BOMBARDMENT OF APRIL
On April 9 the second bombardment, for which such incessant
preparations had been made during the winter, at length commenced, and
was vigorously maintained for the following ten days; and although the
Russians carried out numerous sorties, and were also unceasing each
night in repairing their shattered batteries, still it became evident
that the allies had achieved a virtual mastery and had laid open paths
for a general assault. It was a momentous crisis. As regards the
condition of Sebastopol at that time, Todleben, writing of the Bastion
du Mât, said[20] 'that after having undergone a constant and violent
bombardment, the work was in a desperate plight. Its artillery had been
dismounted, its embrasures and its merlons almost entirely demolished,
and a part of its salient had fallen in,' ... 'that they were
constantly expecting to see the enemy take advantage of the critical
state to which the bastion was reduced, and advance to the assault of
the work.' He adds, that the French might have advanced to the assault
of the bastion with an absolute certainty of success ... and that would
have carried with it the fall of Sebastopol.' ...
The allied armies were indeed in full expectation of being at length
led to the assault, and the result was almost a foregone conclusion,
but no order was issued and no decisive action taken. The real history
of the case was not known at the time, but the accounts published by
De Bazancourt in 1856, and confirmed long afterwards by Kinglake's
account, have cleared up the mystery. De Bazancourt[21] said: 'La
pensée d'une opération à l'extérieur planait toujours, on le voit,
sur les décisions, et empêchait de tenter contre la place une action
décisive. Les instructions secrètes du général Canrobert lui liaient
les mains, à moins de force majeure.' Again, he quotes a despatch of
Canrobert of April 24 as follows: 'Les officiers généraux des armes
spéciales des deux armées, les chefs de nos deux corps d'armée, ont été
unanimes pour céder dans cette circonstance aux cris de nos soldats
français et anglais, demandant l'assaut. Lord Raglan partage fermement
leur avis. J'ai pensé que mon devoir était de m'y joindre....' It
seems remarkable, considering the unanimity which prevailed amongst
the allied generals, and that the French Commander-in-Chief himself
said he felt it his duty to join them, that no assault took place.
Kinglake,[22] however, by means of French official documents brought to
light after the fall of the Empire, proves that General Canrobert was
in reality held back by instructions from Paris and by the influence
of General Niel, and, in view of the expected arrival of the Emperor,
would not join in a general assault.
Lord Raglan had apparently been informed of the expected arrival of
the Emperor Napoleon, which he considered ill-advised, but both he and
the English Government were kept for some time in the dark as to the
special instructions which fettered the action of General Canrobert.
Various interviews took place towards the end of April between the two
Commanders-in-Chief, and in my journal I find a remark as follows: 'Met
Lord Raglan out riding; he invited me to dinner, but added: "Canrobert
is coming to a Council of War at half-past six, so we shall be late."
The Council did not break up till ten P.M.'
Days thus passed away, and the allies were gradually losing the
opportunity for which they had so long waited. In fact, the second
bombardment of Sebastopol failed, from causes, however, very different
from those which prevailed in the first. In October, 1854, our failure
was due to want of power; in April, 1855, it was from want of will.
Events, however, were hurrying on, and the crisis soon came.
Towards the end of April the Emperor Napoleon[23] relinquished his
intention of coming to the Crimea, but sent out his proposed plan
of an external campaign, to which, however, Lord Raglan strongly
objected.[24] Whilst matters thus drifted, and whilst the batteries of
the allies were again becoming weak and their ammunition exhausted, a
new actor appeared on the scene in the person of General Pélissier, who
was commanding the French _corps d'armée_ on the left. Amongst other
matters, he pointed out to Canrobert in clear and forcible language[25]
that the Russians were establishing counter approaches in his front,
and that he, and those under him, were fully convinced that the enemy's
new position must be taken by a _coup de main_. He concluded: 'S'il
m'était donner de décider, je n'hésiterais pas.' General Canrobert
wavered, but at length accepted the responsibility, and the order for
the attack was given for May 1. In my journal is a record as follows:
'Returned from Balaclava about 10 o'clock P.M. on the 1st of May and
had an interview with Lord Raglan. Lord Stratford was there, when a
message came that a severe battle was going on in front of the French
trenches near the sea. We went off to a post of observation. The scene
was striking. The sky was lit up with constant flashes--shells whizzing
through the air; and amidst the incessant rattle of musketry could be
heard the cheers of the troops as they stormed the works. It lasted
four hours. Canrobert was with us, walking up and down, flourishing his
stick and greatly excited. The result was that the French captured an
outwork, and took eight mortars, and also five officers prisoners.'
In addition to the many difficulties of Lord Raglan's position at this
time, he was also much worried by receiving a notification that Lord
Panmure was about to abolish the Master-General and Board of Ordnance,
and to absorb their duties in the newly constructed War Department.
Speaking to me one day, he deplored the change, and said that the
Ordnance was one of the most efficient and economical departments of
the State, and that a much greater man than himself, the late Duke of
Wellington, was of the same opinion.[26]
In the meantime, Lord Raglan, backed by the opinions of Admirals Bruat
and Sir Edmund Lyons, strongly advocated a naval and military force
being sent to Kertch at the entrance to the Sea of Azov, with a view
of cutting the Russian communications and stopping their supplies; and
the expedition, consisting of about 12,000 troops (one-fourth being
English) started at the beginning of May. Hardly had it got out to sea
than General Canrobert received an order by telegraph from Paris to
concentrate all his troops for an external attack, and in consequence
recalled the Kertch expedition, to the dismay, not only of Lord Raglan,
but of the admirals and generals, and indeed of the officers and men of
the allied fleets and armies.[27] Matters were evidently coming to a
deadlock.
On May 14 Lord Raglan, Canrobert, and Omar Pasha had a long and final
consultation as to the proposal of the Emperor Napoleon, which was
in effect to separate the allied forces into three armies acting
independently--one to blockade Sebastopol, the second to storm the
Mackenzie Heights, and the third to march to the centre of the Crimea.
The scheme was rejected on the broad ground that it would render
each separate force liable to attack and defeat in detail.[28] This
decision brought affairs to a crisis, and on May 16 General Canrobert
telegraphed to the Emperor resigning his command, partly on the plea
of ill health, but chiefly because his recall of the Kertch expedition
and the rejection of the Emperor's scheme had placed him in a false
position.[29] General Canrobert's resignation was accepted, and by his
own wish he resumed command of his old division.
On May 19 General Pélissier was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the
French army, and the situation was at once completely altered. Writing
to Marshal Vaillant, Minister for War at Paris, he said: 'I have
already seen Lord Raglan, and we are in complete accord; please ask the
Emperor to give me liberty of action indispensable under the actual
conditions of the war, and especially in view of the preservation
of the intimate alliance of the two countries.' Efforts, however,
were still made from Paris to regulate the strategy of the campaign,
but they were virtually disregarded, and General Pélissier, acting
with Lord Raglan, in the course of a few days carried out a series
of important movements which put an end not only to the delays and
disappointments that had so long trammelled the actions of the allies,
but entirely altered the conditions of the campaign. The strength of
the allies towards the end of May was approximately as follows:
French 100,000
English 25,000
Sardinians 15,000
Turks 45,000
_May 18._--Accompanied Lord Raglan and La Marmora round the English
trenches.
The first movement by Pélissier was a renewed attack on the Russian
counter approaches in front of the French left, on the night of May
23; and as, owing to the desperate nature of the fighting, the object
was not fully accomplished he refused an armistice to bury the dead,
and followed it up the following evening with complete success, and
his troops then entrenched themselves in the captured cemetery. I
accompanied Lord Raglan and Omar Pasha on the second night to the
French post of observation. The losses on both sides were very severe,
being computed at 2,303 on the part of the French, and at 3,081 of the
Russians.[30]
On May 25 General Canrobert was ordered to take up the line of the
Chernaya, which he accomplished with ease and almost without loss. In
this operation he was assisted by the Sardinians under La Marmora, who
had arrived some days previously. I remember riding in the morning down
to the Chernaya with Lord Raglan and his staff on the occasion. General
Canrobert galloped up to meet him, in the highest spirits, and speaking
in French said: 'My Lord, when I was a great man and Commander-in-Chief
you used to come and visit me, and now when I am only commanding a
division you again come to see me.' Lord Raglan, in reply, expressed
his pleasure that Canrobert had gained so extended a position, and
with such trifling loss. He afterwards joined General La Marmora, and
made a reconnoissance towards Baidar, being altogether ten hours in
the saddle. This movement in advance was of the greatest benefit to
the allies, who, instead of being cooped up in a corner, had now ample
space in a fertile valley, with plenty of grass, fuel, and fresh water
at their disposal.
On May 24 the expedition to Kertch re-embarked, and sailed the
following day. It consisted of 7,000 French, 3,000 English, and
5,000 Turks, with 5 batteries of artillery, and was attended with
complete success. Kertch and Yenikale were captured without loss, the
Russians retreating, after destroying large depots of supplies, &c.
A considerable number of guns were taken, the Sea of Azov was opened
to our fleets, and the enemy's communications interrupted. Sir Edmund
Lyons reported that in four days the squadron had destroyed 241 vessels
employed in transporting provisions to the Crimea, besides four war
steamers and six million rations of flour and corn.[31]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 20: Kinglake, vii. 192.]
[Footnote 21: Bazancourt, ii. 239-242.]
[Footnote 22: Kinglake, vii. 121.]
[Footnote 23: Kinglake, vii. 245, and De Bazancourt, ii. 266.]
[Footnote 24: De Bazancourt, ii. 266-274.]
[Footnote 25: _Ibid._ ii. 252.]
[Footnote 26: See also Clode's _Military Forces of the Crown_, ii. 237.]
[Footnote 27: Kinglake, vii. 260-273.]
[Footnote 28: Kinglake, vii. 287; also De Bazancourt, ii. 273-276.]
[Footnote 29: _Ibid._ 278.]
[Footnote 30: Kinglake, viii. 25.]
[Footnote 31: Lord Raglan's despatch, June 2, 1855.]