Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great

principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point;

and this point is to be determined from the considerations given in

Article XIX. What was the passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line of

operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of the

enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? The marches of Ulm and Jena

were the same maneuvers; and what was Blücher's march at Waterloo but an

application of interior strategic lines?

From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to

throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the

front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the

principle of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. The

operations of the French in 1793 from Dunkirk to Landau, and those of

Napoleon in 1796, 1809, and 1814, are models of this kind.

One of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to

so combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest

strategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple

object of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease

and rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. However, it

is necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means of

concentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow.

This alternate application of extended and concentric movements is the

true test of a great general.

There is another kind of marches, designated as _flank marches_, which

deserves notice. They have always been held up as very dangerous; but

nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. If by the term

_flank marches_ are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field of

battle in view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicate

operations, though sometimes successful; but if reference is made to

ordinary strategic marches, I see nothing particularly dangerous in

them, unless the most common precautions of Logistics be neglected. In a

strategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated by

about two marches, (counting the distance which separates the advanced

guards from the enemy and from their own columns.) In such a case there

could be no danger in a strategic march from one point to another.

There are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogether

inadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations,

of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen as

to present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. This was the

famous project of marching upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden on

the flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies.

It was modified by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of the

author.

The second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as was

the case with Napoleon at Borodino,) and particularly if this line

affords but a single suitable route for retreat: then every flank

movement exposing this line would be a great fault.

In countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements are

still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in a

change of the line of operations. The physical and moral condition of

the troops and the more or less energetic characters of the commanders

will, of course, be elements in the determination of such movements.

The often-quoted marches of Jena and Ulm were actual flank maneuvers; so

was that upon Milan after the passage of the Chiusella, and that of

Marshal Paskevitch to cross the Vistula at Ossiek; and their successful

issue is well known.

A tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite a

different affair. Ney suffered for a movement of this kind at Dennewitz,

and so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frederick at Kolin.

Nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of Frederick at Leuthen was a

true flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealed

by the heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in its

camp; and it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shock

Daun was taken in flank, and not Frederick.

In the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where line

of battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by a

right or left into line,) movements parallel to the enemy's line were

not _flank marches_, because the flank of the column was the real front

of the line of battle.

The famous march of Eugene within view of the French army, to turn the

lines of Turin, was still more extraordinary than that of Leuthen, and

no less successful.

In these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and not

strategic. The march of Eugene from Mantua to Turin was one of the

greatest strategic operations of the age; but the case above referred to

was a movement made to turn the French camp the evening before the

battle.

ARTICLE XXV.

Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches.

The subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is the

commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must be

supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy's

country is a very difficult one. It is proposed to discuss the relation

between the commissariat and strategy.

It will always be difficult to imagine how Darius and Xerxes subsisted

their immense armies in Thrace, where now it would be a hard task to

supply thirty thousand men. During the Middle Ages, the Greeks,

barbarians, and more lately the Crusaders, maintained considerable

bodies of men in that country. Cæsar said that war should support war,

and he is generally believed to have lived at the expense of the

countries he overran.

The Middle Ages were remarkable for the great migrations of all kinds,

and it would be interesting to know the numbers of the Huns, Vandals,

Goths, and Mongols who successively traversed Europe, and how they lived

during their marches. The commissariat arrangements of the Crusaders

would also be an interesting subject of research.

In the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armies

of Francis I., in crossing the Alps into Italy, did not carry with them

large stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty or

fifty thousand men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys of

the Ticino and Po.

Under Louis XIV. and Frederick II. the armies were larger; they fought

on their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which were

established as they moved. This interfered greatly with operations,

restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent upon

the means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the

number of days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to

camp.

During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity.

The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany lived sometimes in

the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the

country, and often by plunder and pillage. To subsist an army on the

granaries of Belgium, Italy, Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine and

Danube, is easy,--particularly if it marches in a number of columns and

does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but

this would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite

impossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It may readily be

conceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where

every thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. This

system gave Napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying it

on too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable.

A general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded

country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the

local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to

make them uniform and legal, while he himself should see to their

fulfillment. If the authorities do not remain, he should create

provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinary

powers. The provisions thus acquired should be collected at the points

most convenient for the operations of the army. In order to husband

them, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking care

to reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them.

The inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey the

supplies to the points occupied by the troops.

It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to

undertake without having previously established these depots, as much

depends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of

the people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:--

1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one

hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from

the enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of

country, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any

single operation.

As the first operation never requires more than a month, during which

time the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be

sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants

of the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain

at a particular point. Thus, the army of Napoleon, while half of it was

besieging Ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and if

there had been a scarcity the operation might have failed.

2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies

obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the

wants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a

position to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise.

3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be

echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of

communication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of the

army, and to extend as much as possible the area from which successive

supplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should

be as well covered as possible. To this end, it would be well to have

the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations,

which will be generally found in the center. This arrangement has two

real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts of

the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, it

facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a single

point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the

initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the

offensive and gained some advantage.

4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its

most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to

advance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient

provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its

lines of depots.

5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in

their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it

is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and

without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under

these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not

impossible.

6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but

it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after

the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid

expeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations should

consist of the most portable articles,--as biscuit, rice, &c.: the

wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of

roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country,

and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these

vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to

take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the

successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry

with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour.

7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of

supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply

himself at will. This advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of

a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications

with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus

exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the

mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the army

advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its

communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the

progress of the army.

8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should base

itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its

ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic

front opposed to the sea.

9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations

of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also

free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise

necessary. For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the

most favorable. The water-communications themselves are not in this case

the lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is

essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance from

the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior

flank upon the river,--which might be as dangerous as if it were the

sea.

In the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for

transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a

small body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. To render it

sure, it is necessary to occupy both banks,--which is hazardous, as

Mortier experienced at Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantages

of rivers are more substantial.

10. In default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may be

fed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populous

countries, in numbers to last for some little time. This source of

supply will, however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this plan

leads to plunder. The requisitions for cattle should be well regulated;

and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle purchased

elsewhere.

I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon which may

appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. He said that in

his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops

were in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy

to procure every thing in abundance. This is a remark upon which it

would be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains the

success of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war

differs from narrow theory.

ARTICLE XXVI.

The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched Lines.--Wars of

Sieges.

Forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers;

secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign.

The defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate.

It is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with great

natural obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, and

these admitting of defense by the art of the engineer. The problem here

is simple; but in open countries it is more difficult. The Alps and the

Pyrenees, and the lesser ranges of the Crapacks, of Riesengebirge, of

Erzgebirge, of the Böhmerwald, of the Black Forest, of the Vosges, and

of the Jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by a

good system of fortresses.

Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont was best

covered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes of Argentine, of

Mont-Genèvre, and of Mont-Cenis,--the only ones considered

practicable,--were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works of

considerable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains

of Piedmont. It was certainly no easy matter to surmount these

difficulties.

These excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passage

of an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may be

carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some other

route hitherto deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by Francis

I.,--which is so well described by Gaillard,--Napoleon's passage of the

Saint-Bernard, and the Splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in

the remark of Napoleon, _that an army can pass wherever a titan can set

his foot_,--a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man,

and applied by him with great success.

Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or

as a second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so

well calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and

communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. It cannot be

said that the Danube divides Bessarabia from the Ottoman empire as long

as the Turks have a foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was never the real

frontier of France and Germany; for the French for long periods held

points upon the right bank, while the Germans were in possession of

Mayence, Luxembourg, and the _têtes de ponts_ of Manheim and Wesel on

the left bank.

If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Po, and

Adige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why they

should not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever they

permit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations.

An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria from

Austria: flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the north by

Bohemia and the Danube, its narrow front is covered by the three

fortified places of Passau, Braunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with some

poetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whose

curtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the most

rapid of rivers. He has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of

"impregnable" was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of 1800,

1805, and 1809.

The majority of the European states have frontiers by no means so

formidable as that of the Alps and the Inn, being generally open, or

consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable number

of points. We propose to give a set of general maxims equally

applicable to all cases.

When the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt to

make a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses,

requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might not

prevent an enemy from penetrating the country. It is much wiser to build

fewer works, and to have them properly located, not with the expectation

of absolutely preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the

impediments to his progress, and, at the same time, to support the

movements of the army which is to repel him.

If it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents the

progress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compels

the army to detach a part of its force or to make _détours_ in its

march; while, on the other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to

the army which holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and,

finally, is a place of refuge in case of need.

Fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations;

and we now propose to examine their relations to strategy.

The first point to be considered is their location; the second lies in

the distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass the

forts without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege;

the third point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siege

which it proposes to cover.

As fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the same

degree those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. They

are an incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and the

state whose men and money are wasted upon them. There are many in Europe

in this category. It is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses

very close together. This system has been wrongly imputed to Vauban,

who, on the contrary, had a controversy with Louvois about the great

number of points the latter desired to fortify. The maxims on this point

are as follow:--

1. The fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, and

should extend from the frontiers toward the capital.[20] There should be

three in the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the

third, near the center of the state. If there be four fronts, this would

require, for a complete system, from twenty-four to thirty places.

It will be objected that this number is large, and that even Austria has

not so many. It must be recollected that France has more than forty upon

only a third of its frontiers, (from Besançon to Dunkirk,) and still has

not enough on the third line in the center of the country. A Board

convened for the purpose of considering the system of fortresses has

decided quite recently that more were required. This does not prove that

there were not already too many, but that certain points in addition

should be fortified, while those on the first line, although too much

crowded, may be maintained since they are already in existence.

Admitting that France has two fronts from Dunkirk to Basel, one from

Basel to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, in addition to the totally

distinct line of the Pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts,

requiring forty to fifty places. Every military man will admit that this

is enough, since the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the

northeast. The system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important

element of their usefulness. Austria has a less number, because she is

bordered by the small German states, which, instead of being hostile,

place their own forts at her disposal. Moreover, the number above given

is what was considered necessary for a state having four fronts of

nearly equal development. Prussia, being long and narrow, and extending

from Königsberg almost to the gates of Metz, should not be fortified

upon the same system as France, Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographical

position and extent of states may either diminish or increase the number

of fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included.

2. Fortresses should always occupy the important strategic points

already designated in Article XIX. As to their tactical qualities, their

sites should not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, in

order to increase the difficulty of blockading them.

3. Those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their own

defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly those

situated on great rivers and commanding both banks. Mayence, Coblentz,

and Strasbourg, including Kehl, are true illustrations and models of

this kind. Places situated at the confluence of two great rivers command

three different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take, for

instance, Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank of the Main the

fort of Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right, was the most formidable

place in Europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men:

so that works of this extent must be few in number.

4. Large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, are

preferable to small ones,--particularly when the assistance of the

citizens can be relied on for their defense. Metz arrested the whole

power of Charles V, and Lille for a whole year delayed Eugene and

Marlborough. Strasbourg has many times proved the security of French

armies. During the last wars these places were passed without being

besieged by the invading forces, because all Europe was in arms against

France; but one hundred and fifty thousand Germans having in their front

one hundred thousand French could not penetrate to the Seine with

impunity, leaving behind them these well-fortified points.

5. Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps,

and positions; recently they have been directed only against organized

armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial

obstacles. The exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: the

true course is a mean between these extremes. Doubtless, it will always

be of the first importance to destroy and disorganize all the armies of

the enemy in the field, and to attain this end it may be allowable to

pass the fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will be

unwise to push the invasion too far. Here, also, very much depends upon

the situation and respective strength of the armies and the spirit of

the nations.

If Austria were the sole antagonist of France, she could not follow in

the footsteps of the allies in 1814; neither is it probable that fifty

thousand French will very soon risk themselves beyond the Noric Alps, in

the very heart of Austria, as Napoleon did in 1797.[21] Such events only

occur under exceptional circumstances.

6. It may be concluded from what precedes,--1st, that, while fortified

places are essential supports, abuse in their application may, by

dividing an army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; 2d,

that an army may, with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the line

of these forts,--always, however, leaving a force to observe them; 3d,

that an army cannot pass a large river, like the Danube or the Rhine,

without reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in order

to secure a good line of retreat. Once master of this place, the army

may advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege other

places; and the chances of the reduction of those places increase as the

army advances, since the enemy's opportunities of hindering the siege

are correspondingly diminished.

7. While large places are much the most advantageous among a friendly

people, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest an

enemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially aid the

operations of an army in the field. The fort of Königstein in 1813 was

as useful to the French as the fortress of Dresden, because it procured

a _tête de pont_ on the Elbe.

In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value

to fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and

not to afford refuge to armies: the little fort of Bard, in the valley

of Aosta, almost arrested Napoleon's army in 1800.

8. It follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortresses

as places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts to

facilitate military operations. Walled cities with a shallow ditch may

be very useful in the interior of a country, to contain depots,

hospitals, &c, when they are strong enough to resist the attacks of any

small bodies that may traverse the vicinity. They will be particularly

serviceable if they can be defended by the militia, so as not to weaken

the active army.

9. Large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positions

are a positive misfortune for both the army and state.

10. Those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war,

except for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continental

army, by holding out to it a delusive promise of support. Benningsen

almost lost the Russian armies by basing them in 1807 on

Königsberg,--which he did because it was convenient for supply. If the

Russian army in 1812, instead of concentrating on Smolensk, had

supported itself on Dunaburg and Riga, it would have been in danger of

being forced into the sea and of being cut off from all its bases.

The relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are of

two kinds. An invading army may pass by fortified places without

attacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least to

watch them; and when there are a number of them adjacent to each other

it will be necessary to leave an entire corps d'armée, under a single

commander, to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. When

the invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to carry

on the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder may either

continue its march or take a position to cover the siege.

Formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a whole

army, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and

contravallation. These lines cost as much in labor and expense as the

siege itself. The famous case of the lines of Turin, which were fifteen

miles in length, and, though guarded by seventy-eight thousand French,

were forced by Prince Eugene with forty thousand men in 1706, is enough

to condemn this ridiculous system.

Much as the recital of the immense labors of Cæsar in the investment of

Alise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general in

our times will imitate his example. Nevertheless, it is very necessary

for the investing force to strengthen its position by detached works

commanding the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which the

siege might be disturbed from without. This was done by Napoleon at

Mantua, and by the Russians at Varna.

Experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat and

pursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could interfere. If

the besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up a

strategic position covering all the avenues by which succor might

arrive; and when it approaches, as much of the besieging force as can be

spared should unite with the covering force to fall upon the approaching

army and decide whether the siege shall continue or not.

Bonaparte in 1796, at Mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for the

operations of an army of observation.

INTRENCHED LINES.

Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to

above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and

is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is

intended to protect a part of the frontiers.

As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an

army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of

intrenched lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of small extent

closing a narrow gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz, for they may be

regarded as forts; but I speak of extended lines many leagues in length

and intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. For instance,

those of Wissembourg, which, covered by the Lauter flowing in front,

supported by the Rhine on the right and the Vosges on the left, seemed

to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on

every occasion when they were assailed.

The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine played the same

part as those of Wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and

those of the Queich and the Kinzig had the same fate.

The lines of Turin, (1706,) and those of Mayence, (1795,) although

intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in

question in their extent and in the fate which befell them. However well

they may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes

their defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned.

To bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and

surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is

manifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another

instance of it. Nevertheless, in our chapter on Tactics we will treat of

their attack and defense.

It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended

lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be

derived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging

force, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 20: The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value of

such a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the defiles

of the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the Russians would not

have reached Adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple.]

[Footnote 21: Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the

Frioul, since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the

Rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important to

beat the Archduke Charles before this force joined him. In view of the

circumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct was in accordance with the

principles of war.]

ARTICLE XXVII.

The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Têtes de Ponts with Strategy.

It would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of

ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards,

or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts.

Only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and

even of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they afford

an army.

It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz, which saved

Frederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and Dusseldorf in 1796, that

such a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. The camp of Ulm, in

1800, enabled Kray to arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau on

the Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp of

Torres-Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the country

between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp of Shumla.

The principal rule in this connection is that camps should be

established on strategic points which should also possess tactical

advantages. If the camp of Drissa was useless to the Russians in 1812,

it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to their

defensive system, which should have rested upon Smolensk and Moscow.

Hence the Russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days.

The maxims which have been given for the determination of the great

decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because

they ought only to be placed on such points. The influence of these

camps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure

for an offensive operation, as _têtes de ponts_ to assure the crossing

of a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for

a defeated army.

However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult

to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of

Torres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. Whenever it can

be passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to

abandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresden

was an important support to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as it

was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of an

ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps

within a few days for want of provisions.

Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary

support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even

when the enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken in

reverse,--that is, provided all their faces are equally safe from a

_coup de main_. It is also important that they be established close to a

fortress, where the depots may be safe, or which may cover the front of

the camp nearest to the line of retreat.

In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large _tête de pont_

on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city

like Mayence or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never

be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of

collecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy,

it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the

open country.

The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly

advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If a

French army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lost

when the space between the Rhine and Elbe was held by the enemy; but if

it were invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with a

little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the

enemy in the interior of France and between the relieving force and the

intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the Rhine.

We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but

several German generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover

places or to prevent sieges,--which appears to me to be a little

sophistical. Doubtless, it will be more difficult to besiege a place

when an army is encamped on its glacis; and it maybe said that the forts

and camps are a mutual support; but, according to my view, the real and

principal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a

temporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively

upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. To bury an army in such a

camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simply

to retard a siege, would be folly. The example of Wurmser, who prolonged

the defense of Mantua, will be cited in opposition to this; but did not

his army perish? And was this sacrifice really useful? I do not think

so; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed, and the

siege-train having fallen into the hands of the Austrians, the siege was

necessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken by

reason of famine; and, this being the case, Wurmser's presence ought

rather to have hastened than retarded its surrender.

The intrenched camp of the Austrians before Mayence in 1795 would,

indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the French had

possessed the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the Rhine had not

been crossed; but as soon as Jourdan appeared on the Lahn, and Moreau in

the Black Forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the

place to its own means of defense. It would only be in the event of a

fortress occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an army

to pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the object

of preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and what place in

Europe is upon such a site?

So far from agreeing with these German authors, on the contrary, it

seems to me that a very important question in the establishment of these

camps near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on the

same bank as the place, or upon the other. When it is necessary to make

a choice, by reason of the fact that the place cannot be located to

cover both banks, I should decidedly prefer the latter.

To serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on the

bank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principal

danger to be feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse by

passing the river at some other point; and if the fortress were upon the

same bank us the camp, it would be of little service; while if upon the

other bank, opposite to the camp, it would be almost impossible to take

the latter in reverse. For instance, the Russians, who could not hold

for twenty-four hours their camp of Drissa, would have defied the enemy

for a long time if there had been a fortification on the right bank of

the Dwina, covering the rear of the camp. So Moreau for three months, at

Kehl, withstood all the efforts of the Archduke Charles; while if

Strasbourg had not been there upon the opposite bank his camp would

easily have been turned by a passage of the Rhine.

Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortified

place upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks would

fulfill this condition. The fortification of Coblentz, recently

constructed, seems to introduce a new epoch. This system of the

Prussians, combining the advantages of intrenched camps and permanent

works, deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its

defects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immense

advantages to an army intended to operate on the Rhine. Indeed, the

inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they are only

very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they are exposed to

the dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened to Napoleon

at Essling,)--to say nothing of the danger of losing their provisions

and munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works might

not avail. The system of detached permanent works of Coblentz has the

advantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the

same bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from

attack at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city were

upon the right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an intrenched camp

of field-works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of security

either for the depots or the army. So, if Coblentz were a good ordinary

fortress without detached forts, a large army could not so readily make

it a place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for debouching

from it in the presence of an enemy. The fortress of Ehrenbreitstein,

which is intended to protect Coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult

of access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the egress of

a force of any magnitude might be vigorously disputed.

Much has been recently said of a new system used by the Archduke

Maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of Linz,--by masonry towers.

As I only know of it by hearsay and the description by Captain Allard in

the _Spectateur Militaire_, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only know

that the system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel Andreis

appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of

improvements,--which the archduke seems to have added. We are told that

the towers of Linz, situated in ditches and covered by the glacis, have

the advantage of giving a concentrated horizontal fire and of being

sheltered from the direct shot of the enemy. Such towers, if well

flanked and connected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous

camp,--always, however, with some of the inconveniences of closed lines.

If the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered by

field-works, (to be thrown up when required,) they will make a camp

preferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous

as afforded by the large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers number

thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort

commanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on the right bank,

some seven or eight are only half-towers. The circumference of this line

is about twelve miles. The towers are between five hundred and six

hundred yards apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by a

palisaded covered way. They are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with

a barbette battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleven

twenty-four pounders. Two howitzers are placed in the upper tier. Those

towers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the _déblais_ of which forms

a high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot; but I should

think it would be difficult to protect the artillery from direct fire.

Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a complete

bastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a fortress of the first rank,

would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than a

quarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, an

entirely different object. If these works are to resist a regular siege,

they are certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp

to give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the Danube for a large

army, they are appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war

like that of 1809, and, if existing then, would probably have saved the

capital.

To complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better to

encircle Linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have built

seven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of the

Traun, within a direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as to

have included for the camp only the curved space between Linz, the

Traun, and the Danube. Then the double advantage of a fortress of the

first rank and a camp under its guns would have been united, and, even

if not quite so large, would have answered for a large army,

particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort of

Perlingsberg had been preserved.

TÊTES DE PONTS.

_Têtes de ponts_ are the most important of all field-works. The

difficulties of crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the face

of the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works,

which can be less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since if

the bridges are safe an army is insured from the disastrous events which

may attend a rapid retreat across a large river.

_Têtes de ponts_ are doubly advantageous when they are as it were

_keeps_ for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they also

cover the bank opposite to the location of the camp, since then they

will mutually support each other. It is needless to state that these

works are particularly important in an enemy's country and upon all

fronts where there are no permanent works. It may be observed that the

principal difference between the system of intrenched camps and that of

_têtes de ponts_ is that the best intrenched camps are composed of

detached and closed works, while _têtes de ponts_ usually consist of

contiguous works not closed. An intrenched line to admit of defense must

be occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which would generally

require a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments are

detached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them.

The attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequent

part of this volume.

ARTICLE XXVIII.

Strategic Operations in Mountains.

A mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, under

four different aspects. It may be the whole theater of the war, or it

may be but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, or

there may be a line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army may

debouch into large and rich plains.

If Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, some parts of Turkey and

Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, be excepted, in the European countries

the mountains are in single ranges. In these cases there is but a

difficult defile to cross,--a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome,

is an advantage rather than an objection. In fact, the range once

crossed and the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may

be regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and

find a temporary refuge. The only essential precaution to be observed

is, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line of

retreat. The part of the Alps between France and Italy, and the

Pyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad,) are of this

nature. The mountains of Bohemia and of the Black Forest, and the

Vosges, belong to this class. In Catalonia the mountains cover the whole

country as far as the Ebro: if the war were limited to this province,

the combinations would not be the same as if there were but a line of

mountains. Hungary in this respect differs little from Lombardy and

Castile; for if the Crapacks in the eastern and northern part are as

marked a feature as the Pyrenees, they are still but a temporary

obstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of

the Waag, of the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields of

Mongatsch, would have the vast plains between the Danube and the Theiss

for a field of operations. The only difference would be in the roads,

which in the Alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in Hungary

there are none of much value. In its northern part, this chain, though

not so high, becomes broader, and would seem to belong to that class of

fields of operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as its

evacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the valleys of the

Waag or the Theiss, it must be regarded as a temporary barrier. The

attack and defense of this country, however, would be a strategic study

of the most interesting character.

When an extremely mountainous country, such as the Tyrol or Switzerland,

is but a zone of operations, the importance of these mountains is

secondary, and they must be observed like a fortress, the armies

deciding the great contests in the valleys. It will, of course, be

otherwise if this be the whole field.

It has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave

control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave

control of the mountains. The Archduke Charles, a very intelligent and

competent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that

the valley of the Danube is the key of Southern Germany. However, in

this kind of questions much depends upon the relative forces and their

arrangement in the country. If sixty thousand French were advancing on

Bavaria in presence of an equal force of Austrians, and the latter

should throw thirty thousand men into the Tyrol, intending to replace

them by reinforcements on its arrival on the Inn, it would be difficult

for the French to push on as far as this line, leaving so large a force

on its flanks masters of the outlets of Scharnitz, Fussen, Kufstein, and

Lofers. But if the French force were one hundred and twenty thousand

men, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority over

the army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to

mask the passes of the Tyrol and extend its progress as far as Linz,--as

Moreau did in 1800.

Thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as only

accessory zones. If we regard them as the principal fields of

operations, the strategic problem seems to be more complicated. The

campaigns of 1799 and 1800 are equally rich in instruction on this

branch of the art. In my account of them I have endeavored to bring out

their teachings by a historical exposition of the events; and I cannot

do better than refer my readers to it.

When we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of Switzerland by

the French Directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent of

the theater of operations and making it reach from the Texel to Naples,

we cannot too much applaud the wisdom of France and Austria in the

transactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of

Switzerland. Every one will be convinced of this by carefully studying

the interesting campaigns of the Archduke Charles, Suwaroff, and

Massena in 1799, and those of Napoleon and Moreau in 1800. The first is

a model for operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second is

a model for wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decided

on the plains.

I will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from this

study.

When a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principal

theater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirely

based upon maxims applicable in an open country.

Transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operations

of the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. In

such a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a small

number of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advanced

guards of sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to provide

means for defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate

these valleys will be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for

the passage of an army, transversal marches can only be made by small

bodies of light troops.

The important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the

larger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few in

number; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its

forces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to direct

attacks to dislodge it.

However, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare and

difficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. On the

contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of these

centers of communication between the large valleys upon the line of

retreat of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than it

would be in an open country; since the occupation of one or two

difficult defiles will often be sufficient to cause the ruin of the

whole army.

If the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be

admitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessity

of covering all the outlets by which an attack in force may be made

upon the decisive points, and of the difficulties of the transversal

marches which it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points.

In order to complete what I have said upon this kind of marches and the

difficulties of directing them, I will refer to what Napoleon did in

1805 to cut off Mack from Ulm. If this operation was facilitated by the

hundred roads which cross Swabia in all directions, and if it would have

been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal

routes, to make the long circuit from Donauwerth by Augsburg to

Memmingen, it is also true that Mack could by these same hundred roads

have effected his retreat with much greater facility than if he had been

entrapped in one of the valleys of Switzerland or of the Tyrol, from

which there was but a single outlet.

On the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level country

concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter to

occupy all the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will be

easy for the latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a very

mountainous country, where there are ordinarily but one or two principal

routes into which other valleys open, even from the direction of the

enemy, the concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since serious

inconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys be not

observed.

Nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense in

mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when we

attempt simply to give advice in such cases,--to say nothing of laying

down maxims for them. If it were but a question of the defense of a

single definite front of small extent, consisting of four or five

converging valleys, the common junction of which is at a distance of two

or three short marches from the summits of the ranges, it would be

easier of solution. It would then be sufficient to recommend the

construction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily turned

point of each of these valleys. Protected by these forts, a few brigades

of infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage, while half the

army should be held in reserve at the junction, where it would be in

position either to sustain the advanced guards most seriously

threatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when he

debouches. If to this be added good instructions to the commanders of

the advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point for

rendezvous when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to

continue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the

general on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the

many difficulties which the country offers to the assailant. But, if

there be other fronts like this upon the right and left, all of which

are to be defended, the problem is changed: the difficulties of the

defense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this system of a

cordon of forts becomes dangerous,--while it is not easy to adopt a

better one.

We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration

of the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After Jourdan's

defeat at Stockach, he occupied the line from Basel by Schaffhausen and

Rheineck to Saint-Gothard, and thence by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He had

enemies in front of Basel, at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch,

and at Chur; Bellegarde threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italian

army menaced the Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defend

such a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great

valleys, thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura, toward

Soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the

trap in which the French army was placed. This was, then, the pivot of

the defense. But how could he leave Schaffhausen unprotected? how

abandon Rheineck and the Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and the

approach by Berne, without surrendering the whole of Switzerland to the

Coalition? And if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would

be his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching

force? It is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate the

masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrender

the keys of the country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where an

inferior army could be concentrated without compromising it.

After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, it

seemed that the only strategic point for Massena to defend was the line

of the Jura. He was rash enough to stand upon the Albis,--a line shorter

than that of the Rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance

to the attacks of the Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going into

Lombardy by the Valtellina, had marched to Berne or made a junction with

the archduke, Massena would have been ruined. These events seem to prove

that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defense

in a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense,

because it necessitates a division of the troops. This can only be

remedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the

offensive.

General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on

the contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind

of war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he

might lose the advantages of the local defenses. He, however, ends by

demonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an active

attack,--which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in

mountains than in plains. If there could be any doubt on this point, it

ought to be dispelled by Massena's campaign in Switzerland, where he

sustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, even

when he was obliged to seek him on the Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard.

Napoleon's course was similar in 1796 in the Tyrol, when he was opposed

to Wurmser and Alvinzi.

As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading

the events of Suwaroff's expedition by the Saint-Gothard upon the

Muttenthal. While we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to

capture Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire the

presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that

general and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and the

Muttenthal, Suwaroff was placed in the same position as Lecourbe had

been, and extricated himself with equal ability. Not less extraordinary

was the ten days' campaign of General Molitor, who with four thousand

men was surrounded in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand

allies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth after

four admirable fights. These events teach us the vanity of all theory

_in details_, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will

is worth more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons,

need I say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not

to risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights? Shall I

say also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operations

should be directed upon the communications of the enemy? And, finally,

that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of the

great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with great

mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means of

defending the country?

I cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous

countries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a

national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes

with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every

advance is then dearly bought. But to be successful it is always

necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or

less numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of

Stanz and of the Tyrol.

The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case:

it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are

extensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous.

In the first case there is little more to be done than this,--viz.: make

demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the

enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which

promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break

through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the

defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole

line is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and the capture of

Leutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men

on Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizing

this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show

that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous

mountain-ranges can generally be forced.

The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army

which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains between

Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those

_insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose him

it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have

already seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and

Italians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it

inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral

issues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into

these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army

toward Turin or Carignano.

When we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and

the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to

regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a

single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought

to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In

my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to

confirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the

columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six

roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened;

but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the

routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the

enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of the

Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the

center, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to

divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march.

The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much

greater and more difficult task than where a dénouement may be

accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of

battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous

region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it

would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow

and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the

invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or

three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated,

the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the

junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should be

driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys.

Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland would

be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with

their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple

number.

To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with

localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies,

would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best

school for this kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 by

the Archduke Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in my

History of the Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of

the Grisons by Ségur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr

and Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and the

passage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good guides in this

study.

ARTICLE XXIX.

Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.

There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those

which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The

second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of

country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile.

The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea

by means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the

seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includes

the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great,

but where a powerful state is attacked.

As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the

Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly

be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of

these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its

base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the

same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of

defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their

arsenals;--while in the other case its resources would be upon the

Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad

fate of many of these great invasions.

In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is

merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own

interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in

the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of

all the armies,--particularly if he belong to the state which is not a

principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. General

Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty

thousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in the

mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand

men brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus

found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity

of Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his

misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of

about seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been

hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. The

battle of Austerlitz--due to a fault of Weyrother--endangered the

Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost became

the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the

opportunity of regaining its own country.

The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the

expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at Bergen in

Holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander

under such circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was less

disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his

communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in

no respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of

the French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great

abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were

allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political

ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension

which may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have

been cited in Article XIX., on political objective points.

History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions

across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with

forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were

necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to

the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran

empires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery

and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly

since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer

together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining

each other, no such events have taken place.

Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the

Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of

Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been

scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of

Charles XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions;

for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in

Germany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the

Swedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and,

besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no

one but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe

from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will be

imitated.

Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all

invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the

same operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from

these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of

operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones

applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable,

although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812,

although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His

care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while

Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered

Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that he

had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself

safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply

on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success.

If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic

precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of

troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at

Wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was

unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which

that general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do

not speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after the

conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune;

although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place

immediately. He has also been accused of having too much despised

distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin.

Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to

know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of

wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been

possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without having

previously defeated the Russian army.

It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of

Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a _dénouement_

between Wilna and the Dwina. Although he fully appreciated the bravery

of the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the

people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and

sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have

given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia,

he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and

enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the

greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm.

The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point

for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never

to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance

of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a

proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which

may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of

resuming the offensive." As to the precautions to be observed in these

operations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on the

safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual

bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to

these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles,

seasons, and countries,--in short, accuracy in calculation and

moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried

too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can

insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five

or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly

ruined nations and armies.

Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been

rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in

date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the

sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers,

has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships,

but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions.

It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now

is very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest

of Greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when

Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his

fleet coasted the shore.

Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that

the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of

immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert.

Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress

depends upon the winds,--which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind

of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare

occurrence.

The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of

operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are

the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations

of war.

Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones,

are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking

Cadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon

the Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the

Tagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of

Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going

as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable

troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all

be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be

undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in

view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general.

Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions

as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in

Article VI., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not

be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change of

policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that

day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551,

and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the

strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their

co-operation cannot be obtained.

EPITOME OF STRATEGY

* * * * *

The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled

by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which

enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the

definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important

operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that

we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. Therefore, before treating

of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations

of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of

which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made.

By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will

be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give

a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.

From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the

manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters

of operations is found in what follows:--

1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the

reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in

accordance with Article XVIII.

2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic

field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy

with the least risk to one's self.

3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of

operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke

Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for

retreats parallel to the frontiers.

On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success

of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the

extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was

successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations

upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined

by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims

presented in Article XXI.

4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them

such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the

forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from

affording each other mutual support.

5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic

positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important

strategic points of the theater of war.

6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and

activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may

be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of

the hostile army.

The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an

army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the

enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will

be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive

strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to

the enemy can be given.

However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive

course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with

attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and

successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy,

thus insuring their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly and

continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of

gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom.

The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths most

satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in 1793, already

mentioned in Article XXIV., and the details of which may be found in

Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Forty

battalions, carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, and

Landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four

victories and saved France. The whole science of marches would have been

found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive

strategic point. The Austrian was then the principal army of the

Coalition, and its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was upon

the Meuse that a general effort of the French would have inflicted the

most severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the most

pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic

principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most

decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at Ratisbon.

The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples.

It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be

able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of

war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own

country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and

of _têtes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the great

decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of

the science. We have already seen how we are to recognize these lines

and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. Napoleon has

afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the Simplon and

Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has profited by it in the roads from

the Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as by

different fortified places projected or completed.

CHAPTER IV.

GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.

Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great

questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies to

the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance,

the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and

fortune, gains victories.

Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to

battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in

tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of

the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that

point the possession of which promises the most important results.

Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding

features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have

been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched

battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that

a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same

character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations.

The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which

are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the

order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the

plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details,

the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers

subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the

proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm,

superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and

the manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, as

well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and

their results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting

that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot

result in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a few

brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish

before his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning his

position. At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the

maneuver more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805.

As is evident from Article XXXII., I by no means intend to discourage

the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of

it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and

opportunely, and I am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's

design to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at the

same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than

tactical combinations to accomplish it.

There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or those

fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy's

attack; 2d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another in

position; 3d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the

collision of two armies meeting on the march. We will examine in

succession the different combinations they present.

ARTICLE XXX.

Positions and Defensive Battles.

When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line

of battle. From the general definitions given at the beginning of this

work, it will appear that I make a distinction between _lines of battle_

and _orders of battle_,--things which have been constantly confounded. I

will designate as a _line of battle_ the position occupied by

battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will

take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will

await attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it is

the right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tactical

intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fully

explained in Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will designate as an

_order of battle_ an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to

execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the

oblique order, the perpendicular order.

This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper

distinction between two things which should by no means be

confounded.[22] From the nature of the two things, it is evident that

the _line of battle_ belongs especially to defensive arrangements;

because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will

be must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of

battle. _Order of battle_, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of

troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some

maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to

offensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended that the

line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body of

troops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of a

position, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or

any other. I refer above only to ordinary cases.

Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war of

positions, an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at a

favorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand for the

purpose of there fighting a defensive battle. Such a position may be

taken up when the object is to cover an important objective point, such

as a capital, large depots, or a decisive strategic point which controls

the surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege.

There are two kinds of positions,--the _strategic_, which has been

discussed in Article XX., and the _tactical_. The latter, again, are

subdivided. In the first place, there are intrenched positions occupied

to await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected,--in a

word, intrenched camps. Their relations to strategic operations have

been treated in Article XXVII., and their attack and defense are

discussed in Article XXXV. Secondly, we have positions naturally strong,

where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. Third

and last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the

defensive. The characteristics to be sought in these positions vary

according to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importance

not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too

extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep

and difficult of access,--quite suitable places, probably, for temporary

camps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. A position of this

kind, to be really strong, must be not only steep and difficult of

access, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it,

should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troops

forming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles

presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy

than for the assailed. For example, it is certain that Massena, in

taking the strong position of the Albis, would have made a great error

if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it was

exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the same reason,

Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a

good choice of position at Waterloo, where all the avenues of approach

were well swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover,

rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a

battle-ground.

The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are

the following:--

1. To have the communications to the front such as to make it

easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him to

approach the line of battle.

2. To give the artillery all its effect in the defense.

3. To have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of

troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point

deemed the proper one.

4. To be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements.

5. To have an unobstructed line of retreat.

6. To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or

artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon

their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or

at least some point of the front.

This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on

a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest

reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the

broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed

to afford perfect protection. This danger--about which there can be

no doubt--gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy

defense are better on a battle-field than insurmountable

obstacles.[23]

7. Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by

throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous; because a

crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may

cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of

the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind

the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the

required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground

must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full

details on this point are given in the description of the battle of

Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years' War.)

8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the

flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other

points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack

upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most

advantageous for defense,--as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo.

Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest

accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the

insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack

Wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered.

When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to

hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in

order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining

idle spectators of it.

The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but

palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is

to _know_ how to take the offensive at a proper time, and _to take it_.

Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been

mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us

to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo.

Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road

behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as

Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that

such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely

open field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure

to very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a

portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would,

in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great

part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain.

There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a

forest,--this statement being made upon the supposition that there are

at least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for

retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press

too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank

movement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest,

as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if,

as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the center; for

this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and

give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads.

When discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varying

chances which the two systems, the _defensive_ and the _offensive_, give

rise to; and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking the

initiative has the great advantage of bringing up its troops and

striking a blow where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon

the defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction, is

often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its movements by

those of the enemy. We have also seen that in tactics these advantages

are not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller

extent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal his

movements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once

counteract them by the aid of a good reserve. Moreover, the party

advancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages arising

from accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile

line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always

inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges,

farm-houses, villages, &c., which must either be taken possession of or

be passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's

batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to a

greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire

either of musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of

these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages

resulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages.

However undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still more

manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history.

Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if

attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by

all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to

take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest

success. A general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping

strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give

way when properly attacked. It is not so, however, with a general who

indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fall

upon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and

transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward

movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength

into the action at the most important point,--a thing altogether

impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. In fact, a general

who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has

the advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previously

arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries

placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very

dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and

when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly

assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the

advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral

effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed

to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops.

A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success

either the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,--1st,

that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know

how to take the offensive at favorable moments; 2d, that his

_coup-d'oeil_ be certain and his coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be able

to rely surely upon his troops; 4th, that, in retaking the offensive, he

should by no means neglect to apply the general principle which would

have regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; 5th,

that he strike his blows upon decisive points. These truths are

demonstrated by Napoleon's course at Rivoli and Austerlitz, as well as

by Wellington's at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at Waterloo.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 22: It is from no desire to make innovations that I have

modified old terms or made new. In the development of a science, it is

wrong for the same word to designate two very different things; and, if

we continue to apply the term _order of battle_ to the disposition of

troops in line, it must be improper to designate certain important

maneuvers by the terms _oblique order of battle_, _concave order of

battle_, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms _oblique

system of battle_, &c.

I prefer the method of designation I have adopted. The _order of battle_

on paper may take the name _plan of organization_, and the ordinary

formation of troops upon the ground will then be called _line of

battle_.]

[Footnote 23: The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and

the rivulet of Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than the

famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the Danube,

in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps be said that

the courage of the defenders in the two cases was not the same; but,

throwing out of consideration this chance, it must be granted that the

difficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need not

be insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. At Elchingen

the great height and steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almost

ineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense.]

ARTICLE XXXI.

Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle.

We understand by offensive battles those which an army fights when

assaulting another in position.[24] An army reduced to the strategic

defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army

receiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take the

offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it. History furnishes

numerous examples of battles of each of these kinds. As defensive

battles have been discussed in the preceding article, and the advantages

of the defensive been pointed out, we will now proceed to the

consideration of offensive movements.

It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage

over the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than the

latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty.

As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack

must be adopted; and that is what I have thought ought to be called

_order of battle_.

It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without

a detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely

known. In either case it should be well understood that there is in

every battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more than

of any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder to

make a proper application of the principles of war: arrangements should

therefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point.

The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already

stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different

localities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the

arrangement of the contending forces. For example, suppose an enemy's

flank to rest upon high ground from which his whole line might be

attained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tactically

considered; but it may happen that the height in question is very

difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the least

importance, strategically considered. At the battle of Bautzen the left

of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of Bohemia, which province

was at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tactically

considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be

held, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line

of retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by forcing the

right, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat and

throw the allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all

their _matériel_ and a great part of the personnel of their army. This

course was also easier for them on account of the difference in the

features of the ground, led to more important results, and would have

diminished the obstacles in the future.

The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has been stated:

1. The topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical

key; 2. The decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which

combines strategic with topographical advantages; 3. When the

difficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategic

point of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point;

4. It is nevertheless true that the determination of this point depends

very much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. Thus, in lines

of battle too much extended and divided the center will always be the

proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center is

the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there,

it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive point in this

case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the numerical

superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon

both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior

numerically to the enemy's. It appears, therefore, that all the

combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to

obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points

mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success,--a

point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned.

The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or

to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruin

his army completely. An enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him at

some point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank

and rear, or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him

in front while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line

turned.

To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make

choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used.

At least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: 1. The simple

parallel order; 2. The parallel order with a defensive or offensive

crotchet; 3. The order reinforced upon one or both wings; 4. The order

reinforced in the center; 5. The simple oblique order, or the oblique

reinforced on the attacking wing; 6 and 7. The perpendicular order on

one or both wings; 8. The concave order; 9. The convex order; 10. The

order by echelon on one or both wings; 11. The order by echelon on the

center; 12. The order resulting from a strong combined attack upon the

center and one extremity simultaneously. (See Figs. 5 to 16.)

[Illustration: Fig. 5.[25]

A TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

____________________________|____________________________ B ]

Each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has been

stated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended to

turn the enemy's line. In order to a proper appreciation of the merits

of each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of the

general principles which have been laid down. For example, it is

manifest that the parallel order (Fig. 5) is worst of all, for it

requires no skill to fight one line against another, battalion against

battalion, with equal chances of success on either side: no tactical

skill is needed in such a battle.

There is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order,

which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in great

strategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy's

communications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering its

own; when the battle takes place between them, that army which has

reached the rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, having

effected the decisive maneuver previous to the battle, all its efforts

should now be directed toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor to

open a way through for himself. Except for this single case, the

parallel order is the worst of all. I do not mean to say that a battle

cannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the other must

gain the victory if the contest is continued; and the advantage will

then be upon his side who has the best troops, who best knows when to

engage them, who best manages his reserve and is most favored by

fortune.

[Illustration: Fig. 6.

| |

| |

A | |B

TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT |

|

______________________|________________________|

B

]

The parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (Fig. 6) is most

usually adopted in a defensive position. It may be also the result of an

offensive combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in

the case of defense it is to the rear. The battle of Prague is a very

remarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed if

properly attacked.

[Illustration: Fig. 7.

A

TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

____|___

___________________|____________________

B ____|___

]

The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (Fig. 7,) or upon the

center, (Fig. 8, page 190,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more

favorable than the two preceding ones, and is also much more in

accordance with the general principles which have been laid down;

although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of the

line which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have its own

safety compromised if placed in line parallel to the enemy.

[Illustration: Fig. 8.

A

TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

________|________

_________________

B _________________

]

[Illustration: Fig. 9.]

The oblique order (Fig. 9) is the best for an inferior force attacking a

superior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the main

strength of the forces against a single point of the enemy's line, it

has two others equally important, since the weakened wing is not only

kept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the double

duty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and of

being at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged

wing. This order was used by the celebrated Epaminondas at the battles

of Leuctra and Mantinea. The most brilliant example of its use in modern

times was given by Frederick the Great at the battle of Leuthen. (See

Chapter VII. of Treatise on Grand Operations.)

[Illustration: Fig. 10.

C |

\ |

\ |

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/ |

/ |

/ |

C |

B-|

|

|

|

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]

[Illustration: Fig. 11.

| |

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| ___________A______________ |

| |

| |

| |

| |

| |

| |

|-B B-|

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]

The perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in Figs. 10 and

11, can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the direction

along which the primary tactical movements might be made in a battle.

Two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions

indicated in these figures; for if the army B were to take its first

position on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of the army

A, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line;

and even the army B, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond the

extremity of A, must of necessity turn its columns either to the right

or the left, in order to bring them near the enemy's line, and so take

him in reverse, as at C, the result being two oblique lines, as shown in

Fig. 10. The inference is that one division of the assailing army would

take a position perpendicular to the enemy's wing, whilst the remainder

of the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him; and

this would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders shown in

Figures 9 and 16.

The attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may be

very advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is very

decidedly superior in numbers; for, if the fundamental principle is to

bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker

army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior

force. This truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on.

[Illustration: Fig. 12.]

The order concave in the center (Fig. 12) has found advocates since the

day when Hannibal by its use gained the battle of Cannæ. This order may

indeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to

it; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him,

and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. But, if this order

is adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on

the center, has only to attack the wings, which present their

extremities and are in precisely the same relative situation as if they

had been assailed in flank. This order would, therefore, be scarcely

ever used except against an enemy who had taken the convex order to

fight a battle, as will be seen farther on.

[Illustration: Fig. 12, _bis_.]

An army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken line

with the center retired, (Fig. 12, _bis_.) If several writers may be

believed, such an arrangement gave the victory to the English on the

famous days of Crécy and Agincourt. This order is certainly better than

a semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to attack,

whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and preserving all the

advantages of concentration of fire. These advantages vanish if the

enemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, is

content to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort upon

one wing. Essling, in 1809, is an example of the advantageous use of a

concave line; but it must not be inferred that Napoleon committed an

error in attacking the center; for an army fighting with the Danube

behind it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges of

communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver at

pleasure.

[Illustration: Fig. 13.]

The convex order with the center salient (Fig. 13) answers for an

engagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings must

be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when a

defensive battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be

passed and the defile covered, as at Leipsic; and, finally, it may

become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. If

an enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a single

wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army.[26]

The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and were successful, because

the Prince of Coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the center

or upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or six

diverging lines, and particularly upon both wings at once. Nearly the

same convex order was adopted at Essling, and during the second and

third days of the famous battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it had

just the result that might have been expected.

[Illustration: Fig. 14

A

TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ B _____

_______

]

The order by echelon upon the two wings Fig. 14 is of the same nature as

the perpendicular order, (Fig. 11,) being, however, better than that,

because, the echelons being nearest each other in the direction where

the reserve would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both as

regards room and time, to throw himself into the interval of the center

and make at that point a threatening counter-attack.

[Illustration: Fig. 15

A

TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

___|___

___|__ __|___

_____ _____

_____B B_____

_____ _____

]

The order by echelon on the center (Fig. 15) may be used with special

success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too

extended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from the

wings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be

probably destroyed. But, applying the test of the same fundamental

principle, this order of attack would appear to be less certain of

success against an army having a connected and closed line; for the

reserve being generally near the center, and the wings being able to act

either by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremost

echelons, might readily repulse them.

If this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedge

or _boar's head_ of the ancients, and the column of Winkelried, it also

differs from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solid

mass,--an impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of

artillery,--it would have a large open space in the middle, which would

render movements more easy. This formation is suitable, as has been

said, for penetrating the center of a line too much extended, and might

be equally successful against a line unavoidably immovable; but if the

wings of the attacked line are brought at a proper time against the

flanks of the foremost echelons, disagreeable consequences might result.

A parallel order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be

a much better arrangement, (Figs. 8 and 16;) for the parallel line in

this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as to

the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking the echelons

of the center by the flank.

This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of the

intrenched camp of Buntzelwitz. (Treatise on Grand Operations, chapter

xxviii.) In such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certain

that the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments,

there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. But, this

formation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point

of his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made

upon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack.

[Illustration Fig 16.]

The order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at the

same time (Fig. 16) is better than the preceding, especially in an

attack upon an enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. It may

even be called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. The

attack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, prevents

the assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking him in flank,

as was done by Hannibal and Marshal Saxe. The enemy's wing which is

hemmed in between the attacks on the center and at the extremity, having

to contend with nearly the entire opposing force, will be defeated and

probably destroyed. It was this maneuver which gave Napoleon his

victories of Wagram and Ligny. This was what he wished to attempt at

Borodino,--where he obtained only a partial success, on account of the

heroic conduct of the Russian left and the division of Paskevitch in the

famous central redoubt, and on account of the arrival of Baggavout's

corps on the wing he hoped to outflank. He used it also at

Bautzen,--where an unprecedented success would have been the result, but

for an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wing

intended to cut off the allies from the road to Wurschen, every

arrangement having been made with that view.

It should be observed that these different orders are not to be

understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A general

who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon

paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be

likely to suffer defeat. This is particularly true as battles are now

fought. In the time of Louis XIV. or of Frederick, it was possible to

form lines of battle almost as regular as the geometrical figures,

because armies camped under tents, almost always closely collected

together, and were in presence of each other several days, thus giving

ample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columns

to be at regular distances from each other. But in our day,--when armies

bivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater mobility,

when they take position near each other in obedience to orders given

them while out of reach of the general's eye, and often when there has

been no time for thorough examination of the enemy's position,--finally,

when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of

battle,--under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must be

laid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. These figures

have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate

arrangements.

If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the

influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of

winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of

battle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of

maneuvers arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different;

for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to

render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous

fractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give

good ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is

to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive

maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, is

to result in victory.

Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be

understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief,

excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective

_coup-d'oeil militaire_,--every thing of this kind may interfere with

the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without

speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the

arrival of a corps at the appointed place.

Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisive

maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuvers

seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than

those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to

previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to

decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the

expected result. Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the

moment when Blücher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont,

nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and

they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In like

manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the retreat of the

allies during the night of the 20th of May could alone have saved them,

for on the 21st it was too late; and, if Ney had executed better what

he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one.

As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the

co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army,

with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank,

it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends

upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely

seen. This subject will be considered in Art. XXXII.

Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an

order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin

without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the

collision may have been expected. This uncertainty results either from

circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's

position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be

still expected to arrive on the field.

From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to

reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that

the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an

engagement,--an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases

cited above. Indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it

is probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy

lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the

party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm

will burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to

be used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar efforts

to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attack

shall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directed

against the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once.

Whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a

resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. Even in

unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,--which will, it is

hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of the

different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless.

There is nothing even in Napoleon's battles which disproves my

assertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of being

represented by lines accurately laid down. We see him, however, at

Rivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward

the center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy.

At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. At

Leipsic, Essling, and Brienne he used a kind of convex order very like

Fig. 11. At Wagram his order was altogether like Fig. 16, bringing up

two masses upon the center and right, while keeping back the left wing;

and this he wished to repeat at Borodino and at Waterloo before the

Prussians came up. At Eylau, although the collision was almost entirely

unforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and offensive

movement of the Russians, he outflanked their left almost

perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to break

through the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on the

center being repulsed at eleven o'clock, whilst Davoust did not attack

vigorously upon the left until toward one. At Dresden he attacked by the

two wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his center

was covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition,

the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the

enemy's line of retreat. At Marengo, if we may credit Napoleon himself,

the oblique order he assumed, resting his right at Castel Ceriole, saved

him from almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles won by

strategy before they were fought, tactics having but little to do with

them. At Ulm there was not even a regular battle.

I think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to mark

out upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be

used in tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may nevertheless

bear in mind the orders which have been indicated above, and may so

combine his troops on the battle-field that the arrangement shall be

similar to one of them. He should endeavor in all his combinations,

whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to

form a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battle-field;

and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy's

line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy

requires him to operate. He will then give his attention and efforts to

this point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or

watch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point

the possession of which will insure him the victory. Acting thus, he

will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can

impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in the

most perfect manner. The manner of determining the decisive point of a

battle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (Art. XIX.)

Having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to me

that this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made in

the Memoirs of Napoleon published by General Montholon.

The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern

invention, a theorist's fancy,--an opinion I can by no means share; for

the oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen it

used with my own eyes. This assertion of Napoleon's seems the more

remarkable because Napoleon himself boasted of having used, at Marengo,

the very order of which he thus denies the existence.

If we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigid

and precise manner inculcated by General Ruchel at the Berlin school.

Napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but I

repeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and

when such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it

can only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by

the use of a known symbol. It is nevertheless true that every line of

battle which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's must

be oblique of necessity. If one army attacks the extremity of another

army, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing troops upon it

while the weakened wing is kept retired from attack, the direction of

the line must of necessity be a little oblique, since one end of it

will be nearer the enemy than the other. The oblique order is so far

from being a mere fancy that we see it used when the order is that by

echelons on one wing, (Fig. 14.)

As to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be denied

that at Essling and Fleurus the general arrangement of the Austrians was

a concave line, and that of the French a convex. In these orders

parallel lines may be used as in the case of straight lines, and they

would be classified as belonging to the parallel system when no part of

the line was more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than

another.

Laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometrical

figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battles

in a truly scientific manner, the following points must be attended

to:--

1. An offensive order of battle should have for its object to force

the enemy from his position by all reasonable means.

2. The maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to overwhelm

one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same time. An

enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and

turning his position.

3. These attempts have a much greater probability of success if

concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault.

4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time, without

having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the

rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very

strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points.

5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at least

half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing,

while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of

attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique

line.

6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or

otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform

strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point.

7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the

attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be

such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position,

and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to

fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least

expect to meet it.

8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best method

to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. An order

of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of

the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset.

A skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting

alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good

combination. In the practical use of this system many variations

must arise from differences in the _coup-d'oeil_ of commanders, the

_morale_ of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers

and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &c.

9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy

from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best

means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can

be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the

direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better

results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing

which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may when thus

threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if

attacked by main force.

History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers,

especially when used against generals of weak character; and,

although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and

the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete

successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a

skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them

when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these

turning movements with attacks by main force.

10. The combination of these two methods--that is to say, the

attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver--will render

the victory more certain than the use of either separately; but,

in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in

presence of a contemptible enemy.

11. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force

is the following:--Throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and

well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion by

vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus

gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in front

by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry.

But, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the

first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that,

the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking

party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral

effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat

of the second and cause the general in command to lose his presence

of mind. In fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat

disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to

replace them by those of the second line, because they generally

follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within

musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to

substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the

moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in

repelling the attack.