OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION;
AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS LIABLE
TO OBJECTIONS.
Besides the objections against the _evidence_ for Christianity, many
are alleged against the _scheme_ of it; against the whole manner
in which it is put and left with the world; as well as against
several particular relations in Scripture: objections drawn from
the deficiencies of revelation: from things in it appearing to men
_foolishness_;[171] from its containing matters of offence, which have
led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into strange enthusiasm
and superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny and
wickedness; from its not being universal; and, which is a thing of the
same kind, from its evidence not being so convincing and satisfactory
as it might have been: for this last is sometimes turned into a
positive argument against its truth.[172]
It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the several
particulars comprehended under the objections here referred to; they
being so various, according to the different fancies of men. There
are persons who think it a strong objection against the authority
of Scripture, that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed
upon by critics, for polite and correct writing. And the scorn is
inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic parts of Scripture are
treated: partly through the rashness of interpreters; but very much
also, on account of the hieroglyphical and figurative language, in
which they are left us.
Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly
considered in the following chapters. But my design at present is to
observe in general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, that,
upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand,
that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree: and
that it would contain many things appearing to us liable to great
objections; in case we judge of it otherwise, than by the analogy
of nature. Therefore, though objections against the _evidence_ of
Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet objections
against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous: almost
all objections against it, excepting those which are alleged against
the particular proofs of its coming from God. I express myself with
caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason; which is indeed
the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even
revelation itself: or be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed
revelation cannot be proved false, from internal characters. For, it
may contain clear immoralities or contradictions; and either of these
would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing
else can possibly render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still
the observation above, is, I think, true beyond doubt; that objections
against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its
evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is the general design of the
present chapter.
With regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, that
the _proofs_ might be attended to; rather than the assertions cavilled
at, upon account of any unacceptable _consequences_, real or supposed,
which may be drawn from them. For, after all, that which is true, must
be admitted, though it should show us the shortness of our faculties:
and that we are in no wise judges of many things, of which we are apt
to think ourselves very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection
with reasonable men; at least upon second thought it will not be any
objection with such, against the justness of the following observations.
As God governs the world and instructs his creatures, according to
certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature; known by reason
together with experience: so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of
divine Providence, additional to this. It relates, that God has, by
revelation, instructed men in things concerning his government, which
they could not otherwise have known; and reminded them of things, which
they might otherwise know; and attested the truth of the whole by
miracles. Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things
are both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together
make up one scheme of Providence; our being incompetent judges of
one, must render it credible, that we may be incompetent judges also
of the other. Upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and
course of nature is found to be greatly different from what, before
experience, would have been expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie
great objections against. This renders it beforehand highly credible,
that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge
of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from
expectations formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to great
objections: objections against the scheme itself, and against the
degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was
attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern his dominions
in the wisest manner possible, by common known laws; and that upon
some exigencies he should suspend these laws; and govern, in several
instances, in a different manner. If one of his subjects were not a
competent judge beforehand, by what common rules the government should
or would be carried on; it could not be expected, that the same person
would be a competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or
to what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended or
deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary
administration, there is no reason to think he would be a judge of the
wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had objections against
the former; doubtless, it is highly supposable, he might think also,
that he had objections against the latter. And thus, as we fall into
infinite follies and mistakes, whenever we pretend, otherwise than from
experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of
nature; it is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into
as great, in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revelation.
Nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should appear
to us clear of objections, than that the former should.
These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are
applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort judges
beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means,
it were to have been expected, that God would naturally instruct
us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction
by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason and
experience, we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what
proportion, it were to be expected that this supernatural light and
instruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand, what degree
or kind of natural information it were to be expected God would afford
men, each by his own reason and experience: nor how far he would enable
and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should
be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain,
highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with equal
clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any good
ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself,
by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at
once, or gradually.
In like manner, we are wholly ignorant, what degree of new knowledge,
it were to be expected, God would give mankind by revelation, upon
supposition of his affording one: or how far, or in what way, he would
interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to whom he should originally
make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and
to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live; and to
secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant,
whether the evidence of it would be certain or highly probable, or
doubtful:[173] or whether all who should have any degree of instruction
from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the
same: or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded
gradually.[174] Nay we are not in any sort able to judge, whether
it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have been
committed to writing; or left to be handed down, and consequently
corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind
so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, in the degree
they evidently are, to act as they will.
But it may be said, “that a revelation in some of the above-mentioned
circumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed to writing,
and thus secured against danger of corruption, would not have answered
its purpose.” I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered all the
purposes, which it has now answered, and in the same degree: but it
would have answered others, or the same in different degrees. And which
of these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general
government, we could not at all have determined beforehand.
Now since we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge
beforehand, how it were to be expected that revelation should have been
left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government, in
any of the forementioned respects; it must be quite frivolous to object
afterwards as to any of them, against its being left in one way, rather
than another: for this would be to object against things, upon account
of their being different from expectations, which has been shown to be
without reason.
Thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of
Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation; not whether it be
attended with every circumstance which we should have looked for: and
concerning the authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to
be; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak
men are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should be.
Therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor
various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular
parts, nor any other things of the like kind, though they had been
much more considerable in degree than they are, could overthrow the
authority of the Scripture: unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord,
had promised, that the book containing the divine revelation should be
exempt from those things. Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such
a kind of revelation as the Christian claims to be, (since there are
no objections against the morality of it,[175]) but such as can show,
that there is no proof of miracles wrought originally in attestation
of it; no appearance of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the
world; nor any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human
sagacity could not foresee. If it can be shown, that the proof alleged
for all these is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned.
But were it allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them is lower
than is allowed; yet, whilst _any_ proof of them remains, revelation
will stand upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the
purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence
upon our behavior.
From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those who
will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth remarking,
that there are several ways of arguing, which though just with regard
to other writings, are not applicable to Scripture: at least not to
its prophetic parts. We cannot argue, for instance, that such and such
cannot be the sense or intent of a passage of Scripture, for, if it
had, it would have been expressed more plainly, or represented under
a more apt figure or hieroglyphic. Yet we may justly argue thus, with
respect to common books. And the reason of this difference is very
evident. In Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in common
books, how plainly it were to have been expected, that the sense should
have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The only
question is, what appearance there is, that this _is_ the sense; and
scarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately it might have
been expressed or figured.[176]
“But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of all kinds
weaken external probable proof?” Doubtless. But to what practical
purpose can this be alleged here, when it has been proved before,[177]
that real internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty,
are overcome by the most ordinary testimony; and when it now has been
made to appear, that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to the
matter we are here considering: as it will further appear from what
follows.
From the observations made above it is manifest, that we are not in any
sort competent judges, what supernatural instruction were to have been
expected; and it is self-evident, that the objections of an incompetent
judgment must be frivolous. Yet it may be proper to go one step
further, and observe, that if men will be regardless of these things,
and pretend to judge of the Scripture by preconceived expectations; the
analogy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible
they may, but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong
objections against it, however really unexceptionable. For so, prior
to experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances,
and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which is
afforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction which
God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and
to mankind by these together with reason, matter of probable proof,
and not of certain observation: it would be rejected as incredible,
in many instances of it, only upon account of the means by which this
instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, the limitations,
necessary conditions, and circumstances of it. For instance: would it
not have been thought highly improbable, that men should have been so
much more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws
of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions, of heavenly
bodies; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many other
things in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in
astronomy? How capricious and irregular a way of information would it
be said; is that of _invention_, by means of which nature instructs us
in matters of science, and in many things, upon which the affairs of
the world greatly depend: that a man should, by this faculty, be made
acquainted with a thing in an instant, (when perhaps he is thinking of
something else,) which he has in vain been searching after, it may be,
for years.
So likewise the imperfections attending the only method, by which
nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to each
other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, inadequate,
ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence; and so
liable to it from design, that every man can deceive and betray by
it. And, to mention but one instance more; that brutes, without
reason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight
vastly greater than what men have in those respects, would be thought
impossible. Yet it is certain they do act with such superior foresight:
whether it be their own, indeed, is another question. From these
things, it is highly credible beforehand, that upon supposition that
God should afford men some additional instruction by revelation,
it would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects,
against the credibility of which we should be apt to fancy we had great
objections. Nor are the objections against the Scripture, nor against
Christianity in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of
nature would beforehand--not perhaps give ground to _expect_; (for the
analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation
upon;) but no more nor greater, than analogy would show it, beforehand,
to be supposable and _credible_, that there might seem to lie against
revelation.
By applying these general observations to a particular objection, it
will be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to others of the
like kind; and indeed to almost all objections against Christianity,
as distinguished from objections against its evidence. It appears
from Scripture, that, as it was not unusual in the apostolic age, for
persons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to be endued with
miraculous gifts; so, some of those persons exercised these gifts in
a strangely irregular and disorderly manner;[178] and this is made an
objection against their being really miraculous. Now the foregoing
observations quite remove this objection, how considerable soever it
may appear at first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of
these gifts, for instance that of tongues: it is to be supposed, that
he had the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have had
over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it
ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he had over any other
natural endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same manner as
he did any other; either regularly, and upon proper occasions only, or
irregularly, and upon improper ones: according to his sense of decency,
and his character of prudence.[179] Where then is the objection? Why,
if this miraculous power was indeed given to the world to propagate
Christianity, and attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have
expected, that other sort of persons should have been chosen to be
invested with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been
endued with prudence; or that they should have been continually
restrained and directed in the exercise of it: _i.e._ that God should
have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner, or
higher degree. But, from the observations made above, it is undeniably
evident, that we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were to
have been expected he should miraculously interpose; upon supposition
of his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course
of Providence, are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and
other talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence
and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use of
them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for
the conduct of life, particularly in our education, commonly given in
a manner the most suited to recommend it; but often with circumstances
apt to prejudice us against such instruction.
One might go on to add, there is a great resemblance between the light
of nature and of revelation, in several other respects. Practical
Christianity, or that faith and behavior which renders a man a
Christian, is a plain and obvious thing: like the common rules of
conduct, with respect to ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct
and particular knowledge of those things, the study of which the
apostle calls _going on unto perfection_,[180] and of the prophetic
parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even civil
knowledge, may require very exact thought, and careful consideration.
The hinderances too, of natural, and of supernatural light and
knowledge, have been of the same kind. And as it is owned the whole
scheme of Scripture is not yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be
understood, before the _restitution of all things_,[181] and without
miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural
knowledge is come at: by the continuance and progress of learning and
of liberty;[182] and by particular persons attending to, comparing, and
pursuing, intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked
and disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in
which all improvements are made; by thoughtful men’s tracing on obscure
hints, dropped us by nature as it were, accidentally, or which seem to
come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book
which has been so long in the possession of mankind, should contain
many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all the same phenomena, and the
same faculties of investigation, from which such great discoveries
in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age, were
equally in the possession of mankind, several thousand years before.
And possibly it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass,
should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture.
It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material respect:
for that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence. But I have
been speaking of the general instruction which nature does or does not
afford us. And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the more
common restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest consequence
to the ease and convenience of life. But suppose the analogy did, as it
does not, fail in this respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied,
from the whole constitution and course of nature: which shows, that God
does not dispense his gifts according to _our_ notions of the advantage
and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, with his
method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together make out
an analogy full to the point before us.
But it may be objected still further and more generally; “The Scripture
represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity as an
expedient to recover it, to help in these respects where nature fails:
in particular, to supply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it
credible then, that so many ages should have been let pass, before a
matter of such a sort, of so great and so general importance, was made
known to mankind; and then that it should be made known to so small a
part of them? Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so very
deficient, should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable
to the like perversions, in short, lie open to all the like objections,
as the light of nature itself?”[183]
Without determining how far this, in fact, is so, I answer; it is
by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light of nature
and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to
diseases: for which God, in his good providence, has provided natural
remedies.[184] But remedies existing in nature have been unknown
to mankind for many ages; are known but to few now; probably many
valuable ones are not known yet. Great has been and is the obscurity
and difficulty, in the nature and application of them. Circumstances
_seem_ often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely
necessary. It is after long labor and study, and many unsuccessful
endeavors, that they are brought to be as useful as they are; after
high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we have; and
after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be endless. The best
remedies too, when unskilfully, much more when dishonestly applied, may
produce new diseases; and with the rightest application the success of
them is often doubtful. In many cases they are not effectual: where
they are, it is often very slowly: and the application of them, and the
necessary regimen accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable,
that some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with the
excuse, that if they would, it is not certain whether it would be
successful. And many persons, who labor under diseases, for which there
are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always, if ever,
in the way of them. In a word, the remedies which nature has provided
for diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. And indeed
the same principles of arguing, which would lead us to conclude, that
they must be so, would lead us likewise to conclude, that there could
be no occasion for them; _i.e._ that there could be no diseases at all.
And therefore our experience that there are diseases, shows that it is
credible beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for
them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they are,
neither certain, nor perfect, nor universal; because it shows, that the
principles upon which we should expect the contrary are fallacious.
And now, what is the just consequence from all these things? Not
that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of divine
revelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable to judge
of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason
can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the
morality and the evidence of revelation.
_First_, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of
the Scripture; _i.e._ not whether it contains things different from
what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; (for
objections from hence have been now obviated:) but whether it contains
things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; to what
the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort
objected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed
upon suppositions, which would equally conclude, that the constitution
of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which
most certainly it is not. There are, indeed, some particular precepts
in Scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions, which
would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is
easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept
changes the whole nature of the case and of the action; and both
constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior
to the precept, must have appeared and really been so: which may well
be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality.
If it were commanded, to cultivate the _principles_, and act from the
spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter
the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances.
But it is quite otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an
_external action_: for instance, taking away the property, or life of
any. For men have no right, either to life or property, but what arises
solely from the grant of God. When this grant is revoked, they cease
to have any right at all in either: and when this revocation is made
known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust
to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which
without command would be immoral, must make an immoral habit; yet a few
detached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to
say thus much of the few Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious
actions, but actions which would have been vicious, but for such
precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great
weight is laid upon objections drawn from them.
To me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what
arises from their being offences: _i.e._ from their being liable to be
perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the
most horrid purposes; and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic.
And objections from this head are not objections against revelation;
but against the whole notion of religion, as a trial: and against the
general constitution of nature.
_Secondly_, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of
revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence: which
shall be the subject of a following chapter.[185]
The consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the question
upon which the truth of Christianity depends, is scarcely at all
what objections there are against its scheme, since there are none
against the morality of it, but _what objections there are against its
evidence_; or, _what proof there remains of it, after due allowances
are made for the objections against that proof_: because it has been
shown, that the _objections against Christianity, as distinguished
from objections against its evidence, are frivolous_. For surely very
little weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and
objecting, which, when applied to the general constitution of nature,
experience shows not to be conclusive: and such, I think, is the whole
way of objecting treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable
into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think,
that the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he does; or
would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does not in like
cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear
yet more evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected
against are justified, as shall be further shown,[186] by distinct,
particular, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of
nature.
It is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections of the
foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed revelation
is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and uniform
tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could
have been expected from enthusiasm and political views, this is a
presumptive proof of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth:
because we are competent judges, what might have been expected from
enthusiasm and political views.[187]