THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY; THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR,
AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM.
There is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity, which has
been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in some
or other of its parts. Yet upon thorough consideration, there seems
nothing less justly liable to it.[207] For,
I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against
the general notion of _a Mediator between God and man_.[208] For we
find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life
in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others: and every
satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means.
So that the visible government, which God exercises over the world, is
by the instrumentality and mediation of others. How far his invisible
government be or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by
reason. The supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the
least, altogether as credible, as the contrary. There is then no sort
of objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a
mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity,
or as an appointment in this dispensation: since we find by experience,
that God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil
to us: the instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the objection
here referred to is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent,
and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely
against the whole notion itself of a mediator at all.
II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the proper moral
government of God, or in a state of religion, before we can enter into
consideration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the redemption of
it by Christ: so that supposition is here to be distinctly noticed.
Now the divine moral government which religion teaches us, implies
that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by
the righteous judgment of God. That such consequent punishment shall
take effect by his appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as it
is not in any sort to be supposed, that we are made acquainted with
all the ends or reasons, for which it is fit that future punishments
should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent
misery to follow vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how or in
what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the
instrumentality of what means; so there is no absurdity in supposing
it may follow in a way analogous to that in which many miseries
follow such and such courses of action at present; poverty, sickness,
infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil
justice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may
follow wickedness _of course_, as we speak, or in the way of natural
consequence from God’s original constitution of the world; from the
nature he has given us, and from the condition in which he places us;
or in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice,
in the way of natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural
consequence of this, breaks his limbs, and in the way of natural
consequence, without help, perishes.
Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken of as a
supposable thing that future punishments of wickedness may be in the
way of natural consequence: as if this were taking the execution of
justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature. But they
should remember, that when things come to pass according to the course
of nature, this does not hinder them from being his doing, who is
the God of nature: and that the Scripture ascribes those punishments
to divine justice, which are known to be natural; and which must be
called so, when distinguished from such as are miraculous. After all,
this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here made use
of only by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it
must be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a
matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; it
comes for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be
inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments
of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there
were a difference, it is allowable, in the present case, to make this
supposition, plainly not an incredible one, that future punishment may
follow wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or according to
some general laws of government already established in the universe.
III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe
somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the constitution of nature or
appointments of Providence: the provision which is made, that all the
bad natural consequences of men’s actions should not always actually
follow; or that such bad consequences, as, according to the settled
course of things, would inevitably have followed if not prevented,
should, in certain degrees, be prevented. We are apt presumptuously to
imagine, that the world might have been so constituted, as that there
would not have been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary
we find the Author of nature permits it: but then he has provided
reliefs, and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains
and difficulties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the
fruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the course of nature, would
have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such remedies.
And this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the
constitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now mentioned,
of a man’s trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And though
all were not, yet some of them might, by proper interposition, if not
rejected:[209] by another’s coming to the rash man’s relief, with his
own laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required.
Persons may do a great deal themselves towards preventing the bad
consequences of their follies: and more may be done by themselves,
together with the assistance of others their fellow-creatures; which
assistance nature requires and prompts us to. This is the general
constitution of the world.
Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions were
done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer,
it should have been no more in human power to have prevented that
naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than it is in all: no
one can say, whether such a more severe constitution of things might
not yet have been really good. But, on the contrary, provision being
made by nature, that we may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad
natural effects of our follies; this may be called mercy or compassion
in the original constitution of the world: compassion, as distinguished
from goodness in general. And, the whole known constitution and
course of things affording us instances of such compassion, it would
be according to the analogy of nature, to hope, that however ruinous
the natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of
God’s government over the universe; yet provision might be made,
possibly might have been originally made, for preventing those ruinous
consequences from inevitably following: at least from following
universally, and in all cases.
Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, or
spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of mankind are so
far from having that awful sense of things, which the present state of
vice and misery and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they
have scarce any apprehension or thought at all about this matter, any
way: and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concerning
it. But let us observe, what we experience to be, and what, from
the very constitution of nature cannot but be, the consequences of
irregular and disorderly behavior: even of such rashness, wilfulness,
neglects, as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend,
that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in
proportion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison
between these irregularities, and the greater instances of vice, or
a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion; if there be any
thing at all in religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral
agents, presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the
kingdom of God, which mankind have in fact introduced: to blaspheme the
Sovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; to be injurious, to
the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, the creatures of God.
Add that the effects of vice in the present world are often extreme
misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death: and upon putting all this
together, it will appear, that as no one can say, in what degree fatal
the unprevented consequences of vice may be, according to the general
rule of divine government; so it is by no means intuitively certain,
how far these consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing,
be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what
is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there would be
large ground to hope, that the universal government was not so severely
strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal
consequences prevented. Yet,
IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we could do would
alone and of itself prevent them: prevent their following, or being
inflicted. But one would think at least, it were impossible that
the contrary should be thought certain. For we are not acquainted
with the whole of the case. We are not informed of all the reasons,
which render it fit that future punishments should be inflicted: and
therefore cannot know, whether any thing we could do would make such
an alteration, as to render it fit that they should be remitted. We
do not know what the whole natural or appointed consequences of vice
are; nor in what way they would follow, if not prevented: and therefore
can in no sort say, whether we could do any thing which would be
sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let
us recollect the analogy of nature or Providence. For, though this
may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in this
matter; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion,
without any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection against a
doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider
then: people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; they bring diseases
upon themselves by excess; they incur the penalties of civil laws;
and surely civil government is natural; will sorrow for these follies
past, and behaving well for the future, alone and of itself prevent
the natural consequences of them? On the contrary, men’s natural
abilities of helping themselves are often impaired; or if not, yet they
are forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon several
accounts, and in different ways; assistance which they would have had
no occasion for, had it not been for their misconduct; but which, in
the disadvantageous condition they have reduced themselves to, is
absolutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs.
Since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of
this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the natural
government of God, which however has a great deal moral in it; why is
it not supposable that this may be our case also, in our more important
capacity, as under his perfect moral government, and having a more
general and future interest depending?[210] If we have misbehaved in
this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future
punishment, which God has annexed to vice: it is plainly credible, that
behaving well for the time to come may be--not useless, God forbid--but
wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment:
or to put us in the condition which we should have been in, had we
preserved our innocence.
Though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we reason
concerning the divine conduct: yet it may be added, that it is clearly
contrary to all our notions of government, as well as to what is,
in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose, that doing
well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial
bad consequences of having done evil, or all the punishment annexed
to disobedience. We have manifestly nothing from whence to determine,
in what degree, and in what cases, reformation would prevent this
punishment, even supposing that it would in some. And though the
efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had
rendered themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they had forfeited,
is now insisted upon, in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the
general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world,
this notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt,
appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind.[211]
Upon the whole then; had the laws, the general laws of God’s government
been permitted to operate, without any interposition in our behalf,
the future punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or have any
reason to think, must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding any
thing we could have done to prevent it.
V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you
please, revelation comes in; and confirms every doubting fear, which
could enter into the heart of man, concerning the future unprevented
consequence of wickedness. It supposes the world to be in a state
of ruin (a supposition which seems the very ground of the Christian
dispensation; and which, if not provable by reason, yet is in no
wise contrary to it;) and teaches us too, that the rules of divine
government are such, as not to admit of pardon immediately and
directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it. But teaches
at the same time, what nature might justly have hoped, that the moral
government of the universe was not so rigid, but that there was room
for an interposition, to avert the fatal consequences of vice; which
therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us,
that the unknown laws of God’s more general government, no less than
the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present,
are compassionate,[212] as well as good in the more general notion of
goodness: and that he hath mercifully provided, that there should be
an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind; whatever
that destruction unprevented would have been. _God so loved the world,
that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth_, not, to
be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, _that whosoever
believeth in him, should not perish_:[213] gave his Son in the same
way of goodness to the world, as he affords particular persons the
friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures, when, without it, their
temporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies: in the
same way of goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely
higher degree. And the Son of God _loved us, and gave himself for us_,
with a love, which he himself compares to that of human friendship:
though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of
the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in such
a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of
justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should otherwise have
been executed upon them; or in such a manner, as to prevent that
punishment from actually following, which, according to the general
laws of divine government, must have followed the sins of the world,
had it not been for such interposition.[214]
If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, inconsistent
with divine goodness; a second, I am persuaded, will entirely remove
that appearance. For were we to suppose the constitution of things to
be such, as that the whole creation must have perished, had it not
been for something, which God had appointed should be, in order to
prevent that ruin: even this supposition would not be inconsistent, in
any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. Still it may
be thought, that this whole manner of treating the subject before us
supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so
it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this state.
Whoever will consider the manifold miseries, and the extreme wickedness
of the world; that the best have great wrongnesses within themselves,
which they complain of, and endeavor to amend; but that the generality
grow more profligate and corrupt with age; that even moralists thought
the present state to be a state of punishment: and, that the earth our
habitation has the appearances of being a ruin: whoever, I say, will
consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he has
little reason to object against the Scripture account, that mankind is
in a state of degradation; against this being _the fact_: how difficult
soever he may think it to account for, or even to form a distinct
conception of the occasions and circumstances of it. But that the
crime of our first parents was the occasion of our being placed in a
more disadvantageous condition, is a thing throughout and particularly
analogous to what we see in the daily course of natural providence; as
the recovery of the world by the interposition of Christ has been shown
to be so in general.
VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the redemption
of the world, or his office as _Mediator_, in the largest sense,
_between God and man_, is thus represented to us in the Scripture.
_He is the light of the world_;[215] the revealer of the will of God
in the most eminent sense. He is a propitiatory sacrifice;[216] _the
Lamb of God_:[217] and, as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is
styled our High Priest.[218] And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is
described beforehand in the Old Testament, under the same characters
of a priest, and an expiatory victim.[219] And whereas it is objected,
that all this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of
the Mosaic law, the Apostle on the contrary affirms, that the _law
was a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the
things_:[220] and that _the priests that offer gifts according to the
law--serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was
admonished of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see,
saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern showed to
thee in the mount_;[221] _i.e._ the Levitical priesthood was a shadow
of the priesthood of Christ; in like manner as the tabernacle made by
Moses was according to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood of
Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals; of the
former of which the Levitical priesthood was a type; and of the latter
the tabernacle made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle
then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great
and final atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; and not that
this was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express and
determinate than the following passage. _It is not possible that the
blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore when he
cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering_, _i.e._ of
bulls and of goats, _thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared
me. Lo! I come to do thy will, O God. By which will we are sanctified.,
through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all._[222]
And to add one passage more of the like kind: _Christ was once offered
to bear the sins of many: and unto them that look for him shall he
appear the second time, without sin_; _i.e._ without bearing sin,
as he did at his first coming, by being an offering for it; without
having our _iniquities_ again _laid upon him_, without being any more
a sin-offering:--_unto them, that look for him shall he appear the
second time, without sin, unto salvation_.[223] Nor do the inspired
writers at all confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning
the satisfaction of Christ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and
suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, example,
and government, in great variety of expression: _That Jesus should
die for that nation_, the Jews: _and not for that nation only, but
that also_, plainly by the efficacy of his death, _he should gather
together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad_:[224]
that _he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust_:[225] that _he
gave his life, himself, a ransom_:[226] that _we are bought, bought
with a price_:[227] that _he redeemed us with his blood: redeemed us
from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us_:[228] that he
is our _advocate_, _intercessor_, and _propitiation_:[229] that _he
was made perfect_, or consummate, _through sufferings; and being_ thus
_made perfect, he became the author of salvation_:[230] that _God was
in Christ reconciling the world to himself; by the death of his Son, by
the cross; not imputing their trespasses unto them_:[231] and lastly,
that _through death he destroyed him that had the power of death_.[232]
Christ having thus _humbled himself, and become obedient to death, even
the death of the cross; God also hath highly exalted him, and given
him a name, which is above every name: hath given all things into his
hands: hath committed all judgment unto him; that all men should honor
the Son, even as they honor the Father_.[233] For, _worthy is the Lamb
that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength,
and honor, and glory, and blessing. And every creature which is in
heaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying, Blessing, and honor, and
glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto
the Lamb forever and ever._[234]
These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express the chief
parts of Christ’s office, as Mediator between God and man, so far, I
mean, as the nature of this his office is revealed; and it is usually
treated of by divines under three heads.
_First_, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: _that Prophet that
should come into the world_,[235] to declare the divine will. He
published anew the law of nature, which men had corrupted; and the very
knowledge of which, to some degree, was lost among them. He taught
mankind, taught us authoritatively, to _live soberly, righteously, and
godly in this present world_, in expectation of the future judgment
of God. He confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and
gave us additional evidence of it; the evidence of testimony.[236] He
distinctly revealed the manner, in which God would be worshipped, the
efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a future
life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other ever was. To
which is to be added, that he set us a perfect _example, that we should
follow his steps_.
_Secondly_, He has a _kingdom which is not of this world_. He founded
a Church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of religion, and
invitation to it; which he promised to be with always even to the
end. He exercises an invisible government over it, himself, and by
his Spirit: over that part of it which is militant here on earth, a
government of discipline, _for the perfecting of the saints, for the
edifying his body: till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of
the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure
of the stature of the fulness of Christ_.[237] Of this Church, all
persons scattered over the world, who live in obedience to his laws,
are members. For these he is _gone to prepare a place, and will come
again to receive them unto himself, that where he is, there they may be
also; and reign with him forever and ever_:[238] and likewise _to take
vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not his Gospel_.[239]
Against these parts of Christ’s office I find no objections, but what
are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter.
_Lastly_, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and made
atonement for the sins of the world; which is mentioned last, in regard
to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded
the Jews, and obtained among most other nations, from tradition, whose
original probably was revelation. And they were continually repeated,
both occasionally, and at the returns of stated times: and made up
great part of the external religion of mankind. _But now once in the
end of the world Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of
himself._[240] This sacrifice was, in the highest degree and with the
most extensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin,
which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to
have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree,
and with regard to some persons.[241]
How and in what particular _way_ it had this efficacy, there are not
wanting persons who have endeavored to explain: but I do not find that
the Scripture has explained it. We seem to be very much in the dark
concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be
made, _i.e._ pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture
has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ
mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it
must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any
one reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can
show his claim to it.
Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what Christ has
done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has authorized:
others, probably because they could not explain it, have been for
taking it away, and confining his office as Redeemer of the world,
to his instruction, example, and government of the church. Whereas
the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the
efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy of which it
is, by what he did and suffered for us: that he obtained for us the
benefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life: not only
that he revealed to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation,
and how they might obtain it; but moreover that he put them into this
capacity of salvation, by what he did and suffered for them; put us
into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining future
happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by
performing the conditions, upon which it is offered, on our part,
without disputing how it was procured on his. For,
VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a future state
would have followed wickedness in this: nor in what manner it would
have been inflicted, had it not been prevented; nor all the reasons
why its infliction would have been needful, nor the particular nature
of that state of happiness, which Christ is gone to prepare for his
disciples: and since we are ignorant how far any thing which we could
do, would, alone and of itself, have been effectual to prevent that
punishment to which we were obnoxious, and recover that happiness which
we had forfeited; it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently
to revelation, whether a mediator was or was not necessary, to obtain
those ends: to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to
the final happiness of their nature. For the very same reasons, upon
supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges,
antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his office, or
of the several parts of which it consists; or of what was fit and
requisite to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends of divine
Providence in the appointment. Hence it follows, that to object against
the expediency or usefulness of particular things, revealed to have
been done or suffered by him, because we do not see how they were
conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is more common
to be met with, than this absurdity. If it be acknowledged beforehand,
that we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection
can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of
Christ’s mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown
positively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be
accomplished; or that it is in itself unreasonable.
There is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, which
looks to be of this positive kind: that the doctrine of his being
appointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents God as being
indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the guilty. Now from
the foregoing observations we may see the extreme slightness of all
such objections; and (though it is most certain all who make them _do
not see_ the consequence) that they conclude altogether as much against
God’s whole original constitution of nature, and the whole daily
course of divine Providence in the government of the world, (_i.e._
against the whole scheme of Theism and the whole notion of religion,)
as against Christianity. For the world is a constitution or system,
whose parts have a mutual reference to each other: and there is a
scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of nature,
to the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various ways,
to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural providence,
it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults
of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection, as the
instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater importance of
that appointment of Christianity, which is objected against, does not
hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same
_kind_, with what the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there
were any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger, in one
respect, against natural providence, than against Christianity: because
under the former we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated
whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the
sufferings of Christ were voluntary.
The world’s being under the righteous government of God does indeed
imply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one shall receive
according to his personal deserts: and the general doctrine of the
whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine
government. But during the progress, and, for aught we know, even in
order to the completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may
be fit, and absolutely necessary. Men by their follies run themselves
into extreme distress; into difficulties which would be absolutely
fatal to them, were it not for the interposition and assistance of
others. God commands by the law of nature, that we afford them this
assistance, in many cases where we cannot do it without very great
pains, and labor, and sufferings to ourselves. We see in what variety
of ways one person’s sufferings contribute to the relief of another:
and how, or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows,
from the constitution and laws of nature, which came under our notice:
and, being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So that the
reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing kind against
the satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not consider God’s
settled and uniform appointments as his appointments at all; or else
they forget that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment
of every day’s experience. And then, from their being unacquainted
with the more general laws of nature or divine government over the
world, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute
to the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will,
they conclude his sufferings could not contribute to it any other
way. And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of this
doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of
our redemption; its tendency to vindicate the authority of God’s laws,
and deter his creatures from sin; this has never yet been answered,
and is I think plainly unanswerable: though I am far from thinking it
an account of the whole of the case. But, without taking this into
consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations above made,
that this objection is not an objection against Christianity, but
against the whole general constitution of nature. And if it were to be
considered as an objection against Christianity, or considering it as
it is, an objection against the constitution of nature; it amounts to
no more in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment cannot be
necessary or expedient, because the objector does not discern it to be
so: though he must own that the nature of the case is such, as renders
him incapable of judging, whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to
be necessary, though it were so!
It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men, to find
people arguing in this manner: objecting against the credibility of
such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they do not see
the necessity or expediency of them. For though it is highly right,
and the most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire with due
reverence into the ends and reasons of God’s dispensations: yet when
those reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such
dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption
of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly of them. And
the folly of them is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they
are, against things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural
dispensations of Providence, which are matter of experience. Let reason
be kept to: and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption
of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let
the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up. But let not such poor
creatures as we are, go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that
we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call
this reasoning; and, which still further heightens the absurdity in the
present case, parts which we are not actively concerned in. For it may
be worth mentioning,
_Lastly_, That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole
analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to have the like
information concerning the divine conduct, as concerning our own duty.
God instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, but experience
which instructs us,) what good or bad consequences will follow from
our acting in such and such manners: and by this he directs us how we
are to behave ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently instructed
for the common purposes of life: yet it is but an almost infinitely
small part of natural providence, which we are at all let into.
The case is the same with regard to revelation. The doctrine of a
mediator between God and man, against which it is objected, that the
expediency of some things in it is not understood, relates only to
what was done on God’s part in the appointment, and on the Mediator’s
in the execution of it. For what is _required of us_, in consequence
of this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none can
complain for want of information. The constitution of the world, and
God’s natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as the
Christian dispensation. Yet under the first he has given men all
things pertaining to life; and under the other all things pertaining
unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is nothing hard to be
accounted for in any of the common precepts of Christianity: though
if there were, surely a divine command is abundantly sufficient to
lay us under the strongest obligations to obedience. But the fact is,
that the reasons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive
institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate religion
among mankind. And our duty to Christ, the internal and external
worship of him; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly
arises out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and
dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand in to us.[242]