SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.
Having shown the importance of the Christian revelation, and the
obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, upon
supposition of its truth, or its credibility, the next thing in
order, is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in
general; which shall be the subject of this chapter: and the objections
against the Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of
some following ones.[159] For it seems the most natural method, to
remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we proceed to the
consideration of the positive evidence for it, and the objections
against that evidence.[160]
It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar
presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian scheme
of things, at least against miracles; so as that stronger evidence
is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than would be
sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of fact. Indeed
the consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought
very insignificant, by many persons. Yet, as it belongs to the subject
of this treatise; so it may tend to open the mind, and remove some
prejudices, however needless the consideration of it be, upon its own
account.
I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature,
against the _general scheme_ of Christianity, that God created
and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by him also
will hereafter judge it in righteousness, _i.e._ render to every
one according to his works; and that good men are under the secret
influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or are not, to
be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about words; or
however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises
any presumption against this general scheme of Christianity, it must
be, either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience; or
else, because it is unlike that course of nature, which is. But analogy
raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme, upon either of
these accounts.
_First_, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth
of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or
experience. Suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most
improved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of natural
philosophy and natural religion; such a one could not but be sensible,
that it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system
of the universe, which he was acquainted with. He could not but be
sensible, that there must be innumerable things, in the dispensations
of Providence past, in the invisible government over the world at
present carrying on, and in what is to come; of which he was wholly
ignorant,[161] and which could not be discovered without revelation.
Whether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or
not; it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And
doubtless that part of it, which is open to our view, is but as a point
in comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout
eternity past and future; in comparison of what is even now going on,
in the remote parts of the boundless universe, nay, in comparison of
the whole scheme of this world. And therefore, that things lie beyond
the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption against
the truth and reality of them; because it is certain, there are
innumerable things, in the constitution and government of the universe,
which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties.
_Secondly_, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the things
contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon
account of their being unlike the known course of nature. For there is
no presumption at all from analogy, that the _whole_ course of things,
or divine government naturally unknown to us, and _every thing_ in it,
is like to any thing in that which is known; and therefore no peculiar
presumption against any thing in the former, upon account of its being
unlike to any thing in the latter. And in the constitution and natural
government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we
see things, in a great degree, unlike one another: and therefore ought
not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible.
However, the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the
scheme of nature; as will appear in the following part of this treatise.
The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine mission,
has been stated with great exactness by divines; and is, I think,
sufficiently understood by every one. There are also invisible
miracles,[162] the Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, being
secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission; but require
themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation itself too
is miraculous; and miracles are the proof of it; and the supposed
presumption against these shall presently be considered. All which I
have been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call every
thing in the dispensations of Providence, not discoverable without
revelation, nor like the known course of things, miraculous; and
whether the general Christian dispensation now mentioned is to be
called so, or not; the foregoing observations seem certainly to show,
that there is no presumption against it from the analogy of nature.
II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some operations,
which we should now call miraculous; particularly none against a
revelation at the beginning of the world: nothing of such presumption
against it, as is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word,
_miraculous_.[163] A miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a
course of nature; and implies something different from it, considered
as being so. Now, either there was no course of nature at the time
which we are speaking of; or if there were, we are not acquainted what
the course of nature is, upon the first peopling of worlds. Therefore
the question, whether mankind had a revelation made to them at _that_
time, is to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but
as a common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more
or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this question,
and concerning common matters of fact of the same antiquity; for
instance, what part of the earth was first peopled.
Or thus: When mankind was first placed in this state, there was a power
exerted, totally different from the present course of nature. Now,
whether this power, thus wholly different from the present course of
nature, (for we cannot properly apply to it the word _miraculous_;)
whether this power _stopped_ immediately after it had made man, or
went on, and exerted itself further in giving him a revelation, is a
question of the same kind, as whether an ordinary power exerted itself
in such a particular _degree_ and manner, or not.
Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be
considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name; the
case will not be different: since it must be acknowledged, that such
a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that our Savior
spent some years in a course of working miracles:[164] there is no
more presumption, worth mentioning, against his having exerted this
miraculous power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain degree
less; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer; in this,
than in another manner.
It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, from the
analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when man was first
placed upon earth.[165]
Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in history or
tradition, that religion was first reasoned out: but the whole of
history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came into the
world by revelation. Indeed the state of religion, in the first ages of
which we have any account, seems to suppose and imply, that this was
the original of it among mankind.[166] And these reflections together,
without taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture, amount to real
and a very material degree of evidence, that there was a revelation
at the beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirmation of
natural religion, and therefore mentioned in the former part of this
treatise;[167] so likewise it has a tendency to remove any prejudices
against a subsequent revelation.
III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar
presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against
revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a course
of nature.
Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed in
general, that before we can have ground for raising what can, with
any propriety, be called an _argument_ from analogy, for or against
revelation considered as something miraculous, we must be acquainted
with a similar or parallel case. But the history of some other world,
seemingly in like circumstances with our own, is no more than a
parallel case: and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet,
could we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, from
being informed, whether such world had one, or not; such a proof, being
drawn from one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious.
More particularly:
_First_, There is a very strong presumption against common speculative
truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the proof[168]
of them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof. There is a
presumption of millions to one, against the story of Cæsar, or
of any other man. For suppose a number of common facts so and so
circumstanced, of which we had no kind of proof, should happen to come
into one’s thoughts; every one would, without any possible doubt,
conclude them to be false. And the like may be said of a single
common fact. Hence it appears, that the question of importance, as
to the matter before us, is, concerning the _degree_ of the peculiar
presumption supposed against miracles; not whether there be any
peculiar presumption at all against them. For, if there be the
presumption of millions to one, against the most common facts; what
can a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be
peculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material
question is, whether there be any such presumptions against miracles,
as to render them in any sort incredible.
_Secondly_, If we leave out the consideration of religion, we are
in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or
circumstances, the present course of nature depends; that there does
not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that five or
six thousand years may have given scope[169] for causes, occasions,
reasons, or circumstances, from whence miraculous interpositions may
have arisen. And from this, joined with the foregoing observation, it
will follow, that there must be a presumption, beyond all comparison
greater, against the _particular_ common facts just now instanced in,
than against miracles _in general_; before any evidence of either.
_Thirdly_, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral
system of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons for
miracles: to afford mankind instruction additional to that of nature,
and to attest the truth of it. This gives a real credibility to the
supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of things, that
there should be miraculous interpositions.
_Lastly_, Miracles must not be compared to common natural events, or to
events which, though uncommon, are similar to what we daily experience:
but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. And then the comparison
will be between the presumption against miracles, and the presumption
against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against
there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity,
so contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these
powers. And before any one can determine, whether there be any peculiar
presumption against miracles, more than against other extraordinary
things; he must consider, what, upon first hearing, would be the
presumption against the last mentioned appearances and powers, to a
person acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and annual course of
nature respecting this earth, and with those common powers of matter
which we every day see.
Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such presumption
against miracles, as to render them in any wise incredible: that,
on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons for them, gives
a positive credibility to the history of them, in cases where those
reasons hold: and that it is by no means certain, that there is any
_peculiar_ presumption at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree,
against miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena:
though it is not worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries into
the abstract nature of evidence, in order to determine a question,
which, without such inquiries, we see[170] is of no importance.