ears[54]. He remained constant to Zeno’s teaching[55], but he
inspired it with a fresh enthusiasm and developed it in more consistent
detail. He is before all things the theologian of Stoicism. The belief
in the deity, which in the fragments of Zeno’s teaching appears merely
formal and argumentative, becomes in the verse of Cleanthes ardent and
dominating. God is the creator and the director of the world; his Logos
gives it order and harmony. In God’s designs it is the privilege and duty
of man to cooperate; but since he is possessed of free will, it is also
within his power to make a futile opposition. In this way the good and
the bad stand in definite contrast. Finally, right knowledge and right
action are only possible by association with the deity through praise and
prayer.
[Sidenote: His poetry.]
=97.= It is our good fortune to possess several complete poems of
Cleanthes, which are of more value to us towards appreciating his
standpoint than a hundred detached sentences would be. The _hymn to
Zeus_[56] is the most important, and its likeness to the opening of
Aratus’ _Phaenomena_[57] will not escape notice.
_Hymn to Zeus._
Supreme of gods, by titles manifold
Invoked, o thou who over all dost hold
Eternal dominance, Nature’s author, Zeus,
Guiding a universe by Law controlled; 2
Hail! for ’tis meet that men should call on thee
Whose seed we are; and ours the destiny
Alone of all that lives and moves on earth,
A mirror of thy deity[58] to be. 5
Therefore I hymn thee and thy power I praise;
For at thy word, on their appointed ways
The orbs of heaven in circuit round the earth
Move, and submissive each thy rule obeys, 8
Who holdest in thy hands invincible
So dread a minister to work thy will—
The eternal bolt of fire, two-edged, whose blast
Thro’ all the powers of nature strikes a chill[59]— 11
Whereby thou guid’st the universal force,
Reason, through all things interfused, whose course
Commingles with the great and lesser[60] lights—
Thyself of all the sovran and the source: 14
For nought is done on earth apart from thee,
Nor in thy vault of heaven, nor in the sea;
Save for the reckless deeds of sinful men
Whose own hearts lead them to perversity. 17
But skill to make the crookèd straight is thine,
To turn disorder to a fair design;
Ungracious things are gracious in thy sight,
For ill and good thy power doth so combine 20
That out of all appears in unity
Eternal Reason, which the wicked flee
And disregard, who long for happiness,
Yet God’s great Law can neither hear nor see; 24
Ill-fated folk! for would they but obey
With understanding heart, from day to day
Their life were full of blessing, but they turn
Each to his sin, by folly led astray. 26
Glory would some thro’ bitter strife attain
And some are eager after lawless gain;
Some lust for sensual delights, but each
Finds that too soon his pleasure turns to pain. 31
But, Zeus all-bountiful! the thunder-flame
And the dark cloud thy majesty proclaim:
From ignorance deliver us, that leads
The sons of men to sorrow and to shame. 33
Wherefore dispel it, Father, from the soul
And grant that Wisdom may our life control,
Wisdom which teaches thee to guide the world
Upon the path of justice to its goal. 35
So winning honour thee shall we requite
With honour, lauding still thy works of might;
Since gods nor men find worthier meed than this—
The universal Law to praise aright. 39
_Translated by W. H. Porter._
=98.= Another short poem of Cleanthes identifies Zeus with fate, and
points the same moral as to human duty:
Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny,
What way soe’er ye have appointed me!
I follow unafraid: yea, though the will
Turn recreant, I needs must follow still[61].
In other poems characteristic Stoic doctrines are set forth with
clearness and emphasis:
‘Look not at common opinion, and be not eager to be wise of a
sudden; fear not the chatter of the many, in which there is no
judgment and no modesty; for the crowd does not possess shrewd
just and fair judgment, but amongst the few you may perchance
find this[62].’
‘Do you ask me of what kind the good is? Listen then. It is
orderly, just, innocent, pious, self-controlled, useful, fair,
necessary, severe, upright, always of advantage; fearless,
painless, profitable, without smart; helpful, pleasing, sure,
friendly, honourable, consistent; noble, not puffed up,
painstaking, comforting, full of energy, biding its time,
blameless, unchanging[63].’
‘He who abstains from some disgraceful action yet all the
while has desire for it, will some day do it, when he gets
opportunity[64].’
In the last of the passages we are introduced to an ethical paradox of
the highest importance to Stoicism: that good and evil are set in the
will and the intention, and are not dependent upon the action[65].
[Sidenote: Originality of Cleanthes.]
=99.= To the ancients Cleanthes was the faithful disciple of Zeno.
Persaeus, Aratus, and others had turned aside from the direct pursuit
of philosophy, and their contact with science and politics might easily
sully the purity of their philosophic creed. Herillus had adopted
Academic doctrine, Aristo had fallen back into Cynism, Dionysius
had actually seceded to the party of pleasure. It might seem that
the far-reaching sweep of Zeno’s intellect had no real hold on his
companions. But Cleanthes at least stood firm by the old landmarks. We
must not suppose from this that he was a man of no originality[66]; his
language and his style at least are his own. Nor on the other hand can we
go all the way with some recent writers, who attribute to him exclusively
large parts of the Stoic system[67]. Our authorities commonly refer
either to Zeno alone, or to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus jointly,
as vouching for accepted Stoic doctrine; and we are hardly entitled
to lay great stress on the comparatively few fragments of which the
authorship is assigned exclusively to Cleanthes, as evidence for the
independence of his teaching; especially as we can in many instances
see that our authorities delight in attributing a difference of meaning
to the Stoic masters, when in reality there is nothing more to be found
than a difference of phrasing[68]. It is however clear that Stoicism did
not assume its complete form in the hands of its first propagator; and
to a limited extent we can see the directions in which his teaching was
amplified by his successors.
[Sidenote: Physics of Cleanthes.]
=100.= Cleanthes took a special interest in the physical speculations
of Heraclitus, on whose writings he composed four books[69], and in
particular in the bearing of his speculations upon the nature of the
deity. The belief in the dualism of God and matter, of the Word and the
world, is attributed to Cleanthes as distinctly as to Zeno[70]; but
on the other hand the conception of an overruling unity is much more
pronounced in the later writer[71]. Hence from the first Cleanthes
endeavours to give a wider meaning to the primary fire of Heraclitus, the
creative fire of Zeno. For this fire he proposed the new term ‘flame’
(φλόξ)[72]; at other times he identified it with the sky[73], with the
sun[74], and with the principle of heat[75]; and finally adopted the
term ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα, _spiritus_), which has ever since held its place
in the discussion of natural theology. This term appears to have been at
first intended to combine the conceptions of the creative fire and of
the Logos[76], but it gradually came to have distinctive associations
of its own. Like fire, ‘spirit’ is to the Stoics a substance, stuff,
or body akin to the element of air, but associated with warmth and
elasticity; it is conceived as immanent in the universe and penetrating
it as the deity; immanent in the human body and penetrating it as the
soul[77]. The elasticity of spirit is measured by its ‘tension’ (τόνος,
_intentio_), by means of which its creative power pushes forward from the
centre to the circumference: as for instance in the human body walking is
effected by ‘spirit exercising tension towards the feet[78].’ The theory
of ‘tension’ has an immediate application to ethics. When the soul has
sufficient tension to perform its proper work, it operates according to
the virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness; but when the
tension is relaxed, the soul becomes disordered and is seized upon by the
emotions[79].
[Sidenote: Theology of Cleanthes.]
=101.= To Cleanthes also it fell to explain more fully the government
both of the universe and of the individual. Zeno indeed is said to have
used the term ἡγεμονικόν (_principale_, _principatus_)[80], which we
may translate by ‘ruling power,’ or shortly (following the Latin) by
‘principate[81],’ for the highest power of the human soul; Cleanthes
sought a similar principle in the universe also, and is said to have
found it in the sun[82]. By thus using the term in a double sense
he implies the analogy which is expressed by the correlative terms
‘macrocosm’ and ‘microcosm,’ and which leads up to the definition of
God as the ‘soul of the universe[83].’ Cleanthes further speaks of the
universe itself as god[84]; but before describing him as a pantheist it
is well to consider that this is only one form out of many in which he
expresses his creed. He was also the first to give the four proofs of the
existence of the deity upon which all discussions of the ‘evidences of
Natural Religion’ have been based down to the present day, and which we
shall further discuss in a later chapter[85].
The pious zeal of Cleanthes was not without a touch of bigotry, destined
to have serious consequences in the final developments of Stoicism, and
to reappear in the history of the middle ages with distressing intensity;
he was bitterly opposed to the novel heliocentric theory of the universe
as an impiety[86].
[Sidenote: Weakness of Stoicism.]
=102.= Thus even though we can no longer discriminate sharply between the
teaching of Zeno and that of Cleanthes, we have every reason to suppose
that the latter was possessed of originality of thought and vigour and
copiousness of expression. We cannot easily believe that a man of such
powers failed to attract hearers or to retain a hold upon them. But in
his extreme old age it seems that the majority were drawn aside either
to the ingenious arguments of Arcesilaus the Academic, or to the more
independent teaching of Aristo of Chios. The continued existence of
Stoicism seemed threatened; its critics were not to be contented with
rhetoric or poetry, but insistently demanded proofs. In this crisis it
was saved and established by a younger man, CHRYSIPPUS of Soli (280-206
B.C.), who was far inferior in original power, but equally zealous and
more in harmony with the tastes and demands of the younger generation.
[Sidenote: Chrysippus.]
=103.= Chrysippus was a fellow-townsman of Aratus of Soli, and his
appearance is doubtless a sign of the active interest in philosophy which
for some centuries marks the neighbourhood of the important town of
Tarsus. Born in 280 B.C. he found in his early manhood three prominent
teachers at Athens, Arcesilaus, Aristo, and Cleanthes. Of these Aristo
seems to have been the most popular, and surprise was expressed that
Chrysippus did not join his school. ‘Had I followed the many,’ he
replied, ‘I should not have become a philosopher[87].’ His convictions
drew him to Cleanthes, but he felt much impatience with his methods.
This state of mind he must have expressed freely, for in after life
he reproached himself that he had not behaved more kindly towards his
teacher in his old age[88]. Confident in his own powers, he desired to
relieve Cleanthes of the burden of replying to the many attacks made
upon his doctrines, especially as to dialectics[89]. It is well known
that he asked his master to supply him with his dogmas only, saying that
he himself would find the proofs[90]. Chrysippus probably outlived his
opponents, and during the time when he was head of the school (232-206
B.C.) only found himself opposed by men of mediocre talents. He devoted
his whole energies to strengthening and systematizing Stoic doctrine.
He not only gave its proofs, but used every art of the dialectician to
recommend it to his hearers[91]. From his facile pen there poured an
endless stream of writings, not remarkable either for originality or for
style, but of the highest importance as fixing definitely the standard
of Stoic orthodoxy. He gathered numerous hearers round him, and before
his death it could truly be said that he had saved the Stoa[92].
[Sidenote: Dialectic of Chrysippus.]
=104.= In his method of exposition Chrysippus made great use of the
syllogism, thus reverting to the practice of Zeno as opposed to the
more poetical style of Cleanthes. As to the value of this syllogistic
reasoning very contrary opinions were expressed in antiquity. By
his contemporaries he was greatly admired, so that it was said that
‘if the gods had needed a dialectic, they would have taken that of
Chrysippus[93].’ On the other hand members of his own school complained
that he often stated his opponents’ case more forcibly than his own[94].
The Romans mix their praise with censure, and find that he sometimes
entangles himself in the threads of his own argument[95]; and we
ourselves cannot fail to notice that when his major and minor premisses
are compared, the meaning of the common term has usually shifted[96].
But if Chrysippus did not provide a final solution to great problems,
he at least adapted the Stoic system to the taste of his age, alike by
his use of syllogisms and by the attention he paid to the solution of
fallacies[97].
[Sidenote: Opposition of the Academy.]
=105.= Whilst the works of Chrysippus cover the whole range of the
Stoic philosophy, their special colour is largely due to the interests
of his own time. The stress laid by Zeno on the certainty of knowledge
had produced a reaction in the Academic school. Arcesilaus, who had
succeeded Polemo as its leader, leaving on one side the positive teaching
of Plato’s later years, reverted to the sceptical attitude which had
been one characteristic of Socrates, and which is so prominent in most
of the Platonic dialogues[98]. He attacked with the utmost vigour Zeno’s
doctrine of ‘comprehension’; and further argued that certain knowledge
is unnecessary for practical life, of which probability, that is, such
action as can find reasonable justification, is the sufficient guide[99].
Chrysippus defended with the utmost energy the dogma of the certainty of
knowledge, based upon the perspicuity of true mind pictures[100]; but the
teaching of Arcesilaus obtained a hold upon him, and (as we shall see)
was ultimately allowed by him a place within the Stoic system.
[Sidenote: Spread of Epicureanism.]
=106.= Chrysippus meanwhile had a more dangerous enemy to meet than
the Academy. During the weakness which befel the Stoic school in the
middle of the third century B.C., the rival school of Epicurus had won
an enormous popularity. Yet its ethical standard, which it had inherited
from the Cyrenaics, offended not only the followers of Zeno but all
sober-minded philosophers. For Epicurus had set up Pleasure as the queen
of life, and had converted the virtues into her handmaidens[101]; and
so far was he from taking interest in model states, that he advised his
hearers to hold aloof altogether from public life. Worst of all, his
followers only smiled at the reproofs that were showered upon them.
They formed among themselves a cheerful, affectionate, and united
society; their simple pleasures created no public scandal, though their
entertainments were often enlivened by tales of the moral lapses of their
self-righteous rivals. The bracing morality of Cynism seemed to be quite
gone out of fashion, and even the Aristonians had ceased to exist.
[Sidenote: Alliance of the three schools.]
=107.= Under these circumstances the remaining schools began to look one
to another for support, and were even brought into a kind of alliance.
The adherents of the Academy and the Porch, in particular, began to meet
in friendly discussion, and sometimes defined anew their doctrines so as
to minimize points of difference, sometimes directly modified them by way
of concession to opposed arguments. This process resulted in a toning
down of Stoicism in every part of its system. The Stoic teachers began
to disregard or push into the background those characteristic doctrines
which had been embodied in the Socratic paradoxes and enforced by the
Cynic propaganda. Thus their teaching gave less offence to the lax crowd,
and at the same time (it must be admitted) less support to the striving
few; but its tone was now so modest that men of gentle and judicious
temperament were attracted to Stoicism for the first time. Stoicism
began now to shew itself receptive of literary influences, especially
as regards the works of Plato and Aristotle, and even appreciative of
artistic ideals. Such was the tendency of the system during both the
second and the first centuries B.C.; but it is more difficult to estimate
the extent of the deviation. Terms like εὐκρασία ‘well proportioned
mixture[102],’ εὔροια ‘even flow[103],’ εὐτονία ‘due tone[104],’ συμφωνία
‘harmony[105],’ are attributed even to the earliest masters: whilst it
is abundantly clear that the Socratic and Cynic paradoxes formed at all
times part of the generally accepted view of Stoic doctrine.
[Sidenote: Chrysippus inclines to the Academy.]
=108.= It is an interesting question, which perhaps needs further
investigation, to what extent this approximation between the doctrines of
the Academy and the Porch can be traced in the writings of Chrysippus.
On the one hand we must remember that Chrysippus was a man of distinctly
orthodox temperament; he firmly opposed the Cynizing heresies of
Aristo, and strongly defended the Stoic theory of knowledge against the
Academy. But our knowledge of the teaching of Chrysippus, abundant in
volume, is lacking in precision. Our authorities, as we have seen, very
imperfectly distinguish, and very inadequately record, the teaching of
the two earlier masters; and the doctrines which are regarded as common
to all Stoics must be assumed to be generally stated in the language of
Chrysippus, whose works remained for centuries the recognised standard
of orthodoxy. Even so there are few distinctive doctrines of Chrysippus
which do not seem to be foreshadowed in expressions attributed to some
earlier teacher. Yet we may fairly assume that in his ethical teaching
there was a substantial sacrifice of the forcefulness of the Socratic
character, and a corresponding approach to Academic views. This appears
when he defines the supreme good as ‘a life according to nature, that is,
both general nature and our individual human nature[106],’ and adds, ‘for
our individual natures are parts of the nature of the all[107].’ This
approaches the doctrine of ‘virtue appropriate to the individual’ (οἰκεία
ἀρετή), as taught by the Academics[108]. A still more striking concession
is his permission to men engaged in practical life to describe advantages
as ‘good things,’ provided they are carefully distinguished from the
supreme good[109].
[Sidenote: Successors of Chrysippus.]
=109.= The weakening hold of the Stoics upon the principles of their
founder first becomes evident in the department of physics. Thus it is an
essential part of the theory which the Stoics borrowed from Heraclitus,
that as the whole universe has proceeded from the all-creative fire, so
it must in due course be re-absorbed in it, this periodical re-absorption
being technically known as the ‘conflagration’ (ἐκπύρωσις). On the other
hand the followers of Aristotle, following dualistic principles, placed
God and the universe in eternal contrast, and held both to be immortal.
Ingenious controversialists now pressed the Stoics to explain how their
deity exercised his providence during the periodic intervals in which
the universe had no separate existence. This and like arguments had
an immediate effect. BOËTHUS of Sidon, a contemporary of Chrysippus,
abandoned altogether the Stoic theory on this subject[110]; ZENO of
Tarsus, who had been with his father DIOSCORIDES a pupil of Chrysippus,
and who succeeded him as head of the school, discreetly ‘suspended
his judgment’ upon the point[111]. But whatever its theoretical
embarrassments, the Stoic school continued to prosper. Zeno of Tarsus
wrote but few books, but had more disciples than any other[112];
he was succeeded by SELEUCUS of the Tigris[113], and he in turn by
Diogenes[114], Antipater, and Panaetius. The last of these maintained
Zeno’s ‘suspense of judgment[115]’ on the question of the conflagration;
but after his death the Stoics quietly returned to the older opinion.
[Sidenote: Diogenes and Antipater.]
=110.= DIOGENES of Seleucia (circ. 238-150 B.C.; often called ‘of
Babylon,’ or simply _Diogenes Stoicus_), and ANTIPATER of Tarsus (circ.
200-129 B.C.), were both men of eminence in the history of Stoicism[116],
but they were unequally matched against Carneades (218-128 B.C.), who
was head of the Academic school about the same time, and who proclaimed
the doctrine of a universal suspension of judgment. The many volumes
of Chrysippus gave Carneades ample opportunities for the exercise of
his critical powers; and Antipater, unable or unwilling to meet him in
open argument, fell himself into the evil habit of book-writing[117].
Both these teachers specially interested themselves in questions of
casuistry. Diogenes, who defined the good as ‘reasonableness in the
choice of natural ends[118],’ adopted practically that interpretation
of ‘reasonableness’ in which divine reason has the least part, and
human plausibility the freest play[119]. Thus he discusses the problems
whether the seller of a house ought to inform the purchaser of its
defects, and whether a man upon whom false coins have been passed may
transfer them to his neighbour[120]. Exactly as Carneades[121], he finds
‘reasonable excuse’ for the less scrupulous course. Antipater on the
other hand holds that a man’s duty to his neighbour requires perfect
frankness[122]; yet he is said to have abandoned the Socratic doctrine of
the self-sufficiency of virtue, and to have held that external goods are
a part (though only a small part) of the supreme good[123].
[Sidenote: Lesser Stoics.]
=111.= We may now shortly mention some less important Stoic teachers,
chiefly of the early part of the second century B.C., since their number
alone is an indication of the wide influence of the sect. ARISTOCREON,
said to have been the nephew of Chrysippus, set up a statue in his
honour, as the man who could cut his way through the knots tied by the
Academics[124]. ZENODOTUS was a pupil of Diogenes, and wrote an epigram
on Zeno: he at least defended the ‘manly doctrine’ of the founder, and
recalled the principle of the sufficiency of virtue[125]. APOLLODORUS of
Seleucia on the Tigris[126] (sometimes called Ephillus[127]), another
pupil of Diogenes, leant towards Cynic views; for he declared that ‘the
wise man will be a Cynic, for this is a short cut to virtue[128]’; an
opinion afterwards adopted by the Stoics generally[129]. He also wrote
on physics. A third pupil of Diogenes was APOLLODORUS of Athens[130].
Closely associated with Antipater is ARCHEDEMUS of Tarsus; like his
fellow-townsman, he was greatly devoted to dialectics[131]; in ethics
he appears to have inclined strongly to Academic views, holding that
the end of life was the regular performance of daily duties[132]. Just
about the time we have now reached (the middle of the second century
B.C.) Eumenes II founded the great library at Pergamus, intended to
rival that of Alexandria. As librarian he installed a Stoic philosopher,
CRATES of Mallos, who devoted much of his time to grammatical inquiries,
and endeavoured to bring Homer into accord with the Stoic views on
geography[133]; he is the first Stoic of whom we hear at Rome, which
he visited about 159 B.C. Being detained there by an accident, he
employed his time in giving lectures on literature[134]; and his pupil
Panaetius was destined to introduce Stoicism to Roman society. Lastly
we may mention HERACLIDES of Tarsus, a pupil of Antipater, said to have
broken away from the teaching of the school by denying that all sins
are equal[135]. Athenodorus of Tarsus, who held the same view, belongs
to a later generation[136]. Of uncertain date are BASILIDES, who pushed
his monism so far as to declare that all things, even statements, are
bodies[137]; EUDROMUS, who wrote on the elements of ethics[138]; and
CRINIS, who interested himself in logic[139].
FOOTNOTES
[1] See below, § 95.
[2] μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τῶν μαθητῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ἠγαπᾶτο ὁ Περσαῖος Ind.
Sto. Herc. col. xii 3 (Arnim i 437).
[3] ‘Zenonis Stoici servus, qui Persaeus vocatus est’ A. Gellius _N. A._
ii 18, 8. ἦν γὰρ ὄντως οἰκέτης γεγονὼς τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ὡς Νικίας ὁ Νικαεὺς
ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἱστορίᾳ καὶ Σωτίων ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς ἐν ταῖς
Διαδοχαῖς Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 452). On the other hand ‘nullum [servum
fuisse] Zenoni ... satis constat’ Sen. _Dial._ xii 12, 4.
[4] Arnim i 439, 440.
[5] _ib._ 449.
[6] Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 452).
[7] Diog. L. vii 162.
[8] Athen. as above.
[9] Paus. ii 8, 4; vii 8, 3 (Arnim i 442).
[10] Plut. _Arat._ 23, 3. According to Plutarch he afterwards admitted
that he had been wrongly taught as to the ‘good general.’
[11] ‘Persaeus eos dicit esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad
vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse
vocabulis nuncupatas’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 38. Persaeus derived the theory
from Prodicus; Philod. _de piet._ 9 (Arnim i 448), and above, § 42.
[12] Diog. L. vii 9.
[13] ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ’ ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν | ἄῤῥητον· μεσταὶ δὲ
Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί, | πᾶσαι δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα |
καὶ λιμένες· πάντῃ δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες. | τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν·
ὁ δ’ ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισιν | δεξιὰ σημαίνει, λαοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει |
μιμνῄσκων βιότοιο: Aratus, _Phaen._ Pref.
[14] Plut. _Cleo._ 11, 2.
[15] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 222.
[16] _ib._ p. 245.
[17] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 44.
[18] ‘Sphaeri, hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoici’ Cic.
_Tusc. disp._ iv 24, 53.
[19] See below, § 332.
[20] ‘fortitudo est ... conservatio stabilis iudici in iis rebus, quae
formidolosae videntur ... [haec definitio erat] Sphaeri’ Cic. as above.
The principle was accepted by all Stoics, see below, § 323.
[21] ‘omitto ... Erillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum
ponit; qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et
quam non multum a Platone’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 42, 129. See also _Fin._ iv 14,
36.
[22] ‘sin ea [quae virtus leget quaeque reiciet] non neglegemus neque
tamen ad finem summi boni referemus, non multum ab Erilli levitate
aberrabimus; facit enim ille duo seiuncta ultima bonorum’ _Fin._ iv 15,
40.
[23] ζῆν ἀεὶ πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ζῆν Diog. L. vii 165.
[24] ὑποτελὶς δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον τοῦ ζῴου πάθος, ἀφ’ οὗ κατήρξατο
συναισθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον τῆς συστασέως αὑτοῦ, οὔπω λογικὸν [ὂν] ἀλλ’ ἄλογον
Stob. ii 7, 3 c.
[25] διαφέρειν δὲ τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα· τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς
στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνον τὸν σοφόν Diog. L. vii 165.
[26] The best discussion is by Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_, ii 46 sqq. He
considers the teaching of Herillus to have inclined to Cynism rather
than to Platonism, and to have been substantially identical with that of
Aristo.
[27] λάλον ἐπέκαλει Diog. L. vii 18.
[28] Athen. vi 58 (Arnim i 342).
[29] _ib._ vii 14 (Arnim i 341).
[30] See above, § 89.
[31] Diog. L. vii 163.
[32] _ib._ vii 161.
[33] ‘nihil istorum [physicorum] sciri putat posse’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123.
[34] ‘qui neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat, neque in dis sensum
esse dicat; dubitetque omnino deus animans necne sit’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14,
37.
[35] ‘Aristo moralem quoque ... quam solam reliquerat, circumcidit’ Sen.
_Ep._ 89, 13. ‘hanc partem [quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta]
levem existimat, et quae non descendat in pectus usque’ _ib._ 94, 2: in
this letter the whole subject is very fully discussed.
[36] ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τὸ προηγμένον αὐτὴν λέγειν ἀδιάφορον τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῦν,
καὶ σχεδὸν ὀνόματι μόνον διαφέρον Sext. _math._ xi 64 (Arnim i 361).
[37] ‘Aristonis ... sententia, non esse res ullas praeter virtutes et
vitia, inter quas quicquam omnino interesset’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 17, 47.
[38] ‘huic [sc. Aristoni] summum bonum est, in his rebus neutram in
partem moveri, quae ἀδιαφορία ab ipso dicitur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 42, 130.
[39] Galen, _Hipp. et Plat._ vii 2 (Arnim i 374). Chrysippus is said to
have complained that he made the various virtues σχέσεις or variations of
a single virtue (Plut. _Sto. rep._ vii 3); nevertheless the same doctrine
frequently reappears in Stoic writers.
[40] ‘vives, inquit Aristo, magnifice atque praeclare, quod erit cunque
visum, ages: nunquam angere, nunquam cupies, nunquam timebis’ Cic. _Fin._
iv 25, 69.
[41] ‘Aristonis ... iampridem explosa sententia est’ _Off._ i 2, 6; cf.
_Fin._ iv 17, 47.
[42] N. Saal, p. 37 sqq. For fuller discussions of Aristo see Hirzel,
_Untersuchungen_, ii p. 44, and Dyroff, _Ethik_, pp. 43 sqq., 356 sqq.
[43] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii p. 161.
[44] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 207.
[45] Athen. vii 14 (Arnim i 408).
[46] ‘nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a
Stoicis propter oculorum dolorem; quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non
dolere, cum doleret! illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non
esse, quia turpe non esset’ Cic. _Fin._ v 31, 94; τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἡδονὴν
διὰ περίστασιν ὀφθαλμίας Diog. L. vii 166.
[47] ‘[quaerebat Antiochus], Dionysius ille Heracleotes utrum
comprehendisset, ... honestum quod esset, id solum bonum esse, an ...
honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 22,
71.
[48] Diog. L. vii 167; Athen. x 50 (Arnim i 428).
[49] Diog. L. vii 167.
[50] Diog. L. vii 38.
[51] He drew water by night that he might study philosophy by day,
according to Diog. L. vii 168. ‘Cleanthes aquam traxit et rigando horto
locavit manus’ Sen. _Ep._ 44, 3.
[52] Diog. L. vii 37.
[53] ‘Zenonem Cleanthes non expressisset, si tantummodo audisset: vitae
enim eius interfuit, secreta perspexit, observavit illum, an ex formula
sua viveret’ Sen. _Ep._ 6, 6.
[54] ‘sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit’ Sen.
_Ep._ 108, 10.
[55] ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔμεινε δογμάτων Diog. L. vii 168.
[56] Stob. i 1, 12 (Arnim i 537).
[57] See above, § 90.
[58] I follow the reading γενόμεσθα, θεοῦ. The words γένος ἐσμέν in the
text are surely a reminiscence of Aratus, _Phaen._ 5 (so Pearson, p.
276), and θεοῦ μίμημα is confirmed by Musonius ap. Stob. _Flor._ 117, 8
(see below, § 419). Mr Pearson now suggests to me that the MS reading
ἤχου may represent the correction of a pious scribe, Ι̅Ϲ̅ Χ̅Υ̅, i.e.
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ for θεοῦ. See below, § 244.
[59] The translation follows Pearson’s ἐρρίγασιν. Arnim reads ἔργα
τελεῖται. Even the meaning is quite uncertain here.
[60] μεγάλῳ μικροῖς τε (Diels) seems the nearest reading to the MS, so
that the word ‘great’ above refers to the sun only.
[61] ἄγου δέ μ’, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ’ πεπρωμένη, | ὅποι ποθ’ ὑμῖν εἰμὶ
διατεταγμένος. | ὡς ἕψομαι γ’ ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω | κακὸς γενόμενος,
οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι Epict. _Manual_ 53; ‘duc, o parens celsique dominator
poli, | quocunque placuit; nulla parendi mora est. | adsum impiger.
fac nolle, comitabor gemens, | malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.
| ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 107, 11. The
translation given above is by G. H. Rendall (_M. Aurel._ Introd. p.
lxvii).
[62] Clem. _Strom._ v 3, 17 (Arnim i 559).
[63] Clem. _Protrept._ vi 72 (Arnim i 557).
[64] Stob. iii 6, 3 (Arnim i 573).
[65] See below, § 317.
[66] As, for instance, Zeller does when he writes ‘Cleanthes was adapted
to uphold his master’s teaching, but he was incapable of expanding it
more completely, or of establishing it on a wider basis’ _Stoics_, p. 41.
[67] Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_, ii pp. 134 sqq.; Stein, _Psychologie der
Stoa_, i 65-72, 162-171, ii 316-332.
[68] Sen. _Ep._ 113, 23.
[69] Diog. L. vii 174.
[70] _ib._ 134.
[71] ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum ... deum dicit esse’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 37.
[72] Arnim i 497, 511.
[73] ‘ultimum et altissimum et omnia complexum ardorem, qui aether
nominetur’ Cic. as in note 71.
[74] Cic. _N. D._ ii 15, 41.
[75] ‘sic res se habet, ut omnia, quae alantur et quae crescant,
contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent neque crescere’
_ib._ 9, 23.
[76] ‘haec (quae Zeno dixit λόγον esse) Cleanthes in spiritum congerit
quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat’ Tert. _Apol._ 21 (Arnim i 533).
[77] The substance of this doctrine is attributed to Zeno also: Ζήνων ...
πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν Diog. L. vii 157.
[78] See below, § 277.
[79] Pearson, _Introd._ p. 45; below, § 362.
[80] Arnim i 143.
[81] There is a slight inconvenience, but also a real advantage, in using
this term both in its philosophic sense for the governing part of the
soul, and historically for the system of government founded by Augustus.
There is a genuine analogy between the two, though it is not developed by
the Latin writers. Seneca uses _principale_ only.
[82] ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι Euseb.
_pr. ev._ xv 15, 7 (Arnim i 499); and see below, § 201.
[83] Κλεάνθης [τὸν θεὸν] τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν Aët. i 7, 17 (Arnim i 532);
‘totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen [dei]’ Cic. _N. D._ i
14, 37.
[84] ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse’ _ib._
[85] Cic. _N. D._ ii 5, 13-15; and see below, ch. x.
[86] See below, § 195.
[87] εἰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἶπε, προσεῖχον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφιλοσόφησα Diog. L. vii
182.
[88] ἐγὼ δὲ τἄλλα μακάριος πέφυκ’ ἀνὴρ | πλὴν εἰς Κλεάνθην· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ
εὐδαιμονῶ Diog. L. vii 179.
[89] _ib._ 182.
[90] _ib._ 179.
[91] ‘num contentus est [Chrysippus] docere, rem ostendere, definire,
explorare? non est contentus: verum auget in quantum potest, exaggerat,
praemunit, iterat, differt, recurrit, interrogat, describit, dividit,
personas fingit, orationem suam alii accommodat’ Fronto, _ep. ad Ant._ p.
146 (Arnim ii 27).
[92] ὅθεν φασὶν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ λεχθῆναι, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν
στοά Diog. L. vii 183.
[93] Diog. L. vii 180.
[94] ‘de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose omnia conquisierit contra
sensus et perspicuitatem ... ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem fuisse;
itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneaden’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 27, 87; cf. Plut.
_Sto. rep._ x 3 and 4.
[95] ‘ab Chrysippo nihil magnum nec magnificum desideravi, qui suo quodam
more loquitur, ut omnia verborum momentis, non rerum ponderibus examinet’
Cic. _Rep._ iii 8, 12; ‘ad Chrysippi laqueos revertamur’ _de Fato_ 4, 7;
‘Chrysippus, penes quem subtile illud acumen est et in imam penetrans
veritatem, qui rei agendae causa loquitur et verbis non ultra quam ad
intellectum satis est utitur, totum librum his ineptiis replet’ Sen.
_Ben._ i 3, 8; ‘magnum mehercule virum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius acumen
nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur’ _ib._ 4, 1.
[96] ‘quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne
est honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 8, 27.
[97] See below, §§ 162, 163.
[98] ‘Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque
Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut
animo percipi possit’ Cic. _de Orat._ iii 18, 67. See above, § 71.
[99] ὁ προσέχων τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει Sext. _math._ vii
158.
[100] ‘cum Chrysippus, Academicos refellens, permulto clariora et
certiora esse dicat, quae vigilantibus videantur, quam quae somniantibus’
Cic. _Div._ ii 61, 126; see further, § 147.
[101] See below, § 346.
[102] See Pearson, _Cle._ fr. 42.
[103] According to Stob. ii 7, 6 e this term was used by all the Stoic
teachers.
[104] Used by Chrysippus, see Arnim iii 473.
[105] Diog. L. vii 88.
[106] φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ᾗ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν
καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην _ib._ vii 89.
[107] μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου _ib._ 87.
[108] See above, § 71.
[109] δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθά Plut. _Sto. rep._
30, 4.
[110] Philo, _inc. mund._ 15, p. 248 (Arnim iii Boëth. 7).
[111] τὸν μὲν γὰρ τούτου [sc. Chrysippi] μαθητὴν καὶ διάδοχον τῆς σχολῆς
Ζήνωνά φασιν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels
(Arnim iii Z. T. 5).
[112] Diog. L. vii 35.
[113] Ind. Sto. Herc. col. 48 (Arnim iii Z. T. 2).
[114] See Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 50.
[115] See below, § 115.
[116] ‘aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud
Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo’ Cic. _Off._ iii 12, 51;
‘Antipater inter magnos [Stoicae] sectae auctores’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 5.
[117] Plut. _de garr._ 23.
[118] τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ Diog. L. vii 88; for the
Academic view see § 71 above.
[119] See below, §§ 159, 332.
[120] Cic. _Off._ iii 13, 54; 23, 91.
[121] _Rep._ iii 20, 30.
[122] ‘tu cum hominibus consulere debeas, ... celabis homines’ _Off._ iii
13, 52.
[123] ‘Antipater ... aliquid se tribuere dicit externis, sed exiguum
admodum’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 5.
[124] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 2, 5.
[125] Diog. L. vii 30.
[126] Arnim iii p. 259; see also Pauly-Wissowa _sub voce_.
[127] So Diog. L. vii 39, where however others read Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ
Σύλλος.
[128] Diog. L. vii 121.
[129] _ib._ vi 104.
[130] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 53: also a pupil of Antipater; to be
distinguished from an Apollodorus of Athens who was an Epicurean; Diog.
L. vii 181.
[131] ‘duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archedemus,
opiniosissimi homines’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 143.
[132] πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντα ζῆν Diog. L. vii 88.
[133] Sandys, _Classical Scholarship_, i pp. 155, 156.
[134] _ib._ p. 157.
[135] Diog. L. vii 121.
[136] See below, §§ 122, 123.
[137] Arnim iii p. 268.
[138] Diog. L. vii 39.
[139] _ib._ 76.