Although it was understood that Sir Arthur's orders only extended

to the defence of Portugal, yet he felt that these stirring times

required active exertions from all Europe, and that tranquillity was

incompatible with the strides France was making to universal dominion.

The cause of our allies on the spot, and of those more distant,

struggling in Germany, pointed out the propriety of some attempt to

create at least a diversion in their favour. It was evident that, could

arrangements be made with the Spaniards, the disorganization of Soult's

army offered an opportunity for striking a blow at Victor, and perhaps

at the Spanish capital, particularly as Sebastiani was supposed to be

fully employed in La Mancha. Sir Arthur, in consequence, offered to aid

the Spaniards in a forward offensive movement into Spanish Estramadura.

Such a step appeared the only means of re-establishing the war in the

Peninsula, as the cause of Spain was fast sinking under the superior

troops and management of the French, who, however they might dread the

population, had learned that the armies were incapable of opposing

their progress[33]. Much precious time was wasted in the arrangements

for the necessary co-operation of the two armies, which, but for the

pride and obstinacy of Cuesta, might have been more usefully employed.

It was only after considerable _negotiation_, (an expression perfectly

applicable to the intercourse between ourselves and our allies, though

we had only in view the saving their country,) that it was determined

to make a simultaneous advance into Spanish Estramadura.

In the meanwhile, Victor, who had retreated from the Guadiana, and

withdrawn his army across the Tagus, was evidently falling back to

receive aid from Madrid and La Mancha. The plan for this forward

movement, was the advance of both armies along each bank of the Tagus,

and a junction of the allies in front of the enemy in the plains of

Estramadura. The British were to march to the north of the river by

Coria and Placentia, turning Almaraz and the enemy's posts facing

Cuesta, while the others were to cross at Almaraz, and to co-operate

with our advancing columns. It was necessary to secure the frontier of

Portugal to the north and north-east, and the passes along the frontier

of that country leading from Castille and Leon, as two _corps d'armée_,

besides that of Soult, were in the north of Spain.

Marshal Beresford, posted near Almeida, was to undertake the first with

the Portuguese army, while Cuesta promised to occupy the Banos pass,

leading direct from Salamanca upon Placentia. The Spaniards engaged

to find means of collecting and furnishing us with provisions. On

the 27th June, head-quarters left Abrantes for Villa del Rey; on the

28th, they reached Cortesada; the 29th, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco

on the following day; and halted the 1st of July. They continued their

march on the 2nd to Zobreira; and the 3rd, passed the frontier to

Zarza Mayor, where they crossed upon the route of the captured Gen.

Franceschi, who, after reaching Spain with Soult's army, had been taken

in Leon, and was being carried to Seville, fated to die incarcerated

within the walls of Grenada. He was a distinguished officer of light

cavalry, and had been opposed to us not only six weeks before on the

Vouga, but the like number of months antecedently on the plain of

Leon. He was dressed in a hussar's uniform, and decorated with a star,

bearing an emblem similar to the arms of the Isle of Man, three legs

diverging from a common centre.

The army was here joined by the Lusitanian legion under Sir R. Wilson,

and after halting on the 4th, reached Coria on the 5th, Galestad on the

7th, and Placentia on the 8th. The approach to this city drew forth

the admiration of all. The bishop's palace and cathedral tower above

the houses, which rise from a bed of verdure, bordered by the river,

while the whole is backed with the most splendid mountains, with silver

tops of perpetual snow. The river above this city is divided into two

branches, which form an island, covered with the finest trees.

The several reinforcements received antecedently to, and during our

short stay at Placentia, rendered necessary a new distribution of the

regiments and brigades. The cavalry were divided into three brigades;

the first, of the 14th and 16th light dragoons, under Sir Stapleton

Cotton; the second, commanded by Gen. Fane, consisted of the 3d dragoon

guards and 4th dragoons; and the third, of the first German hussars,

and 23d light dragoons, led by Gen. Anson.

The infantry was divided into four divisions:—

1st. DIVISION.—LIEUT.-GEN. SHERBROOKE.

BRIG.-GEN. H. CAMPBELL, Guards and 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th.

Regiment.

BRIG.-GEN. CAMERON, 61st, 83d. Regiments, 1 Comp. 5 Batt.

60th. Regiment.

BRIG.-GEN. LANGWORTH, 2 Batt. King's German Legion.

BRIG.-GEN. LOWE, 2 Batt. King's German Legion.

2d. DIVISION.—MAJOR-GEN. HILL.

BRIG-GEN. STEWART, 29th, 48th Regiments, 1 Batt. Detachment.

MAJ.-GEN. TILSON, Buffs. 48th, 66th. Regiments.

3d. DIVISION.—MAJOR-GEN. M'KENZIE.

1st. Brigade, 24th, 31st, 45th. Regiments.

COL. DONKIN'S Brigade, 5 Comps. 5 Batt. 60th Regt. and 87th

88th Regts.

4th DIVISION.—BRIG.-GEN. A. CAMPBELL.

1st Brigade, 7th, 53d, Regiments, 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regiment.

2nd Brigade, 2 Batt. Detachment, 97th Regt. 1 Comp. 5 Batt.

60th Regiment.

To these was to be added the Lusitanian legion under Sir R. Wilson,

being the only Portuguese troops employed in this operation.

This distribution into divisions was the first step to the gradual

growth of these corps into little armies, complete in themselves like

the Roman legions, being, (with the sole exception of cavalry,) about

their strength. The light companies of the regiments composing them

were formed into a battalion, which under some intelligent officer,

ever marched at the head, and to which was added a company or more

of the deadly riflemen of the foreign corps, the 60th. These were

the Velites, while the battalions were all worthy to be considered

as Triarii or Principes. They had subsequently artillery, spare

ammunition, and engineer, medical, and commissariat staff attached to

them; and when each was increased in 1810, by a Portuguese brigade,

consisting of a battalion of light infantry, and two line battalions,

they became in themselves superior in numbers to some of the petty

expeditions in which England has often placed her hope, while they

have only wasted her strength. Our whole force of British did not

consist of 18,000 men, principally of men raised by the voluntary

enrolment of the militia.

We learned at Placentia, that the French occupied Talavera de la Reyna,

and were supposed to be waiting for reinforcements from Madrid and La

Mancha. During the concentration of the army at Placentia, Sir Arthur

had his first personal communication with Cuesta at Casa del Puertos.

His Excellency passed in review the Spanish army, and definitively

settled the plan of the campaign.

The British army was to cross the Teitar, and direct its march upon

Oropesa, where it was to form a junction with the Spanish army from

Almaraz, and to advance on Talavera de la Reyna. The cavalry of the

Spaniards under the Duke of Albuquerque, and the division of infantry

commanded by Ballasteros, were to continue and move on the left bank of

the Tagus, and cross that river at the Puente del Arzobispo.

To diminish and separate the enemy's force, and distract their

attention, General Vanegas from La Mancha was to threaten Aranjuez,

while Sir R. Wilson, who was already on the Teitar, was to have,

besides his own corps, some few Spanish troops, and to act upon their

other flank, and by pushing to and beyond Escalona, make them uneasy

respecting the capital.

Sir Arthur, after having halted eight days at Placentia, moved on

the 17th to Talaquela; on the 18th to Majedas, and on the following

day to Casa de Centinela, across vast plains, occasionally covered

with forests of cork trees. These quarters of the 19th, as the name

indicates, consisted of a single house, which offered such miserable

accommodation, that Sir Arthur, as well as the rest of the staff,

preferred sleeping in wigwams, made with boughs of trees. On the 20th,

while the army pushed on to Oropesa, the heat and the want of water

were so great, that the troops suffered exceedingly, and several

men sank under exhaustion. Here we became an allied army, forming a

junction with the Spaniards, from whom we hoped, however we might

doubt, to receive support and assistance. But the first view of the

infantry considerably damped our expectations, though we were assured

their cavalry, moving across at Arzobispo, were to appearance (for we

had not forgotten their conduct at Medellin) the best of the army. On

further acquaintance, however, our conclusions respecting even this

part of the army were not more favourable than that we had formed of

their sister arm the first day we joined them; as they wanted in

spirit and conduct, what the foot soldiers required in appointments and

organization.

The army of Spain, before the breaking out of the Revolution, though

not so degraded as that of Portugal, had been long declining. Although

the army intended for the coast of Barbary, assembled under Gen. Count

O'Reilley, as late as 1788, was in an efficient state, it had greatly

altered for the worse within the last twenty years. Instead of keeping

pace with the rest of Europe in improvements in the art of war, Spain

had considerably retrograded; and while the two last years had shaken

to pieces the old establishment, the officers educated under it were

incapable of forming a new army.

Although the men were the same as those who, three centuries before,

had raised the Spanish name to the height of celebrity it so well

deserved and so long maintained, they were no longer led by a

chivalrous nobility and gentry. The officers taken from these classes

in the beginning of the 19th century, evinced in their character the

debasing state of the Court and Government.

In July, 1809, it was but the remnant of an organized army, and even

this was only evinced (except in a few regiments) in the appellation

of the corps known to be of long standing. A portion of the

garde-du-corps accompanied this army; the sole remains of the court

establishment of the past Bourbons, whether of France or Spain. It

had been created by Philip V. on taking possession of the throne of

Spain at the beginning of the last century, and consisted entirely of

officers. Those with Cuesta bore cartouch belts of green leather and

silver. Some of the heavy cavalry looked respectable, particularly

the regimento del Rey, the first of dragoons, which, commanded by a

relation of Cuesta, would have passed muster in any army.

The carabineers, a part of the royal guard, and who bore a better

character for conduct in the field than the other regiments of cavalry,

were efficient both in men and horse, as well as in appointments.

A brigade of two regiments of heavy dragoons, one of which was the

regiment of Saguntum, attracted the attention of the British officers,

from being dressed in yellow with cocked-hats, and they looked better

than would be supposed from so singular a costume.

Their light cavalry consisted of Hussars (_Usares_) and Chasseurs,

dressed in all the colours of the rainbow. Little judgment seemed to

have been employed in proportioning the size of the horse to the light

or heavy cavalry, though it must be allowed the Spanish horses offer

little choice, being universally slight, and not so well adapted for

the shock of a charge as for an Eastern irregular kind of warfare.

The Spanish cavalry had a means of turning their jackets and sleeved

waistcoats into a stable dress, by the sleeves, taking off at the

shoulders, being only laced on with a differently coloured cord from

that of the coat; thus, besides being useful, having a good appearance.

Their mode of riding was new to the English; the stirrup leathers

were so long, that they could only touch them with their toe; while

the carabine, hanging perpendicularly along the valise, was equally

novel. Boots were far from universal, and many had in their stead a

kind of leather legging, stiff-fitting, buttoned tight to the limbs,

and formed like a gaiter, coming over the shoe. Many horsemen, however,

were devoid of covering for the legs or feet, and the naked toe was

seen peeping through a sandal, touching the stirrup. Of the infantry,

the Walloon Guards, (consisting principally of foreigners,) and the

Irish brigade, were in the best order. The first, in two or more

battalions, were dressed in dark blue, and broad white lace; while

the uniforms of the latter were light blue. These consisted of the

regiments of Yrlanda, Ultonia, and Hibernia, being the remains of the

Irish Catholic regiments. At this time, although they had no privates,

there were still among them some few officers of that nation. The white

Bourbon uniform had entirely disappeared, and circumstances and economy

had changed the colour of the principal part of the infantry into a

deep chocolate.

But several battalions were, with the exception of the British arms,

little better in appearance than peasantry; and though the major part

of them had chaccos, many could only boast a kind of sandal instead of

shoes, and in lieu of cross, waist-belts, from which hung tubes like

the ancient Bandeleer, lined with tin, each containing a cartridge. Few

had great coats; the generality having blankets, (with a hole in the

middle for the head to pass through,) hanging loose about their person.

Their artillery was good, from attention having been given to it before

the breaking out of the war, but the train was unlike any other in

modern armies, the guns and ammunition-waggons being drawn by mules,

not two abreast, but in teams like cart-horses, without reins, and

under no farther command than the voice of their conductors, who ran

on foot on the side of the road. Their guns were heavy, and among the

field batteries were several of twelve-pounders.

Their _matériel_ for provisions, stores, and baggage was perfectly

inadequate to their army, and ill adapted for their country. Instead of

a large proportion of sumpter mules, they were accompanied by a vast

train of tilted two wheeled carts, carrying little, and with long teams

of mules, lengthening to inconvenience the line of march.

The whole army was said to consist of 7000 cavalry and 31,000 infantry.

But we should not have been dissatisfied with our allies, _malgré_

their appearance, or even their rags, had we felt any reason to confide

in them. The men were evidently capable of "all that man dare," but the

appearance of their officers at once bespoke their not being fit to

lead them to the attempt. These not only did not look like soldiers,

but not even like gentlemen; and it was difficult, from their mean

and abject appearance, particularly among the infantry, to guess from

what class of society they could have been taken. Few troops will

behave well if those to whom they ought to look up are undeserving

respect; and on this principle we might, at Oropesa, have predicted

coming events, as far as the conduct of the Spanish soldiers was

concerned. But besides their general inefficiency, we found their moral

feeling different from what we expected. The preceding two years had

made a great alteration in the feeling of the nation; the burst of

enthusiasm was but momentary, and being only fed by accidental victory,

soon subsided on a reverse of fortune. Far from their army evincing

devotion, or even the most common courage in their country's cause,

they were more often guilty, individually and collectively, of the most

disgraceful cowardice.

The inefficiency of the officers spread to the staff, and we hourly

regretted that the revolution had not occasioned a more complete

_bouleversement_, so as to bring forward fresh and vigorous talents

from all classes. The proof that this opinion was just, was evinced

by none of the regular military showing themselves worthy of command.

Indeed, with the exception of a few self-made soldiers among the

Guerillas, who had risen from among the farmers and peasantry, it would

be difficult to point out during the whole war any officer, whose

opinion, even in his own department, or on the most trivial military

subject, was worthy of being asked.

The Cortes ruling for Ferdinand, and continuing the old system, formed

one of the causes of the want of success of the Spaniards. They had

to meet youthful Generals and the fresh energies of France with all

the improvements of modern warfare, by old besotted and prejudiced

Generals, whose armies were formed of obsolete principles, while

the system of an _ancien régime_ of a decrepit Government continued

to cramp every step to improvement. To these were added that blind

pride and self-vanity, which made them still consider themselves what

history and tradition had represented their forefathers and nation. No

proofs of inferiority would open their eyes, and without reflection or

consideration they rushed from one error and misfortune into others,

benefiting by no experience, and disdaining to seek aid or improvement

from those capable of restoring them to efficiency.

Had they placed their armies at our disposal, and allowed the

introduction of the active and intelligent British officers into

command, their regular army might have become as celebrated in

after-ages for the defence of the Peninsula, as the Portuguese or

their own Guerillas; while at present, with the exception of their

irregular warfare and defence of cities, their military character,

during a period so brilliant for their allies, both Portuguese and

British, appears absolutely contemptible. The army which we joined at

Oropesa, in addition to its other drawbacks, was headed by a general as

decrepit in mind as body. To abilities not superior to the most common

intellect he united the greatest fault in a commander of an army, that

of indecision, while every act bespoke his suspicion and jealousy of

his allies and their commander.

Attached to this army was an example, in the person of Lord Macduff,

of one of those gallant spirits, who occasionally shaking off the

indolence of wealth, volunteer to aid some soul-stirring cause. His

Lordship had the rank of a Spanish Colonel.

On the 21st, the two Commanders-in-Chief dined together, and in return

for the military spectacle Cuesta had given to Sir Arthur at Casa

de Puertos, when he visited him from Placentia, the British troops,

with the exception of Gen. M'Kenzie's division on the advance, were

drawn out in the evening for his inspection. The mounting on horseback

to proceed to the review, showed how ill-fitted was Cuesta for the

activity of war. He was lifted on his horse by two grenadiers, while

one of his aide-de-camps was ready on the other side to conduct his

right leg over the horse's croup, and place it in the stirrup! Remarks

were whispered at this moment, that if his mental energy and activity

did not compensate for his bodily infirmity, Sir Arthur would find

him but an incapable coadjutor. The Spanish General passed along the

line from left to right, just as the night fell, and we saw him put

comfortably into an antiquated square-cornered coach, drawn by nine

mules, to proceed to his quarters.

On the morning of the 22d, we came in sight of the town of Talavera

de la Reyna, which has since become so celebrated in English history.

The town, seen about three miles distant, was embosomed in trees and

inclosures, while the scarped hills on the right marked the course

of the Tagus. The inclosures ended about a mile to the left of the

town, joining some low, open, undulating hills, which stretched to

some valleys and higher ridges. This open country communicated with

an extensive plain in front of the town, across which passed the road

from Oropesa, being gradually lost as it approached Talavera in the

vineyards and woods. In the midst of this plain were posted about

800 or 1000 French cavalry, who, with the utmost indifference, were

dismounted, feeling assured that a few skirmishers would check the

advance of the Spanish cavalry in their front. These, under the Duke

d'Albuquerque, had crossed the Tagus at the Puente del Arzobispo,

and had arrived early opposite the French advance. Instead of being

anxious to show their Allies their activity when at so little cost,

being five or six times more numerous than the enemy, they made no

attempt to drive them in, but contented themselves with deploying

into several long lines, making a very formidable appearance. With

feelings of astonishment we rode on to the skirmishers, who consisted

of mounted Guerillas, dressed like the farmers of the country. We

expected to see them closely and successfully engaged, having heard

they were peculiarly adapted for petty warfare; but we found them

utterly incapable of coping with the enemy's _tirailleurs_, who were

driving them almost into a circle. They were so careless and inexpert

in the use of their arms, that one of them nearly shot, by accident, an

English officer near him.

The Spaniards (from the commencement) thus continued skirmishing

for four hours,[34] until Gen. Anson's brigade arrived, which they

allowed at once, and as a matter of course, without any reference or

notice, to pass through the intervals of their squadrons; at the same

time these heroes notified their own want of efficiency and spirit,

by acknowledging and paying tribute to both in their allies, by a

profusion of _vivas!_

On our advancing, the French drew off to the left of the town along the

open ground, skirting the inclosures, and exchanging shots with our

skirmishers. The Spaniards kept to the right along the great road, and

could scarcely be brought by the intercession of British officers to

enter the town, from whence they learned a body of 4 or 500 infantry

had just retired. Brig. General Charles Stewart, who happened to be

on the spot, persuaded their officers to follow their retreat along

the fine Madrid road, which was one hundred and fifty yards wide. The

enemy were overtaken retiring in two small columns, and to the attack

of one General Stewart led the Spanish cavalry. The result, as indeed

all we saw on this day of our allies, was a proof of their total want,

not only of discipline, but of courage. On this and two succeeding

attempts, (to which the English general headed them), on receiving the

enemy's fire, when the principal danger was past, they pulled up and

fled in every direction; yet in Cuesta's account of this affair, he

called it an "_intrepid charge_."

Cruelty and cowardice are ever combined, and these same Spaniards who

had thus avoided closing with the unmaimed enemy, murdered in cold

blood a few wounded and dying men their column left in the road when

they retired, who were struck down by the artillery which was brought

up after the cavalry's repulse. Their barbarity was even heightened by

accompanying each stab with invectives and comments on their victims'

never again seeing their homes or Paris. On the left the enemy retired

before our cavalry, about four miles beyond the town. Anson's brigade

made an attempt to charge about 1,500 of their cavalry, but they were

found unassailable, having taken post beyond the bed of the Alberche,

which, running for about two miles at right angles with the Tagus,

empties itself into that river. The enemy allowed them to come close,

and then opened a fire of four guns and two howitzers, which occasioned

some small loss before they could withdraw out of fire. One of the

horses of this brigade, the hip and leg of which was carried off, and

its entrails trailing on the ground, recovered itself on three legs,

and tried to take its place again in squadron.

The enemy had tirailleurs in the underwood near the river, and were

very jealous of its banks, opening a fire of artillery on all who

showed themselves. Sir Arthur and head-quarter staff came unexpectedly

in the afternoon under a fire of some light guns on the right in front

of the Spaniards, and one of several four-pound shots whizzed close

over the General's head. The troops were ordered to bivouack in the

neighbourhood of Talavera, and General M'Kenzie's division was pushed

on to the front in the neighbourhood of an old ruined building, at the

angle of the Alberche, where it turned east. It was evident that the

enemy were in force on the opposite side of the river; and a ridge

of hills, above 800 yards from the bank, sloping towards it, offered

them a very suitable defensive position. Its left rested on the Tagus,

and its right was secured by the turning of the Alberche, and some

difficult wooded ridges beyond. Their strength could not exceed 23,000

men, being the troops which had fallen back from the south of the

Tagus, not having been joined by any troops from Madrid or Aranjuez.

We fully expected a battle on the following day, and about twelve

o'clock on the 23rd, the first and third division got under arms, and

advanced in the direction of the enemy's right, while the rest of the

army were ready to move at a moment's notice; but, unfortunately,

Sir Arthur had to overcome the wavering conduct of his confederate

General, who appeared quite unaware of the use of time or opportunity

in military operations. He could not be brought so to decide on

attack, that Sir Arthur could feel secure of the Spaniards making a

simultaneous attack with his army, or that the British might not be

left to gain the day alone. The bivouack of Cuesta was on the road to

Madrid, about three-quarters of a mile from the Alberche, where, on the

cushions taken out of his carriage, he sat, the picture of mental and

physical inability.

Two soldiers stood near to aid or support him in any little necessary

operation, and the scene would have been ridiculous had it not been

painful, as we saw the tide, which, "when taken at its flood," might,

nay, would "lead us on to fortune" and victory, fast ebbing, without

our taking advantage of it. After considerable suspense, it was

universally reported throughout the army, that on being pressed and

driven to his last excuse, Cuesta pleaded that it was Sunday, at the

same time promising to attack at daylight the next morning; and our

troops were in consequence ordered back to their bivouacks. It may be

fairly considered that pride had considerable weight on this occasion.

Cuesta was a true Spaniard, and disliked the suggestion of an English

general in his own country, and, with recollections of two hundred and

fifty years before, could not bring his ideas down to present changes

and circumstances. These feelings were national, and ever evinced, and

it was only very late in the war, after the Spaniards found they had

not an officer to lead their armies, and they despaired of finding

one, that they consented to place Sir Arthur at their head. Sir Arthur

deserves as much credit for keeping his temper during his six years'

intercourse with the Spanish Government and officers, as for the

general conduct of the war. When we reflect on promises broken and

engagements violated, involving the safety of his army, the honour of

his character, and his credit as an officer, and yet know of no quarrel

that extended (if any existed) beyond correspondence or negotiation,

future ages are bound to give our Commander credit for unbounded

placidity of temperament.

Though sorely annoyed by this determination, the officers could not

let pass without ridicule the incongruity we had observed within the

last three days in the old gentleman's proceedings. It was impossible

not to notice the Spanish General going out to battle, to within half

a mile of the advanced-posts, in a carriage drawn by nine mules, and

the precautions to preserve him from the rheumatism, like those taken

by delicate ladies, in our humid climate, at a _fête champêtre_, in

placing the carriage cushions on the grass. To these the Spanish

Commander-in-Chief was supported by two grenadiers, who let him drop

on them, as his knees were too feeble to attempt reclining without

the chance, nay certainty, of a fall. Yet this was the man to whom the

Cortes had entrusted their armies, but who ought (if he did not himself

feel his own inability), to have been removed without a moment's delay

after the first trial. They had only one excuse; the year before had

made common honesty a virtue, and they forgot every other requisite, in

a desire to avoid treachery.

We began, however, to have some hope on the evening of the 23rd, when

orders were delivered out for attack the next morning at daylight.

General Sherbrooke was to move at two in the morning, while the

remainder of the army was to rendez-vous in rear of the third division,

at the angle of the Alberche. The British column of attack, with the

third division at its head, supported by General Anson's brigade, and

followed by the first, second, and fourth divisions, was to attack the

enemy's right, the Spaniards were to force the troops on the heights

crossed by the road to Madrid, while the remainder of the British and

the whole of the Spanish cavalry were to cross the river on the open

ground in the enemy's front. No drums or trumpets were to sound. The

columns for attack were formed before daybreak on the 24th, and the

left column, which was to cross the river and ascend the heights round

the enemy's right and opposite the village of Casaleguas, was already

on its march, when it was discovered the enemy had retired during the

night.

While this event proved the effect of procrastination in warfare, it

was to be deeply lamented on every account. The enemy, the day before,

not consisting of above 22,000 men, had most imprudently offered us

battle before the reinforcements from Madrid or la Mancha had reached

him, and, if he had been attacked, must have been annihilated. We had

near 18,000 British and 36,000 Spaniards, of whom 10,000 were horse,

and, the position once forced, they would have had to retire across

an open plain of many leagues, pursued by a victorious enemy and a

superior cavalry.

Colonel Delancey had gained and continued in the rear of the enemy all

night, and joined us at daylight with a French officer he had taken. We

entered their variously-hutted camps across the river, which we found

arranged with comfort and taste. Their army, on arriving from the line

of the Tagus, had found the ripe wheat standing, and, regardless of its

value, had not only thatched, but made whole huts, with the corn in the

ear, which, hanging down, shed the grain on the ground as we passed

along and between them. They had built with boughs of trees an immense

_Salle de Spectacle_, and formed, by cutting down and removing the

largest olive trees, and sticking their pointed ends into the ground,

an avenue, leading up to it, of some length—an act more wanton and

reprehensible than that of taking the unthrashed corn, as the fruit of

the olive is not produced under several years' growth.

Shy as Cuesta was of coming to blows with the enemy when in his

front, he became most anxious for his pursuit when at a distance and

in retreat. Without considering that Victor was only falling back on

reinforcements, he ordered his army to advance, (as if the French were

in full retreat for the Ebro,) and established his posts on the 25th at

Torrijos. Had not the English General taken quite a different view of

the subject, it would have been most imprudent, if not impossible to

advance, as provisions began to fail us. The Spaniards, far from aiding

our commissariat, took no precautions whatever to prepare food for

18,000 additional mouths, and our position threatened to be untenable

for want of food.

Sir Arthur, in consequence, declined making any forward movement, and

contented himself with pushing two divisions of infantry across the

Alberche, and posting them at Casaleguas. In the meanwhile the enemy

were concentrating their various corps. The reserve, and the Guards

from Madrid left that capital with King Joseph on the 22d at night,

and joined the 4th _corps d'armée_, under Sebastiani, at Toledo. These

united on the 25th, between Torrijos and Toledo, with the corps under

Victor, and formed an army of 45 to 48,000 men, after a garrison of

2,000 had been left in Toledo. This small force was sufficient to cover

any advance of the Spaniards from La Mancha, as Vanegas frittered away

the time to no purpose, while Madrid was overawed by General Belliard,

entrenched in the Retiro.

On the junction of these armies, Cuesta saw too late his mistake in

so inconsiderately advancing from the neighbourhood of the British,

and before he could withdraw his most advanced corps, became engaged

with the enemy. The cavalry Regiment of Villa Viciosa, drawn up in an

enclosure surrounded by a deep ditch, with but one means of egress,

was hemmed in by the enemy and cut to pieces, without a possibility of

escape. A British officer of Engineers saved himself by his English

horse taking at a leap the barrier which surrounded the Spaniards, and

which their horses were incapable of clearing. The Spaniards, on the

26th, fell back towards the Alberche and Talavera, in such confusion

that it can only be compared to a flight, while the enemy followed with

the evident intention of bringing the Allies to battle.

Every one now felt its approach, and some little preparations were

made to strengthen a position which Sir Arthur had selected, resting

on Talavera. These consisted in placing some of the Spanish heavy

guns in battery on the main road, in front of the Madrid gate, and

throwing up some barricades on the different approaches to the town. A

breastwork was commenced on a small rising ground in a little plain,

at the spot where the flanks of the British and Spanish would unite,

about the centre of the Allied army. These were the only attempts at

entrenchment, and the last was not completed. All the troops were

ordered to hold themselves in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

On the 27th the British cavalry were ordered to the front, to cover the

retreat of the Spaniards and of our own divisions across the Alberche.

About mid-day the enemy's army began to show itself, and while our

cavalry withdrew to the right bank of the river, in the open ground,

the 5th division fell back from Casaleguas, through a woody country,

to the same spot, near an old ruined house, the Casa de Salinas,

which they had occupied before the enemy retreated. Before re-crossing

the Alberche, they set fire to the old hutted camps of the enemy, the

smoke from which rose so thickly as completely to hide from view the

country beyond and to the west of the village of Casaleguas. The two

brigades of the 5th division lay upon their arms in front of this ruin,

the highest part of which overlooked the surrounding trees, offering

a view of the country. Sir Arthur dismounted, and, leaving his horse

standing below, scrambled with some difficulty up the broken building,

to reconnoitre the advancing enemy. Though ever as gallant, we were by

no means such good soldiers in those days as succeeding campaigns made

us, and sufficient precautions had not been taken to ascertain what

was passing within the wood (on the skirt of which the division was

posted,) and between it and the ford below Casaleguas.

But the enemy had crossed, under cover of the smoke from the burning

huts, a very large force of infantry, and, gradually advancing, opened

a fire so suddenly on our troops lying on the ground, that several men

were killed without rising from it. This unexpected attack threatened

the greatest confusion, little short of dismay, but the steadiness

of the troops, particularly the 45th, prevented disorder, and gave

time for Sir Arthur and his staff to withdraw from the house and mount

their horses. Sir Arthur's escape, may, however, be considered most

providential. The troops were withdrawn from the wood into the plain,

but after we had lost many officers and men. As this was the enemy's

first attack, and might, by our withdrawing, be considered successful,

it was peculiarly unfortunate, from adding to the enemy's confidence

in attacking our army. These two brigades, being supported by General

Anson's cavalry, gradually fell back towards our army.

The enemy now crowded the heights, extending from Casaleguas to the

Tagus, with vast bodies of troops, accompanied with quantities of

artillery. These crossed at the various fords on the Alberche, to the

plain west of it; while some of their cavalry, in the loosest order,

came in crowds through the woods, following our advanced corps as they

gradually withdrew to our position, of which, as we approached the

chosen ground, the principal features began to show themselves. Their

horse artillery soon overtook us in our retreat, and opened a heavy and

constant fire, particularly of shells, under which the troops formed

on their ground. As the enemy closed on our position, our different

divisions were seen hurrying to the post assigned them, which formed

the left wing of the Allies; and some anxiety was felt for the arrival

of the troops who were to defend a towering height, which, it was

evident, would be the key of the position.

The men, as they formed and faced the enemy, looked pale, but the

officers, riding along their line, only of two deep, on which all our

hopes depended, observed they appeared not less cool and tranquil than

determined. In the mean while the departing sun showed by his rays the

immense masses moving towards us, while the last glimmering of twilight

proved their direction to be across our front towards the left, leaving

a sensation of anxiety and doubt if they would not be able to attack

that point even before our troops, which had not yet arrived, were up.

The darkness, only broken in upon by the bursting shells and flashes

of the guns, closed quickly upon us, and it was the opinion of many

that the enemy would rest till morning. But this was soon placed beyond

doubt, by the summit of the height on our left being suddenly covered

with fire, and for an instant it was evident the enemy had nearly, if

not completely, made a lodgment in our line. This attack was made by

three regiments of the division of Ruffin, the 24th, 96th, and 9th, but

of which, the enemy say, the last only reached the summit, the very

citadel of our position.

They had marched, without halting, up the rise of the hill, and came

upon the German Legion, who had, having been informed they were to the

rear of General Hill's division, and believing they were in a second

line, lain down on their arms, and when the enemy topped the hill, _en

masse_, many were asleep. But General Hill's corps had not arrived, and

the Germans were first roused by the enemy seizing them as prisoners,

or firing into them at _brûle-pourpoint_. The flashes of the retiring

fire of the broken and surprised Germans marked the enemy's success,

and the imminent danger of our army. General Sherbrooke, posted in the

centre, with the promptitude required in such an emergency, ordered

the regiments of the brigade next to the Germans to wheel into open

column, and then, facing them about, was preparing to storm the hill,

with the rear-rank in front, when the brigade of Gen. Donkin by a

brilliant charge restored the height to its proper owner, also driving

the French from the top of the hill into the valley, with immense

loss, and the colonel of the 9th regiment terribly wounded. A second

attack was afterwards repelled by the timely arrival of the division

of Gen. Hill, Colonel Donkin's brigade having taken ground to its

right. There was some fear that the enemy, when the Germans had been

driven back, had carried off the only heavy guns we had with our army,

but fortunately they had been withdrawn at dusk from the brow of the

hill. Major Fordice, of the Adj.-Gen. department, an officer of great

promise, fell in retaking these heights, with many valuable officers

and men.

After this attack was repulsed, the enemy remained quiet, awaiting

the morn which was to decide the fate of the battle. The British

light infantry was thrown out to the front, with sentries still more

advanced towards the enemy. This necessary precaution, coupled with

the inexperience of our troops, principally militia-men, produced a

heavy loss, from the jealousy they felt of all in their front, after

this night attack. This was increased by the constant word "_stand up_"

being passed along the line, and on more than one occasion it led to an

individual soldier firing at some object in his front, which was taken

up by the next, and so passed, like, and to appearance being a running

wildfire, down the front of one or more regiments, till stopped by the

officers. In this, the troops unfortunately forgot their light infantry

in front, and many brave officers and men fell a sacrifice to the fire

of their comrades; amongst them was Colonel Ross of the Guards.

The Spaniards were not less on the alert than ourselves, but their

anxiety not only extended to firing musquetry, but to salvos of the

cannon placed in front of Talavera. On one occasion this was said to

have originated from a cow having got loose and cantered up to their

line. Our troops, however, stood firm to their ground, while regiments

of the Spaniards, after giving a volley, quitted their position and

fled through the gardens and enclosure, bearing down all before them,

and were only brought into line again by degrees. One of these alarms

about midnight, in front of Talavera, was so great, that a large

portion of the troops posted in the front, left their ground, and

rushed through the town, and in the midst of the crowd of fugitives was

seen a certain square-cornered coach, the nine mules attached to it

being urged to the utmost; implying that its inmate was as anxious to

escape as the meanest in the army.

Sir Arthur, surrounded by his staff, slept, wrapped in his cloak, on

the open ground, in rear of the second line, about the centre of the

British army. A hasty doze was occasionally taken, as more continued

rest was disturbed by alarm of different kinds,—while the reflections

of others kept them waking. The bustle of the day had prevented a

review of our situation, but, on being left to our own thoughts, it

was impossible not to reflect on the awfully approaching crisis. We

could not but feel that here was to be another trial of the ancient

military rivalry of England and France; that the cool, constitutional,

persevering courage of the former was again to be pitted against the

more artificial, however chivalrous, though not less praiseworthy,

bravery of the latter. This view of the relative valour of the two

nations cannot be questioned, if we consider that the reminding the

British of this moral quality is wholly unnecessary, and instead of

language of excitement being constantly applied to our soldiery, that

of control, obedience, and composure is solely recommended; while our

ancient opponents are obliged incessantly to drive into the ears of

their men, that they are nationally and individually the bravest of

the human race. Hearing nothing else so flattering to their unbounded

vanity, they become so puffed up by this eternal stimulant, as to be

fully convinced of its truth, which, in consequence, makes their first

attack tremendous.

Buonaparte, being aware of this weak point in their character, fed

it in every way, and the object of wearing a paltry piece of enamel

gained him many battles. But this sort of created courage is not

capable of standing a severe test, and the French have always been in

their military character more Gauls than Franks; and what Cæsar said

of the former eighteen centuries ago, is still applicable to the races

now occupying their fine country. If stoutly opposed at first, this

kind of courage not only diminishes but evaporates, and has, does, and

will, ever fail before that of the British. As soldiers, taking the

expression in its widest sense, they are equal, if not superior, to us

in many points; but on one, that of individual constitutional courage,

we rise far superior to them. It is remarkable how often they evince a

knowledge of this, and in nothing more than their subterfuges of all

kinds to keep it from resting on their minds. All France, aware of this

inferiority, by all species of casuistry attempts to conceal it; and in

order not to shock their national vanity, they blame every unsuccessful

officer opposed to us, even should his dispositions be ever so good,

and such as might, but for the courage of our men, have succeeded.

Buonaparte's conduct, after Vittoria, was directed to work on this

feeling, and, by sacrificing the officers to the self-vanity of the

troops, established for a time the _moral_ of the army, by making

those who had fled like sheep at Vittoria, fight us again, though

unsuccessfully, with renewed spirit. Besides the bravery of the two

nations, no less was the plain of Talavera to try the merit of two

systems, and prove the value of different means and education in

forming a powerful and efficient military. It was not only to be shown

if a chivalrous enthusiasm, and a confidence founded on vanity was

to overcome natural and patriotic courage, but if a sense of duty,

inculcated by a real discipline, was to sink under feelings created by

an absence of control and a long train of excess and military license.

It was whether an organized army, worthy of a civilized period, and

state of warfare, should not overcome a military cast grown up in the

heart of Europe, (from the peculiarity of the times and circumstances,)

little better than the Bandits led by Bourbon to the walls of Rome

in the sixteenth century. The system on which the French armies were

formed was so demoralizing and pernicious in its effects, that the

army of Buonaparte ought not to be considered as the national force of

France, but that of a conqueror, like Ghenghis Khan, or Tamerlane, of

a more civilized age and quarter of the world. Like those scourges,

the ruler of the French existed by upholding that soldiery the times

had first created, and which his ambition subsequently fostered, and,

in perpetuating their attachment to his person by leading them to

victory and plunder; in consequence, robbery was not only overlooked

but permitted, and an economist of the French army has since dared in

print to excuse its atrocities. This, it is true, is written by one

of the revolutionary school, but it will be, (as long as the work is

read,) a perpetual disgrace to the army whose acts he records.[35]

All discipline sank under this state of things. Coercion was neither

necessary nor prudent, where the views of all were directed to the same

lawless objects; and the military code was rather a bond of union and

companionship, fostering a spurious glory, or ambition, and a thirst

and hope of reward in unshackled military license and execution, than a

collection of laws respecting the rights and claims of human nature.

The quickness and intelligence of the French soldiery pointed out the

necessity of an obedience to their officers, whom they considered as

leading them to objects equally desirable to all; and thus actuated,

far from having to receive orders, they readily anticipated them. A

Bedouin robber does not require the positive commands of his chief to

do his utmost to destroy the guards, or to plunder the camels of a

caravan; and no more did the French, with gain or impure military fame

in view, require farther stimulus or direction.

But these various causes so suited the French, that they had the

effect, since the Revolution, of raising their armies to the summit

of fame, while their successes over the continental troops had made

them universally dreaded. They felt this, which increased their

confidence; and the army before us, sleeping on the opposite side of

the ravine, was strongly imbued with this impression, being formed of

the fine regiments of the Italian army, who had so often conquered

under Buonaparte, and subsequently marched from one victory to another.

Neither the corps of Victor nor Sebastiani, nor the guard or reserve

under Desolles, from Madrid, had formed parts of the armies defeated by

us at Vimiera or Corunna, nor had any recollections of our prowess to

shake that good opinion of themselves, in which the principal strength

of the French armies consists.

Though no fears could be entertained for the result, dependent on the

brave fellows lying around us, we could not but regret that they were

not composed of troops as fine as those who accompanied Sir John Moore.

We could not hide from ourselves that our ranks were filled with young

soldiers, being principally the second battalions of those English

regiments which had embarked at Corunna, and consisting of draughts

from the militia that had never seen an enemy. With the exception of

the Guards and a few others, there were more knapsacks with the names

of militia regiments upon them, than of numbered regular regiments.

Indeed we felt, no contrast could be stronger than that of the two

armies. The ideas of England have never run wild on military glory.

We more soberly consider our army rather as a necessary evil than an

ornament and boast; and as an appeal to brute force and arms is a proof

of barbarism, so ought the general diffusion of the former sentiment

in a community to be viewed as conclusive evidence of advance to

civilization and intelligence; and instead of directing the talents,

or drawing forth the best blood of a people to be wasted in the field,

a well-wisher to his country ought to desire them to be retained at

home for the general advantage. But, however secure in ourselves, we

recollected that we formed but one-third of the Allied army, and

that 36,000 men lay in the same line, every action of whom had led

us to consider them as more likely to occasion some common reverse

than a happy termination to our operations. We were convinced that if

attacked, even in their strong and almost impregnable position, it was

most likely to be attended by their immediate flight, which would leave

the whole of the enemy to direct his efforts upon us single-handed. In

addition, a certain degree of coolness had grown up between the two

commanders; and Sir Arthur must have felt that the weakness of his ally

by his side was not less to be dreaded than the strength of his enemy

in his front. The prospect on the eve of the 28th July, 1809, was thus,

though far from hopeless, by no means one of encouragement or sanguine

expectation.

The rest of all the officers lying around Sir Arthur was hasty and

broken, and interrupted by the uneasiness of the horses held at a

distance, and the arrival of deserters, a few of whom came over during

the night. They generally informed us, that we were to be attacked at

daylight, and that the corps that stormed the hill had consisted of

6000 men. Our glances were constantly directed towards the point from

whence the sun was to rise for the last time on many hundreds who were

here assembled within a mile around, while Sir Arthur, occasionally

asking the hour, showed he looked for daylight with as much anxiety

as any of us. Just before day, we quietly mounted our horses and rode

slowly towards the height, where we arrived just as the light allowed

us to see the opposite side of the ravine beneath us covered with

black indistinct masses. Every instant rendered them more visible, and

the first rays of the sun showed us Sebastiani's division opposite

our centre, Victor's three divisions at our feet, with the reserve,

guard, and cavalry extending backward to the wood near the Alberche.

Our eyes were, however, principally attracted by an immense solid

column opposite but rather to the left of the hill, evidently intended

for attack. Its front was already covered with tirailleurs, ready to

advance at the word, and who saw before them the dead bodies of their

comrades, who had fallen the night before, strewing the ground. The

gray of the morning was not broken in upon by a single shot from either

side, and we had time to observe our position, (which had not been

completely occupied before dark on the preceding eve,) and how the

troops were posted.

The distance from the Tagus to the height on our left, which

overlooked a deep valley, bounded beyond by some sharp and rugged

hills, was little less than two miles. The right of the Allied army

rested on the town of Talavera and the river. About half the ground

from our right to a little beyond the centre was flat, and covered

with woods and vineyards, but where these ceased, the remainder of

the country was open, and gradually rose to the foot of our important

conical hill on the left.

A rill ran along the whole front of our line, and in that part of the

ground which was open and undulating, it passed through a ravine,

the brow of which was taken advantage of in posting our troops. The

Spaniards, from being incapable of moving, were posted in heavy columns

in the most difficult country, till they joined our right, which was

in an open space, though in its front and rear were inclosures. At

this point had been commenced a little redoubt, which however remained

imperfect, and was the only "_intrenchment_" of those with which the

French, in their accounts, as an excuse for their defeat, have so

liberally strengthened our line. But as every thing is sacrificed by

them to vanity, truth cannot be expected alone to escape.

On the right of the British was posted the fourth division, under

Sir A. Campbell, supported by Sir S. Cotton's brigade of cavalry; on

their left commenced the first division, of which the Guards were on

the right. The remainder of this division, consisting of Brig.-Gen.

Cameron's brigade and the Germans, extended across the most open

ground, and joined on the left to the brigade of Colonel Donkin and

the second division, clustered round the height for its defence. The

other brigade of Gen. M'Kenzie was placed in the second line. The

remainder of the cavalry had bivouacked at some distance to the rear,

and were not come up. The enemy were employed from daylight in placing

opposite our centre thirty pieces of cannon on the opposite side of

the ravine, but not a shot was fired on either side, and the whole

looked as if the armies had met for a review. But the calm augured the

coming storm, and the quiet evinced that all were aware of the great

approaching struggle, and that it was useless to throw away a casual

fire, or destroy individuals, where salvos alone and the death of

thousands could decide the day. When the vast column we had seen in

the dusk was considered ready, a single cannon shot from the centre

of the enemy's batteries was the signal for its advance, and for

the opening of all their guns. A shower of balls instantly fell on

all parts of our position, and the smoke, (the wind being east, and

the damp of the morning preventing its rising,) was blown across the

ravine, and completely enveloped us in a dense fog. But we had seen the

forward movement intended for our dislodgment, and knew, under cover

of this cannonade and smoke, it was advancing up the face of the hill.

It consisted of a close column of battalions, of the same division of

Ruffin which had attacked the night before.

Gen. Hill, with the brigades of Tilson and Stewart, which had already

successfully tried their strength with these same troops, was ready to

receive them. The Buffs, 48th, and 66th, advanced to the brow of the

hill, wheeling round to meet them with their arms ported, ready to rush

on the ascending foe as soon as perceived through the intense smoke.

They were not long in suspense, and without a moment's hesitation, by a

desperate charge and volley, they overthrew, as they topped the hill,

the enemy, who fled in the utmost confusion and consternation, followed

by our troops, even across the ravine. Here they rallied, and, after an

exchange of sharp firing, our regiments were withdrawn again to their

vantage ground. Had the cavalry been present, the victory might have

been completed at this early hour, but they had not come in from their

bivouack. As the smoke and tumult cleared off, and the troops were

seated behind the summit of the hill, we found our loss considerable,

and that Gen. Hill had been forced to quit the field from a shot in

the head. The dead of the enemy lay in vast numbers on the face of the

hill, and had been tall, healthy, fine young men, well-limbed, with

good countenances; and as proof of their courage, (the head of their

column having reached within a few yards of the top of the hill before

being arrested,) the bodies lay close to our ranks. The face of the

height was furrowed out into deep ravines by the water rushing down its

steep sides during the rains, and the dead and wounded of both nations

lay heaped in them.[36] Musquetry almost ceased after this defeat, but

the cannonade continued; our centre and right suffering considerably,

though in the other parts of the line, as our shots were plunging,

while theirs were directed upwards, it was not so deadly. It continued

for above an hour after the repulse, and showed us the inferiority of

our calibre. All our guns, with the exception of one brigade of heavy,

were miserably _light_ six pounders, while the French returned our fire

with eights and twelves.

As the weather was dreadfully hot, and it was impossible to know how

long we should occupy this ground, orders were given to bury the men

who had fallen the night before and in the morning attack, lying around

the hill interspersed with the living.

The entrenching tools were thus employed, and it was curious to see

the soldiers burying their fallen comrades, with the cannon shot

falling around, and in the midst of them, leaving it probable that an

individual might thus be employed digging his own grave! Gradually,

however, the fire slakened, and at last wholly ceased, and war appeared

as much suspended as before daylight and previously to the attack of

the morning. The troops on the advance talked together, and the thirsty

of both armies met at the bottom of the ravine, and drank from the same

stream. There was also a well at the foot of the hill to the left,

where the same water was divided among the collected of both nations

around its brink.

About nine it was evident that the enemy had no intention of disturbing

us for some time, as their numerous fires proved they were not

inclined to fight again on empty stomachs. This was a painful sight to

us, who felt acutely for our starving soldiery, who began to experience

the most pinching want. All the promises of the Spaniards had ended

in nought. They had made no arrangements to act up to their word, and

starvation began to stare us in the face. Generally, however, it was

borne by our men with philosophy, but one hungry soldier became almost

troublesome, and, close to Sir Arthur and his staff, said, "It was very

hard that they had nothing to eat," and wished that they might be let

to go down and fight, "for when engaged, they forgot their hunger."

The poor fellow was, however, at last persuaded to retire. Till about

eleven o'clock all remained quiet, but about that hour immense clouds

of dust were seen rising above the woods towards the Alberche opposite

the centre of the Allied army, implying movements of large bodies of

troops. This indicated the preparing for a general assault, and was

occasioned by Sebastiani's corps forming a column of attack.[37] As

the enemy's troops approached, the cannonade was renewed, and our

inferiority of metal was so evident, that a brigade of Spanish 12

pounders was borrowed from Cuesta. The fellows attached to these guns

showed good spirit, and, posting their guns on the side of the hill,

were found most effective. The French, at times, had the most exact

range of the height, and threw shot and shells upon it with terrible

precision. One shell killed four horses, held by a man, who escaped

uninjured. Their fuses, however, often burned too quick, exploding

the shells high in the air and forming little clouds of smoke. It

was curious that the enemy changed their fire from the troops to our

artillery, or from our batteries to our line, whenever we gave them the

example.

But the dust drew near in the woods, and a vast column was seen

preparing to advance against Sir A. Cameron's brigade in the open

ground. General Sherbrooke had cautioned his division to use the

bayonet, and when the enemy came within about fifty yards of the

Guards, they advanced to meet them, but on their attempting to close

the enemy by a charge, they broke and fled. The regiment on their left,

the 83rd, made a simultaneous movement, driving the enemy with immense

loss before them; but the impetuosity of the Guards led to endangering

the day. The flying enemy led them on till they opened a battery on

their flank, which occasioned so heavy a loss, that the ranks could

not be formed after the disorder of pursuit, and, on being ordered to

resume their ground, produced confusion.

The enemy instantly rallied and followed them, and were so confident

of victory, that their officers were heard to exclaim, "_Allons, mes

enfans; ils sont tous nos prisonniers_." But Sir Arthur had foreseen

the difficulty in which the Guards were likely to become entangled, and

had ordered the 48th from the height to their support. This gallant

regiment arrived in the rear of the Guards at the moment when they were

retiring in confusion, pressed by the enemy, on the line of position.

They allowed the Guards to pass through them, and then, breaking in

upon the enemy, gave them a second repulse. The Guards quickly formed

in the rear, and moved up into the position; and their spirit and

appearance of good humour and determination after having lost in twenty

minutes five hundred men, was shown by their giving a hurrah, as they

took up their ground; and a report soon after that the enemy's cavalry

was coming down upon them, was answered by a contemptuous laugh along

their ranks.

The remainder of Sherbrooke's division, after repulsing the enemy,

had retired to their former ground in excellent order. The enemy

had made an attack at the same time on the fourth division; they

accompanied this by a _ruse_, which nothing but the determination of

our troops could have overcome. Trusting to the similarity of uniform,

they advanced towards the 7th, 97th, and 53d, crying out they were

Spaniards, and repeating the Spanish cry of _Vivan los Ingleses!_

Though this did not deceive our officers, it did the men, who, under

this false impression, could not be brought to fire on them; this

allowed their approaching quite close, when they gave their fire so

unexpectedly, that it staggered our line, and even caused them to fall

back. This was, however, only to exemplify the French proverb, _reculer

pour mieux sauter_, as indignation and anger took place of surprise,

and a spontaneous rush with the bayonet instantly threw the enemy into

utter rout. A Spanish regiment of infantry, on the right flank of the

fusileers, broke and fled on this attack; but the King's regiment of

horse, with great gallantry, dashed into the wood in co-operation with

our troops in pursuit. Several pieces of cannon fell into the hands

of Gen. A. Campbell, and three were captured by the Spanish cavalry,

while the flight of the enemy was so rapid, that several others were

left in their retreat.

Besides these attacks, the enemy's endeavours and intentions were

extended along the whole British line, with the exception of the hill,

which they did not again attack after the morning. We had not posted

any troops in the valley, or on the hills on our left, the former being

commanded, and the latter considered too distant; but it soon became

evident that the enemy had turned their views to these points.

The Spanish division of Gen. Bassecourt was in consequence borrowed

from Cuesta, and sent across the valley to oppose the enemy's light

troops on the distant ridge. The French soon after advanced two heavy

columns into the valley, consisting of the divisions of Vilelle and

Ruffin, and two-thirds of our cavalry were ordered to occupy the

valley opposite them. Gen. Anson's brigade arrived first, while the

heavy brigade was moving from the rear of the centre to its support.

The enemy's two columns advanced, supported by cavalry, threatened

to turn our left, and orders, either positive or discretionary,

were given to charge them if opportunity offered; these were either

interpreted into direct orders, or considered as definitive, under

particular circumstances, and the 23d regiment soon after advanced

in line against one of the columns, the brigade of Laval, which had

taken post with its flank against a house. This gallant regiment moved

forward with great steadiness, and the squadron, (for the width of

only one could embrace the front of the column,) on arriving within

firing distance, received a well-directed volley. It seemed to stop

them in their career—the whole country was instantly covered with

horses galloping back without riders, and men straggling to the rear

without horses, while a dense spot seen from the hill marked where the

slaughtered lay.

Though this squadron was annihilated, the others dashed on, passed

between and round the columns, and fell upon a brigade of cavalry in

the rear, broke through them, and rushed on a second brigade beyond.

Of these, some cut their way back, while many were slain or taken.

Though this desperate charge cost the 23d two-thirds of its men and

horses, it had the effect of astounding the enemy, who, seeing not only

the 1st German, and the 3d and 4th dragoons prepared for a similar

act, but the Spanish cavalry moving into the valley in support, and

their efforts unsuccessful elsewhere, not only gave up all farther

idea of penetrating in that quarter, but seemed satisfied that it

was imprudent and hopeless any longer to continue the contest. But

for being on the defensive, the gaps in our lines, which now forcibly

showed themselves, by the regiments not covering one-third of their

former ground, would have made us come to the like conclusion; and it

was no unpleasing sight to see them begin gradually to draw off their

infantry, and bring forward, to cover their retreat, their cavalry,

which had been all day in numerous _échelons_, extending back to the

woods. They formed several lines, and must have numbered not less than

9 or 10,000 cavalry, dressed in all the colours of the rainbow.

But the views of the British were attracted to a new enemy which had

threatened occasionally during the day, and had gained great head soon

after the defeat on the right and centre. The ripe corn and dry grass

took fire from the cartridges and wadding, and hundreds of acres were

rapidly consumed, involving in their conflagrations the more severely

wounded and helpless; adding a new and horrid character to the misery

of war.

It was so general, that it was a consolation to the friends of officers

slain, to learn that their bodies, when found, did not bear the marks

of being scorched or burned in their last moments!

But the attention of all was directed till dusk to the enemy's evident

preparations for retreat, and during the night they drew off behind the

Alberche, which river they had all crossed by the daylight of the 29th;

on which morning, Brig.-Gen. R. Craufurd joined the army with 3000 men,

and a troop of horse-artillery, and was pushed on to the old ruin, from

which Sir Arthur had so narrowly escaped two days before. But these

reinforcements, consisting of the 43d, 52d, and 95th, (the beginning of

the celebrated light division,) did not make up for the heavy loss we

had sustained during the 27th and 28th.

Out of 17,500 men we had lost 5,335, including Generals M'Kenzie and

Langworth killed, and Gen. Hill, Sir H. Campbell, and Brig.-Gen. A.

Campbell, wounded. This was two-sevenths of our force, and is, with

the exception of Albuera, the heaviest list of casualties offered, for

the men engaged, of any victorious army in modern war. The loss of the

23d Dragoons was remarkable from its extent; that fine regiment, which

had only joined three weeks, being only able to assemble, after the

action, one hundred men. Two officers and forty-six men and ninety-five

horses were killed on the spot, and besides the numerous wounded, three

officers, and about one hundred men were taken, in consequence of

penetrating into the enemy's supporting cavalry. The whole regiment

was so reduced, as to be sent home to England, on our return to the

Portuguese frontier.

The Spanish returns gave between 1300 and 1400 men, but this included

their loss on the 25th in front of St. Ollala[38].

The French army fell back across the Alberche, diminished not less

than one-fifth, if not one-fourth of their effectives, their loss

being indifferently rated from 10 to 14,000 men. Some of the little

enclosures in front of the right of the British were choked with their

dead, and in one little field more than 400 bodies were counted.

Besides the innumerable dead, vast numbers of wounded were left in our

front; and many more stand of arms than the most sanguine rated their

loss, were abandoned on the field of battle[39]. Nineteen pieces of

cannon remained in our possession as trophies of our victory[40].

Besides these, they left in our possession several silk standards,

but whether they had borne eagles or not it was difficult to say; as,

besides being much broken and torn when brought into head-quarters, the

staff of one had been used as a poker to a bivouac fire. It was the

custom of the French to unscrew their eagles, and for the eagle-bearers

to conceal them about their person when in danger. Having only one to

a regiment, and there being five battalions to each, every eagle taken

by us during the war, may be considered as equivalent to five stand of

colours, and the trophies at Whitehall as ten times more numerous than

they appear.

It is a remarkable and curious instance of the instability of human

institutions, that these idols of the French armies for so many years,

and around which so much blood was spilt, only now exist as trophies to

their conquerors.

This hard-fought battle was remarkable from the circumstance of almost

the entire efforts of an army being directed on the troops of one

nation of their allied opponents. It is, perhaps, fortunate, that

the rancour and vanity of the enemy led them to this conduct, as, had

they forced the Spaniards from the difficult country on our right, our

army would have been thrown off the Tagus, and had to combat the whole

French army, with its communications threatened, if not cut off.

With the exception of occupying the ground, the dash of the regiment of

King's cavalry, and the employment of a few battalions in skirmishing

on the hills on our left, the Spaniards did nothing whatever[41]. But

their previous behaviour had tended to make us uneasy during the whole

battle, and so disgusted was Cuesta with some of his troops, that he

ordered several officers and men to be shot for cowardice the next day.

This battle gave the character to all the subsequent actions in the

Peninsula. They were ever almost entirely of infantry and artillery,

while the cavalry, which acted with such effect on the continent, did

not assert its power. However brilliant Vimiera and Corunna, still

Talavera must be considered as the place where the military character

of the two nations was fairly brought to trial and proved. This battle

proved the total want of firmness of the enemy in meeting our troops

with the bayonet, and offered an example, followed by others on every

occasion, of their best troops flying like chaff before the wind, on

the hostile troops arriving within charging distance.

The French would ever expose themselves to fire at the smallest

distance as long as ourselves, but a hurra and a rush with the bayonet,

within reach, caused their instant flight.

With the exception of a few desperate men at the rear of a flying

column, or from accidental circumstances, scarce any bayonet wounds

were exchanged during the whole war; and their dread of closing was so

strongly evinced in foggy weather, that a shout was sufficient, as at

the pass of Maida in the Pyrenees, to disperse a forming column.

Indeed, our bayonets might as well have been of pasteboard, from

their temper being so seldom tried, for the dread of them alone was

sufficient to scatter the best troops of France. In fact it is a bad,

if not useless weapon in their hands, and the Portuguese beat them with

it on more than one occasion.

Brig.-Gen. Alexander Campbell had two horses shot under him, and though

wounded through the thigh, continued on his horse till the close of the

battle. Sir H. Campbell, who headed the brigade of Guards, was wounded

in the face, the ball entering the cheek and coming out behind the

ear. Col. Gordon, of the 83d, was badly wounded in the neck, and when

in the act of being removed to the rear, a shell fell into the blanket

in which he was carried, and bursting, slew alike the wounded and

his bearers. A man of the 87th, while lying down, was shot, the ball

entering the head, and was alive five days after.

The incessant and terrible cannonade had created the most shocking

wounds, and an unusual portion of wounded were not expected again to

join the ranks. The standard of one of the regiments of Guards had

three balls in its staff. The prisoners and deserters stated that,

during the action, a Westphalian regiment, in the enemy's service,

mutinied, but that they were reduced to obedience and marched to the

rear.

The morning after the battle was employed in removing our numerous and

suffering wounded into the convents and churches, now converted into

hospitals. By requisitions of beds and blankets, within three days,

principally through the exertion of the head of the medical staff,

Dr. Frank, no patient was without a mattrass. Nurses and orderlies

were selected to attend, and Sir Arthur visited the hospitals himself.

The number of deaths from wounds that proved mortal, obliged immense

burial parties to be employed during the first three or four days

in removing the bodies from the hospitals. Even in the case of the

officers, it was only through the attention of their brother officers,

who read the service themselves, that the usual funeral forms were

used, while the men were interred without prayers, being generally

placed in ditches and the bank dug in upon them.

The heat of the weather rendered as necessary a proper attention to

the dead of the enemy, and the Spaniards burned a vast number of the

slain; but the weather was too rapid for all exertion, and the tainted

air was fraught with every horror, so that the quarters of some of the

troops were forced to be changed. Though distressing to relate, it must

not be overlooked, that the 29th was disgraced by the atrocious conduct

of the Spaniards, in putting to death most of the enemy's wounded left

in our front. The amount has been rated as high as one thousand, but

it is certain several hundred were thus inhumanly butchered. One of

our officers found a French officer badly wounded, and, on offering to

seek aid, the poor fellow remarked, that he had no right to expect it,

until our own numerous wounded were housed and dressed. But during the

search for assistance, the Spaniards had passed the spot, and he was

found stabbed to death!

Sir Arthur felt he could not too soon thank the army which had so nobly

aided his efforts, and on the 29th his Excellency issued a long order

to that effect, naming distinguished officers and regiments. The enemy

continued a rear guard on the Alberche till the night of the 31st

July, when they retired through St. Ollala, and our patrols passed

through that town: here our officers learned some curious details of

the enemies' bearing, under the different feelings of confidence of

success and the discouragement of subsequent defeat. In the house

where the King had lodged, an instance was given highly creditable to

Joseph. A caricature was discovered of El Rey Pepé, which created great

indignation in those around Joseph's person, accompanied by threats and

ill-treatment. The King, the next morning, on his departure, tendered

his host a snuff-box, remarking, that he should be more careful of its

contents than of the caricature; on its being opened, it was found to

contain the King's miniature.

We were prevented from moving after the enemy, not only on account of

our numerous wounded, but from want of provisions. Our difficulties

on this head greatly increased after the battle, and were felt to so

great an extent, that the army in part became disorganized, from the

ravenous callings for food overpowering all other considerations.

While, it was said, comparative plenty reigned in the Spanish camp, our

troops were driven to seek and take provisions by force, wherever they

could find them; this led to such straggling from the camp, that on

the 2d of August the rolls were ordered to be called every two hours.

While our position was thus unsatisfactory and even doubtful, news

reached head-quarters that our rear was threatened by troops moving

down from Castile and Leon. On the 30th a rumour (proved however to be

anticipated) spread that the French had arrived in Placentia, and the

anxiety became universal.

Our information at this time was less perfect than it afterwards

became, and the various reports left the impression that it was

Soult's corps alone of 12 to 15,000 men that was thus menacing our

communication with Portugal. This however did not make our position

untenable, as our army of between 15 and 16,000, was capable of

defeating his force, if Cuesta could be persuaded to hold his ground,

and keep in check the lately defeated army, and thus cover our

hospitals. To this Cuesta agreed, and, ordering Gen. Bassecourt's

division to act as our advance, caused it to march to Oropesa on the

2d. Arrangements were made respecting the hospitals, and Col. M'Kinnon

was left in their charge, with but thirty-four medical officers (all we

could spare) to attend 5,000 sick and wounded.

We left Talavera on the 3d, under the full expectation of fighting

the forces coming from the north, concentrating about Naval Moral.

On our arrival at Oropesa on the evening of that day, Bassecourt was

pushed on towards that place, and orders were given out implying active

and immediate operations, by directing the troops to hold themselves

in readiness to march by such orders as they might receive from the

Quarter-master-general.

But the course of the night changed all our prospects. Sir Arthur

received a despatch from Cuesta stating, that he had received

information on which he could depend, that not only had Soult's corps

moved from the north, but that it was accompanied by the two other

corps, the 5th and 6th, and that he had, in consequence, determined to

retire from Talavera. This implied the sacrifice to the enemy of all in

our hospitals who had not the power of walking, as the Spaniards, on

Col. M'Kinnon applying to them for means of transport, furnished only

ten or a dozen carts, while very many quitted the town empty. Col.

M'Kinnon, thus under the painful necessity of leaving nearly 2,300 sick

and wounded, gave directions for the rest to withdraw by a nearer road

to the bridge of Arzobispo, than through Oropesa.[42]

This unexpected news added to Sir Arthur's difficulties; and while

these were under consideration, they were greatly increased by the

whole Spanish army coming in upon us, at daylight on the 4th, with

their carts and baggage.

On this occasion the old General had not wanted decision, as was proved

by the arrival of himself and army within a few hours after forming his

opinion.

The intelligence of Cuesta proved most true; a junction of the three

corps had taken place, and the King, before he left Madrid, had sent

them orders on the 22d to advance on Placentia. The head-quarters of

the 2d, 5th, and 6th corps were at Salamanca on the 27th of July, and

directing their march on three succeeding days to the south, forced

all the weak passes and posts, and arrived on the 1st of August, at

Placentia, making prisoners 300 sick in the hospitals.

The Spanish troops, retiring before Soult, crossed the Tagus, and

fortunately destroyed the bridge of boats at Almarez. But the enemy

only thought of intercepting and surrounding the British, and their

advance reached Naval Moral on the 3d, but five leagues from Oropesa,

thus cutting off the direct road by Almarez to Portugal.

No time was now to be lost, as we were not only likely to be attacked

from the west, but, in consequence of the retreat of the Spaniards,

threatened with the advance of King Joseph, and his defeated army at

Talavera, within three or four days: in which case we should have had,

besides 36 to 38,000 from Madrid, 30 to 34,000 from Placentia.

But Sir Arthur soon decided, and gave directions, at four o'clock on

the 4th, for all the baggage to proceed across the bridge of Arzobispo.

This was preparatory to a similar movement of the army; and having

recalled Bassecourt's division, the whole British force filed over to

the left bank of the Tagus, where the wounded from Talavera arrived a

short time before.

The Spaniards followed to the side of the river, but did not cross that

evening. So nearly had the enemy intercepted our retreat, that at

dusk his cavalry interchanged some shots with our advance-posts, close

to Arzobispo, and carried off one of our videttes. The Spaniards did

not cross the next day; but the British army proceeded down the river,

by the same road where the enemy had turned Cuesta's flank before the

battle of Medellin, in the preceding spring. This was rendered most

necessary, as the occupation of Almarez could alone secure a retreat

upon Portugal; and the pontoons, though removed, had been left but in

the charge of some militia. Head-quarters on the 5th were near the

village of Peretada de Gabern, and the 3rd division, which had been

placed under the orders of General Craufurd, with the addition of his

light brigade, was pushed by narrow paths across the mountain, and

reached a point within two leagues of the passage over the Tagus.

On the 6th it reached Roman Gourdo, which secured this important

position, and head-quarters moved on to Meza de Ibor, (the spot of

Cuesta's unsuccessful affair on the 17th of March), and the following

day to Deleytoza. It was now possible to halt with security; from the

pass at Almarez being secured; and in a large convent, about a mile

from the town, a hospital was formed, and it was found above 2,000

wounded had accompanied the army.

General A. Campbell had found his way in a huckster's tilted-cart, with

a bed made in it, across the most difficult passes in the mountain.

The roads during three days' march were scarcely capable of transport,

and the greatest difficulty was experienced in conveying the artillery,

while the troops were often halted to cover their retreat.

As we moved over the high ridges, we had a most extensive view across

the place we had traversed a fortnight before from Placentia, and saw

the glittering of the arms, and the rising dust of the French columns

moving on Oropesa.

Colonel Waters and Captain Mellish crossed the river, and reconnoitered

the last of these columns, and learned from the peasants, that it was

the third of the same size that had passed along that road within the

preceding few days; thus fully confirming the information of the three

corps having been directed on our rear.