THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION; AND THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN
THE PROOF OF IT.
It has been thought by some persons, that if the evidence of revelation
appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argument against
it: because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would
be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And the objection against
revelation from its not being universal is often insisted upon as of
great weight.
The weakness of these opinions may be shown, by observing the
suppositions on which they are founded: which are really such as these;
that it cannot be thought God would have bestowed any favor at all
upon us, unless in the degree which we think he might, and which, we
imagine, would be most to our particular advantage; and also that it
cannot be thought he would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed
the same upon all; suppositions, which we find contradicted, not by
a few instances in God’s natural government of the world, but by the
general analogy of nature together.
Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, and of this
supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against it, should be
put upon considering, what that evidence is, which they act upon with
regard to their temporal interests. It is not only extremely difficult,
but in many cases absolutely impossible, to balance pleasure and pain,
satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side
is the overplus. There are the like difficulties and impossibilities
in making the due allowances for a change of temper and taste, for
satiety, disgusts, ill health: any of which render men incapable of
enjoying, after they have obtained what they most eagerly desired.
Numberless too are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death,
which may even probably disappoint the best-concerted schemes: and
strong objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed
or answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side;
so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by
every one; thought justly disregarded, upon account of the appearing
greater advantages in case of success, though there be but little
probability of it. Lastly, every one observes our liableness, if we be
not upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the
false appearances of things: and this danger must be greatly increased,
if there be a strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to
favor the deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness
of proof, _wherein_ our temporal interest really consists; what are the
most probable _means_ of attaining it; and whether those means will
eventually be _successful_. And numberless instances there are, in the
daily course of life, in which all men think it reasonable to engage in
pursuits, though the probability is greatly against succeeding; and to
make such provision for themselves, as it is supposable they may have
occasion for, though the plain acknowledged probability is, that they
never shall.
Those who think the objection against revelation, from its light not
being universal, to be of weight,[243] should observe, that the Author
of nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon some, which he
does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed
he appears to bestow all his gifts with the most promiscuous variety
among creatures of the same species: health and strength, capacities
of prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and all
external advantages. As there are not any two men found, of exactly
like shape and features; so it is probable there are not any two, of
an exactly like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to
the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties
and varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world;
and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of
life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that his natural
government.
As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been universal; and
as they have been afforded to a greater or less part of the world,
at different times; so likewise at different times, both revelations
have had different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during the
succession of prophets, that is, from Moses till after the Captivity,
had higher evidence of the truth of their religion, than those had,
who lived in the interval between the last-mentioned period, and the
coming of Christ. And the first Christians had higher evidence of the
miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, than what we have now.
They had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of
much greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of which we
have very little remaining; I mean the presumptive proof of its truth,
from the influence which it had upon the lives of the generality of its
professors. And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it,
which they could not have, from the conformity between the prophetic
history, and the state of the world[244] and of Christianity.
And further: if we were to suppose the evidence, which some have of
religion, to amount to little more than seeing that it _may_ be true;
but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties about both its
evidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule
of life: others to have a _full conviction_ of the truth of religion,
with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and others severally to have
all the intermediate degrees of religious light and evidence, which
lie between these two--if we put the case, that for the present, it
was intended that revelation should be no more than a small light,
in the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with
ignorance and darkness: that certain glimmerings of this light should
extend, and be directed, to remote distances, in such a manner as
that those who really partook of it should not discern whence it
originally came: that some in a nearer situation to it should have
its light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted:
and that others should be placed within its clearer influence, and
be much more enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet that
even to these it should be no more than a _light shining in a dark
place_: all this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the
conduct of Providence, in the distribution of its other blessings. If
the fact of the case really were, that some have received no light
at all from the Scripture; as many ages and countries in the heathen
world: that others, though they have, by means of it, had essential or
natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never had
the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to
their consideration; and the ancient Persians and modern Mahometans
may possibly be instances of people in a situation somewhat like to
this; that others, though they have had the Scripture laid before them
as of divine revelation, yet have had it with the system and evidence
of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence
so blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost
doubtfulness and uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state
of some thoughtful men, in most of those nations who call themselves
Christian: and lastly, that others have had Christianity offered to
them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence, as
persons in countries and churches of civil and of Christian liberty;
but that even these persons are left in great ignorance in many
respects, and have by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy
their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to teach them their
duty, and encourage them in the careful discharge of it. I say, if we
were to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the degrees
of moral and religious light and evidence, which were intended to be
afforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is their situation,
in their moral and religious capacity; there would be nothing in all
this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in all these varieties,
and supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respecting
religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural
dispensations of Providence at present, considering ourselves merely in
our temporal capacity.
Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would seem to
bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we would really
keep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably with: instead of
forgetting this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in
words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in
this various economy of Providence, would be lost, if we would keep
in mind, that every merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be
required of any one, than what might have been equitably expected of
him, from the circumstances in which he was placed; and not what might
have been expected, had he been placed in other circumstances: _i.e._
in Scripture language, that every man shall be _accepted according to
what he had, not according to what he had not_.[245] This however does
not by any means imply, that all persons’ condition here is equally
advantageous with respect to futurity. And Providence’s designing to
place some in greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge,
is no more a reason why they should not endeavor to get out of that
darkness, and others to bring them out of it, than why ignorant and
slow people in matters of other knowledge should not endeavor to learn,
or should not be instructed.
It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good
principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of nature to
make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also to
place creatures of like kinds in different situations. And that the
same principle which disposed him to make creatures of different
moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of like moral
capacities in different religious situations; and even the same
creatures, in different periods of their being. The account or reason
of this is also most probably the account why the constitution of
things is such, as that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for a
considerable part of that duration in which they are living agents, are
not at all subjects of morality and religion; but grow up to be so, and
grow up to be so more and more, gradually from childhood to mature age.
What, in particular, is the account or reason of these things, we must
be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so very little even
of our own case. Our present state may possibly be the consequence
of something past, of which we are wholly ignorant: as it has a
reference to somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any more than
is necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in its notion,
implies variety; and so complicated a one as this world, very great
variety. So that were revelation universal, yet, from men’s different
capacities of understanding, from the different lengths of their lives,
their different educations and other external circumstances, and from
their difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious
situations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some in
comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. The
true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part of mankind,
are placed in this condition of ignorance, must be supposed also the
true account of our further ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why,
or whence it is, that they are placed in this condition.
The following practical reflections may deserve the serious
consideration of those persons, who think the circumstances of mankind
or their own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of complaint.
_First_, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may constitute
one particular part of some men’s trial in the religious sense: as
it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect of their
understanding, in examining or not examining into that evidence. There
seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state
of moral probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding
upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behavior
in common affairs. The former is as much a thing within our power and
choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid down for certain,
that the same character, the same inward principle, which, after a man
is convinced of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the
precepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an
examination of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his
thoughts: and that in the latter state his examination would be with an
impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to what his
obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, want of all
serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and such importance,
when offered to men’s consideration, is, before a distinct conviction
of its truth, as real depravity and dissoluteness, as neglect of
religious practice after such conviction: so active solicitude about
it, and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before such
conviction, is as really an exercise of a morally right temper; as
is religious practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively
true, but a matter of deduction and inference; that a conviction of its
truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected
with heedful attention to premises; this as much constitutes religious
probation, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right
and wrong behavior, as any thing whatever does. And their manner of
treating this subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their
heart, and is an exertion of it.
_Secondly_, It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not so
much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, the evidence
of it should seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest supposable
degree; even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them into a
_general state of probation_ in the moral and religious sense. For,
suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether such a person had not done
him the greatest favor; or, whether his whole temporal interest did not
depend upon that person; no one, who had any sense of gratitude and of
prudence, could possibly consider himself in the same situation, with
regard to such person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is
as just to say, that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say the
situations now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in
point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he certain he had
received no favor from such person; or that he no way depended upon
him. Thus, though the evidence of religion which is afforded to some
men should be little more than they are given to see, the system of
Christianity, or religion in general, to be supposable and credible;
this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical apprehension,
that it _may_ be true. And even this will afford matter of exercise
for religious suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution and
self-government; because the apprehension that religion may be true
does as really lay men under obligations, as a full conviction that
it is true. It gives occasion and motives to consider further the
important subject; to preserve attentively upon their minds a general
implicit sense that they may be under divine moral government, an
awful solicitude about religion, whether natural or revealed. Such
apprehension ought to turn men’s eyes to every degree of new light
which may be had, from whatever side it comes; and induce them to
refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live in the
conscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially are they
bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness,
for this the very nature of the case forbids; and to treat with highest
reverence a matter, upon which their own whole interest and being,
and the fate of nature, depend. This behavior, and an active endeavor
to maintain within themselves this temper, is the business, the duty,
and the wisdom of those persons, who complain of the doubtfulness of
religion: is what they are under the most proper obligations to. And
such behavior is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in
them, that character, which the practice of all the several duties of
religion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and
has a tendency to improve in others: others, I say, to whom God has
afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance
of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be said in
general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly may see, there
is not near so much difference, as is commonly imagined, between what
ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons who are
fully convinced of its truth, and to those who have only a serious
doubting apprehension, that it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and
obligations, will be in various degrees: but, as the subject-matter
of their hopes and fears is the same, so the subject-matter of their
obligations, what they are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so
very unlike.
It is to be observed further, that, from a character of understanding,
or a situation of influence in the world, some persons have it in their
power to do infinitely more harm or good, by setting an example of
profaneness and avowed disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary,
of a serious, though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its truth, and
of a reverent regard to it under this doubtfulness; than they can do,
by acting well or ill in all the _common intercourses_ among mankind.
Consequently they are most highly accountable for a behavior, which,
they may easily foresee, is of such importance, and in which there
is most plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence of
religion to be as doubtful as is pretended.
The ground of these observations, and that which renders them just
and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies _some_ degree of
evidence for that, of which we doubt. For no person would be in doubt
concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced,
which should accidentally come into his thoughts, and of which he had
no evidence at all. And though in the case of an even chance, and
where consequently we were in doubt, we should in common language say,
that we had no evidence at all for either side; yet that situation
of things, which renders it an even chance and no more, that such an
event will happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where
there is such evidence on both sides of a question,[246] as leaves
the mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases,
there is no more evidence on one side than on the other; but there is
(what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the truth of a
number of facts, which come into one’s thoughts at random. Thus, in
all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, in lower degrees,
as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher still. Any one,
who will a little attend to the nature of evidence, will easily carry
this observation on, and see, that between no evidence at all, and
that degree of it which affords ground of doubt, there are as many
intermediate degrees, as there are, between that degree which is the
ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we have not faculties
to distinguish these degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness;
yet, in proportion as they are discerned, they ought to influence
our practice. It is as real an imperfection in the moral character,
not to be influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when
discerned, as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as,
in all subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well
as higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of
understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in
practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably
to their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to defects in the
understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence, are in
danger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily
imposed upon in such cases; so, in proportion to the corruption of
the heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no
regard in practice to evidence acknowledged to be real, if it be not
overbearing. From these things it must follow, that doubting concerning
religion implies such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with
the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the
obligations before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all
their behavior.
_Thirdly_, The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is
involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of
complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which others
are placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full
conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state a more improving
state of discipline,[247] than it would be otherwise: as they give
occasion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which
confirms and strengthens it more, than an easier or less attentive
exercise of it could. Speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of
the very same nature with these external temptations. For the evidence
of religion not appearing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to
reject it, without any consideration at all; and therefore requires
such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to
consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such
temptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has
been in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind
of explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence
which it might see; and also for men’s encouraging themselves in vice,
from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least,
that these hopes are uncertain. In like manner the common temptation
to many instances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin,
is the ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with
impunity; _i.e._ the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such
foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the contrary,
supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion calls for a more
careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly
yielding themselves up to the proper influence of any real evidence,
though doubtful; and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though
under some uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may
not possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. And in
general, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to
wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as the
greater ones; temptation, I say, as such and of every kind and degree,
as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional to what would
otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline
and improvement of virtue, as well as probation of it in the other
senses of that word.[248] So that the very same account is to be given,
why the evidence of religion should be left in such a manner, as to
require, in some, an attentive, solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of
their understanding about it; as why others should be placed in such
circumstances, as that the practice of its common duties, after a full
conviction of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude,
and pains: or, why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to
afford matter of temptation to some; as why external difficulties
and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation
to others. The same account also is to be given, why some should be
exercised with temptations of both these kinds; as why others should be
exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some have been,
particularly as the primitive Christians were.
Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the speculative
difficulties, in which the evidence of religion is involved, may make
even the principal part of some persons’ trial. For as the chief
temptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives
to injustice, or unrestrained pleasure, or to live in the neglect of
religion, from that frame of mind which renders many persons almost
without feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the object of
their senses; so there are other persons without this shallowness of
temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future;
who not only see, but have a general practical feeling, that what is to
come will be present, and that things are not less real for their not
being the objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of
body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have small
temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the
common course of life. Now when these latter persons have a distinct
full conviction of me truth of religion, without any possible doubts
or difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless
they do a constant violence to their own minds; and religion is scarce
any more a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state
of perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral
discipline and exercise, in a higher degree than they would have by
such an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons
unknown to us, that they should give some further manifestation[249]
what is their moral character, to the creation of God, than such
a practice of it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious
situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and
peculiarly constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons,
may be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved:
and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will
behave under and with respect to these difficulties. Circumstances in
men’s situation in their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure
to this respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some persons
are placed in such a situation in the world, as that their chief
difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent
when it is known; for this, in numberless cases, is as easy as the
contrary: but to some the principal exercise is, recollection and being
upon their guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of those about
them; against false appearances of reason and prudence. To persons in
some situations, the principal exercise with respect to conduct is,
attention in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really
the reasonable and prudent part to act.
[_Fourthly._] As I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that men’s
dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing to their
neglects or prejudices; it must be added, on the other hand, in all
common reason, and as what the truth of the case plainly requires
should be added, that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to
those, possibly may be men’s own fault. For,
If there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily and in
earnest to be informed in religion: if there are any, who secretly
wish it may not prove true; and are less attentive to evidence than to
difficulties, and more to objections than to what is said in answer to
them: these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing
the evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true, and
capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom themselves to
consider this subject in the way of mirth and sport: if they attend
to forms and representations, and inadequate manners of expression,
instead of the real things intended by them: (for signs often can be
no more than inadequately expressive of the things signified:) or if
they substitute human errors in the room of divine truth; why may
not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that
evidence, which really is seen by others; as a like turn of mind, with
respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, we find
by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right
understanding, in matters of common speculation and practice, which
more fair and attentive minds attain to? And the effect will be the
same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of
religion, and their indirect behavior with regard to it, proceed from
mere carelessness, or from the grosser vices; or whether it be owing
to this, that forms and figurative manners of expression, as well as
errors, administer occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and
the truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far
as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and
even, as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general,
levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice _do_ hinder us from being
rightly informed, with respect to common things: and they _may_, in
like manner, and perhaps, in some further providential manner, with
respect to moral and religious subjects: may hinder evidence from being
laid before us, and from being seen when it is. The Scripture[250]
does declare, that every one _shall not understand_. And it makes no
difference, by what providential conduct this comes to pass: whether
the evidence of Christianity was, originally and with design, put and
left so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations
should not see it; and that honest-minded persons should: or, whether
it comes to pass by any other means.
Further: [_Fifthly._] The general proof of natural religion and of
Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men: even those, the
greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age, is taken
up with providing for themselves and their families the common
conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life: those I mean, of this
rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof, or attending to it.
Common men, were they as much in earnest about religion, as about their
temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evidence,
that there is a God who governs the world: and they feel themselves to
be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity
entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are
capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that
there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many
appearing completions of prophecy.
This proof, though real and conclusive, is liable to objections,
and may be run up into difficulties; which however persons who are
capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable
also of seeing through: _i.e._ not of clearing up and answering them,
so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we are not
capable with respect to any one thing in nature; but capable of seeing
that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by
these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion with
regard to these objections, which cannot be the business of every
man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and, from the nature of it,
requires some knowledge, as well as time and attention; to see, how
the evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing with another, and
what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. If persons who pick up
these objections from others, and take for granted they are of weight,
upon the word of those from whom they received them, or, by often
retailing of them, come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight;
will not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a competent
degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and attention to the
subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such
information: in this case, they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance,
or error: in the same way as they must, with regard to common
sciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary
means of being informed in them.
Perhaps it will still be objected, that if a prince or common master
were to send directions to a servant, he would take care, that they
should always bear the certain marks, who they came from, and that
their sense should be always plain: so as that there should be no
possible doubt if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning
of them. The proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that,
wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with
respect to Him who is the Governor of the world: and that he does not
afford us such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and
interests, experience abundantly shows.
However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature
of religion. The reason why a prince would give his directions in this
plain manner is, that he absolutely desires an external action done,
without concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it
is done: _i.e._ he regards only the external event, or the thing’s
being done; and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the
action. Whereas the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in
action itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if
the prince be supposed to regard only the action; _i.e._ only to desire
to exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a
servant; he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner.
It may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality and
religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only conditional.
If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act virtuously
in such given circumstances; not that we should be brought to act
so, by this changing of our circumstances. And if God’s will be thus
absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense,
to do or to contradict his will; which is a most weighty consideration.
Or his will may be considered only as conditional, that if we act
so and so, we shall be rewarded: if otherwise, punished: of which
conditional will of the Author of nature, the whole constitution of it
affords most certain instances.
Upon the whole: that we are in a state of religion necessarily
implies, that we are in a state of probation: and the credibility
of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no
peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it
is, in those respects which are above objected against. There seems
no pretence, from _the reason of the thing_, to say, that the trial
cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably
to certain information, or such as admits no room for doubt; so as
that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their not
attending to what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion
hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For, since ignorance and doubt,
afford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive
conviction or certainty; and since the two former are to be put to
the same account as difficulties in practice; men’s moral probation
may also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by
impartial consideration, and afterwards whether they will act as the
case requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubtful.
And this, we find by _experience_, is frequently our probation,[251]
in our temporal capacity. For, the information which we want with
regard to our worldly interests is by no means always given us of
course, without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to
self-deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of
others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often
requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we have judged
the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will
live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high degree.
And the constitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that
want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and venturing
upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what will be the
consequence, are often naturally, _i.e._ providentially, altogether
as fatal, as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we
certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion.
Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, perhaps
unintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons for whose sake
they are made think so, (persons who object as above, and throw off all
regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence;) I desire them
to consider again, whether their thinking so be owing to any thing
unintelligible in these observations, or to their own not having such
a sense of religion and serious solicitude about it, as even their
state of scepticism does in all reason require? It ought to be forced
upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and condition
necessarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon
evidence much lower than what is commonly called probable: to guard,
not only against what we fully believe will, but also against what we
think it supposable may, happen; and to engage in pursuits when the
probability is greatly against success, if it even be credible, that
possibly we may succeed in them.