CAPTURE OF THE MAMELON AND QUARRIES--INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PÉLISSIER
The next combined action of the allied forces took place against the
Mamelon, the _ouvrages blancs_, and the quarries in front of the Redan.
As the capture of these important outworks involved not only a partial
re-armament of the siege batteries and a renewal of their munitions,
but also a careful consideration of engineer arrangements, some short
delay necessarily followed before decisive action could be taken.
Towards the end of May a meeting was arranged to take place at the
French head quarters between the senior artillery and engineer officers
of the two armies, with a view to discuss the various details. As
General Dacres was temporarily absent, owing to illness, and had gone
for a few days to Constantinople, Lord Raglan directed me to accompany
General Harry Jones, the Commanding Engineer. The meeting took place in
a hut, at 6 A.M. To my surprise General Pélissier came in and presided;
and, instead of the conference being limited to officers of the
special arms, the following were present: French Generals Martimprey,
Niel, Bosquet, Trochu, Frossard, Beuret, and Thiry, and one or two
more; General Jones and myself being the only English officers at the
meeting. Major Claremont and Prince Polignac were also in the room, to
act as interpreters if required.
General Pélissier, in opening the proceedings, said it was decided that
in a few days the French were to attack the Mamelon and other adjacent
positions, whilst the English would seize the quarries in front of the
Redan; and he invited those present to offer any remarks on details.
A plan of Sebastopol was lying on the table for reference. General
Niel began the discussion, stating that on an important occasion like
the present it was necessary to take a general survey of the allied
position and of the trenches, and he would begin with the left attack.
Pélissier stopped him at once, and declined to enter into any such
general considerations, saying that all he wanted was assistance as
to details. He then took a ruler, laid it across the left attack,
and said: 'L'attaque gauche n'existe plus.' General Niel under these
circumstances abstained from taking any further part in the discussion.
General Bosquet having made a few remarks as to the troops to be
detailed for the assault of the Mamelon, in which the Zouaves were to
occupy a conspicuous place, Pélissier objected to the arrangement,
contending that the Zouaves were not the best troops--'Pourquoi
toujours les Zouaves?' he added. He went on to say that these, however,
were small questions of detail to be settled afterwards. He was
evidently determined to assert his position as Commander-in-Chief,
and told us that there were persons in France of the highest position
(evidently alluding to the Emperor) who read history and studied
campaigns, and then sent him out their ideas as to what should be
done. He told us that he had written respectfully to the Minister
for War that, so long as he commanded the French army in the field,
he declined to carry out any plans except such as were arranged and
concerted between Lord Raglan and himself. A few other officers
offered some observations, and then Pélissier turned to General
Harry Jones. Apparently he had some difficulty in pronouncing his
name, and approximately addressed him as General Hairy-Joze.[32]
The General--who, I found afterwards, was considerably ruffled by
Pélissier's arbitrary language--speaking in somewhat moderate French,
said that when the French were ready to take the Mamelon the British
troops were prepared to storm and capture the quarries in front of the
Redan, and then sat down. Pélissier at once expressed his pleasure at
hearing the statement of General Hairy-Joze. The English, he added,
were evidently waiting for their allies, and with that 'solidité' which
so distinguished them would no doubt succeed in what they undertook.
The day and hour of the attack were known only to Lord Raglan and
himself, but they should not have long to wait. Pélissier ended by
stating that the discussion had been very interesting (no one having
practically spoken except himself), and then he wished us all good
morning.
Lord Raglan was much interested and amused when he heard of the
interview, saying that had he known General Pélissier would be present
he would have gone himself to listen to his lecture. It was known at
the time that considerable differences existed between Pélissier and
Niel. Years afterwards, in Kinglake's 'History of the Crimea,'[33] he
quotes extracts of letters written at this time by General Niel to the
Emperor Napoleon, and which evidently refer to the conference I have
just described. In one General Niel says: 'At a meeting which took
place yesterday he, General Pélissier, ordered me to be silent with
a harshness not to be characterised.... We were in the presence of
English officers.' Again, he writes to the Minister for War: 'Knowing
nothing of what is going on, I abstain from all reflections. I asked
leave to offer some observations on the state of the siege, and was
told that it was not the time....'
It must be borne in mind that the active measures which had been
carried out by the allied generals during the latter part of May were
by no means approved of in Paris, so much so that on June 5 Napoleon
telegraphed to Pélissier as follows:[34] 'Je vous donne l'ordre
positif, de ne point vous acharner au siège, avant d'avoir investi la
place.' General Pélissier, however, entirely ignoring the veto, simply
replied that he was in perfect accord with Lord Raglan, and was making
final dispositions for the assault of the white redoubts, the Mamelon,
and the quarries; and adds, that he should commence on the 7th and push
on with the utmost vigour. And so he did.
A few days later, in writing to Paris, he speaks of himself as being
at the paralysing extremity of an electric wire.[35] Lord Panmure, the
Minister for War, however, about this time informed Lord Raglan that
the English and French Governments had arranged that no orders should
be sent out as to operations, without mutual consent,[36] and it seems
curious that so obvious and common-sense a plan had not been in force
throughout.
On the afternoon of June 6 the third great bombardment of Sebastopol
commenced. My brother, Captain Mortimer Adye, R.A., was in command of
an advanced battery in the trenches, and, the weather being hot, was
fighting his guns in his shirt sleeves, when a shell from the enemy
burst in the battery, exploding some loose gunpowder which was lying
there, and burned him and two sergeants seriously; in fact, nearly
blew them away. His face, neck, and arms were scorched, blackened, and
blistered, and his flannel shirt smouldering. Some infantry soldiers,
seeing his condition, threw some water over him, and he was then
conveyed to camp; but some weeks elapsed before he was able to resume
his duties.
The fire of the allied batteries soon obtained a mastery, and the
Mamelon especially was in ruins. Todleben, speaking of the bombardment,
said that more terrific than all else was the fire of the English.[37]
It was arranged that the assault of the Russian advanced works should
take place shortly before sunset, and during the afternoon of the
7th the French columns, in the highest spirits, marched under cover
and unobserved down the ravines in readiness. The signal was given
about half-past six, and the French first attacked and occupied the
_ouvrages blancs_, near the Careening Bay ravine, taking several
hundred prisoners. They then assaulted the Mamelon, took it with great
rapidity and comparative ease, and hoisted their flag on the work; but,
led away by success, they impetuously, and contrary to the intention,
followed the enemy even up to the glacis of the Malakoff. The Russians,
however, came out in great force, and not only drove back the French
columns, but followed them into the Mamelon and recaptured it, the
French retreating down the slopes in disorder and with great loss. It
was a critical moment, but Pélissier was equal to the occasion. Having
large reserves in the adjoining ravine, he at once sent them forward
and for a second time occupied the great outwork; and, darkness coming
on, its entrenchments were turned during the night and the position
firmly held. At the same time, whilst these serious battles were taking
place, the English troops, consisting of part of the Light and Second
Divisions, stormed the quarries in front of the Redan in the most
brilliant manner; and although they were furiously attacked several
times during the night by sorties from the Russian adjacent works, and
suffered great loss, they resisted all efforts to dislodge them, and
the next morning found them firmly established in comparatively close
proximity to the Redan.
The great energy and activity of the allies during the fortnight since
Pélissier had been in command of the French army and in full accord
with Lord Raglan had thus been attended with important results, not
only on the Chernaya and at Kertch, but also in depriving the enemy of
the outworks in front of the city which they had established during
the previous winter. Within a day or two of the successful actions of
June 7, another meeting took place of the senior artillery and engineer
officers of the two armies, at which I was present with General
Dacres. The subject considered had reference to the arrangements in
the trenches necessary for the further prosecution of the siege.
Opinions rather differed, some considering that in view of the recent
success, and its moral effect on the Russians, a general assault should
speedily follow. Colonel Frossard, a distinguished engineer of the
French army, however, urged that as we were still at a distance of some
hundred yards from the Malakoff and Redan we should continue to advance
cautiously by means of sap and trench as heretofore. He pointed out
that an assault from our present position would involve the carrying of
scaling ladders and woolbags to fill the ditches, for a considerable
distance in the open under heavy fire, and that under all the
circumstances we might be liable to defeat in assaulting prematurely.
General Dacres entirely concurred in the views of Colonel Frossard, and
the event proved that their misgivings were justified.
Some days passed away, during which time the batteries in the trenches
were augmented and again prepared for a fresh effort, and it was
finally decided that a general assault should be made on the Malakoff
and Redan on June 18, to be preceded by a vigorous bombardment at
daylight for two or three hours, so as to smash and silence the enemy's
batteries and open a road for the attacking columns. It is important,
however, to bear in mind that General Pélissier declined to make a
simultaneous movement against the Bastion du Mât. A heavy fire was
opened at daylight on June 17 from the English and French trenches,
and continued throughout the day. In the evening Lord Raglan sent for
me, and directed orders to be issued at once to all the batteries,
that the renewed bombardment at daylight the next morning was not to
be carried out. I ventured to remark that every preparation had been
made, and that it would not only be a great disappointment to the navy
and artillery, but it seemed to me that a concentrated fire for two or
three hours on the points to be assaulted would produce a great effect.
Lord Raglan replied that he entirely agreed with me, but, he added, it
was useless to argue the question, as he had just received a message
from General Pélissier altering previous arrangements, and saying that
the French columns would attack at daylight.[38] The necessary orders
were, of course, given.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 32: Soon afterwards, when he was knighted, he called him
'Sairey-Joze'! (Sir Harry Jones).]
[Footnote 33: 'Extracts from French Official Documents,' Kinglake,
viii. 32 and 88.]
[Footnote 34: Kinglake, viii. 89-90.]
[Footnote 35: _Ibid._ viii. 129.]
[Footnote 36: _Ibid._ 236.]
[Footnote 37: Kinglake, viii. 94.]
[Footnote 38: See Lord Raglan's despatch, June 19, 1855. Also Kinglake,
viii. 310.]