CHAPTER III._Roman Stoicism being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire

THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH.

[Sidenote: Political changes of the 4th century.]

=58.= Before a hundred years had passed since the death of Socrates,

the face of the Greek world had been completely changed. Athens,

Lacedaemon, Corinth, Thebes, which had been great powers, had sunk into

comparative insignificance; their preeminence was gone, and even of

their independence but little remained. Throughout Greece proper the

Macedonian was master. But if the old-fashioned politician suffered a

bitter disappointment, and the adherents of the old polytheism despaired

of the future, there was rich compensation for the young and the hopeful.

Petty wars between neighbouring cities, with their wearisome refrain

‘and the men they killed, and the women and children they enslaved[1],’

began to be less common; internal and still more murderous strife between

bigoted oligarchs or democrats began to be checked from without. For

the enlightened Greek a new world of enterprise had been opened up in

the East. Alexander the Great had not only conquered Asia Minor, and

established everywhere the Greek language and a Greek bureaucracy; he

had opened the way to the far East, and pointed out India and even China

as fields for the merchant and the colonizer. His work had been partly

frustrated by the disorders that followed his death; but if achievement

was thus hindered, hopes were not so quickly extinguished. These new

hopes were not likely to be accompanied by any lasting regrets for the

disappearance of ancient systems of government now regarded as effete

or ridiculous, or of inherited mythologies which were at every point in

conflict with the moral sense[2].

[Sidenote: East and West.]

=59.= The same historic events which opened the East to Hellenic

adventurers also made the way into Europe easy for the Oriental. As

the soldier and the administrator travelled eastward, so the merchant

and the philosopher pushed his way to the West. Not merely in Persia

had ancient superstitions been swept away by reforming zeal; the Jews

were now spreading from town to town the enthusiasm of a universalized

religion which was ridding itself of bloody sacrifices; and, for the time

at least, the humane philosophy of the Buddha was dominant in India, was

being preached far and wide by self-sacrificing monks, and was inspiring

the policy of great monarchies. We find it hard to picture the clashing

of ideals, enthusiasms, and ambitions which was at this time taking place

in all the great cities of the old world; but it is certain that in the

universal excitement the old distinctions of Greek and barbarian, Jew and

Gentile, rich and poor, free and slave, man and woman were everywhere

becoming weakened, and community of thought and temperament were

beginning to reunite on a new basis individuals who had broken loose from

the ties of ancient society.

[Sidenote: New schools of philosophy.]

=60.= During this fourth century B.C. the foundations were laid of the

four philosophical schools which were destined to vie one with another

for the allegiance of the Roman world. The Socratic schools which we have

already mentioned, those of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, did not perhaps

altogether die out; in particular the Cynic missionaries appear to have

been a social force until the second century B.C. But their intellectual

basis was too narrow to admit of their effective transplantation to

new soil. At the end of the century each gave place to a new school,

which preserved the central doctrines of its predecessor. The Socratic

paradoxes were handed on from the Cynics to the Stoics; the doctrine that

pleasure is the good was accepted by Epicurus. Stoics and Epicureans

disputed with a bitterness as yet unequalled, finding themselves just

as much opposed upon the subjects of logic and physics, which they

introduced anew into popular philosophy, as upon the questions of ethics

on which their antipathies were inherited. Between them stood two schools

which had meanwhile established themselves. Plato, himself a companion of

Socrates, founded the Academy at Athens about 380 B.C.; and if he did not

impress his own teaching upon it with absolute fixity, still the school

flourished under a succession of leaders, always proud of the fame of

its founder, and rendering him at least a nominal allegiance. From the

Academy branched off the school of the Peripatetics, founded by Plato’s

pupil Aristotle about 350 B.C. After Aristotle’s death this school

gravitated towards the Academics, and in later centuries there seemed

little difference, if any, between the two. If Stoicism may be called

the child of Cynism, it largely drew nourishment from these two schools

and their founders. Some account of the teaching of Plato and Aristotle

is therefore needed here, partly because of the great importance of both

in the general history of philosophy, partly because of their direct

influence upon the subject of this book. On account of the much greater

prominence of the Academy in the later history we shall often use this

term to refer to the general teaching of the two allied schools.

[Sidenote: Plato.]

=61.= Of all the companions of Socrates far the most famous is PLATO of

Athens (427-347 B.C.), the founder of the philosophical association known

as the ‘Academy.’ In the general judgment of lovers of Greek letters he

stands out not merely as a great master of Attic prose style, but also

as the ablest exponent of the true mind of Socrates[3], and the most

brilliant light of Greek philosophy[4]. On the first point this judgment

stands unchallenged; for delicate and good-natured wit, felicity of

illustration and suggestiveness of thought the Platonic dialogues are

unrivalled. But it is only in his earlier writings that we can accept

Plato as a representative of Socrates; after the death of his master he

travelled for many years in Egypt, Lower Italy, and Sicily, and absorbed

in particular much of the teaching of the Pythagoreans. The theory

of ‘ideas,’ the special characteristic of Plato’s later work, is not

strictly Socratic. Neither, we must add, is it of first-rate importance

in the history of human thought; from our point of view it lies apart

from the main current both of speculation and of practice. It was a

still-born theory, not accepted even by Plato’s successors in the control

of the Academy[5]. We are therefore very little concerned with the direct

teaching of Plato; but all the more readily it should be acknowledged

that the Stoics were often indebted to him for help in the treatment of

important details, and that the Platonic attitude remained for them a

factor of which they needed continuously to take account.

[Sidenote: Plato’s realism.]

=62.= A striking feature of the Platonic dialogues is that their results

are usually negative. First the opinions of the crowd, then those of

Socrates’ contemporaries the ‘sophists’ and of the other Socratic schools

are subjected to a cross-examination, under which they are one and

all shewn to be unreasonable. This cross-examination is quite in the

Socratic spirit, and is before all things a mental gymnastic, training

the dialectician to observe with keener eye and to discuss with apter

tongue than his fellows. Gradually there emerges from a mass of doubts

something like a positive theory that Plato is prepared to adopt. The

true reasoning is that of induction from the particular to the general,

from the individual to the class. In the class name we come upon the true

being of the individual, and by a right definition of it we discern what

each thing really is. The ‘idea,’ which corresponds to the class name,

is alone really existent; the individual is a more or less imperfect

imitation of it (μίμησις). In this way Plato found what seemed to him a

solution of a difficulty which Socrates hardly felt, that of explaining

the participation (μέθεξις) of the particular in the general (ὑπόθεσις

or ἰδέα). Thus where ordinary men see ‘horses,’ and Antisthenes holds

that they are right, Plato sees ‘horsiness,’ or the idea of ‘horse.’ In

the language of medieval philosophy Plato is a _realist_, that is, one

who holds that our Ideas are more than what men mean when they say ‘mere

ideas’; that they are Realities, and have their being in a truly existing

world; and that in knowing them we know what _is_. But just as Plato

holds that general conceptions are alone true and real, so he necessarily

maintains that objects perceivable by the senses are only half-real, and

that the ordinary man lives in a world of illusions. Thus the thoughts

of the philosopher are separated by an abyss from the world in which men

live and die.

[Sidenote: God and the soul.]

=63.= Upon the basis of the individual ‘ideas’ Plato builds up by a

process of classification and induction higher and smaller classes of

ideas, until we begin to see the vision of a single idea, a class which

includes all classes, a supreme ‘being’ from which all being is derived.

This highest idea is variously suggested by the names ‘the Good,’ ‘the

Beautiful,’ ‘the One.’ By a sudden transformation it becomes the Creator

(δημιουργός) of the universe. Containing in itself all being, it needs

for its operation some kind of formless and inert matter; for this the

name ἄπειρον, ‘the unlimited,’ is taken from Anaximander. The whole

created universe may be considered as the joint production of the ‘idea’

and the ‘unlimited’; and the cosmology of Anaxagoras, ‘all things were

together, and mind came and ordered them,’ is substantially justified.

The world thus created is both good and beautiful, for it is made by a

good Creator on the best of patterns.

The human soul is of triple nature. The highest part, the rational soul

(τὸ λογιστικόν), is seated in the head; the emotional soul (τὸ θυμοειδές)

in the heart; the appetitive soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) in the belly. Over

these two lower souls the reasoning part should hold control, as a driver

over two unruly steeds[6]. The rational soul has existed before birth,

and may hope for immortality, for it is knit up with the idea of ‘being.’

Ultimately it may even attain to perfection, if it is purified as by

fire from baser elements that have attached themselves to it.

[Sidenote: Ethics and Politics.]

=64.= Plato himself does not formulate an ethical ideal of the same

precision that his successors used, but we infer from his works a goal

towards which he points. Thus the ethical end for each man is the

greatest possible participation in the idea of the good, the closest

attainable imitation of the deity. The virtue of each part of the

human soul lies in the fit performance of its proper work; that of

the reasoning soul is Wisdom (σοφία); of the emotional soul Courage

(ἀνδρεία); of the appetitive soul Soberness (σοφροσύνη). Over all (it

is hinted rather than stated) rules the supreme virtue of Justice

(δικαιοσύνη), assigning to each part its proper function. Thus the

four cardinal virtues are deduced as a practical application from the

Platonic psychology. The high position assigned to Justice leads up to

the practical doctrine of Moderation (μετριότης); even the virtues are

restricted both in their intensity and in their spheres of work, and if

any virtue passes its proper limit it becomes changed into the vice that

borders on it. Thus the ideal of practical life is the ‘moderate man,’

calm, considerate, and self-respecting, touched with a warm flow of

feeling, but never carried away into excitement; and even this ideal is

strictly subordinate to that of the life of philosophic contemplation.

The ideal State is modelled on the individual man. To the three parts of

the soul correspond three classes of citizens; the rulers, whose virtue

is Wisdom; the guardians, on whom Courage is incumbent; the labourers and

tradesmen, who owe the State Soberness and obedience. Thus the political

system to which Plato leans is that of an Aristocracy; for the middle

class in his state has only an executive part in the government, and the

lower orders are entirely excluded from it.

[Sidenote: Aristotle.]

=65.= By far the greatest of Plato’s pupils was ARISTOTLE of Stagira

(384-322 B.C.), who introduced into philosophy, now convulsed by the

disputes of the disciples of Socrates, a spirit of reconciliation. From

his point of view the various contentions are not so much erroneous as

defective. To attain the truth we need first to collect the various

opinions that are commonly held, and then to seek the reconciling formula

of which each one is a partial statement.

[Sidenote: The ten categories.]

=66.= In his investigation Aristotle did not altogether break with

Plato’s theory of ideas, but brought them from a transcendental world

into touch with common life. He held fast to the method of induction

(ἐπαγωγή) from the particular to the general, and agreed that we

reach the true nature of each thing when we have determined the

class-conception. But the class-conception or idea (ἰδέα), though the

most real existence, does not exist independently, but only in and

through the particulars, which compose the class. Having thus come to

see that there are gradations of existence, we need to inquire what

these are; and to classify the various kinds of judgment with regard to

which we inquire whether they are true or false. Now by observation we

find that judgments or predications have ten different shapes, to which

therefore there must correspond ten kinds of existence. These are the

well-known ‘categories’ of Aristotle, and are as follows:

(i) ‘substance,’ as when we say ‘this is a man,’ ‘a horse’;

(ii) ‘quantity,’ as that he is ‘six feet high’;

(iii) ‘quality,’ as ‘a grammarian’;

(iv) ‘relation,’ as ‘twice as much’;

(v) ‘place,’ as ‘at Athens’;

(vi) ‘time,’ as ‘last year’;

(vii) ‘position,’ as ‘lying down’;

(viii) ‘possession,’ as ‘with a sword’;

(ix) ‘action,’ as ‘cuts’; and

(x) ‘passion,’ as ‘is cut’ or ‘is burned.’

Aristotle thus reinstates the credit of the common man; he it is who

possesses the substance of truth and gives it habitual expression by

speech, even roughly indicating the various kinds of existence by

different forms of words. It is now indicated that a study of grammar is

required as the foundation of logic.

Aristotle also greatly advanced the study of that kind of reasoning which

proceeds from the general to the particular, and which is best expressed

in terms of the ‘syllogism’ (συλλογισμός), of which he defined the

various forms.

[Sidenote: The four causes.]

=67.= In the study of physics Aristotle picks up the thread which

Socrates had dropped deliberately, that is, the teaching of the Ionic

philosophers. Either directly from Empedocles, or from a _consensus_ of

opinion now fairly established, he accepted the doctrine of the four

elements (στοιχεῖα), earth, water, air, and fire; but to these he added a

fifth (πεμπτὸν στοιχεῖον, _quinta essentia_), the aether, which fills the

celestial spaces. Behind this analysis lies the more important problem

of cosmology, the question how this world comes to be. Collecting once

more the opinions commonly held, Aristotle concludes that four questions

are usually asked, and that in them the search is being made for four

‘causes,’ which will solve the respective questions. The four causes are:

(i) the Creator, or ‘efficient cause,’ answering the question;—Who

made the world?

(ii) the Substance, or ‘material cause’;—of what did he make it?

(iii) the Plan, or ‘modal cause’;—according to what design?

(iv) the End, or ‘final cause’;—for what purpose?[7]

Reviewing these ‘causes’ Aristotle concludes that the first, third, and

fourth are ultimately one, the Creator containing in his own nature

both the plan and the purpose of his work[8]. The solution is therefore

dualistic, and agrees substantially with that of Plato; the ultimate

existences are (i) an informing power, and (ii) matter that has the

potentiality of accepting form.

In consequence of this dualism of Aristotle the term ‘matter’ (ὕλη,

_materia_) has ever since possessed associations which did not belong to

it in the time of the hylozoists. Matter now begins to suggest something

lifeless, inert, and unintelligent; and to be sharply contrasted not

only with such conceptions as ‘God’ and ‘mind,’ but also with motion and

force. For this reason the Stoics in reintroducing monism preferred a new

term, as we shall see below[9].

[Sidenote: The microcosm.]

=68.= What God is to the universe, that the soul is to the body, which

is a ‘little universe[10].’ But the reasoning part of the soul only is

entirely distinct; this is of divine nature, and has entered the body

from without; it is at once its formative principle, its plan, and its

end. The lower parts of the soul are knit up with the body, and must

perish with it. So far Aristotle’s teaching differs little from that of

Plato; but a new point of view is introduced when he speaks of the soul

as subject to ‘diseases’ (παθήματα), and thus assigns to the practical

philosopher a social function as the comrade of the physician. Amongst

the diseases he specially names Pity and Fear, which assail the emotional

part of the soul. Their cure is found in ‘purging’ (κάθαρσις), that

is to say in their complete expulsion from the soul, as reason and

circumstances may require; but Aristotle by no means considers that the

analogy between body and soul is complete, or that the emotions should

always be regarded as injurious[11].

[Sidenote: Ethics and Politics.]

=69.= In setting forth an ideal for human activity Aristotle conceives

that other philosophers have differed more in words than in substance,

and he hopes to reconcile them through the new term ‘blessedness’

(εὐδαιμονία). This blessedness is attained when the soul is actively

employed in a virtuous way, and when it is so circumstanced that it

commands the instruments of such action, that is, in a life which is

adequately furnished. On such activity pleasure must assuredly attend,

and it is therefore needless to seek it of set purpose. Further, virtue

appears personified in the ‘true gentleman’ (καλὸς κἀγαθός), who ever

avoids vicious extremes, and finds his highest satisfaction in pure

contemplation, just as the Creator himself lives to contemplate the world

he has produced[12].

In politics Aristotle can find ground for approving in turn of monarchy,

oligarchy, and democracy, according to the circumstances of each state.

We cannot however but feel that his sympathies point most towards

monarchy, and that his personal association with Alexander the Great was

in full harmony with his inmost convictions. As a means of government he

advocates before all things the education of the young.

[Sidenote: Social prepossessions.]

=70.= The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, comprehensive in their

range, brilliant and varied in their colouring, nevertheless appeal

effectively only to a limited circle. Socrates had been the companion

of rich and poor alike; Plato and Aristotle addressed themselves to

men of wealth, position, and taste. Their sympathies appear clearly in

their political systems, in which the sovereign or the aristocracy is

considered fit to play a part, whilst the many are practically excluded

from the commonwealth, sometimes as a harmless flock which needs kindly

shepherding, and at other times as a dangerous crowd which must be

deceived or enslaved for its own good. These prepossessions, which we

shall find reappearing within the Stoic system, appear to weaken the

practical forcefulness of both philosophies. In the ideal character

the Socratic ‘force’ has disappeared, and ‘self-restraint’ alone is

the standard of virtue; the just man moves quietly and conventionally

through life, perhaps escaping blame, but hardly achieving distinction.

In resuming the study of ontology, which Socrates had treated as a ‘mist

from Ionia,’ bright fancies had been elaborated rather than dominating

conceptions; the deity of Aristotle seems but a faint reflex of the

god of Socrates and the Cynics, and neither the ‘idea’ of Plato or the

‘matter’ of Aristotle is so well fitted for the world’s hard work as the

atoms of Leucippus and Democritus. The teachers who succeeded to the

control of the two schools inclined more and more to engross themselves

in special studies, and to leave on one side the great controversial

problems.

[Sidenote: The Academics.]

=71.= The followers of Plato were known as the ‘Academics’: amongst them

we must distinguish between the members of the ‘old Academy,’ as Cicero

terms them[13], and those who followed the innovations of Arcesilaus.

The old Academy chiefly developed the ethical side of Plato’s teaching,

finding that the path of virtue is indicated by the natural capacities

of the individual. Thus XENOCRATES of Chalcedon (396-314 B.C.) taught

that each man’s happiness resulted from the virtue proper to him (οἰκεία

ἀρετή)[14]; whilst POLEMO of Athens (head of the school 314-270 B.C.)

is said by Cicero to have defined it as consisting in ‘virtuous living,

aided by those advantages to which nature first draws us,’ thereby

practically adopting the standard of Aristotle[15]. The teaching of

Polemo had a direct influence upon that of Zeno the founder of Stoicism.

But with the first successes of Stoicism the Academy revived its

dialectical position, in strong opposition to the dogmatism of the

new school. ARCESILAUS of Pitane in Aeolia (315-240 B.C.) revived the

Socratic cross-examination, always opposing himself to any theory that

might be propounded to him, and drawing the conclusion that truth

could never be certainly known[16]. Life must therefore be guided by

considerations of probability, and the ethical standard is that ‘of

which a reasonable defence may be made[17].’ This sceptical attitude

was carried still further by CARNEADES of Cyrene (214-129 B.C.), whose

acute criticism told upon the Stoic leaders of his time, and forced them

to abandon some of their most important positions. From this time a

reconciliation between the two schools set in[18].

[Sidenote: The Peripatetics.]

=72.= The members of the Peripatetic school founded by Aristotle are of

less importance to us. The Romans found little difference between their

teaching and that of the earlier Academy. Cicero mentions that the

Stoic Panaetius was a keen student of two of the pupils of Aristotle,

THEOPHRASTUS (his successor as head of the Peripatetic school) and

DICAEARCHUS[19]; amongst later teachers in whose views he is interested

he names HIERONYMUS, who held that the supreme good was freedom from

pain[20]; CALLIPHO, who combined virtue with pleasure, and DIODORUS who

combined it with freedom from pain[21]; and amongst his contemporaries

STASEAS of Naples, who stated the same doctrines in a slightly different

form[22], and CRATIPPUS, whom he selected as a teacher for his own

son[23]. It was a common complaint of these teachers that the Stoics

had stolen their doctrines wholesale, and (as is the way with thieves)

had altered the names only[24]. All these writers however agree in

denying the doctrine which Zeno accepted from the Cynics that ‘virtue is

sufficient for happiness,’ and lay stress upon the supply of external

goods (χορηγία) as needed to admit of the active exercise of virtue. They

were diligent students of the written works of their founder, and thus

opened the way for the work of erudition and interpretation which found

its centre in Alexandria in a later period.

[Sidenote: Zeno.]

=73.= Amidst the conflict of these schools ZENO grew up. Born in Citium

on the island of Cyprus in 336 B.C., in the same year in which Alexander

became king of Macedon, he heard as a boy of the Greek conquest of

the East, and was only 13 years of age when its course was checked by

the death of Alexander. Of the town of Citium the inhabitants were

partly Greek, partly Phoenician; and Zeno, whether or not he was of

Phoenician blood, certainly derived from his environment something of

the character of the enterprising and much-travelled Phoenician nation,

and imparted this trait to the school which he founded. He was nicknamed

by his contemporaries ‘the Phoenician,’ and the title clung to his

followers[25]. His father was a merchant of purple, and often travelled

in the one direction to Tyre and Sidon, in the other as far as Athens,

whence he brought back a number of ‘Socratic books,’ which were eagerly

read by the young Zeno, and in time attracted him to the famous Greek

city[26]. We may presume that when he first came to Athens he intended

to carry further his studies without abandoning his calling; but when

news reached him of the wreck of the ship which carried all his goods,

he welcomed it as a call to devote himself entirely to philosophy[27].

His first step in Athens was to seek out the man who best represented the

character of Socrates, as represented in Xenophon’s Memoirs; and it is

said that a bookseller accordingly pointed him to CRATES of Thebes[28],

the pupil and (it would seem) the successor of Diogenes as acknowledged

head of the Cynic school.

[Sidenote: Zeno joins the Cynics.]

=74.= Our authorities busy themselves chiefly with narrating the

eccentricities of Crates, who wore warm clothing in summer and rags in

winter, entered the theatre as the audience were coming out, and drank

water instead of wine. But doubtless, like his predecessors in the Cynic

school, he was a man of the true Socratic character, who had trained

himself to bear hunger and thirst, heat and cold, flattery and abuse.

His life and wisdom won him the love of the high-born Hipparchia, who

turned from her wealthy and noble suitors, choosing instead the poverty

of Crates, who had abandoned all his possessions. In his company she went

from house to house, knocking at all doors in turn, sometimes admonishing

the inmates of their sins, sometimes sharing with them their meals[29].

In such a life Zeno recognised the forcefulness of Socrates, and in the

dogmas of the Cynic school he reached the foundation on which that life

was built. From that foundation neither Zeno nor his true followers ever

departed, and thus Stoicism embodied and spread the fundamental dogmas of

Cynism, that the individual alone is really existent, that virtue is the

supreme good, and that the wise man, though a beggar, is truly a king.

[Sidenote: Zeno’s Republic.]

=75.= Whilst still an adherent of the Cynic school[30], Zeno wrote his

Πολιτεία or _Republic_, which is evidently an attack on Plato’s work

with the same title[31]. If this work does not reveal to us the fully

developed philosopher, it at least shews us better than any other

evidence what the man Zeno was. His ideal was the establishment of a

perfect State, a completion of the work in which Alexander had failed;

and he found a starting-point in a treatise by Antisthenes on the same

subject. The ideal State must embrace the whole world, so that a man no

longer says, ‘I am of Athens,’ or ‘of Sidon,’ but ‘I am a citizen of the

world[32].’ Its laws must be those which are prescribed by nature, not

by convention. It will have no images or temples, for these are unworthy

of the nature of the deity; no sacrifices, because he cannot be pleased

by costly gifts; no law-courts, for its citizens will do one another

no harm; no statues, for the virtues of its inhabitants will be its

adornment[33]; no gymnasia, for its youth must not waste their time in

idle exercises[34].

The people will not be divided into classes (and here Plato’s _Republic_

is contradicted), for all alike will be wise men[35]; nor will men and

women be clothed differently, or shamefacedly hide any part of their

bodies[36]. No man will speak of a woman as his property, for women will

belong to the community only[37]. As for the dead, men will not trouble

whether they bury them (as the Greeks), burn them (as the Indians), or

give them to the birds (as the Persians); for it matters not at all what

happens to men’s dead bodies[38], but whether their souls shall reach

the abodes of the blest, or need hereafter to be purged by fire from

the foulness they have contracted through contact with the body[39]. To

conclude, Love shall be master throughout the State, being as it were a

God cooperating for the good of the whole[40]; and the wise man shall be

a citizen in it, not a missionary, and shall be surrounded with wife and

children[41].

[Sidenote: Zeno seeks knowledge.]

=76.= Zeno, after writing his _Republic_, took up a position more

independent of the Cynics. He could not, perhaps, avoid noticing that

the coming of his model Kingdom was hindered by the narrowmindedness of

the philosophers, their disagreement one with another, and their lack

of clear proofs for their dogmas. He began to realize that the study of

dialectics and physics was of more importance than his Cynic teachers

would allow; and he seems to have conceived the idea of uniting the

Socratic schools. He became eager to learn from all sources, and turned

first to Stilpo, who then represented the Megarian school[42]. Crates,

we are told, tried to drag him back from Stilpo by force; to which Zeno

retorted that argument would be more to the point[43]. From this time he

no longer restricted his outlook to force of character, but sought also

for argumentative power and well ascertained knowledge. The foundations

of his state must be surely laid, not upon the changing tide of opinion,

but on the rock of knowledge. That a wise man should hesitate, change his

views, withdraw his advice, he felt would be a bitter reproach[44]. If

indeed virtue, the supreme good, is knowledge, must it not follow that

knowledge is within the reach of man?

[Sidenote: Zeno’s theory of knowledge.]

=77.= The chief cause of error, Zeno found, lay in hasty assertion; and

this he held was a fault not so much of the intellect as of the will. In

the simplest case the senses present to the mind a ‘picture’ (φαντασία,

_visum_), carrying with it the suggestion of a statement (e.g. ‘that is a

horse’). But it is for the man to consider well whether this suggestion

is true, and only to give his ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις, _adsensus_) when

he is so assured. Assent is an act of the will, and therefore in our

power. Of a picture to which he has given his assent the wise man should

retain a firm hold; it then becomes an item of ‘comprehension’ (φαντασία

καταληπτική, _comprehensio_), and may be stored in the memory, thus

preparing the way for further acquisitions of knowledge, which in the end

combine in ‘scientific knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη, _scientia_).

This theory is little more than an exhortation against the prevailing

error of hasty thought (δόξα, _opinio_); but it made a very deep

impression, especially as enforced by Zeno’s gestures. He stretched out

his fingers and shewed the open palm, saying ‘Such is a picture.’ He

partially contracted his fingers, and said ‘This is assent.’ Making a

closed fist, he said ‘This is comprehension.’ Then closing in the left

hand over the right he pressed his fist tight, and said ‘This is science,

and only the wise man can attain to it[45].’

We have no reason to suppose that this theory was in any way suggested

by Stilpo, from whom however Zeno probably learnt to attach importance

to the formal part of reasoning, such as ‘definition’ and the use of the

syllogism. With Stilpo he shared an aversion to the Platonic theory of

ideas, maintaining that ideas are by no means realities but have only

a ‘kind of existence’ in our minds, or (as we should call it to-day) a

‘subjective existence[46].’

[Sidenote: Zeno studies under Polemo.]

=78.= In becoming in turn a listener to Polemo, Zeno, we may imagine,

entered a new world. He left behind the rough manners, the stinging

retorts, and the narrow culture of the Cynics and Eristics[47], to sit

with other intelligent students[48] at the feet of a man of cultured

manners[49] and wide reading, who to a love for Homer and Sophocles[50]

had, we must suppose, added an intimate knowledge of the works of Plato

and Aristotle, was himself a great writer[51], and yet consistently

taught that not learning, but a natural and healthy life was the end to

be attained. That Zeno profited much from his studies under Polemo we may

conjecture from Polemo’s good-natured complaint, ‘I see well what you are

after: you break down my garden wall and steal my teaching, which you

dress in Phoenician clothes[52].’ From this time it became a conventional

complaint that Stoic doctrine was stolen from that of the Academics: yet

the sharp conflict between the two schools shews that this cannot apply

to essentials. But in two important matters at least Zeno must have been

indebted to Academic teaching. This school had elaborated the doctrine

of Anaxagoras, which so attracted Socrates, that the world began with

the working of mind upon unordered matter. So too, according to all our

authorities, Zeno taught that there are two beginnings, the active which

is identified with the deity or Logos, and the passive which is inert

matter, or substance without quality[53]. This doctrine appears to pledge

Zeno to a dualistic view of the universe.

[Sidenote: ‘Soul is body.’]

=79.= On the other hand the Platonic teaching on the soul was reversed

by Zeno. He denied the opposition between soul and body. ‘Soul is

Breath[54],’ he taught, and ‘soul is body[55].’ With Plato’s threefold

division of the soul he would have nothing to do; rather he maintained

that the soul has eight parts[56], each displaying itself in a distinct

power or capacity, whilst all of them are qualities or operations of

one soul in various relations[57]. In this part of his philosophy Zeno

appears as a strong monist, and his debt to the Platonists is necessarily

restricted to details.

[Sidenote: Zeno studies Heraclitus.]

=80.= It would seem then that Zeno after seeking for philosophic safety

for some twenty years in one harbour after another had so far made

shipwreck. But from this shipwreck of his intellectual hopes he could

afterwards count the beginning of a fair voyage[58]. As he eagerly

discussed with his younger fellow-student Arcesilaus the teaching of

their master Polemon, he took courage to point out its weak points[59],

and began to quote in his own defence not only his previous teachers

Crates and Stilpo, but also the works of Heraclitus[60]. He thus

broke down the barrier which Socrates had set up against the Ionic

philosophers. From Heraclitus Zeno drew two doctrines of first-rate

importance; the first, that of the eternal fire[61] and its mutation into

the elements in turn[62]; the second (already referred to) that of the

_Logos_[63]. It is evident that the Heraclitean doctrine of fire breaks

down the distinction between God and the world, active and passive, soul

and body; and is therefore inconsistent with the dualism which Zeno had

partly borrowed from Plato. It is not clear whether Zeno attained to

clearness on this point; but in the general teaching of the Stoics the

monistic doctrine prevailed[64]. Hence God is not separate from body,

but is himself body in its purest form[65]. The _Logos_ or divine reason

is the power which pervades and gives shape to the universe[66]; and

this Logos is identical with the deity, that is with the primitive and

creative Fire[67]. The Logos (ὀρθὸς λόγος, _vera ratio_) brings into

harmony the parts of philosophy; for it is also on the one hand the guide

to right reasoning[68]; on the other hand the law which prescribes what

is right for the State and for the individual[69].

[Sidenote: Zeno opens his school.]

=81.= When Zeno definitely accepted the teaching of Heraclitus, he felt

bound to break finally with the school of Polemo, and he founded soon

after 300 B.C. a school of his own, which was rapidly crowded. His

followers were at first called Zenonians, but afterwards Stoics, from the

‘picture porch’ (so called because it was decorated with paintings by

Polygnotus) in which he delivered his lectures. He now applied himself

afresh to the problem of ethics. Whilst still adhering to the Cynic views

that ‘virtue is the only good,’ and that ‘example is more potent than

precept,’ he entirely rejected the intuitional basis which the Cynics

had accepted, deciding in favour of the claims of reason. He found his

ideal in ‘consistency’ (ὁμολογία, _convenientia_)[70]; as the Logos or

Word rules in the universe, so should it also in the individual. Those

who live by a single and harmonious principle possess divine favour and

an even flow of life[71]; those that follow conflicting practices are

ill-starred[72]. In this consistency there is found virtue, and (here

again he follows the Cynics) virtue is sufficient for happiness[73], and

has no need of any external support.

[Sidenote: His theory of virtue.]

=82.= But whilst the virtue of the Cynics is something detached and

self-contained, and is ‘natural’ only in the sense that it is not

determined by custom or authority, that of Zeno is bound up with the

whole scheme of the universe. For the universe puts before men certain

things, which though rightly named ‘indifferent’ by the Cynics, and

wrongly named ‘good’ by the Academics, have yet a certain value (ἀξία,

_aestimatio_), and are a natural goal for men’s actions[74]. Such are

health, prosperity, good name, and other things which the Academics named

‘things according to nature’ (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν). These Zeno took over, not

as a part of his theory of virtue, but as the basis of it[75]; and for

things having value introduced the term ‘of high degree’ (προηγμένα),

and for their opposites the term ‘of low degree’ (ἀποπροηγμένα), these

terms being borrowed from court life. Thus virtue alone is queen, and

all things naturally desired are subject to her command[76]. The end of

life is therefore to live consistently, keeping in view the aims set

before us by nature, or shortly, to live ‘consistently with nature.’ Our

authorities do not agree as to whether Zeno or Cleanthes was the first

to use this phrase[77]; but there can be no doubt that the doctrine is

that of Zeno, that it is a fundamental part of the Stoic system, and that

it was maintained unaltered by all orthodox Stoics. On the other hand

the Academics and Peripatetics ridiculed these new and barbarous terms

προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα, and their view has generally been supported

both in ancient and modern times[78]. We cannot however question the

right of Zeno to reserve a special term for that which is morally good;

he was in fact feeling his way towards the position, still imperfectly

recognized, that the language of common life is inadequate to the exact

expression of philosophic principles[79].

[Sidenote: Zeno’s syllogisms.]

=83.= In expounding his system Zeno made much use of the syllogism,

thereby laying the foundations of a new style of oratory, consisting

of short and pointed clauses, which became a characteristic of his

school[80]. He no doubt regarded this form as a sure method of attaining

truth; but even at the present day the principle that truth can only

be reached from facts and not from words is not everywhere admitted.

The syllogisms of Zeno have all their weak points, and as a rule the

term which is common to the major and minor premisses suffers a shift

of meaning. These syllogisms can no longer convince us, and even in

antiquity they were severely criticized. But they are excellent aids

to the memory, and so serve the same end as the catechisms of the

Reformation period. Amongst the syllogisms attributed to Zeno are

these: ‘That which has reason is better than that which has not reason;

but nothing is better than the universe; therefore the universe has

reason[81].’ ‘No one trusts a secret to a drunken man; but one trusts

a secret to a good man; therefore a good man will not be drunken[82].’

‘No evil is accompanied by glory; but death is accompanied by glory;

therefore death is no evil[83].’ Such syllogisms were embedded in the

numerous works of Zeno, of which many were certainly extant as late as

the time of Epictetus[84].

[Sidenote: Epicurus and Arcesilaus.]

=84.= At the very time when Zeno was elaborating the doctrines of the

Porch, another school of equal eminence was established at Athens by

EPICURUS (341-270 B.C.) in his Gardens. Epicurus combined the ethical

principle of the Cyrenaics, that pleasure is the end of life, with the

atomistic philosophy of Democritus; he had no respect for the study of

dialectic, but placed the criterion of truth in the observations of the

senses, leaving little room for the participation of mind or will. Thus

in every part of philosophy his teaching was opposed to that of Zeno,

and the two schools during their whole existence were in the sharpest

conflict. We may nevertheless notice some points of contact between them.

Both founded, or conceived that they founded their ethical doctrine upon

physical proofs; that is, both maintained that the end of life which they

put forward was that prescribed by natural law. As a consequence, they

agreed in removing the barrier which Socrates had set up against the

pursuit of natural science. Both again were positive teachers, or (in the

language of the ancients) propounders of dogmas; and here they came into

conflict with the Academic school, which maintained, and was soon about

to emphasize, the critical spirit of Socrates and Plato. For in the last

years of Zeno’s life his old fellow-pupil Arcesilaus became head of the

Academic school (270 B.C.), and at once directed his teaching against

Zeno’s theory of knowledge[85]. Following the practice of Socrates and

of Plato’s dialogues, he argued against every point of view presented,

and concluded that certain truth could not be known by man[86]. He

pressed Zeno closely as to his definition of ‘comprehension,’ and induced

him to add a clause which, in the opinion of his opponent, shewed the

worthlessness of the whole doctrine[87]. Thus was raised the question

of the κριτήριον or test of truth, which for at least a century to come

sharply divided the schools[88].

[Sidenote: Zeno at Athens.]

=85.= The conflict between these three schools, which from this time

on greatly surpassed all others in importance, did not embitter the

political life of Athens. The citizens watched with amusement the

competition of the schools for numbers and influence, and drew their

profit from the crowds of foreigners who were drawn to Athens by its

growing fame as a centre of adult education. To the heads of the schools

they were ready to pay every mark of respect. With Zeno they deposited

the keys of their gates, and they awarded him during his lifetime a gold

crown and a bronze statue. His fame spread abroad, and those of his

fellow-citizens of Citium who were then resident at Sidon claimed a share

in it. In his old age the high-minded Antigonus Gonatas (who occupied the

throne of Macedonia with varying fortune from 278 to 239 B.C.) looked to

him for advice and help. But no offers of public employment could draw

Zeno himself from his simple life and the young companions who surrounded

him: like Socrates, he thought that he could best serve the State by

sending out others to take part in its duties[89]. He died in the year

264 B.C.[90], having been engaged in teaching for more than 30 years from

the time when he ‘discovered the truth[91].’

[Sidenote: Honours paid to him.]

=86.= The vote which the Athenians passed in honour of Zeno, shortly

before his death, deserves record by its contrast with that by which

their predecessors had condemned Socrates. It ran somewhat as follows:

‘Whereas Zeno the son of Mnaseas from Citium has spent many

years in this city in the pursuit of philosophy; and has been

throughout a good man in all respects; and has encouraged the

young men who resorted to him in virtue and temperance, and has

sped them on the right path; and has made his own life an example

to all men, for it has been consistent with the teaching he has

set forth;

Now it seems good to the people of Athens to commend Zeno the

son of Mnaseas from Citium, and to crown him with a golden crown

(in accordance with the law) for his virtue and temperance, and

to build him a tomb on the Ceramicus at the public expense. And

the people shall elect five Athenian citizens to provide for the

making of the crown and the building of the tomb. And the town

clerk shall engrave this vote on two pillars, and shall set up

one in the Academy, and one in the Lyceum. And the treasurer

shall make due allotment of the expense, that all men may see

that the people of Athens honours good men both in their life

time and after their death[92].’

We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of this tribute. It is true

that all the charges brought against Socrates hold even more forcibly

as against Zeno. But the spirit of political and religious independence

was now dead, and the advantage of the philosophical schools to the fame

and business interests of the city had become clearer; so that nothing

prevented any longer the open recognition of Zeno’s virtues and eminence.

Who will may also read in the decree a belated mark of respect to the

memory of Socrates.

[Sidenote: Zeno’s breadth of view.]

=87.= In this sketch of the life of Zeno no attempt has been made to

give a complete view of his philosophy; but a few landmarks have been

indicated, by which it may be possible to distinguish which parts of

it were his own, which were taken over from others, and how all were

gradually combined in one whole. Zeno had not the kind of originality

which begins by assuming a general principle, and then explains all

things human and divine by deductions from it. Instead of this he

gathered together (as Aristotle had done before, but with a very

different bias) what seemed most sound and illuminating in the teaching

of all the schools which surrounded him. He did this in a positive

spirit, feeling assured that truth exists and is discernible, and must be

consistent in all its parts. We seem unable to say that in his writings

he attained to this consistency, but at least he worked steadily towards

it. The effort for consistency led him in the direction of monistic

principle, though his points of departure both in physics and in ethics

are dualistic. But the teaching of Zeno does not lend itself to that kind

of study which assigns all new facts to compartments of thought ready

labelled in advance, nor can it be summarized by any of the technical

terms which are in use in modern philosophical thought. Enough has

perhaps been said to shew that, great as was the debt of Zeno to his

predecessors, he was no mere imitator or plagiarist; the history of the

following centuries will shew that he had in some sense touched the

pulses of human life more truly than any of his contemporaries.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Thucydides, _passim_.

[2] Mahaffy, _Greek Life and Thought_, ch. 1.

[3] ‘Plato combined the various elements, the, so to speak, prismatically

broken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, and richer unity’

Ueberweg, Eng. transl. i p. 89.

[4] ‘The philosophy of Greece reached its highest point in Plato and

Aristotle’ Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 11. ‘The bloom of Greek philosophy

was short lived’ _ib._ p. 10.

[5] The phrases ‘cum Platone errare,’ ‘amicus Plato, magis amica veritas’

agree in expressing the general incredulity with which Platonism was

received in the ancient world. In our own days an ill-balanced sympathy

for Platonic dogma is often a serious hindrance to philosophic progress.

[6] See further, § 284.

[7] See below, § 179.

[8] Aristotle, _Physics_, ii 7.

[9] See below, § 173.

[10] εἰ δ’ ἐν ζῴῳ τοῦτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, τί κωλύει τὸ αὐτὸ συμβῆναι καὶ

κατὰ τὸ πᾶν; εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ar. _Phys._

viii 2, 252 b.

[11] See Ueberweg’s note, i (Eng. trans., pp. 178-180; tenth German

edition, pp. 238-240), and below, § 362.

[12] ‘vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis [Peripateticis]

placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum; quae quia

deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima’ Cic. _Fin._ v

4, 11.

[13] See note 15, below.

[14] Clem. _Strom._ ii p. 419 a.

[15] ‘honeste autem vivere, fruentem rebus eis, quas primas homini natura

conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit (ut indicant scripta Polemonis), et

Aristoteles eiusque amici huc proxime videntur accedere’ Cic. _Ac._ ii

42, 131. Here Prof. J. S. Reid suggests that Polemo may merely have used

the phrase κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, as opposed to κατὰ θέσιν (conventionally).

[16] ‘quem [_sc._ Arcesilan] ferunt ... primum instituisse, non quid ipse

sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset,

disputare’ Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 67. ‘Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam

quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset’

_Ac._ i 12, 45.

[17] ‘[cuius] ratio probabilis possit reddi’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 17, 58. See

further below, §§ 105, 332.

[18] See especially §§ 113 and 123.

[19] Cic. _Fin._ iv 28, 79.

[20] ‘non dolere ... Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit’ _ib._ v 25, 73.

[21] ‘at vero Callipho, et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem

adamavisset, alter vacuitatem doloris: neuter honestate carere potuit,

quae est a nostris laudata maxime’ _ib._

[22] _ib._ 25, 75.

[23] _Off._ i 1, 1.

[24] ‘[Stoici] quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram a nobis, sed totam ad

se nostram philosophiam transtulerunt. atque, ut reliqui fures, earum

rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris

pro suis uterentur, nomina, tanquam rerum notas, mutaverunt’ _Fin._ v 25,

74.

[25] Ζήνωνα τὸν Φοίνικα, Athen. _Deipnos._ xiii 2; ‘tuus ille Poenulus,’

‘e Phoenicia profecti’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 20, 56.

[26] Diog. L. vii 31 and 32.

[27] ‘nuntiato naufragio Zeno noster, cum omnia sua audiret submersa:

iubet, inquit, me fortuna expeditius philosophari’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 14, 3.

[28] Diog. L. vii 3.

[29] Diog. L. vi 96 and 97.

[30] _ib._ vii 4.

[31] ἀντέγραψε πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν Plut. _Sto. rep._ 8, 2 (Arnim

i 260).

[32] This doctrine can be traced back to Diogenes and even to Socrates:

see below, § 303.

[33] τὰς πόλεις κοσμεῖν οὐκ ἀναθήμασιν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς τῶν οἰκούντων ἀρεταῖς

Stob. iv 1, 88.

[34] See below, § 305.

[35] παριστάντα πολίτας τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον Diog. L. vii 33.

[36] See below, § 318.

[37] § 306.

[38] § 307.

[39] §§ 296, 297.

[40] § 304.

[41] § 315.

[42] See above, § 56.

[43] He said ‘O Crates, the best handle of philosophers is that by the

ear; persuade me if you can, and lead me that way; if you use violence,

my body will stay with you, but my soul will be with Stilpo’ Diog. L. vii

24.

[44] ‘errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et

suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et constantis

adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque [Zeno] removebat’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 42.

[45] ‘hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. nam cum extensis digitis

adversam manum ostenderat, ‘visum,’ inquiebat, ‘huiusmodi est.’ deinde

cum paulum digitos contraxerat, ‘adsensus huiusmodi.’ tum cum plane

compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat;

cum autem laevam manum admoverat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque

compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat: cuius compotem nisi sapientem

esse neminem’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 145.

[46] See below, § 188.

[47] So the Megarians were commonly called on account of their

disputatious methods.

[48] As for instance Arcesilaus; Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, Ζήνωνος

τοῦ Κιτιέως συσχολαστὴς παρὰ Πολέμωνι Strabo xiii p. 614 (Arnim i 10).

[49] Diog. L. iv 18.

[50] _ib._ 20.

[51] _ib._

[52] Diog. L. vii 25.

[53] See below, § 189.

[54] See § 268, note 2.

[55] οἵ γε ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφοι καὶ πάντες ὅσοι σῶμα τὴν

ψυχὴν νοοῦσι Iamb. _de an._ (Stob. i 49, 33).

[56] Ζήνων ὁ Στωϊκὸς ὀκταμερῆ φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν Nemes. _nat. hom._ p.

96 (Arnim i 143).

[57] οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ὀκταμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν διαδοξάζουσι, περὶ [ἣν] τὰς

δυνάμεις εἶναι πλείονας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονίκῳ ἐνυπαρχουσῶν φαντασίας

συγκαταθέσεως ὁρμῆς λόγου Iamb. _de an._ (Arnim i 143). See below, § 270.

[58] τῶν προειρημένων ἤκουσεν ἕως ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν· ἵνα καί φασιν αὐτὸν

εἰπεῖν· νῦν εὐπλόηκα, ὅτε νεναυάγηκα Diog. L. vii 4. It must not however

be assumed that Zeno himself used the phrase in this sense: see the other

references in Arnim i 277.

[59] ‘iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas. Sed Zeno cum

Arcesilam anteiret aetate, valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute

moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam’ Cic. _Ac._ i 9, 34 and 35.

[60] ἐπεὶ συμφοιτῶντες παρὰ Πολέμωνι ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν ἀλλήλοις,

συμπαρέλαβον εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μάχην ὁ μὲν Ἡράκλειτον καὶ Στίλπωνα

ἅμα καὶ Κράτητα Euseb. _Praep. ev._ xiv 5, 11 (quoting Numenius) (Arnim i

11).

[61] Zeno often calls it _aether_: ‘Zenon ... aethera ... interim

vult omnium esse principium’ Min. Felix xix p. 58: Cleanthes calls it

_spirit_, see below, § 100. ‘The fire of Heraclitus becomes aether or πῦρ

τεχνικόν—for this distinction is unknown to the Ephesian—and is thereby

spiritualised and rarefied’ Pearson, _Fragments_, Intr. pp. 22, 23.

[62] See below, § 196.

[63] See above, § 39.

[64] Stein, _Psychologie_, i 62 sqq.

[65] Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων ὑπέθεντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων,

σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον Hippolyt. _Philos._ 21, 1 (Arnim i 153).

[66] ‘rationem quandam per naturam omnem rerum pertinentem vi divina esse

affectam putat’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.

[67] ‘Zeno [deum nuncupat] naturalem divinamque legem’ Lact. _Div. inst._

i 5, 20.

[68] ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωϊκῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον

ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου φησί Diog. L. vii 54

(quoting Diocles Magnes). It is much disputed who the authorities are to

which Posidonius here refers.

[69] ‘Zeno naturalem legem divinam esse censet eamque vim obtinere recta

imperantem prohibentemque contraria’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.

[70] τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε, τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν·

τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων

κακοδαιμονούντων Stob. ii 7, 6 a. ‘summum bonum, quod cum positum sit in

eo, quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam’ Cic. _Fin._ iii

6, 21.

[71] εὐδαιμονία δ’ ἐστὶν εὔροια βίου Stob. ii 7, 6 e.

[72] See note 70 above.

[73] See below, § 322.

[74] For a fuller treatment see below, §§ 319-321.

[75] οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτοις (sc. Peripateticis) ἠκολούθησεν ὑποτιθέμενοις

στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; Plut. _comm. not._

23, 1; ‘[a Polemone] quae essent principia naturae acceperat’ Cic. _Fin._

iv 16, 45.

[76] τὰ μὲν [οὖν] πολλὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν προηγμένα λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πολλὴν

ἀπαξίαν ἀποπροηγμένα, Ζήνωνος ταύτας τὰς ὀνομασίας θεμένου πρώτου τοῖς

πράγμασι Stob. ii 7, 7 g; see also below, § 320.

[77] Diogenes Laertius says distinctly that Zeno used the phrase, and

names the book in which he found it; Diog. L. vii 87. On the other hand

Stobaeus (ii 7, 6 a) attributes it to Cleanthes.

[78] ‘Zeno Citieus, advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex’ Cic.

_Tusc._ v 12, 34.

[79] See below, § 165.

[80] ‘illa vetus Zenonis brevis, et ut tibi videbatur, acuta conclusio’

Cic. _N. D._ iii 9, 22.

[81] τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου

κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος Sext. _math._ ix 104 (Arnim i 111);