CHAPTER VII.

THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.

The presumptions against revelation, and objections against the general

scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it, being

removed, there remains to be considered, what positive evidence we

have for the truth of it; chiefly in order to see, what the analogy

of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections

against it: or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain

natural rule of judgment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in

cases where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of

objections against it, that we have in the case before us.

In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things of

great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or the

completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. But

these two are its direct and fundamental proofs: and those other

things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged

apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with them. Thus

the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching,

as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of

great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the

collateral, proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argument.

The conviction arising from this kind of proof may be compared to

what they call _the effect_, in architecture or other works of art;

a result from a great number of things, so and so disposed, and taken

into one view. I shall therefore, _first_, make some observations

relating to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; and

consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought

against this evidence. And, _secondly_, I shall endeavor to give some

account of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the

direct and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument:

this being the kind of proof, upon which we determine most questions

of difficulty, concerning common facts, alleged to have happened, or

seeming likely to happen; especially questions relating to conduct.

_First_, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of

Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections

alleged against it.[252]

I. Now the following observations relating to the _historical evidence

of miracles_ wrought in attestation of Christianity appear to be of

great weight.

1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence of the

miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common civil history

of Moses and the kings of Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish

nation. And the _Gospels_ and _the Acts_ afford us the same historical

evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of the common

matters related in them. This indeed could not have been affirmed by

any reasonable man, if the authors of these books, like many other

historians, had appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing,

and hence interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances

and upon proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation,

amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same account

would naturally have been given of them, as of the speeches and

descriptions given by such authors: the same account, in a manner, as

is to be given, why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But

the facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are related in

plain unadorned narratives, and both of them appear, in all respects,

to stand upon the same foot of historical evidence.[253]

Further: some parts of Scripture, containing an account of miracles

fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as

genuine, from the age in which they are said to be written, down to

the present: and no other parts of them, material in the present

question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford any

sort of proof of their not being genuine. And, as common history, when

called in question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by

contemporary or subsequent events more known and acknowledged; and as

the common Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed;

so likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular

instances, but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish and

Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the miracles

related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them,

these events are just what we should have _expected_, upon supposition

such miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of those

religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events:

of which no other satisfactory account can be given; nor any account at

all, but what is merely imaginary and invented.

It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct

account of this history, how it came to be written, and to be received

in the world as a true history, is that it really is so; nor can

any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account,

not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may be and

often is, the true account of a matter, yet it cannot be admitted on

the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and

possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing, but

that historical evidence is not demonstrative.

The just consequence from all this, I think is, that the Scripture

history in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine history,

till something positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. No

man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or

thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none; even

though the evidence now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This

evidence may be confronted by historical evidence on the other side,

if there be any: or general incredibility in the things related, or

inconsistence in the general turn of the history, would prove it to be

of no authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first

and general view, the _appearance_ is, that it is an authentic history,

it cannot be determined to be fictitious, without some proof that it is

so. The following observations in support of these, and coincident with

them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of

Christianity.

2. The Epistles of Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, and

moreover from several of them being written, not to particular persons

but to churches, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond

what can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the world at

large. This evidence,[254] joined with that which they have in common

with the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much as any

particular pretence for denying their genuineness, considered as an

ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism: I say _particular_ pretence,

for _denying_ it; because any single fact, of such a kind and such

antiquity, may have _general doubts_ raised concerning it, from the

very nature of human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be

mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the

epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians; from

the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of

his own to that church.[255] Now these epistles afford a proof of

Christianity, detached from all others, which is, I think, a thing of

weight; and also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For,

In them the author declares, that he received the Gospel in general,

and the institution of the Communion in particular, not from the rest

of the apostles, or jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ

himself; whom he declares likewise, conformably to the history in the

Acts, that he saw after his ascension.[256] So that the testimony of

Paul is to be considered, as detached from that of the rest of the

apostles.

He declares further, that he was endued with a power of working

miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, speaks of

frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in

those very churches, to which he was writing; which he was reproving

for several irregularities, and where he had personal opposers. He

mentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner, and without

effort; by way of reproof to those who had them, for their indecent

use of them; and by way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral

virtues. In short he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous

powers, in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, which

was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as any thing

in the world.[257] And this, as hath been observed by several persons,

is surely a very considerable thing.

3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity offered

itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation,

(_i.e._ as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence,) of miracles,

publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in such an age; and

that it was actually received by great numbers in that very age,

and upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. And

Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems

distinguished by this from all other religions. I mean, that this

does not _appear_ to be the case with regard to any other; for surely

it will not be supposed to lie upon any person, to prove by positive

historical evidence, that it was not. It does in no sort appear that

Mahometanism was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed

miracles,[258] _i.e._ public ones:[259] for, as revelation is itself

miraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence

of miracles. And it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the

very first, propagated by other means. And as particular institutions,

whether in Paganism or Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles _after_

those institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose: so, were there

what might be called historical proof, that any of them were introduced

by a supposed divine command, believed to be attested by miracles;

these would not be in any wise parallel. For single things of this sort

are easy to be accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power

in their hands; and the leaders of them are in veneration with the

multitude; and political interests are blended with religious claims,

and religious distinctions. But _before_ any thing of this kind, for a

few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over

such great numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon

the particular evidence of miracles; this is quite another thing.

I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact

now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances, is peculiar to

the Christian religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that

Christianity obtained, _i.e._ was professed to be received in the

world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in which

it is said those miracles were wrought: or that this is what its

first converts would have alleged, as the reason for their embracing

it. It is not to be supposed that such numbers of men, in the most

distant parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their

country, in which they had been educated; separate themselves from

their friends, particularly in their festival shows and solemnities,

to which the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were of

a nature to engage them much more, than any thing of that sort among

us: and embrace a religion, which could not but expose them to many

inconveniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a

great degree, even from the very first, and before the empire engaged

in form against them: it cannot be supposed, that such numbers should

make so great, and to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their

whole institution of life, unless they were really convinced of the

truth of those miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of which they

professed to make it. And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged,

that the generality of the first converts to Christianity must have

believed them: that as by becoming Christians they declared to the

world, they were satisfied of the truth of those miracles; so this

declaration was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same

kind of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing,

and these writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence,

because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full opportunity to

inform themselves of.

It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence,

though it is of the same kind: and would be allowed to be distinct in

all cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient

historians, and disputed in after ages; that this fact is acknowledged

to have been _believed_ by great numbers of the age in which the

historian says it was done, would be allowed an additional proof of

such fact, quite distinct from the express testimony of the historian.

The credulity of mankind is acknowledged: and the suspicions of mankind

ought to be acknowledged too; and their backwardness even to believe,

and greater still to practise, what makes against their interest. And

it must particularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and

authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So

that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real presumption

of somewhat more than human in this matter.[260] I say presumption,

for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any one

of the things mentioned in this chapter be considered as a proof by

itself: and yet all of them together may be one of the strongest.[261]

Upon the whole: as there is large historical evidence, both direct and

circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity,

collected by those who have writ upon the subject; it lies upon

unbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be credited. This way

of speaking is, I think, just; and what persons who write in defence

of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeakable

importance, the proper question is, not whom it lies upon, according to

the rules of argument, to maintain or confute objections: but whether

there really are any, against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to

destroy the credit of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them

the part of showing that there are.

They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages

and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties which the

primitive Christians did; and are ready to give up their lives for the

most idle follies imaginable. It is not very clear, to what purpose

this objection is brought. For surely, every one, in every case, must

distinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony is no

proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any _opinion_ at all; yet it

is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of _facts_. A person’s

laying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions, is the

strongest proof of his believing them. And if the apostles and their

contemporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of which they

exposed themselves to sufferings and death; this their belief, or

rather knowledge, must be a proof of those facts: for they were such

as came under the observation of their senses. And though it is not of

equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age,

notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were

the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full opportunity

to inform themselves whether they were true or not, and gave equal

proof of their believing them to be true.

But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of testimony

even for facts, in matters relating to religion: some seem to think it

totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon this

subject. The powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases too, which operate

in a like manner, are indeed very wonderful, in particular instances.

But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak,

nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw

and heard such things plainly, with their eyes and their ears, and are

admitted to be in earnest; such testimony is evidence of the strongest

kind we can have, for any matter of fact. Possibly it may be overcome,

strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by

contrary testimony. And in an instance where one thought it was so

overcome, it might be just to consider, how far such evidence could be

accounted for by enthusiasm; for it seems as if no other imaginable

account were to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown,

or contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so

far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such testimony, as

that of enthusiasm must be; an account so strange, that the generality

of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by it; it

cannot, I say, be expected that such an account will be admitted of

such evidence; when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account of

it, that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible, which they

affirm, sincerely and with full assurance, they did see and hear.

Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an absurd,

but a possible account of such testimony, it is manifest, that the

very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition, that the things

so attested are incredible: and therefore need not be considered,

till they are shown to be so. Much less need it be considered, after

the contrary has been proved. And I think it has been proved, to full

satisfaction, that there is no incredibility in a revelation, in

general; or in such a one as the Christian, in particular. However, as

religion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be

observed, that prejudices almost without number, and without name,

such as romance, affection, humor, a desire to engage attention, or

to surprise, party spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable

likings and dislikings; these influence men strongly in common matters.

And as these prejudices are often scarce know a or reflected upon

by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to

be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human

testimony, in common matters, is naturally and justly believed,

notwithstanding.

It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation, that

though it should be proved, that the apostles and first Christians

could not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and in other

respects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon the world,

yet it will not follow that their general testimony is to be believed,

though truly handed down to us: because they might still in part,

_i.e._ in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in part also

designedly impose upon others; which, it is added, is a thing very

credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be

met with in the same characters.[262]

I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this

observation upon mankind is not to be denied; and that something

very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as a very common

case, and most severely reproved. But it were to have been expected,

that persons capable of applying this observation as applied in

the objection, might also frequently have met with the like mixed

character, in instances where religion was quite out of the case.

The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued with reason,

or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood; and as

naturally they are endued with veracity, or a regard to truth in what

they say: but from many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and

biassed and deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive

others, in every degree: insomuch that, as we are all liable to be

deceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon

thing, for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not invent

a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate it with

heightening circumstances, after it is once invented and set a-going.

And others, though they would not _propagate_ a lie, yet, which is a

lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. But

notwithstanding all this, _human testimony_ remains still a natural

ground of assent; and this assent a natural principle of action.

It is objected further, that however it has happened, the _fact_

is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded

with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means to be

admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be

deceived by these than by other pretences.

It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of historical

evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, acknowledged to be

fabulous. But suppose there were even _the like_ historical evidence

for these, to what there is for those alleged in proof of Christianity,

which yet is in no wise allowed, but suppose this; the consequence

would not be, that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted.

Nor is there a man in the world, who in common cases, would conclude

thus. For what would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that

evidence, confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced,

destroys the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor

overbalanced? To argue that because there is, if there were, like

evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for those

in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the latter

case is not to be credited; this is the same as to argue, that if two

men of equally good reputation had given evidence in different cases

no way connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury, this

confuted the testimony of the other!

Upon the whole then, the general observation, that human creatures

are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in religion, and

principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from

negligence; and that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavoring

to deceive others; this does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony

in all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things will

appear, to different men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, in

different degrees: in degrees proportionable to the observations they

have made, or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the

weakness and negligence and dishonesty of mankind; or concerning the

powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems

to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm these things

to destroy the evidence from testimony which we have, of the truth of

Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any

case, but a proof or probability, that persons are not competent judges

of the facts to which they give testimony; or that they are actually

under some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular case.

Till this be made out, the _natural_ laws of human actions require,

that testimony be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow

direct historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many

principles, from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves,

and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion,

that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising persons can

help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes they are

not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, of which they

speak thus; or that they can avoid observing, if they do make this

reflection, that it is on such a subject, a very material one.[263]

Over against all these objections is to be set the _importance_ of

Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first

converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from

carelessness, than they would in common matters; and likewise the

strong _obligations to veracity_, which their religion laid them under:

so that the first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not

be deceived themselves nor deceive others. And this presumption, in

this degree, is peculiar to the testimony we have been considering.

In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have an air of

positiveness which sometimes is not very easy: yet they are necessary,

and necessary to be repeated; in order to connect a discourse, and

distinctly to lay before the view of the reader, what is proposed

to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now the conclusion from

the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this:

that unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence for

Christianity, _i.e._ the proof of miracles wrought to attest it, to be

of real weight and very considerable; though they cannot allow it to

be sufficient, to convince them of the reality of those miracles. And

as they must, in all reason, admit this; so it seems to me, that upon

consideration they would, in fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who

know any thing at all of the matter; in like manner as persons, in many

cases, own they see strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of

things, which yet they cannot be convinced are true: cases, suppose,

where there is contrary testimony; or things which they think, whether

with or without reason, to be incredible. But there is no testimony

contrary to that which we have been considering: and it has been fully

proved, that there is no incredibility in Christianity in general, or

in any part of it.

II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall only

make some few general observations, which are suggested by the analogy

of nature; _i.e._ by the acknowledged natural rules of judging in

common matters, concerning evidence of a like kind to this from

prophecy.

1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy does

not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising from

the appearing completion of those other parts, which are understood.

For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts which are not

understood were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown

tongue. Whether this observation be commonly attended to or not, it is

so evident, that one can scarce bring oneself to set down an instance

in common matters, to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly

in cipher, and partly in plain words at length; and that in the part

one understood, there appeared mention of several known facts; it would

never come into any man’s thoughts to imagine, that if he understood

the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not in reality

known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example and in the thing

intended to be exemplified by it, our not understanding the whole (the

whole, suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion

a doubt, whether one understood the literal meaning of such a part: but

this comes under another consideration.

For the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for want of

learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having turned

his studies this way, even so much as to judge whether particular

prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled; yet he may see,

in general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree, as, upon

very good ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in such

prophecies, and of such events being intended by them. For the same

reason also, though, by means of the deficiencies in civil history,

and the different accounts of historians, the most learned should not

be able to make out to satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic

history have been minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong

_proof of foresight_ may arise, from that general completion of them,

which is made out. As much perhaps, as the giver of prophecy intended

should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy.

2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events,

is itself a proof that it was intended of them: as the rules by which

we naturally judge and determine, in common cases parallel to this,

will show.[264] This observation I make in answer to the common

objection against the application of the prophecies, that, considering

each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear, that they

were intended of those particular events to which they are applied by

Christians; and therefore it is to be supposed, that if they meant any

thing, they were intended of other events unknown to us, and not of

these at all.

Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great resemblance to

prophecy, with respect to the matter before us: the mythological, and

the satirical, where the satire is to a certain degree concealed. And

a man might be assured, that he understood what an author intended by

a fable or parable related without any application or moral, merely

from seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and that such

a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully

assured, that such persons and events were intended in a satirical

writing, merely from its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to

the last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it,

though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story of such

persons to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction that

he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these writings,

would be greater or less in proportion as he saw the general turn

of them to be capable of such application; and in proportion to the

number of particular things capable of it. And thus, if a long series

of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the church, and to

the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand

years after these prophecies were delivered; and a long series of

prophecy delivered before the coming of Christ is applicable to him;

these things are in themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was

intended of him, and of those events: in proportion as the general turn

of it is capable of such application, and to the number and variety of

particular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way of

consideration, the obvious completion of prophecies is to be allowed to

be thus explanatory of, and to determine, their meaning; yet it is to

be remembered further, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to

a Messiah before his coming,[265] in much the same manner as Christians

do now: and that the primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies

respecting the state of the church and of the world in the last ages,

in the sense which the event seems to confirm and verify. From these

things it may be made appear:

3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could be,

that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and such

predictions, and not those which Christians allege to be completions

of those predictions; or that such and such prophecies are capable of

being applied to other events than those, to which Christians apply

them--that this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument

from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For, observe

how this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole

author of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any

degree, that one knew the whole of what he intended in it; one should

be assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole

meaning of that book: for the meaning of a book is nothing but the

meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have _compiled_ a

book out of memoirs, which he received from another, of vastly superior

knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book full

of great intricacies and difficulties; it would in no wise follow,

that one knew the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the whole

meaning of the compiler: for the original author of them, might have,

and there would be no presumption, in many cases, against supposing

him to have, some further meaning than the compiler saw. To say then

that the Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have no

other or further meaning than those persons had, who first recited or

wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were the original,

proper, and sole authors of those books, _i.e._ that they are not

inspired: which is absurd, while the authority of these books is under

examination; _i.e._ till you have determined they are of no divine

authority at all. Till this be determined, it must in all reason be

supposed, not indeed that they have, (for this is taking for granted

that they are inspired;) but that they may have, some further meaning

than what the compilers saw or understood. And, upon this supposition,

it is supposable also, that this further meaning may be fulfilled.

Events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different meaning

from that, in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them;

affords in a manner, the same proof, that this different sense was

originally intended, as it would have afforded, if the prophets had

not understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did:

because there is no presumption of _their_ sense of them being the

whole sense of them. And it has been already shown, that the apparent

completions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its

meaning. So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has

been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, _i.e._ in any real sense of

the words of it. For such completion is equally a proof of foresight

more than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have

understood it in a different sense. I say, supposed: for, though I

think it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full meaning

of their predictions, it is another question, how far they thought they

did; and in what sense they understood them.

Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy themselves,

who endeavor to prove, that the prophetic history is applicable to

events of the age in which it was written, or of ages before it.

To have proved this, before there was any appearance of a further

completion of it, might have answered some purpose; for it might have

prevented the expectation of any such further completion. Thus could

Porphyry have shown, that some principal parts of the book of Daniel,

for instance the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the

Christians interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events,

which happened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; this

might have prevented them from expecting any further completion of

it. And, unless there was then, as I think there must have been,

external evidence concerning that book, more than is come down to

us; such a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way

of Christianity itself: considering the authority which our Savior

has given to the book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme of

Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this discovery,

had there been any such,[266] would be of very little weight with

reasonable men now; if this passage, thus applicable to events before

the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to events, which

succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I mention this, not at

all as intending to insinuate, that the division of this empire into

ten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number, were,

alone and by itself, of any moment in verifying the prophetic history:

but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of. Thus upon the

whole, the matter of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether

the prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of

the world, and of the church; applicable in such a degree, as to imply

foresight: not whether they are _capable_ of any other application.

Though I know no pretence for saying the general turn of them is

capable of any other.

These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence referred to

in them real: though there may be people who will not accept of such

imperfect information from Scripture. Some too have not integrity and

regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence, which keeps the mind

in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort

from what they expected. It plainly requires a degree of modesty and

fairness, beyond what every one has, for a man to say, not to the world

but to himself, that there is a real appearance of great weight in this

matter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it;

but that it shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its

apparent reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in

with the negligence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to

determine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it. The

prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, with which

this evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention. For what can

be said to persons, who are weak enough in their understandings to

think this any presumption against it; or, if they do not, are yet weak

enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a

subject?

_Secondly_, I shall endeavor to give some account of the general

argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the direct

and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one argument. To

state and examine this argument fully, would be a work much beyond the

compass of this whole treatise; nor is so much as a proper abridgment

of it to be expected here. Yet the present subject requires to have

some brief account of it given. For it is the kind of evidence, upon

which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined:

evidence arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm

each other, and in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the

point under consideration. I choose to do it also: First, because it

seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by

every one, that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express

things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; and

that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed

to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be joined

together; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the

result of those several things, considered in their respects to each

other, and united into one view. In the next place, because it seems

to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which are acknowledged

by unbelievers, must be acknowledged by them also to contain together

a degree of evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to

lay these several things before themselves distinctly, and then with

attention consider them together; instead of that cursory thought of

them, to which we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the

cursory thought of things as really hinders the weight of them from

being seen, as from having its due influence upon practice.

The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired into,

is this: That over and above our reason and affections, which God

has given us for the information of our judgment and the conduct

of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given us an

account of himself and his moral government over the world, implying

a future state of rewards and punishments; _i.e._ hath revealed

the system of natural religion: (for natural religion may be

externally[267] revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by

their fellow-creatures)--that God, I say, has given us the evidence

of revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this

moral system; together with an account of a particular dispensation of

Providence, which reason could no way have discovered, and a particular

institution of religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out

of their present wretched condition, and raising them to the perfection

and final happiness of their nature.

This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly

historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of events before

they come to pass; doctrines also are matters of fact; and precepts

come under the same notion. The general design of Scripture, which

contains in it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may be

said to be, to give us an account of the world in this one single view,

as God’s world: by which it appears essentially distinguished from all

other books, so far as I have found, except such as are copied from

it. It begins with an account of God’s creation of the world, in order

to ascertain, and distinguish from all others, who is the object of

our worship, by what he has done: in order to ascertain, who he is,

concerning whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings,

this sacred book, all along, treats; [viz.] the Maker and Proprietor

of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature: in order

likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, which are

either imaginary beings, _i.e._ no beings at all; or else part of that

creation, the historical relation of which is here given. And John, not

improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account of the creation, begins

his Gospel with an account of our Savior’s pre-existence, and that _all

things were made by him; and without him, was not any thing made that

was made_:[268] agreeably to the doctrine of Paul, that _God created

all things by Jesus Christ_.[269] This being premised, the Scripture,

taken together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of

the history of the world, in the view just now mentioned: that is, a

general account of the condition of religion and its professors, during

the continuance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness,

which it everywhere supposes the world to lie in. And this account

of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the

political state of things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation

indeed considers the common affairs of this world, and what is going

on in it, as a mere scene of distraction; and cannot be supposed to

concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or Babylon, or

Greece, or any particular place, should be the most conspicuous seat

of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all places equally aspire

to be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give any account of this wild

scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some very general

account of the chief governments of the world, as the general state of

religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from the first

transgression, and during the whole interval of the world’s continuing

in its present state, to a certain future period, spoken of both in

the Old and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great variety of

expression: _The times of the restitution of all things_:[270] when

_the mystery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his

servants the prophets_:[271] when _the God of heaven shall set up a

kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be

left to other people_,[272] as it is represented to be during this

apostasy, but _judgment shall be given to the saints_,[273] and _they

shall reign_:[274] _and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of

the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the

saints of the Most High_.[275]

Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, how great a

length of time the whole relation takes up, near six thousand years

of which are past; and how great a variety of things it treats of;

the natural and moral system or history of the world, including the

time when it was formed, all contained in the very first book, and

evidently written in a rude and unlearned age; and in subsequent

books, the various common and prophetic history, and the particular

dispensation of Christianity. Now all this together gives the largest

scope for criticism; and for the confutation of what is capable of

being confuted, either from reason, or from common history, or from

any inconsistence in its several parts. And it deserves, I think, to

be mentioned, that whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of

the evidence for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not

true; it appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that

it is true. For, could any common relation of such antiquity, extent,

and variety (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing

lies) be proposed to the examination of the world: that it could not,

in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown to have

nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable men; would be thought

a strong presumptive proof of its truth. Indeed it must be a _proof_

of it, just in proportion to the probability, that if it were false,

it might be shown to be so: which, I think, is scarce pretended to be

shown, but upon principles and in ways of arguing, which have been

clearly obviated.[276] Nor does it at all appear, that any set of men,

who believe natural religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has

been thus confuted. But to proceed:

Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testament contains

a chronological account of the beginning of it, and from thence, an

unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history

begins; and carried on as much farther as to make up a continued

thread of history, of the length of between three and four thousand

years. It contains an account of God’s making a covenant with a

particular nation, that they should be his people, and he would be

their God, in a peculiar sense; of his often interposing miraculously

in their affairs; giving them the promise, and long after, the

possession, of a particular country; assuring them of the greatest

national prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition

to the idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his

commands; and threatening them with unexampled punishments if they

disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry: insomuch that

this one nation should continue to be the observation and the wonder

of all the world. It declares particularly, that _God would scatter

them among all people, from one end of the earth unto the other_; but

that _when they should return unto the Lord their God, he would have

compassion upon them, and gather them from all the nations, whither he

had scattered them_: that _Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an

everlasting salvation; and not be ashamed or confounded world without

end_.[277] And as some of these promises are conditional, others are as

absolute as any thing can be expressed: that the time should come, when

_the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever_:

that _though God would make a full end of all nations whither he had

scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them_: that _he

would bring again the captivity of his people Israel, and plant them

upon their land, and they should be no more pulled up out of their

land_: that _the seed of Israel should not cease from being a nation

forever_.[278] It foretells, that God would raise them up a particular

person, in whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled; the

Messiah, who should be, in a high and eminent sense, their anointed

Prince and Savior. This was foretold in such a manner, as raised a

general expectation of such a person in the nation, as appears from

the New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact; an expectation of his

coming at such a particular time, before any one appeared claiming to

be that person, and when there was no ground for such an expectation,

but from the prophecies: which expectation, therefore, must in all

reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if there were

any doubt about their meaning. It seems moreover to foretell, that this

person should be rejected by the nation to whom he had been so long

promised, though he was so much desired by them.[279] And it expressly

foretells, that he should be the Savior of the Gentiles; and that the

completion of the scheme contained in this book, and then begun, and in

its progress, should be something so great, that in comparison with it,

the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account. _It is

a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes

of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee

for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the

end of the earth._ And, _In the last days, the mountain of the Lord’s

house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be

exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow into it--for out of

Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.

And he shall judge among the nations--and the Lord alone shall be

exalted in that day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish._[280]

The Scripture further contains an account, that at the time the Messiah

was expected, a person rose up in this nation, claiming to be that

Messiah, to be the person to whom all the prophecies referred, and in

whom they should center: that he spent some years in a continued course

of miraculous works; and endued his immediate disciples and followers

with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that

religion, which he commissioned them to publish: that invested with

this authority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest

countries, and settled and established his religion in the world; to

the end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of

the state of this religion among mankind.[281]

Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have all

this related to him out of the Scripture. Or suppose such an one,

having the Scripture put into his hands, to remark these things in

it, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil history, as well

as the other parts of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire

invention; and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the revelation

here related was real, or a fiction? And, instead of a direct answer,

suppose him, all at once, to be told the following confessed facts; and

then to unite them into one view.

Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and

establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is one God

to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that mankind shall be

rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here; in

how very great a degree, I say, the profession and establishment of

this moral system in the world is owing to the revelation, whether

real or supposed, contained in this book: the establishment of this

moral system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge the

proper authority of the Scripture.[282] Let him be told also, what

number of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. Let him then

take in the consideration, of what importance religion is to mankind.

And upon these things he might, I think, truly observe, that this

supposed revelation’s obtaining and being received in the world, with

all the circumstances and effects of it, considered together as one

event, is the most conspicuous and important event in the history of

mankind: that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended

to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have

its claims most seriously examined; and that, before such examination,

to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an offence

against natural piety. It is to be remembered, that how much soever

the establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to the

Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion from

reason, any more than the proof of Euclid’s Elements is destroyed, by

a man’s knowing or thinking, that he should never have seen the truth

of the several propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions

come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician.

Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the next place,

informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this book;

and that its chronology, its account of the time when the earth, and

the several parts of it, were first peopled with human creatures, is

no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil

history of the world, collected from common historians, from the state

of the earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences.

And as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common and civil

history, from the creation to the captivity, for between three and

four thousand years; let the person we are speaking of be told, in the

next place, that this general history, as it is not contradicted, but

confirmed by profane history[283] as much as there would be reason

to expect, upon supposition of its truth; so there is nothing in the

whole history _itself_, to give any reasonable ground of suspicion

of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true

genealogy of men, and series of things. I speak here only of the common

Scripture history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it,

as distinguished from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In

all the Scripture narrations of this kind, following events arise out

of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing

related as done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that

age: nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would say

could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of things in the

preceding one. There is nothing in the characters, which would raise a

thought of their being feigned; but all the internal marks imaginable

of their being real. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies,

bare narratives of the number of years, which persons called by such

and such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction; perhaps do

carry some presumption of veracity: and all unadorned narratives, which

have nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like

presumption too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly

credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken alone in

the naked way they are told, may appear strange; especially to persons

of other manners, temper, education: but there are also incidents of

undoubted truth, in many or most persons’ lives, which, in the same

circumstances, would appear to the full as strange.[284] There may be

mistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes,

not easy to be particularly accounted for: but there are certainly

no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than what were to have

been expected in books of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise,

sufficient to discredit the general narrative.

Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the creation, and

extending in one continued series, through so great a length of time,

and variety of events, should have such appearances of reality and

truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance

in its favor. And as all this is applicable to the common history

of the New Testament, so there is a further credibility, and a very

high one, given to it by profane authors: many of these writing of

the same times, and confirming the truth of customs and events, which

are incidentally as well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this

credibility of the common Scripture-history, gives some credibility

to its miraculous history: especially as this is interwoven with the

common, so as that they imply each other, and both together make up one

relation.

Let it then be more particularly observed to this person, that it is an

acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in the foregoing

observation, that there was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest

antiquity, whose government and general polity was founded on the law,

here related to be given them by Moses as from heaven: that natural

religion, with rites additional yet no way contrary to it, was their

established religion, which cannot be said of the Gentile world: and

that their very being as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment

of one God, the God of the universe. For, suppose in their captivity in

Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, there

would have remained no bond of union, to keep them a distinct people.

And while they were under their own kings, in their own country, a

total apostasy from God would have been the dissolution of their whole

government. They in such a sense nationally acknowledged and worshipped

the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in

idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. This

remarkable establishment and preservation of natural religion among

them, seems to add peculiar credibility to the historical evidence for

the miracles of Moses and the prophets. Because these miracles are a

full satisfactory account of this event, which plainly needs to be

accounted for, and cannot be otherwise.

Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be acquainted

further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish extraction,

rose up at the time when this nation, from the prophecies above

mentioned, expected the Messiah: that he was rejected, as it seemed

to have been foretold he should, by the body of the people, under the

direction of their rulers: that in the course of a very few years, he

was believed on and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by great

numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture,

yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,[285] of which

miracles we have also strong historical evidence; (by which I mean here

no more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious frauds

and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy

our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity:)[286] that

this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying

its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its system,

and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of it which require

to be believed upon the mere authority of its Author; that this

religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself for some hundred

years, not only without any assistance from temporal power, but under

constant discouragements, and often the bitterest persecutions from

it; and then became the religion of the world: that in the mean time

the Jewish nation and government were destroyed in a very remarkable

manner, and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the

most distant countries; in which state of dispersion they have remained

fifteen hundred years: and that they remain a numerous people, united

among themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as they

were in the days of Moses, by the profession of his law; and everywhere

looked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how distinctly to

express, but in the words of the prophetic account of it, given so

many ages before it came to pass: _Thou shalt become an astonishment,

a proverb, and a byword, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead

thee_.[287]

The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining a distinct

people in their dispersion, and the confirmation which this event

appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be thought to be

answered, by their religion’s forbidding them intermarriages with those

of other nations, and prescribing them many peculiarities in their

food, by which they are debarred from incorporating with the people in

whose countries they live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account

of that which it pretends to account for. But what does it pretend to

account for? The correspondence between this event and the prophecies;

or the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence,

of a peculiar nature, towards that people? No. It is only the event

itself, which is offered to be thus accounted for: which single event,

taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence,

perhaps would not have appeared miraculous: but that correspondence

and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be supposed not.

Thus the concurrence of our Saviour’s being born at Bethlehem, with a

long foregoing series of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless

miraculous; the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the

event, being admitted: though the event itself appears to have been

brought about in a natural way; of which, however, no one can be

certain.

As several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to have

verified the prophetic history already, so likewise they may be

considered further, as having a peculiar aspect towards the full

completion of it; as affording some presumption that the whole of it

shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been

so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion; which is

indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now mentioned

only as looking forward to somewhat yet to come: that natural religion

came forth from Judea, and spread, in the degree it has done over

the world, before lost in idolatry; which, together with some other

things, have distinguished that very place, in like manner as the

people of it are distinguished: that this great change of religion over

the earth was brought about under the profession and acknowledgment,

that Jesus was the promised Messiah: things of this kind naturally

turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of the

prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that people;

concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the

kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state of the world, under this

sacred government. Such circumstances and events, compared with these

prophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think,

be spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first

being informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history of

things still future, give it some additional credibility, and have the

appearance of being somewhat in order to the full completion of it.

Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great calmness and

consideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of the evidence for the

truth of Christianity, from that part of the prophetic history which

relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the state

of the church, from the establishment of Christianity to the present

time. But it appears from a general view of it, to be very material.

And those persons who have thoroughly examined it, and some of them

were men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable

to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive.

[CONCLUSION.] Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first

to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scripture, without

knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then to be informed

of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to unite them all into

one view: that the profession and establishment of natural religion

in the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to this book, and

the supposed revelation which it contains; that it is acknowledged to

be of the earliest antiquity; that its chronology and common history

are entirely credible; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it

chiefly treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a

distinguished sense; that, as there was a national expectation among

them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a

time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; that

he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, not upon

the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the religion he taught

supported itself under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and

at length became the religion of the world; that in the mean time the

Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the

face of the earth; that notwithstanding this, they have remained a

distinct numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day; which

not only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies

concerning them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and

easy possibility that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be

fulfilled.

To these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been supposing

add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow it or no, the

obvious appearances which there are, of the state of the world, in

other respects besides what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian

church, having so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic

history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the things before

mentioned out of the Scripture, and seriously compared with them;

the joint view of both together must, I think, appear of very great

weight to a considerate reasonable person: of much greater indeed, upon

having them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so

familiarized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention

for that purpose.

All these things, and the several particulars contained under them,

require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined into; that the

weight of each may be judged of, upon such examination, and such

conclusion drawn, as results from their _united force_. But this has

not been attempted here. I have gone no further than to show, that the

general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed historical

evidence for miracles, and the many obvious appearing completions of

prophecy, together with the collateral things[288] here mentioned, and

there are several others of the like sort; that all this together,

which, being fact, must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to

real evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter: evidence

much more important, than careless men, who have been accustomed

only to transient and partial views of it, can imagine; and indeed

abundantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, must

be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may say, that the

historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity,

is not sufficient to convince them, that such miracles were really

wrought: they cannot deny, that there is such historical evidence,

it being a known matter of fact that there is. They may say, the

conformity between the prophecies and events is by accident: but there

are many instances in which such conformity itself cannot be denied.

They may say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those

above mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will

have a meaning found in them by fanciful people: and that such as are

fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences,

which seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk

thus: but no one who is serious, can possibly think these things to

be nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things, and

even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as

distinguished in nature, from the evidence of demonstration. In many

cases indeed it seems to require the truest judgment, to determine with

exactness the weight of circumstantial evidence: but it is very often

altogether as convincing, as that which is the most express and direct.

This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered as

making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious persons,

to set down every thing which they think may be of any real weight at

all in proof of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of

prophecy: and they will find, that, judging by the natural rules, by

which we judge of probable evidence in common matters, they amount to

a much higher degree of proof, upon such a _joint review_, than could

be supposed upon considering them separately, at different times;

how strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such

separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not only

_increase_ the evidence, but _multiply_ it.[289] Nor should I dissuade

any one from setting down, what he thought made for the contrary

side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his

judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in its

consequences, much more dangerous, than a mistake on the other. And

what course is most safe, and what most dangerous, will be thought a

very material consideration, when we deliberate, not concerning events,

but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by

this consideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it,

is indeed as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other

prejudices, it operates contrary ways, in different men; for some are

inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. And

it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men’s passions in order

to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning conduct, there

is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account,

than the importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would be the

consequence of acting in this, or in the contrary manner: still, that

taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence,

and taking the other might be attended with the greatest, must appear,

to unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment towards determining how

we are to act. The truth of our religion, like the truth of common

matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken together.

And unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this

argument, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed

to have been by accident (for here the stress of the argument for

Christianity lies); then is the truth of it proved: in like manner, as

if in any common case, numerous events acknowledged, were to be alleged

in proof of any other event disputed; the truth of the disputed event

would be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of

itself clearly imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if

the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason

be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were true.

It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives

to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation.

For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, that such and

such things are liable to objection, that this and another thing is of

little weight in itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the

united force of the whole argument in one view.

Lastly, as it has been made appear, that there is no presumption

against a revelation as miraculous; that the general scheme of

Christianity, and the principal parts of it, are conformable to the

experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible:

so the account now given of the positive evidence for it, shows, that

this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed,

though it should be lessened.

The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue. · 第 7 / 9 章