Flank movement to the right—Method of feeding cattle in
Gascony—Catching a goose—Halt at St. Simon—Cross the Garonne
and advance on Toulouse—The French take up a position to the east
of that town—The Spaniards attack the heights of La Pugade—Their
terrible slaughter and precipitate retreat—The enemy advance
against the fourth and sixth divisions—The sixth division carry
the front of the enemy's position—Retreat of the French from
Toulouse towards Carcassonne.
In the middle of the night we were aroused and ordered to pack up
and accoutre, and make a flank march to the right, over execrable
roads, in order to support the second division, who were to cross the
river Garonne above Toulouse, at the village of Portet. The number of
pontoons, however, proving inadequate to cover the width of the river,
it was tried elsewhere—On the 31st of March the pontoons were laid
down within a short distance of Roques, General Hill crossed: but the
ground was found so swampy, that he was obliged to repass the river.
In this part of the country, wine abounded to such an extent, that
serious alarm was experienced for the morals and sobriety of the
troops. Almost every shed, and even the stables, were half filled with
wine casks, (owing to the long war, and to the want of exportation),
and, during the rainy weather, it was necessary to beg of the soldiers
to be moderate. Publicly they were not permitted to partake of the
wine; but how could they be effectually hindered from broaching casks
under which they slept, after being covered with the mud of the miry
roads, or soaked through and through from incessant rains? and such was
the abundance of the juice of the grape, that a peasant was glad to
sell a hogshead of the best wine for twenty _francs_, which was divided
among our several small messes.
The people of Gascony have a particular method of feeding their cattle:
the trap doors or sliding partitions communicate with the interior of
the kitchens, and when thrown aside, the oxen or cows thrust in their
heads, and are fed by the hand with the stalks of maize, or Indian corn.
One evening, while in the kitchen of a small house, round the cheerful
blaze of a crackling wood-fire, partaking of our dinner, and the
servant girls standing behind us feeding the cattle, we were suddenly
aroused by the cackling of the poultry in a large out-house—where the
soldiers were quartered; and, on ascending the ladder, we observed some
feathers scattered about the floor. The soldiers stood up and saluted,
as if no depredations had been committed. One soldier alone remained
sitting, and feigning to be in great pain from the effects of a sore
foot. The officer with me having shrewd suspicions of this individual,
said, "Get up,—surely you can stand upon one leg."—"Oh no!" answered
this piece of innocence, (possessing a muscular frame, and a face as
brown as a berry), "no indeed Sir, I cannot; for, besides the pain
in my foot, I am otherwise much indisposed." Finding however that we
were determined, he slowly and reluctantly arose from his crouching
posture, by which he had concealed a half-plucked goose. This was death
by martial law, and we put on a most ferocious aspect, and threatened
I know not what. However, as soon as the lecture was over, and we were
out of the soldier's sight, we could no longer refrain from giving way
to our hilarity, at the old marauder being so fully detected. Who could
kill an old soldier for plucking a goose? The bird being duly paid for,
the kind-hearted woman not only gave it back to the soldiers, but, we
understood, cooked it for their supper.
We now halted at St. Simon and pushed our advanced posts within two
miles of Toulouse, situated on the right bank of the Garonne; but the
enemy still held the Faubourg of St. Ciprien, facing us on the left of
the river.
One day we passed in a handsome chateau, with all the rooms on the
_parterre_; it was well furnished, and the doors and windows opened on
a spacious lawn, from which descended a flight of stone steps of about
thirty feet in breadth, to an extensive garden laid out _à l'Anglaise_,
in broad and serpentine walks, labyrinths, fish ponds, fruit trees,
exotics, rose trees and flower beds, which in the summer must
altogether have formed a lovely retreat. The inhabitants had fled from
the chateau, and all its windows, and doors, were flapping, and jarring
in the wind; the knapsacks were suspended in the gilded ornaments of
its mirrors, and the soldiers reposed on the silken covering of the
chairs and couches.
On the night of the 3rd of April, our division broke up from before
Toulouse, (the second division taking our station), crossed the
river Touch and marched northerly down the Garonne, as a corps of
communication between the right and left wings of the army—in
readiness to move to either flank.
On the morning of the 4th the left wing under Lord Beresford crossed
the Garonne, just above the town of Grenade, by a pontoon-bridge.
In the afternoon the rain came down in torrents, and the river was
so swollen and the current so strong, that the pontoon-bridge was
obliged to be taken up, and Lord Beresford was cut off with his corps
for four days on the right bank of the river, while the enemy had the
opportunity of attacking him, or debouching by the Faubourg de St.
Ciprien against him—of which they did not take advantage.
During these few days we obtained good shelter in the fine large
farm-houses with which the country abounded, every one of them having a
large round pigeon-house at the corner, (which was entered by a regular
door from the interior of the house); the swarms of pigeons were so
great, that they literally covered the whole face of the country. Here
we ate pigeon-pie, omelets, and eggs in profusion. "_Diable_," said the
French, "_comme les Anglais mangent des œufs!_"
On the 8th the bridge of boats being restored, we mounted our horses
to see a Spanish army cross; and a more bombastical display I never
beheld! The Spaniards crossed by companies: at the head of each
marched an officer with a drawn sword, (accompanied by a drummer),
and strutting in time to the tapping or roll of the drum; exclaiming,
while looking pompously over his shoulder, "_Vamos, guerréros!_" The
very bridge seemed to respond to such glorious appeals, for it rose and
fell with a gentle undulating motion, to the _rub dub, rub a dub_, of
Spain's martial drum.
As soon as these _Guerréros_ had formed column on the sod of
_Languedoc_, a heavy brigade of artillery passed the bridge, and one of
the cannon becoming stationary in the middle of it, one of the pontoons
nearly went under water; and, had not the drivers whipped and spurred
with all their might, in another instant, the boat would have been
swamped, and the gun would have dragged the horses and drivers into the
rapid and furious torrent.
The bridge was again taken up during the night, and, on the following
day, our division formed on a rising ground near Aussonne to be in
readiness to pass it; but, having waited nearly the whole day, the
Duke of Wellington quitted the spot extremely angry, leaving Sir Colin
Campbell to superintend the finishing of it.
At two o'clock on the morning of the 10th, our division crossed the
pontoon-bridge, and, bringing up our left shoulder near Fenoulhiet, six
miles from Toulouse the army marched in parallel columns on that place.
The country north of the town is flat, and on every side intersected
with rural cottages, enclosed by gardens, fruit trees, and small
plains, or fields of corn.
When within two miles of Toulouse, we could distinguish the black
columns of the enemy filing out of the town to the eastward, and
forming in order of battle on the _Terre de Cabade_, which was crowned
with redoubts, and constituted the _apex_ of their grand position
nearly three miles long, and extending in a southerly direction by
Calvinet, towards the road of Montauban. They also occupied with a
small body of troops and two pieces of light artillery, the detached
eminence of _la Borde de La Pugade_, for the purpose of watching the
movements on the left and centre of our army. This small hill was of
fallow ground, without hedges, trees, or entrenchments.
At the first view, the French army seemed to be formed from the right
bank of the Garonne, and resting their right flank on the detached
hill of _la Borde de la Pugade_, which, in reality, only formed a
dislocated elbow of their position. The ancient wall of the town was
lined by the enemy, being covered at a short distance by the royal
canal (which communicates with the Garonne), and runs in a half circle
round the north and west sides of Toulouse. Over it there were six
bridges, within five miles, occupied as _têtes-du-pont_; the three to
the southward being marked by the before-mentioned heights, which gave
the enemy an exceedingly strong position, and to embrace which it was
necessary to split our army into three distinct bodies, to be ready to
fight independently of each other—as follows:—
Lord Hill's corps was stationed on the left bank of the Garonne (to
coop up the enemy in the entrenched faubourg of St. Ciprien), but was
so completely cut off from the army destined to fight the battle,
owing to the river intervening, that the nearest communication with it
was, at least, sixteen miles by the pontoon bridge we had crossed in
the morning—although, as the bird flew, little more than two miles
from the right flank of the army, composed of four divisions, and a
corps of Spaniards which were destined to fight the battle. The right
wing consisted of the third and light divisions, the centre of the
Spaniards, and the left wing of the fourth and sixth divisions with the
great bulk of the cavalry, ready to shoot forward from the village of
Montblanc, to throw the enemy on two sides of a square.
At nine o'clock in the morning the forcing began on the Paris road near
a large building in front of the _tête-du-pont_, in the vicinity of
Graniague, by the third division with its right on the river Garonne.
The left brigade of the light division branched off to the right, to
make a sham attack opposite the _tête-de-pont_, near les Minimes, and
to keep up the link with the third division; while the first brigade
edged off to the left to support the Spaniards now moving forwards in
échelon on our left. While they were crossing a small rivulet, two of
the enemy's cannon fired on them from the detached eminence of _la
Borde de la Pugade_. As soon as the Spaniards had crossed the stream or
ditch, they rapidly advanced and drove the French from their advanced
post, behind which they formed in columns for the grand attack. At
this time a sprinkling musketry was kept up to our right by the third
division and our second brigade, while driving the enemy behind their
_têtes-du-pont_.
At eleven o'clock the Spaniards moved forward single-handed, to attack
the heights of la Pugade, under a heavy fire of musketry and grape
shot, which thinned their ranks and galled them sadly. The ground was
fallow, of a gentle ascent, without hedges or trees, so that every shot
told with a fatal precision. Notwithstanding this, they closed, and
kept onwards. The French position was a blaze of flashing cannon, and
sparkling musketry, and the iron balls were cutting through the fallow
ground, tearing up the earth and bounding wantonly through the country.
The fatal moment had arrived: the Spaniards could do no more: the
shouting of the French army was daggers to their hearts, and thunder to
their ears, and when within fifty yards of crowning all their hopes,
down went the head of their column, as if the earth had opened and
swallowed them up. A deep hollow road ran parallel with the enemy's
works, into which the affrighted column crowded. Terrible shelter!
for at this time the enemy sprang over their entrenchments, and stood
over their victims, pouring down the bullets on their devoted heads
with fatal precision, so that two thousand of them fell a prey to the
adversary, without destroying hardly any of their opponents; and, as if
in anticipation of such a result, the enemy had constructed a battery
of heavy calibre at the bridge of Montauban, which raked the road, and
ploughed up the heaps of the living and the dead—the former crawling
under the latter to screen themselves for a few short moments from the
merciless effects of the enemy's projectiles.
The rear of the Spaniards now closed up, and, stretching their necks
over the brink of the fatal gulf, they turned about and fled like
chaff before the wind, amid the volume and dense clouds of rolling
smoke majestically floating in the air, as if to veil from the enemy
the great extent of their triumph.
As soon as the fugitives could be scraped together in a lump, they
once again moved forward to make a second attack, led on by a group
of Spanish officers, on foot, and on horseback. The shot levelled
them to the earth, without any chance of success: the disorganized
column once more stood in a mass on the bank of the fatal hollow
road, by this means bringing all the enemy's fire to a focus; but
at the sight of the mangled bodies of their dying comrades, their
last sparks of courage forsook them, and they fled from the field,
heedless of the exhortations of many of their officers, who showed an
example worthy of their ancient renown. The French again bounded over
their entrenchments, and at full run came round the left flank of the
disconcerted Spaniards (at a point where the road was not so deep), and
plied them with more bullets, nor ceased to follow them, until they
were stopped by the fire of a brigade of guns, (supported by a regiment
of English heavy dragoons), and attacked on their left flank by the
rifle corps, supported by our brigade. This movement prevented them
from cutting asunder and separating the two wings of our army.
The enemy, finding that they had totally defeated the Spaniards,
immediately moved a body of troops to make head against the _fourth_
and _sixth divisions_, and cavalry, which were now moving along the
river Ers, parallel with the heights of Calvanet, before bringing up
their left shoulders to attack that position; but, owing to the marshy
state of the ground, the troops were much impeded on their march.
After the repulse of the Spaniards, the battle almost ceased, with the
exception of an irregular musketry-fire amongst the detached houses
bordering the canal. During this pause in the grand event, several of
us fell asleep (under the gentle rays of an April sun), from want of
rest, having been under arms all the previous day, and marching nearly
the whole of the night.
How long I enjoyed this slumber I cannot say, for a round shot
whizzing, close over my head, caused me hastily to start on my feet.
For a few seconds, I almost fancied I was at a review, or dreaming of
it, for the right wing of the British army were within less than cannon
range opposite the left wing of the enemy, whose bright arms and brazen
eagles glistened on the venerable towers of Toulouse.
Soon after this, we descried an officer of our regiment, (who was an
extra aide-de-camp to Gen. Baron Alten) riding at the base of the
enemy's position, and turning and twisting his horse at full speed,
which induced us to imagine that he was wounded, and no longer able to
manage the animal, which appeared to be running away with him. Suddenly
he fell from his saddle to the ground, and the horse made a dead stop.
Of course we thought he was killed, when, to our great surprise, he
remounted, and came towards us at a canter with a hare in his arms,
that he had ridden down.
In the middle of the day, the sixth division crossed the valley
opposite the heights of Calvanet; and the interchanged cannon shots,
and the forked musketry, rattled without intermission. At length, amid
charges of cavalry and sanguinary fighting (for the enemy marched down
the hill to meet them,) this division gained the French position, and
took a redoubt, which, however, they could hardly maintain, owing to
the great loss they had sustained in moving up the hill; for, while
struggling with the enemy's infantry in front, their second line had
been charged by the French horse[24].
During this part of the combat the fourth division was edging off by
an oblique march to its left, to turn the enemy's right flank near the
road of Montauban, which manœuvre greatly enhanced the victory on this
hard-fought day.
The French several times returned to the charge on the _plateau_, and
made a most desperate attempt at four o'clock in the afternoon to
retake the great redoubt in the centre, but without effect.
Owing to this failure the French quietly evacuated the redoubts on the
left of their position on the canal, on the heights of _Terre Cabade_,
and their whole army retired behind the _têtes-du-pont_, and the
faubourg of St. Etienne.
On the following day the Duke of Dalmatia held the town hemmed in
almost on every side; but, as there was not any firing, an officer and
myself rode towards the road where the Spaniards had been repulsed.
Its steep banks were at least twenty-five feet in depth, with two or
three narrow pathways by which the Spaniards had descended in hopes of
obtaining a little shelter. This spot was strewed with heaps of the
slain, piled on the top of each other in strange confusion, many having
tumbled over the precipitous banks, and remaining stuck on the twisted
bayonets on whose points they had fallen. Death here appeared in every
possible shape; some were jammed in the crowd, and propped up in an
erect posture against the bank; others were standing on their heads,
or sprawling with legs and arms spread out to their fullest extent.
Almost the whole of the cadaverous dead were without caps, which in
the _mêlée_ had been knocked off, and were intermixed with knapsacks,
breast-plates, broken arms, bayonets, and swords. A mournful silence
reigned around. No voice broke on the stillness that reigned over the
lacerated remains of the swarthy Spaniards!
While looking down on these inanimate objects swept off by the scythe
of war, I noticed a naked man lying on his back at my feet: as there
was no appearance of any wound about his person, we were lost in
conjectures as to the probable cause of his death. A Spaniard who
stood by was so overcome with curiosity, that he laid hold of the dead
man's hair; but, to his inexpressible wonder the head was as light
as a feather, for it now appeared, that a cannon ball had struck him
sideways, leaving nothing of the head remaining but the scalp and face.
The sight was too horrible to look upon, and we hastily remounted our
horses, and returned from this melancholy spectacle. While riding
over the field of battle, the motion of a horse is the most gentle and
easy to be fancied: the animals cock their ears, snort, look down, and
plant their feet with a light and springing motion, as if fearful of
trampling on the dead soldiers.
The heights of the Terre Cabade and Calvanet are free from trees or
hedges, and have two hollow roads cutting through the middle of them,
which protected the French from our cavalry. The banks of these roads
are so steep, and at the same time so imperceptible, that a whole
brigade of dragoons at a canter might be swallowed up without any
previous warning. Many dead horses lay in this hollow way, with their
lifeless riders thrown to a distance, maimed, bruised, or with broken
limbs.
The ascent in front of this position is very steep, but southerly;
where the fourth division attacked, it is of a gentle acclivity.
The bodies of the soldiers of the sixth division lay very thick,
in front of the heights of Calvanet, and also round a fort of the
_maison des Augustins_. Here the Highlanders and English soldiers
were intermixed with the French. The town of Toulouse lay nearly
within point blank range on the west of these heights, from whence we
could see the enemy's columns under arms at the _têtes-du-pont_ which
protected the various bridges across the canal. They were in a manner
besieged in the town, as the only road left open to them was by a
narrow strip of land south of Toulouse, between the canal and the river
Garonne.
On the night of the 11th the enemy retreated towards Carcassone, taking
the road by St. Aigne, Montgiscard, Baziege, and Ville-franche, to
Castelnaudary.
[Footnote 24: It will always be a matter of surprise to me, how the
sixth division managed to carry the front of so formidable a position
almost single-handed. The following day, while passing over the range
of heights, the firelocks of one of its brigades were piled, and I
counted only five hundred, out of eighteen hundred stand effective on
the morning of the battle. Both brigades suffered enormously in killed
and wounded.]
END OF THE
MEMOIRS OF CAPTAIN COOKE.
AN ACCOUNT
OF THE
BRITISH CAMPAIGN OF 1809,
UNDER SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN:
BY
THE EARL OF MUNSTER.
NOTICE TO THE READER.
The following Narrative of one of the most brilliant and important
Campaigns of the British Army on the Peninsula, was originally
published, in parts, (commencing in May 1829) in the United Service
Journal, under the head of "A revised Journal of an Officer on the
Staff of the Army." Though anonymous, it was soon discovered by
internal evidence to be the production of Colonel Fitzclarence—now
Earl of Munster,—who served throughout the whole of the Peninsular
Campaigns, with the exception of that of 1812, when he returned to
England on promotion.
Yielding, in point of fidelity and spirit, to no existing Record of the
Events of which it treats, this soldier-like Sketch is reprinted in a
complete form, as a valuable addition to the Military Memoirs of The
British Army.—EDITOR.
AN ACCOUNT
OF THE
BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN 1809,
UNDER
SIR A. WELLESLEY,
IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.
On the 18th of January, 1809, when the last transport, containing the
rear guard of Sir. J. Moore's army, sailed from the harbour of Corunna,
the British little foresaw that the Peninsula was still to be the arena
for their conquests and renown. None were so sanguine as to hope that
their splendid successes and example should yet cause Europe to regain
the moral feelings she had lost under the long victorious career of
France, or that the latter country was finally to sink under their
exertions.
Neither did Buonaparte suspect, when halting on the confines of the
Galician mountains, and leaving to Soult the easy task of "driving the
leopard into the sea," that his legions were soon to be checked and
defeated; or that his vaunted representation of the broken-hearted
and dismayed state of the British army, should, by the repulse of
his troops within a few days after in a set battle, become a severe
reflection on the conduct of his own soldiery. Neither Soult nor the
Frenchmen under his command could have supposed, at the same period,
how early the fate of war would create a total reverse in their
hitherto prosperous campaigns; or that their corps, which had led the
advance to Corunna, should soon become the _pursued_, and in a retreat
not less disastrous than that they had just witnessed. But Buonaparte
ever miscalculated, and at this time was wholly unacquainted with, the
perseverance of our national character, or the power of England; and
when he compared her apparent means with those of France, by showing
she had not a million of infantry or one hundred thousand cavalry to
oppose her rival, he had to learn the extent of her vast and boundless
resources, and the determined character of her people.[25]
When this boastful and triumphant comparison was made, the ruler of
France little feared that the refutation of England's inadequacy
to cope with his power would be proved within seven years, by her
hurling him from the throne, and leading him a captive at her chariot
wheels, or that he should end his days in one of her distant colonies,
in confinement and obscurity! Buonaparte thus considering the army
expelled from Spain as the utmost extent of the means and exertion of
the English as a military people, hastily concluded that they could not
again appear on the continent. He naturally deduced from this, that the
subjection of both Spain and Portugal was the inevitable consequence of
his success in Galicia, and that it only required the time necessary
for their occupation to secure them under Gallic sway.[26]
But how uncertain are the results of human calculation! At the moment
when Buonaparte thought the Peninsula at his feet, the seeds of
discontent sown by that restless ambition, which was urging him on
to his ruin, began to develope themselves in a distant nation. Their
growth to maturity was as rapid as opportune, and created a powerful
diversion in favour of those countries to the southward suffering under
his yoke.
The perhaps necessary employment of the French nation, and of the
military feeling and spirit grown up since the revolution, which
Napoleon fostered, had twice, previously to his invasion of Spain,
caused him to direct his conquests against his most powerful military
neighbour,—Austria.
The last campaign of 1806 left the family of Hapsburg indignant at
their reverses, and on their vanquisher becoming entangled by his
unjust aggression of Spain, they hoped a fit opportunity was offered
for redeeming their character and importance in Europe. If the bold
advance of Sir J. Moore into the heart of Spain, and his demonstration
on Carrion, had made Buonaparte direct the most considerable portion
of his armies on the front or flanks of the English, thus interrupting
for a time, in other quarters, the rapidity of conquest, not less did
the Austrian declaration of war, drawing off a portion of the resources
of France, tend materially to the ultimate advantage of the rightful
cause. Buonaparte was not only personally arrested from overrunning
Spain by his return to France, but from directing a just combination
among his dispersed marshals, which circumstance fortunately allowed
England to regain a firm footing in the Peninsula, and, by the events
of the succeeding campaign, an opportunity of renewing a good feeling
and confidence in the people. Considering the reorganized Austrian as
a more dangerous enemy than the broken Spaniards or expelled English,
Buonaparte, on withdrawing from Astorga, only passed through Madrid,
and returned to Paris. He, however, left (with the exception of the
Imperial Guard, about 15,000 of whom had accompanied him across
the Pyrenees,) his armies entire, under the command of his various
marshals, to complete the subjugation of Spain.
Of these eight _corps d'armée_, (each equal to the whole British army
in Spain in 1809,) which had crossed the frontier, five had co-operated
directly or otherwise against Sir J. Moore. The sixth, commanded
by the gallant Ney, was ordered to remain in and reduce to control
Galicia and the Asturias. The fourth, under Mortier, with a vast body
of cavalry commanded by Kellerman, was to overawe Leon and Castille;
while Victor, with the first corps, was at once to complete the ruin
of the beaten Spanish armies, and to threaten the line of the Tagus,
the south of Portugal, and eventually its capital. The eighth corps,
which had, under Junot, served in 1807-8 in Portugal, and according to
the convention of Cintra been carried to Rochelle, and subsequently
recrossed Spain, and met their old antagonists before Corunna, was
broken up, and its _débris_ added to the second corps under Soult.[27]
This force was intended to take the active part of the campaign against
Portugal, which country was to be immediately attacked, the orders to
that effect being received within ten days after the embarkation of the
British. So certain was Buonaparte of Soult's conquest, that he fixed
the 5th of February for the arrival of his troops at Oporto—and the
16th of the same month for his triumphant entrance into Lisbon!
The army under Soult consisted of 23,500 men, of which 4,000 were
cavalry, divided into ten regiments. It was accompanied by fifty-six
pieces of cannon. Besides these troops, a division under Gen. Lapisse
was to be pushed south from Salamanca to invade Portugal, by the way of
Almeida, at the same time becoming a point of communication between the
corps of Victor and Soult.
The army of the latter General advanced to the southward, through
Galicia, by several routes, but the principal part, with the artillery,
marched through St. Jago. His directions were to invade Portugal along
the sea-coast, and, with that view, he attempted to cross the Minho at
Tuy, but failing, was forced to proceed up the right bank of the river
as far as Orense, where he crossed that barrier. Besides the great loss
of time from this disappointment and change of route, the army was much
detained by the opposition of the peasantry and the remains of Romana's
dispersed army, and it was only on the 10th of March it was able to
enter Portugal, by the valley of the Tamega.
Though Soult met considerable opposition from Gen. Silveira,[28] the
French army reached and captured Chaves on the 12th, and Braga on
the 20th, after defeating a corps of Portuguese troops under Baron
Eben; and nine days subsequently, forced the entrenched lines covering
Oporto, having been more than seven times longer on their march than
had been calculated by Buonaparte. The next day Gen. Franceschi, with
several regiments of cavalry, was pushed on to the banks of the Vouga,
where he established his posts opposite those of Col. Trant, who had
collected a few troops and ordenança, and a corps of volunteers,
formed of the students of the University of Coimbra, who gave up their
literary pursuits for the defence of their country. The division of
Gen. Mermet was cantoned in Villa Nova, with the 31st regiment in its
front in support of the cavalry. Soult's corps had been diminished
upwards of 3,000 men within the two months occupied in its march,
having left great numbers of sick at Chaves and Braga. Although it
had overcome all opposition, its chief found himself in an isolated
position, shut out from all intercourse with the other French corps,
and his difficulties increasing every day, as he was obliged to
separate and detach a considerable portion of his force to subdue the
country, and attempt to open his communication with Lapisse.
But, however insecure and critical his post, it was likely to become
more immediately endangered by the activity of the British, whose
Government, far from being discouraged at the result of the preceding
year, was employed in preparation for a hearty prosecution of the
contest. At the moment the British army withdrew from Corunna, the
troops left in the Peninsula, including a brigade under Brigadier-Gen.
Cameron, (which had advanced to the north-east frontier of Portugal,)
the 14th Light Dragoons, and the sick, convalescents, and stragglers
of Sir J. Moore's army, did not consist of above 7,000 men, under the
command of Sir J. Craddock, at Lisbon. The want of information was
great, and the state of alarm so exaggerated, that the advance of the
French on that capital was daily expected. The artillery and cavalry
were embarked, and the forts of St. Julien and Bugio dismantled, to
prevent their guns being turned upon the ships while withdrawing from
the Tagus.
The Portuguese felt the danger in which their country was placed,
and the Regency called upon the people to rise _en masse_. They had
little else than the populace to oppose the invader, as the same
principle which had instigated the march of the Spanish corps under
Romana to Denmark, had been acted upon with the only respectable part
of the Portuguese army. These had been sent into France under the
Marquis de Lorna, and suffered a harder fate than the Spanish troops,
the greater part of whom, by aid of the English fleet, returned to
fight their country's battles, while the miserable remnant of the
Portuguese perished at Moscow, under the appellation of the "_Légion
Portugaise_." The remaining regular troops were scarcely to be
considered as organized, and those under Silveira, though actuated by
the best spirit, were little better than the rest. One regiment of two
battalions, called the Lusitanian legion, raised by Sir R. Wilson at
Oporto, was an exception to the general inefficiency, it having made
considerable progress in discipline and order. Sir Robert had proceeded
with the first battalion to the frontier opposite Ciudad Rodrigo, while
the other, under Baron Eben, had been engaged in the defence of the
Tras os Montes, and in the entrenchments around Oporto.
But this inefficient army had a probability of being regenerated.
Scarce had the fleet returned from Corunna, when the British Government
evinced its conviction that the Spanish and Portuguese cause was not
hopeless, and, with a view to make the latter aid in their own defence,
sent General Beresford with twelve or fourteen officers from England to
re-organize and form their army. This determination being made so soon
afterwards, and before the despondency of the failure at Corunna had
worn off, was much ridiculed at the time as being too late, and doubts
were expressed if Lisbon would not be in the possession of the enemy
before they could reach the Tagus. This anticipation was not confirmed
by events, and, with the rank of a Portuguese Marshal, General
Beresford, on the 13th of March, issued a spirited address to that
nation, in which he assured them, that they only required organization
and discipline to make them equal to face the invader. How just were
the Marshal's ideas of their latent martial character, is to be learned
from their brilliant conduct in the ensuing war. Much, however, was to
be done to raise from degradation the military profession in Portugal.
Perhaps in no age or country had it fallen so low. Even among the
Chinese, where civil and literary celebrity is ever sought before that
of arms, it was never so despised, as it had been among our faithful
allies since the war of succession.
In 1762-3, La Lippe had been called in by the Marquis de Pombal, who
formed the army into twenty-four regiments of infantry, twelve of
cavalry, and four of artillery, and which had continued, at least
nominally, till the arrival of Junot. Few of his regulations were
permanent or long respected. During the whole of the latter half of
the eighteenth century, in all the short successive wars, though
occasionally invigorated by fresh disciplinarians from foreign
countries, the Portuguese army never rose above mediocrity. It is
true, but few opportunities were offered of trial, but in 1801, at
Arronches, the scandalous panic that seized the corps commanded by the
Duke d'Alafoes, made them to be considered worse than contemptible. Not
that the people required either physical or moral qualities, as might
be easily proved from their conflicts with the Spaniards: having ever
placed themselves at least upon an equality, in courage and conduct,
with their neighbours. The French, in their progress through the Tras
os Montes, drew a favourable comparison of their bravery with that of
the Spaniards, while it was impossible to see the peasantry and not be
convinced of their bodily strength and capability of bearing fatigue.
The difficulty of creating a Portuguese army lay not with the men
but with the officers, who had sunk so low in the estimation of the
country, of themselves, and of their men, as to be little superior to
the degrading and menial offices, (as when La Lippe arrived in 1792,)
they once filled, of servants in the houses of the nobility. No cause
of improvement had offered itself since those disgraceful times, which
had naturally placed them on terms of the greatest familiarity and
equality with their men. It was no uncommon spectacle to find them in
a common _cabaret_ gambling, if not cheating the soldiers out of the
pay they had just made over to them. It was not less to counteract
this deteriorating cause, than to organize the soldiers, that Gen.
Beresford had taken officers with him from England, whose numbers were
subsequently greatly increased. Those who accompanied him in the first
instance, and some who afterwards joined him, were, with the view to
place British Captains in command of battalions, first raised a step
of rank in their own service, and received another in that of the
Portuguese, when appointed to regiments.
The Marshal established his head-quarters at Thomar, and fairly
grappled with all the prominent difficulties, and, aided by the
example and conduct of the officers placed under his orders, at once
did away the causes of the want of respect and confidence of the men.
The interior economy was strictly investigated, and the regiments
made efficient, not only by British arms and equipments, but by being
subsidized to fight their own battles by the money of England.
Without going farther into detail, it will be sufficient to remark,
that the arrangement and system of the Marshal were so good, and
improvement so rapid in the Portuguese army, that within two months
from the date of his first order, a battalion of the 16th regiment was
brought into collision with the enemy; and if it did not distinguish
itself as much as it did on so many subsequent occasions, it evinced
neither confusion nor dismay. Eighteen months after, the general
conduct of the whole Portuguese army was marked by traits of discipline
and bravery, and even of individual gallantry, which continued on the
increase to the end of the war, and which were most unquestionably
shown on many subsequent occasions, by overthrowing the veterans of
France with the bayonet.
The twenty-four regiments of the line formed by La Lippe had been
broken into two battalions each in 1797, and were continued at that
establishment; as were the twelve regiments of cavalry, of which
not above one-third had been ever mounted. The artillery was placed
under British officers, as well as the other arms. To this the whole
population was to be added, though as irregulars or _ordenanza_, rather
than militia. This force was increased in the course of the next
year, by six regiments of Caçadores, which were, at a later period
during the war, doubled, on their value being duly appreciated. But
England was not less active in sending reinforcements of her own troops
to the Peninsula. Doubts had been once entertained, whether future
operations should be carried on from the south of Spain, rather than
from Portugal; and the first convoy of troops was directed to Cadiz.
On its reaching that port, the besotted Spaniards hesitated, as they
had the year before when Sir D. Baird arrived at Corunna, respecting
the disembarkation of the troops. After some futile negotiations, and
(in consequence of the slow advance of the French,) in the revived hope
of saving Lisbon, the British troops fortunately passed to the latter
place, as the frontier statistics of Portugal are better calculated for
military operations than those of Andalusia.
The first reinforcement that reached the Tagus early in March was
commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Sherbrooke, which was followed in the
beginning of April by another, under Major-Gen. Hill, together
increasing the army to 13,000 men. The arrival allayed much the fears,
and not only allowed Sir J. Craddock to take up a position out of
Lisbon, and cover the great roads that led upon it, with the right on
Santarem, and the left on the Sea, but even to contemplate offensive
operations, and in the middle of April to push the army in advance
towards the North.
In the mean time, the administration at home had determined to give the
command of the army for the defence of Portugal to the same general
officer who had so successfully attacked it the year before, and,
in order to make room for him, Sir J. Craddock was appointed to be
Governor of Gibraltar.
Sir A. Wellesley sailed on the 16th of April on board the Surveillant,
Sir George Collier, from Portsmouth, to which place or to England he
did not again return, until 1814, as Duke of Wellington, when, on his
first arrival from the south of France, his Grace proceeded direct to
the same town—where the Prince Regent was showing to the Emperor of
Russia and the King of Prussia the arsenal and fleet.
The same night the frigate was nearly lost off St. Catherine's Head in
the Isle of Wight: so imminent was the danger, and so close the ship
to the breakers, that Sir G. Collier desired Sir Arthur to dress, and,
thinking the loss of the vessel certain, advised him to stay by the
wreck as long as possible, this being considered a more probable means
of escape than a premature attempt to reach the shore. The frigate
missed stays more than once: but a fortunate start of wind off the
land prevented her wreck.[29] Even had all escaped with life, but for
this shift of wind, (or rather the never failing happy destiny of Sir
Arthur, who might have desired Sir G. Collier not to despair, while he
had not Cæsar, but Wellesley and his fortunes on board) much valuable
time would have been lost, not only as to striking the blow at Soult,
but by allowing fresh combinations between the distant French Marshals,
and perhaps not giving the opportunity of opposing them in detail.
The entrance of the Surveillant into the Tagus was an interesting
event, when, at a distance of twenty years, it was considered, that
she bore in her bosom the regeneration of England's military fame,
and that Europe was to date from it the positive commencement of that
formidable and permanent position taken up by our armies, which allowed
its nations to breathe, and subsequently, by our victories over the
common enemy, to break the spell of gloomy conviction, becoming daily
universal, that the French armies were invincible.
Sir Arthur's landing at Lisbon on the 22nd of April was strongly marked
by the gratifying expression of the people's feeling; they hailed him
as their former deliverer, and evinced their gratitude by illuminating
the city during his stay. On the 25th Sir J. Craddock, in a farewell
address, bade adieu to the army, and two days subsequently Sir Arthur
took the command, and in his first order changed its staff, placing
Brig.-Gen. Stewart at the head of the Adj.-General's, and Col. Murray,
3d Guards, at that of the Quarter-master General's department. The
same day his Excellency went in procession with the royal carriages,
escorted by a squadron of the 16th dragoons, to be introduced to
the Regency, at the palace of the Inquisition in the Roçio, on his
receiving from them the rank of Marshal General.
The state of affairs in the Peninsula at this time was neither
satisfactory nor encouraging. Although Buonaparte had withdrawn from
Spain, his legions, which had passed through Madrid, and witnessed
the replacing Joseph on the throne, had subsequently overthrown all
the Spanish armies. The advanced guard of the Duke del Infantado's
army under Vanegas had been beaten at Ucles in January, and the army
of Cartojal had met a defeat at Ciudad Real. Cuesta, with the main
Spanish army, after retiring across the Tagus, and taking position at
Almaraz, had allowed his flank to be turned by the bridge of Arzobispo,
and was forced, in consequence, to retreat across the Guadiana, when,
at Medellin on its banks, he was on the 28th of March completely
routed, through the bad conduct of his cavalry. His infantry, who
from their behaviour on this occasion deserved a better fate, were
so completely,—not at the mercy, for none was shown, but—in the
power of the enemy's cavalry, that their horsemen were worn out with
slaughtering their easily routed victims; and it was reported, many
wore their arms for several days in slings, from having had such
opportunity of using their sabres. The remnant of the Spanish army
took refuge in the Sierra Morena, where attempts were made to recruit
the infantry—the dastardly cavalry, not less disgraced in the action
by their conduct, than after by the General's notice of it, scarcely
requiring a man. While so little aid was to be expected for the
British from these broken armies, Victor was left with 22,000 men,
in a position threatening the weakest part of Portugal, and, by the
existence of the bridge of Alcantara, both banks of the Tagus.
But in the mean time, Soult's position at Oporto had become more
critical every day. Vigo had surrendered to the Spaniards, aided by
some English ships, while Silveira had retaken Chaves, with 1,300
sick, and had continued his advance by Amarante to Penafiel. Lapisse
had advanced as far as Ciudad Rodrigo, but, on finding himself opposed
by Sir R. Wilson and the Spanish troops, he made no attempt to
communicate with or join Soult, and, after a little skirmishing, passed
on to join Victor on the Tagus. Soult's communications were thus wholly
destroyed, and his force had been much dispersed in trying to make them
good; not less than between six and 7000 men having been sent into the
valley of the Tamega and other points. But, although Marshal Soult had
not above half the number of men collected at Oporto that Victor's army
consisted of, still the British army was not strong enough to oppose
both at once. It became necessary, therefore, to act with vigour on one
point, and the former army being the weakest, and in the Portuguese
territory, while its retreat was endangered, drew the more immediate
attention of the British General. Lest Victor should be enabled to
advance to the south of the Tagus, Sir Arthur lost no time at Lisbon,
and, after a stay of but six days, set out on the 23d for the army,
part of which had arrived at Coimbra. All the towns were illuminated
on the road, and on his Excellency's arrival at Coimbra on the 2d, in
addition to other demonstrations of joy, the ladies from the balconies
covered him with roses and sugar-plums!
The army was brigaded anew on the 4th of May.
_Cavalry._
MAJOR-GEN. COTTON.
14th Light Dragoons.
20th — —
16th — —
3rd — — King's G. L^n.
_Infantry._
BRIG.-GEN. H. CAMPBELL.
2 Battalions of Guards.
1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
_First Brigade._
MAJOR-GEN. HILL.
3rd or Buffs
66th Regiment.
48th —
1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
_Third Brigade._
MAJOR-GEN. TILSON.
5 Comp. 5 Batt. 60 Regt.
88th Regiment.
1 Batt. Port^{se}. Grenadiers.
87th Regiment.
_Fifth Brigade._
BRIG.-GEN. A. CAMPBELL.
7th Fusileers.
1 Batt. 10th Port^{se}. Regt.
53rd Regiment.
1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
_Seventh Brigade._
BRIG.-GEN. CAMERON.
9th Regiment
2nd Batt. 10th Port^{se}. Regt.
83rd Regiment
1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
_Sixth Brigade._
BRIG-GEN. STEWART.
1st Batt. Detachments.
1st Batt. 16th Port^{se}. Regt.
29th Regiment.
_Fourth Brigade._
BRIG.-GEN. SONTAG.
2nd Batt. Detachments.
1st. Batt. 16th Port^{se}. Regt.
79th Regiment.
1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
_Second Brigade._
MAJOR-GEN. M'KENZIE.
27th Regiment
45th —
31st —
_King's German Legion._
MAJOR-GEN. MURRAY.
1 Brigade (2 Regiments)
BRIG.-GEN. LANGWORTH.
2 Brigade (2 Regiments)
BRIG.-GEN. DRIBOURG.
It was subsequently divided into wings under Lieut.-Gens. Sherbrooke
and Paget, and the cavalry placed under Lieut.-Gen. Payne. The same
reasons that pressed the departure of the Commander of the Forces from
Lisbon, accelerated the preparations of the campaign, and advance upon
Oporto. A few days' delay were, however, necessary to complete the
arrangements, according to the following plan of operations. While
Sir A. advanced with the main force of the army on the enemy's front,
a corps that quitted Coimbra on the 5th, was intended to move on
the enemy's left flank and rear. This was to be under the orders of
Marshal Beresford, and consisted of Maj.-Gen. Tilson's brigade, and
some cavalry. It was ordered to direct its march on Viseu, and across
the Douro, to co-operate with Silveira. This officer was unfortunately
driven from Amarante on the 2d of May, the enemy thus opening to
themselves a practicable route for carriage to the eastern frontier.
Lisbon was to be covered during these northern operations by a corps of
observation, under Maj.-Gen. M'Kenzie, to watch Victor. It was posted
at Santarem, consisting of the General's own brigade, a brigade of
British heavy cavalry, and 7,000 Portuguese. In his front at Alcantara,
was Col. Mayne, with a battallion of the Lusitanian legion.
On the 6th, opportunity was taken of inspecting that portion of the
army around Coimbra, on some sands two miles from the town. The British
troops appeared in excellent order, and the Portuguese regiments,
though not so soldier-like as their allies, looked better than was
expected, as it was the fashion of the day to hold them in utter
contempt. Their dark olive complexions, and blue single-breasted coats,
gave them a _sombre_ appearance when in contrast with our countrymen,
and it could not be denied that the comparison was to the advantage
of the latter. It was a fine sight, although of the 21,000 British in
Portugal, only 17,000 were present, on account of the two detachment
corps.[30]
On the 7th, part of these troops advanced in two columns on the main
roads towards Oporto, by Adiha on the Vouga, and by the bay of Aveiro
to Ovar. On the 9th, the remainder of the army and head quarters
quitted Coimbra in the same direction. The advance of the French under
Gen. Franceschi had remained on the Vouga, and arrangements were
made for surprising it on the 10th.[31] If the success of this _coup
d'essai_ was to be taken as a sample of our future proceedings, it
would have been unfortunate, as, between the neighing of the horses of
the Portuguese cavalry, and the stupidity of the guides, the enemy were
prepared, and the whole was a complete failure. But for the withdrawing
of the French, and the capture of two four-pounders, we had little to
boast in the scrambling skirmish it produced. We advanced to the spot
where they had been encamped, which was as much chosen for beauty of
situation as strength. We had here the first instance of the trouble
the French took in embellishing their camps; in the centre of the front
they were erecting a pretty wooden obelisk.
On the following day the army advanced on the great northern road, and,
about twelve o'clock, a squadron of the enemy was seen on the skirts
of a wood, in front of a little village. On some three-pounders and
our cavalry advancing against them, they fell back, but showed some
infantry, and our light troops were directed to attack them. This
produced some skirmishing as we continued to advance. The country
was much inclosed; the enemy clung longer to their ground than was
expected, as we only supposed it an affair of posts; but a column of
infantry on a height over the village of Grijon soon convinced us that
it was at least a strong advanced guard. The road here crossed a ridge
of hills, at right angles, covered with olives and fir woods, which
offered a strong position. The ground was not ill chosen, though the
left was without any _appui_. Brigadier Gen. Stewart's brigade formed
in line to the support of the 16th Portuguese regiment, acting as
skirmishers on the left of the road, while the German light infantry
were engaged on the right. The four battalions of the German legion
brought their left shoulders up, and marched diagonally across to turn
the left, the enemy's weak point. The skirmishing was very sharp in the
woods, and the 29th regiment was forced to support the Portuguese, who
were once obliged to fall back. At this moment they pushed a column
of infantry down the road through the village of Grijon, which being
reported to Sir Arthur, he replied in the most quiet manner, "If they
come any farther, order the battalion of detachments to charge them
with the bayonet."
The officers of the staff, many of them at that time young soldiers,
could not help evincing strong feeling on hearing the simple and
distinct manner in which this order was given; but before some months
had passed over their heads, they had opportunities of not only
hearing, but seeing them carried into execution. On this occasion the
alternative mentioned by Sir Arthur did not occur, as, on their flank
being turned, and finding our whole force on their front, about two
o'clock they retired from their position. Our guns were brought up to
bear upon them in their retreat, Brig.-Gen. Stewart put himself at
the head of two squadrons, and trotted after the enemy, who withdrew
their troops with astonishing rapidity. The country was much inclosed
and intersected, and, on nearing the enemy's rear guard, the cavalry
entered a deep ravine, closely wooded. The French lined the sides
with their light infantry, who opened a close and sharp fire, which,
for a moment, created some confusion, and checked the advance; but on
coming in sight of five companies, drawn up in line in a wider space,
by the exertion and example of the General, the latter led them to the
charge, broke through the enemy, and made above one hundred prisoners.
This rapid movement threw the 31st French regiment off the road of
retreat, and they fell back on Ovar, where finding Maj.-Gen. Hill,
they withdrew, after some skirmishing, to Oporto, during the night.
Thus ended the operations of this day, which were beautiful in their
prosecution and satisfactory in the result.
The enemy's corps (besides the cavalry engaged the day before on the
Vouga,) consisted of 4 or 5,000 infantry of the division of Mermet,
which had been pushed on to this ground from Villa Nova on the 8th, on
Soult's hearing of our probable advance. It was the 47^e _de ligne_
that was charged on the retreat, and however valiantly they may have
acted, they cannot be praised for prudence or judgment in forming a
line to receive cavalry.[32] Instead of this, had they vaulted over the
enclosures, or scrambled up the banks, they might have killed every man
of the cavalry without endangering a soldier. One of the privates was
very loud in his attempts to draw notice, and by his vociferation, that
he was the son of a marquis, proved the aristocratic feeling not quite
deadened by the revolution, though the conscription had reached and
levelled all ranks of society. Our loss was under one hundred men: one
officer of the 16th Dragoons received no less than three balls, though
happily none proved mortal.
Our first progress to the front, on the morning of the 12th, showed us
the horrors produced by a war of invasion. Beyond Grijon nine bodies
of unfortunate Portuguese peasants were seen hanging on trees by the
side of the road, blackened in the sun. The common people, naturally
considering the enemy as _hors de la loi_, sought every means, open or
otherwise, for their destruction. This brought on them that retaliation
produced by the military ideas of a regular army, who conceived they
had only a right to be opposed by _soldiers_, and not by the unclothed
and unorganized population. These they considered as insurgents and
brigands, and shot and hung, with as little compassion as we should a
burglar. The exasperation of the French was not wholly uncalled-for,
as the atrocities committed on the stragglers and sick were horrible,
amounting often, besides shocking lingering deaths, to frightful
mutilations.
A hair-dresser who escaped from Oporto in the night, had brought in,
soon after daybreak, the intelligence that the enemy had destroyed
the bridge of boats over the Douro at one o'clock; and the still more
disagreeable information, that all the boats were secured on the other
side the Douro. On the fugitive barber being taken to Sir Arthur by
Colonel Waters of the Adjutant General's Department, that officer was
instructed to proceed immediately to the banks of the river, and
directed to procure boats, _coute qui coute_.
As we advanced on the high road to Oporto, this report of the
destruction of the bridge was confirmed, and doubts came fast and
thick upon us, respecting the passage of the Douro in the face of an
enemy. On our arrival at Villa Nova, we found General Hill's brigade
arrived from Ovar, and with the troops of the centre column choking the
streets; through these Sir Arthur threaded his way, and took post on
the right of the town in the garden of the convent of Sierra. From this
elevated spot the whole city was visible, like a panorama, and nothing
that passed within it could be hidden from the view of the British
general. The French guards and sentries were seen in the various parts
of the town, but no bustle was evinced, or even apparent curiosity. No
groups were noticed looking at us, which was afterwards accounted for,
by learning that the French were ordered to remain in their quarters
ready to turn out, and the Portuguese not allowed to appear beyond the
walls of their houses. There were a few sentries in the quays, but none
without the limits or above the town. A line of baggage discovered
retiring beyond the town across the distant hills, was the sole
indication of our threatening neighbourhood.
The passage of a river in the front of an enemy is allowed to be the
most difficult of military operations; and when it became obvious, from
the collection of boats on the other bank, that precautions had been
taken to secure them from us, the barrier appeared insurmountable.
General Murray had been directed to march in the morning to try and
cross the river, about five miles up at Aventas, but having only four
battalions and two squadrons, unless we could aid his successful
passage, he would lie open to defeat; and in consequence our anxiety
was very great to establish ourselves on the opposite bank. In the
meanwhile Colonel Waters (who has since become so distinguished for
his intelligence and activity) had passed up the left bank of the
river, searching for means to cross it, and about two miles above the
city, found a small boat lying in the mud. The peasantry demurred at
going over to the other side to procure some larger boats seen on
the opposite bank; but the Colonel, (from speaking Portuguese like a
native,) learned that the Prior of Amarante was not distant from the
spot, and hoped by his influence to attain his object. This patriotic
priest, on learning the desire of the British, joined with Colonel
Waters in inducing the peasants, after some persuasion, to accompany
the Colonel across, who brought back four boats.
When our doubts and fears were at the highest, this agreeable
information arrived, and was received by all with the greatest
satisfaction, while three companies of the Buffs, accompanied by
General Paget, were immediately conveyed to the other side.
The spot at which they passed over and landed was about half a mile
above the city, at the foot of a steep cliff, up which a zigzag road,
or winding path, led to a vast unfinished brick-building, standing on
the brink. This was intended as a new residence for the bishop, and
placed in the Prado, being surrounded by a wall with a large iron-gate,
opening on the road to Vallongo. It was a strong post, and the three
companies, on gaining the summit, threw themselves into it, as it at
once covered the place of disembarkation, and was for themselves a good
means of defence. Our artillery was posted on the high bank, on the
other side, completely commanding the Prado and the Vallongo road.
Soult had his quarters on the side of the city near the sea, and,
having collected all the boats, as he supposed, on the right bank,
considered himself in perfect security. He thought if we made any
attempt to cross, it would be in conjunction with our ships lying off
the bar, and all his attention was directed to that quarter. He even
turned into ridicule the first report of our having crossed, and
discredited the fact to the last, until it was incontestably proved by
our firing. The boats had made more than one trip before any one in the
town appeared to notice it. Foy has the credit of being the first to
discover our having passed, and he instantly ordered the drums of the
nearest battalion to beat the _general_. We heard the drums beat when
nearly the whole of the Buffs had crossed, and soon saw symptoms of
bustle and confusion in the town, and the French regiments forming on
their parades. This was an anxious moment, and just as the whole of the
Buffs had landed, a battalion was observed moving down a road towards
them. This was the 17th, brought down by Foy, and which was quickly
supported by the 70th. The first made an attack on the Buffs, who stood
their ground, giving a tremendous fire, while our artillery from the
opposite side killed and wounded a great number of the enemy.
More boats, in the mean time, were brought across and more troops; the
48th, 66th, and a Portuguese battalion landed, and not only defended
themselves successfully, but even drove the enemy from the walls,
between the town and the bishop's palace. This petty success was seen
by Sir Arthur and his staff, who cheered our soldiery as they chased
the enemy from the various posts. The enemy's troops now came through
the town in great numbers, and obliged our troops to confine themselves
to the enclosure. They continued running along the road towards and
beyond the iron-gate, while our shells and shot were whizzing through
the trees and between the houses into the road as they passed. They
brought up a gun through the gate to batter the house; but this proved
an unfortunate experiment, as our troops increasing in number by fresh
embarkations, (though General Paget was wounded), charged and captured
it. They also brought some guns to bear from the open spaces in the
town, but they were tamely if not badly served. But General Murray had
made good his position on the north bank of the river, and we soon
descried him making as much show as possible, marching with his ranks
open towards the Vallongo road, thus threatening the communication of
the enemy with Loison. He was not, however, strong enough to interrupt
the retreat of 10,000 desperate men; for the French now began to think
of nothing else, and directed their march toward Amarante. On their
deserting the quays, the Portuguese jumped into the boats, which soon
transported across, (amidst the cheers of the people and the waving
of pocket-handkerchiefs by the women from the windows,) the guards
and General Stewart's brigade, who proceeded through the town with the
greatest speed.
The Buffs, in the mean time, had dashed into the city and cut off
a battery of Light Artillery in retreat, which, becoming jammed
between that regiment, and the 29th received the fire of both, and
was captured. The flight of the enemy was continued, but they were
overtaken by the two squadrons which had passed with General Murray,
led by Brig.-Gen. Charles Stewart, who charged the rear and made 200
prisoners. Major Hervey, who commanded the Dragoons, lost his arm. The
enemy collected their scattered troops at some distance, but continued
their retreat towards Amarante in the night. Our loss did not exceed
120 men, while the enemy, besides killed and wounded, left in our hands
500 prisoners and 1000 sick in the hospitals, and several pieces of
cannon. The city was illuminated at night, and Sir Arthur, without
allowing himself any rest, the same evening gave out an order of thanks
to the army. The operations of the three preceding days had been most
gratifying, and the quickness with which the enemy had been forced
from his various positions and pursued, seldom equalled. The army
had advanced 80 miles in four days, three of which were in constant
presence of the enemy.
Sir Arthur had completely surprised in his quarters one of the most
distinguished French Marshals, and consummated in his face the most
difficult operation in war, that of crossing a deep and rapid river
before an enemy. Nothing can relieve Soult from the disgrace of
this day; and all that has been or whatever may be written in his
defence, can but palliate his want of precaution and fatal security.
The rapidity of Sir Arthur's own movements had been wonderful; for
within twenty-six days since leaving Portsmouth, Oporto was captured
and the enemy in full retreat. Captain Fitzroy Stanhope, one of the
Commander-of-the-Forces' aide-de-camps, was sent to England with the
dispatches of this success by one of the ships cruising off the port,
whose crews from the sea had seen the smoke of the firing during the
actions of the 11th and 12th.
The retreat of the enemy was directed upon Amarante, the seizure of
that place from Silveira by Loison, ten days before, having opened them
a loop-hole for escape. But Marshal Beresford, after crossing the Douro
at Pedro de Regoa, had joined Silveira, and on the 11th drove Loison
out of Amarante, and thus closed the road and the enemy's hopes in that
direction. Loison fell back on Guimaraens by the good carriage-road
that led to Chaves, sending information of his movement to Soult at
Oporto. Soult on his arrival at Penafiel, on the night of the 12th,
received this disagreeable news, and finding himself pressed in so
many directions, and no road open for carriages, determined at once to
destroy the heavy material of his corps and to join Loison across the
Sierra de Santa Catherina, at Guimaraens. Capt. Mellish, who was sent
on the morning of the 13th to Penafiel, confirmed the report which had
reached Oporto, of the destruction of their ammunition-waggons, guns,
and carriages. The cannon had been placed mouth to mouth and discharged
into each other, by trains laid communicating through the mass of
baggage and ammunition waggons.
Want of provisions and uncertainty of the enemy's route prevented the
advance of the army on the 13th, but the Germans were pushed on with
some six-pounders on the road of the enemy's retreat. On ascertaining
that the enemy had given up the idea of retreating by Amarante, orders
were sent to Marshal Beresford, to direct his march on Chaves, at which
place he arrived on the 16th, detaching Silveira in the direction of
the enemy's rear on Ruivaens. On the 14th, the army advanced half-way
on the road towards Braga. Soult collected his army, (the garrison
of Braga retiring on our advance) on the morning of the 15th at
Guimaraens, but finding our troops at Villa Nova de Famillacao, and no
road open for cannon, he destroyed the baggage and the military chest
of Loison's corps, and in despair took to the Goat-herds' paths across
the mountain, trusting to the interest, aid, and information procured
by the Bishop of Braga. Their army was in great confusion during the
13th, but the two following days it became totally disorganized. The
paths were so narrow, that but one man could pass at a time, and the
cavalry were obliged to lead their horses, while their column, thus
distressingly lengthened, had the additional misery of incessant
rain that fell in torrents during the whole of this trying period.
The peasantry, happy in revenging the horrors and atrocities of
their enemy's advance, watched them like vultures, and failed not
to dart upon all who sunk under fatigue; the stones they rolled on
them swept whole files into the abysses, while single shots from the
mountain-tops slew soldiers in the column of march. Their sufferings
met commiseration from the British alone, who had not suffered from the
guilty acts for which they were now receiving retribution.
Their _déroute_ was so complete, that Sir A. Wellesley thought it
unnecessary to follow them with the whole army beyond Braga, which
city he reached on the 16th. The probability of Victor's threatening
the south was also to be taken into consideration, and he therefore
contented himself in pursuing with some cavalry, the Guards, and
Brig.-Gen. Cameron's brigade, while the Germans, following the enemy,
even with three-pounders, across the Sierra de Santa Catherina, reached
Guimaraens the same day. The French continued their retreat, and on
the night of the 15th reached Salamonde, where their position was most
alarming. They found one of the bridges on the Cavado, on the road
to Ruivaens, destroyed and occupied, while that called Pontè Nova
only offered a single beam. They, however, surprised and killed the
Portuguese who guarded the last, and this proved the safety of their
army. They restored the troops into some order on the night between
the 15th and 16th, while the bridge was being repaired, which was made
passable by the morning, and allowed them to continue their march
towards Montalegre, leaving a rear-guard at Salamonde. Our cavalry
discovered them about half-past one o'clock, but the Guards did not
arrive until late. The position of the enemy was behind a deep and wide
ravine, accessible only by the road, with their right on the torrent,
and the left upon a ridge of broken mountains. The light troops were
directed to turn this point, and when sufficiently on their flank,
about half past six, the column and two-three-pounder guns, which
had joined from Gen. Murray's column, were pushed along the road to
attack in front. The enemy, who had placed their pickets, thinking the
cavalry were the only troops up, and hoping to continue all night,
instantly retired from the position, and, as it was almost dark, little
advantage could be taken of the confusion in which they fled, farther
than that of the guns firing on their columns, and the light infantry
pressing them _en tirailleur_. A few prisoners were made, among whom
was an officer. The rain continued incessant, and the miserable village
scarcely allowed cover for a quarter of the troops.
The next morning the disasters of the enemy in their flight of the
night before were fully revealed by the wreck left at and near the
bridge over the Cavado. The bridge had been only partially repaired,
and the infantry were obliged to file, and the cavalry to lead their
horses across. The passage must have been ever dangerous, but the
confusion occasioned by our pursuit and cannonade, and the darkness
of the night, rendered it to a degree hazardous. The rocky torrent of
the Cavado, in consequence, presented next morning an extraordinary
spectacle. Men and horses, sumpter animals and baggage, had been
precipitated into the river, and literally choked the course of the
stream. Here, with these fatal accompaniments of death and dismay, was
disgorged the last of the plunder of Oporto, and the other cities north
of the Douro. All kinds of valuable goods were left on the road, while
above 300 horses, sunk in the water, and mules laden with property,
fell into the hands of the grenadier and light companies of the guards.
These active-fingered gentry soon found that fishing for boxes and
bodies out of the stream produced pieces of plate, and purses and belts
full of gold and silver; and, amidst scenes of death and destruction,
arose shouts of the most noisy merriment.
Soult reached the pass of Ruivaens before Silveira, or his capture
would have been certain; but at that place learning that Marshal
Beresford had arrived at Chaves, he turned the head of his columns
towards Montalegre. The British army being greatly distressed from
fatigue, want of provisions, and bad weather, only advanced a league on
the 17th; but a squadron of cavalry and a battalion of Germans, were
pushed to the bridge of Miserele and Villa da Ponte. On the 18th, the
Guards, Germans, and Brig.-Gen. Cameron's brigade, pushed on in pursuit
of the enemy, whose track might have been found from the _débris_
of baggage, dead and dying men, (worn down by fatigue and misery to
skeletons,) houghed mules, and immense quantities of cartridges, which
the wearied soldiery threw away to lighten themselves from even the
weight of the balls.
Marshal Beresford had directed Silveira to march on Montalegre, but
he arrived about two hours too late, the enemy having dragged their
weary march along by that town and across the frontier, at twelve
o'clock. This was witnessed by some of our officers, who had pushed
on, and observed their distressed and miserable state. On our arrival
at Montalegre, we saw their retiring columns in march fairly over the
Spanish frontier, and a village on their route in flames. However, Col.
Talbot, of the 14th light dragoons, followed the enemy's route for
some way, and made prisoners an officer and 50 men. Marshal Beresford
crossed the frontier, but proceeded no farther than Ginso, on hearing
that Sir Arthur had given up the pursuit. The Commander-of-the-Forces,
from the advices received from Gen. M'Kenzie, had become anxious
respecting the line of the Tagus, and, being content with seeing the
enemy across the frontier, desisted from a more northern advance, and
ordered the troops to be cantoned in the nearest villages, wherever
the order might reach them.
Thus ended this short but active operation of twelve days, in which
the disasters of the Corunna campaign were repaid on the corps of
Soult with interest, as the distress and misery of the enemy were more
considerable than we had suffered in the preceding January. Instead
of the fine Gallician road of retreat, they were obliged to file
through mule and even goat-herd paths, while the incessant rain was
more distressing than the snow. The French had not stores and supplies
to fall back upon, but, on the contrary, passed through the most
unproductive wilds in the valleys and mountains. But the difference of
the circumstances of the two retreats marks their degrees of misery.
The peasantry, while friendly to us in Gallicia, evinced, in the Tras
os Montes, every mark of hatred to the enemy, whose cruelties had well
deserved severe retributive justice. This was carried to a distressing
extent, and though it kept the French together, added greatly to the
extent of their loss. Our army was never so disorganized in Gallicia as
that of the French, who could not have attempted to fight a battle at
Montalegre, as we did at Corunna. The loss of men (including Soult's
invasion and retreat) seems to have been nearly equal; but the enemy,
besides the military chest and baggage, (of which we only sacrificed a
part,) left the whole of their artillery, while we embarked ours safely
at Corunna. But Soult saw that his escape could be alone confined to
his men, and barely avoided capture, if not destruction, by sacrificing
the whole of his _matériel_. The fortunate chance of finding a traitor
in the Bishop of Braga tended to the safety of their retreat, which had
been constantly endangered, and would have been intercepted, had he
continued his march from Salamonde, on Chaves, instead of Montalegre.
Intelligence from the south of Victor's intention to invade Portugal
had induced Sir A. Wellesley to avoid pushing more troops beyond Braga
than was absolutely necessary, in order that they should be as near
and as ready as practicable, to proceed against Victor. This Marshal,
having been joined by Lapisse, hoping to create a diversion in favour
of Soult, seized, with a corps of 12 to 14,000 men, the bridge of
Alcantara, and pushed his patrols to Castello Branco. This movement
required strict attention, and rendered necessary a more speedy
retrograde movement from the northern frontier than would have been
desired after the fatigues of the troops; but, only allowing two days'
rest at Oporto, they were withdrawn to Coimbra, by the same routes by
which they had advanced. Head-quarters were on the 23rd at Coimbra.
Here the Portuguese regiments, which had acted with us in the Tras os
Montes, were ordered to form the garrison of Oporto. These regiments
had given some hopes of good promise, yet none were so sanguine at this
time as to expect from them their subsequent bravery and efficiency.
Sir Arthur continued his route on the 5th to Thomar, where we found the
heavy brigade, consisting of the 3rd dragoon guards and 4th dragoons,
which had disembarked while we were in the north, and appeared in
excellent condition. Head-quarters were established at Abrantes on the
8th of June, from whence Major-Gen. M'Kenzie, on our advance, had been
pushed forward to Castello Branco; as Victor, finding that Soult's
retreat had left Portugal free from danger in the north, considered
his own position less tenable, and had withdrawn from the north of the
Tagus. The French army soon afterwards fell back from Caseres upon
Merida and Medellin.