CHAPTER VIII.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE, TO RELIGION.

If every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound,

even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge and give

characters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good

measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to be expected;

for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what

they write against: since this treatise, in common with most others,

lies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful

men at first sight; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the

objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can

censure without judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of

these objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands.

They are such as these:

“That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by

saying, that there are the same in natural religion; when what is

wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as well as

other their respective, difficulties; that it is a strange way indeed

of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them,

that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits: and a

strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of

nature, and of removing the objections against both, to which the

system of religion lies open, to show, that the like objections lie

against natural providence; a way of answering objections against

religion, without so much as pretending to make out, that the

system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are

reasonable--especially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add,

must this be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no

answer to such objections: that when this sort of reasoning is carried

to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave

the mind in a very unsatisfied state; and that it must be unaccountable

ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego

their present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon

doubtful evidence.”

Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance

will be found in a great measure owing to half views, which show but

part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and to undeterminate

language. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and

ludicrous men, by themselves. And even those, who are serious and

considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and at once clearly see

through the perplexities, in which subjects themselves are involved;

and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To

this latter sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this

objection severally, may be of some assistance; as it may also tend a

little to stop and silence others.

_First_, The thing wanted, _i.e._ what men require, is to have _all_

difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any thing we know

to the contrary, it may be, the same as requiring to comprehend the

divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to

everlasting! But it hath always been allowed to argue from what is

acknowledged, to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor

thing, to argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner

found fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of

probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are

continually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet

_poor_ may be applied, I fear as properly, to great part or the whole

of human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it

not a poor thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the

cure of diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon conjecture

and guess, where the life of man is concerned? Undoubtedly it is: but

not in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and

being obliged to act wholly in the dark.

Further: since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge

objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against

natural religion; and those who do this, if they are not confused

themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that they are

arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when

in reality they are arguing against moral providence; it is a thing

of consequence to show, that such objections are as much levelled

against natural religion, as against revealed. Objections, which are

equally applicable to both, are properly speaking answered, by its

being shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted to be

true. And without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is

admitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things

objected against in natural religion are of the same kind with what is

certain matter of experience in the course of providence, and in the

information which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under

his government; so the objections against the system of Christianity,

and the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which are

made against the system and evidence of natural religion. However, the

reader upon review may see, that most of the analogies insisted upon,

even in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to

have more taken for granted than is in the former; [viz.] that there is

an Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world: and Christianity

is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly

from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature.

_Secondly_, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a

determinate course of life, as what, there is reason to think, is

commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our

happiness under his government. If men can be convinced, that they

have the like reason to believe this, as to believe that taking care

of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage; such conviction

cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion.

And if there be really any reason for believing one of these, and

endeavoring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries

and conveniences of it; then there is reason also for believing the

other, and endeavoring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And

if the interest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater

than our whole temporal interest; then there must be proportionably

greater reason for endeavoring to secure one, than the other; since, by

the supposition, the probability of our securing one is equal to the

probability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable,

and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what our

condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed

to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we

live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it

be, which is afforded us.

But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the

objection, lies in another place. The proof of religion, it is said, is

involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful;

and that it cannot be supposed that if it were true, it would be left

upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each

particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections

taken together are turned into a positive argument against the truth

of religion; which argument would stand thus. If religion were true,

it would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree

in which it is: therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the

evidence of it weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight

of such objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general

presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural

constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns,

almost continually, and even in matters of great consequence, act upon

evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an

answer to this argument. Because it shows, that it is according to the

conduct and character of the Author of nature to appoint we should act

upon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be

supposed to appoint we should act upon: it is an instance, a general

one, made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing

with us, similar to what is said to be incredible. As the force of this

answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the evidence

for religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer is equally just

and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, by showing the

evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to

be lower.

_Thirdly_, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the

character of God, but to show the obligations of men: it is not to

justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. These are

two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. Though they may at length

run up into each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make

out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connection, to

the purpose of the former; which is less our concern, than many seem to

think. For, first,

It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence

against objections, any farther than to show, that the things objected

against may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and

goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the system of this

world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would

be unjust: yet it has been shown unanswerably, that if we could take

in the reference, which these things may have to other things, present

past and to come; to the whole scheme, which the things objected

against are parts of; these very things might, for aught we know, be

found to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances of it.

Indeed it has been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only

possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus

objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is

vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary.

Hence it appears, Secondly, that objections against the Divine justice

and goodness are not endeavored to be _removed_, by showing that the

like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural

providence: but those objections being supposed and shown not to be

_conclusive_, the things objected against, considered as matters of

fact, are farther shown to be credible, from their conformity to the

constitution of nature; for instance, that God will reward and punish

men for their actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does

reward and punish them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend,

is of weight.

Thirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections were

not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above set down;

and religion implying several facts; for instance again, the fact

last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for their actions

hereafter; the observation, that his present method of government is by

rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be incredible:

whatever objections men may think they have against it, as unjust or

unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy; or as

improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, _as improbable_: for

it is evident no objection against it, _as unjust_, can be urged from

necessity; since this notion as much destroys injustice, as it does

justice.

Fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of

religion cannot indeed be answered without entering into consideration

of its reasonableness; yet objections against the credibility or

truth of it may. Because the system of it is reducible into what is

properly matter of fact: and the truth, the probable truth of facts,

may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it

necessary, though, in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and

proper, yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness

of every precept enjoined us, and of every particular dispensation

of Providence, which comes into the system of religion. Indeed the

more thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the

perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he will

advance towards that perfection of religion, which John[290] speaks

of.[291] But the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by

proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice

of religion _is_ reasonable, may be shown, though no more could be

proved, than that the system of it _may be_ so, for aught we know to

the contrary: and even without entering into the distinct consideration

of this.

Fifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is not

an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the justice, or

goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion; yet it may be, as it

is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such

objections; which is, to show that the things objected against are

incredible.

_Fourthly_, It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing

treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but so

would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a system,

together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are

divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains:

and whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world.[292] And

were all such controversies settled, which perhaps, in speculation,

would be found involved in great difficulties; and were it determined

upon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined it to our hands,

that life is to be preserved: still, the rules which God has been

pleased to afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining

its satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and

recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but

very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, as to future

contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what

is the best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success

of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is

highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them in the proper

sense of the word; _i.e._ what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain

by them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory

nature of the evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the

daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw

away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this

doubtfulness. The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those

who object against it, as not satisfactory, _i.e._ as not being what

they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being: for

satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man.

And, what is more material, they forget also the very nature of

religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it,

a certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it was intended to try

whether men have or not, and to exercise in such as have it, in order

to its improvement. Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same

sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in

which you speak; or as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he

hath such a regard to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it.

Therefore the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion

be satisfactory; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and

discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is

fully sufficient for all those purposes of _probation_; how far soever

it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of _curiosity_, or

any other: and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in several

respects, which it would not do, if it were as overpowering as is

required. Besides, whether the motives or the evidence for any course

of action be satisfactory, meaning here, by that word, what satisfies

a man that such a course of action will in event be for his good; this

need never be, and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical

question in common matters. The practical question in all cases is,

Whether the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all

circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and

judge of conduct,[293] determine that course of action to be prudent.

Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness,

abundantly determines an action to be prudent: but evidence almost

infinitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too; even in

the conduct of every day.

_Fifthly_, As to the objection concerning the influence which this

argument, or any part of it, may, or may not be expected to have upon

men; I observe, as above, that religion being intended for a trial[294]

and exercise of the morality of every person’s character, who is a

subject of it; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for

it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it: to

object, that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by

such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing treatise. For

the purpose of it is not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind

are; but what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them, requires

they should be: to show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how,

in fact, they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their

own concern; the personal concern of each man in particular. How little

regard the generality have to it, experience indeed does too fully

show. But religion, considered as a probation, has had its end upon

all persons, to whom it has been proposed with evidence sufficient in

reason to influence their practice: for by this means they have been

put into a state of probation; let them behave as they will in it.

Thus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us, that by the

evidence of religion being laid before men, the designs of Providence

are carrying on, not only with regard to those who will be influenced

by it, but likewise with regard to those who will not. Lastly, the

objection here referred to, allows the thing insisted upon in this

treatise to be of _some_ weight; and if so, it may be hoped it will

have some influence. And if there be a probability that it will have

any at all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree,

to lay it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a

greater influence.

Further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the whole of

the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have argued upon

the principles of others,[295] not my own: and have omitted what I

think true, and of the utmost importance, because by others thought

unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of

the fatalists, which I do not believe: and have omitted a thing of the

utmost importance which I do believe,--[viz.] the moral fitness and

unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever; which as certainly

determine the divine _conduct_, as speculative truth and falsehood

necessarily determine the divine _judgment_. Indeed the principle of

liberty, and that of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind,

that moralists, ancient as well as modern, have formed their language

upon it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeavored

to avoid it; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to

express myself in a manner, which will appear strange to such as do not

observe the reason for it. But the general argument here pursued, does

not at all suppose, or proceed upon these principles.

Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being

omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than merely as

a question of fact: and in this view it is here considered. It is

obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical.

Even natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact. For, that there

is a righteous Governor of the world, is so: and this proposition

contains the general system of natural religion. But then, several

abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are usually

taken into consideration in the proof of it: whereas it is here treated

of only as a matter of fact. To explain this; That the three angles of

a triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth; but that

they appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. This last must

have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, who

would not admit the former: but pretended to doubt, whether there were

any such thing as truth, or whether we could certainly depend upon our

faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case.

The assertion that there is, in the nature of things, an original

standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all will, but

which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise that moral

government over the world, which religion teaches, (_i.e._ finally

and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act

right or wrong;) contains an abstract truth, as well as matter of fact.

But suppose that in the present state, every man without exception,

was rewarded and punished, in exact proportion as he followed or

transgressed that sense of right and wrong, which God has implanted

in his nature: this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a

matter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged by every one,

yet the same difficulties might be raised as now are, concerning the

abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness. And we should have a

proof, even the certain one of experience, that the government of the

world was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those

questions: and this proof would remain, in what way soever they were

determined.

Thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which

is actions, and which naturally approves some actions as right, and

of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and of ill desert; that

he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former and punish the

latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as

mere a fact, as his doing so at present would be. This future fact I

have not, indeed, proved with the force with which it might be proved,

from the principles of liberty and moral fitness; but without them

have given a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly

strengthened by the general analogy of nature; a proof easily cavilled

at, easily shown not to be demonstrative, (and it is not offered as

such;) but impossible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. Thus the

obligations of religion are made out, exclusive of the questions

concerning liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed with

difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may.

Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force of this

treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion upon the

proof arising out of the two last mentioned principles, an _additional_

proof and confirmation of it: to such as do not admit those principles,

an _original_ proof of it,[296] and a confirmation of that proof. Those

who believe, will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of

objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened.

Those who do not believe will at least be shown the absurdity of all

attempts to prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility

of it; and, I hope, a good deal more.

Thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy, as here

urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable

ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from it in a

disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question, but that it is

a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, implying in it

numerous facts; analogy, being a _confirmation_ of all facts to which

it can be applied, and the _only proof_ of most, cannot but be admitted

by every one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side of

religion, both natural and revealed. And it ought to be particularly

regarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied

with abstract reasonings.

CONCLUSION.

Whatever account may be given of the strange inattention and disregard,

in some ages and countries, to a matter of such importance as religion;

it would, before experience, be incredible, that there should be the

like disregard in those, who have had the moral system of the world

laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated upon

them: because this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence

for its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There

is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince an

unprejudiced understanding, that there is a God who made and governs

the world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be

necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are raised:

when the very meaning of those words, which express most intelligibly

the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be uncertain; and

the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of

speculation. To an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances

of design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest,

that _creatures_ ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker;

and that justice and charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has

made social, and placed in society.

The truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not indeed

self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its being

received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, will

be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of mind, as

inattention to natural religion: because, when both are laid before

us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our

obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition

of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. Revelation claims

to be the voice of God: and our obligation to attend to his voice is

surely moral, in all cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence

is conclusive, upon thorough consideration of it; so it offers itself

with obvious appearances of having something more than human in it,

and therefore in all reason requires to have its claims most seriously

examined into.

It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what manner

soever afforded, is equally from God; yet a miraculous revelation

has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of our nature, to

awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and awe. And this

is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what claims to be so, with

such appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain, that our

obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of Christianity,

and, upon supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost

importance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense. Let us then

suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and of Christianity,

has been seriously inquired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet

we find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of

infidelity. All of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect

of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its restraints.

Some go much beyond this. They deride God’s moral government over

the world. They renounce his protection, and defy his justice. They

ridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the author of it; and

take all occasions to manifest scorn and contempt of revelation. This

amounts to an active setting themselves against religion; to what

may be considered as a positive principle of irreligion, which they

cultivate within themselves; and, whether they intend this effect

or not, render habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle.

Others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in

avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless.

Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons

act upon what they think principles of reason, (and otherwise they are

not to be argued with,) it is really inconceivable, that they should

imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered in

itself, to be nothing at all: nor do they pretend this. They are far

indeed from having a just notion of its evidence: but they would not

say its evidence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, with

all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of science or

history. Their manner of treating it must proceed, either from such

kind of objections against all religion, as have been answered or

obviated in the former part of this treatise; or else from objections,

and difficulties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they

entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and

miraculous interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether in

incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which appear to

them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if Christianity were

true, the light of it must have been more general, and the evidence

of it more satisfactory, or rather overpowering: that it must and

would have been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now

this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing,

or inconsiderable; but quite another thing. It is being fortified

_against_ the evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they

see the system of Christianity, or something which appears to them

necessarily connected with it, to be incredible or false; fortified

against that evidence, which might otherwise make great impression

upon them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in

doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their behavior seems owing

to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that such

doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being certain against it.

To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning religion,

the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the general objections

against the moral system of nature having been obviated, it is

shown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at all against

Christianity, considered either as not discoverable by reason, or as

unlike to what is so discovered; nor any, worth mentioning, against

it as miraculous, if any at all; none, certainly, which can render

it in the least incredible. It is shown, that, upon supposition of

a divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand

highly credible, I think probable, that many things in it must appear

liable to great objections; and that we must be incompetent judges of

it, to a great degree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably

true, and of the very utmost importance. But it is urged, as I hope

it will be understood, with great caution not to vilify the faculty

of reason, which is _the candle of the Lord within us_;[297] though

it can afford no light, where it does not shine; nor judge, where

it has no principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of,

being first answered in the view of objections against Christianity

as a matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more

immediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian

dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly the

like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections against

the constitution of nature admit of: that, as partial views give the

appearance of wrong to things, which, upon further consideration

and knowledge of their relations to other things, are found just

and good; so it is perfectly credible, that the things objected

against the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation, may

be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness, by their reference to

other things beyond our view. Because Christianity is a scheme as much

above our comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme

in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is

most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be

attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from

our ignorance: but from something positive, which our observation shows

us. For, to like objections, the like answer is experienced to be just,

in numberless parallel cases.

The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the method

by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in general,

and together; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and the

particular things objected to are shown credible, by their perfect

analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be

fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite

wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our recovery: it were to have

been expected, it is said, that this should have been effected at once;

and not by such a long series of means, and such a various economy of

persons and things; one dispensation preparatory to another, this to

a further one, and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before

the end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished; a scheme

conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. But now,

on the contrary, our finding that every thing in the constitution and

course of nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning

revelation to be highly unreasonable; and is a satisfactory answer to

them, when urged as objections against the credibility, that the great

scheme of Providence in the redemption of the world may be of this

kind, and to be accomplished in this manner.

As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a

Mediator between God and man: this has been shown to be most obviously

analogous to the general conduct of nature, _i.e._ the God of nature,

in appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we

experience in the daily course of Providence. The condition of this

world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so

much falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred

it from those appearances: inferred that human nature was fallen from

its original rectitude, and in consequence of this, degraded from its

primitive happiness. However this opinion came into the world, these

appearances kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it.

And as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that

repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient to

do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to

it; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such

conclusion; so every day’s experience shows us, that reformation is

not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and

miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God has annexed to

folly and extravagance.

Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments, which, by

the general laws of divine government, are annexed to vice, may be

prevented: that provision may have been, even originally, made, that

they should be prevented by some means or other, though they could not

by reformation alone. For we have daily instances of _such mercy_, in

the general conduct of nature: compassion provided for misery,[298]

medicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision

made, in the original constitution of the world, that much of the

natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves

alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others;

assistance which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to

afford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay

in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, _God so loved the world, that

he gave his only-begotten Son_ to save it: and _he being made perfect

by suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to all them that

obey him_.[299] Indeed neither reason nor analogy would lead us to

think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner

in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery

of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was. But neither

would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other particular

means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows they are, in

numberless instances. Therefore, as the case before us does not admit

of experience; so, that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or

in what particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in

Scripture, is of that efficacy, which it is there represented to be;

this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its being really of

that efficacy.

Further: the objections against Christianity, from the light of it not

being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given,

have been answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has made

such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the former: but that

he dispenses his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds,

among creatures of the same species, and even to the same individuals

at different times; is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it is

so far from being the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us

such overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity;

that on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally

appointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part of

life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that God

has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion; the

same account may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations

with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible,[300] surely,

that this alleged doubtfulness may be men’s own fault; it deserves

their most serious consideration, whether it be not so. However, it is

certain, that doubting implies a _degree_ of evidence for that of which

we doubt: and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under

obligations as demonstrative evidence.

The whole of religion then is throughout credible: nor is there, I

think, any thing, relating to the revealed dispensation of things, more

different from the experienced constitution and course of nature, than

some parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it.

If so, the only question which remains is, What positive evidence can

be alleged for the truth of Christianity? This too in general has been

considered, and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore,

what is to be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight

which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what the

analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them: and then consider,

what are the practical consequences from all this upon the most

sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am writing to persons

who entertain these principles): and upon such consideration it will be

obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself,

is greatly aggravated, in persons who have been made acquainted with

Christianity, whether they believe it or not: because the moral system

of nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us,

approves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing

it proposed.

In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed

that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of it,

and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state of mind between

these two consists in a serious apprehension, that it may be true,

joined with doubt whether it is so. And this, upon the best judgment

I am able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any

sceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity,

with the proper evidences of it, laid before him, and has in any

tolerable measure considered them. For I would not be mistaken to

comprehend all who have ever heard of it; because it seems evident,

that in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity nor

its evidence, is fairly laid before men. And in places where both

are, there appear to be some who have very little attended to either,

and who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their

inattention; and yet are by no means without understanding in other

matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that

Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations

of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life; a regard

not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same with what a

full conviction of its truth would lay them under.

_Lastly_, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, with

regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. There is no

temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; and

those, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are no such

temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a just account

of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity,

which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its

falsehood, there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior

to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth.

DISSERTATIONS.

OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

Advertisement.

In the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the two following

dissertations into the chapters, on _a Future Life_, and on the _Moral

Government of God_; with which they are closely connected. But as these

do not directly fall under the _title_ of the foregoing treatise, and

would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, it seems more

proper to place them by themselves.

DISSERTATION I.

Personal Identity.

Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important

question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most intelligible

one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have

been raised about the meaning of that identity or sameness of person,

which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in

any two successive moments. And the solution of these difficulties hath

been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity

has been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a

future life of no consequence at all to us the persons who are making

it. And though few men can be misled by such subtleties; yet it may be

proper to consider them a little.

When it is asked _wherein_ personal identity consists, the answer

should be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists similitude,

or equality; that all attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet

there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining _the idea_. For as,

upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises to

the mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea

of equality: so likewise, upon comparing the consciousness of one’s

self, or one’s own existence, in any two moments, there as immediately

arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former

comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality;

but also show us that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four

are equal: so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of

personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those

two moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or the

present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. In other

words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was

myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the

same self.

But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our

personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it _makes_ personal

identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say,

that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but

what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one

should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal

identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal

identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute

truth, which it presupposes.

This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; that to be

endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person, or

intelligent being. For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that

consciousness makes personality: and from hence it might be concluded

to make personal identity. But though present consciousness of what we

at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we _now

are_; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not

necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or

_once had_ those feelings.

The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common acceptation

of the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal

identity: because, the word _same_, when applied to them and to a

person, is not only applied to different subjects, but it is also

used in different senses. For when a man swears to the same tree,

as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the

same as to all the purposes of property, and uses of common life;

and not that the tree has been all that time the same, in the strict

philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know, whether any one

particle of the present tree be the same with any one particle of the

tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago. And if they have

not one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree in

the proper philosophic sense of the word _same_: it being evidently

a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of their

substance, and no one of their properties is the same: no part of their

substance, by the supposition; no one of their properties, because it

is allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from one

substance to another. Therefore when we say the identity of sameness of

a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under

the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the

same or not; the word _same_, when applied to life and to organization,

cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in this

very sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense

then, the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to

be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in

strict and philosophical language, no man, no being, no mode of being,

no any thing, can be the same with that, with which it has indeed

nothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, when

applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist

with diversity of substance.

The thing here considered, and as I think, demonstratively determined,

is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, _Whether it_; _i.e._ the same

self or person, _be the same identical substance_? And he has suggested

what is a much better answer to the question, than that which he gives

it in form. For he defines person, _a thinking intelligent being_,

&c., and personal identity, _the sameness of a rational being_.[301]

The question then is, whether the same rational being is the same

substance: which needs no answer, because being and substance, in

this place, stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether

the same person be the same substance, is said to be this; that the

consciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any

two joint successive moments, is not the _same individual action_,[302]

_i.e._ not the same consciousness, but different successive

consciousnesses. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned

such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may have

a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now, which

it was when he contemplated it formerly: yet in this case, where, by

the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception

of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same perception. And

thus, though the successive consciousnesses, which we have of our own

existence, are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and

the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent.

The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and was

felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be; not two persons, but

one and the same person; and therefore is one and the same.

Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear hasty: and he seems

to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which he has made

relating to it.[303] But some of those hasty observations have been

carried to a strange length by others; whose notion, when traced

and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this:[304] “That

personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it lives

and dies, begins and ends continually: that no one can any more remain

one and the same person two moments together, than two successive

moments can be one and the same moment: that our substance is indeed

continually changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems,

nothing to the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness

alone, which constitutes personality: which consciousness, being

successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently

the personality constituted by it.” Hence it must follow, that it is

a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any thing

we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which

befell us yesterday; or that our present self will be interested in

what will befall us to-morrow: since our present self is not, in

reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or

person coming in its room, and mistaken for it; to which another self

will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow. For if the self or

person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only

like persons; the person of to-day is really no more interested in what

will befall the person of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other

person.

It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of

the opinion we are speaking of: because those who maintain it allow,

that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches.

Indeed they use the words, _identity_, and _same person_. Nor will

language permit these words to be laid aside; since if they were, there

must be I know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the

room of them. But they cannot, _consistently with themselves_, mean,

that the person is really the same. For it is self-evident, that the

personality cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly assert,

that in which it consists is not the same. And as, consistently with

themselves, they cannot, so, I think it appears, they do not _mean_,

that the person is _really_ the same, but only that he is so in a

fictitious sense: in such a sense only as they assert, for this they do

assert, that any number of persons whatever may be the same person. The

bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems

the best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to be

put upon it, I add the following things.

_First_, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain

conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we

turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past,

and look forward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily

change of that living agent which each man calls himself, for another,

or of any such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely

borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a

person in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or

affairs, from a suspicion, that, though he should live to-morrow, he

should not, however, be the same person he is to-day. Yet, if it be

reasonable to act, with respect to a future life, upon the notion that

personality is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect

to the present. Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion

and to temporal concerns. Every one sees and feels the inexpressible

absurdity of it in the latter case; therefore, if any can take up with

it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but

must be owing to inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart.

_Secondly_, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a

_being_ only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and

misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole

time of their existence. Consider then a living being now existing, and

which has existed for any time alive. This living being must have done

and suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and enjoyed

formerly, (this living being, I say, and not another) as really as it

does and suffers and enjoys, what it does and suffers and enjoys this

instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are

actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they

are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting:

since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of

past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued with limited powers

of knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it

to have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it

was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and

enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or

remember or forget any thing else.

_Thirdly_, Every person is _conscious_, that he is now the same person

or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches: since when any

one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain

of the person who did that action, namely, himself who now reflects

upon it, as he is certain that the action was done at all. Nay, very

often a person’s assurance of an action having been done, of which he

is absolutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he

himself did it. This he, person, or self, must either be a substance,

or the property of some substance. If he, a person, be a substance;

then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness that

he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property of

a substance, still consciousness that he is the same property is as

certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness

that he remains the same substance would be; since the same property

cannot be transferred from one substance to another.

But though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents, living

beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our

remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly

be deceived in it? And this question may be asked at the end of any

demonstration whatever: because it is a question concerning the truth

of perception by memory. He who can doubt, whether perception by memory

can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether perception

by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed

whether intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. For

it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions,

whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of

exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same

ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties,

which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those

very suspected faculties themselves.[305]

DISSERTATION II.

The Nature of Virtue.

That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having

a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action.

Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and

propensions: so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity

of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to

our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve

some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of

good desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert.

That we have this moral approving and disapproving[306] faculty, is

certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in

each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the

approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from the

words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many

others of like signification in all languages applied to actions and

characters: from the many written systems of morals which suppose it,

since it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout all

these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a

meaning merely chimerical: from our natural sense of gratitude, which,

implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good, and

intending it: from the distinction every one makes between injury and

mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and between

injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the

consideration of human laws.

It is manifest that great part of common language, and of common

behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral

faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or

divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding,

or as a perception of the heart; or, which seems the truth, as

including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course

of action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us,

approves and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed

wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be

about particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality a universally

acknowledged standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all

countries have made profession of in public: it is that, which every

man you meet puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and

fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth

make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of upon

mankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. It being

manifest then, in general, that we have such a faculty or discernment

as this, it may be of use to remark some things more distinctly

concerning it.

_First_, It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty

is actions,[307] comprehending under that name active or practical

principles: those principles from which men would act, if occasions

and circumstances gave them power; and which, when fixed and habitual

in any person, we call his character. It does not appear, that brutes

have the least reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events:

or that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions

as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to ours they

are: and they are the object, and the only one, of the approving and

disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, behavior, abstracted from all

regard to what is in fact and event the consequence of it, is itself

the natural object of the moral discernment; as speculative truth

and falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such

consequences, is indeed, always included; for it is part of the action

itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow,

we have exactly the same sense of the _action_, as if they did. In

like manner we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all

consideration of the good or the evil, which persons of such characters

have it actually in their power to do. We never, in the moral way,

applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or what

we suffer, or for having impressions made upon us, which we consider

as altogether out of our power: but only for what we do or would have

done, had it been in our power: or for what we leave undone, which we

might have done, or would have left undone, though we could have done.

_Secondly_, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good or

evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill

desert. It may be difficult to explain this perception, so as to

answer all the questions which may be asked concerning it: but every

one speaks of such and such actions as deserving punishment; and it is

not, I suppose, pretended, that they have absolutely no meaning at all

to the expression. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive

it for the good of society, that the doer of such actions should be

made to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were resolved, that a man, who

by some innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left

to perish, lest, by other people’s coming near him, the infection

should spread; no one would say he _deserved_ this treatment. Innocence

and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always supposes

guilt: and if one be no part of the other, yet they are evidently and

naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises

our compassion towards him; and if this misery be inflicted on him by

another, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are

informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for

his treachery or cruelty; our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in

many instances our indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces

this effect is the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call

ill desert. Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of

vice and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert.

And thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas,

natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this association

were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing: but being most

unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead

of endeavoring to explain it away.

It may be observed further, concerning our perception of good and

of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to common

instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that it does not

appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from

a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is prevalent:

since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act

well in many common instances. On the other hand, our perception of ill

desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the temptations men

are thought to have had to such vices. For, vice in human creatures

consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle;

though a man be overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence

appear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that

appears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over

the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would have

rendered him proof against common temptations.

_Thirdly_, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is

the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities

of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do, would,

in many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest degree

vicious. This determination must arise from such comparison, and be the

result of it; because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures

of other natures and capacities, as brutes. It is the same also with

respect to positive vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought

not. For every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot,

madman, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding; though

the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the

action, be the same: as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as

children, are capable not only of doing mischief but also of intending

it. Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the

nature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious; and the

want of which, in the other, renders the same action innocent or less

vicious: and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon

or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our

determining an action to be vicious. Hence arises a proper application

of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to

actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious.

_Fourthly_, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at

liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without

reason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to neglect their

own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than

they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has committed to

their care. It would seem, that a due concern about our own interest

or happiness, and a reasonable endeavor to secure and promote it,

(which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence,

in our language;) it would seem, that this is virtue, and the

contrary behavior faulty and blamable; since, in the calmest way of

reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct,

both in ourselves and others. This approbation and disapprobation

are altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of their

happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion

of this last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas

the object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our

thoughts fix upon is our condition: in the other, our conduct.

It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a

disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in _ourselves_ or

_others_, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I suppose, because

that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we

always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less

necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own

happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and

wanting to keep us from injuring others; to whose good we cannot have

so strong and constant a regard: and also because imprudence and folly,

appearing to bring its own punishment more immediately and constantly

than injurious behavior, it less needs the additional punishment,

which would be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible

indignation against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty.

Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion,

the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it be

wilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this of course lessens

our displeasure against them. Still it is matter of experience, that we

are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of

imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others.

In instances of this kind, men often say of themselves with remorse,

and of others with some indignation, that they deserved to suffer such

calamities, because they brought them upon themselves, and would not

take warning. Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by

a long course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though

without falsehood or injustice; we plainly, do not regard such people

as alike objects of compassion with those, who are brought into the

same condition by unavoidable accidents. From these things it appears,

that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice: meaning by

_folly_, something quite different from mere incapacity; a thoughtless

want of that regard and attention to our own happiness, which we had

capacity for. And this the word properly includes; and, as it seems, in

its usual acceptation: for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures.

However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I shall very

willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as not applicable to

prudence and folly: but must insist, that the faculty within us, which

is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves

imprudent ones: I say prudent and imprudent _actions_ as such, and

considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion.

And by the way, this observation may help to determine what justness

there is in the objection against religion, that it teaches us to be

interested and selfish.

_Fifthly_, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue is

resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it may

be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it, singly

considered, are in no sort the _whole_, of virtue and vice. For if

this were the case, in the review of one’s own character, or that of

others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent

to every thing, but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and

the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither approve

of benevolence to some persons rather than to others, nor disapprove

injustice and falsehood upon any other account, than merely as an

overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the

first, and of misery by the second. On the contrary, suppose two men

competitors for any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage

to each of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent,

than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred

to the other; yet such endeavor would be virtue, in behalf of a

friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant

consequences: as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation of

friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose one

man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his

labor, with intent to give it to a third, who he thought would have as

much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first

possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the

loss of it; suppose also that no bad consequences would follow: yet

such an action would surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery,

violence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely

to produce an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a

man could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice,

as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon others

by it, would amount to; such a piece of injustice would not be faulty

or vicious at all: because it would be no more than, in any other case,

for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another’s, in equal degrees.

The fact, then, appears to be, that we are _constituted_ so as to

condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve

of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all

consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of

happiness or misery. Therefore, were the Author of nature to propose

nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were

his moral character merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so.

Upon that supposition indeed, the only reason of his giving us the

above mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather

than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence,

and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of our

nature would produce more happiness, than forming us with a temper of

mere general benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution,

falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us; and benevolence to

some, preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all consideration

of the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to

produce.

Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature as we have

been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural object of which

is actions: moral government must consist in rendering them happy and

unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or

depart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or

suggested and enforced by this moral faculty;[308] in rewarding and

punishing them upon account of their so doing.

I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted

what any author designed to assert. But some of great and distinguished

merit, have, I think, expressed themselves in a manner, which may

occasion some danger, to careless readers, of imagining the whole of

virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their

judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state;

and the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or might foresee,

is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which

mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that

some of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder,

perjury, and even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not

have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of

misery in the present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary

appearance.

This reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The

happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the lord and the

proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavor

to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has

directed; that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and

justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeavoring,

in some sort, to do good without regard to these. But the truth seems

to be; that such supposed endeavors proceed, almost always, from

ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed

perhaps in great measure from persons themselves. And though it is our

business and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and

justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness

and diversion of our fellow-creatures: yet, from our short views, it is

greatly uncertain, whether this endeavor will, in particular instances,

produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole; since so many and

distant things must come into the account. And that which makes it our

duty is, that there is some appearance that it will, and no positive

appearance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side; and also,

that such benevolent endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent

of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence.

However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule of

life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of

some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, generally

understood, cannot be falsehood; and in general, that there can be no

designed falsehood, without designing to deceive. It must likewise be

observed, that in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest

obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his intending it.

For it is impossible not to foresee, that the words and actions of men,

in different ranks and employments, and of different educations, will

perpetually be mistaken by each other. And it cannot but be so, while

they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what

they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges of, even

though they considered it with great attention.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Among these were _Jones_, author of the admirable Treatise on the

Canon of the New Testament: _Lardner_, _Maddox_, _Chandler_, Archbishop

_Secker_, &c.

[2] Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial.

[3] Among them were CUDWORTH, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the

Universe:” BOYLE, 1626; “Things above Reason:” STILLINGFLEET, 1635;

“Letters to a Deist:” Sir I. NEWTON, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:”

LESLIE, 1650; “Short Method with Deists:” LOWTH, 1661, Vindic. of

the Divine Author of the Bible: KING, 1669; “Origin of Evil:” SAM.

CLARK, 1675; “Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion:” WATERLAND, 1683;

“Scripture Vindicated:” LARDNER, 1684; “Credibility of Gospel History:”

LELAND, 1691; “View of Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity

of Rev.:” CHANDLER, 1693; “Definition of Christianity,” on “Prophecy,”

&c.: WARBURTON, 1698; “Divine Leg. of Moses;” Bishop NEWTON, 1704; “On

the Prophecies:” WATSON, 1737; “Apology for Christianity,” (against

Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the Bible,” (against Paine.)

[4] MCINTOSH: “Progress of Ethical Philosophy.”

[5] BROUGHAM: “Disc. on Nat. Theology.”

[6] Verisimile.

[7] [These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each

other. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second

produces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar

case. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.]

[8] The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.

[9] [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent.

But it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He that

_believeth_ not shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He that _believeth_

hath everlasting life:” John iii. 36. “With the heart man _believeth_

unto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner’s _duty_

in submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.]

[10] See Part II. chap. vi.

[11] Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.

[12] [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of

absurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and

Critical Dictionary.” See as instances, the articles ORIGEN, MANICHÆUS,

PAULICIANS.]

[13] Ch. i.

[14] Ch. ii.

[15] Ch. iii.

[16] Ch. iv.

[17] Ch. v.

[18] Ch. vi.

[19] Ch. vii.

[20] Part II. Ch. i.

[21] Ch. ii.

[22] Ch. iii.

[23] Ch. iv.

[24] Ch. v.

[25] Ch. vi. vii.

[26] Ch. viii.

[27] [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in

the book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected

with the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only

serves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from

the indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not

fairly use it.

We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not

made plain. Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or

crystallization, or any thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of

personal identity, (see Essay, ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid.

His definition is, “Existence itself, which determines a being of any

sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of

the same kind.” I had rather define it “the uninterrupted continuance

of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: for then it would

exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before it

existed. Locke makes _consciousness_ to constitute identity, and argues

that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a

man, but was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten,

I am not the same person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very

ludicrously.

Butler, in his “Dissertation,” urges that consciousness _presupposes_

identity, as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke’s theory, no person

would have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory

extends. We cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses,

nor could memory, if material, spread itself over successive years of

life.]

[28] I say _kind_ of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to

affirm that there is the same _degree_ of conviction, that our living

powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.

[29] _Destruction of living powers_, is a manner of expression

unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either _the destruction of a

living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of

ever perceiving or acting again at all_; or _the destruction of those

means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of

its present state of perception and of action_. It is here used in the

former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet _present_ is

added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the

latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living

powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to

think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its

whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.

[30] [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers

thinks, consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute

demonstration.” It just places all arguments for and against the soul’s

future life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the

fact from revelation, free from presumptions _against_ its truth. This

view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life

of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the

future, both of man and beast.]

[31] [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human

souls are not _naturally_ immortal, but become so, by the power of the

Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was

continued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.

These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial

of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have

extension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger

an inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels

have even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple,

uncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided,

and so cannot perish.” And in another place, “I never could believe

that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or

that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and

again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I

cease to live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his

last moments, “O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me

from you, I shall cease to exist.”]

[32] See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.

[33] [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years,

an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind

changes with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to

suffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is

driven to affirm that _the whole_ is not altered, though every particle

be changed.

This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our

identity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not

also destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this

particular body?]

[34] See Dissertation I.

[35] [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind.

Love, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may

stop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical

causes, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The

brain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But

this does not prove that there was no _functional_ derangement.]

[36] [“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with

his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also.

S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we

agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S.

The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes

they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man then _use_ his whole body? A.

Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different.

A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.” PLAT.

ALCIBI. PRIM. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.

“It may easily be perceived that the _mind_ both sees and hears, and

not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither

are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy

body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.” CICERO, Tusc.

Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.

“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed

out with the finger.” CIC., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]

[37] [Butler’s argument, if advanced for _proof_ would prove too much,

not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence.

And this is really the tenet, (_i.e._ transmigration,) of those who

arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy

cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any

presumptions _against_ either a future or a pre-existent state.

Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine

of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it

we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does

teach that He who can _create_, under infinite diversity of forms, can

_sustain_ existence, in any mode he pleases.

The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to

the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out in POLIGNAC’S

Anti-Lucretius, and still more in BAYLE’S Dictionary, under the

articles PEREIRA, and RORARIUS. The topic is also discussed in DES

CARTES on the Passions: BAXTER on The Nature of the Soul: HUME’S

Essays, Essay 9: SEARCH’S Light of Nature: CHEYNE’S Philosophical

Principles: WAGSTAFF on the Immortality of Brutes: EDWARDS’ Critical

and Philosophical Exercitations: WATT’S Essays, Essay 9: COLLIBER’S

Enquiry: LOCKE on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.: DITTON on the

Resurrection: WILLIS De Anima Brutæ.]

[38] [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye

sees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or

spectacles. If the _nerve_ be paralyzed, there is no vision, though

the eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of

sight, or knock a person down.

The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from

palsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind.

MORGAGNI, HALLER, BONNET, and others, have proved that there is no

part of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found

destroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind,

nor any suspicion of such disease, during life.]

[39] Pp. 84, 85.

[40] [We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and

complicated organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind

material, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do

not see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very

same as it does in a swoon, till _chemical_ changes begin.]

[41] There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life,

here considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents;

if not, Whether it be the destruction of their _present_ powers of

reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present

powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or

discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now,

if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were

possible, less for the next, and less still for the first.

[42] This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans,

νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι·

τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς

φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For they think that

the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born;

and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those

who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may

allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς

τῆς γυναικός σου ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν

σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage

may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.]

[43] [The _increase_ of a force in any direction, cannot of itself

_change_ that direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object,

does not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.]

[44] [Our nature will _always_ be ours, or we should cease to be

ourselves, and become something else. And this nature is _social_.

Every one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself

for the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which

may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within.

Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still

more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body.

Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a

right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness.

But Such society must include God.]

[45] See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv.

[46] [Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in _some_

of their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which

care and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a

doctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely

plausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means:--a dogmatic

insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain

truth.]

[47] Part I. chap. vii.

[48] [Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his

creatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But

our relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or

abrogated.]

[49] Pp. 93, 94.

[50] [“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature,

are but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or

frequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a

miracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for

no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men

usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.”

Dr. CLARKE, Controv. with Leibnitz.]

[51] [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part,

and of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part

we learn what it _is_, and what it is _to do_: _e.g._ the eye, the

hand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas,

shame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to

relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate

design,--viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual

and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end,

it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame,

anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin.

See LAW’S Notes on King’s Origin of Evil.]

[52] [It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the

laws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which

reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very

result of philosophy,--viz.: that the world is governed by _general

laws_. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90,

91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.]

[53] See Part II. chap. vi.

[54] Part II. chap. vi.

[55] The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most

evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of

these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this

doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe,

that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future

punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it,

in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture

does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere

revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great

distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the

end of this world; that each shall _then_ receive according to his

deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally

and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the

wicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason,

whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through

other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should

finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the

next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution

of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but _the mystery

of God_, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to

prevail, _shall then be finished_; and he will _take to him his great

power and will reign_, by rendering to every one according to his works.

[56] [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument

analogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most

plausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and

unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by

simply directing attention to the same things, in the universally

observed course of nature.]

[57] Chap. i.

[58] See chaps. iv. and vi.

[59] [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of

positive argument. If in this world, we have _proofs_ that God is

a moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under

moral government _hereafter_, we have only to supply an intermediate

consideration,--viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The

argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because

admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very _principles_ on

which God’s government goes at present, compel us not only to _suppose_

that the principles of God will remain, but to _believe_ so.]

[60] Chap. ii.

[61] The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not

being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be

urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And

therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this

treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly

urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the

second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against

Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against

the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to

that chapter.

[62] Dissertation II.

[63] Chap. vi.

[64] See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.

[65] [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction

that what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This

again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all

power over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences

of _design_, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its

structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of

mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes

of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans,

and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a

facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as

to secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or

disapprove our modes, constitutes an evident _adaptedness_ to a moral

government on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if

there be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason

from the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God’s law; and the

inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God’s retributions.

These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying,

emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually

so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance,

gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and

we would deem it insane to act in opposition.]

[66] [Consult CAPP on the Gov. of God: TWISSE Vindiciæ Prov. Dei:

WITTICHII Excre. Theol.: DWIGHT’S Theol.: MARTINIUS de Gubernatione

Mundi: LIEFCHILD on Providence: MORTON on do.: SHERLOCK on do.:

RUTHERFORD on do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping,

Hunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.]

[67] Chap. ii.

[68] [In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no

contrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform

to the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly

the result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only

learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too

late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has in mercy

given forth his teachings, by which, _beforehand_, we may know the

effects of actions.]

[69] See Dissertation II.

[70] [It was contended by MANDEVILLE in his “_Fable of the Bees_,”

that private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the

well-being of society. This idea is fully refuted by WARBURTON, Divine

Legation of Moses, b. 1: BERKELEY, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by

BROWN, Characteristics, Ess. 2.]

[71] [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the

“delivering up” of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of

delivering up, we find it referred, =1.= To God the Father, John iii.

16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32. =2.= To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and

v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally _delivered himself_.

=3.= To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12. =4.= To Pontius

Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6. =5.= To Judas, Matt.

xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.

As to the _mere act_, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father,

and our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the _qualities_ of

the act!]

[72] [“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a

fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before.

For the stories which are told about _Hades_, that such, as have

practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of

for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he

who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will

support old age.” PLATO, Respub. i. s. 5.]

[73] See Dissertation II.

[74] [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must

be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral

sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable

distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we

ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning,

that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the

argument _a fortiori_, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He

that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not

conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that _he sees_, for he

makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have

them, from him.

This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily

acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is

addressed to their _understanding_, but deny his moral ones, because

their _hearts_ are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.]

[75] [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue,

are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally

advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a

proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In

face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.]

[76] [The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true

only with qualifications. The apostles, as to _this_ life, were the

most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not _always_

bring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from

considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe,

1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his

principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good

persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their

future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of

future happiness were the _only_ reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at

best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must have

_obvious_ triumphs.

On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience,

so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and

what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who

kills a good man, wholly _deprives_ him of his only reward, if this

life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his

only punishment.

Virtuous persons, in the strong language of ROBERT HALL,[A] would be

“the _only_ persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the

only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an

imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity

of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves;

dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the

substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural

propensities and passions, and all in vain!”

[A] Sermon on the Vanity of Man.]

[77] [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons,

conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any

restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will

soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see

the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams,

in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]

[78] Isa. lx. 21.

[79] P. 109.

[80] P. 110, &c.

[81] P. 111, &c.

[82] P. 118, &c.

[83] See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi.

[84] [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the

mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close

examination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may

consult, as he has opportunity, MUSÆI Disput.: HOLTZSFUSII Disp. de

Lapsu Prim. Hominum: SELDEN de Laps. Angelorum: STAPFERI Inst.: WITSII

Econom. Fœd.: BATE’S Harmony of the Divine Attrib.: CALCOTT on the

Fall: SHUCKFORD on the Creation of Man: MANTON’S Sermons: SOUTH’S

do.: TOPLADY’S do.: PEARSON on the Creed: LE CLERC’S Diss.: HENLY’S

Dissert.: KENNICOTT on the Tree of Life: and FABRICIUS de Primo Peccato

Angelorum Lapsorum.]

[85] [The _evils_ of life, are not to be regarded as entering,

necessarily, into God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so

presented. The Scriptures show that _all_ suffering is either punitive,

or castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by

sufferings.]

[86] Chap. ii.

[87] See Sermons preached at the _Rolle_, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c.

Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c.

[88] [“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies,

then should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an

unrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.”--Dr. CHALMERS.]

[89] [Shall _we_ be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great

fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our

proper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and

blood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as

the present, _but still ourselves_. Still with wants to be supplied,

desires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!]

[90] Part II. chap. v.

[91] [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction,

as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the

author, to have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption.

That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of

such a man as CHALMERS. After speaking of human helplessness in matters

of religion, he says, “There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break

the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms

the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies

here:--that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may,

if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in

general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the

next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most

certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that

seeketh findeth.’”]

[92] [It comes to this:--good things, in this life, are not forced

upon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor

are they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as the _results_ of

self-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.]

[93] [They _are_ an answer, but a cavil remains,--viz.: “the difference

between temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not

analogous.” Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only

in _degree_, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a

great scale, is wrong on a small one.

Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life

of some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may

not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of

innumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this

earth? It would but be securing “the greatest good of the greatest

number.” No analogies could _teach_ this, for analogies of course teach

nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more

repugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy

offer repellant presumptions?]

[94] [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double,

one against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing

established the good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.]

[95] [Consult MILLMAN’S Hist. of Christ, vol. i.: PRIESTLEY’S

Institutes of Nat. and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: and WHATELY’S Pol.

Econ., sec. 5.]

[96] [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor;

(which is often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his

own powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to

an improper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this

is a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again; but how

shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled judgment, or a

vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves

than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole

future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an

occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general

welfare, and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a

particular act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark

well its effects on themselves. See the description of how an upright

being may fall; in a subsequent part of this chapter.]

[97] [“It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter

presented no temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of

indulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such

a state; and our forming the contrary habits no qualification.

But _habits_ of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely securities

against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the

_principles_ of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends

upon _the ratio_ between our circumstances and our dispositions, our

happiness, in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope

for the practice of falsehood, injustice, &c., _must depend on our

having formed a love for their opposites_. Besides, the circumstances

of the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from

characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life,

and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”--PROF.

FITZGERALD.]

[98] It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually

restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a _sense of interest_

is meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such

indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than

satisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, that this

sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging

themselves. And if by a _sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard

to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident

with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the

idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to

be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily

see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by

curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence:

especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which

is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are

profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed

by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for

moralists to disclaim this principle.--See p. 131.

[99] [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of

small individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral

considerations, is the sure, and the only mode of self-culture.

These acts are embryo habits, and we may often see clearly the moral

character of a habit, when the single act seems indifferent. Thus

viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. A single

cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with

exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our

whole destiny!

It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to

consequences, that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err

in teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous.

Indulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress,

according to our reason for indulgence. When we can repress an appetite

or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its mastery over us is

broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, from force

of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete.

Ascetic acts are only useful as _means_, and so long as they are

_ascetic_ (askesis) are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is

good only _as_ discipline; and when complete, changes from a struggle

between principle and inclination, to a spontaneous habit, and

permanent mental peace.]

[100] [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants

harmony with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the

objection. Butler _of course_ does not copy the Scripture account, for

he would then depart from the aim and nature of his book. The Bible

says man fell _suddenly_, no less in his state than in his character.

Butler says that we could not reason out _how much_ disorder and

damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids any

incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B.

says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly

cannot be gainsayed.

Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner

“lives” the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God.

Increase of guilt, or growth in grace are predicable in both instances.

In both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship

with God.]

[101] [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with

earthly happiness; but may, in the highest degree promote our _future_

happiness. It will not _long_ mar our happiness, even here; because

being based on principle, and established by habit, it will, in process

of time, be superseded by prompt and pleasurable submission. Thus a

person _habitually_ virtuous, is hardly conscious of self-denial; a

fact noticed by Aristotle. “He who abstains from bodily pleasures and

delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is troubled

by it is undisciplined.” Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.]

[102] P. 145.

[103] [The student should learn to distinguish between the _kinds_

of necessity. There is--1. “Logical necessity,” which requires the

admission of a consequent to a premise 2. “Moral necessity,” which

requires means in order to ends. “Physical necessity,” which is the

compulsory connection of sequences to antecedents, in the material

world. 4. “Metaphysical necessity,” which belongs to God only, as

existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and operate, and by

them we govern ourselves.

But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and

pernicious, which may be grouped under two heads:--1. “Atheistic,”

sometimes called the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the

mechanical laws of matter. 2. “Theistic,” which admits the existence of

God, but denies to him moral character, and makes him the arbitrary and

only agent in the universe, and creatures not responsible. See COLLINGS

on Providence, PRICE’S Dissertations, RUTHERFORD on Providence,

CHARNOCK’S Sermons, and WHATELY’S Logic.]

[104] P. 157.

[105] P. 158.

[106] [HUME says, “though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having

all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being

concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.”

Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an

important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr.

Hume found him out!]

[107] By _will_ and _character_ is meant that which, in speaking of

men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words

_temper_, _taste_, _dispositions_, _practical principles_: _that whole

frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another_.

[108] Chap. ii.

[109] P. 157, &c.

[110] Chap. ii.

[111] Dissert. II.

[112] Serm. 2, at the _Rolls_.

[113] Dissert. II.

[114] However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God

is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case;

though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation,

and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be

intelligible to say, that _it is fit and reasonable for every one to

consult his own happiness_, then _fitness of action, or the right and

reason of the case_, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it

seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action,

or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from

design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that

end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern

an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in

it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear,

that moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract

truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and

lightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than

to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.

[115] P. 118.

[116] P. 110, &c.

[117] Chap. ii.

[118] Dissertation II.

[119] Pp. 68, 71.

[120] Serm. 8th, at the _Rolls_.

[121] [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical

writers generally; such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse,

Martineau, Leroux, and Holyoake--also, BELSHAM’S Essays, COLLINS on

Liberty, CROMBIE on Phil. Necessity, HOBBES’ Liberty and Necessity, and

Leviathan, PRIESTLEY on Liberty, HARTLEY on Man, and EDWARDS on the

Will.

Against the doctrine, see BEATTIE’S Works, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes

by BRAMHALL and LAWSON; Replies to Priestley by PALMER and BRYANT;

GROVE on Liberty; CLARKE’S Sermons at the Boyle Lectures; GIBB’S

Contemplations; KING’S Origin of Evil; REID on the Mind; WATTS on

Liberty; HARRIS’ Boyle Lectures; JACKSON’S Defence; BUTTERWORTH on

Moral Government.]

[122] [MAIMONIDES makes use of the following similitude. “Suppose one

of good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to

be brought up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father

nor the female of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men

are produced. He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the

same species and that while in the womb we are very small and there

move and are nourished. The young man inquires whether when thus in

the womb we did not eat, and drink, and breathe, as we do now, and is

answered, No. Then he denies it, and offers demonstration that it could

not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to breathe our life is

gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months?

So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child live

so for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it is _impossible_

man should come into existence in such a manner.”]

[123] [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great

historical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant

raises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning

strip of foreground, derive any conception of the figures yet

concealed? Much less is he able to criticize their proportions, or

beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist? The small

fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite

unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty,

fitness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God’s dominions within our

survey, is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe, and its

interminable duration, as, an atom compared to a planet or a man’s age

to eternity.

The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every

difficulty as to such ignorance being as valid against the _proofs_ of

religion, as it is against _objections_ to it.]

[124] [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the

wider the range of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our

ignorance. The young student may well hesitate to decide points, on

which the profoundest thinkers take opposite sides, and when conscious

of inability intrust himself to the guidance of those whose lives are

best.]

[125] Pp. 177, 178.

[126] P. 173, &c.

[127] P. 175.

[128] Pp. 72, 73.

[129] P. 68, and Part II. chap. vi.

[130] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 312, 2d ed.

[131] P. 172, &c.

[132] See Part II. ch. ii.

[133] P. 173.

[134] [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole

argument from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.]

[135] Part II. ch. vi.

[136] P. 108.

[137] [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls

into the old plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before

determining its truth. Paley discards this order of arrangement,

in his very first sentence; and with good reason. The necessity of

revelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it are patent facts. To

hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Christianity, till

we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such

announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter

discusses the _importance_ rather than the necessity of revelation; and

so is a fitting commencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed

in revelation, over and above the truths which natural religion

furnishes, proves the _necessity_ of revelation, if we would know any

thing of _such_ truths. And it is such truths which constitute the very

peculiarities of revelation, and teach the _way of salvation_, for the

sinful and helpless.]

[138] [No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity

without a full and sad conviction that in relation to the character

of God, the sinfulness of man, the future state, and the rules of

living, those prime points on which we need knowledge, they were

almost profoundly ignorant. See on this point, LELAND’S Adv. and

Necess.: CHALMERS’ Nat. Theol.: MCCOSH’S Div. Gov.: PASCAL’S Thoughts:

WARBURTON’S Div. Legation.]

[139] Invenis multos----propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi

sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid

mihi præcepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid

mihi necessarius est Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum,

nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio

contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et

qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. _Aug. in Psal._ xxxi. [You find

many who refuse to become Christians, because they feel sufficient of

themselves to lead a good life. “We ought to live well.” says one.

“What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what need

then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I

covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one

find in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a

Christian.”]

[140] [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or

individual command from such as are of universal and perpetual

obligation, is well laid down by WAYLAND, _Mor. Sci._ ch. ix. sec. 2.]

[141] [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the

infinite danger of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of

restoration after death. And as to the efficacy of repentance, it

rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. At least it does not

teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to cancel guilt,

but restore to the favor of God.]

[142] [“Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in

like manner as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in

general. There was however this difference that by an institution

of external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and

discipline, it pleased God to unite Christiana into _visible churches_,

and all along to preserve them over a great part of the world, and thus

perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.” BUTLER’S sermon before

the Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that discourse,

that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories

for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their

heresies.]

[143] Rev. xxii. 11.

[144] [“It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first

sight, to say that since Christianity is a _remedial_ system, designed

to obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect

and abuse of the light of nature, it ought not to be _liable_ to the

same perversions. Because--1. Christianity is not designed primarily

to remedy the defects of _nature_, but of an unnatural state of ruin

into which men were brought by _the Fall_. And 2. It is remedial of

the defects of nature in a _great degree_, by its giving additional

advantages. 3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a

greater degree than it is, without destroying man’s free agency; which

would be to destroy its own end, the practice of virtue.”--FITZGERALD’S

Notes.]

[145] [CHALMERS (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain.

He shows the _ethics_ of natural religion to be one thing and

its _objects_ another. Natural religion discloses no Redeemer or

Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should regard such a person, if

there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such a being by the

_relation_ in which we of course stand to him. How we are to _express_

that love and obedience it cannot teach.]

[146] See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian

Sacraments, &c., [by WATERLAND,] and COLLIBER of Revealed Religion, as

there quoted.

[147] [If Christianity were but “a republication of natural religion,”

or as Tindall says, “as old as creation,” why do deists oppose it? It

does indeed republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths

beside. If it gave us no new light, no new motives, it would be but a

tremendous curse, making us all the more responsible, and none the more

instructed or secure.]

[148] P. 94.

[149] Ch. v.

[150] John iii. 5.

[151] This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts

considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have

somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered

in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike,

in other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the

reasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons

of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 189, &c.

[152] [Without offering the least objection to what is here said of

the comparative value of moral and positive institutions, it should

not be overlooked that sometimes, obedience to a positive rite is more

indicative of an obedient spirit, than obedience to a moral rule. The

latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over and above the command,

and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The former rests singly

on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who would repel a

temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty of

baptism or the Lord’s supper.]

[153] Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.

[154] Hosea vi. 6.

[155] See Matt. xii. 7.

[156] See ch. iii.

[157] [Dr. ANGUS judiciously remarks on this sentence, “This sentiment,

as understood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly,

the Bible must be so interpreted as to agree with _all_ known truth,

whether of natural religion or natural science. At the same time, to

correct the theology of the Bible by the theology of nature, as finite

and guilty men understand it, may involve the rejection of Bible

theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was intended

to supply. The converse of Butler’s statement is equally true, and even

more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the

seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming

lesson is not the real one.” Practically, it will be found that seeming

meanings of Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts

of Scripture itself. I understand Butler as only affirming that we

must interpret Scripture according to immutable principles, and _known

truth_. The infidel rejects it for not conforming to his _assumed

hypothesis_.]

[158] P. 203.

[159] Chaps. iii., iv., v., vi.

[160] Chap. vii.

[161] P. 172.

[162] [Papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine

in the Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is

such because wrought under circumstances which _exclude_ examination:

while transubstantiation _invites_ and _facilitates_ examination. It is

wrought publicly, and constantly, and yet cannot be discovered to be a

miracle. Indeed it supposes the working of a second miracle, to make

the first invisible.]

[163] [Paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not

only to a denial of revelation, but a denial of the existence of God,

all of whose extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous.]

[164] [WHATELY, in his _Logic_, b. iii., has shown the folly of the

Deistical attempts to explain our Savior’s miracles as mere natural

events. Having labored to show this of some _one_ of the miracles, they

then do so as to _another_, and thence infer that _all_ were accidental

conjunctures of natural circumstances. He says, they might as well

argue “that because it is not improbable one may throw sixes once in a

hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw

sixes a hundred times running.”

FITZGERALD says, “the improbability of a whole series of strange

natural events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts

to a far greater improbability than is involved in the admission of

miracles.”]

[165] [That man, at first, must have had supernatural _instructions_,

or in other words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop WHATELY in

his “Origin of Civilization.” Rev. SAMUEL STANHOPE SMITH expresses

his conviction, both from reason and history, that man in his savage

state could not even have preserved life without instruction from his

Creator.]

[166] [The maintenance by the Jews, of a system of pure Theism, through

so many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to

their neighbors, in science and civilization, can only be accounted for

on the presumption of a revelation.]

[167] P. 166, &c.

[168] [MILLS (Logic, chap. 24, § 5,) points out what he deems a mistake

of “some of the writers against Hume on Miracles,” in confounding

the improbability of an event, before its occurrence, with the

improbability afterwards; that is, considering them equal in degree.

He fully proves that the great Laplace fell into this error, and the

student should consult the passage.

Prof. FITZGERALD holds Butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted

to by Mills; and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make

him say that such is his opinion also. I do not so understand Mills,

nor do I see that Butler has confounded these meanings; but the very

contrary. He expressly affirms, and most truly, that the strongest

presumption may lie against “the most ordinary facts _before the proof_

which yet is overcome by almost any proof.” Butler’s position here, may

be thus illustrated. Suppose a hundred numbers to be put in a box, and

it is proposed to draw out the number 42. Now there are 99 chances to 1

against drawing that, or any other _given_ number. But suppose a child

tells you he put the hundred numbers into a box, and drew out one, and

it proved to be 42; you at once believe, for that was as likely to come

as any other.

The proof of Christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong, thus

viewed. There are many predictions, for instance that Christ should be

born at a certain time, and place, and under certain very particular

circumstances. The probabilities against such a _conjuncture_ of events

are almost infinite; yet they happened exactly as foretold.]

[169] [For instance, a mass of ice or snow, may imperceptibly

accumulate for an age, and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village.

Or a planet, or comet, may have been gradually nearing our earth for a

million of years, without producing, _as yet_, any effect on our orbit;

but in process of time, its proximity may work great changes in our

condition.]

[170] P. 208.

[171] 1 Cor. i. 28.

[172] See Chap. vi.

[173] See Chap. vi.

[174] [See note, page 218.]

[175] P. 220.

[176] [It is not to be understood that Butler would not have the

ordinary rules of interpretation applied to the Holy Scriptures.

Because the interpretation, “if not gathered _out_ of the words,

must be brought _into_ them.” We cannot interpret them as if we knew

beforehand, what the Holy Ghost meant to say; as SPINOZA proposes to

do, in his Philosophia Scripturæ Interpretes. The student will do well

to consult BENSON’S Hulsean Lectures on Scripture Difficulties: KING’S

Morsels of Criticism: STORR, Exertationes Exeget.: MICHAELIS, Introd.

ad. Nov. Test.: and FEATLEY’S Key.]

[177] Pp. 207, 208.

[178] [See 1 Cor. xii. 1-10: xiii. 1: and xiv. 1-19.]

[179] [“The power of healing, or working miracles, is, during the

whole course of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of

the general laws of matter and motion. It was therefore fit that this

power should be given occasionally. But the _speaking with tongues_,

when once the gift was conferred, became thenceforth a natural

power; just as the free use of members of the body, after being

restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions.

In healing, the apostles are to be considered as the workers of a

miracle; in speaking strange tongues, as persons on whom a miracle is

performed.”--WARBURTON, Doct. of Grace, b. i. ch. iii.]

[180] Heb. vi. 1.

[181] Acts iii. 21.

[182] [The doctrine of “development” has of late been popular in

some quarters. Butler here shows the only _safe_ notion we may

entertain on that subject. “Exact thought, and careful consideration”

may show us how to confute specious heresies, expound embarrassing

passages, dissipate painful doubts, and remove many prejudices or

misapprehensions. But revelation is complete as it stands.

We may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences; not in

the development of new facts or faith, as Papists and Socinians

pretend, but in the increase of sound wisdom, aided by a more perfect

interpretation of God’s word.]

[183] Chap. vi.

[184] Chap. v.

[185] Chap. vii.

[186] Chap. iv. latter part, and v. vi.

[187] [This pregnant paragraph should receive very full attention.

We know much of men, little of God. What men are likely to do, or

say, in certain circumstances, is often very clear; and generally may

be guessed at. But what God would do or say in new contingencies,

who shall attempt to prescribe or predict? We are poorly qualified

to assert that such and such declarations could not have come from

infinite wisdom; but we are quite competent to affirm that such and

such things could not have come from human contrivance or enthusiasm.]

[188] In the foregoing chapter.

[189] Part I, ch. vii., to which this all along refers.

[190] [“It is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of

things which surpass it.”--PASCAL. “The wall of adamant which bounds

human inquiry, has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer,

till he was aroused by the shock that drove him back.”--Sir JAS.

MACKINTOSH. “Of the dark parts of revelation there are two sorts:

one which may be cleared up by the studious; the other which will

always reside within the shadow of God’s throne where it would be

impiety to intrude.”--WARBURTON. “A Christianity without mystery is as

unphilosophical as it is unscriptural.”--ANGUS.]

[191] John xi. 52.

[192] 2 Peter iii. 13.

[193] 1 Peter i. 11, 12.

[194] Phil. ii. [6-11.]

[195] [The influences of the Holy Spirit are not only “given to good

men,” but are sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity, quickening

their consciences, enlightening their understandings and arresting

their passions, and thus it is they are converted unto the truth in

Christ.]

[196] John xiv. 2.

[197] John v. 22, 23.

[198] Matt. xxviii. 18.

[199] 1 Cor. xv. 28.

[200] 1 Tim. iii. 16.

[201] P. 174, &c.

[202] 1 Cor. i. [18-25.]

[203] Pp. 178, 179.

[204] Pp. 180, 181.

[205] P. 172, &c.

[206] [“Providence hurries not himself to display to-day the

consequence of the principle he yesterday announced. He will draw it

out in the lapse of ages Even according to our reasoning logic is none

the less sure, because it is slow.”--GUIZOT on Civilization, Lect. I.

How impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology, and

astronomy!]

[207] [“Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes, when they

judge of the Divine economy. He cannot, they tell us, act thus,

it would be contrary to his wisdom, or his justice, &c. But while

they make these peremptory assertions they show themselves to be

unacquainted with the fundamental rules of their own science, and

with the origin of all late improvements. True philosophy would begin

the other way, with observing the constitution of the world, how God

has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and _then_

from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus

might they learn ‘the invisible things of God from those which are

clearly seen’ the things which are not accomplished from those which

are.”--POWELL’S _Use and Abuse of Philosophy_.]

[208] 1 Tim. ii. 5.

[209] [The interposition of a man of known probity and worth often

saves the thoughtless or the guilty from punishment. Mediation is seen

in a thousand forms in the arrangements of social life; and the common

sense of all mankind approves of it. The release of the offending, by

the intercession of the good, and all the benefits of advice, caution,

example, instruction, persuasion, and authority, are instances of

mediation.]

[210] [MR. NEWMAN notices a distinction between the facts of

revelation, and its principles; and considers the argument from analogy

more concerned with its principles than with its facts. “The revealed

facts are special and singular, from the nature of the case, but the

revealed principles are common to all the works of God; and if the

Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be expected that the

principles displayed in them will be the same, and form a connecting

link between them. In this identity of _principle_, lies the analogy

of natural and revealed religion, in Butler’s sense of the word. The

Incarnation is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature:

the doctrine of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified

in nature.”--_Essay on Developments._]

[211] [The student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel

guilt, beautifully exhibited by WAYLAND, Mor. Science: MAGEE,

Atonement: HOWE, Living Temple.]

[212] P. 232, &c.

[213] John iii. 16.

[214] It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory

reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing

said in this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general

redemption, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted

with it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that

several questions, which have been brought into the subject before

us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here, questions

which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal

rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved

the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with

the general laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the

world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of

men; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses

in his prayer[A] asserts, repentance was not appointed. The meaning of

the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous: and neither of them

can properly be answered, without going upon that infinitely absurd

supposition, that we know the whole of the case. And perhaps the very

inquiry, _What would have followed, if God had not done as he has_, may

have in it some very great impropriety: and ought not to be carried

on any further than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate

conceptions of things.

[A] [The “prayer of Manasses” is one of the apocryphal books of the Old

Testament, which next precedes “Maccabees.”]

[215] John i., and viii. 12.

[216] Rom. iii. 25, v. 11: 1 Cor. v. 7: Eph. v. 2: 1 John ii. 2: Matt

xxvi. 28.

[217] John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation.

[218] Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews.

[219] Isa. liii.: Dan. ix. 24: Ps. cx. 4.

[220] Heb. x. 1.

[221] Heb. viii. 4, 5.

[222] Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10.

[223] Heb. ix. 28.

[224] John xi. 51, 52.

[225] 1 Pet. iii. 18.

[226] Matt. xx. 28: Mark x. 45: 1 Tim. ii. 6.

[227] 2 Pet. ii. 1: Rev. xiv. 4: 1 Cor. vi. 20.

[228] 1 Pet. i. 19: Rev. v. 9: Gal. iii. 13.

[229] Heb. vii. 25: 1 John ii. 1, 2.

[230] Heb. ii. 10.: v. 9.

[231] 2 Cor. v. 19: Rom. v. 10: Eph. ii. 16.

[232] Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job,

xxxiii. 24.

[233] Phil. ii. 8, 9: John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23.

[234] Rev. v. 12, 13.

[235] John vi. 14.

[236] P. 188, &c.

[237] Eph. iv. 12, 13.

[238] John xiv. 2, 3: Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15.

[239] 2 Thess. i. 8.

[240] Heb. ix. 26.

[241] [Consult MAGEE, on Atonement: STAPFERI Institutiones: TURRETIN,

De Satisfactione: CHALMERS, Discourses: OWEN, Satis. of Christ.]

[242] P. 194, &c.

[243] [This objection is ably urged by TINDALL. The answer of our

author is complete. We should remember, that twice in the history of

mankind, revelation _has been_ universal. The first pair, and the

occupants of the ark, comprised the whole population. But how soon was

light rejected! Christianity is universal, in nature and intention; is

to become so in fact; and according to a very probable construction of

prophecy, will continue to be universal, for three hundred and sixty

thousand years.]

[244] [May not this be a principal object of the Apocalypse? As the

book of Daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith

of the Jew, by the constant development of prophecy, so the Apocalypse,

rightly studied must powerfully, and through all time, support the

faith of the Christian by the continual unfolding and verification of

its predictions.]

[245] 2 Cor. viii. 12.

[246] Introduction.

[247] Part I. chap. v.

[248] Part I. chap. iv. and pp. 156, 157.

[249] Pp. 156, 157.