HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES.
[Sidenote: Greek thought.]
=31.= We have seen already that the great problems of which Stoicism
propounds one solution were agitated during the millennium which
preceded the Christian era alike in India, Persia and Asia Minor on the
one hand, and in Greece, Italy and the Celtic countries on the other.
To the beginnings of this movement we are unable to assign a date;
but the current of thought appears on the whole to have moved from
East to West. But just at the same time the influence of Greek art and
literature spreads from West to East; and it is to the crossing and
interweaving of these two movements that we owe almost all the light
thrown on this part of the history of human thought. The early history
of Stoicism has reached us entirely through the Greek language, and is
bound up with the history of Greek literature and philosophy[1]. But
long before Stoicism came into existence other movements similar in
kind had reached Greece; and the whole of early Greek literature, and
especially its poetry, is rich in contributions to the discussion of the
physical and ethical problems to which Stoicism addressed itself. From
the storehouse of this earlier literature the Stoics drew many of their
arguments and illustrations; the speculations of Heraclitus and the life
of Socrates were especially rich in suggestions to them. The study of
Greek literature and philosophy as a whole is therefore indispensable for
a full appreciation of Stoicism; and the way has been made easier of
late by excellent treatises, happily available in the English language,
dealing with the general development of philosophic and religious thought
in Greece[2]. Here it is only possible to refer quite shortly to those
writers and teachers to whom Stoicism is most directly indebted.
[Sidenote: Homer.]
=32.= Although the HOMERIC POEMS include representations of gods and men
corresponding to the epoch of national gods and to other still earlier
stages of human thought, nevertheless they are pervaded by at least
the dawning light of the period of the world-religions. Tales of the
gods that are bloodthirsty or coarse are kept in the background; and
though heroes like Agamemnon, Achilles, and Ajax move in an atmosphere
of greed, bloodshed, and revenge, yet all of them are restrained both
in word and in act by a strong feeling of self-respect, the αἰδώς or
shamefastness which entirely differentiates them from the heroes of
folk-lore; in particular, the typical vices of gluttony, drunkenness,
and sexual unrestraint are amongst the things of which it is a shame to
speak without reserve. The gods are many, and in human shape; yet they
are somewhat fairer than men, and something of the heavenly brilliance
in which the Persian archangels are wrapped seems to encircle also the
heights where the gods dwell on mount Olympus[3]. Gradually too there
comes to light amidst the picture of the many gods something resembling
a supreme power, sometimes impersonally conceived as Fate (αἶσα,
μοῖρα), sometimes more personally as the Fate of Zeus, most commonly
of all as Zeus himself, elevated in rank above all other gods[4]. Thus
Zeus is not only king, but also father of gods and men[5]; he is the
dispenser of happiness to men, ‘to the good and the evil, to each one
as he will[6],’ and the distributor of gracious gifts[7], unbounded
in power[8] and in knowledge[9]. The gods again, in spite of the many
tales of violence attached to their names, exercise a moral governance
over the world. ‘They love not froward deeds, but they reverence justice
and the righteous acts of men[10]’; ‘in the likeness of strangers from
far countries, they put on all manner of shapes, and wander through the
cities, beholding the violence and the righteousness of men[11].’
Whilst therefore the philosophers of later times could rightly object to
Homer that he told of the gods tales neither true nor worthy of their
nature, there was on the other hand much in the _Iliad_ and _Odyssey_,
and particularly in the latter, which was in harmony with philosophical
conceptions. It was not without reason that the Stoics themselves made
of Ulysses, who in Homer plays but little part in fighting, an example
of the man of wisdom and patience, who knows men and cities, and who
through self-restraint and singleness of purpose at last wins his way
to the goal[12]. From this starting-point the whole of the _Odyssey_ is
converted into a ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’; the enchantress Circe represents
the temptations of gluttony, which turns men into swine[13]; the chant of
the Sirens is an allegory of the enticements of sensual pleasure.
[Sidenote: Hesiod.]
=33.= In HESIOD (8th century B.C.) we find the first attempt to construct
a history of the universe; his _Theogony_ is the forerunner of the
Cosmology which later on is a recognised part of philosophy. Here in the
company of the personal gods we find not only the personified lights of
heaven, Sun and Moon, but also such figures as those of Earth and Ocean,
Night and Day, Heaven and Hell, Fate, Sleep, and Death, all bearing
witness to the emergence of the spirit of speculation. In Hesiod again we
first find the description of the ‘watchmen of Jove,’ who are no longer
the gods themselves as in Homer, but an intermediate class of beings,
corresponding to the Persian angels and the δαίμονες of later Greek.
‘Thrice ten thousand are the servants of Zeus, immortal, watchmen
over mortal men; these watch deeds of justice and of wickedness,
walking all ways up and down the earth, clothed in the mist[14].’
But it is in his ethical standards that Hesiod is more directly a
forerunner of the Stoic school: for neither the warlike valour nor the
graceful self-control of the hero appeals to him, but the stern sense of
justice and the downright hard work of the plain man.
‘Full across the way of Virtue the immortal gods have set the
sweat of the brow; long and steep is the path that reaches to
her, and rough at the beginning; but when you reach the highest
point, hard though it is, in the end it becomes easy[15].’
[Sidenote: The Orphic poems.]
=34.= Between Epic and Attic literature stands the poetry of the ‘Orphic’
movement, belonging to the sixth century B.C., and exercising a wide
influence over various schools of philosophy in the succeeding centuries.
For an account of this movement the reader must look elsewhere[16]; here
we can only notice that it continued the cosmological speculations of
Hesiod’s _Theogony_, and in particular developed a strain of pantheism
which is echoed in the Stoic poets. According to an Orphic poet
‘Zeus is the first and the last, the head and the foot, the
male and the female, Earth and Heaven, Night and Day; he is the
one force, the one great deity, the creator, the alluring power
of love; for all these things are immanent in the person of
Zeus[17].’
Here amidst the fusion of poetry and theology we first see the budding
principle of philosophic monism, the reaching after a unity which will
comprehend all things. To the same school is attributed the doctrine that
‘the human soul is originally and essentially divine[18].’
[Sidenote: The Hylozoists.]
=35.= To the sixth century B.C. belong also the earliest Greek
philosophers who are known to us by name. In all of these the early
polytheism is either abandoned or becomes so dim in its outlines that
the origin and governing force of the universe is sought in quite other
directions. The philosophers of Ionia busied themselves with the problem
of the elements. THALES of Miletus was a man of many attainments; he
had travelled both in Egypt and in Babylon, and was an active political
reformer. To him water was the primary substance, from which all others
proceeded and to which they returned[19]. ANAXIMANDER of the same town
was the first who undertook to give the Greeks a map of the whole known
world. To him it seemed that the primary matter could not be the same as
any visible substance, but must be a protoplasm of undefined character
(ἄπειρον), capable of assuming in turn all shapes[20]. ANAXIMENES (once
more of Miletus) assumed air as the first principle, and derived the
other elements from it by processes of condensation (πύκνωσις) and
rarefaction[21]. But on one point all the Ionian philosophers were
agreed: the primary substance was the cause of its own motion; they were
‘hylozoists,’ since they hold that matter (ὕλη) is a living thing (ζῷον).
They are from the standpoint of physics ‘monists,’ as opposed to those
who hold matter and life, or matter and force, to be two things eternally
distinct, and are therefore ‘dualists’ in their theory[22].
[Sidenote: Pythagoras.]
=36.= To the same sixth century belong two other notable philosophers.
PYTHAGORAS, born in Samos about 575 B.C., and like Thales, one who had
travelled widely, left his native land rather than submit to the rule of
a tyrant, and founded in Croton in Lower Italy a community half religious
and half political, which in its original form was not long-lived. But a
widespread tradition remained as to his doctrines, in which the theory
of Numbers held a leading position. Pythagoras appears to have been a
good mathematician and astronomer, and followers of his school were at an
early date led to the doctrines of the rotation of the earth on its axis
and the central position of the sun in the planetary system[23]. His name
is also connected with the theory of the transmigration of souls, which
we may suppose him to have derived ultimately from some Indian source;
and to the same country we must look as having suggested to him and his
followers the practice of abstaining from animal food[24].
[Sidenote: Xenophanes.]
=37.= If we looked merely to the theories of the philosophers, it might
seem as if the old mythologies and theogonies were already dead. But in
fact the battle was yet to come. XENOPHANES of Colophon (born circ. 580
B.C.) witnessed in his youth the fall of Ionia before the conquering
progress of Cyrus king of Persia. Rather than submit to the power of the
invader he adopted the life of a wandering minstrel, and finally settled
in Elea, in Lower Italy, where he became the founder of the Eleatic
school. But in his religious convictions he was whole-heartedly on the
Persian side. ‘There is one God, greatest amongst gods[25] and men,
not like mortal men in bodily shape or in mind[26].’ Thus the worship
of many gods and that of images of the deity are alike condemned; and
it is probable that in this false worship he found the cause of his
country’s fall. With the lack of historic sense which is characteristic
of the zealous reformer, he condemned Homer and Hesiod as teachers of
immorality, since they ‘ascribed to the gods theft, adultery, and deceit,
and all acts that are counted shame and blame amongst men[27].’ With
keen criticism he pointed out that myths as to the birth of the gods
dishonoured them just as much as if they related their deaths; for on
either supposition there is a time when the gods do not exist[28]. The
conception of the deity formed by Xenophanes seems to approach Pantheism
or Nature-worship, and so far to foreshadow the Stoic deity; but the
fragments that survive of his works are insufficient to make this point
clear[29]. The successors of Xenophanes did not inherit his religious
zeal, but they emphasized all the more the philosophic principle of an
ultimate Unity in all things.
[Sidenote: Heraclitus.]
=38.= With the opening of the fifth century B.C. we reach HERACLITUS
of Ephesus, a philosopher of the highest importance to us, since the
Stoics afterwards accepted his teaching as the foundation of their own
system of physics. The varied speculations of the sixth century were all
examined by Heraclitus, and all found wanting by him; his own solutions
of the problems of the world are set forth in a prophetic strain,
impressive by its dignity, obscure in its form, and lending itself to
much variety of interpretation. For the opinions of the crowd, who are
misled by their senses, he had no respect[30]; but even learning does
not ensure intelligence[31], unless men are willing to be guided by the
‘Word,’ the universal reason[32]. The senses shew us in the universe
a perpetual flowing: fire changes to water (sky to cloud), water to
earth (in rainfall), which is the downward path; earth changes to water
(rising mist), and water to fire, which is the upward path[33]. Behind
these changes the Word points to that which is one and unchanging[34].
Anaximander did well when he pointed to the unlimited as the primary
stuff, but it is better to describe it as an ‘ever-living fire[35].’ Out
of this fire all things come, and into it they shall all be resolved[36].
Of this ever-living fire a spark is buried in each man’s body; whilst
the body lives, this spark, the soul, may be said to be dead[37]; but
when the body dies it escapes from its prison, and enters again on its
proper life. The ‘Word’ is from everlasting[38]; through the Word all
things happen[39]; it is the universal Law which holds good equally in
the physical world and in the soul of man. For man’s soul there is a
moral law, which can be reached only by studying the plan of the world in
which we live[40]. But of this law men are continually forgetful; they
live as in a dream, unconscious of it; it calls to them once and again,
but they do not hear it[41]. Most of all it is needed in the government
of the state; for ‘he who speaks with understanding must take his
foothold on what is common to all; for all human laws are nourished by
the one divine law[42].’
[Sidenote: The Word.]
=39.= The general import of the physical teaching of Heraclitus, and the
indebtedness of the Stoics to it, have long been recognised: the bearing
of this teaching upon religion, ethics and politics is a more disputable
matter. Does Heraclitus by the ‘Logos’ which he so often names mean
merely his own reasoning and message? is he speaking of the common reason
of mankind? or does the term suggest to him a metaphysical abstraction,
a divine power through which the world is created and governed? For
the fuller meaning we have analogies in the beliefs of Persism before
Heraclitus, and of Stoics, Judaists, and Christians afterwards. The
latest commentator, adopting this explanation, sums it up in three
propositions: first, the ‘Logos’ is eternal, being both pre-existent and
everlasting, like the world-god of Xenophanes; secondly, all things both
in the material and in the spiritual world happen through the ‘Logos’; it
is a cosmic principle, ‘common’ or ‘universal’; and in the third place,
it is the duty of man to obey this ‘Logos,’ and so to place himself in
harmony with the rest of nature. And accordingly, in agreement with many
recent writers, he adopts the translation ‘the Word’ as on the whole
the most adequate[43]. Even the Romans found it impossible to translate
λόγος by any single word, and they therefore adopted the phrase _ratio
et oratio_ (reason and speech); in modern language it seems clearly to
include also the broad notion of ‘Universal Law’ or the ‘Laws of Nature.’
If we can rightly attribute to Heraclitus all that is thus included in
the interpretation of this one word, he certainly stands out as a great
creative power in Greek philosophy, harmonizing by bold generalizations
such diverse provinces as those of physics, religion, and ethics; ‘he
was the first [in Greece, we must understand] to build bridges, which
have never since been destroyed, between the natural and the spiritual
life[44].’ It is to the Stoics almost alone that we owe it that teaching
so suggestive and so practical was converted into a powerful social and
intellectual force.
[Sidenote: Zarathustra and Heraclitus.]
=40.= The prominence given to fire in the system of Heraclitus has
very naturally suggested that his doctrine is borrowed from that of
Zarathustra[45]. The historical circumstances are not unfavourable to
this suggestion. Ionia was conquered in turn by Cyrus and Darius, and
definitely annexed by Persia about 496 B.C., that is, at the very time
at which Heraclitus taught. Moreover the Persian invasion was akin to a
religious crusade, and had for a principal aim the stamping out of the
idle and superstitious habit of worshipping images, by which (according
to the Persians) the true God was dishonoured. The elevated character of
the Persian religion could hardly fail to attract learned Greeks, already
dissatisfied with the crude mythology of their own people. Further, the
resemblance between the teaching of Zarathustra and that of Heraclitus
is not restricted to the language used of the divine fire; the doctrines
of an all-creating, all-pervading Wisdom, the λόγος or Word, and of
the distinction between the immortal soul and the corruptible body, are
common to both. But the differences between the two systems are almost
equally striking. Heraclitus is a monist; according to him all existences
are ultimately one. Zarathustra taught a principle of Evil, everywhere
opposed to the Good Spirit, and almost equally powerful; his system is
dualist[45a]. Zarathustra is not free from nationalism, Heraclitus is
cosmopolitan. In the Ephesian system we find no trace of the belief in
Judgment after death, in Heaven, or in Hell. We may in fact well believe
that Heraclitus was acquainted with Zoroastrianism and influenced by it,
but we have not the means to determine what the extent of that influence
was. It is related of him that he received (but declined) an invitation
to the court of Darius; and that his dead body was given up to be torn to
pieces by dogs in the Persian fashion[45b].
[Sidenote: The tragedians.]
=41.= The development of philosophic thought at Athens was, as we have
noticed, much complicated by the political relations of Greece to
Persia. Although the Persian empire had absorbed Asia Minor, it was
decisively repulsed in its attacks on Greece proper. Athens was the
centre of the resistance to it, and the chief glory of the victories of
Marathon (490 B.C.) and Salamis (480 B.C.) fell to Athenian statesmen
and warriors. By these successes the Hellenes not only maintained
their political independence, but saved the images of their gods from
imminent destruction. A revival of polytheistic zeal took place, as might
have been expected. The wealth and skill of Greece were ungrudgingly
expended in the achievement of masterpieces of the sculptor’s art, and
their housing in magnificent temples. But even so religious doctrines
strikingly similar to those of the Persians gained ground. The same
Aeschylus who (in his _Persae_) celebrates the defeat of the national
enemy, a few years later (in his _Agamemnon_) questions whether the
Supreme Ruler be really pleased with the Greek title of Zeus, and the
Greek method of worshipping him[46]. His more conservative successor
Sophocles was contented, in the spirit of the Homeric bards, to eliminate
from the old myths all that seemed unworthy of the divine nature.
Euripides adopts a bolder tone. Reproducing the old mythology with exact
fidelity, he ‘assails the resulting picture of the gods with scathing
censure and flat contradiction[47].’ With equal vigour he attacks the
privileges of noble birth, and defends the rights of the slave; he has
a keen sympathy for all the misfortunes that dog man’s life; but his
ethical teaching in no way derives its sanction from any theology. The
Hellenes have lost confidence in their inherited outlook on the world.
[Sidenote: The Sophists.]
=42.= The same problems which the poets discussed in the city theatre
were during the fifth century B.C. the themes of a class of men now
becoming so numerous as to form the nucleus of a new profession. These
were the ‘sophists,’ who combined the functions now performed partly by
the university professor, partly by the public journalist[48]. Dependent
for their livelihood upon the fees of such pupils as they could attract,
and therefore sensitive enough to the applause of the moment, they were
distinguished from the philosophers by a closer touch with the public
opinion of the day, and a keener desire for immediate results. Their
contribution to philosophic progress was considerable. Cultivating
with particular care the art of words, they created a medium by which
philosophic thought could reach the crowd of men of average education;
eager advocates of virtue and political progress, they gave new hopes
to a people which, in spite of its material successes, was beginning to
despair because of the decay of its old moral and civic principles. In
PRODICUS of Ceos we find a forerunner of the popular Stoic teachers of
the period of the principate[49]:
‘A profound emotion shook the ranks of his audience when they
heard his deep voice, that came with so strange a sound from the
frail body that contained it. Now he would describe the hardships
of human existence; now he would recount all the ages of man,
beginning with the new-born child, who greets his new home with
wailing, and tracing his course to the second childhood and
the gray hairs of old age. Again he would rail at death as a
stony-hearted creditor, wringing his pledges one by one from his
tardy debtor, first his hearing, then his sight, next the free
movement of his limbs. At another time, anticipating Epicurus,
he sought to arm his disciples against the horrors of death by
explaining that death concerned neither the living nor the dead.
As long as we live, death does not exist; as soon as we die, we
ourselves exist no longer[50].’
To Prodicus we owe the well-known tale of Hercules at the parting of
the ways, when Virtue on the one hand, and Pleasure on the other, each
invite him to join company with her[51]. This tale we shall find to be
a favourite with the Roman philosophers. The same Prodicus introduced a
doctrine afterwards taken up by the Cynics and the Stoics in succession,
that of the ‘indifference’ of external advantages as distinct from
the use to which they are applied. He also propounded theories as
to the origin of the gods of mythology, explaining some of them as
personifications of the powers of nature, others as deified benefactors
of the human race[52]; theories which later on were adopted with zeal
by the Stoic Persaeus[53]. To another sophist, HIPPIAS of Elis, we owe
the doctrine of the ‘self-sufficiency’ of virtue, again adopted both
by Cynics and Stoics[54]. ANTIPHON was not only the writer of an ‘Art
of Consolation,’ but also of a treatise of extraordinary eloquence
on political concord and the importance of education. ‘If a noble
disposition be planted in a young mind, it will engender a flower that
will endure to the end, and that no rain will destroy, nor will it be
withered by drought[55].’
[Sidenote: The Materialists.]
=43.= Amongst the sophists of Athens was counted ANAXAGORAS, born
at Clazomenae about 500 B.C., and a diligent student of the Ionic
philosophers. But in his explanation of nature he broke away from
‘hylozoism’ and introduced a dualism of mind and matter. ‘From eternity
all things were together, but Mind stirred and ordered them[56].’ More
famous was his contemporary EMPEDOCLES of Agrigentum, whose name is still
held in honour by the citizens of that town. In him we first find the
list of elements reaching to four, earth, air, fire, and water; and the
doctrine that visible objects consist of combinations of the elements in
varying proportions, first brought together by Love, then separated by
Hatred. Just in so far as Empedocles abandoned the quest after a single
origin for all things, his conceptions became fruitful as the basis of
the more limited study now known as Chemistry. His work was carried
further by LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS, both of Abdera, who for the four
elements substituted invisible atoms, of countless variety, moving by
reason of their own weight in an empty space. This simple and powerful
analysis is capable of dealing effectively with many natural phenomena,
and with comparatively slight alterations is still held to be valid in
chemical analysis, and exercises a wide influence over the neighbouring
sciences of physics and botany. When however (as has frequently been the
case both in ancient and modern times) the attempt is made to build upon
it a general philosophical system, its failure to explain the cohesion
of matter in masses, the growth of plants and animals, and the phenomena
of mind, become painfully apparent. Such attempts roughly correspond
to the attitude of mind now called _materialism_, because in them the
atoms, endowed with the material properties of solidity, shape, and
weight alone, are conceived to be the only true existences, all others
being secondary and derivative. This materialism (with some significant
qualifications) was a century later the central doctrine of Epicurus, and
is of importance to us by reason of its sharp contrast with the Stoic
system of physics.
[Sidenote: Socrates.]
=44.= The value of these scientific speculations was not for the time
being fully recognised at Athens. It was in the atmosphere of sophistic
discussion, not free from intellectual mists, but bracing to the exercise
of civic and even of martial virtue that SOCRATES of Athens (circ.
469-399 B.C.) grew to maturity. He set to his fellow-citizens an example
of the vigorous performance of duty. As a soldier he was brave almost to
rashness, and took an active part in three campaigns. As a magistrate
he discharged his duty unflinchingly. After the battle of Arginusae the
ten Athenian generals were said to have neglected the duty of succouring
certain disabled ships and the people loudly demanded that all should be
condemned to death by a single vote. Socrates was one of the presiding
senators, and he absolutely refused to concur in any such illegal
procedure[56a]. Again, when Athens was under the rule of the Thirty,
Socrates firmly refused to obey their unjust orders[57]. But when himself
condemned to death, he refused to seize an opportunity for flight which
was given him; for this, he said, would be to disobey the laws of his
country[58].
His private life was marked by a firm self-control. Athens was now
wealthy, and its leading citizens frequently gathered together for
festive purposes. Socrates joined them, but showed the greatest
moderation in eating and drinking: such a course, he said, was the
better for health and also produced more real pleasure. Over the grosser
temptations of the senses he had won a complete victory[59]. His temper
was calm and even; he was not put out by the violences of his wife, nor
did he allow himself to break out into rage with his slaves. His personal
habits, though simple, were careful: he did not approve any neglect
either of bodily cleanliness or of neatness in dress.
Thus Socrates gave an example of a life of activity and self-control
(ἰσχὺς καὶ κράτος); and by his character, even more than by his
speculation, exercised an influence which extended widely over many
centuries.
[Sidenote: His teaching.]
=45.= The teaching of Socrates is not easily reduced to the set formulae
of a philosophic school. But clearly it was focussed upon the life of men
in the city and in the home, and was no longer chiefly concerned with the
phenomena of the sky or the history of the creation of the universe. So
Cicero well says of him that ‘Socrates called philosophy down from the
heavens to earth, and introduced it into the houses and cities of men,
compelling men to enquire concerning life and morals and things good
and evil[60]’; and Seneca that he ‘recalled the whole of philosophy to
moral questions, and said that the supreme wisdom was to distinguish
between good and evil[61].’ He had no higher object than to send out
young men, of whose good disposition he was assured, to take an active
part in the affairs of the community, and to this course he urged them
individually and insistently[62]. But it must not be supposed that he put
on one side problems concerned with the acquirement of truth, or with the
constitution and government of the universe. His views on these points
carried perhaps all the more weight because they were stated by him not
as personal opinions, but as points upon which he desired to share the
convictions of his neighbours, if only they could assure him that reason
was on their side.
[Sidenote: Reason the guide.]
=46.= Socrates more than any other man possessed the art of persuasive
reasoning, thereby making his companions wiser and better men. First he
asked that terms should be carefully defined, so that each man should
know what the nature is of each thing that exists[63], and should examine
himself and know well of what he speaks. Next he introduced the practice
of induction (ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι), by which men make larger the outlook of
their minds, understand one thing by comparison with another, and arrange
the matter of their thought by classes[64]. By induction we arrive at
general truths: not however by any mechanical or mathematical process,
but (at least in the higher matters) by the use of Divination, that is,
by a kind of divine enlightenment[65]. He who has accustomed himself to
think with deliberation, to look on the little in its relation to the
great, and to attune himself to the divine will, goes out into the world
strengthened in self-restraint, in argumentative power, and in active
goodwill to his fellow-men.
Most directly this method appeals to the future statesman. Of those
who seek the society of Socrates many intend to become generals or
magistrates. Let them consider well what these words mean. Is not a pilot
one who knows how to steer a ship? a cook one who knows how to prepare
food? must we not then say that a statesman is one who knows how to guide
the state? And how can he know this but by study and training? Must we
not then say generally that all arts depend on knowledge, and knowledge
on study? Do we not reach the general truths that ‘virtue is knowledge’
and that ‘virtue can be taught’? We may hesitate as to how to apply these
principles to our individual actions, and Socrates will accuse none on
this point; but for himself he has a divine monitor which never fails
to warn him when his mind is turned towards a course which the gods
disapprove.
[Sidenote: His dualism in physics.]
=47.= In the speculations of the Ionian philosophers Socrates could
find no satisfaction. But one day he discovered with pleasure the words
of Anaxagoras: ‘it is mind that orders the world and is cause of all
things[66].’ Thus he was attracted to a dualistic view of the universe,
in which matter and mind are in fundamental contrast. In the beginning
there existed a chaos of unordered dead meaningless matter, and also
mind, the principle of life, meaning, and order. Mind touched matter,
and the universe sprang into being. Mind controls matter, and thus the
universe continues to exist. The proof is found in the providential
adaptation of the world for the life and comfort of mankind: for it is
only consistent to suppose that things that exist for use are the work
of mind[67]. He that made man gave him eyes to see with, ears to hear
with, and a mouth conveniently placed near to the organs of sight and
smell; he implanted in him a love of his offspring, and in the offspring
a love of its parents; and lastly endowed him with a soul capable of
understanding and worshipping his maker. For the divine power Socrates
uses quite indifferently the words ‘god’ and ‘gods’: but his belief is
essentially monotheistic. In the gods of the city of Athens he has
ceased to believe, although he still makes sacrifices upon their altars
in good-humoured conformity with the law, and even adopts the popular
term ‘divination[68],’ though in a sense very different to that in which
the official priesthood used it.
In the analysis of human nature Socrates adopts a similar dualism. Man
consists of body and soul: the soul is lord and king over the body, and
indeed may rightly be called divine, if anything that has touch with
humanity is such[69].
[Sidenote: His pietism.]
=48.= The practical teaching of Socrates was entirely dominated by his
religious principles. The gods, he held, know all things, our words, our
deeds, and the secrets of our hearts: they are everywhere present and
give counsel to men concerning the whole of life[70]. The first duty of
man is therefore to enter into communion with the gods by prayer, asking
them to give us the good and deliver us from the evil, but not qualifying
the prayer by any instruction to the gods as to what is good or evil; for
this the gods themselves know best[71]. In these words then we may pray:
‘Zeus our king, give us what is good for us whether we ask for it or not;
what is evil, even though we ask for it in prayer, keep far from us[72].’
In this spirit of what we should to-day call ‘pietism’ we must interpret
his principle that ‘virtue is knowledge[73].’ This not only asserts that
no one can rightly practise any art unless he has studied and understands
it, but also that no one can rightly understand an art without practising
it. We say that there are men who know what is good and right, but do not
perform it; but this is not so; for such men in truth think that some
other course is good for them. Only the wise and pious man has a right
understanding; others cannot do good even if they try[74]; and when they
do evil, even that they do without willing it[75].
In its application to politics the teaching of Socrates came into
collision with the democratic sentiments prevalent at Athens. To say
the least, Socrates had no prejudice against the rule of kings. He
distinguished sharply between kingship and tyranny, saying that the rule
of one man with the assent of his subjects and in accordance with the
laws was kingship, but without such assent and according to the man’s
arbitrary will was tyranny. But under whatever constitutional form
government was carried on, Socrates asserted that those who knew the
business of government were alone the true rulers, and that the will of
the crowd, if conflicting with that of the wise, was both foolish and
impious[76].
[Sidenote: Why Socrates was condemned.]
=49.= So teaching and influencing men Socrates lived in Athens till
his seventieth year was past, and then died by the hands of the public
executioner. This fate he might so easily have avoided that it seemed
almost to be self-chosen. His disciple Xenophon expresses amazement that
the jurors should have condemned a man so modest and so wise, and so
practical a benefactor of the Athenian people[77]. Modern historians,
with a wider knowledge of human nature, wonder rather that Socrates
was allowed to live so long[78]. The accusers complained that Socrates
offended by disbelieving in the gods of the city, introducing new
deities, and corrupting the youth of Athens. From the point of view
of conservatively-minded Athenians, the charges were amply justified.
Clearly Socrates disbelieved, not merely in the official gods of the
city, but also in the deities it worshipped most earnestly, democracy
and empire. Not only did he introduce new deities, but it might fairly
be argued that he was introducing the most essential parts of the
religion of the national enemy, Persia. Daily inculcating these heretical
doctrines upon young men of the highest families in Athens, he might well
be the cause that the Athenian state was less unquestioningly served
than before. That the heresies of Socrates were soundly founded on wide
observation and general truths could not be considered to make them less
dangerous. Athens had already passed the time when its political power
could be of service to its neighbours; it had not reached that when it
could be content with intellectual influence; Socrates, just because he
was in harmony with the future of Athens, was a discordant element in its
present.
[Sidenote: The companions of Socrates.]
=50.= It is with difficulty, and not without the risk of error, that
we trace even in outline the positive teaching of Socrates. The severe
self-repression with which he controlled his senses was exercised by
him no less over his intelligence. In his expositions it took the shape
of irony (εἰρωνεία), that is, the continual withholding of his personal
convictions, and obstetrics (μαιευτική), the readiness to assist others
in bringing their speculations to the birth. Thus he was a great educator
rather than a great teacher. For whilst he held that virtue alone was
worthy of investigation, and that virtue was essentially wisdom, he
professed to be entirely at a loss where to find this wisdom for himself;
he left it to his pupils to go out and discover the precious cup. Thus
whilst men of all classes and with every variety of mental bias listened
to his teaching, not one was content with his negative attitude. Of the
various suggestions which Socrates threw out, without committing himself
to any one, his pupils took up each in turn and endeavoured to construct
out of it a system[79]. These systems were in the sharpest possible
contrast one with another, but they have certain points in common. All
the teachers retained a strong personal affection and loyalty towards
their common master; each was convinced that he alone possessed the
secret of his real convictions. All of them held aloof from the physical
speculations of which the ripe fruit was already being gathered in by
the Atomists. The portal of knowledge was to all of them the right use
of the reasoning power; the shrine itself was the discipline of virtue,
the attainment of happiness, the perfect ordering of social life. Such
were the Socratic schools, in which philosophy was now somewhat sharply
divided into the two branches of dialectics and ethics. Another century
had yet to elapse before the rejected discipline of physics again
established its importance.
[Sidenote: The Cynics.]
=51.= Of the Socratic schools three contributed directly to the Stoic
system. Of these the Cynic school, founded by ANTISTHENES of Athens
(circ. 440-365 B.C.) and developed by DIOGENES of Sinope, is its
immediate precursor. The Cynic masters inherited most completely the
moral earnestness[80] and the direct pietistic teaching of Socrates; and
for this reason Antisthenes appears to have been the master’s favourite
pupil. The lives both of these men and of their successors were marked
by simplicity and self-abnegation, and they devoted themselves with true
missionary zeal to the reformation of moral outcasts. The caricature of
the figure of Diogenes which was promulgated by his opponents and still
lives in literary tradition needs constantly to be corrected by the
picture which Epictetus gives of him, and which (though not without an
element of idealization and hero-worship) shews us the man as he appeared
to his own disciples.
The breach with the state-religion which was latent in Socrates was
displayed without disguise by the Cynics. Antisthenes, following in the
track of the ardent Xenophanes, declared that the popular gods were many,
but the god of nature was one[81]; he denounced the use of images[82];
and he and his followers naturally acquired the reproach of atheism[83].
Equally offensive to the Athenians was their cosmopolitanism[84], which
treated the pride of Hellenic birth as vain, and poured contempt on the
glorious victories of Marathon and Salamis. Nor did the Cynics consider
the civilization of their times as merely indifferent; they treated it
as the source of all social evils, and looked for a remedy in the return
to a ‘natural’ life, to the supposed simplicity and virtue of the savage
unspoilt by education. Thus they formulated a doctrine which especially
appealed to those who felt themselves simple and oppressed, and which has
been well described as ‘the philosophy of the proletariate of the Greek
world[85].’
[Sidenote: Cynic intuitionism.]
=52.= The destructive criticism of the Cynics did not stop with its
attack upon Greek institutions; it assailed the citadel of reason itself.
Socrates had renounced physics; the Cynics considered that dialectic was
equally unnecessary[86]. For the doctrine of general concepts and the
exercise of classification they saw no use; they were strict Nominalists;
horses they could see, but not ‘horsiness.’ In their ethics they held
to the chief doctrines of Socrates, that ‘virtue is knowledge,’ ‘virtue
can be taught’ and ‘no one willingly sins’; and they laid special
stress on the ‘sufficiency’ (αὐτάρκεια) of virtue, which to produce
happiness needs (according to them) nothing in addition to itself except
a Socratic strength of character (Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς)[87]. But in reality
they identified virtue with this will-power, and entirely dispensed with
knowledge; virtue was to them a matter of instinct, not of scientific
investigation. They appear therefore as the real founders of that ethical
school which bases knowledge of the good on intuition, and which is at
the present time, under ever-varying titles, the most influential of all.
In practice, the virtue which specially appealed to the Cynics was that
of ‘liberty,’ the claim of each man at every moment to do and say that
which seems to him right, without regard to the will of sovereigns, the
conventions of society, or the feelings of his neighbour; the claim made
at all times by the governed against their rulers, whether these are just
or unjust, reckless or farseeing.
[Sidenote: Limits of Cynism.]
=53.= Cynism is in morals what Atomism is in physics; a doctrine which
exercises a widespread influence because of its extreme simplicity,
which is extraordinarily effective within the range of ideas to which
it is appropriate, and fatally mischievous outside that range. Nothing
is more alien from Cynism than what we now call cynicism; the Cynics
were virtuous, warm-hearted, good-humoured, and pious. In their willing
self-abnegation they equalled or surpassed the example set by Buddhist
monks, but they were probably much inferior to them in the appreciation
of natural beauty and the simple pleasures of life. As compared with
their master Socrates, they lacked his genial presence, literary taste,
and kindly tolerance; and they were intensely antipathetic to men of the
type of Plato and Aristotle, whose whole life was bound up with pride in
their country, their birth, and their literary studies[88].
[Sidenote: Xenophon.]
=54.= The Cynics themselves seem to have made no effective use of
literature to disseminate their views; but in the works of XENOPHON of
Athens (440-circ. 350 B.C.) we have a picture of Socrates drawn almost
exactly from the Cynic standpoint. Xenophon was a close personal friend
of Antisthenes, and thoroughly shared his dislike for intellectual
subtleties. He was possessed of a taste for military adventure, and his
interpretation of Socratic teaching entirely relieved him of any scruples
which patriotism might have imposed upon him in this direction, leaving
him free at one time to support the Persian prince Cyrus, and at another
to join with the Spartan king Agesilaus against his own countrymen.
From adventure he advanced to romance-writing, and his sketches of the
expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks (in which he took part in person)
and of the life of Cyrus the Great have an interest which in no way
depends upon their accuracy. The account which he gives of Socrates in
his _Memorabilia_ (ἀπομνημονεύματα) is not always to be depended upon; it
is at the best a revelation of one side only of the historic philosopher;
but it is to a large extent confirmed by what we learn from other
sources, and is of special interest to us because of the great influence
it exercised over Latin literature.
[Sidenote: The Cyrenaics.]
=55.= In the opposite direction ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene shared the
sympathetic tone of Socrates, but could not adopt his moral earnestness
or his zeal for the good of others. He refused altogether the earnest
appeal of Socrates that he should take part in politics. ‘It seems to
me,’ he says, ‘to show much folly that a man who has quite enough to do
to find the necessities of life for himself, should not be satisfied with
this, but should take upon himself to provide his fellow-citizens with
all that they want, and to answer for his action in the courts if he is
not successful.’ Aristippus revolted altogether from the ascetic form in
which the Cynics represented his master’s teaching, and held that the
wise man, by self-restraint and liberal training, attained to the truest
pleasure, and that such pleasure was the end of life. The Cyrenaics (as
his followers were called) were the precursors in ethics of the school of
Epicurus; and the bitter opposition which was later on to rage between
Stoics and Epicureans was anticipated by the conflict between the Cynics
and the Cyrenaics.
[Sidenote: The Megarians.]
=56.= The school of EUCLIDES of Megara swerved suddenly from these
ethical interests and devoted itself mainly to the problems of dialectic.
From the Socratic practice of classification it arrived at the doctrine
of the One being, which alone it held to be truly existent, and which it
identified with the One God proclaimed by Xenophanes and his followers
of the Eleatic school. To the Megaric school we are therefore chiefly
indebted for the assertion of the philosophical principle of monism; the
same school drew the necessary logical consequence, that evil is not in
any real sense existent. From the Eleatics the Megarians further derived
an interest in logical speculation of all kinds, and they were greatly
occupied with the solution of fallacies: amongst the followers of this
school we first meet with the puzzles of ‘the heap’ (_Sorites_), ‘the
liar’ (_Pseudomenos_), and others upon which in later times Chrysippus
and other Stoics sharpened their wits[89]. DIODORUS the Megarian set out
certain propositions with regard to the relation of the possible and the
necessary which are of critical importance in connexion with the problem
of free-will[90]. Finally STILPO, who taught in Athens about 320 B.C.,
and who made a violent attack upon Plato’s theory of ideas, adopted
an ethical standpoint not unlike that of the Cynics[91], and counted
amongst his pupils the future founder of Stoicism. Stilpo enjoyed amongst
his contemporaries a boundless reputation; princes and peoples vied in
doing him honour[92]; but we have scarcely any record of his teaching,
and know him almost exclusively as one who contributed to form the mind
of Zeno.
[Sidenote: Advance of Philosophy.]
=57.= With the school founded by Phaedo of Elis we are not concerned;
the consideration of Plato and Aristotle and their respective followers
we must leave to another chapter. We have already seen philosophy grow
from being the interest of isolated theorists into a force which is
gathering men in groups, and loosening the inherited bonds of city and
class. So far its course has violently oscillated, both as regards its
subject-matter and its principles. But its range is now becoming better
defined, and in the period that is approaching we shall find determined
attempts to reach a comprehensive solution of the problems presented to
enquiring minds.
FOOTNOTES
[1] ‘Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the
religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the
West’ Lightfoot, _Philippians_, p. 274.
[2] Amongst the most important of these are Th. Gomperz’ _Greek Thinkers_
(transl. by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, London, 1901-5), and J. Adam’s
_Religious teachers of Greece_ (Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1908).
[3] ‘Most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light
floats over it’ Hom. _Od._ 6, 46 (Butcher and Lang’s transl.). See also
Adam, _Religious Teachers_, p. 31.
[4] ‘It is not possible for another god to go beyond, or make void, the
purpose of Zeus’ _Od._ 5, 103.
[5] _Il._ 24, 308; _Od._ 14, 404.
[6] _ib._ 6, 188.
[7] _Od._ 8, 170.
[8] _ib._ 4, 237.
[9] _ib._ 20, 75.
[10] _ib._ 14, 84.
[11] _ib._ 17, 485.
[12] See below, § 325.
[13] So already Socrates understood it; Xen. _Mem._ i 3, 7.
[14] Hesiod, _Works and Days_, 252-255; and see below, § 254.
[15] _ib._ 289-292, quoted Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 20.
[16] For instance, to Adam, _Religious Teachers_, Lect. V; Gomperz,
_Greek Thinkers_, bk. i, ch. ii.
[17] Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel).
[18] Adam, p. 114.
[19] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, i pp. 46-48.
[20] _ib._ 48-56.
[21] _ib._ 56-59.
[22] The terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ have recently become the watchwords
of opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In
this book they stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are
not necessarily irreconcileable. For without such contrasts as life and
matter, universe and individual, right and wrong, thought is impossible;
so far we are all ‘dualists.’ Yet as soon as we fix our attention on
these contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some
kind of ultimate reconciliation; and to this extent all diligent thinkers
tend to become ‘monists.’ Similarly the broad monistic principle ‘all
things are one’ is meaningless apart from some kind of interpretation in
dualistic language.
[23] See below, §§ 71, 195.
[24] Gomperz, i 127.
[25] This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p.
204.
[26] Xen. apud Euseb. _Praep. ev._ xiii 13.
[27] Xenophanes apud Sext. _math._ ix 193.
[28] Id. apud Arist. _Rhet._ ii 23.
[29] On Xenophanes see Gomperz, i pp. 155-164; Adam, pp. 198-211.
[30] ‘Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, unless their souls have
wit’ Heracl. _Fr._ 4 (Bywater), 107 (Diels).
[31] ‘Much learning does not teach sense, else it had taught Hesiod and
Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus’ _Fr._ 16 B, 40 D.
[32] ‘The Word is common, yet most men live as if they owned a private
understanding’ _Fr._ 92 B, 2 D.
[33] ‘All things move and nothing remains’ Plato _Crat._ 402 A.
[34] ‘Listening not to me but to the Word it is reasonable to confess
that all things are one’ _Fr._ 1 B, 50 D.
[35] ‘All things change with fire and fire with all things, as gold with
goods and goods with gold’ _Fr._ 22 B, 90 D; ‘neither God nor man created
this World-order (κόσμος), which is the same for all beings: but it has
been and shall be an ever-living fire’ _Fr._ 20 B, 30 D.
[36] ‘The fire shall one day come, judge all things and condemn them’
_Fr._ 26 B, 66 D.
[37] ‘Whilst we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we
die, our souls revive and live’ Sext. _Pyrrh. inst._, iii 230 (_Fr._ 78
B, 88 D).
[38] ‘This Word is always existent’ _Fr._ 2 B, 1 D.
[39] _ib._
[40] ‘There is but one wisdom, to understand the judgment by which all
things are steered through all’ _Fr._ 19 B, 41 D.
[41] ‘Men fail in comprehension before they have heard the Word and at
first even after they have heard it.... Other men do not observe what
they do when they are awake, just as they forget what they do when
asleep’ _Fr._ 2 B, 1 D.
[42] _Fr._ 91 B, 114 D.
[43] Adam, pp. 217-222.
[44] Gomperz, i p. 63.
[45] See Gladisch, _Herakleitos und Zoroaster_; Ueberweg, _Grundriss_, p.
39; above, § 13.
[45a] Gladisch traces this dualism in Heraclitus under the names of Zeus
and Hades (see his p. 26, note 39).
[45b] Clem. _Strom._ i 14; Suidas, s. v. Herakleitos. (Gladisch, pp. 65,
75).
[46] _Agam._ 155-161, 167-171.
[47] Gomperz, ii p. 13.
[48] ‘Half professor and half journalist—this is the best formula that we
can devise to characterise the sophist of the 5th century B.C.’ Gomperz,
i p. 414.
[49] See below, §§ 124, 130, and 131.
[50] Gomperz, i p. 428.
[51] Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 21 to 34.
[52] Gomperz, i p. 430.
[53] See below, § 89.
[54] Gomperz, i p. 433.
[55] _ib._ p. 437.
[56] Arist. _Phys._ viii 1; and see below, § 173.
[56a] Xen. _Mem._ i 1, 18.
[57] Plato, _Apol._ p. 32.
[58] Plato, _Crito_, p. 44 sqq.
[59] Gomperz, ii p. 48.
[60] Cic. _Ac._ i 4, 15; _Tusc. disp._ v 4, 10.
[61] Sen. _Ep._ 71, 7.
[62] Xen. _Mem._ iii 7.
[63] Xen. _Mem._ iv 6, 1; Epict. _Disc._ i 7, 11.
[64] Xen. _Mem._ iv 5, 12; Arist. _Met._ xiii 4.
[65] Xen. _Mem._ iv 7, 10. The Socratic μαντική must not be taken too
seriously; it is only one of many tentative suggestions for explaining
the process of reasoning, akin to our modern use of the term ‘genius’ in
connexion with achievements in poetry and art.
[66] Plato, _Phaedo_, p. 97 c. The passage gives the impression of a
real reminiscence; at the same time its recognition as such implies that
Socrates was not consistent in disregarding all physical speculations.
[67] Xen. _Mem._ i 4, 4.
[68] _ib._ i 4, 2.
[69] _ib._ i 4, 9, and iv 3, 14; Cic. _N. D._ ii 6, 18.
[70] _ib._ i 1, 19.
[71] _ib._
[72] Plato, _Alc._ ii 143 A.
[73] Xen. _Mem._ iii 9, 4 and 5.
[74] _ib._
[75] οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει; see Plato _Prot._ p. 345 D, _Apol._ p. 25,
Xen. _Mem._ iv 2, 20. No one is willingly ignorant, and no one does evil
for any other reason than that he is ignorant of the good.
[76] In accepting generally the statements of Xenophon as to the
religious and practical teaching of Socrates I am glad to find myself
in agreement with Adam; Gomperz on the other hand is more sceptical.
It should however always be realized that Socrates himself veiled his
positive opinions under the form of suggestions and working hypotheses or
‘divinations.’
[77] _Mem._ i 1, 1.
[78] Grote, _History of Greece_, ch. lxviii. Gomperz gives a very
dramatic representation of the attitude of an Athenian of the old school;
_Greek Thinkers_, ii pp. 94-97.
[79] ‘ex illius [Socratis] variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis
disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat’ Cic. _de Orat._ iii 16, 61.
[80] παρὰ [Σωκράτους] τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας Diog. L.
vi 2.
[81] ‘Antisthenes ... populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens’
Cic. _N. D._ i 13, 32.
[82] οὐδεὶς [θεὸν] εἰδέναι ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται Clem. Alex. _Protrept._ p.
46 C.
[83] Epict. _Disc._ iii 22, 91.
[84] See below, § 303.
[85] Gomperz, ii p. 148, referring to Göttling’s book, _Diogenes der
Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats_ (Halle 1851).
[86] ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν Diog. L.
vi 103.
[87] _ib._ vi 11.
[88] See Plato, _Theaet._ 155 E, _Soph._ 251 B; Aristotle, _Met._ vii 3,
7.
[89] See below, § 163.
[90] See below, §§ 220 and 221.
[91] ‘hoc inter nos et illos [Stilbonem etc.] interest; noster sapiens
vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem’ Sen.
_Ep._ 9, 3.
[92] Gomperz, ii p. 196.