CHAPTER I.

THE

ANALOGY OF RELIGION,

TO THE

Constitution and Course of Nature.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS:

I. ON PERSONAL IDENTITY.--II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

BY

JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L.

Ejus [Analogiæ] hæc vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad

aliquid simile, de quo non quæritur referat ut incerta

certis probet.--QUINTIL. l. i. c. 6.

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, CONSPECTUS, AND AMPLE INDEX,

BY

HOWARD MALCOM, D.D.

PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, LEWISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA.

SEVENTEENTH EDITION.

PHILADELPHIA:

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.

1873.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.

in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United

States in and for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION 5

” PREFACE 19

” CONSPECTUS 21

AUTHOR’S ADVERTISEMENT 66

” INTRODUCTION 67

PART I.

OF NATURAL RELIGION.

CHAP. I.--A Future Life 77

CHAP. II.--The Government of God by Rewards and Punishments 95

CHAP. III.--The Moral Government of God 105

CHAP. IV.--Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and

Danger 128

CHAP. V.--Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and

Improvement 136

CHAP. VI.--The Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing

Practice 157

CHAP. VII.--The Government of God, considered as a Scheme or

Constitution, imperfectly comprehended 171

CONCLUSION 180

PART II.

OF REVEALED RELIGION.

CHAP. I.--The Importance of Christianity 186

CHAP. II.--The supposed Presumption against a Revelation,

considered as miraculous 202

CHAP. III.--Our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected

in a Revelation; and the Credibility, from Analogy,

that it must contain things appearing liable to

Objections 209

CHAP. IV.--Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution,

imperfectly comprehended 223

CHAP. V.--The Particular System of Christianity; the

Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of

the World by him 230

CHAP. VI.--Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the

supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it 247

CHAP. VII.--The Particular Evidence for Christianity 263

CHAP. VIII.--Objections against arguing from the Analogy of

Nature to Religion 296

CONCLUSION 306

DISSERTATIONS.

DISSERTATION I.--Personal Identity 317

DISSERTATION II.--The Nature of Virtue 324

INDEX TO PART I 333

INDEX TO PART II 343

Editor’s Introduction

JOSEPH BUTLER was born at Wantage, England, May 18th, 1692, the

youngest of eight children. The biographies of that day were few

and meagre; and in few cases is this so much to be regretted as in

Butler’s. It would have been both interesting and profitable to trace

the development and occupations of one of the mightiest of human minds.

But no cotemporary gathered up the incidents of his life, and now all

efforts to elicit them have been without success.

His father was a prosperous dry-goods merchant, who, at the time of his

son’s birth, had retired from business with a competency, and resided

in a suburban mansion called “The Priory,” still in existence.

Being a non-conformist, he educated Joseph at a “dissenting” academy

at Gloucester, under SAMUEL JONES, a gentleman of great ability, and

a skilful instructor, who raised up some of the greatest men of their

day.[1]

It was while a member of this academy, and about the age of twenty-one,

that Butler disclosed to the world his wonderful power of abstract

reasoning, in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke, in relation

to that eminent author’s “_Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of

God_.” This correspondence is now generally inserted at the end of that

work.

Mr. Butler having deliberately adopted Episcopal views, and resolved

to unite himself with the Established Church, his father, with

praiseworthy liberality, sent him to Oxford, where he entered Oriel

College, March, 1714. Of his college life there is no account; nor of

the time and place of his ordination. He removed to London in 1718,

on receiving the appointment of “Preacher at the Rolls.” His famous

Fifteen Sermons were preached in that chapel, and published before

resigning the place, with a dedication to Sir Joseph Jekyl, “as a

parting mark of gratitude for the favors received during his connection

with that learned society.”

One of Butler’s warmest college friends was Edward Talbot second son

of a clergyman who afterwards became Bishop of Durham. This admirable

young man died of smallpox; in his last hours recommending Butler to

his father’s patronage; and scarcely had that gentleman attained the

see of Durham, before he gave Mr. B. the living of Haughton, from

whence he transferred him, in 1725, to the richer benefice of Stanhope.

On receiving this honorable and lucrative appointment, he resigned

the Lectureship at the Rolls, and in the autumn of 1726 retired to

his beautiful residence at Stanhope. Here, without a family to occupy

his time, he devoted himself to his great work, the Analogy: using

horseback exercise, seeing little company, living abstemiously and

caring for his flock.

Seven years thus rolled away; when to draw him from what seemed to his

friends too great retirement and application, Lord-Chancellor Talbot

made him his chaplain, and afterwards, in 1736, gave him a prebend’s

stall in Rochester. In 1736, Butler being now forty-four, Caroline,

consort of George II., appointed him “Clerk of the Closet,” an office

which merely required his attendance at the Queen’s apartments every

evening, from seven to nine.

Being now in London, convenient to the press, and enjoying both leisure

and competency, he published his immortal ANALOGY--the cherished work

of his life. The Queen was delighted with the book, and made herself

master of its glorious array of reasoning. But she died the same year,

and he lost not only a patroness, but a friend. He returned to his

benefice at Stanhope, the income of which had been held during his

residence in London.

On her death-bed, the Queen had urged her husband to promote her

honored chaplain to a bishopric; and next year, the see of Norwich

becoming vacant, the Bishop of Bristol was translated to it, and the

see of Bristol given to Butler. Bristol was the poorest bishopric

in England, its emoluments being but $2,000 per annum; less than

those of the rectorship of Stanhope. Butler distinctly disclosed his

disappointment in his letter to the minister Walpole, accepting the

position; and declared that he did not think it “very suitable to the

condition of his fortune, nor answerable to the recommendation with

which he was honored.” The king was not displeased at this candor,

and in 1740 improved his income by giving him, in addition to his

bishopric, the profitable and influential office of Dean of St.

Paul’s. Butler, who had retained the living of Stanhope along with

his bishopric, now resigned that rectorship. “The rich revenues,” says

Professor Fitzgerald, “of the Deanery of St. Paul, enabled him to

gratify his taste at Bristol.” He expended about $25,000 in improving

and beautifying the episcopal residence and gardens. He fostered useful

charities, and employed his wealth for others rather than for himself.

In 1750, upon the death of Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of Durham,

Butler was promoted to that see, the most honorable and lucrative

in England. He had before been offered the Primacy, on the death of

Archbishop Potter, but declined it, with the remark that “it was too

late for him to try to support a falling church.” On assuming his

diocese at Durham, Butler delivered and published his famous Charge

to the Clergy, upon “The Use and Importance of External Religion.”

He was at once assailed vigorously, in pamphlets and papers, by

Archdeacon Blackburn, the Rev. T. Lindsay, and others, on the charge

of Popery; an imputation which is still sometimes cast upon him, and

which finds some slender support in his setting up a marble cross over

the communion-table at Bristol. That he never was a Papist, is now so

evident, that we can account for the imputation only by the strong

jealousy of the Romish Church then prevalent.

Butler now became still more munificent. His private charities were

exceedingly generous, and his public ones seemed sometimes to border on

extravagance. He gave $2,000 a year to the county hospital, and often

gave away thousands of dollars at a time. But though quite lavish in

buildings and ornaments, as well as in benevolence, he was remarkably

frugal in his personal expenses. It is said of him, by Rev. John

Newton, that on one occasion, when a distinguished visitor dined with

him by appointment, the provision consisted of a single joint of meat,

and a pudding. The bishop remarked to his guest on that occasion, that

he “had long been disgusted with the fashionable expense of time and

money in entertainments, and was determined that it should receive no

countenance from his example.”

Of his amusements we know little except that he took much horseback

exercise, and often employed his secretary, Mr. Emms, to play for him

on the organ.

Butler held the see of Durham less than two years. Symptoms of general

physical decay betrayed themselves about the time of his promotion, and

in spite of all that skill and affection could prompt, he sunk to rest

June 16th, 1752, aged sixty. He was never married.

A considerable number of his sermons and charges have been printed,

but are too philosophical to be generally read. His great work is the

Analogy, published in 1736, and from that day read and admired by every

highly-cultivated mind. He was induced to write by a state of things

very remarkable in the history of religion. Debauchery and infidelity

were almost universal, not in any one class of society but in all.

England had reached the culminating point of irreligion, and the firm

re-establishment of Episcopacy had as yet done nothing to mend the

nation’s morals. Piety was deemed a mark of ignorance and vulgarity,

and multitudes of those who professed it were persecuted to dungeons

and death.

Infidel writers, warmed into life by court corruption, became more

numerous and audacious than ever before. Their methods of attacking

Christianity were various; but the most successful then, as always, was

to impugn certain doctrines and declarations of the Sacred Scriptures,

as irrational, and hence reject the whole. They generally admitted the

Being and perfection of God, and extolled the sufficiency of natural

religion; but denied any revelation, or any necessity for one. The

verdict of the world was that the Bible is not authentic, that man is

not accountable, nor even probably immortal, that God neither rewards

nor punishes, and that present indulgence, as far as our nature admits,

is both wise and safe.

Bishop Downam,[2] one of the most learned of the clergy, in the early

part of the seventeenth century writes thus: “In these times, if a

man do but labor to keep a good conscience, though he meddle not with

matters of state, if he make conscience of swearing, sanctify the

Sabbath, frequent sermons, or abstain from the common corruptions of

the times, he shall straightway be condemned for a puritan, and be less

favored than either a carnal gospeller, or a close Papist.”

It was considered settled, especially in polite circles, that

Christianity, after so long a prevalence, had been found out to be an

imposture. The clergy, as a body, did nothing to dispel this moral

gloom, but rather increased it by their violent and scandalous conduct.

In the sad language of Bishop Warburton, “Religion had lost its hold on

the minds of the people.” He adds with great point, “Though a _rule of

right_ may direct the philosopher to a principle of action; and the

_point of honor_ may keep up the thing called manners, among gentlemen:

yet nothing but _religion_ can ever fix a sober standard of behavior

among the common people.” Even the universities were on the side of

irreligion; for professorships, as well as pulpits, were given to men,

not for positive worth and fitness, but for possessing qualities then

most in vogue with those who held the appointing power. Such were the

trying times which had driven our pilgrim fathers to seek a home amid

the wilds of an unexplored continent, and to face the dangers of sea

and savage.

It must ever be regarded as among the highest instances of God’s

bringing good out of evil, that this outrageous rampancy of infidelity

brought out a host of champions for the truth of His word; who boldly

met the odium of discipleship, and waged battle in such style that the

Deistical controversy was settled forever. Never was a dispute more

determined on both sides, and never was victory more complete. Literary

infidelity not only recoiled, but was routed; and can never again

prevail. Henceforth, no _scholar_ will ever treat the evidences of

Christianity as a subject of ridicule or contempt.

When we contrast the stupendous learning, and powerful logic, of the

Christian writers of that century, with the superficial and almost

contemptible productions of the writers against whom they contended, we

are tempted to wonder why such power should be requisite to overthrow

such weakness. But we must remember, that frail logic and shallow

considerations, will persuade men to indulge their vices; while

the soundest reasonings and the most impressive inducements, with

difficulty lead them to self-restraint and true holiness.

The infidel writers of that day have sunk into such oblivion that

their works are now seldom found but in great libraries; and even

well-educated persons scarcely know more of them than their names. Yet

so perfectly did their principles accord with the temper of the times

and the universal depravity of the carnal heart, that they enjoyed the

highest popularity with all classes. Forever honored be the names of

that noble band, who, in face of such odds, established the authority

of the Bible, and left the advocates of atheism and immorality without

a lurking-place.[3] In this noble cohort Butler stands conspicuous:

and to him, I think, more than to all the others, is to be attributed

the sudden and total overthrow of infidelity, when it was in its glory.

As a metaphysician, few have equalled him. What he added to the

science, has ever since remained a part of it, which can be said

of scarcely another. He advanced more that was new, fortified old

positions more ably, and applied speculation to religion more usefully

than any before him. Our language furnishes no profounder thinking.

Merely to understand him is an honorable distinction, and requires no

small previous training of the power of attention. As a polemic, he is

keen, sagacious, candid, patient, persevering, calm, inventive, and

profound: every page indicates that repose of mind, which belongs only

to true greatness, combined with a full knowledge of the subject. So

far as I am able to judge, he never presses a consideration beyond its

just limits, and seldom introduces an illustration which has not the

force of an argument. Fallacies he seems to abolish at a touch.

The Analogy employed much of his life. It was begun in his twentieth

year, but was not published till he was forty-five. Such a mode of

writing never makes large books, for the matter, constantly revised,

becomes constantly condensed. The Analogy is so condensed, as that to

make a satisfactory synopsis is scarcely practicable. Hence, though my

Conspectus and notes have aided my pupils to understand and remember

the argument, they do not in any measure obviate the necessity of

studying the book itself. If they do not increase the number of those

who shall studiously peruse the book itself, my aim and expectations

will be disappointed.

To this work no reply has ever been attempted! Extensive as is its

diffusion, and great as is its acknowledged influence, infidelity

has had the highest inducements to attempt to set it aside. Written

for a present purpose, and most signally accomplishing it, it is yet

so written as to endure, in full value, through all coming time.

It is undoubtedly “the most original and the most profound work

extant, in any language, on the philosophy of religion,”[4] “the most

argumentative and philosophical defence of Christianity ever submitted

to the world.”[5]

Writers in defence of Christianity had, before Butler, amply discussed

the several departments of evidences; but still there remained

objections. The structure of the globe, the course of nature, the

organization of animals, &c. were affirmed to contradict revelation.

Its doctrines and duties, moreover, were pronounced inconsistent

with sound reason. Butler repeats none of the old arguments, but

confines himself to the showing that the declarations of revelation

are in perfect harmony with facts seen daily in the world, and which

all admit. That the world might not have been ordered and governed

otherwise, he does not choose to dispute. Taking things as they are,

and closely studying the connection between one thing and another,

we ought to inquire what course of action on our part, will conform

to the needs of such a nature and such circumstances. Our bodies are

constructed of parts, all adapted to each other, and also to one

general end. So too, our souls. And the two together have relations

and adaptations, which may, to some extent at least, indicate what is

designed to be the _general_ end of our existence. If Christianity

befits these several parts of our mixed nature and their obvious uses,

then there is nothing incongruous between the two; and no objections

against Christianity can be drawn from the course of nature. On the

contrary, all seems to be governed as the gospel declares it is, and

shows that the Author of man and the Author of the Bible is the same.

This is still more impressive when we consider that we have a _moral

faculty_; for it is the very object and business of this faculty to

deal with right and wrong, good and evil; the facts and magnitudes of

which are obvious in the course of nature. If Christianity does, in an

especial manner, _befit_ this faculty, if it is adapted to promote our

general rectitude and happiness, and if it contains no principle which

is not discernible in the government of the visible world, then there

is no discrepancy between Christianity and Providence.

This is Butler’s position. He confines himself to proving such

an analogy between revelation and the daily course of things, as

that nothing known in the universe can be offered in disproof of

Christianity. The mode of warfare was new. Without professing to prove

Christianity to be true, he demonstrates that it cannot be proved to be

false; and that if it be even probable, the rejection of it is a gross

folly and a tremendous hazard. Every objection against it he proves to

be equally forcible against facts which constantly occur, and which all

admit, though none profess to understand. Thus leaving the ramparts of

the church to be guarded by the mighty men who had valiantly maintained

its defence, he quietly walked out into the camp of the enemy, and

spiked every gun!

It has been said that the whole argument of the “Analogy” seems to be

built on Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24: “All things are double, one against

the other, and God hath made nothing imperfect.” If it be so, it

involves no disparagement to have received thus the seminal idea of

this immortal work. Who else has so gloriously discerned and expanded

the profound philosophy of the son of Sirac? Others have uttered

sentiments which seem to involve the whole exposition of Butler. Origen

affirms that “he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him

who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of

difficulties in it, as are found in nature.” Shall we assign to Origen

the whole credit of the “Analogy”? As well might we bestow all our

admiration for the delightful papers of Addison, in the Spectator, to

the classical authors from whom he selected appropriate mottoes! By

such a rule, the entire merit of this most Christian work of Butler

should be attributed to the pagan Quintilian, from whom he derives the

motto which so appropriately graces his title-page.

A rapid sketch of the outline of the argument will aid the student

at his outset. He begins by taking for granted the existence of an

intelligent Author and Governor of the universe. Then, from the

conditions and changes observed in the visible world, he argues the

folly of objecting to revelation on account of doctrines which do but

declare the same general laws and the same principles of government.

That there is this harmony, he proves; and hence the probability that

the same sort of government will prevail hereafter, which prevails now.

He demonstrates that man is under exactly such a probation in this

world, and as to this world, as revelation affirms him to be under,

as to the next; and that embarrassments produced by the doctrine of

necessity, involve nature no less than religion. He then evinces the

need that man should be placed in a state of training and trial, if he

is ever to be qualified for better conditions; and that this world,

as now governed, is exactly adapted to give that training, and to

produce such a character as will insure happiness under any possible

contingencies. This is the argument of Part I.

Proceeding to examine Christianity, he discusses its importance, its

proofs, the unavoidableness of its containing strange things, the

absurdity of expecting fully to comprehend its statements, and the

abundance of its evidence for candid minds, though they are not, and

ought not to be, irresistible. He answers not only the objections to

Christianity, but the objections against its proofs; which he shows

are very different things. Though he keeps rigidly to the refutation

of objections, and nowhere meddles with the direct evidence of

Christianity, yet, by removing every objection, he does in fact confirm

its claims. This clearing away of objections, _after_ the usual proofs

are presented, crowns and completes the evidence. Thus the ultimate

result of a study of his book is not only negative but positive; and

such has been its effect on every candid and competent student.

We should remember that we have no right to require the removal of

objections, and that therefore the whole of Butler’s work is in fact

supererogatory; a concession and kindness to such as have doubts,

either honest or captious. Our only rightful demand of Christianity is

for _credentials_. It presents these in its nature, its miracles, its

prophecies, its propagation, its influence, and its success. If these

are competent, we should bow to its teachings. To suppose that we are

capable of judging of the _propriety_ of all God’s law, or even to

understand his reasons for it, if they were disclosed, is absurd.

It is true we naturally presume that a revelation in words, and a

revelation by natural objects and the visible order of things, would

coincide; but to find out the fact or the extent of such coincidence,

is not our first business. We are to weigh the _testimony_ in favor of

religion, embrace it, if sufficient, and attribute the obscurity of any

part, to our present want of capacity. The solution of difficulties

serves to _confirm_ our faith in Christianity, but has no place in our

_ground of reception_: and we have no right to wait for such solution,

however painful and embarrassing may be the difficulties.

Another, and perhaps even more important, use of the “Analogy,” is to

dissipate the prejudices and objections to Christianity which prevent

a candid study of its evidences. These prepossess and poison the mind,

and obstruct or abate the force of the best arguments. Few, if any,

after a careful examination of the positive evidences of Christianity,

conclude them to be inadequate. But many are they, who having heard

objections which their scanty learning does not enable them to answer,

and their no less scanty interest in the subject does not induce them

to examine, or which their inclinations lead them to cherish, cast

it all aside. In this way they relieve themselves from the labor of

investigation, as well as their compunctions of conscience; while they

indulge both their love of sin and pride of singularity.

An instance of the use of this book to such a mind, we have in the

case of Chalmers. He had read, when a young man, several infidel

productions. Their semblance of logic and learning, and supercilious

confidence of style, disposed him to regard all religion as mere

superstition. His mind was poisoned. Accustomed as he had been to

the positive and precise reasonings of mathematics, he could not

find similar proofs for Christianity. But he was induced, by some

friends, to study Butler’s Analogy. This, as he expresses it, took

Christianity “out of the class of unlikelihoods.” It brought him to

the investigation, as if the evidence was neither plus nor minus. He

examined the evidences as he would have done a declaration that Cicero

weighed just one hundred and fifty pounds; open to the smallest proof

or presumption on the positive side of the question. Delivered from

prejudice, not only against Christianity but against its proofs, he

soon saw the madness of deism, and immovably accepted the word of God,

though he did not, at that time, feel its transforming power on his own

heart. Long afterwards he writes, “I cannot render sufficient homage to

the argument, which first, addressing itself to the _subject-matter_ of

Christianity, relieves it of all disproof, and pronounces it worthy of

a trial; and then, addressing itself to the evidence of Christianity,

relieves it of all objections, and makes good, to that evidence, all

the entireness and efficiency which natively belong to it.” Years

afterwards he said, “Butler made me a Christian.” That it did far more

for him than to effect his change of sentiment, that it continued to

be a light in his firmament, is touchingly told in the Preface of his

Bridgewater Treatise, where he says, “I have derived greater aid from

the views and reasonings of Butler, than I have been able to find,

besides, in the whole range of our extant authorship.”

To the sincere believer in the word of God the study of Butler is of

great use. Doubts are among Satan’s tried weapons, and often haunt

the holiest, especially if of a contemplative turn. They see goodness

oppressed, and vice rampant; the world ruled by wicked men, and

truth making its way with difficulty. Their hearts are traitorous,

their surroundings full of temptation, and the direct evidence of

Christianity they may never have studied. To such the analogical

argument comes with full power, meets a candid examination, and

prevails.

To no Christian is this book so useful as the minister. He is

constantly confronted by the difficulties which Butler so triumphantly

handles. Here he is furnished, not only with a shield to protect his

own mind from subtle darts, but a sword to demolish the cavil, and

defend the system of which he is a public teacher.

To _all_ persons this book is of great value. We arrive at certainty

in but few of our decisions, and are often obliged, even in matters of

great moment, to act on probability. Thus we employ precautions when

an evil is not certain to occur. If the evil would be very serious,

we adopt the precaution, when there is but little probability, or

perhaps a bare possibility, of its occurrence. Now, Butler has shown

that if the proofs of revelation were weak, nay, if it had absolutely

no proof, nay further, if on fair examination there appeared not even

a probability of its truth, still there would remain a _possibility_,

and this alone, considering the tremendous issues at stake, should make

every man a Christian. This argument cannot be applied to Mahometanism

or any other religion, because against those much may be advanced as

_disproof_. Our author, having shown the utter absence of disproof,

shuts us up to the reception of Christianity, were its truth barely

possible.

There have not been wanting persons to disparage the “Analogy,” because

it affords, as they say, no _direct_ proof of revelation. As well might

we demand a discussion of chemistry in a work on astronomy. Scores of

writers _prove_ Christianity, and here we have one to relieve us from

the difficulties which beset it, and objections which still remain.

There is an aspect in which the Analogy may be said to contribute

the best of proof. What can go further towards establishing a point,

than to demonstrate that there is no proof of the contrary? What can

show the fallacy of a set of objections, more than to prove that

they might be urged with no less force against the obvious course of

nature? This use of analogy is conformable to the severest logic, and

though offering no pretence of positive argument, goes far towards

establishing full conviction. “The probabilities,” says STEWART,

“resulting from a concurrence of different analogies, may rise so high

as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely distinguishable from

moral certainty.”

When it is considered that Butler’s argument is wholly in addition

to the cumulative mass of direct and almost irresistible evidence,

and removes even the objections which attend the subject, we see the

rejection of Christianity to be inexpressibly rash and absurd. We see

the skeptic condemned at his own bar, for acting in the most momentous

of all possible concerns, in a manner the very opposite of that which

he calls sensible and prudent in his ordinary affairs. The “Analogy”

establishes, beyond cavil, strong _presumptions_ that Christianity is

true, aside from all inspection of its proofs. The man, therefore, who

really understands this book, and refuses to be a Christian, is led by

his lusts and not his reason.

Some admirers of this book have lamented as a defect, its want of

evangelical tincture, and its exclusive reference to natural things. To

me, this is a prime recommendation. Were it otherwise, the reasoning

would be in a circle. The very structure of the argument demands that

it should avoid quotations from the Bible.

It must be admitted, however, that some expressions, taken just as they

stand, without qualification by the current of the argument, tend to

lead astray. For instance, “There is nothing in the human mind contrary

to virtue.” “Men’s happiness and virtue are left to themselves.”

“Religion requires nothing which we are not well able to perform.” “Our

repentance is accepted, to eternal life.” “Our relations to God are

made known by reason.” Such expressions are not to be taken alone, but

as explained by the general drift of sentiment and doctrine. No one can

be familiar with his works, without finding the fullest evidence that

Christianity was to Butler infinitely more than a creed or a ritual.

Nor should we forget that such expressions are not to be interpreted by

the tenor of the “Analogy” only, but by that of his whole ‘Works.’

Even if it be judged that he everywhere fails to express himself in

such phrase as we usually call evangelical, it should be remembered

that he was a Church-of-England man, at a time when there was a

powerful reaction against the evangelism of the Puritans, and when a

real lack of emotional piety was general in his church.

That he did not enjoy in his last illness, which extended over a long

period, that sustaining sense of the love of Christ which hearty

Christians generally feel, is certain. A friend, trying to relieve

his depression, reminded him of his excellent life, and especially

his wide liberalities. He immediately replied, “l am but a steward!

All is His, intrusted to me, to promote his glory and the good of

mankind; how can I know that I have not abused the trust? I reflect on

all these things, and they fill my soul with terror by the feeling of

responsibility they awaken.”

On another occasion, his chaplain sought to soothe his troubled spirit

by referring to the extensive influence of his _Analogy_ in reclaiming

skeptics. His reply was, “I _began_ the Analogy with a view to the

glory of God; but as I proceeded, visions of the fame it might bring

me mingled themselves with my motives, and all was polluted and made

sinful! The book may be a blessing to others, but it weighs like lead

on my soul.” “Admit all this,” tenderly replied the chaplain; “yet has

not Jesus said, ‘Whosoever cometh unto me shall in no wise be cast

out’?” Instantly the Bishop raised himself in the bed, exclaiming,

“How wonderful that the force of this passage never struck me before!

‘Whosoever,’--_all_, ALL! ‘In no wise,’--no amount of sin can prevent

acceptance! Christ’s righteousness will hide the iniquities of _all_

who accept his offer of mercy!”

From that time, for weeks, Butler spoke to all who approached him, of

a _full_ and _free_ salvation. He died triumphantly repeating this

passage.

If all that is said of the lack of evangelical sentiment in Butler or

his book be conceded, it certainly cannot impair either the value of

the analogical argument, or the force of our author’s use of it.

Various circumstances conspire to make the study of “The Analogy”

difficult. The nature of the reasoning--the conciseness, and often

obscurity of the style--the dislocation of parts by frequent

digressions--the arrest of a close course of reasoning to answer

objections--and the abstruseness of the subject itself--combine to

make the full comprehension of its import difficult. Mackintosh says,

“No thinker so great, was ever so bad a writer.” But this, like some

other objections of Sir James, is stated too strongly. The language is

good, sinewy Saxon, and will endure when much that is now called fine

writing, will seem grotesque. Still it is possible to write philosophy

in better phrase, as has been shown by at least two great men, Berkeley

and Stewart. Had Butler but possessed the glowing style of Berkeley,

or the smooth, graceful, and transparent diction of Dugald Stewart,

his work, instead of serving only for close thinkers, or a college

text-book, would have been read by all classes, and banished that

vulgar infidelity which flippant writers still disseminate. That it is

thus restricted in its influence is a misfortune to the world. But he

wrote for a class, and did his work completely. Literary infidelity was

conquered. Vulgar, ignorant, licentious infidelity, will always exist,

and is even now deplorably prevalent. Both Europe and America contain

conceited and malignant ignoramuses, who by their sneers, their cavils,

and their audacity, make havoc of souls. Of these, Tom Paine is a type,

whose book, the contempt of cultivated minds, continues to be sold and

read. For this class of persons, “Baxter’s Call,” or “Alleine’s Alarm,”

are far more suitable than treatises on the evidences of Christianity,

or even Butler’s Analogy.

Editor’s Preface.

The text is the result of a careful collation of the various principal

editions. Occasionally solecisms are corrected, and a word transposed

or put in italics, when a sentence could thus be made perspicuous. The

author had a fashion of beginning a large proportion of his sentences

with “and,” “but,” “now,” “indeed,” “however,” &c., which often served

to perplex, and in such cases they have been omitted. Long paragraphs,

comprehending different topics, have been so divided as to correspond

with the true analysis; which will greatly assist the student in

detecting the successive stages of the argument. Special pains has been

taken to correct and improve the punctuation. Hundreds of sentences

have thus been rendered more perspicuous, and many which were obscure,

have been made lucid. In no respect was Butler’s style, as printed, so

defective.

The Conspectus is made much ampler than any other, for this reason:

that students are apt to content themselves with such help instead of

mastering the full discussion by the author. In the present case they

cannot so do, for such is the fulness of the Conspectus, that if they

master this, they have mastered the subject itself in full.

Notes by the present editor are distinguished from those of the author

by being enclosed in brackets. They are designed to open out further

views, to elucidate the text, to facilitate extended researches, and to

suggest topics for conversation in the class-room.

The Index has cost far more labor than would be supposed, and may not

be of much benefit to the undergraduate. Its advantages will not be

small to him in after life when he desires to recur to particular

topics. The general scholar will find it enables him to make use of the

book for occasional reference. Without it the work is not complete for

the class-room, still less for the library.

That students of the Analogy need help, is confessed; and all attempts

to furnish it have been kindly received. As is remarked by Bishop

Wilson, “His argument, clear and convincing as it is to a prepared

mind, is not obvious to the young reader, whose experience of life

being small, and his habits of reflection feeble, has not the furniture

necessary for comprehending, at first, the thoughts and conclusions of

such a mind. The style is too close, too negligent, too obscure, to be

suitable for the young.”

If it be asked why, with several existing helps to the study of the

Analogy, I offer another, I frankly reply, because I have found none of

them satisfactory, either to the public or to myself.

* * * * *

Some teachers prefer their text-books to be accompanied by a set of

questions. Such will find in this edition all they desire. They have

only to enunciate each sentence of the Conspectus in the interrogative

form, and they will have every possible question prepared to their

hand.

Conspectus of the Author’s Introduction.

I. _What is probable evidence?_

=1.= It differs from demonstration in that it admits of degrees; of

_all_ degrees.

1.) One probability does not beget assurance.

2.) But the slightest presumption makes a probability.

3.) The repetition of it may make certainty.

=2.= What constitutes probability is _likeness_; in regard to the

event itself, or its kind of evidences, or its circumstances.

1.) This daily affords presumptions, evidence, or conviction:

according as it is occasional, common, or constant.

2.) Measures our hopes and fears.

3.) Regulates our expectations as to men’s conduct.

4.) Enables us to judge of character from conduct.

=3.= It is an imperfect mode of judging, and adapted to beings of

limited capacities.

=4.= Where better evidence cannot be had, it constitutes moral

obligation, even though great doubts remain.

1.) We are as much bound to do what, on the whole, _appears_ to

be best, as if we _knew_ it to be so.

2.) In questions of great moment, it is reasonable to act when

the favorable chances are no greater than the unfavorable.

3.) There are numberless cases in which a man would be thought

distracted if he did not act, and that earnestly, where the

chances of success were _greatly against_ him.

II. _The use and application of probabilities_.

Shall not go further into the _nature_ of probable evidence, nor

inquire _why_ likeness begets presumption and conviction; nor how far

analogical reasoning can be reduced to a _system_; but shall only show

how just and conclusive this mode of reasoning is.

=1.= In determining our judgments and practice.

1.) There may be cases in which its value is doubtful.

2.) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such.

3.) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and

conclusive.

=2.= In noting correspondencies between the different parts of God’s

government.

1.) We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the

Bible, as we do in Nature.

2.) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these

difficulties, requires us to deny that the world was made by

him.

3.) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of

nature, it affords a presumption that both have the same author.

4.) To reason on the construction and government of the world,

without settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis.

5.) To apply principles which are certain, to cases which are

not applicable, is no better.

6.) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of

facts, and argue, from known present things, to what is likely

or credible, must be right.

7.) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all.

=3.= In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural.

This is the use which will be made of analogy in the following

work. In so using it,

1.) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent

Creator and Ruler.

--There are no presumptions _against_ this, prior to proof.

--There are proofs:--from analogy, reason, tradition, &c.

--The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics.

2.) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how

the world _might_ have been made and governed.

--Such prating would amount to this:

· All creatures should have been made at first as happy as

they could be.

· Nothing of hazard should be put upon them.

· Should have been _secured_ in their happiness.

· All punishments avoided.

--It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not

faculties for such speculations.

3.) We are, to some extent, judges as to _ends_; and may

conclude that Nature and Providence are designed to produce

virtue and happiness; but of the _means_ of producing these in

the highest degree, we are not competent judges.

--We know not the extent of the universe;

--Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection.

--We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each

other.

--As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his

universe; but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing

this end.

4.) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes

for God’s conduct, we must _study what is_.

--Discovering general laws.

--Comparing the known course of things with what revelation

teaches us to expect.

III. _The force of this use of Analogy._

=1.= Sometimes is practically equivalent to proof.

=2.= Confirms what is otherwise proved.

=3.= Shows that the system of revelation is no more open to

ridicule, than the system of nature.

=4.= Answers almost all objections against religion.

=5.= To a great extent answers objections against the _proofs_ of

religion.

IV. _General scope of the book._

=1.= The divine government is considered, as containing in it,

Chap. 1. Man’s future existence.

” 2. In a state of reward or punishment.

” 3. This according to our behavior.

” 4. Our present life probationary.

” 5. And also disciplinary.

” 6. Notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity.

” 7. Or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness.

=2.= Revealed religion is considered,

Chap. 1. As important.

” 2. As proved by miracles.

” 3. As containing strange things.

” 4. As a scheme imperfectly comprehended.

” 5. As carried on by a mediator.

” 6. As having such an amount of evidence as God saw fit to give.

” 7. As having sufficient and full evidence.

Conspectus of the Analogy.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

A FUTURE LIFE.

Will not discuss the subject of identity; but will consider what

analogy suggests from changes which do not destroy; and thus see

whether it is not _probable_ that we shall live hereafter.

I. _The probabilities that we shall survive death._

=1.= It is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different

stages, and in various degrees of perfection.

--Worms turn into flies.

--Eggs are hatched into birds.

--Our own present state is as different from our state in the

womb, as two states of the same being can be.

--That we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from

the present as the present is from our state in the womb, is

according to analogy.

=2.= We now have capacities for happiness, action, misery, &c., and

there is always a probability that things will continue as they

are, except when experience gives us reason to think they will be

altered. This is a general law; and is our _only_ natural reason

for expecting the continuance of any thing.

=3.= There is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us.

If there was, it would arise from the nature of death; or from the

analogy of nature.

1.) Not from the nature of death.

--We know not what death is.

--But only _some_ of its _effects_.

--These effects do not imply the destruction of the living

agent.

--We know little of what the _exercise_ of our powers depends

upon; and nothing of what _the powers_ themselves depend on.

--We may be unable to _exercise_ our powers, and yet not lose

them--_e.g._ sleep, swoon.

2.) Not from analogy.

--Reason shows no connection between death and our

destruction.

--We have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it.

--The possession of living powers, up to the very moment

when our faculties cease to be able to trace them, is a

probability of their continuing.

--We have already survived wonderful changes.

--To live after death is analogous to the course of nature.

II. _Presumptions against a future life._

=1.= That death _destroys_ us.

_Ans._ 1. This is an assumption that we are compound and

material beings, and hence discerptible; which is not true.

1.) Consciousness is a single, indivisible power, and of

course the subject of it must be.

2.) The material body is not ourself.

3.) We can easily conceive of our having more limbs, or of

a different kind, or of having more or fewer senses, or of

having no bodies at all, or of hereafter animating these same

bodies, remodelled.

4.) The dissolution of a succession of new and strange

bodies, would have no tendency to destroy _us_.

_Ans._ 2. Though the absolute simplicity of the living being

cannot be proved by _experiment_, yet facts lead us so to

conclude. We lose limbs, &c. Our bodies were once _very_ small,

but we might, then, have lost part of them. There is a constant

destruction and renewal going on.

1.) Thus we see that no certain _bulk_ is necessary to our

existence, and unless it were proved that there is, and that

it is larger than an indissoluble atom, there is no reason to

presume that death destroys us, even if we are discerptible.

2.) The living agent is not an _internal material organism_,

which dies with the body. Because

--Our only ground for this presumption is our relation to

other systems of matter. But we see these are not necessary

to us.

--It will not do to say that lost portions of the body were

not _essential_--who is to determine?

--The relation between the living agent, and the most

essential parts of the body, is only one by which they

mutually affect each other.

3.) If we regard our body as made up of organs of sense, we

come to the same result.

--We see with the eyes, just as we do with glasses. The eye

is not a _recipient_, any more than a telescope.

--It is not pretended that vision, hearing, &c. can be

traced clear up to the percipient; but so far as we can

trace perceptions, the _organ_ does not perceive.

--In dreams we perceive without organs.

--When we lose a limb we do not lose the _directing power_;

we could move a new one, if it could be made, or a wooden

one. But the limb cut off has no power of moving.

--Thus, our loss of the _organs_ of perception and motion,

not being the destruction of the power, there is no

ground to think that the destruction of other organs or

instruments would destroy _us_.

_Objection._ These observations apply equally to brutes.

_Ans._ 1. Be it so. Perhaps they are immortal:--may hereafter

improve: we know not what latent powers they may have.

1.) The human being at one period looks as little likely to

make great intellectual attainments; for a long time he has

capacities for virtue and religion, but cannot use them.

2.) Many persons go out of the world who never became able

to exercise these capacities; _e.g._ infants.

_Ans._ 2. If brutes were immortal, it does not prove them to

be _moral agents_.

1.) It may be necessary, for aught we know, that there

should be living creatures not moral agents, nor rational.

2.) All difficulties as to what would become of them, are

founded in our ignorance.

=2.= That our souls, though not material, so depend upon the

bodily structure, that we cannot survive its destruction.

_Ans._ 1. Reason, memory, &c. _do not_ depend on the body,

as perceptions by the senses do. Death may destroy those

_instruments_, and yet not destroy the _powers_ of reflection.

_Ans._ 2. Human beings exist, here, in two very different

states, each having its own laws: sensation and reflection. By

the first we feel; by the second we reason and will.

1.) Nothing which we know to be destroyed at death, is

necessary to reflecting on ideas formerly received.

2.) Though the senses act like scaffolds, or levers, to

_bring in_ ideas, yet when once in, we can reflect, &c.

without their aid.

_Ans._ 3. There are diseases which prove fatal, &c., yet do

not, in any part of their course, _impair_ the intellect; and

this indicates that they do not _destroy_ it.

1.) In the diseases alluded to, persons have their reflective

power, in full, the very moment before death.

2.) Now, why should a disease, at a certain degree, utterly

destroy powers which were not even affected by it, up to that

point?

=3.= That death at least _suspends_ our reflective powers,

or interrupts our continuing to exist in the like state of

reflection which we do now.

_Ans._ There appears so little connection between our powers of

sensation and our powers of reflection that we cannot presume

that what might _destroy the former_, could even _suspend the

latter_.

1.) We daily see reason, memory, &c. exercised without any

assistance, that we know of, from our bodies.

2.) Seeing them in lively exercise to the last, we must infer

that death is not a discontinuance of their exercise, nor of

the enjoyments and sufferings of such exercise.

3.) Our posthumous life may be but a going on, with

additions. Like the change at our birth--which produced not

a suspension of the faculties we had before, nor a _total_

change in our state of life; but a continuance of both, with

great alterations.

4.) Death may but at once put us into a _higher_ state of

life, as our birth did; our relation to bodily organs may be

the only hinderance to our entering a higher condition of the

reflective powers.

5.) Were we even sure that death would suspend our

intellectual powers, it would not furnish even the lowest

probability that it would destroy them.

_Objec._ From the analogy of plants.

_Ans._ This furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our

frailty, but affords no proper analogy. Plants are destitute

of perception and action, and this is the very matter in

question.

REMARKS.

=1.= It has been shown, that confining ourselves to what we

know, we see no probability of ever ceasing to be:--it cannot be

concluded from the reason of the thing:--nor from the analogy of

nature.

=2.= We are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence.

=3.= Our going into _new scenes_ and conditions, is just as

natural as our coming into the world.

=4.= Our condition may naturally be a social one.

=5.= The advantages of it may naturally be bestowed, according to

some fixed law, in proportion to one’s degrees in virtue.

1.) Perhaps not so much as now _by society_; but by God’s more

immediate action.

2.) Yet this will be no less _natural_, _i.e._ stated, fixed,

or settled.

3.) Our notions of what is natural, are enlarged by greater

knowledge of God and his works.

4.) There may be some beings in the world, to whom the whole

of Christianity is as natural as the visible course of nature

seems to us.

=6.= These probabilities of a future life, though they do not

satisfy curiosity, answer all the purposes of religion, as well

as demonstration.

1.) Even a demonstration of a future state, would not

demonstrate religion, but would be reconcilable with atheism.

2.) But as religion implies a future state, any presumption

against such a state, would be a presumption against religion.

3.) The foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that

sort, and prove to a great probability, a fundamental doctrine

of religion.

CHAPTER II.

THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

The question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for

happiness and misery.

Especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct.

We should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject.

And that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other

than the probabilities just discussed.

I. _In the present world our pleasures and pains are, to a great

extent, in our own power._

=1.= We see them to be consequences of our actions.

=2.= And we can _foresee_ these consequences.

=3.= Our desires are not gratified, without the right kind of

exertion.

=4.= By prudence we may enjoy life; rashness, or even neglect may

make us miserable.

=5.= Why this is so is another matter.

1.) It may be impossible to be otherwise.

2.) Or it may be best on the whole.

3.) Or God’s plan may be to make only the good happy.

4.) Or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us.

_Objec._ It may be said “this is only the course of nature.”

_Ans._ It is granted: but

1. The course of nature is but the will of God. We admit

that God is the natural governor of the world: and must not

turn round and deny it because his government is _uniform_.

2. Our natural foresight of the consequences of actions, is

his appointment.

3. The consequences themselves, are his appointment.

4. Our ability to foresee these consequences, is God’s

_instruction_ how we are to act.

_Objec._ By this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our

appetites, and such gratification is our reward for so doing.

_Ans._ Certainly not. Foreseen pleasures and pains are proper

motives to action _in general_; but we may, in particular

cases, damage ourselves by indulgence. Our eyes are made to

see with, but not to look at every thing:--for instance the

sun.

It follows, from what has been said, that

II. _We are, now, actually under God’s government, in the strictest

sense._

=1.= Admitting that there is a God, it is not so much a matter of

speculation, as of experience, that he governs us.

=2.= The annexing of pleasures and pains to certain actions, and

giving notice them, is the very essence of government.

=3.= Whether by direct acts upon us, or by contriving a general

plan, does not affect the argument.

1.) If magistrates could make laws which should _execute

themselves_, their government would be far more perfect than it

is.

2.) God’s making fire burn us, is as much an instance of

government, as if he _directly inflicted_ the burn, whenever we

touched fire.

=4.= Hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render

incredible the Bible doctrine of God’s rewarding or punishing

according to our actions.

_Additional remarks on Punishment._

As men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show

further that the course of administration, as to _present_ punishment,

is analogous to what religion teaches as to _the future_.

Indeed they add credibility to it.

And ought to raise the most serious apprehension.

I. _Circumstances to be observed touching present punishments._

=1.= They often follow acts which produce present pleasure or

advantage.

=2.= The sufferings often far exceed the pleasure or advantage.

=3.= They often follow remotely.

=4.= After long delay they often come suddenly.

=5.= As those remote effects are not certainly foreseen, they

may not be thought of at the time; or if so, there is a hope of

escaping.

=6.= There are opportunities of advantage, which if neglected do

not recur.

=7.= Though, in some cases, men who have sinned up to a certain

point, may retrieve their affairs, yet in many cases, reformation

is of no avail.

=8.= Inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful

wrong-doing.

=9.= As some punishments by civil government, are capital, so are

some natural punishments.

1.) Seem intended to remove the offender out of the way.

2.) Or as an example to others.

II. _These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws._

=1.= They are matters of daily experience.

=2.= Proceed from the general laws, by which the world is

governed.

III. _They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future

punishment, that both might be expressed in the same words._

_e.g._ Proverbs, ch. i.

The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the

Scripture doctrine of future punishment, such as

1.) That our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of

vice.

2.) Or the objection from necessity.

3.) Or that the Almighty cannot be contradicted.

4.) Or that he cannot be offended.

REMARKS.

=1.= Such reflections are terrific, but ought to be stated and

considered.

=2.= Disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing

short of a _demonstration_ of atheism. Even skeptical doctrines

afford no justification.

=3.= There is no pretence of reason for presuming that the

licentious will not find it better for them that they had never

been born.

CHAPTER III.

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

As the structure of the world shows _intelligence_, so the mode of

distributing pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God’s

_natural_ government, such as a king exercises over his subjects.

But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the _moral

character_ of such government.

I. _What is a moral or righteous government?_

=1.= Not mere rewarding and punishing.

=2.= But doing this according to character.

=3.= The perfection of moral government is doing this _exactly_.

_Objec._ God is simply and absolutely benevolent.

_Ans._ Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him

to produce the greatest possible happiness, regardless of

behaviour. This would rob God of other attributes; and should

not be asserted unless it can be proved. And whether it can

be proved is not the point now in hand.

The question is not whether there may not be, in the

universe, beings to whom he manifests absolute benevolence,

which might not be incompatible with justice; but whether he

treats _us_ so.

=4.= It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a

disordered world, to estimate with exactness the overplus of

happiness on the side of virtue: and there may be exceptions to

the rule. But it is far from being doubtful that _on the whole_,

virtue is happier than vice, in this world.

II. _The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature._

=1.= It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God _governs_: and it is

reasonable to suppose that he would govern _righteously_.

1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for.

2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy,

and the wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a

method of government, now begun, shall be carried on.

=2.= The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show

a right constitution of nature; and our ability to foresee and

control these consequences, shows that we are under moral law.

=3.= God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree,

is actually punished by it.

1.) Without this, society could not exist.

2.) This is God’s government, through society; and is as

_natural_, as society.

3.) Since the course of things is God’s appointment, men are

unavoidably accountable for their behaviour.

_Objec._ Society often punishes good actions, and rewards

wickedness.

_Ans._ 1. This is not _necessary_, and consequently not

natural.

2. Good actions are never punished by society as _good_, but

because considered bad.

=4.= By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice

punished, _as such_, which proves a moral government; as will

be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their

qualities.

1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be

wrong: in which case the gratification is in the act, not the

morality of it: in other cases the enjoyment consists wholly in

the quality of virtuousness.

2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension,

vexation, remorse, &c.

--This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere

misfortune.

--Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not

their own fault.

3.) Honest and good men are befriended _as such_.

4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices

are regarded with gratitude on account of the _intention_, even

when they fail to benefit us.

--This is seen in family government, where children are

punished for falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is

hurt.

--And also in civil government, where the absence or presence

of ill intention goes far in determining the penalty of

wrong-doing.

5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations,

turns much upon approbation and disapprobation.

6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of

our being under God’s moral government.

--We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on

our moral nature.

--Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of

vice, as such, is a _rule_, never inverted. If it be thought

that there are instances to the contrary, (which is not so,)

they are evidently monstrous.

--The _degree_ in which virtue and vice receive proper

returns, is not the question now, but only the thing itself,

in some degree.

7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice

prospers; but this is _disorder_, and not the order of nature.

8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world,

a declaration from God, for virtue and against vice. So far

as a man is true to virtue, is he on the side of the divine

administration. Such a man must have a _sense of security_, and

a hope of _something better_.

=5.= This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has

necessary tendencies beyond their present effects.

1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals.

2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society.

--The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends

to prevail over power not so directed, just as power under

direction of reason, tends to prevail over brute force.

--As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case

stands, as to reason:

· Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for

reason to triumph over brutes.

· Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and

treacherous, may be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves

by instinct: but this would be an inverted order of things.

--A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority.

· By making the good of society, the object of every member

of it.

· By making every one industrious in his own sphere.

· By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice.

3.) If the part of God’s government which we see, and the part

we do not see, make up one scheme, then we see a _tendency_ in

virtue to superiority.

4.) But to _produce_ that superiority there must be

--A force proportioned to the obstacles.

--Sufficient lapse of time.

--A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate

occasions, and opportunities for the virtuous to unite.

5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its

tendencies, though real, are _hindered_.

6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter.

--Eternity will be lasting enough.

--Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over

the earth, and ignorant of one another.

--Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very

nature of virtue is a bond of union.

7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by

vicious beings in any part of the universe, would be to the

amendment of all who were capable of it, and their recovery to

virtue.

8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are

contingent, and that its beneficial tendencies are God’s

declarations in its favor.

9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too

speculative, we may easily come to the same result by

reflecting on the supremacy which any earthly nation would

attain, by entire virtue for many ages.

REMARKS.

Consider now the general system of religion. The government of

the world is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail

over wickedness; and to see the importance and fitness of such an

arrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things,

if vice had these advantages, or virtue the contrary.

_Objec._ Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and

continue always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and

disordered state as at present?

_Ans._ We are not proving that God’s moral government is

_perfect_, or the truth of religion, but only seeing what

there is in the course of nature, to confirm it, supposing it

to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, but the present

distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no ground

to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished

exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would

be no indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the

preceding observations _confirm_ the doctrine of future

retribution; for,

1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to

virtue and vice.

2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in

_kind_, but in degree only, from God’s present government. It

would be the _effect_, towards which we see the _tendency_.

3.) That higher rewards and punishments _may be_ hereafter.

4.) That we should _expect_ it to be so; because the

tendencies of vice and virtue are immutable, while the

hinderances are only artificial.

SUMMARY.

[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter,

in as condensed a form as possible.]

CHAPTER IV.

OF A STATE OF PROBATION.

The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the

most common notion is that our future interests are _depending_; and

depending on _ourselves_. And that we have _opportunities_ for both

good and bad conduct, and _temptations_ to each.

This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for

it implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good.

Hence needs to be considered by itself.

_Doctrine._ THE NATURAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD, IN THIS WORLD, PUTS US ON

TRIAL AS TO THE THINGS OF THIS WORLD; AND SO IMPLIES, WHAT RELIGION

TEACHES, THAT HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT PUTS US ON TRIAL AS TO A FUTURE

WORLD.

I. _So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal

interests, so far we are under probation as to those interests._

=1.= The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or

bad, and enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our

interests, in part at least, depend on ourselves.

=2.= We often _blame_ ourselves and others for evils, as

resulting from misconduct.

=3.= It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and

incur evils, not for want of knowing better, but through our

_fault_.

=4.= Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from other

causes than ignorance.

II. _These natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral and

religious trial._

=1.= In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our

circumstances or in our nature.

1.) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary

temptations.

2.) Others will _seek_ evil, and go out of their way after

wicked indulgence, when there are no external temptations.

3.) But even those who err through temptation, must have that

within which makes them _susceptible_ of temptation.

4.) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect to

both present and future interests.

=2.= If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both

capacities, we see the same analogy.

1.) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification.

2.) Some are driven by their passions against their better

judgment and feeble resolutions.

3.) Some shamelessly go on in open vice.

4.) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong

apprehensions of future misery.

=3.= The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of

others upon us.

1.) Bad example.

2.) Wrong education.

3.) Corruptions of religion.

4.) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness.

=4.= In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well

as vice.

III. _The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered

state, are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests._

This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for,

=1.= We _may_ manage to pass our days in comfort and peace.

=2.= And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion.

=3.= We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of

beings.

REMARKS.

=1.= It is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion

says we are in, is credible; for it exactly corresponds to what

we see.

1.) If from birth till death we were in a constant security

of enjoyment, without care or correctness, it would be a

presumption against religion.

2.) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an

infinitely good Being would not expose us to the hazard of

misery. This is indeed a difficulty, and must remain so; but

still the course of nature is as it is.

3.) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more

unavoidable than our deportment.

=2.= It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as

to our interests, both present and future.

=3.= The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present

enjoyments and honors forced upon us, in spite of misconduct, so

this _may_ be the case, as to that chief and final good which

religion proposes.

CHAPTER V.

PROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.

Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter,

is a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not

understand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just

now. It certainly is consistent with God’s righteous government.

Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified

for a better state.

This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry _why_ we are so

placed, answers an infinitely more important question,--viz.: _What is

our business here?_

I. _We are placed in this state of trial, for our improvement in

virtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and

happiness._

=1.= Every creature is designed for a particular way of life.

1.) Happiness depends on the congruity between a creature’s

nature and its circumstances.

2.) Man’s character might be so changed as to make him

_incapable_ of happiness on earth.

3.) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature, in a

world where he must be wretched, for want of the proper objects

to answer to his desires.

4.) So that without determining what is the future condition of

good men, we know there must be necessary _qualifications_ to

make us capable of enjoying it.

=2.= Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and

different conditions.

1.) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up.

2.) We can become more expert in any kind of action.

3.) And can make settled alterations in our tempers.

4.) We can form _habits_--both bodily and mental.

As these operate in producing radical changes in human

character, we will look for a moment at the process.

--Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits; though

necessary to _forming_ them.

--There are habits of perception, however, and habits of

action: the former are passive, the latter active.

--Habits of body are produced by external acts, and habits of

mind by the exertion of principles; _i.e._ carrying them out.

--Resolutions to do well are acts, and may _help_ towards

forming good habits. But _mere_ theorizing, and forming

pictures in the mind, not only do not help, but may harden

the mind to a contrary course.

--Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker. Thus

familiarity with danger lessens fear.

--Hence active habits may be formed and strengthened, by

acting according to certain motives or excitements, which

grow less sensibly felt and less and less felt, as the habit

strengthens.

· Thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion

of pity, and the active principle of benevolence. But

inquiring out cases of distress in order to relieve them,

causes diminished sensitiveness at the sight of misery, and

stronger benevolence and aptitude in relieving it.

· So admonition, experience, and example, if acted upon,

produce good; if not, harden.

5.) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even

inexplicable, but the thing itself is matter of certain

experience.

6.) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and often

pleasurable: opposite inclinations grow weaker: difficulties

less: and occasions more frequent.

7.) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed.

=3.= We should not have these capacities for improvement and for

the reconstruction of character, if it were not necessary.

1.) They are necessary, even as to this life.

--We are not qualified, at first, for mature life:

understanding and strength come gradually.

--If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first be

distracted and bewildered, and our faculties would be of no

use previous to experience. Ignorant of any employment, we

could not provide for ourselves.

--So that man is an unformed, unfinished creature, even as

to this world, till he _acquire_ knowledge, experience, and

habits.

2.) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the

requisite qualities for manhood.

--Children _learn_, from their very birth,

· The nature and use of objects.

· The subordinations of domestic life.

· The rules of life.

--Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly, as to seem

like instinct, but some requires great care and labor, and

the doing of things we are averse to.

--According as we act during this formative period, is our

character formed; and our capacity for various stations in

society determined.

--Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered.

3.) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another,

is exactly of the same kind: and comprehended under one general

law.

--If we could not see how the present discipline fitted us

for a higher life, it would be no objection.

· We do not know how food, sleep, &c. enlarges the

child’s body; nor would we expect such a result, prior to

experience.

· Nor do children understand the need of exercise,

temperance, restraint, &c.

--We thus see a general analogy of Providence indicating that

the present life is preparatory.

=4.= If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness,

then we see our need of the moral culture of our present state.

1.) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social.

--Nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the

Scripture doctrine that this future community will be under

the more immediate government of God.

--Nor the least proof that its members will not require the

exercise of veracity, justice, &c. towards each other; and

that character which _results_ from the practice of such

virtues.

--Certainly the universe is under moral government; and a

virtuous character must, in some way, be a condition of

happiness in that state.

2.) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is

right.

--We have desires for outward objects.

--The times, degrees, &c. of gratifying these desires, are,

of right, subject to the control of the moral principle.

--But that principle neither excites them, nor prevents their

being excited.

--They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully gratified, or

gratified at all.

--When the desire exists, and the gratification is unlawful,

we are tempted.

3.) The only security is the principle within.

--The strengthening of this lessens the danger.

--It may be strengthened, by discipline and exercise.

· Noting examples.

· Attending to the right, and not to preference.

· Considering our true interests.

--When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its strength,

our security from the dangers of natural propensions.

--Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is improved virtue;

and improved virtue must produce increased happiness, if the

government of the world is moral.

4.) Even creatures made upright may fall.

--The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for by the

nature of liberty; for that would only be saying that an

event happened because it might happen.

--But from the very nature of propensions.

--A finitely perfect being would have propensions

corresponding to its surroundings; its understanding; and its

moral sense; and all these in due proportions.

--Such a being would have propensions, though the object

might not be present, or the indulgence might be contrary to

its moral sense; and this would have some tendency, however

small, to induce gratification.

--The tendency would be increased by the frequency of

occasions; and yet more by the least indulgence, even in

thought; till, under peculiar conjunctures, it would become

effect.

--The first transgression might so utterly disorder the

constitution, and change the proportions of forces, as to

lead to a repetition of irregularities; and hence to the

construction of bad habits, and a depraved character.

5.) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain higher

virtue, and more security, by obeying the moral principle.

--For the danger would lessen, by the increased

submissiveness of propensions.

--The moral principle would gain force by exercise.

6.) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and virtue

is not only right, but improving.

--The degree of improvement may be such that the danger of

sinning may be almost infinitely lessened.

--Yet the security may always be the habits formed in a

state of discipline; making such a state altogether fit and

necessary.

7.) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to

fallen and corrupt creatures.

--The upright need improvement; the fallen must be renewed.

--Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for the

other; and of a severer sort.

II. _The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we

need._

=1.= Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical

knowledge, &c. very different from a mere speculative knowledge

of our liability to vice and misery.

=2.= Our experience in this world, with right views and practice,

may leave eternal impressions for good.

=3.= Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue,

must, from the very make of our nature, form habits of virtue,

and a more intense virtuous principle.

=4.= Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and

violent temptations, is a _continued_ act of virtue, and that in

a _higher degree_ than if the seduction were transient and weak.

=5.= Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost

essential to discipline and improvement.

1.) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no

difficulty, but agree with our inclinations, may be done merely

from inclination, and so not be _really_ virtuous.

2.) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty,

virtuousness is increased, and confirmed into a habit.

_Objec._ 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be

overtasked, so may our moral.

_Ans._ This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not

confute the argument. In general, it holds good. All that is

intended to be proved is, that this world is _intended_ to be a

state of improvement, and is _fitted_ for it.

1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving,

require a trying measure of attention, which some will not

submit to.

2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice:

but this viciousness of many is the very thing which makes

the world a virtuous discipline to good men. The _whole end_

in placing mankind as they are we know not; but these things

are evident--the virtues of some are exercised:--and so

exercised as to be improved: and improved beyond what they

would be in a perfectly virtuous community.

3.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no

proof that their improvement was not _intended_. Of seeds and

animals not one in a million comes to perfection; yet such

as do, evidently answer an end for which they were designed.

The _appearance of waste_ in regard to seeds, &c. is just as

unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents.

_Objec._ 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the

discipline of self-love.

_Ans._ Obedience _is_ obedience, though prompted by hope or

fear: and a _course_ of such obedience, forms a habit of

it: and distinct habits of various virtues, by repressing

inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c. require.

Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God’s authority, and

self-interest, are coincident; and each, separately, a just

principle. To begin a good life from either of them, and

persist, produces that very character which corresponds to our

relations to God, and secures happiness.

_Objec._ 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions,

and produced by it, are not wanted to qualify us for a state of

happiness.

_Ans._ Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive

submission is essential to right character. Prosperity itself

begets extravagant desires; and imagination may produce as much

discontent as actual condition. Hence, though we may not need

_patience_ in heaven, we shall need that _temper_ which is

formed by patience.

Self-love would always coincide with God’s commands, when

our interest was rightly understood; but it is liable to

error. Therefore, HABITS of resignation are necessary, for

_all_ creatures; and the proper discipline for resignation is

affliction.

_Objec._ 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have

been avoided by making us at once, what we are intended to become.

_Ans._ What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to

do. God’s natural government is arranged not to save us from

trouble or danger, but to enable and incline us to go through

them. It is as natural for us to seek means to obtain things,

as it is to seek the things; and in worldly things we are left

to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so better our

condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the

advantage.

Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to

a future state.

III. _This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of

character._

=1.= Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part

of it, and in many ways which we know not.

=2.= It may be a _means_ in disposing of men according to

character.

=3.= And of showing creation that they are so disposed of.

=4.= Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to

the general course of things considered in this chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

OF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT.

Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course

hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.

The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what

Christianity teaches.

To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is

puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore

be excused.

I. _Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and

Governor of the world._

=1.= It does not exclude design and deliberation.

1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness.

--Necessity does not account for the _existence_ of any

thing, but is only a _circumstance_ relating to its origin.

Instance the case of a house: the fatalist admits that it had

a builder, and the only question would be, was he obliged to

build it as he did?

2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say

it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker, who _acted_ by

necessity: for necessity is only an abstract notion, and can

_do_ nothing.

3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively

discern that there must be an infinite Being, prior to all

causes; but we cannot say that _every thing_ so exists.

The fact that many changes in nature are produced by man’s

contrivance is a proof of this.

4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by

necessity _an agent acting necessarily_, he is obliged to mean

this.

5.) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by necessity

does not exclude _design_.

=2.= It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of

religion.

1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own

principles,--viz.: that he cannot do otherwise than he does;

and is not subject to praise or blame.

(It might be asked, _would_ he, if possessed of common sense,

so educate his child?)

--The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would

soon prove a pest, and go to destruction.

--He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach

him that he _was_ accountable.

--He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine

was wrong, or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it,

and misapplied it.

2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be

found equally fallacious: _e.g._ that he need not take care of

his life.

3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom.

--Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience.

--The constitution of things is _as if_ we were free.

4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we

_apply it_ to life, always misleads us; how, then, can we be

sure it would not mislead us with respect to future interests?

5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the

supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on the

supposition of necessity.

=3.= It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a

character.

1.) It does not hinder _us_ from having a will and a character;

from being cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c.

2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally

excuses the _punishment_ of crime; for if it destroys the sin

of the one, it destroys the sin of the other.

3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows

that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and

injustice.

_Objec._ If necessity be _reconcilable_ with the character of

God, as portrayed in Christianity, does it not destroy _the

proof_ that he has that character; and so destroy the proofs of

religion?

_Ans._ No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the

results of our conduct. God’s government is that of a father

and a magistrate; and his natural rule of government must be

veracity and justice. We shall proceed to show that,

II. _Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion._

=1.= It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes.

1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern

between actions, and approve or disapprove, &c.

2.) This implies a _rule_, a peculiar _kind_ of rule; _i.e._

one from which we cannot depart without being self-condemned.

3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with

sanctions. It not only raises a sense of _duty_, but a sense of

_security_ in obeying, and danger in disobeying; and this is an

explicit sanction.

4.) God’s government must conform to the nature he has given

us; and we must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow

virtue, and misery vice.

5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of

keeping up the sense of this government.

6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of

proof.

--The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not

from what might appear to us to be _fit_, but from what his

actions tell us _he wills_.

=2.= Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if

true, does not affect.

1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural

religion, but ignorant of history, and of the present state of

mankind, he would inquire:

--How this religion came?

--How far the belief of it extended?

--If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a

deduction of reason, then, though its evidences from reason

would not be impaired, its history would furnish no further

proof.

2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary,

--That essentially it had been professed in all countries.

--And can be traced up through all ages.

--And was not _reasoned out_, but revealed.

3.) These things are of great weight.

--Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common

sense of mankind.

--And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the

mind.

--The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its

being revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned.

=3.= Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real

one from which they were copied.

--The history of revelation is as old as history itself.

--Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is

no presumption.

--And indicates a revelation prior to the examination

of the book said to contain it; and independent of all

considerations of its being corrupted, or darkened by fables.

=4.= It is thus apparent that the _external_ evidence of religion

is considerable; and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity.

REMARKS.

1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule.

1.) We are all liable to prejudice.

2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded.

3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment.

2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof.

_Objec._ Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may

be overbalanced by greater probabilities: much more by

demonstration. Now, as the doctrine of necessity must be true,

it cannot be that God governs us as if we were free when he

knows we are not.

_Ans._ This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is

not to be evaded,--viz.: that the whole constitution and

course of things shows this reasoning to be false, be the

fallacy where it may.

The doctrine of freedom shows where,--viz.: in supposing

ourselves necessary agents when in fact we are free.

Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently

lies in denying that necessary agents are accountable; for

that they _are_ rewarded and punished is undeniable.

CONCLUSION.--It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that

God will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to

their conduct, nor destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is,

necessity, practically, is false.

CHAPTER VII.

DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.

Moral government, _as a fact_, has now been considered; it remains for

us to remove objections against its _wisdom and goodness_. A thing

being true does not prove it to be good.

In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible.

But, if a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it

credible that it is a scheme or system, and that man’s comprehension

of it is necessarily so limited, as to be inadequate to determine its

injustice.

This we shall find to be the case.

_Doctrine._ ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT GOD EXERCISES MORAL GOVERNMENT,

THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TEACHES THAT IT MUST BE A SCHEME, AND ONE QUITE

BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION.

I. _The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by

analogy, that moral government is a scheme._

=1.= The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to

individuals, species to species, events to events; and all these

both immediate and remote.

=2.= This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the

future; including all creatures, actions, and events.

1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence

on some further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole

account of any one thing.

2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be

necessary to others, of the greatest importance.

=3.= If such is God’s natural government, it is credible that

such is his moral government.

1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme.

--One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable

kingdom subserves the animal, and our animal organization

subserves our mental.

--Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to

have reference to a general plan.

--There is evidently a previous adjustment.

· The periods, &c. for trying men.

· The instruments of justice.

· The kinds of retribution.

2.) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is

known to us: therefore no objections against any part can be

insisted on.

3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in

arguing against religion. That it ought to be a valid answer to

objections against religion, we proceed to show.

--Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been

prevented by repeated interpositions; or that more good might

have been so produced; which would be the utmost that could

be said: still,

--Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections

arising from apparent disorders in the world.

--The government of the world might be _good_, even on those

suppositions; for at most they could but suggest that it

might be _better_.

--At any rate, they are mere assertions.

--Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach,

of suppositions palpably impossible, which _all_ do not see

to be so: nor _any, at first sight_.

4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to

all objections against the divine government.

--An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected

with any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered

by our ignorance.

--But when the objection is made against an act related to

other and unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer.

--Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render

the act not only good, but good in the highest degree.

II. _Consider some particular things, in the natural government of God,

the like of which we may infer, by analogy, to be contained in his

moral government._

=1.= No ends are accomplished without means.

1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable

results.

2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but

experience.

3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected

contrary results.

4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected

against God’s moral government, produce good.

5.) It is evident that our not seeing _how_ the means work

good, or their seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no

presumption against their fitness to work good.

6.) They may not only be fit, but the _only_ means of ultimate

good.

_Objec._ Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote

virtue, and _our_ suffering for sin be better than if we were

restrained by force, yet it would have been better if evil had

not entered the world.

_Ans._ It is granted that though sinful acts may produce

benefits, to refrain from them would produce more. We have

curative pains, yet pain is not better than health.

=2.= Natural government is carried on by general laws.

1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is

because there are general laws. They enable us to _forecast_

for the procurement of good.

2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all

irregularities, or remedy them.

3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders

arising under them, but this would have bad effects.

--Encouraging improvidence.

--Leaving us no rule of life.

--Every interposition would have _distant_ effects: so that

we could not guess what would be the _whole_ result.

· If it be replied that those distant effects might also be

corrected by direct interpositions--this is only talking at

random.

_Objec._ If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes,

we are too ignorant to understand the proofs of religion.

_Ans._ 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but

partial ignorance does not. We may, in various degrees, know a

man’s character, and the way he is _likely_ to pursue certain

ends; and yet not know how he _ought_ to act to gain those

ends. In this case objections to his mode of pursuing ends may

be answered by our ignorance, though that he _does_ act in a

certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have evidence

of God’s character and aims, and yet not be competent judges

as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the

difficulties of religion, but no objection to religion itself.

_Ans._ 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of

religion, as well as the objections, yet is it undeniable that

moral obligations remain unaffected by our ignorance of the

consequences of obedience or violation. The consequences of

vice and virtue may not be fully known, yet it is credible that

they may be such as religion declares: and this credibility is

an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin.

_Ans._ 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are

_not_ equally valid against the proofs of it.

[Answers rehearsed.]

_Ans._ 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based

on our ignorance, are really not so, but on what analogy

teaches _concerning_ our ignorance,--viz.: that it renders

us incompetent judges. They are based on experience, and

what we _do know_; so that to credit religion is to trust to

experience, and to disregard it is the contrary.

CONCLUSION.

=1.= The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this

life as part of a larger plan of things.

1.) Whether we are connected with the distant _parts_ of the

universe, is uncertain; but it is very clear we are connected,

more or less, with present, past, and future.

2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but

progressive; and one equally incomprehensible, whether we

regard the present, past, or future.

=2.= This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion

does: for it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature

came into existence without a Creator, as that there should be a

Creator: and as wonderful that the Creator should act without any

rule or scheme, as that he should act with one; or that he should

act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous one.

=3.= Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and

character of the Author of nature, is just and good.

=4.= Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and

controls it as he does, and has assigned us our part and lot.

=5.= Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot,

without reflection, but creatures endued with reason, can hardly

avoid reflecting whither we go, and what is the scheme, in the

midst of which we find ourselves.

[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.]

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

Every one must admit that we _need_ a revelation. Few, if any, could

reason out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is

no probability that they would. Such as might, would still feel the

want of revelation. To say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild

as to say all are happy.

No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of

small importance.

If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his

reasons for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at

least in our case. This we cannot know.

The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it

I. _As a republication of natural religion._

=1.= It gives the moral system of the universe.

1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that

--Jehovah created all things.

-- ” governs all things.

--Virtue is his law.

--Mankind will be judged according to character.

2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively.

3.) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a future

state: danger of sin: efficacy of repentance.

4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from

the world by peculiar institutions.

_Objec._ The perversions of Christianity, and the little good

it has done.

_Ans._ 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has

done less good.

2. The benefits of Christianity are _not_ small.

3. The evils ascribed to it, are not _its_ effects. Things

are to be judged by their genuine tendencies.

4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces

acquiescence.

5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is

bound to instruct and persuade others.

II. _As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason._

=1.= A mode of salvation for the ruined.

=2.= Duties unknown before.

=3.= Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost.

1.) Hence the form of baptism.

2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our

relations to them.

=4.= The manner of external worship.

III. _The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity._

=1.= Those who think natural religion _sufficient_, must admit

that Christianity is highly _important_.

=2.= Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious

regard to him is an evident obligation.

=3.= These relations being real, there is no reason to think that

our neglect of behaving suitably to them, will not be attended

with the same kind of consequences as follow the neglect of

duties made known by reason.

=4.= If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and

if we need God’s Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a

slight thing whether we make use of the means for obtaining such

assistance?

=5.= Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it

is most rash and presumptuous to treat it lightly.

REMARKS.

=1.= The distinction between positive and moral obligations.

1.) For moral precepts we can see _the reason_: for positive we

cannot.

2.) Moral duties are such _prior_ to command; positive duties

are such _because_ commanded.

3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not make it

moral or positive.

=2.= The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive.

1.) Both have the nature of moral commands.

2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral.

--Positive institutions are _means_ to moral ends.

--Ends are more excellent than means.

--Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as

proceeding from moral principle.

3.) Both moral and positive duties are _revealed_, and so are

on a level; but the moral law is _also_ interwoven with our

very nature, and so its precepts must prevail when the two

interfere.

=3.= There is less necessity for determining their relative

authority, than some suppose.

1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion,

nothing can give us acceptance with God, without moral virtue.

2.) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties.

3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light

of positive institutions, because less important than moral.

--We are bound to obey _all_ God’s commands.

--A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God,

creates moral obligation, in the strictest sense.

CONCLUSION.

This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the

Scriptures.

CHAPTER II.

PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.

Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions

against it.

The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions

against miracles.

They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events.

I. _Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of

Christianity._

=1.= It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not

the discovery of reason, or of experience.

=2.= Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it

contains things _unlike_ the apparent course of nature.

1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be

just like what is the course of nature in this little world.

2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see

many things greatly unlike.

=3.= If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of

things, _miraculous_, still that does not make it _improbable_.

II. _There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should

now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the world._

=1.= There was then _no_ course of nature, as to this world.

=2.= Whether man _then_ received a revelation involves a question

not of miracles, but of _fact_.

=3.= Creation was a very different exertion of power from that

which _rules_ the world, now it _is_ made.

=4.= Whether the power of forming _stopped_ when man was made; or

went on, and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as

to the _degree_ or _extent_, to which a power was exerted.

=5.= There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing

man had a revelation when created.

=6.= All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts

to a real and material proof.

III. _There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous

revelation, after the course of nature was settled._

=1.= Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some

_parallel_ case.

=2.= This would require us to know the history of some other

world.

=3.= Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the

presumption would be very precarious.

_To be more particular_,

=1.= There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is

proved--which yet is overcome by almost any proof.

--Hence the question of a presumption against miracles,

involves only the _degree_ of presumption, (not whether the

presumption is _peculiar_ to miracles,) and whether that

degree is such as to render them incredible.

=2.= If we _leave out religion_, we are in total darkness as

to the cause or circumstances on which the course of nature

depends.

--Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and

reasons for miraculous interpositions of Providence.

=3.= _Taking in religion_, there are distinct reasons for

miracles; to afford additional instruction; to attest the truth

of instruction.

=4.= Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with

uncommon; earthquakes, pestilence, &c.

CONCLUSION.

1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible.

2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them.

3. There are no presumptions against them, _peculiar_ to them,

as distinguished from other unusual phenomena.

CHAPTER III.

OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM

GOD.

Beside the objectors to the _evidences_ of Christianity, there are many

who object to its _nature_. They say it is not full enough: has in it

foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not

universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.

It is granted that if it contained _immoralities_ or _contradictions_

they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion,

aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now

be shown.

Let the student look to the _force_ of the proofs, rather than any

_consequences_ which may be drawn from them.

I. _The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to

the material laws of the world._

=1.= If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide

and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of

nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise

the system of grace.

=2.= Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior

to experience.

=3.= Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.

=4.= If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of

the _general_ laws of his government, he is equally incompetent

to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or

deviated from.

II. _We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted._

Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree

of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given

gradually or suddenly.

=1.= We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be

given by revelation.

=2.= Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to

transmit any revelation he might make.

=3.= Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or

doubtful.

=4.= Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.

=5.= Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be

said that if not in writing it would not have answered its

purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best

suit God’s _general_ government?

=6.= All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular

things in revelation as unsuitable.

III. _Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is,

whether it is a revelation._

=1.= No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a

revelation.

=2.= It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.

=3.= Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is

affirmed, it still should control our conduct.

IV. _Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other

books, are not so as to the Bible._

=1.= We are competent judges of common books, but not of

Scripture.

=2.= Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.

=3.= In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external

proof; but in regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are

improbabilities.

1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations,

will imagine they find improbabilities.

2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things.

--It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that

man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and

motions of heavenly bodies, than he is to determine the

causes and cures of disease, which much more nearly concerns

him.

--Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant,

even when thinking of something else, which we had been

vainly trying to discover for years.

--Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every

man may be a deceiver.

--Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason.

V. _Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity,

as distinguished from objections against its evidence._

For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age

used their miraculous gifts.

=1.= This does not prove the acts _not_ miraculous.

=2.= The person having any such gift, would have the same power

over it which he would have over any other ability, and might

pervert it.

=3.= To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain

its use, is but saying why did not God give a _higher degree_ of

miraculous endowment? As to which we are not competent judges.

=4.= God does not confer his _natural_ gifts, (memory, eloquence,

knowledge, &c.) only on those who are prudent and make the best

use of them.

=5.= Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in

the happiest manner.

VI. _There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several

other respects._

=1.= In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to “go

on to perfection” in either, requires exact and laborious study.

=2.= The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge,

are the same in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought

about,

1.) By the progress of learning and liberty.

2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the

generality.

=3.= It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should

be small; for the natural world has laid open to inspection, for

thousands of years, and yet only lately are any great discoveries

made.

=4.= Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of

opening and ascertaining Bible truth.

_Objec._ The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is

of no consequence, compared to spiritual.

_Ans._ 1. The cases _are_ parallel; for natural knowledge

is as important to our natural well-being, as spiritual

knowledge is to our spiritual well-being.

_Ans._ 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of

other analogies, which show that God does not dispense his

gifts according to _our_ notions of their value.

_Objec._ 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of

men, why not sooner introduced, and more widely diffused?

_Ans._ The objection is just as strong against the natural

sciences. Nay, if the light of nature and of revelation are

both from the same source, we might _expect_ that revelation

would have been introduced and diffused just as it is.

1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not

known at all, nor to any without care and study.

2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated

with derision, and the use rejected by thousands whom they

might have cured.

3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so

made to produce more disease.

4.) Their benefit may come very slowly.

5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual.

6.) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to

use them, even with the prospect of a cure.

7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we

were ready to take it.

All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.

VII. _Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its

containing things we should not have expected, we will now consider the

objections against its morality._

=1.= Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things

contrary to justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are

taught by natural religion. But no such objections are advanced,

except such as would equally condemn the constitution of nature.

=2.= There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons,

which _would_ be immoral, but for the precept. The precept

changes the nature of the action.

=3.= None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never

commanded to cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery,

&c.

=4.= God may command the taking of life or property because these

are _his_.

=5.= The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable

to be perverted by the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and

to mislead the weak. But such objections do not lie against

revelation, as such, but against the very notion of _religion as

a trial_.

=6.= The sum of the whole is, objections against the _scheme_

of Christianity do not affect its truth; since there are no

objections against its morality. Hence objections against it,

aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections against the

_evidence_, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, [_i.e._

ch. vii.]

CHAPTER IV.

CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD.

In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that

a revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great

objections.

This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them.

But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be

good, or credible.

It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the

course of nature, that it was a _scheme_, imperfectly comprehended.

If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer.

[In studying this chapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.]

I. _Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension._

=1.= God’s _general_ plan is to conduct things _gradually_, so

that, finally, every one shall receive what he deserves.

=2.= Christianity is a _particular_ arrangement, under this

general plan: is a part of it, and conduces to its completion.

=3.= It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy.

1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man.

2.) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were

preparatory to it.

3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus

Christ came.

4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy.

5.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church,

judge the world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c.

=4.= Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme.

=5.= We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very

much unrevealed.

=6.= Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging

as to the whole system of religion, as we are as to the whole

system of nature.

II. _In both material and spiritual things, means are used to

accomplish ends._

=1.= Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know

its object and end.

=2.= Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so.

III. _Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature._

=1.= Why do we say there are _laws of nature_?

1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many

things, _e.g._

· Pestilence.

· Storms.

· Earthquakes.

· Diversities of human powers.

· Association of ideas.

2.) Hence we call many things _accidental_, which we know are

not matters of chance, but are subject to general laws.

3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their

general laws.

4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy.

=2.= Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with

God’s _general laws of wisdom_. These laws may be unknown to us;

but no more so than those by which some die as soon as born, or

live to old age, or have superior understandings, &c.

=3.= We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of

nature as a scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such.

1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would

be _likely_ to be a scheme.

2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an

arrangement to accomplish ends, there would of course seem to

us, in it, irregularities; just as we see in nature.

3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the

same manner as objections against the other.

* * * * *

Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to

Christianity _as a matter of fact_, and in this, as a general question

of _wisdom and goodness_, the next thing is to discuss _objections in

particular_.

As one of these is directed against _the scheme_, as just now

described, it will be considered here.

_Objec._ Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance;

just such as men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged

to adopt, in their designs.

_Ans._ 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the

natural world. The mystery is quite as great in nature as in

grace.

2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends.

3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but

progressive.

4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; _e.g._

animals, vegetables, geological periods, &c.

5.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining

another.

6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate.

CHAPTER V.

OF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM.

Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned

to Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits

mediation.

I. _Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of

others._

=1.= If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual?

=2.= The objection therefore is not only against _Christ’s_

mediation, but _all_ mediation.

II. _We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by whom he

should punish._

=1.= Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a

broken limb is of falling from a precipice.

=2.= This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and

giving it to nature; it is only distinguishing ordinary events

from miraculous.

III. _In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad

consequences of actions do not always follow._

=1.= We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he

permits it, and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect

remedies for it.

1.) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be

prevented by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance.

2.) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad

consequences of our misdeeds.

3.) Still more if assisted.

=2.= It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but

that it is so, shows compassion, as distinguished from goodness.

=3.= The course of nature affords many instances of such

compassion.

=4.= Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous

consequences of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some

cases.

=5.= If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which

we scarcely call vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend

that the bad consequences will be greater, in proportion as the

irregularity is greater.

=6.= A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a

religion, is incomparably more reprehensible than the mere

neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life.

=7.= As the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often

misery, ruin, and even death, no one can say what may be

the consequences of blasphemy, contempt of God, and final

impenitence.

=8.= Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great

wickedness can possibly be prevented, consistently with the

eternal rule of right.

=9.= Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for

pardon.

IV. _There is no probability that any thing we could do alone, would

entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities._

=1.= We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it

should be fit to remit punishment.

=2.= Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should

not know how to prevent them.

=3.= Vice impairs men’s abilities for helping themselves.

=4.= Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would

not have been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our

future interests?

=5.= In temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not

repair old errors, why should it as to future things?

=6.= Were it so in _all cases_ it would be contrary to all our

notions of government.

=7.= It could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases,

it would be so, even if we knew it might in _some_ cases.

=8.= The efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to

atonement, is contrary to the general sense of mankind; as shown

by the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices.

V. _In this state of apprehension, awakened by the light of nature,

revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of pardon

and safety._

=1.= Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin.

=2.= Declares the world to be in a state of ruin.

=3.= That repentance alone will not secure pardon.

=4.= That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition.

=5.= That God’s moral government is compassionate, as well as his

natural government.

=6.= That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to

save men.

=7.= All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless

degradation. But it is not Christianity which puts him so. All

philosophy and history show man to be degraded and corrupt.

VI. _Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the

light of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory

sacrifice._

=1.= He is “_that prophet_.”

1.) Declared the will of God.

2.) Published anew the law of nature.

3.) Taught with authority.

4.) Revealed the right manner of worship.

5.) Revealed the exact use of repentance.

6.) Revealed future rewards and punishments.

7.) Set us a perfect example.

=2.= He has a _kingdom_ which is not of this world.

1.) Founded a church.

2.) Governs it.

3.) Of it, all who obey him are members.

4.) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever.

=3.= He is a propitiatory _sacrifice_.

1.) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly

told.

2.) Conjectures may be absurd; at least cannot be certain.

3.) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him

produce his claim to it.

4.) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their

creed; and regard Christ only as a teacher.

5.) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about

how it was procured.

VII. _We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, whether a mediator

was necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his office._

=1.= We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted.

=2.= Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary.

=3.= The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as

indifferent whether he punishes the innocent or guilty.

1.) We see, in this world, the innocent _forced_ to suffer for

the faults of the guilty.

2.) But Christ suffered _voluntarily_.

=4.= Though, finally, every one shall receive according to

his own deserts; yet, during the progress of God’s scheme,

_vicarious_ sufferings may be necessary.

1.) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it

costs us suffering and toil.

2.) One person’s sufferings often tend to relieve another.

=5.= Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the

authority of God’s laws, and to deter men from sin.

=6.= Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not

objections to Christianity, but to the whole course of nature.

=7.= The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than

saying that a divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit,

because the objector does not see it to be so; though he must

own he is no judge, and _could_ not understand why it should be

necessary, if it were so!

VIII. _We have no reason to expect the same information touching God’s

conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty._

=1.= God instructs us by experience.

=2.= This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an

infinitely small part of his providence.

=3.= The things not understood involve God’s appointment, and

Christ’s execution; but what _is required of us_, we are clearly

informed.

=4.= Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious.

CHAPTER VI.

SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY.

It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that

its evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known

and believed.

But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us

any favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did

exactly the same for everybody else.

Such a notion, all analogy contradicts.

I. _Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence._

=1.= It is often absolutely _impossible_ to say which of two

modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit.

=2.= If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper,

satiety, ill health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our

pleasure.

=3.= We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off.

=4.= Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course

of action we adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter

us.

=5.= We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our

passions, &c.

=6.= Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage,

even when the probabilities of success are against them.

II. _As to the light of Christianity not being universal._

=1.= Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even

among creatures of the same species.

=2.= Yet it is certain that God governs.

=3.= We may prudently or imprudently use our good things.

=4.= The Jewish religion was not universal.

=5.= If it be _intended_ that Christianity should be a small

light, shining in a great and wide-spread darkness, it would be

perfectly uniform with other parts of God’s providence.

=6.= If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as

to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some

countries; and if, where it is the purest, some learn much less

from it than they might, there are manifest parallels in God’s

natural dispensations.

=7.= No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his

circumstances.

=8.= Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he

can, and to instruct his neighbor.

=9.= If revelation _were_ universal, in extent and degree,

different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives,

and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as

different as it is at present.

III. _Practical reflections._

_First._ That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably

to convince all, may be part of our probation.

=1.= It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our

understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs.

=2.= Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as

immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth.

_Secondly._ If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on

probation.

=1.= If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done

him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest

depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would

if there were _no_ reason to think so.

=2.= So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity

_may_ be true, we are as much bound to _examine_, &c. as we

would be bound to _obey_, if we _knew_ it was true.

=3.= Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is

not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of

those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their

hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and

so their obligations are much the same.

=4.= Doubts presuppose _some_ evidence, belief _more_, and

certainty _more still_. Each state should influence our

conduct, and does so, in common things.

=5.= It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is

glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless

overpowering.

_Thirdly._ Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a

ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it.

=1.= They constitute a wholesome discipline.

1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.

2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some

uncertainties.

=2.= In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as

to the evidence of religion is the _principal_ trial. A full

conviction of its truth would _constrain_ some to obedience.

_Fourthly._ The difficulties may be _in the objector_ rather than

in the religion.

=1.= Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.

=2.= Secretly _wishes_ religion not to be true.

=3.= Looks at objections rather than replies.

=4.= Treats the subject ludicrously.

_Fifthly._ The proof of Christianity is level to common men.

=1.= They are capable of being convinced of the existence of

God, and of their moral accountability.

=2.= And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the

fulfilment of prophecy.

=3.= If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are

capable of understanding the proof.

=4.= If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or

cannot examine them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just

as they do as to the sciences.

_Objec._ Our directions should be too plain to _admit_ of

doubt; like those of an earthly master.

_Ans._ The earthly master only wants his work done, and is

careless as to the state of the heart; but as the whole of

morality consists in the state of the heart, the cases are

not parallel.

_Finally._ The credibility of our being in a state of probation

is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion.

Our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to

our duty, and then whether we choose to do it.

Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what

is best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves

doubts: and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when

there may be doubt, is often fatal.

CHAPTER VII.

POSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of

Christianity, and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to

consider the positive evidence of its truth; _i.e._ what analogy

teaches with regard to that evidence.

There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or

prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs,

direct and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now

consider the proofs from MIRACLES and PROPHECY.

I. _Miracles._

=1.= Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles

described, as for common events.

1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as

speeches are by historians and poets put into the mouths of

heroes.

2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by

various writers, from that day to this.

3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the

miracles alone, can account for those events.

4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements,

and their reception in the world, is that the things really

happened.

5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if

doubtful.

=2.= Paul’s Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what

can attach to mere history.

1.) _Additional._ His evidence is quite detached. He received

the gospel not in common with the other apostles, but

separately, and direct from Christ, _after_ his ascension.

2.) _Peculiar._ He speaks of Christ’s miracles and those of

others _incidentally_, as familiar facts, fully believed by

those to whom he wrote.

=3.= Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles,

and was so received by great numbers, at the time and on the

spot; which is the case with no other religion.

1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground.

2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such

fearful sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these

miracles.

3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of

evidence as if they had testified to the truth of the miracles

in writing.

4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to

inform themselves.

5.) It is a sort of evidence _distinct_ from direct history,

though of the same nature.

6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to

believe _against their interests_, as these did.

=4.= It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof

is to be rejected; but in such an important concern we shall

proceed to notice some possible objections.

_Objec._ 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle

follies.

_Ans._ 1. This objection ignores the distinction between

opinions and facts. Suffering for an opinion is no proof of

its truth; but in attestation of observed facts, it is proof.

2. Enthusiasm _weakens_ testimony, it is true, even as to

facts; and so does disease, _in particular instances_. But

when great numbers, not weak, nor negligent, affirm that

_they_ saw and heard certain things, it is the fullest

evidence.

3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires

that the things testified be _incredible_; which has not been

shown, as to religion, but the contrary.

4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which

witnesses are liable to enthusiasm. In common matters, we

_get at the truth_ through witnesses, though influenced by

party spirit, custom, humor, romance, &c. &c.

_Objec._ 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the

apostles and first Christians.

_Ans._ Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in

Scripture; but not more in religious than in common affairs.

Men in all matters deceive themselves and others, in every

degree, yet human testimony is good ground of belief.

_Objec._ 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles.

_Ans._ Not oftener than by other pretences.

_Objec._ 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence.

_Ans._ 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles,

the evidence for the latter would not be _impaired_. The

objection really amounts to this, that evidence proved not to

be good, destroys evidence which is good and unconfuted! Or

to this, that if two men, of equal reputation, testify, in

_cases not related_ to each other, and one is proved false,

the other must not be believed!

2. Nothing can rebut testimony, but proof that the witness is

incompetent, or misled.

3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that

Christianity was too serious a matter to allow the first

converts to be careless as to its evidence; and also that

their religion forbid them to deceive others.

II. _As to the evidence from prophecy._

=1.= Obscurity as to _part_ of a prophecy does not invalidate it,

but is, as to us, as if that part were not written, or were lost.

We may not see the whole prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough

fulfilled to perceive in it more than human foresight.

=2.= A _long series_ of prophecies, all applicable to certain

events, is proof that such events were intended. This answers the

objection that _particular_ prophecies were not intended to be

applied as Christians apply them.

Mythological and satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy.

Now we apply a parable, or fable, or satire, merely from seeing

it _capable_ of such application.

So if a long series of prophecies be _applicable_ to the present

state of the world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that

they were so _intended_.

Besides, the ancient Jews, _before_ Christ, applied the

prophecies to him, just as Christians do now.

=3.= If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand

their own predictions, or that their prophecies are capable of

being applied to other events than those to which Christians

apply them, it would not abate the force of the argument from

prophecy, even with regard to those instances. For,

1.) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the

whole meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is

not knowing the whole mind of the author.

2.) If the book is a _compilation_, the authors may have

meanings deeper than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke

by inspiration, they are not the authors, but the writers of

prophecy, and may not have known all that the Divine Spirit

intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy shows a foresight

more than human.

REMARK.

This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those

will be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor

of understanding it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to

allow an argument its due weight; or who wilfully discard the whole

investigation.

THE GENERAL ARGUMENT

We _now_ proceed to THE GENERAL ARGUMENT embracing both direct and

circumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and

cannot be expected here; but _something_ should be said, especially

as most questions of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by

evidence arising from circumstances which confirm each other.

The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring

himself to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and

disclosing a plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising

them to perfect and final happiness.

I. _Consider this revelation as a history._

=1.= It furnishes an account of the world, as God’s world.

1.) God’s providence, commands, promises, and threatenings.

2.) Distinguishes God from idols.

3.) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors,

in a world considered as apostate and wicked.

4.) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not

for their importance as mere political events.

5.) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the

world.

=2.= It embraces a vast variety of other topics; natural and

moral.

1.) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism.

2.) So that _doubts_ of its truth confirm that truth, for in

this enlightened age the claims of a book of such a nature

could be easily and finally shown to be false, if they were so.

3.) None who believe in natural religion, hold that

Christianity has been thus confuted.

=3.= It contains a minute account of God’s selecting one nation

for his peculiar people, and of his dealings with them.

1.) Interpositions in their behalf.

2.) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled.

3.) Promises of a Messiah as their prince; so clearly as to

raise a general expectation, &c.

4.) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be

the Savior of the Gentiles.

=4.= Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his

life and labors; and the result, in the establishment of a new

religion.

II. _As to the authenticity of this history._

Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not

knowing even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of

authenticity, he would find,

=1.= That natural religion owes its establishment to _the

truths_ contained in this book. This no more _disproves_ natural

religion, than our learning a proposition from Euclid, shows that

the proposition was not true before Euclid.

=2.= The great antiquity of revelation.

=3.= That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by

known facts.

=4.= That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken

suspicion of its fidelity.

1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is

conformable to the manners of that age and country.

2.) The characters are all perfectly natural.

3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some

of these, taken alone, seem strange to _some_, in _this_ day;

but not more so than things now occurring.

4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more

numerous than in other ancient books; and none of them impair

the narrative.

=5.= That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts.

=6.= That the credibility of the _general_ history, confirms the

accounts of the miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make

but one statement.

=7.= That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews;

whose form of government was founded on these very books of

Moses; and whose acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept

them a distinct race.

=8.= That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time

when the Jews expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was

prophesied, and was received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied.

=9.= That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the

religion of the world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance;

and has continued till now.

=10.= That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people

dispersed into all lands; and still for many centuries, continue

to be a distinct race, professing the law of Moses. If this

separateness be _accounted for_, in any way, it does not destroy

the fact that it was _predicted_.

CONCLUSION.

=1.= Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations.

=2.= Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the

world, aside from the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history.

=3.= These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with

each other, in _a joint view_, will appear to be of great weight,

and would impress one who regarded them for the first time, more

than they do us who have been familiar with them.

=4.= The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to

proof of something more than human in this matter.

1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the

_existence_ of them cannot be.

2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be

accidental, but the _conformity itself_ cannot be denied.

3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it

cannot be said they are _nothing_. Probabilities may not amount

to demonstration, but they remain probabilities.

=5.= Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy,

and judge of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that

_together_ they amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs,

added together, not only increase evidence, but multiply it.

=6.= It is very well to observe objections; but it should be

remembered that a mistake on one side is far more dangerous than

a mistake on the other; and the safest conclusion is the best.

=7.= Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the

evidence taken together. Unless _all_ its proofs be overthrown,

it remains proved. If no proof singly were sufficient, the whole

taken together might be.

=8.= It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend

the united force of a whole argument.

=9.= Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation

cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.

CHAPTER VIII.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.

If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be

no need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they

condemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in

the minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections

will therefore be considered. They are these:--it does not solve

difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural

religion:--it will not make men religious to show them that it is

_as_ important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does not make

them prudent:--the justice of God in the system of religion, is not

proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:--no

reasoning from analogy can carry full conviction:--mankind will not

renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from

doubt. To each of which a reply will now be given.

I. _As to requiring a solution of all difficulties._

=1.= This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and

the whole plan of his government throughout eternity.

=2.= It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is

disputed. We are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician

does not understand all diseases, yet we do not despise what he

does know.

=3.= It is very important to find that objections against

revelation are just as strong, not only against natural religion,

but against the course of nature.

II. _As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they

have for being religious._

=1.= If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be

religious as they have to practise worldly prudence, then _there

is_ a reason for being religious.

=2.= If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has

the same reasons for belief, then it has proportionally a greater

claim.

=3.= If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then

doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be

wrong. Yet we constantly act, even in the most important affairs,

without _certainty_ of being right.

III. _As to the justice and goodness of God in religion._

=1.= Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty,

governed as we are; which is a very different thing. It has been

shown that if we knew all things, present, past, and future, and

the relations of each thing to all other things, we might see to

be just and good what now do not seem so: and it is probable we

should.

=2.= We do not say that objections against God’s justice and

goodness are removed by showing the like objections against

natural providence, but that they are not _conclusive_, because

they apply equally to what we know to be facts.

=3.= The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence

of facts. The fact for instance that God rewards and punishes,

though men may think it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human

acts, does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice.

=4.= Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown

from analogy, the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be

proved without regard to its quality. The reasonableness of

obeying Christianity is proved, if we barely prove Christianity

itself to be possible.

=5.= Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good,

it proves them to be credible.

IV. _The analogical argument does not remove doubt._

=1.= What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no

doubt? Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life,

is not agreed upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our

objects, is always uncertain; and still more whether the objects,

if accomplished, will give us happiness. Yet men do not on this

account refuse to make exertion.

=2.= This objection overlooks the very nature of religion.

The embracing of it presupposes a certain degree of candor

and integrity, to try which, and exercise, and improve it, is

its intention. Just as warning a man of danger, presupposes a

disposition to avoid danger.

=3.= Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such;

and would not be such, if it compelled assent.

=4.= We never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as

necessarily determines a man to act, but only such as will show

an action to be prudent.

V. _As to the small influence of the analogical argument._

=1.= As just observed, religion is a _test_, and an _exercise_,

of character; and that some reject it is nothing to our purpose.

We are inquiring not what sort of creature man is, but what he

should be. This is each man’s own concern.

=2.= Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether

individuals believe or not.

=3.= Even this objection admits that religion has some weight,

and of course it should have some influence; and if so, there is

the same reason, though not so strong, for publishing it, that

there would be, if it were likely to have greater influence.

FURTHER. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is

on the principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance

are omitted, because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and

the abstract fitness or unfitness of actions. The general argument is

just a question of fact, and is here so treated. Abstract truths are

usually advanced as proof; but in this work, only _facts_ are adduced.

That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is

an abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only a matter of

fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which

determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion

of an abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world

rewarded and punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his

conscience, this would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if

all acknowledged this as a fact, all would not see it to be right. If,

instead of his doing it now, we say he will do it hereafter, this too

is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. This fact could be

fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but without

them, there has now been given a _conclusive practical proof_; which

though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration,

cannot be answered.

Hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise,

=1.= To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as

proved on the principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will

furnish a full confirmation. To such as do not admit those

principles it is an original proof.

=2.= Those who believe will find objections removed, and

those who disbelieve will find they have no grounds for their

scepticism; and a good deal beside.

=3.= Thus though some may think _too much_ is here made of

analogy, yet there can be no denying that the argument is _real_.

It confirms _all facts_ to which it can be applied; and of

many is the only proof. It is strong on the side of religion,

and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts to abstract

reasonings.

CONCLUSION.

Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the

classes of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and

declares those who reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse.

Advertisement prefixed to the First Edition.

If the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not before

attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution

and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the application

of them; in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me

of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will

observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, if

he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any real

weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the proper

force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy

considered together.

It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many persons,

that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that

it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly they

treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among

all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up

as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of

reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the

world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not

taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will

thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his

own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing in

it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain

no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary.

The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to by

every one who is concerned in it.

_May, 1736._

INTRODUCTION.

Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by

this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the

highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot

indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption

for it; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a

question, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet

a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction, which

is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slightest

possible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from

hence; that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even

to moral certainty. Thus a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of

the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest

imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the observation of

this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has

been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will.

That which chiefly constitutes _probability_ is expressed in the word

_likely_, _i.e._ like some truth,[6] or true event; like it, in itself,

in its evidence, in some (more or fewer) of its circumstances.[7] For

when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event

has or will come to pass, it is from the mind’s remarking in it a

likeness to some other event, which we have observed has come to pass.

This observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption,

opinion, or full conviction, that such event has or will come to pass;

according as the observation is, that the like event has sometimes,

most commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches, come to

pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence

arises the belief, that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow

up to the stature and strength of a man; that food will contribute to

the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a number of

days, be its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure

of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits; our

expectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances; and

our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles; all these

rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, fear, expect,

judge; I say, upon our having observed the like, either with respect to

others or ourselves. Thus, the prince[8] who had always lived in a warm

climate, naturally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no

such thing as water’s becoming hard, because he had always observed it

to be fluid and yielding. We, on the contrary, from analogy conclude,

that there is no presumption at all against this: that it is supposable

there may be frost in England any given day in January next; probable

that there will on some day of the month; and that there is a moral

certainty, _i.e._ ground for an expectation without any doubt of it, in

some part or other of the winter.

Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind

of information; and is to be considered as relative only to beings

of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of

knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an

infinite intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely

as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But to us,

probability is the very guide of life.

From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such

as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or

is not seen; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon

the whole, any even the lowest presumption on one side, and none on

the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest

degree greater; this determines the question, even in matters of

speculation. In matters of practice, it will lay us under an absolute

and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act

upon that presumption or low probability, though it be so low as to

leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely a

man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole, according

to the best of his judgment, appears to be for his happiness,[9] as

what he certainly knows to be so.

Further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man will think

it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than

these; such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question

to be as supposable and credible as the other: nay, such even as but

amount to much less than this. For numberless instances might be

mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would

be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and

with great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon

much less, and where the probability or chance was greatly against his

succeeding.[10]

It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation,

and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds that _likeness_

should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which

the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does

necessarily produce in every one; or to guard against the errors, to

which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of

Logic; and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly

considered. Indeed I shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent,

compass, and force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general

heads and rules; and the whole be formed into a system. But though so

little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated of our

intellectual powers, and the exercise of them; this does not hinder but

that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that analogy is of

weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and our

practice. Nor does it in any wise cease to be of weight in those cases,

because persons, either given to dispute, or who require things to be

stated with greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of

in practical matters, may find other cases in which it is not easy to

say, whether it be, or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming

analogies, which are really of none. It is enough to the present

purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently

natural, just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question

but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at

all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.

Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen[11] has with singular

sagacity observed, that “_he who believes the Scripture to have

proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect

to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the

constitution of nature_.” And in a like way of reflection it may be

added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been from God upon

account of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny

the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there be

an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation

of Providence, which _revelation_ informs us of, and that system of

things and dispensation of Providence, which _experience_ together with

reason informs us of, _i.e._ the known course of nature; this is a

presumption, that they have both the same author and cause; at least so

far as to answer objections against the former’s being from God, drawn

from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter,

which is acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of nature is here

supposed.

Forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world

upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume,

whether from the attributes of God, or any thing else, is building

a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon

reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to

which we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the

structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines,

from mere mathematics,) is an error much akin to the former: since what

is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis.

But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the

observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to

others that are like them; from that part of the divine government over

intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and

more general government over them which is beyond it; and from what is

present, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will

be hereafter.

This method then of concluding and determining being practical, and

what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the common

pursuits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various degrees,

proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or

likeness; and having so great authority for its introduction into the

subject of religion, even revealed religion; my design is to apply

it to that subject in general, both natural and revealed: taking for

proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural

Governor of the world. For as there is no presumption against this

prior to the proof of it: so it has been often proved with accumulated

evidence; from this argument of analogy and final causes; from abstract

reasonings; from the most ancient tradition and testimony; and from

the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can

find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves

dissatisfied with the evidence of religion.

As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is in fact

the constitution of nature, form their notions of God’s government

upon hypothesis: so there are others, who indulge themselves in vain

and idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been framed

otherwise than it is; and upon supposition that things might, in

imagining that they should, have been disposed and carried on after a

better model, than what appears in the present disposition and conduct

of them.[12] Suppose now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with

his reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan

of nature, as appearing to him the best.--One shall scarce be thought

guilty of detraction against human understanding, if one should say,

even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person would fix

upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, probably would not

be the very best, even according to his own notions of _best_; whether

he thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives for

the exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the

greatest happiness, or that these two were necessarily connected, and

run up into one and the same plan.

It may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the amount

of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system of

nature, or how far they would mislead us. It seems there could be no

stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these: that all

creatures should at first be made as perfect and as happy as they

were capable of ever being: that nothing, surely, of hazard or danger

should be put upon them to do; some indolent persons would perhaps

think nothing at all: or certainly, that effectual care should be

taken, that they should, whether necessarily or not, yet eventually

and in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to happiness;

which would be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either by

not giving them any principles which would endanger their going wrong,

or by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their

minds in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing them to

act conformably to it: and that the whole method of government by

punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an awkward roundabout

method of carrying things on; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose,

for which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely, happiness.

Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to the

several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has been

above intimated, is a full direct general answer to it; namely, that

we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of

speculation. For though it be admitted that, from the first principles

of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be

absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends now

mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is absolutely

the best; and consequently that we must conclude the ultimate end

designed, in the constitution of nature and conduct of Providence, is

the most virtue and happiness possible; yet we are far from being able

to judge what particular disposition of things would be most friendly

and assistant to virtue; or what means might be absolutely necessary

to produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our own

world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should

suppose it detached from the whole things. Indeed we are so far from

being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what may be the

necessary means of raising and conducting one person to the highest

perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs

of the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are

not competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole nature

leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all

imperfection of him. And this will forever be a practical proof of his

moral character, to such as will consider what a practical proof is;

because it is the voice of God speaking in us. Hence we conclude, that

virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature;

and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a

universe under his government. But we are in no sort judges, what are

the necessary means of accomplishing this end.

Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent employment of

forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn

our thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of nature with

respect to intelligent creatures; which may be resolved into general

laws or rules of administration, in the same way as many of the laws of

nature respecting inanimate matter may be collected from experiments.

Let us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is

said to be the moral system of nature; the acknowledged dispensations

of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with

what religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether they

are not analogous and of a piece. Upon such a comparison it will, I

think, be found that they are very much so: that both may be traced

up to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of

divine conduct.

The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large extent,

and consists of several parts; in some more, in others less exact.

In some few instances perhaps, it may amount to a real practical

proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confirmation of what is

proved otherwise. It will undeniably show, what too many need to have

shown them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed,

considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is not

a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. And it will

afford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of

natural and revealed religion; though not perhaps an answer in so great

a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer to the objections

against the evidence of it: for objections against a proof, and

objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe

are different things.

The divine government of the world, implied in the notion of religion

in general and of Christianity, contains in it: that mankind is

appointed to live in a future state;[13] that there every one shall be

rewarded or punished;[14] rewarded or punished respectively for all

that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words, virtuous

or vicious, morally good or evil:[15] that our present life is a

probation, a state of trial,[16] and of discipline,[17] for that future

one; notwithstanding the objections, which men may fancy they have,

from notions of necessity, against there being any such moral plan as

this at all;[18] and whatever objections may appear to lie against

the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known

to us at present:[19] that this world being in a state of apostasy

and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense both of their

condition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this gave

occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence; of the utmost

importance;[20] proved by miracles;[21] but containing in it many

things appearing to us strange, and not to have been expected;[22] a

dispensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of things;[23]

carried on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order

to the recovery of the world;[24] yet not revealed to all men, nor

proved with the strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is

revealed; but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular

evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.[25]

The design then of the following treatise will be to show, that

the several parts principally objected against in this moral and

Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the

proof which God has afforded us of its truth; that the particular

parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation, are

analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and course of

nature or Providence; that the chief objections themselves which are

alleged against the former, are no other than what may be alleged

with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact

to be inconclusive; and that this argument from analogy is in general

unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion,[26]

notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, and

the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to

the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a

general account of what may be looked for in the following treatise.

I shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes

and of all our fears; all our hopes and fears, which are of any

consideration; I mean a future life.

THE

ANALOGY OF RELIGION.

PART I.

Natural Religion.

CHAPTER I.

A FUTURE LIFE.[27]

Strange difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal

identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of

our existing now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments;

which, whoever thinks it worth while, may see considered in the first

dissertation at the end of this treatise. But without regard to any of

them here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, and the several

changes which we have undergone, and those which we know we may undergo

without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or

may not, have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable, that

we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life and

perception.

I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect

state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find

it to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same

creatures, the _same individuals_, should exist in degrees of life and

perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in

one period of their being, greatly different from those appointed them

in another period of it. In other creatures the same law holds. For

the difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth

(to go no higher) and in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and

the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change: and

birds and insects bursting the shell of their habitation, and by this

means entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations

for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; these are

instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the various and

wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration

here. The states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly, in

the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different from our present

in mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees

of life can be. Therefore that we are to exist hereafter, in a state

as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former,

is but according to the analogy of nature; according to a natural

order or appointment of the very same kind, with what we have already

experienced.

II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness

and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure and

suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and capacities before

death, is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after

death; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon,

unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the

destruction of those living powers; because there is in every case

a probability, that all things will continue as we experience they

are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to

think they will be altered. This is that _kind_[28] of presumption or

probability from analogy, expressed in the very word _continuance_,

which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the

world will continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience

or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only

reason for believing, that any one substance now existing will continue

to exist a moment longer; the self-existent substance only excepted.

Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the

destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, there would

be no apprehension that any other power or event, unconnected with this

of death, would destroy these faculties just at the instant of each

creature’s death; and therefore no doubt but that they would remain

after it; which shows the high probability that our living powers will

continue after death, unless there be some ground to think that death

is their destruction.[29] For, if it would be in a manner certain that

we should survive death,[30] provided it were certain that death would

not be our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive

it, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction.

Though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the natural and

moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, there would arise

a general confused suspicion, that in the great shock and alteration

which we shall undergo by death, we, _i.e._ our living powers, might be

wholly destroyed; yet even prior to those proofs, there is really no

particular distinct ground or reason for this apprehension at all, so

far as I can find. If there be, it must arise either from _the reason

of the thing_, or from _the analogy of nature_.

But we cannot argue from _the reason of the thing_, that death is the

destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is

in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of

flesh, skin, and bones. These effects do in no wise appear to imply the

destruction of a living agent. Besides, as we are greatly in the dark,

upon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly

ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon; the powers themselves

as distinguished, not only from their actual exercise, but also from

the present capacity of exercising them; and as opposed to their

destruction: for sleep, or certainly a swoon, shows us, not only that

these powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of

motion does in inanimate matter; but shows also that they exist, when

there is no present capacity of exercising them: or that the capacities

of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual exercise

of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain

undestroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what the existence of

our living powers depends, this shows further, there can no probability

be collected from the reason of the thing, that death will be their

destruction: because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no

degree affected by death; upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this

king of terrors. So that there is nothing more certain, than that _the

reason of the thing_ shows us no connection between death and the

destruction of living agents.

Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole _analogy of nature_ to

afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose their

living powers; much less if it were possible, that they lose them

by death: for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or

through it, so as to see what becomes of them. This event removes them

from our view. It destroys the _sensible_ proof, which we had before

their death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does not

appear to afford the least reason to believe that they are, then, or by

that event, deprived of them.

Our knowing that they were possessed of these powers, up to the very

period to which we have faculties capable of tracing them, is itself

a probability of their retaining them beyond it. This is confirmed,

and a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very great

and astonishing changes which we have experienced; so great, that our

existence in another state of life, of perception and of action, will

be but according to a method of providential conduct, the like to which

has been already exercised even with regard to ourselves; according to

a course of nature, the like to which we have already gone through.

However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how difficult it is to

silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason even distinctly

heard in this case; as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge

that forward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere;

(of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all

error,) as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude conceptions

of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted with what indeed

we are wholly ignorant of: it may be proper to consider the imaginary

presumptions, that death will be our destruction, arising from these

kinds of early and lasting prejudices; and to show how little they

really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of

them. And,

I. All presumption of death’s being the destruction of living beings,

must go upon supposition that they are compounded;[31] and so,

discerptible. But since consciousness is a single and indivisible

power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so

too. For were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and

indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose

part of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, _i.e._ part of

this matter to move, and part to be at rest, then its power of motion

would be indivisible; and so also would the subject in which the power

inheres, namely, the particle of matter: for if this could be divided

into two, one part might be moved and the other at rest, which is

contrary to the supposition.

In like manner it has been argued,[32] and, for any thing appearing

to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or consciousness,

which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that it

is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here and the

other there; the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is

indivisible too: and consequently the subject in which it resides,

_i.e._ the conscious being. Now, upon supposition that the living

agent each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which there is

at least no more difficulty in conceiving than in conceiving it to be

a compound, and of which there is the proof now mentioned; it follows,

that our organized bodies are no more ourselves or part of ourselves,

than any other matter around us. And it is as easy to conceive, how

matter, which is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the

manner which our present bodies are; as how we can receive impressions

from, and have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that

we may exist out of bodies, as in them; and that we might have animated

bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now

given us; and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies,

variously modified and organized; as to conceive how we can animate

such bodies as our present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these

several organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively

animated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy

the living beings ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the

faculties of perception and of action, than the dissolution of any

foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving impressions from, and

making use of, for the common occasions of life.

II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot,

from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental

observations. But as these _fall in_ with the supposition of its

unity, so they plainly lead us to _conclude_ certainly, that our gross

organized bodies, with which we perceive objects of sense, and with

which we act, are no part of ourselves; and therefore show us, that we

have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours: even without

determining whether our living substance be material or immaterial. For

we see by experience, that men may lose their limbs, their organs of

sense, and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the

same living agents. Persons can trace up the existence of themselves

to a time, when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in

comparison of what it is in mature age: and we cannot but think, that

they might _then_ have lost a considerable part of that small body,

and yet have remained the same living agents; as they may now lose

great part of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain,

that the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux;[33] from that

never-ceasing attrition, which there is in every part of them. Now,

things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between these

living agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in which we

are very nearly interested; since these may be alienated, and actually

are in a daily course of succession, and changing their owners; whilst

we are assured, that each living agent remains one and the same

permanent being.[34] And this general observation leads us on to the

following ones.

_First_, That we have no way of determining by experience, what is the

certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself: and yet, till

it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary

particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural

power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the

dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be

absolutely indiscerptible.

_Secondly_, From our being so nearly related to and interested

in certain systems of matter, (suppose our flesh and bones,) and

afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents,

ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding

such alienation; and consequently these systems of matter not being

ourselves, it follows further that we have no ground to conclude any

other (suppose _internal_) _systems_ of matter, to be the living agents

ourselves; because we can have no ground to conclude this, but from

our relation to and interest in such other systems of matter: and

therefore we can have no reason to conclude what befalls those systems

of matter at death, to be the destruction of the living agents. We have

already several times over, lost a great part or perhaps the whole of

our body, according to certain common established laws of nature, yet

we remain the same living agents. When we shall lose as great a part,

or the whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why

may we not also remain the same? That the alienation has been gradual

in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does not prove

any thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those

many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us

ourselves; why should we imagine death will be so fatal to us? Nor can

it be objected, that what is thus alienated or lost, is no part of our

original solid body, but only adventitious matter. Because we may lose

entire limbs, which must have contained many solid parts and vessels of

the original body; or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that

any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though

we are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter,

whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of our

solid body, yet after all, the relation a person bears to those parts

of his body, to which he is most nearly related, amounts but to this,

that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually affect

each other.[35] The same thing, the same thing in kind though not in

degree, may be said of _all foreign_ matter, which gives us ideas, and

over which we have any power. From these observations the whole ground

of the imagination is removed, that the dissolution of any matter, is

the destruction of a living agent, from the interest he once had in

such matter.

_Thirdly_, If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, as made

up of organs and instruments of perception and of motion, it will

bring us to the same conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments

show, and even the observation how sight is assisted by glasses

shows, that we see with our eyes in the same sense as we see with

glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, that we see with them in

any other sense; any other, I mean, which would lead us to think the

eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hearing; and our

feeling distant solid matter by means of something in our hand, seems

an instance of the like kind, as to the subject we are considering.

All these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of

our body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying

them to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar to the manner in

which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are in a like

way instruments of our receiving such ideas from external objects,

as the Author of nature appointed those external objects to be the

occasions of exciting in us. Glasses are evident instances of this;

namely of matter which is no part of our body, preparing objects for

and conveying them towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our

bodily organs do. And if we see with our eyes only in the same manner

as we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy,

of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said,

to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by

any other sense, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to the

_living power_ of seeing, or perceiving: but that so far as it can be

traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that our organs

of sense prepare and convey objects, in order to their being perceived,

in like manner as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of

appearance, that they themselves perceive. And that we have no reason

to think our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of

persons losing some of them, the living beings themselves, their former

occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience

of dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent,

and what would be otherwise an unimagined unknown power of perceiving

sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external

organs of sense, as with them.

So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing motion by will

and choice; upon the destruction of a limb, this active power evidently

remains, unlessened; so that the living being, who has suffered this

loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had another limb to

move with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg. It can make

use of a pole or a lever, to reach towards itself and to move things,

beyond the length and the power of its arm; and this it does in the

same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things

nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of

our limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves;

though they are adapted, like the several parts of a machine, to be the

instruments of motion to each other; and some parts of the same limb,

to be instruments of motion to the other parts.

Thus a man determines that he will look at an object through a

microscope; or being lame, that he will walk to such a place with a

staff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in these

cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to

think they any more put the determination in practice; or that his

eyes are the seers, or his feet the movers, in any other sense than

as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs

of sense, and our limbs, are certainly _instruments_,[36] which the

living persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with: there

is not any probability, that they are any more; nor consequently,

that we have any other kind of relation to them, than what we have to

any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and

motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind of

relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it) nor consequently

is there any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these

instruments, is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent.

And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which living

beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution; and

that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of

perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction;

shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to think that the

dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and

instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents,

from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand

in any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by

death.

But it is said, these observations are equally applicable to

brutes:[37] and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they

should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting

happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak:

but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in

the way of natural or moral consideration. For 1, Suppose the invidious

thing, designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as

it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes, namely,

that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and

moral agents; even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what

latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once,

prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures,

as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of

understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace up our own

existence to the same original with theirs. We find it to be a general

law of nature, that creatures endued with _capacities_ of virtue and

religion should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are

altogether without _the use_ of them, for a considerable length of

their duration; as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the

human species, go out of the present world, before they come to the

exercise of these capacities in _any_ degree.

2. The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply, that

they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or _moral_

nature. The economy of the universe might require, that there should

be living creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all

difficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed of, are so

apparently and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is wonderful

they should be insisted upon by any, but such as are weak enough to

think they are acquainted with the whole system of things. There

is then absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so

rhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs

or presumptions of the immortality of human minds; I say the greatest

part, for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is

more peculiar to mankind.

III. As it is evident our _present_ powers and capacities of reason,

memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross body in the manner

in which perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not appear

to depend upon it at all, in any such manner as to give ground to

think, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of

these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of

sensation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much

as a suspension of the former.

Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception,

greatly different from each other; each of which has its own peculiar

laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of

our senses are affected, or appetites gratified with the objects of

them, we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation. When

none of our senses are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we

perceive, and reason, and act, we may be said to exist or live in a

state of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing

which is dissolved by death, is in any way necessary to the living

being, in this its state of reflection, _after_ ideas are gained.

For, though, from our present constitution and condition of being,

our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to

our reflecting powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in

architecture:[38] yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable

of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest

pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection,

without any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, which

we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It does

not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting

being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking; to intellectual

enjoyments or sufferings: nor, consequently, that the dissolution or

alienation of the former by death, will be the destruction of those

present powers, which render us capable of this state of reflection.

Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all

affect our present intellectual powers; and this affords a presumption,

that those diseases will not destroy these present powers. Indeed,

from the observations made above,[39] it appears, that there is no

presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the

dissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent. By

the same reasoning, it must appear too, that there is no presumption,

from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of

the body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers: indeed

instances of their not affecting each other, afford a presumption of

the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present

reflecting powers, evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such

diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly

affect all our living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of

them; as for instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound

sleep: and hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till

we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. But in

the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this shadow of

probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting

powers which we have at present. For in those diseases, persons the

moment before death appear to be in the highest vigor of life. They

discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire; the utmost force of

affection; a sense of character, of shame and honor; and the highest

mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp. These surely

prove even greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now what

pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when arrived

to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, will destroy

those powers, which were not impaired, which were not affected by it,

during its whole progress quite up to that degree? And if death by

diseases of this kind, is not the destruction of our present reflecting

powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other means is.

It is obvious that this general observation may be carried further.

There appears to be so little connection between our bodily powers

of sensation, and our present powers of reflection, that there is

no reason to conclude, that death, which destroys the former, does

so much as _suspend the exercise_ of the latter, or interrupt our

_continuing_ to exist in the like state of reflection which we do

now.[40] For suspension of reason, memory, and the affections which

they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor implied in our notion

of it. Our daily experiencing these powers to be exercised, without

any assistance, that we know of, from those bodies which will be

dissolved by death; and our finding often, that the exercise of them

is so lively to the last; afford a sensible apprehension, that death

may not perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of these

powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies.[41] So

that our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it additional to our

present, may yet not be beginning entirely anew; but going on. Death

may, in some sort and in some respects, answer to our birth; which is

not a suspension of the faculties which we had before it, or a _total_

change of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb; but a

continuation of both, with such and such great alterations.

Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life and of death,

death may immediately, in the natural course of things, put us into a

higher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does;[42] a state

in which our capacities; and sphere of perception and of action, may

be much greater than at present. For as our relation to our external

organs of sense, renders us capable of existing in our present state of

sensation; so it may be the only natural hinderance to our existing,

immediately, and of course; in a _higher_ state of reflection. The

truth is, reason does not at all show us, in what state death naturally

leaves us. But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive

and active powers; yet the suspension of a power and the destruction

of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience from

sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from one to the

other; or conclude even to the lowest degree of probability, that the

same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though

it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them.[43]

These observations together may be sufficient to show, how little

presumption there is, that death is the destruction of human creatures.

However, there is the shadow of an analogy, which may lead us to

imagine it,--viz.: the supposed likeness which is observed between the

decay of vegetables, and of living creatures. This likeness is indeed

sufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of

the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life. But

in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that there appears no

ground for the comparison, as to the present question; because one

of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that, which is the

principal and chief thing in the other; the power of perception and of

action; which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continuance

of. So that the destruction of a vegetable, is an event not similar or

analogous to the destruction of a living agent.

If, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive custom of

substituting imagination in the room of experience, we would confine

ourselves to what we do know and understand; if we would argue only

from that, and from that form our expectations, it would appear at

first sight, that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to

be so, can be concluded from the reason of the thing, so none can be

collected from the analogy of nature; because we cannot trace any

living beings beyond death. But as we are conscious that we are endued

with capacities of perception and of action, and are living persons;

what we are to go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee

some accident or event, which will endanger those capacities, or be

likely to destroy us: which death does in no wise appear to be.

Thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new scenes, and

a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we came into the

present. And this new state may naturally be a social one.[44] And the

advantages of it, advantages, of every kind, may naturally be bestowed,

according to some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon every one in

proportion to the degrees of his virtue. And though the advantages

of that future natural state should not be bestowed, as these of the

present in some measure are, by the will of the society; but entirely

by his more immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature

depends: yet this distribution may be just as natural, as their being

distributed here by the instrumentality of men. Indeed, though one

should allow any confused undetermined sense, which people please to

put upon the word _natural_, it would be a shortness of thought scarce

credible, to imagine, that no system or course of things can be so, but

only what we see at present:[45] especially whilst the probability

of a future life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is admitted

upon the evidence of reason; because this is really both admitting

and denying at once, a state of being different from the present to

be natural. But the only distinct meaning of that word is, _stated_,

_fixed_, or _settled_; since what is natural as much requires and

presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, _i.e._ to effect it

continually, or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous

does to effect it for once.

Hence it must follow, that persons’ notion of what is natural, will be

enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of God,

and the dispensations of his providence. Nor is there any absurdity in

supposing, that there may be beings in the universe, whose capacities,

and knowledge, and views, may be so extensive, as that the whole

Christian dispensation may to them appear natural, _i.e._ analogous

or conformable to God’s dealings with other parts of his creation; as

natural as the visible known course of things appears to us. For there

seems scarce any other possible sense to be put upon the word, but that

only in which it is here used; similar, stated, or uniform.

This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted upon,

how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to answer all the

purposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof would.

Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not

be a proof of religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as

reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted

for by it, as that we are now alive is: and therefore nothing can

be more absurd than to argue from that scheme, that there can be no

future state. But as religion implies a future state, any presumption

against such a state, is a presumption against religion. The foregoing

observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to a

very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine of

religion; which, if believed, would greatly open and dispose the mind

seriously to attend to the general evidence! of the whole.

CHAPTER II.

THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

That which makes the question concerning a future life to be of so

great importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and misery. And

that which makes the consideration of it to be of so great importance

to us, is the supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter

depending upon our actions here. Indeed, without this, curiosity

could not but sometimes bring a subject, in which we may be so highly

interested, to our thoughts; especially upon the mortality of others,

or the near prospect of our own. But reasonable men would not take

any further thought about hereafter, than what should happen thus

occasionally to rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future

interest no way depended upon our present behavior; whereas, on the

contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, to

think it does, then there is reason also for the most active thought

and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as that we may

escape that misery, and obtain that happiness, in another life, which

we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also

is put in our own power. And whether there be ground for this last

apprehension, certainly would deserve to be most seriously considered,

were there no other proof of a future life and interest, than that

presumptive one, which the foregoing observations amount to.

In the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of what

we suffer, _is put in our own power_. Pleasure and pain are the

consequences of our actions; and we are endued by the Author of our

nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. We find by

experience that he does not so much as preserve our lives, exclusive

of our own care and attention, to provide ourselves with, and to make

use of, that sustenance, by which he has appointed our lives shall

be preserved; and without which, he has appointed, they shall not be

preserved. In general we foresee, that the external things, which

are the objects of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor

enjoyed, without exerting ourselves in such and such manners: but by

thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in which

our natural good consists; or by this means God gives us the possession

and enjoyment of them. I know not, that we have any one kind or degree

of enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. By prudence and

care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and

quiet: on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion,

wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever

we please. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable,

_i.e._ to do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow

those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, and

experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely

death. This every one observes to be the general course of things;

though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that _all_

our sufferings are owing to our own follies.

Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures promiscuously such

and such perceptions, without regard to their behavior; why he does

not make them happy without the instrumentality of their own actions,

and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another

matter.[46] Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature

of things, which we are unacquainted with.[47] Or less happiness, it

may be, would upon the whole be produced by such a method of conduct,

than is by the present. Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I

mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare

single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make the

good, the faithful, the honest, happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect

mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably to the

nature which he has given them; to the relations which he has placed

them in to each other; and to that which they stand in to himself:

that relation to himself, which, during their existence, is even

necessary,[48] and which is the most important one of all: perhaps,

I say, an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this moral

piety of moral agents, in and for itself; as well as upon account of

its being essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or

the whole end, for which God made, and thus governs the world, may

be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat

in it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind

man to have a conception of colors. However this be, it is certain

matter of universal experience, that the general method of divine

administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capacities to foresee,

with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall have

such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings; and giving us those

enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our

actions.

“But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature,” True.

This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to

the general course of nature: _i.e._ not surely to the words or ideas,

_course of nature_; but to Him who appointed it, and put things into

it; or to a course of operation, from its uniformity or constancy,

called natural;[49] and which necessarily implies an operating agent.

For when men find themselves necessitated to confess an Author of

nature, or that God is the natural governor of the world, they must

not deny this again, because his government is uniform. They must not

deny that he does things at all, because he does them constantly,[50]

because the effects of his acting are permanent, whether his acting

be so or not; though there is no reason to think it is not. In short,

every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the forethought

and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good: and if the natural

course of things be the appointment of God, and our natural faculties

of knowledge and experience are given us by him, then the good and bad

consequences which follow our actions, are his appointment, and our

foresight of those consequences, is a warning given us by him, how we

are to act.

“Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every particular

gratification of passion, intended to put us upon gratifying ourselves

in every such particular instance, and as a reward to us for so doing?”

No, certainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes were naturally

intended to give us the sight of each particular object, to which they

do or can extend; objects which are destructive of them, or which, for

any other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is

no doubt, but that our eyes were intended for us to see with.[51] So

neither is there any doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and pains

belonging to the passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind

to act in such and such manners.

From this general observation, obvious to every one, (that God has

given us to understand, he has appointed satisfaction and delight to be

the consequence of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of

our acting in another, and of our not acting at all; and that we find

these consequences, which we were beforehand informed of, uniformly

to follow;) we may learn, that we are at present actually under his

government in the strictest and most proper sense; in such a sense, as

that he rewards and punishes us for our actions.

An Author of nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction

of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are thus under his

government; under his government, in the same sense, as we are under

the government of civil magistrates. Because the annexing of pleasure

to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear,

and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it

concerns, is the proper formal notion of government.

Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our behavior, be

owing to the Author of nature’s acting upon us every moment which we

feel it; or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part

in the plan of the world; makes no alteration as to the matter before

us. For if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws

take place, without interposing at all, after they had passed them;

without a trial, and the formalities of an execution: if they were able

to make their laws _execute themselves_, or every offender to execute

them upon himself; we should be just in the same sense under their

government then, as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more

perfect manner.

Vain is the ridicule, with which one foresees some persons will divert

themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as instances of divine

punishment. There is no possibility of answering or evading the general

thing here intended, without denying all final causes. For final causes

being admitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted

too as instances of them. And if they are; if God annexes delight to

some actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design to

induce us to act so and so; then he not only dispenses happiness and

misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for example, the

pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the destruction of our

bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding

ourselves, be appointed by the Author of nature to prevent our doing

what thus tends to our destruction; this is altogether as much an

instance of his punishing our actions, and consequently of our being

under his government,[52] as declaring by a voice from heaven, that if

we acted so, he would inflict such pain upon us; and inflicting it,

whether it be greater or less.

Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of the Author of

nature, is that of a master or governor, prior to the consideration

of his moral attributes. The fact of our case, which we find by

experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or government over

us at present, by rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as

strict and proper a sense of these words, and even in the same sense,

as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished by those who

govern them.

Thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course of things,

most fully shows, that there is nothing incredible in the general

doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish men for their

actions hereafter: nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the

notion of rewarding and punishing. For the whole course of nature is

a present instance of his exercising that government over us, which

implies in it rewarding and punishing.

* * * * *

As divine _punishment_ is what men chiefly object against, and are most

unwilling to allow; it may be proper to mention some circumstances

in the natural course of punishments at present, which are analogous

to what religion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment;

indeed so analogous, that as they add a further credibility to it, so

they cannot but raise a most serious apprehension of it in those who

will attend to them.

It has been now observed, that such and such miseries naturally follow

such and such actions of imprudence and wilfulness, as well as actions

more commonly and more distinctly considered as vicious; and that

these consequences, when they may be foreseen, are properly natural

punishments annexed to such actions. The general thing here insisted

upon, is, not that we see a great deal of misery in the world, but a

great deal which men bring upon themselves by their own behavior, which

they might have foreseen and avoided. Now the circumstances of these

natural punishments, particularly deserving our attention, are such

as these. Oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of,

actions which procure many present advantages, and are accompanied with

much present pleasure; for instance, sickness and untimely death are

the consequence of intemperance, though accompanied with the highest

mirth, and jollity. These punishments are often much greater, than

the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions, of which they are

the punishments or consequences. Though we may imagine a constitution

of nature, in which these natural punishments, which are in fact to

follow, would follow, immediately upon such actions being done, or

very soon after; we find on the contrary in our world, that they are

often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the actions

occasioning them are forgot; so that the constitution of nature is

such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of presumption of

final impunity. After such delay, these natural punishments or miseries

often come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, and at once;

however, the chief misery often does. As certainty of such distant

misery following such actions, is never afforded persons, so perhaps

during the actions, they have seldom a distinct, full expectation of

its following:[53] and many times the case is only thus, that they see

in general, or may see, the credibility, that intemperance, suppose,

will bring after it diseases; civil crimes, civil punishments; when

yet the real probability often is, that they shall escape; but things

notwithstanding take their destined course, and the misery inevitably

follows at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. Thus also

though youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness and folly,

as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the

consequences of being untractable and profligate, this does not hinder,

but that these consequences follow; and are grievously felt, throughout

the whole course of mature life. Habits contracted even in that age,

are often utter ruin: and men’s success in the world, not only in the

common sense of worldly success, but their real happiness and misery,

depends, in a great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in

which they pass their youth; which consequences they for the most

part neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said to

believe, beforehand. In numberless cases, the natural course of things

affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to ourselves at

certain times, which we cannot procure when we will; nor ever recall

the opportunities, if we have neglected them. Indeed the general course

of nature is an example of this. If, during the opportunity of youth,

persons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their

future life, for want of those acquirements, which they neglected the

natural season of attaining. If the husbandman lets seedtime pass

without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. Though

after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance _up to a certain

degree_, it is often in their power, to retrieve their affairs, to

recover their health and character, at least in good measure; yet real

reformation is in many cases, of no avail at all towards preventing

the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly

and extravagance _exceeding that degree_. There is a certain bound to

imprudence and misbehavior, which being transgressed, there remains no

place for repentance in the natural course of things. It is further

very much to be remarked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want

of attention,[54] not looking about us to see what we have to do, are

often attended with consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active

misbehavior, from the most extravagant passion. And lastly, civil

government being natural, the punishments of it are so too: and some

of these punishments are capital; as the effects of a dissolute course

of pleasure are often mortal. So that many natural punishments are

final[55] to him who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal

capacity; and seem inflicted by natural appointment, either to remove

the offender out of the way of being further mischievous, or as an

example, though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are left

behind.

These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met with only

now and then; but they are things of every day’s experience. They

proceed from general laws, very general ones, by which God governs the

world in the natural course of his providence.[56]

And they are so analogous, to what religion teaches us concerning the

future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that

both would naturally be expressed in the very same words, and manner

of description. In the book of _Proverbs_,[57] for instance, wisdom

is introduced, as frequenting the most public places of resort, and

as rejected when she offers herself as the natural appointed guide

of human life. _How long_, speaking to those who are passing through

it, _how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and the scorners

delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn ye at my

reproof. Behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, I will make known

my words unto you._ But upon being neglected, _Because I have called,

and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but

ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I

also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh;

when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a

whirlwind; when distress and anguish come upon you. Then shall they

call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they

shall not find me._ This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and

some parts of it are highly figurative; but the meaning is obvious.

And the thing intended is expressed more literally in the following

words; _For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of

the Lord----therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way,

and be filled with their own devices. For the security of the simple

shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them._ The

whole passage is so equally applicable to what we experience in the

present world, concerning the consequences of men’s actions, and to

what religion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it may be

questioned which of the two was principally intended.

Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a future

state of rewards and punishments, nothing methinks can give one so

sensible an apprehension of the latter, or representation of it to

the mind, as observing, that after the many disregarded checks,

admonitions, and warnings, which people meet with in the ways of vice

and folly and extravagance, warnings from their very nature, from the

examples of others, from the lesser inconveniences which they bring

upon themselves, from the instructions of wise and virtuous men:

after these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed: after the

chief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of their follies, have

been delayed for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly,

like an armed force: repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve

only to aggravate their distress, the case is become desperate: and

poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the

effects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond possibility of

remedy or escape. This is an account of what is; in fact, the general

constitution of nature.

It is not in any sort meant, that, according to what appears at present

of the natural course of things, men are always uniformly punished

in proportion to their misbehavior. But that there are very many

instances of misbehavior punished in the several ways now mentioned,

and very dreadful instances too; sufficient to show what the laws of

the universe may admit, and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient fully

to answer all objections against the credibility of a future state of

punishments, from any imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and

external temptations, almost annihilate the guilt of human vices: as

well as objections of another sort; from necessity, from suppositions,

that the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he

must be incapable of offence and provocation.[58]

Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious

persons, even the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest

strength of mind; but it is fit that things be stated and considered as

they really are. There is, in the present age, a certain fearlessness

with regard to what may be hereafter under the government of God, which

nothing but a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of

atheism can justify; and which makes it quite necessary, that men be

reminded, and if possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground

for being thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles.

For, may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the

world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by being

made an example of the woeful effects of vice and folly? That he may,

as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands

of civil justice, or in some other course of extravagance shorten his

days; or bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than death? So

that it had been better for him, even with regard to the present world,

that he had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for

people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain

proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be

nothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more general

interest, under the providence and government of the same God?

CHAPTER III.[59]

THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

As the manifold appearances of design, and of final causes, in the

constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an intelligent

mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed

amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his government; what

may be called his natural government of creatures endued with sense

and reason. This implies somewhat more than seems usually attended to,

when we speak of God’s natural government of the world. It implies

government of the very same kind with that which a master exercises

over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These

latter instances of final causes, as really prove an intelligent

_Governor_ of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before[60]

distinctly treated of; as any other instances of final causes prove an

intelligent _Maker_ of it.

But this alone does not appear at first sight to determine any thing

certainly, concerning the moral character of the Author of nature,

considered in this relation of governor; does not ascertain his

government to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous Judge of

the world. Moral government consists, not in barely rewarding and

punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical may do, but

in rewarding the righteous, and punishing the wicked: in rendering to

men according to their actions, considered as good or evil. And the

_perfection_ of moral government consists in doing this, with regard

to all intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal

merits or demerits.

Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of nature to be

that of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of

action and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest

possible happiness, without regard to persons’ behavior, otherwise than

as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this

to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be

nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Surely this ought not to

be asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak with cautious

reverence upon such a subject. Whether it can be proved or no, is not

the thing here to be inquired into; but whether in the constitution and

conduct of the world, a righteous government be not discernibly planned

out: which necessarily implies a righteous governor. There may possibly

be in the creation beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests

himself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite

absolute benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as

perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests himself

to us under the character of a righteous governor. He may, consistently

with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, in the sense now

explained: but he is (for he has given us a proof in the constitution

and conduct of the world that he is) a governor over servants, as he

rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in the constitution and

conduct of it, he may also have given, besides the reason of the thing,

and the natural presages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations,

that his government is righteous or moral: clear to such as think the

nature of it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless

person, who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.[61]

It is particularly to be observed, that the divine government, which

we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken alone, is

allowed not to be the perfection of moral government. Yet this by no

means hinders, but that there may be _somewhat_, be it more or less,

truly moral in it. A righteous government may plainly appear to be

carried on to some degree, enough to give us the apprehension that it

shall be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfection which

religion teaches us it shall; but which cannot appear, till much more

of the divine administration be seen, than can be seen in the present

life. The design of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the

case: how far, over and above the moral nature[62] which God has given

us, and our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his

creatures, to whom he has given this nature;[63] I say how far besides

this, the principles and beginnings of a moral government over the

world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion

and disorder of it.

One might mention here, what has been often urged with great force,

that, in general, less uneasiness and more satisfaction, are the

natural consequences[64] of a virtuous than of a vicious course of

life, in the present state, as an instance of a moral government

established in nature; an instance of it collected from experience and

present matter of fact.[65] But it must be owned a thing of difficulty

to weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst

themselves, and also against each other, so as to make an estimate with

any exactness, of the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue.

And it is not impossible, that, amidst the infinite disorders of the

world, there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue; even with

regard to persons, whose course of life from their youth up has been

blameless: and more with regard to those who have gone on for some

time in the ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed. For suppose an

instance of the latter case; a person with his passions inflamed, his

natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of indulgence,

and with all his vices about him, like so many harpies, craving their

accustomed gratification; who can say how long it might be, before

such a person would find more satisfaction in the reasonableness and

present good consequences of virtue, than difficulties and self-denial

in the restraints of it? Experience also shows, that men can to a

great degree, get over their sense of shame, so as that by professing

themselves to be without principle, and avowing even direct villany,

they can support themselves against the infamy of it. But as the ill

actions of any one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown

in his way, upon his reformation; so the infamy of them will be much

more felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is recovered.

Uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the account of

former vices: yet it will be said they are in part the consequences

of reformation. Still I am far from allowing it doubtful, whether

virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice in the present world. If

it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous administration may, beyond

all question, be found in nature, if we will attentively inquire after

them.[66]

I. In whatever manner the notion of God’s moral government over the

world might be treated, if it did not appear, whether he were in a

proper sense our governor at all; yet when it is certain matter of

experience, that he does manifest himself to us under the character

of a governor in the sense explained,[67] it must deserve to be

considered, whether there be not reason to apprehend, that he may be

a righteous or moral governor. Since it appears to be fact, that God

does govern mankind by the method of rewards and punishments, according

to some settled rules of distribution; it is surely a question to be

asked, what presumption is there against his _finally_ rewarding and

punishing them according to this particular rule, namely, as they act

reasonably, or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously? Rendering men

happy or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls

in, with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing

so by any other rule whatever; since rewarding and punishing actions

by any other rule, would appear much harder to be accounted for, by

minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then

more or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us, that the

righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and the wicked miserable,

cannot possibly be considered as absurd or chimerical; because it is

no more than an expectation, that a method of government already begun,

shall be carried on, the method of rewarding and punishing actions; and

shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to

us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule which we call

distributive justice. Nor,

II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillity,

satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural consequences

of prudent management of ourselves, and our affairs; and rashness,

profligate negligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them many

inconveniences and sufferings; these afford instances of a right

constitution of nature, as the correction of children, for their

own sakes, and by way of example, when they run into danger or hurt

themselves, is a part of right education.[68] Thus, that God governs

the world by general fixed laws, that he has endued us with capacities

of reflecting upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing the good

and bad consequences of behavior, plainly implies _some sort_ of moral

government; since from such a constitution of things it cannot but

follow, that prudence and imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue

and vice,[69] must be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished.

III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to a

great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society; and besides

punishment actually inflicted upon this account, there is also the

fear and apprehension of it in those persons, whose crimes have

rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery; this state of

fear being often itself a very considerable punishment. The natural

fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains from such crimes,

is a declaration of nature against them. It is necessary to the very

being of society, that vices, destructive of it, should be punished

_as being so_; the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty: which

punishment therefore is as natural as society, and so is an instance

of a kind of moral government, naturally established, and actually

taking place. And, since the certain natural course of things is the

conduct of providence or the government of God, though carried on by

the instrumentality of men, the observation here made amounts to this,

that mankind find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, as

that they are unavoidably accountable for their behavior; and are often

punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in the view of

their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to society.

If it be objected that good actions and such as are beneficial to

society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution and in other

cases; and that ill and mischievous actions are often rewarded:[70] it

may be answered distinctly, first, that this is in no sort necessary,

and consequently not natural in the sense in which it is necessary, and

therefore natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be punished:

and in the next place, that good actions are never punished, considered

as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of

their being hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without any thing on

the side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of nature

has as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as mischievous

to society, should be punished, and put mankind under a _necessity_ of

thus punishing them, as he has directed and necessitated us to preserve

our lives by food.

IV. In the natural course of things, virtue _as such_ is actually

rewarded, and vice _as such_ punished: which seems to afford an

instance or example, not only of government, but of moral government,

begun and established; moral in the strictest sense, though not in

that perfection of degree, which religion teaches us to expect.

In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish between

_actions_ themselves, and that _quality_ ascribed to them, which we

call virtuous or vicious.[71] The gratification itself of every

natural passion, must be attended with delight; and acquisitions of

fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the means or materials of

enjoyment. An action then, by which any natural passion is gratified,

or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage; abstracted from

all consideration of the morality of such action. Consequently, the

pleasure or advantage in this case, is gained by the action itself, not

by the morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be

perhaps virtuous or vicious.

To say that such an action or course of behavior, procured such

pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is

quite a different thing from saying, that such good or bad effect

was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behavior. In one

case, an action abstracted from all moral consideration, produced its

effect: in the other case, for it will appear that there are such

cases, the morality of the action under a moral consideration, _i.e._

the virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced the effect. Now I say

virtue as such, naturally procures considerable advantages to the

virtuous, and vice as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience

and even misery to the vicious, in very many instances. The immediate

effects of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper, are to be

mentioned as instances of it. Vice as such is naturally attended with

some sort of uneasiness, and not uncommonly, with great disturbance and

apprehension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser matters and

in familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself, and in matters

of importance and in more serious language, remorse; is an uneasiness

naturally arising from an action of a man’s own, reflected upon by

himself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, _i.e._ vicious in greater or

less degrees: and this manifestly is a different feeling from that

uneasiness, which arises from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is

more common, than to hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and

adding--but however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame

himself for it; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of

being sensible it was his own doing? Thus also the disturbance and

fear, which often follow upon a man’s having done an injury, arise

from a sense of his being blameworthy; otherwise there would, in many

cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resentment

or shame. On the other hand, inward security and peace, and a mind

open to the several gratifications of life, are the natural attendants

of innocence and virtue. To which must be added the complacency,

satisfaction, and even joy of heart, which accompany the exercise, the

real exercise of gratitude, friendship, benevolence.

And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future

punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who fully

believe, or have any serious apprehension of religion: because these

hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the mind,

and cannot be got rid of by great part of the world, even by men who

have thought most thoroughly upon the subject of religion. And no one

can say, how considerable this uneasiness or satisfaction may be, or

what upon the whole it may amount to.[72]

In the next place comes in the consideration, that all honest and

good men are disposed to befriend honest good men as such, and to

discountenance the vicious as such, and do so in some degree; indeed

in a considerable degree: from which favor and discouragement cannot

but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. Though the

generality of the world have little regard to the morality of their

own actions, and may be supposed to have less to that of others, when

they themselves are not concerned; yet let any one be known to be a

man of virtue, somehow or other he will be favored and good offices

will be done him, from regard to his character, without remote views,

occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the generality of

the world, as it happens to come in their way. Public honors too

and advantages are the natural consequences, and sometimes at least,

the consequences in fact, of virtuous actions; of eminent justice,

fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of

being virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, often infamy and

external inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice as vice.

For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, injustice,

oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has

doubtless been instrumental in bringing about revolutions, which make

a figure even in the history of the world. For it is plain, that men

resent injuries as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely

under the notion of having received harm, but of having received

wrong; and they have this resentment in behalf of others, as well as

of themselves. So likewise even the generality are, in some degree,

grateful and disposed to return good offices, not merely because such

a one has been the occasion of good to them, but under the view, that

such good offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer.

To all this may be added two or three particular things, which many

persons will think frivolous; but to me nothing appears so, which at

all comes in towards determining a question of such importance, as,

whether there be or be not, a moral institution of government, in the

strictest sense moral, _visibly_ established and begun in nature. The

particular things are these: That in domestic government, which is

doubtless natural, children and others also are very generally punished

for falsehood, injustice, and ill-behavior, as such, and rewarded for

the contrary: which are instances of veracity and justice and right

behavior, as such, naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, more

or less considerable. That, though civil government be supposed to take

cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to society,

without respect to the immorality of them, yet as such actions are

immoral, so the sense which men have of the immorality of them, very

greatly contributes, in different ways, to bring offenders to justice.

And that entire absence of all crime and guilt in the moral sense, when

plainly appearing, will almost of course procure, and circumstances of

aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the penalties annexed to civil

crimes, in many cases, though by no means in all.

Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad effects of virtue and

vice upon men’s own minds, the course of the world does, in some

measure, turn upon the approbation and disapprobation of them as such,

in others. The sense of well and ill doing, the presages of conscience,

the love of good characters and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame,

resentment, gratitude, all these, considered in themselves, and in

their effects, do afford manifest real instances, of virtue as such

naturally favored, and of vice as such discountenanced, more or less,

in the daily course of human life; in every age, in every relation,

in every general circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral

nature,[73] may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his

moral government: but that he has placed us in a condition, which gives

this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and in which it does

unavoidably operate; _i.e._ influence mankind to act, so as thus to

favor and reward virtue, and discountenance and punish vice, this is

not the same, but a further additional proof of his moral government;

for it is an instance of it. The first is a proof, that he will finally

favor and support virtue effectually: the second is an example of his

favoring and supporting it at present, in some degree.

If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that virtue as

such is often rewarded, and vice as such is punished, and this rule

never inverted, it will be found to proceed, in part, immediately from

the moral nature itself, which God has given us;[74] and also in part,

from his having given us, together with this nature, so great a power

over each other’s happiness and misery. For, _first_, it is certain,

that peace and delight, in some degree and upon some occasions, is

the necessary and present effect of virtuous practice; an effect

arising immediately from that constitution of our nature. We are _so

made_, that well-doing as such, gives us satisfaction, at least in

some instances; ill-doing as such, in none. And, _secondly_, from our

moral nature, joined with God’s having put our happiness and misery

in many respects in each other’s power, it cannot but be, that vice

as such, some kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous,

and men will be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable; and the

villain will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy,

any more than he will be able to escape this further punishment, which

mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the notion of his

deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice, to answer

this; because there is nothing in the human mind contradictory, as

the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue consists in a regard to

what is right and reasonable, as being so; in a regard to veracity,

justice, charity, in themselves: and there is surely no such thing,

as a like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be

thought, that there are instances of an approbation of vice, as such,

in itself, and for its own sake, (though it does not appear to me, that

there is any such thing at all;) it is evidently monstrous: as much

so, as the most acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such

instances of perversion then being left out, as merely imaginary, or

at least unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and

from our condition, in the respects now described, that vice cannot

at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favored as such by others, upon

some occasions, and happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here

insisted upon, is not the _degree_ in which virtue and vice are thus

distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they are so in some

degree; though the whole good and bad effect of virtue and vice as

such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But that they must be thus

distinguished in some degree, is in a manner necessary: it is matter

of fact of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of human

affairs.

It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of things,

happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules, than

only the personal merit and demerit of characters. They may sometimes

be distributed by way of mere discipline. There may be the wisest and

best reasons, why the world should be governed by general laws, from

whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow; and also

why our happiness and misery should be put in each other’s power, in

the degree which they are. And these things, as, in general, they

contribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, so

they often contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is

impossible, but to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked;

afflicted, though righteous; and, which is worse, to the _rewarding

some actions_, though vicious, and _punishing other actions_, though

virtuous.[75] But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the

conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way

of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For our being so

constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and

discountenanced, rewarded and punished, respectively as such, is

an intuitive proof of the intent of nature, that it should be so;

otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately

and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot be said, because

virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and vicious actions rewarded,

that nature intended it. For, though this great disorder is brought

about, as all actions are, by means of some natural passion; yet _this

may be_, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of such

passion, implanted in us for other, and those very good purposes. And

indeed these other and good purposes, even of every passion, may be

clearly seen.

We have then a declaration, in some degree of present effect, from Him

who is supreme in nature, which side he is of, or what part he takes;

a declaration for virtue, and against vice. So far therefore as a man

is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and

the right of the case, in whatever he is concerned; so far he is on the

side of the divine administration, and co-operates with it: and from

hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense

of security, and implicit hope of somewhat further.

V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of virtue,

which, though not of present effect, yet are at present discernible in

nature; and so afford an instance of somewhat moral in the essential

constitution of it. There is, in the nature of things, a tendency in

virtue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in

a greater degree than they do in fact produce them. For instance; good

and bad men would be much more rewarded and punished as such, were it

not, that justice is often artificially eluded,[76] that characters are

not known, and many, who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice,

are hindered from doing so, by accidental causes. These tendencies of

virtue and vice are obvious with regard to _individuals_. But it may

require more particularly to be considered, that power in a _society_,

by being under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, and has

a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power, not under the

direction of it; in like manner, as power, by being under the direction

of reason, increases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force.

There are several brute creatures of equal, and several of superior

strength, to that of men; and possibly the sum of the whole strength

of brutes may be greater than that of mankind; but reason gives us the

advantage and superiority over them; and thus man is the acknowledged

governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority considered by

any as accidental; but as what reason has a tendency, in the nature of

the thing, to obtain. And yet perhaps difficulties may be raised about

the meaning, as well as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue has

the like tendency.

To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly, how the case

stands with regard to reason; which is so readily acknowledged to have

this advantageous tendency. Suppose then two or three men, of the best

and most improved understanding, in a desolate open plain, attacked

by ten times the number of beasts of prey: would their reason secure

them the victory in this unequal combat? Power then, though joined

with reason, and under its direction, cannot be expected to prevail

over opposite power, though merely brutal, unless the one bears some

proportion to the other. Again: put the imaginary case, that rational

and irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner: it is

certain, before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish

each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to form a union

among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in several respects

upon great disadvantage; though united they might be vastly superior:

since union is of such efficacy, that ten men united, might be able

to accomplish, what ten thousand of the same natural strength and

understanding wholly ununited, could not. In this case, brute force

might more than maintain its ground against reason, for want of union

among the rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon

an island inhabited only by wild beasts; men who, by the regulations

of civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of some

years, could they be preserved so long, would be really sufficient to

subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in security from

them: yet a conjuncture of accidents might give such advantage to the

irrational animals as they might at once overpower, and even extirpate,

the rational ones. Length of time then, proper scope, and opportunities

for reason to exert itself, may be absolutely necessary to its

prevailing over brute force.

Further: there are many instances of brutes succeeding in attempts,

which they could not have undertaken, had not their irrational nature

rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger of such attempt, or

the fury of passion hindered their attending to it: and there are

instances of reason and real prudence preventing men’s undertaking

what, it has appeared afterwards, they might have succeeded in by a

lucky rashness. In certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness

and discord, may have their advantages. So that rational animals

have not _necessarily_ the superiority over irrational ones; but,

how improbable soever it may be, it is evidently possible, that in

some globes the latter may be superior. And were the former wholly at

variance and disunited, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery

and injustice, and consequent rage and malice against each other,

whilst the latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this

might greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order

of things. For every one would consider it as inverted: since reason

has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute force;

notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, and the necessity,

which there is, of many concurring circumstances to render it prevalent.

Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure

superiority and additional power: whether this power be considered

as the means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining other

advantages. It has this tendency, by rendering public good, an object

and end, to every member of the society; by putting every one upon

consideration and diligence, recollection and self-government, both in

order to see what is the most effectual method, and also in order to

perform their proper part, for obtaining and preserving it; by uniting

a society within itself, and so increasing its strength; and, which

is particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and

justice. For as these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence

or public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows

what.

And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dispensations of

Providence, to be, in any sort, analogous to what appears: or that both

together make up one uniform scheme, the two parts of which, the part

which we see, and that which is beyond our observation, are analogous

to each other: then, there must be a like natural tendency in the

derived power, throughout the universe, under the direction of virtue,

to prevail in general over that which is not under its direction; as

there is in reason, derived reason in the universe, to prevail over

brute force.

But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually

produce, what it has a tendency to produce; the _like concurrences

are necessary_, as are, to the prevalence of reason. There must be

some proportion, between the natural power or force which is, and that

which is not, under the direction of virtue: there must be sufficient

length of time; for the complete success of virtue, as of reason,

cannot, from the nature of the thing, be otherwise than gradual: there

must be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and

extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities, for the virtuous

to join together, to exert themselves against lawless force, and to

reap the fruit of their united labors. Now indeed it is to be hoped,

that the disproportion between the good and bad, even here on earth,

is not so great, but that the former have natural power sufficient

to their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances would

permit this power to be united. For, much less, very much less, power

under the direction of virtue, would prevail over much greater not

under the direction of it.[77] However, good men over the face of

the earth cannot unite; because, (among other reasons,) they cannot

be sufficiently ascertained of each other’s characters. And the

known course of human things, the scene we are now passing through,

particularly the shortness of life, denies to virtue its full scope in

several other respects.

The natural tendency which we have been considering, though real, is

_hindered_ from being carried into effect in the present state: but

these hinderances may be removed in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the

Christian allusion, is militant here; and various untoward accidents

contribute to its being often overborne: but it may combat with

greater advantage hereafter, and prevail completely, and enjoy its

consequent rewards, in some future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps

unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here; there maybe scenes in

eternity, lasting enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford

it a sufficient sphere of action; and a sufficient sphere for the

natural consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally

immortal, and this state be a progress towards a future one, as

childhood is towards mature age, good men may naturally unite, not only

among themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous creatures,

in that future state. For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a

principle and bond of union, in some degree, among all who are endued

with it, and known to each other; so as that by it, a good man cannot

but recommend himself to the favor and protection of all virtuous

beings, throughout the whole universe, who can be acquainted with his

character, and can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his

duration.

One might add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue

to become effect, among one or more orders of creatures, in any

distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious

creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God; this happy effect

of virtue would have a tendency, by way of example, and possibly in

other ways, to amend those of them who are capable of amendment, and of

being recovered to a just sense of virtue. If our notions of the plan

of Providence were enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late

discoveries have enlarged our views with respect to the material world,

representations of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant.

They are not to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of

what is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which cannot

be known without revelation: for suppositions are not to be looked

on as true, because not incredible: but they are mentioned to show,

that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such

superiority and advantages, is no objection against its having, in the

essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure them. And the

suppositions now mentioned do plainly show this: for they show, that

these hinderances are so far from being necessary, that we ourselves

can easily conceive, how they may be removed in future states, and full

scope be granted to virtue. And all these advantageous tendencies

of it are to be considered as declarations of God in its favor. This

however is taking a pretty large compass: though it is certain, that,

as the material world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and

immense, there must be _some_ scheme of Providence vast in proportion

to it.

But let us return to the earth our habitation; and we shall see this

happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an instance not so vast and

remote: by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon it, perfectly

virtuous, for a succession of many ages; to which, if you please, may

be given a situation advantageous for universal monarchy. In such

a state, there would be no such thing as faction: but men of the

greatest capacity would of course, all along, have the chief direction

of affairs willingly yielded to them; and they would share it among

themselves without envy. Each of these would have the part assigned

him, to which his genius was peculiarly adapted; and others, who had

not any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very

happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who had.

Public determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom

of the community: and they would faithfully be executed, by the united

strength of it. Some would contribute in a higher way, but all in some

way, to the public prosperity: and in it, each would enjoy the fruits

of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would

be unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured

from it in their neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest,

confederacies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction

and intestine treachery; these on one hand would be found mere childish

folly and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public

spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other: allowing both

a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general

influence, which such a kingdom would have over the face of the earth,

by way of example particularly, and the reverence which would be paid

it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must

gradually come under its empire; not by means of lawless violence;

but partly by what must be allowed to be just conquest; and partly by

other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a

course of ages, and claiming its protection, one after another, in

successive exigencies. The head of it would be a universal monarch,

in another sense than any mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style

would be literally applicable to him, _that all people, nations, and

languages should serve him_. And though indeed our knowledge of human

nature, and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility,

without some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here on

earth, should unite in one society or government, in the fear of God

and universal practice of virtue; and that such a government should

continue so united for a succession of ages: yet admitting or supposing

this, the effect would be as now drawn out. Thus for instance, the

wonderful power and prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the

Scripture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence of what is

predicted of them; that the _people should be all righteous, and

inherit the land forever_;[78] were we to understand the latter phrase

of a long continuance only, sufficient to give things time to work. The

predictions of this kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to

pass, in the present known course of nature; but suppose them come to

pass, and then, the dominion and preëminence promised must naturally

follow, to a very considerable degree.

Consider now the general system of religion; that the government of

the world is uniform, and one, and moral; that virtue and right shall

finally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud and lawless force,

over the deceits as well as the violence of wickedness, under the

conduct of one supreme governor: and from the observations above made,

it will appear that God has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar

connection in the several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards

the completion of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue: which

tendency is to be considered as something moral in the essential

constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of

little importance, I desire him to consider, what he would think, if

vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous tendencies;

or if virtue had essentially the contrary ones.

It may be objected, that notwithstanding all these natural effects and

natural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout

the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at

present upon earth: virtue sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed;

vice sometimes punished, sometimes successful.

The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this chapter,

nor of this treatise, properly to prove God’s perfect moral government

over the world, or the truth of religion; but to observe what there

is in the constitution and course of nature, to confirm the proper

proof of it, supposed to be known: and that the weight of the

foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus distinctly proved.

Pleasure and pain are, to a certain degree, say to a very high degree,

distributed among us without any apparent regard to the merit or

demerit of characters. And were there nothing else concerning this

matter discernible in the constitution and course of nature, there

would be no ground from the constitution and course of nature, to hope

or to fear that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according

to their deserts: which, however, it is to be remarked, implies, that

even then there would be no ground from appearances to think, that vice

upon the whole would have the advantage, rather than that virtue would.

Thus the proof of a future state of retribution would rest upon the

usual known arguments for it; which are I think plainly unanswerable;

and would be so, though there were no additional confirmation of them

from the things above insisted on. But these things are a very strong

confirmation of them. For,

_First_, They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to

virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration, from him, determinate

and not to be evaded, in favor of one, and against the other; such a

declaration, as there is nothing to be set over against or answer, on

the part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the proper proof

of religion, to determine from the course of nature only, whether it

were most probable, that the righteous or the wicked would have the

advantage in a future life; there can be no doubt, but that he would

determine the probability to be, that the former would. The course of

nature then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real

practical proof of the obligations of religion.

_Secondly_, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God shall

reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every one shall,

upon the whole, have his deserts; this distributive justice will not

be a thing different in _kind_, but only in _degree_, from what we

experience in his present government. It will be that in _effect_,

towards which we now see a _tendency_. It will be no more than the

_completion_ of that moral government, the _principles and beginning_

of which have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the

present constitution and course of nature.

_Thirdly_, As under the _natural_ government of God, our experience of

those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which we do experience

at present, gives just ground to hope for, and to fear, higher degrees

and other kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state

admitted: so under his _moral_ government our experience, that virtue

and vice are, in the manners above mentioned, actually rewarded and

punished at present, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and

to fear, that they _may be_ rewarded and punished in a higher degree

hereafter. It is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient

ground to think, that they _actually will be_ rewarded and punished in

a higher degree, rather than in a lower: but then,

_Lastly_, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good and

bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are essential,

and founded in the nature of things: whereas the hinderances to

their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but

artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly argued, that these

tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punishments, of virtue

and vice, which arise directly out of the nature of things, will

remain hereafter, than that the accidental hinderances of them will.

And if these hinderances do not remain; those rewards and punishments

cannot but be carried on much farther towards the perfection of moral

government: _i.e._ the tendencies of virtue and vice will become

effect; but when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known

at all, but by revelation.

Upon the whole: there is a kind of moral government implied in God’s

natural government:[79] virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and

punished as beneficial and mischievous to society;[80] and rewarded

and punished directly as virtue and vice.[81] The notion of a moral

scheme of government is not fictitious, but natural; for it is

suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and course of nature:

and the execution of this scheme is actually begun, in the instances

here mentioned. And these things are to be considered as a declaration

of the Author of nature, for virtue, and against vice: they give a

credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished

hereafter; and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be

rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are here. All this

is confirmed, and the argument for religion, from the constitution

and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that there

are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial

hinderances, to this moral scheme’s being carried on much farther

towards perfection, than it is at present.[82]

The notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more perfect

than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion; for it

is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of virtue

and vice. These tendencies are to be considered as intimations, as

implicit promises and threatenings, from the Author of nature, of much

greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do at

present. Indeed, every _natural_ tendency, which is to continue, but

which is hindered from becoming effect by only _accidental_ causes,

affords a presumption, that such tendency will, some time or other,

become effect: a presumption proportionable in degree to the length of

the duration, through which such tendency will continue. From these

things together, arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of

government established in nature, shall be carried on much farther

towards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a presumption that it will

be absolutely completed. From these things, joined with the moral

nature which God has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a

practical proof[83] that it _will_ be completed: a proof from fact; and

therefore a distinct one from that which is deduced from the eternal

and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of actions.

CHAPTER IV.

PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.[84]

The general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a state of

probation for a future one, comprehends under it several particular

things, distinct from each other. The first and most common meaning

of it seems to be, that our future interest is now depending, and

depending upon ourselves; that we have scope and opportunities here,

for that good and bad behavior, which God will reward and punish

hereafter; together with temptations to one, as well as inducements

of reason to the other. And this, in a great measure, is the same as

saying, that we are under the moral government of God, and to give

an account of our actions to him. For the notion of a future account

and general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations

to what is wrong: otherwise there would be no moral possibility of

doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But there

is this difference, that the word _probation_ is more distinctly and

particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or difficulties in

adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying

by such temptations, than the words _moral government_. A state

of probation then, as thus particularly implying in it trial,

difficulties, and danger, may require to be considered distinctly by

itself.[85]

As the moral government of God, which religion teaches us, implies

that we are in a state of trial with regard to a future world, so

also his natural government over us implies that we are in a state of

trial, in the like sense, with regard to the present world. Natural

government by rewards and punishments, as much implies natural trial,

as moral government does moral trial. The natural government of God

here meant,[86] consists in his annexing pleasure to some actions,

and pain to others, which are in our power to do or forbear, and

giving us notice of such appointment, beforehand. This necessarily

implies, that he has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to

depend in part upon ourselves. So far as men have temptations to any

course of action, which will probably occasion them greater temporal

inconvenience and uneasiness, than satisfaction, so far their temporal

interest is in danger from themselves; or they are in a state of trial

with respect to it. Now people often blame others, and even themselves,

for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And we find many are

greatly wanting to themselves, and miss that natural happiness, which

they might have obtained in the present life: perhaps every one does

in some degree. But many run themselves into great inconvenience, and

into extreme distress and misery, not through incapacity of knowing

better, and doing better, for themselves, which would be nothing

to the present purpose, but through their own fault. These things

necessarily imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater

or less degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happiness.

Every one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the

hazards which young people run, upon their setting out in the world:

hazards from other causes, than merely their ignorance, and unavoidable

accidents. And some courses of vice, at least, being contrary to men’s

worldly interest or good; temptations to these must at the same time be

temptations to forego our present and our future interest.

Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state of trial,

_i.e._ of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral and

religious trial. This will more distinctly appear to any one, who

thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it is which

constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe, how mankind

behave under it.

That which constitutes this trial, in both these capacities, must be

something either in our external circumstances, or in our nature. For,

on the one hand, persons may be betrayed into wrong behavior upon

surprise, or overcome upon any other very singular and extraordinary

external occasions, who would, otherwise, have preserved their

character of prudence and of virtue: in which cases, every one, in

speaking of the wrong behavior of these persons, would impute it to

such particular external circumstances. On the other hand, men who

have contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have some

particular passions in excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it

were, go out of their way, to gratify themselves in these respects,

at the expense of their wisdom and their virtue; led to it, as every

one would say, not by external temptations, but by such habits and

passions. And the account of this last case is, that particular

passions are no more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable

self-love, the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are

with the principle of virtue and religion; but often draw contrary

ways to one, as well as to the other: and so such particular passions

are as much temptations, to act imprudently with regard to our worldly

interest, as to act viciously.[87] When we say, men are misled by

external circumstances of temptation; it cannot but be understood, that

there is somewhat within themselves, to render those circumstances

temptations, or to render them susceptible of impressions from them.

So when we say, they are misled by passions; it is always supposed,

that there are occasions, circumstances, and objects, exciting

these passions, and affording means for gratifying them. Therefore,

temptations from within, and from without, coincide, and mutually imply

each other. The several external objects of the appetites, passions,

and affections, being present to the senses, or offering themselves to

the mind, and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature; not only

in cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and

prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified

imprudently and viciously: this as really puts them in danger of

voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good, as their future;

and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure one, as the

other: _i.e._ we are in a like state of trial with respect to both, by

the very same passions, excited by the very same means.

Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upon themselves, and

a prudent course of behavior being necessary to secure it, passions

inordinately excited, whether by means of example, or by any other

external circumstance, towards such objects, at such times, or in

such degrees, as that they cannot be gratified consistently with

worldly prudence, are temptations; dangerous, and too often successful

temptations, to forego a greater temporal good for a less; _i.e._ to

forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal interest, for the sake

of a present gratification. This is a description of our state of

trial in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word _future_ for

_temporal_, and _virtue_ for _prudence_; and it will be just as proper

a description of our state of trial in our religious capacity; so

analogous are they to each other.[88]

If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both

capacities, we go on to observe farther, how mankind behave under

it; we shall find there are some, who have so little sense of it,

that they scarce look beyond the passing day: they are so taken up

with present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of

consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life:

any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded

and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly concerns, as

much as in religion. Others are not deceived, but as it were forcibly

carried away by the like passions, against their better judgment, and

feeble resolutions too of acting better.[89] And there are men, and

truly not a few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their

mere will and pleasure, to be their law of life: and who, in open

defiance of every thing reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious

extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse and little fear, that it will

be their temporal ruin; and some of them, under the apprehension of

the consequences of wickedness in another state. To speak in the most

moderate way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go

wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so,

with respect to their temporal interests, as well as with respect to

religion.

Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal and

our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes, and have

the same effect upon men’s behavior, are evidently analogous, and of

the same kind.

It may be added, that the difficulties and dangers of miscarrying in

our religious state of trial, are greatly increased, and one is ready

to think, are in a manner wholly _made_, by the ill behavior of others;

by a wrong education, wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively

vicious; by general bad example; by the dishonest artifices which are

got into business of all kinds; and, in very many parts of the world,

by religion’s being corrupted into superstitions, which indulge men in

their vices. In like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves

prudently in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being

led aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish

education; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and

carelessness of others, with whom we have intercourse: and by mistaken

notions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from common opinion,

concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it consists.

Persons, by their own _negligence_ and _folly_ in temporal affairs, no

less than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties,

and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through

them: and one irregularity after another, embarrasses things to such

a degree, that they know not whereabout they are; and often makes

the path of conduct so intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult

to trace it out; difficult even to determine what is the prudent or

the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong behavior in one stage of

life, youth; wrong, I mean considering ourselves only in our temporal

capacity, without taking in religion; this, in several ways, increases

the difficulties of right behavior in mature age; _i.e._ puts us into

a more disadvantageous state of trial in our temporal capacity.

We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are natural

appearances of our being in a state of degradation.[90] We certainly

are in a condition, which _does not seem_, by any means, the most

advantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral

capacity, for securing either our present or future interest. However,

this condition, low, and careful, and uncertain as it is, does not

afford any just ground of complaint. For, as men _may_ manage their

temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass their days here on earth

in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care: so

likewise with regard to religion, there is no more required than what

they are well able to do,[91] and what they must be greatly wanting

to themselves, if they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon

them, which they are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally

consider as an equitable thing; supposing it done by proper authority.

Nor have we any more reason to complain of it, with regard to the

Author of nature, than of his not having given us advantages belonging

to other orders of creatures.

[REMARKS.] The thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial,

which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible, by its

being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general conduct of

Providence towards us, in all other respects within the compass of our

knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered in their natural capacity, as

inhabitants of this world only, found themselves, from their birth to

their death, in a settled state of security and happiness, without

any solicitude or thought of their own: or if they were in no danger

of being brought into inconveniences and distress, by carelessness, or

the folly of passion, through bad example, the treachery of others, or

the deceitful appearances of things: were this our natural condition,

then it might seem strange, and be some presumption against the truth

of religion, that it represents our future and more general interest,

as not secure _of course_, but as depending upon our behavior, and

requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. It _then_

might be alleged, “What you say is our condition, in one respect, is

not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by experience, is our

condition in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our

hands, without any solicitude of ours; and why should not our future

interest, if we have any such, be so too?” But since, on the contrary,

thought and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things

which we desire, and a course of behavior, far from being always

agreeable to us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common

decent, and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction

through the _present_ world, and be received upon any tolerable

good terms in it: since this is the case, all presumption against

self-denial and attention being necessary to secure our _higher_

interest,[92] is removed.

Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, that it

is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon us by

an infinite being; when every thing which has hazard and danger in our

manner of conception, and will end in error, confusion, and misery,

is already certain in his foreknowledge. Indeed, why any thing of

hazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures as we are,

may well be thought a difficulty in speculation; and cannot but be so,

till we know the whole, or at least much more of the case. But still

the constitution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are

trusted to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in

many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do,

or to suffer, as we choose. All the various miseries of life, which

people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and might have

avoided by proper care, are instances of this: which miseries are,

beforehand, just as contingent and undetermined as conduct, and left to

be determined by it.

These observations are an answer[93] to the objections against the

credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real

danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under the

moral government of God. And they show, that, if we are at all to be

considered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest, the

general analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in

danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by

our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity.

For we have a present interest under the government of God, which we

experience here upon earth. This interest, as it is not forced upon us,

so neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; and

in such manner, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of

temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it; and without attention

and self-denial, we must and do miss it. It is then perfectly credible,

that this may be our case, with respect to that chief and final good,

which religion proposes to us.

CHAPTER V.

PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.

From the consideration of our being in a probation-state, of so

much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how we

came to be placed in it? But such a general inquiry as this would

be found involved in insuperable difficulties. For, though some

of these difficulties would be lessened, by observing that all

wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion; and that

many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects: yet, when

we consider other circumstances belonging to both, and what must be

the consequence of the former in a life to come, it cannot but be

acknowledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend to give an account

of the _whole reasons_ of this matter; the whole reasons of our being

allotted a condition, out of which so much wickedness and misery,

so circumstanced, would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our

faculties, not only to find out, but even to understand; or, though we

should be supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would

be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible

to say. But as our present condition can in no wise be shown to be

inconsistent with the perfect moral government of God: so religion

teaches us we were placed in it, that we might qualify ourselves, by

the practice of virtue, for another state which is to follow it. This,

though but a partial answer, a very partial one indeed, to the inquiry

now mentioned; is yet a more satisfactory answer to another, which is

of real, and of the utmost importance to us to have answered,--viz.:

What is our business here? The known end then, why we are placed

in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our

improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a

future state of security and happiness.

The beginning of life, considered as an education for mature age in the

present world, appears plainly, at first sight, analogous to this our

trial for a future one: the former being in our temporal capacity, what

the latter is in our religious capacity. Some observations common to

both, and a more distinct consideration of each, will more distinctly

show the extent and force of the analogy between them; and the

credibility, which arises from hence, as well as from the nature of the

thing, that the present life was intended to be a state of discipline

for a future one.

I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular

way of life; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper, and

qualifications, of each species, are as necessary as their external

circumstances. Both come into the notion of such state, or particular

way of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change a man’s capacities

or character, to the degree in which it is conceivable they may be

changed, and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of

life, and human happiness; as incapable, as if, his nature continuing

unchanged, he were placed in a world, where he had no sphere of action,

nor any objects to answer his appetites, passions, and affections of

any sort. One thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer

expresses it.[94] Our nature corresponds to our external condition.

Without this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any

such thing as human life and happiness: which life and happiness are,

therefore, a _result_ from our nature and condition jointly: meaning

by human life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole complex

notion commonly understood by those words. So that without determining

what will be the employment and happiness, the particular life, of

good men hereafter; there must be some determinate capacities, some

necessary character and qualifications, without which persons cannot

but be utterly incapable of it: in like manner, as there must be some,

without which men would be incapable of their present state of life.

II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all creatures

which come under our notice, is such, as that they are capable

of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for which

they were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we may indeed

conceive of creatures, incapable of having any of their faculties

naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally to acquire any new

qualifications. But the faculties of every species known to us, are

made for enlargement; for acquirements of experience and habits. We

find ourselves, in particular, endued with capacities, not only of

perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of

storing up ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, not only of

acting, and of having different momentary impressions made upon us;

but of getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled

alterations in our temper or character. The power of the two last is

the power of habits. But neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge

of any sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to the forming of

them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities

of acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. Whether the

word habit is applicable to all these improvements, and in particular

how far the powers of memory and of habits may be powers of the same

nature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds

readily and of course, by means of their having been there before,

seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of

action, proceeding from being accustomed to it. Aptness to recollect

practical observations, of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in

many cases. There are habits of perception, and habits of action. An

instance of the former, is our constant and even involuntary readiness,

in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and

distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation,

imperceptibly to ourselves. It seems as if all other associations of

ideas not naturally connected, might be called passive habits; as

properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight, or

hearing of words. Our readiness in speaking and writing them, are

instances of active habits.

For distinctness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the body,

or to the mind: and the latter will be explained by the former.

Under the former are comprehended all bodily activities or motions,

whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to use: under the

latter, general habits of life and conduct; such as those of obedience

and submission to authority, or to any particular person; those

of veracity, justice, and charity; those of attention, industry,

self-government, envy, revenge. Habits of this latter kind seem

produced by repeated acts, as well as the former. And as habits

belonging to the body are produced by external _acts_, so habits of the

mind are produced by the _exertion_ of inward practical principles;

_i.e._ by carrying them into act, or acting upon them; the principles

of obedience, of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those

habits be formed by any external course of action, otherwise than as

it proceeds from these principles: because it is only these inward

principles exerted, which are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity,

of justice, and of charity.

So likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are in

the same manner acquired by exercise; and habits of envy and revenge

by indulgence, whether in outward act, or in thought and intention;

_i.e._ inward act: for such intention is an act. Resolutions to do

well, are also properly acts. And endeavoring to enforce upon our own

minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical

sense of it, which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All

these, therefore, may and will contribute towards forming good habits.

But going over the theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, talking well,

and drawing fine pictures, of it; this is so far from necessarily or

certainly conducing to form a habit of it, in him who thus employs

himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render

it gradually more insensible; _i.e._ form a habit of insensibility

to all moral considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits,

passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often

passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly: being accustomed to

danger, begets intrepidity, _i.e._ lessens fear; to distress, lessens

the passion of pity; to instances of others’ mortality, lessens the

sensible apprehension of our own.

From these two observations together, that practical habits are formed

and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions grow

weaker by being repeated upon us, it must follow, that active habits

may be gradually forming and strengthening, by a course of acting

upon such and such motives and excitements, while these motives and

excitements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, growing less

sensible; _i.e._ are continually less and less sensibly felt, even as

the active habits strengthen. And experience confirms this: for active

principles, at the very time that they are less lively in perception

than they were, are found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into

the temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing

our practice. The three things just mentioned may afford instances of

it. Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and

active caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are

gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually lessens.

Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively

to pity, and actively to relieve it: but let a man set himself to

attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot

but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of

life, with which he must become acquainted; when yet, at the same time,

benevolence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle

of action, will strengthen: and while he passively compassionates the

distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist

and befriend them. So also at the same time that the daily instances of

men’s dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or

apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to

the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; _i.e._ to

forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it.

This seems further to show, that passive impressions made upon our

minds by admonition, experience, or example, though they may have a

remote efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming active habits,

yet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a

course of action: and that it is not being _affected_ so and so, but

acting, which forms those habits: only it must be always remembered,

that real endeavors to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a

species of virtuous action. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in

the nature of things, that effects should be wrought in us at once,

equivalent to habits; _i.e._ what is wrought by use and exercise. The

thing insisted on is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the

appointment of nature: which is, that active habits are to be formed

by exercise. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible

in its steps: it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which we are

capable of habits, throughout its several parts; and to trace it up

to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind:

and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But

the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield to use and

exercise, in some such manner as this, is matter of certain experience.

Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get an

aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in it.

The inclinations which rendered us averse to it, grow weaker; the

difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen;

the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all

occasions; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go

on, in a course of action, to which we have been accustomed. Practical

principles appear to grow stronger, absolutely in themselves, by

exercise; as well as relatively, with regard to contrary principles;

which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually, and of course.

Thus a new character, in several respects, may be formed; and many

habitudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature directs us to

acquire.

III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had these

capacities of improving by experience, acquired knowledge, and habits,

had they not been necessary, and intended to be made use of. And

accordingly we find them so necessary, and so much intended, that

without them we should be utterly incapable of that which was the end

for which we were made, considered in our temporal capacity only: the

employments and satisfactions of our mature state of life.

Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for this

mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding, and bodily

strength, not only are arrived at gradually, but are also very much

owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind from

infancy. If we suppose a person brought into the world with both these

in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly at first

be as unqualified for the human life of mature age, as an idiot. He

would be in a manner distracted, with astonishment, and apprehension,

and curiosity, and suspense: nor can one guess, how long it would be,

before he would be familiarized to himself and the objects about him,

enough even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too,

whether the natural information of his sight and hearing would be of

any manner of use to him in acting, before experience. And it seems,

that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed

to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would render society

insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, were it not for some

acquired moderation and self-government, some aptitude and readiness

in restraining themselves, and concealing their sense of things. Want

of every thing of this kind which is learnt would render a man as

incapable of society, as want of language would; or as his natural

ignorance of any of the particular employments of life would render

him incapable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or

supplying the necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably

in many more of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left

by nature, an unformed, unfinished creature; utterly deficient and

unqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, and

habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of his

creation, considering him as related only to this world.

But, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those

deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experience, and habits; so

likewise we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and

youth, fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those qualifications of

all sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence children,

from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects

about them, with the scene in which they are placed, and to have

a future part; and learning something or other, necessary to the

performance of it. The subordinations, to which they are accustomed in

domestic life, teach them self-government in common behavior abroad,

and prepare them for subjection and obedience to civil authority.[95]

What passes before their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them

experience, caution against treachery and deceit, together with

numberless little rules of action and conduct, which we could not

live without; and which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as

to be mistaken perhaps for instinct, though they are the effect of

long experience and exercise; as much so as language, or knowledge in

particular business, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to

the several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days is

adapted to be, and is, a state of education in the theory and practice

of mature life. We are much assisted in it by example, instruction,

and the care of others; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do.

And of this, as part is done easily and of course; so part requires

diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many things which we

desire, and setting ourselves to what we should have no inclination to,

but for the necessity or expedience of it. For that labor and industry,

which the station of so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly

unqualified for, in maturity, as those in other stations would be for

any other sorts of application; if both were not accustomed to them

in their youth. And, according as persons behave themselves, in the

general education which all go through, and in the particular ones

adapted to particular employments, their character is formed,[96] and

made to appear; they recommend themselves more or less; and are capable

of, and placed in, different stations in society.

The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an important

opportunity, which nature puts into our hands; and which, when lost

is not to be recovered. And our being placed in a state of discipline

throughout this life, for another world, is a providential disposition

of things, exactly of the same kind, as our being placed in a state

of discipline during childhood, for mature age. Our condition in both

respects is uniform and of a piece, and comprehended under one and the

same general law of nature.

If we were not able at all to discern, how or in what way the present

life could be our preparation for another; this would be no objection

against the credibility of its being so. We do not discern, how food

and sleep contribute to the growth of the body; nor could have any

thought that they would, before we had experience. Nor do children at

all think, on the one hand, that the sports and exercises, to which

they are so much addicted, contribute to their health and growth;

nor, on the other, of the necessity which there is for their being

restrained in them. Nor are they capable of understanding the use of

many parts of discipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go

through, in order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were

we not able then to discover, in what respects the present life could

form us for a future one; yet nothing would be more supposable than

that it might, in some respects or other, from the general analogy

of Providence. And this, for aught I see, might reasonably be said,

even though we should not take in the consideration of God’s moral

government over the world. But,

IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that the character

of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the future state,

and then we may distinctly see, how, and in what respects, the present

life may be a preparation for it; since we _want, and are capable of,

improvement in that character, by moral and religious habits_; and _the

present life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement_:

in like manner as we have already observed, how, and in what respects,

infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a

natural state of discipline, for mature age.

Nothing which we at present see, would lead us to the thought of a

solitary inactive state hereafter. If we judge at all from the analogy

of nature, we must suppose, according to the Scripture account of

it, that it will be a community. And there is no shadow of any thing

unreasonable in conceiving, though there be no analogy for it, that

this community will be, as the Scripture represents it, under the more

immediate, or, if such an expression may be used, the more sensible

government of God. Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments

of this happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular

scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice,

and charity, among the members of it with regard to each other, any

proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues.

Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof, that

there will be no occasion for that frame of mind, or character, which

is formed by the daily practice of those particular virtues here,

and which is a result from it.[97] This at least must be owned in

general, that, as the government established in the universe is moral,

the character of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, be the

_condition_ of our happiness or the qualification for it.

From what is above observed, concerning our natural power of habits,

it is easy to see, that we are _capable_ of moral improvement by

discipline. And how greatly we _want_ it, need not be proved to any

one who is acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind; or even

with those imperfections, which the best are conscious of. But it is

not perhaps distinctly attended to by every one, that the occasion

which human creatures have for discipline, to improve in them this

character of virtue and piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess

in the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps

all finite creatures, from the very constitution of their nature,

before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating

from what is right; and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits,

for a security against this danger. For, together with the general

principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame various

affections towards particular external objects. These affections

are naturally, and of right, subject to the government of the moral

principle, as to the occasions upon which they may be gratified; as

to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them may

be pursued. But the principle of virtue can neither excite them, nor

prevent their being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt,

when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all

consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after

it is found they cannot. The natural objects of affection continue so;

the necessaries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally

desirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently: nay, though

they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any

affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful means; but may

be obtained by them: such affection, though its being excited, and its

continuing some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural and

necessary, yet cannot but be conceived to have a _tendency_ to incline

persons to venture upon such unlawful means: and therefore must be

conceived as putting them in some danger of it. Now what is the general

security against this danger, against their actually deviating from

right? As the danger is, so also must the security be, from within:

from the practical principle of virtue.[98] The strengthening or

improving this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle

of action, will lessen the danger, or increase the security against

it. And this moral principle is capable of improvement, by proper

discipline and exercise: by recollecting the practical impressions

which example and experience have made upon us: and, instead of

following humor and mere inclination, by continually attending to the

equity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, be it in

greater or less matters; and accustoming ourselves always to act upon

it, as being itself the just and natural motive of action; and as this

moral course of behavior must necessarily, under the divine government,

be our final interest. _Thus the principle of virtue, improved into

a habit, of which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly be,

in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the danger

which finite creatures are in, from the very nature of propension,

or particular affections._ This way of putting the matter, supposes

particular affections to remain in a future state; which it is scarce

possible to avoid supposing. And if they do; we clearly see, that

acquired habits of virtue and self-government may be necessary for the

regulation of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in

this supposition, but to speak only in general; the thing really comes

to the same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are

improvement in virtue: and improvement in virtue must be advancement in

happiness, if the government of the universe be moral.

From these things we may observe, (and it will further show this

our natural and original need of being improved by discipline,) how

it comes to pass, that creatures made upright, fall; and how those

who preserve their uprightness, raise themselves by so doing, to a

more secure state of virtue. To say that the former is accounted for

by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than that an event’s

actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of its

happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of

particular affections or propensions. For, suppose creatures intended

for such a particular state of life, for which such propensions were

necessary: suppose them endued with such propensions, together with

moral understanding, as well including a practical sense of virtue as

a speculative perception of it; and that all these several principles,

both natural and moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were

in the most exact proportion possible; _i.e._ in a proportion the most

exactly adapted to their intended state of life; such creatures would

be made upright, or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, from

their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present;

though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of

the moral principle. If they can be gratified without its allowance,

or by contradicting it, then they must be conceived to have some

tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce

persons to such forbidden gratification. This tendency, in some one

particular propension, may be increased, by the greater frequency of

occasions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting others.

The least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstances,[99] though

but in thought, will increase this wrong tendency; and may increase

it further, till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it

becomes effect; and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual

deviation from it; a danger necessarily arising from the very nature of

propension, and which therefore could not have been prevented, though

it might have been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would

be, as if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person,

in which a certain degree of attention would keep him steady: but if

he would not attend, in this degree, any one of a thousand objects,

catching his eye, might lead him out of it.

Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt act

of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution; unsettle the

adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed it, and in which

the uprightness of its make consisted: but repetition of irregularities

would produce habits. Thus the constitution would be spoiled;

and creatures made upright, become corrupt and depraved in their

settled character, proportionably to their repeated irregularities

in occasional acts,[100] On the contrary, these creatures might

have improved and raised themselves, to a higher and more secure

state of virtue, by the contrary behavior: by steadily following the

moral principle, supposed to be one part of their nature: and thus

_withstanding_ that unavoidable danger of defection, which necessarily

arose from propension, the other part of it. For, by thus preserving

their integrity for some time, their danger would lessen; since

propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and

of course: and their security against this lessening danger would

increase; since the moral principle would gain additional strength

by exercise: both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous

habits.

Thus vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also

depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous

self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the

inward constitution or character: and may improve it to such a degree,

that though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections

to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle; and consequently

should allow, that such creatures as have been above supposed, would

forever remain defectible, yet their danger of actually deviating from

right may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified

against what remains of it; if that may be called danger, against which

there is an adequate, effectual security. Still, this their higher

perfection may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a

state of discipline, and this their more complete security remain to

proceed from them.

Thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish, as they

came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going wrong; and so

may stand in need of the security of virtuous habits, additional to the

moral principle wrought into their natures by him. That which is the

ground of their danger, or their want of security, maybe considered as

a deficiency in themselves, to which virtuous habits are the natural

supply. And as they are naturally capable of being raised and improved

by discipline, it may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be

placed in circumstances with an eye to it: in circumstances peculiarly

fitted to be to them a state of discipline for their improvement in

virtue.

But how much more strongly must this hold with respect to those who

have corrupted their natures, are fallen from their original rectitude,

and whose passions are become excessive by repeated violations of

their inward constitution! Upright creatures may want to be improved:

depraved creatures want to be renewed. Education and discipline, which

may be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are

expedient for those: but must be absolutely necessary for these. For

these, discipline of the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees

of it, must be necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits; to

recover their primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence

must have weakened; to repair, as well as raise into a habit, the moral

principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous

happiness.

Whoever will consider the thing, may clearly see that the present world

is _peculiarly fit_ to be a state of discipline for this purpose, to

such as will set themselves to mend and improve. For, the various

temptations with which we are surrounded; our experience of the deceits

of wickedness; having been in many instances led wrong ourselves; the

great viciousness of the world; the infinite disorders consequent upon

it; our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own

feeling of it, or from the sight of it in others; these things, though

some of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet when

duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct tendency to bring us

to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper: the contrary both

to thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained self-will, and

violent bent to follow present inclination, which may be observed in

undisciplined minds.

Such experience, as the present state affords, of the frailty of our

nature; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned passion; of the

power which an infinite being has over us, by the various capacities

of misery which he has given us; in short, that kind and degree of

experience, which the present state affords us, that the constitution

of nature is such as to admit the possibility, the danger, and the

actual event, or creatures losing their innocence and happiness, and

becoming vicious and wretched; has a tendency to give us a practical

sense of things very different from a mere speculative knowledge, that

we are liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows, whether

the security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of

perfection, may not in part arise, from their having had such a sense

of things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, in some

state of probation. And passing through the present world with that

moral attention, which is necessary to the acting a right part in it,

may leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our minds.

To be a little more distinct: allurements to what is wrong,

difficulties in the discharge of our duty, our not being able to act a

uniform right part without some thought and care, and the opportunities

which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike or

obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when we either cannot do

it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones, these things,

_i.e._ the snares and temptations of vice, are what render the present

world peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, to those who will

preserve their integrity: because they render being upon our guard,

resolution, and the denial of our passions, necessary in order to that

end. The exercise of such particular recollection, intention of mind,

and self-government, in the practice of virtue, has, from the make of

our nature, a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue; as implying,

not only a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense exercise

of the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a stronger effort of

virtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know himself to be

in particular danger, for some time, of doing any thing wrong, which

yet he fully resolves not to do; continued recollection and keeping

upon his guard, in order to make good his resolution, is a _continued_

exerting of that act of virtue in a _high degree_, which need have

been, and perhaps would have been, only _instantaneous_ and _weak_, had

the temptation been so.

It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to

virtue and piety:[101] but it would have been nearer the truth, though

not strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essential to

discipline and improvement. For though actions materially virtuous,

which have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to

our particular inclinations, may possibly be done only from these

particular inclinations, and so may not be any exercise of the

principle of virtue, _i.e._ not be virtuous actions at all; yet, on

the contrary, they _may_ be an exercise of that principle: and when

they are, they have a tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue.

But when the exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued,

oftener repeated, and more intense; as it must be in circumstances of

danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind and in any degree; this

tendency is increased proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the

consequence.

This undoubtedly holds to a certain length: but how far it may hold,

I know not. Neither our intellectual powers, nor our bodily strength

can be improved beyond a certain degree: and both may be overwrought.

Possibly there may be something analogous to this, with respect to the

moral character; which is scarce worth considering. I mention it only,

lest it should come into some persons’ thoughts, not as an exception to

the foregoing observations, which perhaps it is; but as a confutation

of them, which it is not. And there may be several other exceptions.

Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, and in

every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And these plainly

hold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly, (which is all

that is intended by them,) that _the present world is peculiarly fit

to be a state of discipline, for our improvement in virtue and piety_:

in the same sense as some sciences, by requiring and engaging the

attention, not to be sure of such persons as will not, but of such as

will, set themselves to them, are fit to form the mind to habits of

attention.

Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline

of virtue to the generality of men, that on the contrary they seem to

make it a discipline of vice. And the viciousness of the world is,

in different ways, the great temptation which renders it a state of

virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to good men. The whole end,

and the whole occasion, of mankind’s being placed in such a state as

the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. That which appears

amidst the general corruption, is, that there are some persons, who,

having within them the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to

and follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear or

more obscure, which are afforded them; and that the present world is

not only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise of

it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it: apt to improve

it, in some respects, even beyond what would be, by the exercise of

it, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or in a society of

equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But that the present world

does not actually become a state of moral discipline to many, even

to the generality, _i.e._ that they do not improve or grow better in

it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it was not intended for moral

discipline, by any who at all observe the analogy of nature. For, of

the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals, which are

adapted and put in the way to improve to such a point or state of

natural maturity and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one in

a million actually does. Far the greatest part of them decay before

they are improved to it; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no

one, who does not deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds

and bodies, which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection,

answer the end for which they were really designed by nature; and

therefore that nature designed them for such perfection. I cannot

forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the

_appearance_ of such an amazing _waste_ in nature, with respect to

these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable,

as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many

moral agents by themselves, _i.e._ by vice.

Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be objected, in

another way; that so far as a course of behavior, materially virtuous,

proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and

strengthening of self-love. But doing what God commands, because he

commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. A

course of such obedience will form habits of it. And a constant regard

to veracity, justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these

particular virtues; and will certainly form habits of self-government,

and of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity

requires it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with

which some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate

all religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, and

charity, regard to God’s authority, and to our own chief interest, are

not only all three coincident; but each of them is, in itself, a just

and natural motive or principle of action. He who begins a good life

from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some

degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more, of that character

which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral; and

to the relation which God stands in to us as moral governor of it:

nor consequently can he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this

constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that

character.

These several observations, concerning the active principle of virtue

and obedience to God’s commands, are applicable to passive submission

or resignation to his will: which is another essential part of a right

character, connected with the former, and very much in our power to

form ourselves to. It may be imagined, that nothing but afflictions

can give occasion for or require this virtue; that it can have no

respect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect

happiness: but it is not experience which can make us think thus.

Prosperity itself, while any thing supposed desirable is not ours,

begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as

much a source of discontent, as any thing in our external condition. It

is indeed true, that there can be no scope for _patience_, when sorrow

shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind, which

shall have been formed by patience. For, though self-love, considered

merely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest,

cannot but be uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to

God’s commands, our interest being rightly understood; because this

obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest, must be in every

ease one and the thing: yet it may be questioned, whether self-love,

considered merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can,

from its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the

will of God; any more than particular affections can:[102] coincident

in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and in

degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution

of things, or the divine appointments. So that _habits_ of resignation

may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures: habits, I

say; which signify what is formed by use. However, in general it is

obvious that both self-love and particular affection in human creatures

considered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the mind; and

therefore stand in need of discipline. Now denial of those particular

affections, in a course of active virtue and obedience to God’s will,

has a tendency to moderate them; and seems also to have a tendency

to habituate the mind, to be easy and satisfied with that degree of

happiness which is allotted us, _i.e._ to moderate self-love. But the

proper discipline for resignation is affliction. A right behavior

under that trial; recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the

view, in which religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of

God, receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in

his world and under his government; this will habituate the mind to a

dutiful submission. Such submission, together with the active principle

of obedience, make up the temper and character in us, which answers to

his sovereignty; and which absolutely belongs to the condition of our

being, as dependent creatures. Nor can it be said, that this is only

breaking the mind to a submission to mere power; for mere power may

be accidental, and precarious, and usurped: but it is forming within

ourselves the temper of resignation to His rightful authority, who is,

by nature, supreme over all.

Upon the whole: such a character, and such qualifications, are

necessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature

alone does in no wise bestow; but has put it upon us, in great part,

to acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another, from

childhood to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them, by giving

us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the beginning of

life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general analogy to our

condition in the present world, as in a state of moral discipline for

another.

It is in vain to object against the credibility of the present life’s

being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the danger

unavoidably accompanying such discipline, might have been saved us, by

our being made at once the creatures and the characters, _which we were

to be_. For we experience, that _what we were to be_, was to be the

effect of _what we would do_: and that the general conduct of nature

is, not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of going

through them, and to put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own,

experience and habits, are the _natural_ supply to our deficiencies,

and security against our dangers: since it is as plainly natural to

set ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the external things,

which we stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general

law of nature, that we should with regard to our temporal interest,

form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, use,

and discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly in the

beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of it. The

alternative is left to our choice: either to improve ourselves, and

better our condition; or, in default of such improvement, to remain

deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible, from the

analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with respect to the

happiness of a future state, and the qualifications necessary for it.

There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present world’s

being a state of probation; that it is a _theatre of action_, for the

manifestation of persons’ characters, with respect to a future one:

not, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his creation or part

of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a

state of probation in the other senses. However, it is not impossible,

that men’s showing and making manifest, what is in their heart,

what their real character is, may have respect to a future life, in

ways and manners with which we are not acquainted: particularly it

may be a means, (for the Author of nature does not appear to do any

thing without means,) of their being disposed of suitably to their

characters; and of its being known to the creation, by way of example,

that they are thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural

account of this; one may just mention, that the manifestation of

persons’ characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the

carrying on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting

mankind, which comes under our observation at present. I shall only

add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that treated

of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government; since by

persons’ behavior under it, their characters cannot but be manifested,

and if they behave well, improved.

CHAPTER VI.

THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.

Throughout the foregoing treatise it appears, that the condition of

mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, and under the

government of God which we experience, is greatly analogous to our

condition, as designed for another world, or as under that farther

government, which religion teaches us. If therefore any assert, as a

fatalist must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable

with the former; there immediately arises a question in the way of

analogy, whether he must not also own it to be reconcilable with the

latter, _i.e._ with the system of religion itself, and the proof of

it. The reader then will observe, that the question now before us is

not absolute, _i.e._ whether the opinion of fate be reconcilable with

religion; but hypothetical, whether, upon supposition of its being

reconcilable with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcilable

with religion also. Or, what pretence a fatalist, not other persons,

but a fatalist, has to conclude from his opinion, that there can be no

such thing as religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must

unavoidably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of

universal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as

easily be excused.[103]

Since it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, that

there is an intelligent Author of nature, or natural Governor of the

world; and since an objection may be made against the proof of this,

from the opinion of universal necessity, as it may be supposed, that

such necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation

of all things; it is requisite, that this objection be distinctly

answered; or that it be shown, that a fatality supposed consistent

with what we certainly experience, does not destroy the proof of

an intelligent Author and Governor of nature; before we proceed to

consider, whether it destroys the proof of a moral Governor of it, or

of our being in a state of religion.

When it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of nature,

the actions of men, every thing, and every mode and circumstance

of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have been

otherwise; it is to be observed, that this necessity does not exclude

deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles,

and to certain ends: because all this is matter of undoubted

experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, every moment,

be conscious of. Hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of itself,

is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, and how things

came _to be_ and _to continue_ as they are; but only an account of

this _circumstance_ relating to their origin and continuance, that

they could not have been otherwise, than they are and have been. The

assertion, that every thing is by necessity of nature, is not an

answer to the question; Whether the world came into being as it is,

by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not: but to quite another

question; Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner

which we call _necessarily_, or in that way and manner which we call

_freely_? For suppose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and one who

kept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself a free agent,

were disputing together, and vindicating their respective opinions;

and they should happen to instance a house; they would agree that it

was built by an architect. Their difference concerning necessity and

freedom would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this;

but only concerning another matter; whether the architect built it

necessarily or freely.

Suppose they should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution

of nature. In a lax way of speaking, one of them might say, it was

by necessity; and the other, by freedom: but if they had any meaning

to their words, as the latter must mean a free agent, so the former

must at length be reduced to mean an agent, whether he would say one

or more, acting by necessity: for abstract notions can do nothing. We

indeed ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent.

For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, _i.e._ immensity

and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of

being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot

but be, something, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the

archetype of it. Hence, (for _this abstract_, as much as any other,

implies a _concrete_) we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be,

an infinite and immense eternal being, existing prior to all design

contributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. From the scantiness

of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced; that necessity

is the foundation, the reason, the account of the existence of God. But

it is not alleged, nor can it be at all intended, that _every thing_

exists as it does, by this kind of necessity: a necessity antecedent in

nature to design: it cannot, I say, be meant that every thing exists

as it does, by this kind of necessity, upon several accounts; and

particularly because it is admitted, that design, in the actions of

men, contributes to many alterations in nature. If any deny this, I

shall not pretend to reason with them.

From these things it follows; _First_, That when a fatalist asserts,

that every thing is _by necessity_, he must mean, _by an agent acting

necessarily_; he _must_, I say, mean this, for I am very sensible he

would not choose to mean it. _Secondly_, That the necessity, by which

such an agent is supposed to act, does not exclude intelligence and

design. So that, were the system of fatality admitted, it would just as

much account for the formation of the world, as for the structure of a

house, and no more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary

agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to be the former

of the world. And the appearances of _design_ and of _final causes_

in the constitution of nature as really prove this acting agent to be

an _intelligent designer_, or to act from choice; upon the scheme of

necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of freedom.

It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy

the proof that there is an intelligent Author of nature and natural

Governor of the world; the present question, which the analogy before

mentioned suggests,[104] and which, I think, it will answer, is this:

Whether the opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibility,

with the constitution of the world, and the natural government which

we experience exercised over it, destroys all reasonable ground of

belief, that we are in a state of religion: or whether that opinion be

reconcilable with religion; with the system, and the proof of it.

Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, in his

own principles; that the child should reason upon them, and conclude,

that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is not

a subject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded

or punished. Imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame

and commendation out of his mind, by means of this system; to form

his temper, and character, and behavior to it; and from it to judge

of the treatment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his

coming abroad into the world: as the fatalist judges from this system,

what he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard to

a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether any

one of common sense would think fit, that a child should be put upon

these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice. And a

man has little pretence to reason, who is not sensible, that we are

all children in speculations of this kind. However, the child would

doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from the restraints

of fear and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered and

embarrassed; and highly conceited in his superior knowledge, so far

beyond his years. But conceit and vanity would be the least bad part

of the influence, which these principles must have, when thus reasoned

and acted upon, during the course of his education. He must either be

allowed to go on and be the plague of all about him, and himself too,

even to his own destruction, or else correction must be continually

made use of, to supply the want of those natural perceptions of blame

and commendation, which we have supposed to be removed; and to give

him a practical impression, of what he had reasoned himself out of the

belief of, that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be punished

for doing what he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible,

but that the correction which he must meet with, in the course of his

education, must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed

in were not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and

somehow or other misapplied it to practice and common life; as what the

fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present, ought

in all reason to convince him, that this scheme is misapplied, when

applied to the subject of religion.[105] But supposing the child’s

temper could remain still formed to the system, and his expectation of

the treatment he was to have in the world, be regulated by it; so as

to expect that no reasonable man would blame or punish him, for any

thing which he should do, because he could not help doing it: upon this

supposition it is manifest he would, upon his coming abroad into the

world, be insupportable to society, and the treatment which he would

receive from it would render it so to him; and he could not fail of

doing something very soon, for which he would be delivered over into

the hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be convinced

of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor.

Suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to practice,

such practical application of it will be found equally absurd; equally

fallacious in a practical sense. For instance, that if a man be

destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no

care of his own preservation; or if he be destined to die before that

time, no care can prevent it, therefore all care about preserving one’s

life is to be neglected: which is the fallacy instanced in by the

ancients. On the contrary, none of these practical absurdities can be

drawn from reasoning, upon the supposition that we are free; but all

such reasoning with regard to the common affairs of life is justified

by experience. Therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of

necessity were _speculatively_ true; yet, with regard to practice, it

is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches: that is, to

the whole of our present life. For, the constitution of the present

world, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we

were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole

process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation,

inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is

as if we were free, therefore we are so.[106]

The thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural

government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, as if

we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are so or not.

Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be ever so true;

yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things,

that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this application of

it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful

manner, with regard to our present interest. How then can people think

themselves so very secure, that the same application of the same

opinion may not mislead them also, in some analogous manner, with

respect to a future, a more general, and more important interest? For,

religion being a practical subject; and the analogy of nature showing

us, that we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true

one, to practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of

religion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations,

it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will still

remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that we deceive

ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner, as when people fancy they can

draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity.

From these things together, the attentive reader will see it follows,

that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of religion be

conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity, because the

notion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects: _i.e._

with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain

any reflection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasonable. For

to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical principles,

which the Author of our nature gave us to act upon; and to pretend

to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to which, our own short

views, and even our experience, will show us, it cannot be depended

upon; and such, at best, the subject of necessity must be; this is

vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness.

But this is not all. We find within ourselves a will, and are conscious

of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with fate, it

is reconcilable with it in the Author of nature. Besides, natural

government and final causes imply a character and a will in the

Governor and Designer;[107] a will concerning the creatures whom he

governs. The Author of nature then being certainly of some character or

other, notwithstanding necessity; it is evident this necessity is as

reconcilable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity,

and justice, in him, which attributes are the foundation of religion,

as with any other character: since we find this necessity no more

hinders _men_ from being benevolent, than cruel; true, than faithless;

just, than unjust; or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. It

is said indeed, that what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just

punishment, upon supposition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust:

because it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could

not avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy the

injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the injustice

of punishing it! However, as little to the purpose as this objection

is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to observe from it, how

the notions of justice and injustice remain, even while we endeavor to

suppose them removed; how they force themselves upon the mind, even

while we are making suppositions destructive of them: for there is not,

perhaps, a man in the world, but would be ready to make this objection

at first thought.

But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be

reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in

the Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion; “Yet, does

it not plainly destroy the _proof_ that he is of that character, and

consequently the proof of religion?” By no means. For we find, that

happiness and misery are not our _fate_, in any such sense as not to be

the consequences of our behavior; but that they are the consequences

of it.[108] We find God exercises the same kind of government over us,

which a father exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate over

his subjects. Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning

liberty and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity

and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this

authority or government, to a Being who can have no competitions, or

interfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects.

But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, may be

perplexed with difficulties, which run up into the most abstruse of

all speculations; and as the opinion of necessity seems to be the very

basis upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may be of some use to

offer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which may

distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion.

The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of nature is

not affected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a

thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of

things.[109] It is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other

speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards and

punishments:[110] and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, by

which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtuous

and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill

desert.[111] This moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a

rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind: for it carries

in it authority and a right of direction; authority in such a sense,

as that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned.[112]

And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a

rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a sense including

sanctions; may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide of

action, in creatures who are capable of considering it as given them

by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also

a sense of security in following it, and of danger in deviating from

it. A direction of the Author of nature, given to creatures capable of

looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him: and a command

from him necessarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in

case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the

sense or perception of good and ill desert,[113] which is contained

in the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes it

appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of government

is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an

inseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely

amounts to declaring, upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and

his rewards be bestowed. He must have given us this discernment and

sense of things, as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter: that is,

by way of information beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this

world. There is then most evident ground to think, that the government

of God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which

he has given us: and that, in the upshot and issue of things, happiness

and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice

respectively; as he has already, in so peculiar a manner, associated

the ideas of them in our minds. And hence might easily be deduced the

obligations of religious worship, were it only to be considered as a

means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government

of God, and securing our obedience to it: which yet is an extremely

imperfect view of that most important duty.

No objection from necessity can lie against this general proof of

religion. None against the proposition reasoned upon, that we have

such a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a mere matter of

fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is thus constituted: none

against the conclusion; because it is immediate and wholly from this

fact. For the conclusion, that God will finally reward the righteous

and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us

fit[114] that _he should_; but from its appearing, that he has told

us, _he will_. And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise

and threatening, which it hath been observed the notion of a command

implies, and the sense of good and ill desert which he has given us,

more distinctly expresses. This reasoning from fact is confirmed, and

in some degree even verified, by other facts; by the natural tendencies

of virtue and of vice;[115] and by this, that God, in the natural

course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous to

society; and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense.[116]

So that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even upon

the wild supposition which we are arguing upon.

It must be observed further, that natural religion has, besides this,

an external evidence; which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be

true, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the observations and

reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion;

that there is a God, who made the world, who is the moral governor

and judge of mankind, and will upon the whole deal with every one

according to his works: I say, suppose a person convinced of this by

reason, but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state

of mankind: it would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what

was the history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in what

manner, it came first into the world; and whether it were believed

by any considerable part of it. Were he upon inquiry to find, that

a particular person, in a late age, first of all proposed it, as a

deduction of reason, and that mankind were before wholly ignorant of

it; then, though its evidence from reason would remain, there would

be no additional probability of its truth, from the account of its

discovery.

But instead of this being the fact, he would find, on the contrary,

what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth:

_First_, That somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions and

alterations, hath been professed in all ages and countries, of which

we have any certain information relating to this matter. _Secondly_,

That it is certain historical fact, so far as we can trace things up,

that this whole system of belief, that there is one God, the creator

and moral governor of the world, and that mankind is in a state of

religion, was received in the first ages. And _Thirdly_, That as

there is no hint or intimation in history, that this system was first

reasoned out; so there is express historical or traditional evidence,

as ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation.

Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The first of

them, general consent, shows this system to be conformable to the

common sense of mankind. The second, namely, that religion was believed

in the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that

there were then any superstitious or false additions to it, cannot

but be a further confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of

this alternative: either that it came into the world by revelation;

or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The

former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will

consider, how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are,

will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the

truth. And as it is shown in the second part[117] of this treatise,

that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation

in the beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against

subsequent ones; a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which

would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pretences to

revelation; than by supposing some real original one, from whence they

were copied.

And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express historical

or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the system of

religion being taught mankind by revelation, this must be admitted as

some degree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why should not

the most ancient tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a

fact, against which there is no presumption? This proof is mentioned

here, because it has its weight to show, that religion came into

the world by revelation, prior to all consideration of the proper

authority of any book supposed to contain it; and even prior to all

consideration, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed

down, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account,

which we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances,

is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of

necessity. And the _external_ evidence, even of natural religion, is by

no means inconsiderable.

It is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after

all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as

speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also

may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and the dictates

of it not impartially attended to. This indeed proves nothing against

the reality of our speculative or practical faculties of perception?

against their being intended by nature, to inform us in the theory

of things, and instruct us how we are to behave, and what we are to

expect in consequence of our behavior. Yet our liableness, in the

degree we are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious

admonition to us to be upon our guard, with respect to what is of such

consequence, as our determinations concerning virtue and religion;

and particularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions

of honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to

mankind, for the only moral rule.[118]

The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the thing, and

the history of religion, amount, _when taken together_, to a real

practical proof of it, not to be confuted: such a proof as, considering

the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, would be admitted

fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the actions of men, who act

upon thought and reflection, if it were admitted that there is no proof

of the contrary. But it may be said; “There are many probabilities,

which cannot indeed be confuted; _i.e._ shown to be no probabilities,

and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities, on the other

side; much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object

against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion

itself may be clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such

arguments at all, but leaving them just as they are.[119] Now the

method of government by rewards and punishments, and especially

rewarding and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must

go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary agents. And

it is incredible, that the Author of nature should govern us upon a

supposition as true, which he knows to be false; and therefore absurd

to think, he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter;

especially that he will do it under the notion, that they are of good

or ill desert.”

Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the answer is full,

and not to be evaded,--viz.: that the whole constitution and course

of things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows beyond possibility

of doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false; wherever

the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed clearly shows where:

in supposing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free agents.

But, upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for

granted, that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded

and punished. That, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned

is false, is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even

brute creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the

natural course of things. Men are rewarded and punished for their

actions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being so,

punished for vicious actions as such; by the natural instrumentality

of each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay, even

the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the

rewards and punishments following from them, which in general are to be

considered as natural, _i.e._ from the Author of nature; these rewards

and punishments, being _naturally_[120] annexed to actions considered

as implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill

desert; these natural rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a

contradiction to the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a

more exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert

as such. So that if it be incredible, that necessary agents should be

thus rewarded and punished; then, men are not necessary but free; since

it is matter of fact, that they are thus rewarded and punished. If,

on the contrary, which is the supposition we have been arguing upon,

it be insisted that men are necessary agents; then, there is nothing

incredible in the further supposition of necessary agents being thus

rewarded and punished: since we ourselves are thus dealt with.

From the whole therefore it must follow, that a necessity supposed

possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, does in no

sort prove that the Author of Nature will not, nor destroy the proof

that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal government,

render his creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as

they behave well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in words

conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy of nature shows

us, that the opinion of necessity, considered as practical, is false.

And if necessity, upon the supposition above mentioned, doth not

destroy the proof of natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration

in the proof of revealed.

From these things likewise we may learn, in what sense to understand

that general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is essentially

destructive of all religion. First, in a practical sense; that by this

notion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves

in vice, and justify to others their disregard to all religion. And

secondly, in the strictest sense; that it is a contradiction to

the whole constitution of nature, and to what we may every moment

experience in ourselves, and so overturns every thing. But by no means

is this assertion to be understood, as if necessity, supposing it could

possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things, and with what

we experience, were not also reconcilable with religion: for upon this

supposition, it demonstrably is so.[121]

CHAPTER VII.

THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION,

IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.

Though it be acknowledged, as it cannot but be, that the analogy of

nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of religion,

and to the several particular things contained in it, considered as so

many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows this credibility not

to be destroyed by any notions of necessity: still, objections may be

insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the divine

government implied in the notion of religion, and against the method

by which this government is conducted; to which objections analogy

can be no direct answer. For the credibility, or the certain truth,

of a matter of fact, does not immediately prove any thing concerning

the wisdom or goodness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately

or directly, than show such and such things to be true or credible,

considered only as matters of fact. But if, upon supposition of a

moral constitution of nature and a moral government over it, analogy

suggests and makes it credible, that this government must be a scheme,

system, or constitution of government, as distinguished from a number

of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness; and

likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and

of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct general answer

to all objections against the justice and goodness of it: then analogy

is, remotely, of great service in answering those objections; both by

suggesting the answer, and showing it to be a credible one.

Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, _First_,

Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the

world, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes it

credible, that his moral government _must_ be a scheme, quite beyond

our comprehension: and this affords a general answer to all objections

against the justice and goodness of it. _Secondly_, A more distinct

observation of some particular things contained in God’s scheme of

natural government, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be

contained in his moral government, will further show, how little weight

is to be laid upon these objections.

I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the

world, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes

it credible, that his moral government must be a scheme, quite

beyond our comprehension; and this affords a general answer to

all objections against the justice and goodness of it. It is most

obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that, upon supposition

of a moral government, it must be a scheme. For the world, and the

whole natural government of it, appears to be so: to be a scheme,

system, or constitution, whose parts correspond to each other, and

to a whole, as really as any work of art, or as any particular model

of a civil constitution and government. In this great scheme of the

natural world, individuals have various peculiar relations to other

individuals of their own species. Whole species are, we find, variously

related to other species, upon this earth. Nor do we know, how much

further these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is not any

action or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single and

unconnected, as not to have a respect to some other actions and events;

so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have

a remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond

the compass of this present world. There seems indeed nothing, from

whence we can so much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures,

actions, and events, throughout the whole of nature, have relations to

each other But, as it is obvious, that all events have future unknown

consequences; so if we trace any event, as far as we can, into what is

connected with it, we shall find, that if it were not connected with

something further in nature, unknown to us, something both past and

present, such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor can we

give the whole account of any one thing whatever; of all its causes,

ends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts, I mean, without which

it could not have been. By this most astonishing connection, these

reciprocal correspondences and mutual relations, every thing which we

see in the course of nature is actually brought about. Things seemingly

the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be

necessary conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so

that any one thing whatever, may for aught we know to the contrary, be

a necessary condition to any other.

The natural world then, and natural government of it, being such an

incomprehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a man must, really

in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of

his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, and strongly shows

the credibility, that the moral world and government of it may be so

too.[122] Indeed the natural and moral constitution and government of

the world are so connected, as to make up together but one scheme:

and it is highly probable, that the first is formed and carried on

merely in subserviency to the latter; as the vegetable world is for the

animal, and organized bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is,

without inquiring how far the administration of the natural world is

subordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that

one should be analogous or similar to the other: that therefore every

act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond

itself, and its immediate object; may have some reference to other

parts of God’s moral administration, and to a general moral plan; and

that every circumstance of this his moral government may be adjusted

beforehand with a view to the whole of it. For example: the determined

length of time, and the degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain

in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wickedness is

permitted to have its progress; the times appointed for the execution

of justice; the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and

punishments, and the manners of their distribution; all particular

instances of divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance of

them, may have such respects to each other, as to make up altogether

a whole, connected and related in all its parts; a scheme or system,

which is as properly such, as the natural world is, and of the like

kind. Supposing this to be the case, it is most evident, that we are

not competent judges of this scheme, from the small parts of it which

come within our view in the present life: therefore no objections

against any of these parts can be insisted upon by reasonable men.[123]

This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from it, are

universally acknowledged upon _other_ occasions; and though scarce

denied, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to argue against

religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the most reasonable

men, always to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make due

allowances for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be useless to go a

little further, in order to show more distinctly, how just an answer

our ignorance is, to objections against the scheme of Providence.

Suppose then a person boldly to assert,[124] that the things complained

of, the origin and continuance of evil, might easily have been

prevented by repeated interpositions;[125] interpositions so guarded

and circumstanced, as would preclude all mischief arising from them.

Or, if this were impracticable, that a _scheme_ of government is itself

an imperfection, since more good might have been produced, without any

scheme, system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated

acts of distributive justice and goodness; because these would have

occasioned no irregularities. Farther than this, it is presumed, the

objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious: that were

these assertions true, still the observations above, concerning our

ignorance in the scheme of divine government and the consequence drawn

from it, would hold, in great measure; enough to vindicate religion,

against all objections from the disorders of the present state. Were

these assertions true, yet the government of the world might be just

and good notwithstanding; for, at the most, they would infer nothing

more than that it might have been better. But they are mere arbitrary

assertions; no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities

of things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of

probability. For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet many

instances may be alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of

suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the most palpable

self contradictions, which, not every one would perceive to be such;

nor perhaps any one, at first sight suspect.

From these things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance,

as it is the common, so it is really a satisfactory answer, to all

objections against the justice and goodness of Providence. If a man,

contemplating any one providential dispensation, which had no relation

to any others, should object, that he discerned in it a disregard to

justice, or a deficiency of goodness; nothing would be less an answer

to such objection, than our ignorance in other parts of providence,

or in the possibilities of things, no way related to what he was

contemplating. But when we know not but the part objected against may

be relative to other parts unknown to us; and when we are unacquainted

with what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in the case

before us; then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because, some

unknown relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is

objected against, just and good; nay good in the highest practicable

degree.

II. How little weight is to be laid upon such objections, will further

appear, by a more distinct observation of some particular things

contained in the natural government of God, the like to which may be

supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his moral government.

_First_, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appear to be

accomplished without means: so we find that means very undesirable,

often conduce to bring about ends in such a measure desirable, as

greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. And in cases

where such means are conducive to such ends, it is not reason, but

_experience_, which shows us, that they are thus conducive. Experience

also shows many means to be conducive and necessary to accomplish ends,

which means, before experience, we should have thought, would have

had even a contrary tendency. From these observations relating to the

natural scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous to

it, arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery in each

other’s power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice to the

degree we are; and in general, that those things which are objected

against the moral scheme of Providence, may be, upon the whole,

friendly and assistant to virtue, and productive of an overbalance of

happiness: _i.e._ the things objected against may be means, by which

an overbalance of good, will in the end, be found produced. And from

the same observations, it appears to be no presumption against this,

that we do not, if indeed we do not, see those means to have any

such tendency, or that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus

those things, which we call irregularities, may not be so at all;

because they may be means of accomplishing wise and good ends more

considerable. It may be added, as above, that they may also be the

only means, by which these wise and good ends are capable of being

accomplished.

It may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and wicked

conclusion from any of these observations, that though the constitution

of our nature, from whence we are capable of vice and misery, may, as

it undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and happiness of

the world; and though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial

to it: (_i.e._ it would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked

person had himself abstained from his own wickedness, but that any

one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted:) yet

notwithstanding, it might have been much better for the world, if this

very evil had never been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, that

the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and

yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain

from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the natural

world, there are disorders which bring their own cures; diseases, which

are themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been

for the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought madness to assert,

that sickness is a better or more perfect state than health; though the

like, with regard to the moral world, has been asserted.

_Secondly_, The natural government of the world is carried on by

general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons: the wisest

and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And that there are such

reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of nature; by our

being made to experience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed all

the good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means,--viz.: that the

laws, by which the world is governed, are general. We have scarce any

kind of enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental

in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we _foresee_ likely

to procure them: now this foresight could not be at all, were not the

government of the world carried on by general laws. And though, for

aught we know to the contrary, every single case may be, at length,

found to have been provided for even by these: yet to prevent all

irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best

general laws, may be impossible in the nature of things; as we see it

is absolutely impossible in civil government.

But then we are ready to think, that, the constitution of nature

remaining as it is, and the course of things being permitted to go

on, in other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to

prevent irregularities; though they could not have been prevented, or

remedied by any general laws. There would indeed be reason to wish,

which, by-the-way, is very different from a right to claim, that all

irregularities were prevented or remedied by present interpositions,

if these interpositions would have no other effect than this. But it

is plain they would have some visible and immediate _bad_ effects:

for instance, they would encourage idleness and negligence; and they

would render doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by

this very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general

laws. And further, it is certain they would have _distant_ effects,

and very great ones too; by means of the wonderful connections before

mentioned.[126] So that we cannot so much as guess, what would be the

whole result of the interpositions desired. It may be said, any bad

result might be prevented by further interpositions, whenever there was

occasion for them: but this again is talking quite at random, and in

the dark.[127]

Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons, why the course of the world

should be carried on by general laws, and good ends accomplished by

this means: and for aught we know, there may be the wisest reasons

for it, and the best ends accomplished by it. We have no ground to

believe, that all irregularities could be remedied as they arise, or

could have been precluded, by general laws. We find that interpositions

would produce evil, and prevent good: and, for aught we know, they

would produce greater evil than they would prevent; and prevent greater

good than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not

interposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is an

instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient: and going

further, seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties.

It may be said, that “after all, these supposed impossibilities and

relations are what we are unacquainted with; and we must judge of

religion, as of other things, by what we do know, and look upon the

rest as nothing: or however, that the answers here given to what is

objected against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate the

proof of it; since their stress lies so very much upon our ignorance.”

But,

_First_, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed equally

destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, and objections

against it; yet partial ignorance does not. For we may in any degree be

convinced, that a person is of such a character, and consequently will

pursue such ends; though we are greatly ignorant, what is the proper

way of acting, in order the most effectually to obtain those ends: and

in this case, objections against his manner of acting, as seemingly

not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by our ignorance;

though the proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be

invalidated by it. Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral

character of God, and consequently that his government is moral, and

that every one upon the whole shall receive according to his deserts; a

proof that this is the designed end of his government. But we are not

competent judges, what is the proper way of acting, in order the most

effectually to accomplish this end.[128] Therefore our ignorance is an

answer to objections against the conduct of Providence, in permitting

irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it

is so obvious, that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to

objections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it

can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates

the proof of religion, as it does the objections against it.

_Secondly_, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations,

might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, as well as

to answer objections against it; and that, in consequence of this,

the proof of it were doubtful. Still, let the assertion be despised,

or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations

would remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the

whole, be the consequences of observing or violating them. For, these

obligations arise, immediately and necessarily, from the judgment of

our own mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being

self-condemned. And they would be certain too, from considerations

of interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the future

consequences of virtue and vice; yet it is, however, credible, that

they may have those consequences, which religion teaches us they will:

and this credibility is a certain[129] obligation in point of prudence,

to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the conscientious

practice of all that is good.

_Thirdly_, The answers above given to the objections against religion

cannot be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. For, upon

suspicion that God exercises a moral government over the world, analogy

does most strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government must

be a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehension. A thousand

particular analogies show us, that parts of such a scheme, from their

relation to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends, which we

should have thought they had no tendency to accomplish: nay ends, which

before experience, we should have thought such parts were contradictory

to, and had a tendency to prevent. Therefore all these analogies show,

that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion is

delusive: because they show it is not at all incredible, that, could we

comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders

objected against to be consistent with justice and goodness; and even

to be instances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of

religion, as it is to the objections against it;[130] and therefore

cannot invalidate that proof, as it does these objections.

_Lastly_, From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that the

answers above given to the objections against Providence, though,

in a general way of speaking, they may be said to be taken from our

ignorance; yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from

something which analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy shows us

positively, that our ignorance in the possibilities of things, and the

various relations in nature, renders us incompetent judges, and leads

us to false conclusions, in cases similar to this, in which we pretend

to judge and to object. So that the things above insisted upon are not

mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations: but they

are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation

of serious men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of nature.

Therefore to take these things into the account, is to judge by

experience and what we do know: and it is not judging so, to take no

notice of them.

CONCLUSION.

The observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this little

scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as having a

reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan of things.

Whether we are, any way, related to the more distant parts of the

boundless universe, into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain.

But it is evident, that the course of things, which comes within

our view, is connected with some things, past, present, and future,

beyond it.[131] So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle

of a scheme, not fixed but progressive, every way incomprehensible:

incomprehensible, in a manner equally, with respect to what has

been, what now is, and what shall be. This scheme cannot but contain

in it some things as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and

conception,[132] as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man in

his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive, how the world

came to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent

Author and Governor of it? Or, admitting an intelligent Governor of

it, that there is some other rule of government more natural, and of

easier conception, than that which we call moral? Indeed, without an

intelligent Author and Governor of nature, no account at all can be

given, how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we

are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it

is: nor any, of its general end and design, without a moral governor of

it. That there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor

of the world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise; as

proved, and generally known, and confessed to be proved. And the very

notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular final

causes, implies a will and a character.[133]

Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us to

conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and good: so we can

scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be otherwise. However, in

consequence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed

the universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does,

rather than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and to all

living creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures act this

their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted

them, without any reflection. But one would think it impossible, that

creatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all

this; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least, whither

we are going; and what the mysterious scheme, in the midst of which

we find ourselves, will, at length, come out and produce: a scheme in

which it is certain we are highly interested, and in which we may be

interested even beyond conception.[134]

For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall

cease to be, at death. Particular analogies do most sensibly show us,

that there is nothing to be thought strange, in our being to exist in

another state of life. And that we are now living beings, affords a

strong probability that we shall _continue_ so; unless there be some

positive ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to think

death will destroy us. Were a persuasion of this kind ever so well

grounded, there would, surely, be little reason to take pleasure in it.

Indeed it can have no other ground, than some such imagination, as that

of our gross bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience.

Experience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding, from

the body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the

dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And there

are remarkable instances of their _not_ affecting each other, which

lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then, which in all

reason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature will _continue_

after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an institution

of life, or to act, upon any other supposition.

All expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, opens

an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears: since we see the

constitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery, as well as to be

productive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both

in some degree; and since we cannot but know, what higher degrees of

both we are capable of. And there is no presumption against believing

further, that our future interest depends upon our present behavior:

for we see our present interest doth; and that the happiness and

misery, which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently do

not follow, till long after the actions are done, to which they are

respectively annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain,

whether it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving happiness

and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not, yet,

since we find by experience that he hath such regard, the whole sense

of things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at once and without

any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, indeed must, be to good

actions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions

misery; or that he will, upon the whole, reward those who do well, and

punish those who do evil.

To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been

observed, that some sort of moral government is necessarily implied

in that natural government of God, which we experience ourselves

under; that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded

and punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, but

also as virtuous and vicious: and that there is, in the very nature

of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and punished in a

much higher degree than they are at present. And though this higher

degree of distributive justice, which nature thus points out and leads

towards, is prevented for a time from taking place; it is by obstacles,

which the state of this world unhappily throws in its way, and which

therefore are in their nature temporary. Now, as these things in the

natural conduct of Providence are observable on the side of virtue;

so there is nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A

moral scheme of government then is visibly established, and, in some

degree, carried into execution: and this, together with the essential

tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us an

apprehension, that it will be carried on further towards perfection in

a future state, and that every one shall there receive according to his

deserts.

And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under the

moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our behavior;

notwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion, of securing

it, and the danger of losing it: just in the same manner as our

temporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed to depend

upon our behavior; notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger.

For, from our original constitution, and that of the world which we

inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves; with our own conduct

and our own interest. And from the same constitution of nature,

especially joined with that course of things which is owing to men,

we have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust; to forfeit this

interest, to neglect it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From

these temptations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure

our temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in

it. There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be the

like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final good,

which religion lays before us.

The whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed in such a

condition as this, must indeed be beyond our comprehension. But it is

in part accounted for by what religion teaches us, that the character

of virtue and piety must be a necessary qualification for a future

state of security and happiness, under the moral government of God; in

like manner, as some certain qualifications or other are necessary for

every particular condition of life, under his natural government: and

that the present state was intended to be a school of discipline, for

improving in ourselves that character. Now this intention of nature

is rendered highly credible by observing; that we are plainly made

for improvement of all kinds; that it is a general appointment of

Providence, that we cultivate practical principles, and form within

ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were

wholly unfit for before; that in particular, childhood and youth is

naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age; and

that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral

discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole notion

of moral government and a probationary state, from the opinion of

necessity; it has been shown, that God has given us the evidence, as

it were, of experience, that all objections against religion, on this

head, are vain and delusive. He has also, in his natural government,

suggested an answer to all our short-sighted objections, against the

equity and goodness of his moral government; and in general he has

exemplified to us the latter by the former.

These things, which it is to be remembered, are matters of fact, ought,

in all common sense, to awaken mankind; to induce them to consider

in earnest their condition, and what they have to do. It is absurd,

absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so

serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life;

or even in that immoral thoughtlessness, into which far the greatest

part of them are fallen. The credibility of religion, arising from

experience and facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason,

to engage them to live in the general practice of all virtue and piety;

under the serious apprehension, though it should be mixed with some

doubt,[135] of a righteous administration established in nature, and

a future judgment in consequence of it: especially when we consider,

how very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be gained

by vice,[136] how unquestionably little as well as precarious, the

pleasures and profits of it are at the best, and how soon they must

be parted with at the longest. For, in the deliberations of reason,

concerning what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations

to any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case, so

inducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest so

small and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in the

view of reason to be almost nothing in _themselves_; and in comparison

with the importance of religion they quite disappear and are lost.

Mere passion may indeed be alleged, though not as a reason, yet as

an excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an excuse it

is, will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in a condition

in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, by being

necessitated to govern them: and to lay ourselves under the same kind

of restraints, and as great ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue

and piety, in the ordinary course of things, require. The plea of

ungovernable passion then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all

things; for it is no reason, and a poor excuse. The proper _motives_ to

religion are the proper _proofs_ of it, from our moral nature, from the

presages of conscience, and our natural apprehension of God under the

character of a righteous Governor and Judge: a nature, and conscience,

and apprehension, given us by him; and from the confirmation of the

dictates of reason, by _life and immortality brought to light by

the Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven against all

ungodliness and unrighteousness of men_.

END OF THE FIRST PART.

PART II.

Revealed Religion.

CHAPTER I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.[137]

Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light of nature,

avowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion incredible,

and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain, no revelation

would have been given, had the light of nature been sufficient in

such a sense, as to render one not wanted and useless. But no man,

in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so, who

considers the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation,

and its present state in those places which have borrowed no light

from it: particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men,

concerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the natural

inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to

say, who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system,

which we call Natural Religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of

superstition: but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the

generality could. If they could, there is no sort of probability that

they would. Admitting there were, they would highly want a standing

admonition to remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them.

And further, were they as much disposed to attend to religion, as the

better sort of men are; yet even upon this supposition, there would

be various occasions for supernatural instruction and assistance, and

the greatest advantages might be afforded by them.[138] So that to say

revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no need of, and what

can be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at random.

Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely

at ease in the present state, and life so completely happy, that it

is a contradiction to suppose our condition capable of being, in any

respect, better.

There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, who seem to

be getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were, overlooking

revelation, as of small importance provided natural religion be kept

to. With little regard either to the evidence of the former, or to

the objections against it, and even upon supposition of its truth;

“the only design of it,” say they, “must be, to establish a belief of

the moral system of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural

piety and virtue. The belief and practice of these were, perhaps, much

promoted by the first publication of Christianity: but whether they

are believed and practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature

or of revelation, is no great matter,”[139] This way of considering

revelation, though it is not the same with the former, yet borders

nearly upon it, and very much, at length runs up into it: and requires

to be particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem

to be getting into this way. The consideration of it will likewise

further show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the truth of

the observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into

the importance of Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction to a

treatise concerning the credibility of it.

Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and commanded those

things which are commanded in Christianity; it is evident, at first

sight, that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent matter, whether

we obey or disobey those commands: unless we are certainly assured,

that we know all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are

now ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves in

particular. It is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this.[140]

For our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case: since

the whole analogy of nature shows, what is indeed in itself evident,

that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not

acquainted.

But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly appear, by

considering it more distinctly: _First_, as a republication, and

external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to the

present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote natural piety

and virtue: _Secondly_, as containing an account of a dispensation of

things, not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several

distinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is the

foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any sense

the whole of it.

I. Christianity is a republication of Natural religion. It instructs

mankind in the moral system of the world: that it is the work of an

infinitely perfect Being, and under his government, that virtue is

his law, and that he will finally judge mankind in righteousness,

and render to all according to their works, in a future state. And,

which is very material, it teaches natural religion in its genuine

simplicity; free from those superstitions, with which it was totally

corrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost.

Revelation is, further, an _authoritative_ publication of natural

religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth of

it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in Scripture, were

intended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, _i.e._ the

redemption of the world by the Messiah: but this does not hinder, but

that they may also prove God’s general providence over the world, as

our moral governor and judge. And they evidently do prove it; because

this character of the Author of nature, is necessarily connected with

and implied in that particular revealed dispensation of things: it is

likewise continually taught expressly, and insisted upon, by those

persons who wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So

that indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture

revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation been

nothing else than to prove it.

But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove natural

religion; and notable objections may be urged against this proof of it,

considered as a matter of speculation: but considered as a practical

thing, there can be none. For suppose a person to teach natural

religion to a nation, who bid lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness

of it; and to declare that he was commissioned by God so to do; suppose

him, in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no

human foresight could have guessed at; to divide the sea with a word;

feed great multitudes with bread from heaven; cure all manner of

diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life; would not this

give additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what

that of a common man would have; and be an authoritative publication of

the law of nature, _i.e._ a new proof of it? It would be a practical

one, of the strongest kind, perhaps, which human creatures are capable

of having given them. The Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ,

are authoritative publications of the religion of nature; they afford

a proof of God’s general providence, as moral Governor of the world,

as well as of his particular dispensations of providence towards sinful

creatures, revealed in the Law and the Gospel. As they are the only

evidence of the latter, so they are an additional evidence of the

former.

To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and most

improved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, convinced upon

the whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the world, that it was

under the direction and moral government of an infinitely perfect

Being; but ready to question, whether he were not got beyond the reach

of his faculties: suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into great

danger of being carried away by the universal bad example of almost

every one around him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical

sense at least, of these things: and this, perhaps, would be as

advantageous a situation with regard to religion, as nature alone

ever placed any man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a

person, all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was

revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had

from principles of reason believed in: and that the publishers of the

revelation proved their commission from him, by making it appear, that

he had intrusted them with a power of suspending and changing the

general laws of nature.

Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing of the utmost

importance, that life and immortality are eminently brought to light

by the Gospel. The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a

course of wickedness[141] and the efficacy of repentance, are not only

confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, especially the last is, with a

degree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness.

Further. As Christianity served these ends and purposes, when it was

first published, by the miraculous publication itself, so it was

intended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by means of the

settlement of a visible church:[142] of a society, distinguished from

common ones, and from the rest of the world, by peculiar religious

institutions; by an instituted method of instruction, and an instituted

form of external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the first

preachers of Christianity, in order to their introducing it into the

world: a visible church was established, in order to continue it, and

carry it on successively throughout all ages. Had only Moses and the

prophets, Christ and his apostles, taught, and by miracles proved,

religion to their contemporaries; the benefits of their instructions

would have reached but a small part of mankind. Christianity must

have been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To

prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible church was

instituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing memorial to the

world of the duty which we owe our Maker: to call men continually,

both by example and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the form

of religion, ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality; to

be the repository of the oracles of God; to hold up the light of

revelation in aid to that of nature, and to propagate it, throughout

all generations, to the end of the world--the light of revelation,

considered here in no other view, than as designed to enforce natural

religion. And in proportion as Christianity is professed and taught in

the world, religion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly

and advantageously laid before mankind, and brought again and again to

their thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance.

A visible church has also a further tendency to promote natural

religion, as being an instituted method of education, originally

intended to be of peculiar advantage to those who conform to it. For

one end of the institution was, that, by admonition and reproof, as

well as instruction, by a general regular discipline, and public

exercises of religion, _the body of Christ_, as the Scripture speaks,

should be _edified_; _i.e._ trained up in piety and virtue for a higher

and better state. This settlement, then, appearing thus beneficial,

tending in the nature of the thing to answer, and, in some degree,

actually answering, those ends, it is to be remembered, that the very

notion of it implies positive institutions; for the visibility of the

church consists in them. Take away every thing of this kind, and you

lose the very notion itself. So that if the things now mentioned are

advantages, the reason and importance of positive institutions in

general is most obvious; since without them these advantages could not

be secured to the world. And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon

knowing the reasons, _why_ such particular ones were fixed upon rather

than others.

The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, which

Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are very

slow in apprehending. And yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a

very plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest really say, that

the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advantageous a

situation, with regard to natural religion, as they are now among us:

that it was laid before them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as

distinct, and as much tending to influence their practice?

The objections against all this, from the perversion of Christianity,

and from the supposition of its having had but little good influence,

however innocently they may be proposed, cannot be insisted upon as

conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead to downright Atheism;

because the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which, upon

all principles of Theism, must have been from God, has been perverted

and rendered ineffectual in the same manner. It may indeed, I think,

truly be said, that the good effects of Christianity have not been

small; nor its supposed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly

speaking. Perhaps, too, the things done have been aggravated; and if

not, Christianity hath been often only a pretence, and the same evils

in the main would have been done upon some other pretence. However,

great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have really

been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon

principles of Theism. For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon

natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without laying it

down as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are not

to be judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies:

not by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would

effect if mankind did their part; that part which is justly put and

left upon them. It is altogether as much the language of one as of the

other: _He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is

holy, let him be holy still._[143] The light of reason does not, any

more than that of revelation, force men to submit to its authority;

both admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with

the consequences of each; and after this, leave them at full liberty

to act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment.

Every moment’s experience shows, that this is God’s general rule of

government.[144]

To return then: Christianity being a promulgation of the law of nature;

being moreover an authoritative promulgation of it; with new light,

and other circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of

mankind; these things fully show its importance.

It is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case requires,

so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their profession

of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such

a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is the very

scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his degree,

contribute towards continuing and carrying it on: all by uniting in

the public profession and external practice of Christianity; some by

instructing, by having the oversight and taking care of this religious

community, the church of God. Now this further shows the importance of

Christianity; and, which is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a

practical sense: or the high obligations we are under, to take it into

our most serious consideration; and the danger there must necessarily

be, not only in treating it despitefully, which I am not now speaking

of, but in disregarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to

do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the

world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all this holds,

even though the only thing to be considered in Christianity were its

subserviency to natural religion.

II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view; as containing

an account of a dispensation of things, not at all discoverable by

reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined

us. Christianity is not only an external institution of natural

religion, and a new promulgation of God’s general providence, as

righteous governor and judge of the world; but it contains also a

revelation of a particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on by

his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are

represented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin. And in consequence

of this revelation being made, we are commanded _to be baptized_, not

only _in the name of the Father_, but also, _of the Son_, _and of the

Holy Ghost_: and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son

and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of these duties

may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not from positive

command merely, but also from the offices which appear, from Scripture,

to belong to those divine persons in the Gospel dispensation; or from

the relations, which we are there informed, they stand in to us. By

_reason_ is revealed the relation, which God the Father stands in to

us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In

_Scripture_ are revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit

stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty;[145] which we are

under to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of

these three respects being admitted: that God is the governor of the

world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the mediator between

God and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide and sanctifier, upon the

evidence of revelation: the truth of the case, I say, in each of these

respects being admitted, it is no more a question, why it should be

commanded, that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy

Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter

seems to require to be more fully stated.[146]

Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under the twofold

consideration of internal and external: for the latter is as real a

part of religion, of true religion, as the former. Now, when religion

is considered under the first notion, as an inward principle, to be

exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and heart, the essence

of natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to

_God the Father Almighty_: and the essence of revealed religion, as

distinguished from natural, to consist in religious regards to _the

Son_, and to _the Holy Ghost_. The obligation we are under, of paying

these religious regards to each of these divine persons respectively,

arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us.

How these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation,

makes no alteration in the case: because the duties arise out of the

relations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed

of them. The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great

dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world; the one our

Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not then the duty of religious

regards to both these divine persons, as immediately arise to the view

of reason, out of the very nature of these offices and relations; as

the good-will and kind intention, which we owe to our fellow-creatures,

arise out of the common relations between us and them? But it will be

asked, “What are the inward religious regards, appearing thus obviously

due to the Son and Holy Spirit; as arising, not merely from command in

Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which

they stand in to us?” I answer, the religious regards of reverence,

honor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope.

In what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, is a

matter of pure revealed command, as perhaps the external manner, in

which God the Father is to be worshipped, may be more so than we are

ready to think. But the worship, the internal worship itself, to the

Son and Holy Ghost, is no further matter of pure revealed command, than

as the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation: for

the relations being known, the obligations to such internal worship

are obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves.

In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason

of these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the words, Son and

Holy Ghost.

If this account of the Christian religion be just, those persons who

can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, provided natural

religion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is

peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, has yet

somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. For the office of

our Lord being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the

obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as

charity to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external

command, immediately out of that his office and relation itself. Those

persons appear to forget, that revelation is to be considered, as

informing us of somewhat new, in the state of mankind,[147] and in

the government of the world: as acquainting us with some relations we

stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. These relations

being real (though before revelation we could be under no obligations

from them, yet upon their being revealed), there is no reason to think,

but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended with

the same kind of consequences under God’s government, as neglecting to

behave suitably to any other relations, made known to us by reason.

Ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly

see, will just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in

the other: the ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally

voluntary, in both cases.

If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between God and man, _i.e._

if Christianity be true; if he be indeed our Lord, our Savior, and our

God, no one can say, what may follow, not only the obstinate, but

the careless disregard to him, in those high relations. Nay, no one

can say, what may follow such disregard, even in the way of natural

consequence.[148] For, as the natural consequences of vice in this

life are doubtless to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted

by God, so for aught we know, the judicial punishments of the future

life may be, in a like way or a like sense, the natural consequence of

vice:[149] of men’s violating or disregarding the relations which God

has placed them in here, and made known to them.

If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, and

so are unfit for that state, which Christ is gone to prepare for his

disciples; and if the assistance of God’s Spirit be necessary to renew

their nature, in the degree requisite to their being qualified for

that state; (all which is implied in the express, though figurative

declaration, _Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter

into the kingdom of God_:[150]) supposing this, is it possible any

serious person can think it a slight matter, whether or no he makes

use of the means, expressly commanded by God, for obtaining this

divine assistance? Especially since the whole analogy of nature shows,

that we are not to expect any benefits, without making use of the

appointed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us

nothing, of the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal

or spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from

experience or revelation. And experience, the present case does not

admit of.

The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity being

supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreverence, and

really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter.

It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it be

positively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher and more important

obligation which we are under, than that of examining most seriously

into its evidence, supposing its credibility; and of embracing it, upon

supposition of its truth.

The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in order to

illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their being

mistaken.

_First_, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction between

what is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral _precepts_, are

precepts the reasons of which we see: positive _precepts_, are precepts

the reasons of which we do not see.[151] Moral _duties_ arise out of

the nature of the case itself, prior to external command. Positive

_duties_ do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external

command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command,

received from Him whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner

in which the nature of the case or the fact of the relation, is made

known, this doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. That

we be baptized in the name of the Father is as much a positive duty, as

that we be baptized in the name of the Son, because both arise equally

from revealed command: though the relation which we stand in to God

the Father is made known to us by reason, and the relation we stand

in to Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dispensation

of the Gospel being admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes due to

Christ, from his being the voluntary minister of this dispensation,

as it is due to God the Father, from his being the fountain of all

good; though the first is made known to us by revelation only, the

second by reason. Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness’ sake,

it may be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a

twofold consideration. They are either institutions founded on natural

religion, as baptism in the name of the Father; (though this has also a

particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in the name

of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ:) or they are external

institutions founded on revealed religion; as baptism in the name of

the Son; and of the Holy Ghost.

_Secondly_, From the distinction between what is moral and what is

positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar preference,

which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the former.

The reason of positive institutions in general, is very obvious;

though we should not see the reason, why particular ones are pitched

upon rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead of cavilling at

words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive

institutions in general, as distinguished from this or that particular

one, have the nature of moral commands; since the reasons of them

appear. Thus, for instance, the _external_ worship of God is a moral

duty, though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to be taken,

when a comparison is made between positive and moral duties, that they

be compared no further than as they are different; no further than as

the former are positive, or arise out of mere external command, the

reasons of which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are

moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such

external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into

endless confusion.

Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the

same authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is impossible to

obey both; that the former is moral, _i.e._ a precept of which we see

the reasons, and that they hold in the particular case before us; but

that the latter is positive, _i.e._ a precept of which we do not see

the reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the

former; because there is an apparent reason for this preference, and

none against it. Further, positive institutions, all those I suppose

which Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral end: and the end must

be acknowledged more excellent than the means.[152] Nor is observance

of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value,

otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to

be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter;

but will, perhaps, be found less applicable to practice, than may be

thought at first sight.

Therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of consideration,

and taking the words, _moral law_ and _positive institutions_, in

the popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter

of revealed command, as positive institutions are: for the Scripture

enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect then they are both upon

a level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts;

interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of the

Author of it, which is to be preferred, when they interfere.

But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of

this question, as some persons seem to think. Nor are we left to reason

alone to determine it. For, _First_, Though mankind have, in all ages,

been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites,

by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without

making any comparison at all between them, and consequently without

determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing

abundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of

true religion, as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general

tenor of Scripture; and likewise to the most express particular

declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without

moral virtue.

_Secondly_, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral

duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the

latter, and never upon the former. This, though no sort of allowance

to neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the latter,

is yet a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter are to be

preferred. And as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion

anywhere, rather than upon virtue; lest both the reason of the thing,

and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation

now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly,

our Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation of positive

institutions arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison between

them and moral precepts; when the Pharisees censured him, for _eating

with publicans and sinners_; and also when they censured his disciples,

for _plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day_. Upon this

comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have

the preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authoritative

determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it

general: _I will have mercy, and not sacrifice_.[153] The propriety of

the word _proverbial_, is not the thing insisted upon: though I think

the manner of speaking is to be called so. But that the manner of

speaking very remarkably renders the determination general, is surely

indisputable. For, had it been said only, that God preferred mercy to

the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason,

most justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise,

to the observance of other ritual institutions; and in general, moral

duties, to positive ones. And thus the determination would have been

general; though its being so were inferred and not expressed. But as

the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is much stronger. For

the sense and the very literal words of our Lord’s answer, are as

applicable to any other instance of a comparison, between positive and

moral duties, as to that upon which they were spoken. And if, in case

of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions,

it will scarce be thought, that justice is to give place to them. It

is remarkable too, that, as the words are a quotation from the Old

Testament, they are introduced, on both the forementioned occasions,

with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning

of them. This, I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce

possible, for the most ignorant person, not to understand the literal

sense of the passage in the prophet;[154] and since understanding

the literal sense would not have prevented their _condemning the

guiltless_,[155] it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our

Lord really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had

not learned from it, as they might, wherein the _general_ spirit of

religion consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as

distinguished from ritual observances. However, it is certain we may

learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the Gospel.

But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, when,

upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of greater

importance than the other, to consider this other as of scarce any

importance at all: it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how

great presumption it is, to make light of any institutions of divine

appointment; that our obligations to obey all God’s commands whatever

are absolute and indispensable; and that commands merely positive,

admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them:

an obligation moral in the strictest and most proper sense.

To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now given of

Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us the obligation

of searching the Scriptures, in order to see, what the scheme of

revelation really is; instead of determining beforehand, from reason,

what the scheme of it must be.[156] Indeed if in revelation there be

found any passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural

religion; we may most certainly conclude, such seeming meaning not to

be the real one.[157] But it is not any degree of a presumption against

an interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation contains a

doctrine, which the light of nature cannot discover;[158] or a precept,

which the law of nature does not oblige to.