the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of
the defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this by
his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many
opportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington's course
was mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most
suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest
talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these
two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during
the progress of a defensive war.
ARTICLE XVII.
Of the Theater of Operations.
The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties
may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or
to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest.
When the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both
hemispheres,--as has happened in contests between France and England
since the time of Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined,
and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the
other army. The theater of a continental war between France and Austria
may be confined to Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if the
German States take part therein.
Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole
theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which
strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In the
second case each army will have its own independent theater of
operations. The _theater of operations_ of an army embraces all the
territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to
defend. If the army operates independently, it should not attempt any
maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in
danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of
action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields.
If, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of
operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the
general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common
object.
Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one
or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:--
1. Of a fixed base of operations.
2. Of a principal objective point.
3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense.
4. Of zones and lines of operations.
5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications.
6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the
enemy.
7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important,
either for the offensive or defensive.
8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective
point and the primary base.
9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse.
For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austria
with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and
starting from Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime
Alps, respectively. The section of country which each of these armies
traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of
operations. But if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige without
concerted action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but a
zone becomes for that army a theater of operations.
In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective
point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point
with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive.
It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations
_par excellence._ Now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to
move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line
of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of
maneuver. It would be much more accurate to say that rivers are
excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment
of a good line of operations, but never the line itself.
It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly
to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because
they facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich cities
for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these
points must be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made a
desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an
individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and
the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover,
was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the use
of converging routes? Besides, these routes are more favorable for
defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial
lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are
pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses
separately.
Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in
strategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary,
these points are more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but also
that if more rare they are more important and more decisive.
Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war,
inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the
Rhetian Alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put his
foot."
Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have
united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of
carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of
partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the
heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the
decisive points,--the junctions of the large valleys.
These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader
that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many
points that admit of discussion.
The most important topographical or artificial features which make up
the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be
examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to
remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the
general. The great leader who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the
passage of the Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of
these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and
a walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo.
ARTICLE XVIII.
Bases of Operations.
A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army
obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it
takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which
it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively.
The base of operations is most generally that of supply,--though not
necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance,
a French army upon the Elbe might be subsisted from Westphalia or
Franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine.
When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be
alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line
of defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will always
be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its
own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a
vast difference between those parts of the country without military
positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those
other portions where these military resources are found; and these
latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An army may
have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a French army in
Germany will have the Rhine for its first base; it may have others
beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but
if it is driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either the
Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine, and a fourth
upon the Loire.
These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the
first. On the contrary, a total change of direction may become
necessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a good
base on Béfort or Besançon, on Mézières or Sedan, as the Russian army
after the evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east and
established itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern provinces.
These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often
decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the
country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain
himself there. A base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being
held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired.
The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in
covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from
it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so
favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more
retired.
A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of
sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There
should be a _tête de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams.
All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions
have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to
that of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of
the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides
almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus
affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of
two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely
apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an
unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate.
The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military
Operations:--
"The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a
great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and,
consequently, upon the direction of the bases.
[Illustration: Fig. 1.]
"If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more
or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign,
may hold one of these faces,--perhaps two,--while the enemy
occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable
obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead
to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the
theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and
that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1,
p. 79. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the
line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of
the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the
Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces,
the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for
them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four
faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The
French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of
operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B
D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the lines
of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could
communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine.
"The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He
occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by Halle
and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea, represented
by the side A B. The result is well known.
"The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them
such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without
losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended position, and the
bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications
with the base C D; and this is exactly the maneuvers of Marengo,
Ulm, and Jena.
"When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always
bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and
closes one side of the square. This may not be an obstacle
insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as
an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a
defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it.
The soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and
fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with
impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none
the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of
war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed
in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached
the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the
frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make
it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in
Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has
control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of
establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided,
since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the
shortened side,--as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806,
with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the
Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier of
Franconia."
[Illustration: Fig. 2.]
The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of my
opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the
French army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense
advantages which the line of the Elbe would otherwise have afforded
Napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor.
Likewise, in 1812, by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the
Oka and Kalouga, the Russians were able to execute their flank march
upon Wiazma and Krasnoi.
If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only
be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of
the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of
operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications
and line of retreat.
It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable
in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics may
object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in
favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against
double lines of operations with equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The
objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a
perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient,
which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On the
other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should
be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be
sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies,
while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,--as was
done in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety
degrees formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and
thence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another
perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions by his
left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the
enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the
extremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen, which carried
him in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached divisions
having already rejoined him.
In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main,
forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first
and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the
extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussians
at Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat.
If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them
being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is
well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be
partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in
Article XX.
Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of
bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be
favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others,
as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always
exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of
the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be
favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day
praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of
Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of
Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers all
the avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus not
only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible
line of retreat, which was upon the fleet.
Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras
secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes,
many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good
except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of
supply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar
notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to
have posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty
thousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that
the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon
the front farthest _from_ the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all
its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the
base were established upon the coast.
An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a
diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle,
viz.: _to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained
by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe
retreat._
A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea
adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty
or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its
supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of
one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a
disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness.
However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it
may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when
your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master
of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior.
We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the
Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was
given to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan
which they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army
(even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin.
Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon
the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The army
covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and
Silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as
its base was well established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously
would have been madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer,
or had the army not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have
terminated with the first campaign.
Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own
frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or
temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's
country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they
will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in Article XXIII.
ARTICLE XIX.
Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and
Objective Points of Operations.
Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive this
title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance:
these are permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a value
from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the
hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against
them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally,
there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others
whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called DECISIVE
strategic points.
Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance,
whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the
presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical
strategic point.
A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily
be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated
operation. I think differently; for a strategic point is such
essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from
the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by
some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. It
would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not
necessarily decisive points.
Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from
their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdivided
as follows,--viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance
belong to the decisive points[7] of the theater of war, and those which
have value merely because they connect two strategic points.
To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in
their relations to maneuvers,--confining ourselves here to what relates
to the _decisive and objective points_ of the zone of operations upon
which enterprises occur.
Although these are most intimately connected, since every objective
point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater
of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all
decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations.
We will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in
our selection of the second.
I think the name of _decisive strategic point_ should be given to all
those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the
result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose
geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor
the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense
are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy
in importance the first rank among them.
The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The first
are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a
consequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take the
case of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of the
Meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the
country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the
Meuse and the North Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if
he give battle parallel to that sea.[8] Similarly, the valley of the
Danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be
looked upon as the key of Southern Germany.
Those points the possession of which would give the control of the
junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of
communication in a country are also _decisive geographic points_. For
instance, Lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the
valleys of the Rhone and Saône, and is at the center of communications
between France and Italy and between the South and East; but it would
not be a _decisive_ point unless well fortified or possessing an
extended camp with _têtes de pont_. Leipsic is most certainly a
strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the
communications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupy
both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,--if
a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive
point.
All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are
not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and
government.
In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of
exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to
any enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the
importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in
1800.
The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver,
which result from the positions of the troops on both sides.
When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian army
through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerth
or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was
cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to
support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same
position, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and
from the army of Mélas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon
him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since
this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of
retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base,
and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objective
point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Mélas by the
Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence
Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by reason
of the march of Mélas upon Nice.
It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of
maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent
operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting
forces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to
the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of
forcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the
case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although
dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet.
If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the
decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be
more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed
separately.
The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,--
1. The features of the ground.
2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.
3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.
These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles.
OBJECTIVE POINTS.
There are two classes of objective points,--objective _points of
maneuver_, and _geographical objective points_. A geographical objective
point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of
operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support
for ulterior enterprises. _Objective points of maneuver_, in
contradistinction to _geographical objectives_, derive their importance
from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile
masses.
In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point.
If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the
hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy
to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the
objective point. However, the geographical position of the capital, the
political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their
respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the
art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of
operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to
occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the capital,
the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line
of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which
would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For
instance, if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the
first objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the
second, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, the
objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain
possession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital, being
considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of
the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first
line and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French army
reduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be
to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the
forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the
river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the
first base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,--which might be
attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front.
As to the objective points of _maneuvers_,--that is, those which relate
particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile
forces,--their importance may be seen by what has already been said. The
greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in
some degree in the good choice of these points. This was the most
conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were
satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of
an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of
accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile
army,--since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no
organized force to protect them. To detect at a glance the relative
advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to
concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best
promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate
position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his
center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which
he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut
his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his
forces,--such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first
campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very
best.
When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances
and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as
in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is
not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances
of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle.
Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real
advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they
are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of
the adjoining states.
The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are
almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and
in what will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing the choice of lines
of operations.
As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend
upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other
circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of
the two parties.
In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may
be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,--such
as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory.
In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success
by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the
hostile army, as did Napoleon.
The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whose
only object is the siege of Antwerp. For very different reasons, they
could not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, five
hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to
be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by
success.
There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are
determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they
play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and
plans of cabinets. They may be called _political objective points_.
Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in
its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are
undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but
often very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great
errors in strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of the
Duke of York to Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the
operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their
failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. The
expedition of the same prince to Holland in 1799--likewise due to the
views of the English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria on
Belgium--was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the Archduke
Charles from Zurich upon Manheim,--a step quite contrary to the
interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. These
illustrations prove that political objective points should be
subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been
attained.
This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd
to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given
has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective
points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or
their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events
of the campaign. Applying this rule to the examples just given, it will
be seen that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirk
should have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; in
other words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for great
attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions of this
kind are generally included in grand diversions,--to be treated of in a
separate article.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 7: I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,--since a
line cannot be a _point_, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisive
or objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that _objective_
points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of
expression used to designate the object which an army desires to
attain.]
[Footnote 8: This only applies to continental armies, and not to the
English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have nothing
to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.]
ARTICLE XX.
Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic
Positions.
There are some parts of the military science that so closely resemble
each other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequently
confounded, although they are decidedly distinct. Such are _fronts of
operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense_, and _strategic
positions_. It is proposed in this article to show the distinction
between them and to expose their relations to each other.
FRONTS OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC FRONTS.
When the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, they
generally occupy strategic positions. The extent of the front occupied
toward the enemy is called the _strategic front_. The portion of the
theater of war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in two
or three marches is called the _front of operations_.
The resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men to
confound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other.
Rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formed
by the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while the
other embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one or
two marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includes
the ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision.
When the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one of
the armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and will
undertake to prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of the
strategic front or more to the rear. Hence the strategic front and line
of defense may coincide, as was the case in 1795 and 1796 upon the
Rhine, which was then a line of defense for both Austrians and French,
and at the same time their strategic front and front of operations. This
occasional coincidence of these lines doubtless leads persons to
confound them, while they are really very different. An army has not
necessarily a line of defense, as, for example, when it invades: when
its masses are concentrated in a single position, it has no strategic
front, but it is never without a front of operations.
The two following examples will illustrate the difference between the
different terms.
At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon's front of operations
extended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg; thence it ran along the
line of the allies toward Glogau and Breslau, (his right being at
Löwenberg,) and followed along the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His
forces were stationed on this grand front in four masses, whose
strategic positions were interior and central and presented three
different faces. Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real line
of defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a bend to
the rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and Magdeburg were beyond the
strategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extended
his operations to these points.
The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His front of
operations here really extended from the mountains of Bergamo to the
Adriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was upon the Adige, between
Lake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was upon the Mincio, between
Peschiera and Mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his
positions.
The front of operations being the space which separates the two armies,
and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of
operations. The strategic front will have the same direction, and ought
to be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend
far enough on either flank to cover this line well. However, this
direction may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or on
account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happens
that it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base and
parallel to the original line of operations. Such a change of strategic
front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this
means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained,
thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a
base with two faces. (See Art. XVIII.)
The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates these
points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which made
the Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew,
from whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka,
to maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and the
Baltic. In such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be
obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It
ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always
be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words,
that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and
should be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the Narew by Allenstein
upon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and farther from the front of the
army the _tête de pont_ of Praga and Warsaw; so that his communications
were safe, while Benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line
parallel to the Baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown
back upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon executed another very
remarkable change of strategic front in his march from Gera upon Jena
and Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in moving by his right upon
Augsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and France, and thereby
forcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at Ulm.
The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the
base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days'
duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by
important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive
blows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and good
pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base.
It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic
front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every
line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As an
example of the first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. In
order to cross the Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged to
present a double front,--in the first case, to face the valley of the
Danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon.
All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the
same precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will require
a double front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troops
into the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countries
which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception,
since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy
could themselves be cut off and captured. This necessity of double
strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an
offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always
dangerous. (See Article XXXVI.)
Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a national
or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities.
Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would
have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country
and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus,
Suchet in Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front,
while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined.
LINES OF DEFENSE.
Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategical
lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines of
defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as
the line of a fortified frontier; 2. Eventual lines of defense, which
relate only to the temporary position of an army.
The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a
well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as
ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range of
the Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since the
practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great
obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in
the valleys of Piedmont are protected by large fortresses. The Rhine,
the Oder, and the Elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of
defense, on account of the important forts found upon them.
Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and
every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary
fortifications, may be regarded as _eventual lines of defense_, both
strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress
of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in
search of a weaker point,--in which case the advantage is evidently
strategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident
tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army
from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and
artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the other
hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should
fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many
armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense,
it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and
receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[9] In
addition to this, since a position naturally very strong[10] is
difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be
able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the
outlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to
Wurmser in Mantua.
STRATEGIC POSITIONS.
There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position
may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for
battle.
Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended
to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be
covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line
of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable
distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli,
Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in
Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The
positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before
the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar
in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in
face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic
positions,--for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily
positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are
sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements,
are of this class.
This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several
points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of
observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the
positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position
of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile
operating on another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all large
detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying
strategic positions.
The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts,
lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a
multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety.
In every case, the first general rule is that the communications with
the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured.
In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of
defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural
or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of
support on the strategic front are called _pivots of operations_, and
are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of
maneuver. For example, in 1796 Verona was an excellent pivot of
operations for all Napoleon's enterprises about Mantua for eight months.
In 1813 Dresden was his pivot.
Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which
it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the
fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the
pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus, Ney's corps was the pivot of
Napoleon's maneuver by Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line
of retreat. A pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point
of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of
support and endures throughout a campaign.
The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as
short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if
it is compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that the
extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the
prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous
point.
The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it
be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to
make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a
short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neither
should the front of operations be too extended. Such a front is
unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not
a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results
of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. Thus, the beautiful
operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not have produced the same
results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the Russian War in
1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could
have found another by adopting a new zone of operations.
The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should
be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army
should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the
intervention of the enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or
interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front
in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to
a dangerous division of force. Great mobility and activity on the part
of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of
security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible
rapid concentration at different and successive points of the front.
An army should never long occupy any strategic point without making
selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there
concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy
when he shall have unveiled his designs. In this manner Napoleon
prepared the fields of Rivoli and Austerlitz, Wellington that of
Waterloo, and the Archduke Charles that of Wagram.
When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be
careful that the front be not too extended. A disposition which might be
called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal
faces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for
all the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an
attack.
Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point
upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic
front. For instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able
to occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position in
rear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so
as to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting
a passage.
For an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugation
or of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however
brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of
defense as a refuge in case of reverse. This remark is made to complete
the subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected with
temporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (XXIII.)
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 9: This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great
difference. They are treated of in Article XXVII.]
[Footnote 10: It is a question here of positions of camps, and not of
positions for battle. The latter will be treated of in the chapter
devoted to Grand Tactics, (Article XXX.)]
ARTICLE XXI.
Zones and Lines of Operations.
A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war,
which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object,
whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. For
example, in the plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the
right, Bavaria that of the center, Franconia that of the left army.
A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single _line of
operations_, either on account of the configuration of the country, or
of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein.
Generally, however, a zone presents several _lines of operations_,
depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number
of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations.
It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a
_line of operations_,--though doubtless it may happen that any good road
in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line;
but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the
sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real
line of operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to
the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would
not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the
communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole
space bounded by them would constitute but a single line.
The term _zone of operations_ is applied to a large fraction of the
general theater of war; the term _lines of operations_ will designate
the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army.
Whether it follow a single or several routes, the term _strategic
lines_ will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive
points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the
front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to
those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive
points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a
temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. _Lines of
communications_ designate the practicable routes between the different
portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone
of operations.
For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the Grand
Coalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, and
another Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden,
Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the
forces. This zone had three _lines of operations_ leading to Leipsic as
an objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leading
from the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic;
the second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau by
Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadotte
from Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armies
marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be
said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. The principal
line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon
which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned,
and over which, if compelled, it would retreat.
If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive
combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on
each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities,
it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided
into different classes, according to their relations to the different
positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field,
and to the enterprises projected by the commander.
_Simple lines of operations_ are those of an army acting from a
frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies.
_Double lines of operations_ are those of two independent armies
proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies
which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in
distance and for long intervals of time.[11]
_Interior lines of operations_ are those adopted by one or two armies to
oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the
general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in
a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose
to them a greater force.[12] _Exterior lines_ lead to the opposite
result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time
on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses.
_Concentric lines of operations_ are those which depart from
widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance
of or behind the base.
_Divergent lines_ are those by which an army would leave a given point
to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course,
necessitate a subdivision of the army.
There are also _deep lines_, which are simply _long lines_.
The term _maneuver-lines_ I apply to momentary strategic lines, often
adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be
confounded with the real _lines of operations_.
_Secondary lines_ are those of two armies acting so as to afford each
other mutual support,--as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse was
secondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagration
was secondary to that of Barclay.
_Accidental lines_ are those brought about by events which change the
original plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of the
highest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fully
recognized only by a great and active mind.
There may be, in addition, _provisional_ and _definitive lines of
operations_. The first designate the line adopted by an army in a
preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select
a more advantageous or direct line. They seem to belong as much to the
class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines
of operations.
These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have preceded
me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than
that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter
has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has
no lines of operations.
The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose two
armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance of
Dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large
depots are immediately behind the river,--certainly the safest, nearest,
and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted.
These armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence they
will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different
proposed enterprises.
1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will
extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both
be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in
the interval which separates them from it. Even if Mélas[13] had
possessed a year's supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have
been cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy
occupied the line of the Po.
2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated
his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double
exterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided
his forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him
to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to
could unite.
Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on
its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than
when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of
support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the
establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of
operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it
has no line of operations.
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WARS OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION.
At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, Prussia and
Austria were the only avowed enemies of France, and Italy was included
in the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it
being too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed.
The real theater extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised three
zones of operations,--the first reaching along the Rhine from Huningue
to Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the center consisting of the
interval between the Meuse and Moselle; the third and left was the
frontier from Givet to Dunkirk.
When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to prevent a
union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the
zones just described, while Austria had but thirty-five thousand in
Belgium. It is quite impossible to understand why the French did not
conquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made.
Four months intervened between the declaration of war and the
concentration of the allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasion
of Belgium would have prevented that of Champagne, and have given the
King of Prussia a conception of the strength of France, and induced him
not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing upon
France another form of government?
When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of July, the
French were no longer able to invade. This _rôle_ was reserved for the
allies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves.
The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and fifteen
thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty
leagues and divided into five corps d'armée, and could not make a good
defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was
only necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also in
favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could
only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line between the
Moselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than the
rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of the
excellent fortress of Luxembourg as a base. They wisely adopted this
plan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception.
The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family
reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might
subject her provinces. For some reason, difficult to understand,
Austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five
thousand men remained as an army of observation in Brisgau, on the
Rhine, and in Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she afterward
displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of them
than to protect the flanks of the invading army? This remarkable conduct
on the part of Austria, which cost her so much, may account for the
resolution of Prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field,
as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. During
the campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for
success. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons. If they had
anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even made a more
serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all the
advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions,
and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately.
Frederick the Great would have justified the remark of Dumouriez at
Grandpré,--that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he
(Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Châlons.
The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with
the false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every point in order to
guard every point.
The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the Moselle and
Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and
how their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin
of armies.
Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the
strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of
a frontier to prevent invasion,--which was exactly the means of
rendering invasion upon every point feasible.
I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez foolishly
abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater
from the center to the extreme left of the general field. Moreover, he
was unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by this
movement, but attacked the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in front,
while by descending the Meuse to Namur he might have thrown it back upon
the North Sea toward Meuport or Ostend, and have destroyed it entirely
in a more successful battle than that of Jemmapes.
The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty
direction of operations. The Austrians were victorious, and recovered
Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations
to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deserves
praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this
enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the
extreme right of the long front of Dumouriez. But after the French had
been driven back under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized
and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a
few towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize new
armies? When the deplorable condition of France and the destitution of
the wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the parades of
the allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be understood?
Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are
particularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince,
and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of
the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars
of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.[14]
If this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. Paris was
France, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had
risen against the government which oppressed them. If, after having
beaten the French army at Famars, the allies had left the Dutch and
Hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the English and the
Austrians directed their operations upon the Meuse, the Sarre, and the
Moselle, in concert with the Prussians and a part of the useless army
of the Upper Rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with
its flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. It
is even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or
running great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have performed the
duty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while the bulk of the army
pursued the remains of Dampierre's forces. After gaining several
victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying on
a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. While they
threatened France with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies
of troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes
and Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon
the camp at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on one
side and Landau on the other.
It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in
the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they
should have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while
the allies were operating in Flanders they were in no manner seconded or
aided by the imposing army upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, this
army took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the
Sambre. Do not these false combinations resemble those of Soubise and
Broglie in 1761, and all the operations of the Seven Years' War?
In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French from a
painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The combinations of
this campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to
represent them as forming a new system of war. To be convinced of this,
it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of the
armies in this campaign and in that of 1757 were almost identical, and
the direction of the operations is quite the same. The French had four
corps, which constituted two armies, as the King of Prussia had four
divisions, which composed two armies.
These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on Brussels,
as Frederick and Schwerin had adopted in 1757 on Prague. The only
difference between the two plans is that the Austrian troops in Flanders
were not so much scattered as those of Brown in Bohemia; but this
difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position
of the North Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank
the Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of
the enemy,--a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to
great operations. This movement was the same as that of Benningsen on
the Lower Vistula which almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fate
of the Prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced upon
the Baltic, is another proof of this truth.
If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have
made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a
month before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up.
The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive
was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six
battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank
Flanders was covered by the corps d'armée of Clairfayt, and upon the
left Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of
a battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis
was found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only _twelve battalions_
were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were
known to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to
Clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army
before Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay
invasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of his
central position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and
to beat all his large detachments in detail.
Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having
been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing
this grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have
been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and
forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous
diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up
between the sea and two fortresses?
The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical
error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on
Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi
till the 3d of June,--more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid
opportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. If
the Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by
its left,--that is, both upon the Meuse,--the state of affairs would
have been different. By establishing themselves in the center of a line
of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the
different fractions. It may be dangerous in a battle to attack the
center of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustained
by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of
three hundred miles in extent.
In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the principal
theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to Italy,--which opened a new
field of glory for the French arms. Their lines of operations in this
campaign were double; they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim.
Clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces
alternately upon these points, and gained victories at Manheim and in
the lines of Mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the Sambre
and Meuse to recross the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and brought
Pichegru back to Landau.
In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from those of
1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different results. The
armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, set out from the
extremities of the base, on routes converging to the Danube. As in 1794,
they were exterior lines. The Archduke Charles, more skillful than the
Prince of Coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating his
forces at a point nearer than that expected by the French. He then
seized the instant when the Danube covered the corps of Latour, to
steal several marches upon Moreau and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: the
battle of Wurzburg decided the fate of Germany and compelled the army of
Moreau to retreat.
Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His plan is
to separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by the
battle of Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic
lines, and beats them successively at Mondovi and Lodi. A formidable
army is collected in the Tyrol to raise the siege of Mantua: it commits
the error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. The
lightning is not quicker than Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandons
every thing before Mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the
first column, which debouches by Brescia, beats it and forces it back
upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, and
is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the Tyrol to
keep up its communications with the right. Wurmser, upon whom these
lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of Roveredo and
Vicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first back
upon the Lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorges
of the Brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to
take refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender.
In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for having formed
two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have three upon the Rhine and
the Danube. The army on the left observes the Lower Rhine, that of the
center marches upon the Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia,
being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. _The three
armies could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn_, eighty
leagues from their base of operations. The archduke has equal forces: he
unites them against the center, which he defeats at Stockach, and the
army of Switzerland is compelled to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern
Switzerland. The allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of
following up their success on this central line, which cost them so
dearly afterward, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the
Lower Rhine. The army of Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while the
other trifles at Manheim.
In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which leaves
thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at Naples, while upon the
Adige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their force
is too weak and meets with terrible reverses. When the army of Naples
returns to the North, it commits the error of adopting a strategic
direction opposed to Moreau's, and Suwaroff, by means of his central
position, from which he derives full profit, marches against this army
and beats it, while some leagues from the other.
In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is again
changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of
operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks
of Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the Danube and the other upon the
Po. This insures the conquest of vast regions. Modern history affords no
similar combination. The French armies are upon interior lines,
affording reciprocal support, while the Austrians are compelled to adopt
an exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate.
By a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts
off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preserving
its own relations with its base and with the army of the Rhine, which
forms its secondary line.
Fig. 3 demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of
the two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of the
armies of the Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and
Mélas; C C C C, the passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the
Saint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of
operations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of retreat of
Mélas; H J K, the French divisions preserving their line of retreat. It
may thus be seen that Mélas is cut off from his base, and that, on the
contrary, the French general runs no risk, since he preserves all his
communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines.
[Illustration: Fig. 3. THE STRATIGIC FIELD OF 1806.]
The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the
importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military
operations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of
defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his
invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province.
By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted
campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led
to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental
principle already alluded to,--viz.: that _simple and interior lines
enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the
important point, a stronger force than the enemy_. The student may also
satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to
this principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits
fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS.
From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from
that of many others, the following maxims result:--
1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive
point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the
choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining
this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a
campaign. Napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in
1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on Gera,--maneuvers that cannot be too
much studied by military men.
Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The
objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to
be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for
this end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first
operation and the new phases it may develop.
2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical
situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position
of the hostile masses upon this strategic field. _In every case,
however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of the
extremities. Only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating
would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the
two extremities at the same time_.[15]
It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide
his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line
will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible,
the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the
rear of his line of defense or front of operations.
The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it
affords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that
by using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy's
force. Thus, the army of the Rhine in 1800, gaining the extreme left of
the line of defense of the Black Forest, caused it to yield almost
without an effort. This army fought two battles on the right bank of the
Danube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction
of the line of operations, brought about the invasion of Swabia and
Bavaria. The results of the march of the army of the reserve by the
Saint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of Mélas were still more
brilliant.
3. Even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained,
it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the
assailant in many cases will lose his own communications. To avoid this
danger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategic
direction, such that the army will always find either to its rear or to
the right or left a safe line of retreat. In this case, to take
advantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require a
change of direction of the line of operations, (Maxim 12.)
The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most important
qualities of a general. The importance of a direction is illustrated by
these examples.
If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had marched upon
Asti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo without having previously
protected himself on the side of Lombardy and of the left bank of the
Po, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat
than Mélas from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points
of Casale and Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona and
Tenda toward the Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of
regaining the Var or the Valais.
In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic, and had
there awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would have
been cut off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of Brunswick from the
Elbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of Weimar he
placed his front before the three roads of Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof,
which thus became well-covered lines of communication. If the Prussians
had endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between Gera
and Baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line,--the
excellent road from Leipsic to Frankfort,--as well as the two roads
which lead from Saxony by Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel.
4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier:
such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large
coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon
the same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better to
have all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies the
principal army.
5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces
on the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more
advantageous than a double one.
6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either
from the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has
been adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of
the army to each of his masses.
7. In this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to
exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can
be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate
of the campaign.[16] Such an army may, by a well-combined strategic
plan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of the
adversary's forces. To be assured of success in these maneuvers, a body
of observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, with
instructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as
much as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling
back upon the principal army.
8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of
force, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring
against it. In this case this course will be advantageous,--since a
single line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from
acting to advantage. However, it will always be prudent to support well
the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the
respective positions of the parties, has the most important duty to
perform.
9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other
maxims. The first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and
sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in
numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted
space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened to
Napoleon at Leipsic.[17] The second is, that interior lines should not
be abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the
opportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. This risk, however,
may be incurred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as
to conclude the war,--when the fate of these secondary bodies would be
viewed with comparative indifference.
10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than
two divergent. The first conform better to the principles of strategy,
and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and
supply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the
armies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the
combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect their
junction.
11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the
enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by
a strategic movement,--in which case divergent operations would add to
the dispersion of the enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior,
since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the
pursued.
12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of
operations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very delicate and
important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great
disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an
army from an embarrassing position. Napoleon projected several of these
changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to
meet unforeseen events.
At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a
line of operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon, which would
have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by
Vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the
Archduke Charles was endeavoring to cut him off. Frederick executed one
of these changes of the line of operations after the raising of the
siege of Olmutz.
In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one
which was favored by the localities. It was to base himself upon the
fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the route to Paris open to
the allies. If Mortier and Marmont could have joined him, and had he
possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the
most decisive results and have put the seal on his military career.
13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical
character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on
the direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages
to be obtained. Central positions, salient toward the enemy, like
Bohemia and Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they
naturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate the
project of taking the enemy in reverse. The sides of this salient angle
become so important that every means should be taken to render them
impregnable. In default of such central positions, their advantages may
be gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following
figure will explain. C D maneuvering upon the right of the front of the
army A B, and H I upon the left flank of G F, will form two interior
lines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior lines A B, F G,
which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. Such was the
result of the operations of 1796, 1800, and 1809.
[Illustration:
Fig. 4.
K
/\
/ \
/ \
/ \
F LLLLLLLLLLLLL G / \ A LLLLLLLLLLLLLL B
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
H TTTTTTTTTTTTT I C TTTTTTTTTTTTTT D
]
14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to influence the
direction to be given to the lines of operations, these latter being
naturally dependent upon the former. It has already been shown that the
greatest advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when the
frontiers allow it to be assumed parallel to the line of operations of
the enemy, thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line and
cutting him from his base.
But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, the
line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of the
perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by referring to the
figure on page 79. The army E, having the double base A C and C D, if it
marched toward F, instead of to the right toward G H, would lose all the
strategic advantages of its base C D.
The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to
establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army
as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one's
own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy.
15. There is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the
direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the
principal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the
presence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. In this case, the
choice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor the
advantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the
first consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most
certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this
purpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by Jourdan, was near
Dusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831 was crossed by
Marshal Paskevitch near Ossiek,--viz., that in neither case was there
the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged to
procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the French in
Holland, and by the Russians at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality of
Prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy
was not able to prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage led
the French into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failed
because the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies
separately. Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula with only
a small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at
Lowicz.
When an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances
of failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to
select the point which may, either on account of its topography or the
position of the enemy, be most advantageous. The discussion between
Napoleon and Moreau on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of the
most curious examples of the different combinations presented by this
question, which is both strategic and tactical.
Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory
is gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the
directions of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. The
point selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon the
center or one of the flanks of the enemy.
A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended
line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the
dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not
think of disturbing the bridges.
If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more
concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after the
passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass
it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the
bridges. This will be referred to in the article upon the passage of
rivers.
16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to be
noticed. It is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home
and one in a hostile country. The nature of the enemy's country will
also influence these chances. Let us suppose an army crosses the Alps or
the Rhine to carry on war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states of
the second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always
rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of that
unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. On the other
hand, a German army invading France would operate upon a line much more
dangerous than that of the French in Italy, because upon the first could
be thrown the consolidated strength of Franco, united in feeling and
interest. An army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its
own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants,
authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and even
private stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily so abroad.
Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the
assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert
regions, particularly when the people are not united against the
invader. In provinces like those first named the army would find a
thousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are about
the only resources. Horses probably may obtain pasturage; but every
thing else must be carried by the army,--thus infinitely increasing the
embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and
dangerous. The French armies, so long accustomed to the comforts of
Swabia and Lombardy, almost perished in 1806 in the bogs of Pultusk, and
actually did perish in 1812 in the marshy forests of Lithuania.
17. There is another point in reference to these lines which is much
insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. It is
that on each side of the line of operations the country should be
cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line:
otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. This rule is
everywhere belied by the events of war. The nature of the country, the
rivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the
people, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by
diagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy
could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a
compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means of
taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in
recent wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does not
contradict this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Vienna
when Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession of the
Austrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin, Genoa, and the
Col-di-Tenda were occupied by the army of Mélas? Did not Eugene march by
way of Stradella and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the French upon
the Mincio but a few leagues from his base?
OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES--WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AGAINST THEM.
Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon
definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood;
and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon
themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether
the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these
principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even
admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot
disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural
principles.
In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the
famous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkable
event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe
in principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptional
cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of
opposed instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from
overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to
establish their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in
case of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double lines
of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and
arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment.
Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg, Blücher, Bernadotte, and
Benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. The inferior
army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed
its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not
upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are
doubly in my favor.
Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and the
Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm,
Katzbach, and Dennewitz,--in a word, to faults of execution, entirely
foreign to the principles in question.
What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with
the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain
on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the
decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of
an essential part of the army. Then the combined efforts of the whole
army may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary armies
are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the
army, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in 1813.
If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously pursued the
allies into Bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at Culm, have
threatened Prague, and perhaps have dissolved the Coalition. To this
error may be added a fault quite as great,--that of fighting decisive
battles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbach
his instructions were not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait for
Blücher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold
movements. Macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments over
torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet
Blücher. If he had fulfilled his instructions and Napoleon had followed
up his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, based
upon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line
of operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. The study
of his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France in 1814 shows that he
knew how to apply this system.
There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the
injustice of judging central lines by the fate of Napoleon in
Saxony,--viz.: _that his front of operations was outflanked on the
right, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of the
frontiers of Bohemia_. Such a case is of rare occurrence. A central
position with such faults is not to be compared to one without them.
When Napoleon made the application of these principles in Italy, Poland,
Prussia, and France, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostile
enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have threatened him in 1807;
but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. To judge of a system of
operations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be as
much in favor of as against it,--which was by no means the case in 1813,
either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective
forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses at
Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable of
destroying a principle the simplest application of which required these
officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement.
Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what advantage can
be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the army
which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere,
shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented
with being bodies of observation?[18] In this case it is the enemy who
applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. Moreover,
in the succeeding campaign, the defense of Napoleon in Champagne, from
the battle of Brienne to that of Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of
these maxims.
The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic
question which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions
founded upon theories. It is, whether the system of central lines loses
its advantages when the masses are very large. Agreeing with
Montesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude of
the arrangements necessary to consummate them, I am disposed to answer
in the affirmative. It is very clear to me that an army of one hundred
thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of
thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them
successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strong
against three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and
for several good reasons:--
1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to
bring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of
one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily
resist a much larger force.
2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand
men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with
one of the other armies.
3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a
quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and _matériel_ of every kind,
that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts
from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the
impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to
support such numbers.
4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in
check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be
very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such
magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will
probably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the
advantages gained by the principal army.
I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric
system. All my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and
to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of
principles.
Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad:
all depends on the situation of the respective forces. The eccentric
lines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a
given point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separately
destroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. Such was the
maneuver of Frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of
1767, the fine battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all the
operations of Napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by
closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, having
pierced the enemy's center or turned his front, to give them eccentric
directions to disperse the defeated army.[19]
On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: 1. When
they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be
sure to arrive before the enemy; 2. When they direct to the same end the
efforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately
by a stronger enemy.
Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be
most pernicious,--which should teach us the necessity of detecting the
principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles
and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base
to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines
and more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union
before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case
with Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles.
In starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated
than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger.
What was the fate of the concentric columns of Wurmser and
Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two banks of Lake
Garda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brussels
be forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march concentrically on this
city,--one by Quatre-Bras, the other by Wavre. Blücher and Wellington,
taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and
the terrible disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable
principles of war cannot be violated with impunity.
Such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not
in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim
to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and
were applied by Cæsar, Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by
Marlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point them
out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various
applications.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 11: This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given
rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.
In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of
_maneuver-lines_, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great
routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three
routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the
different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three
lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two
armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there was a
double line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachment
starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six
other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not have
a double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term to
designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set
them in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single
corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal
enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an
accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms or
radii, but the operation was not double.]
[Footnote 12: Some German writers have said that I confound central
positions with the line of operations,--in which assertion they are
mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of two
masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these
are two very different things. Others have thought that I would have
done better to use the term _radii of operations_ to express the idea of
double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the
theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after
all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.]
[Footnote 13: This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct;
for Mélas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was
unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication
by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to
cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.]
[Footnote 14: The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of
Napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and the
French people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. If he
had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown that
the capital was at his head-quarters.]
[Footnote 15: The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively
upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their _morale_,
and the ability of their commander are also very important elements.]
[Footnote 16: When the fractions of an army are separated from the main
body by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intended
to act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategic
positions, and not lines of operations.]
[Footnote 17: In the movements immediately preceding the battle of
Leipsic, Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of
operations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions;
but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of
lines of operations.]
[Footnote 18: I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a
combat without running greater risks than would result from a check; but
Macdonald might have fought Blücher to advantage if he had better
understood Napoleon's instructions.]
[Footnote 19: It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve of
concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflect
that among the finest operations of Napoleon there are some in which he
employed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; for
example, in the movements about Ratisbon in 1809.]
ARTICLE XXII.
Strategic Lines.
Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which
differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to
define them, for many confound them. We will not consider those
strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason of
their position and their relation to the features of the country, like
the lines of the Danube and the Meuse, the chains of the Alps and the
Balkan. Such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minute
examination of the topography of Europe; and an excellent model for this
kind of study is found in the Archduke Charles's description of Southern
Germany.
The term _strategic_ is also applied to all communications which lead by
the most direct or advantageous route from one important point to
another, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its
objective points. It will be seen, then, that a theater of war is
crossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those
only which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real
importance. This renders plain the distinction between the general line
of operations of a whole campaign, and these _strategic_ lines, which
are temporary and change with the operations of the army.
Besides territorial strategic lines, there are _strategic lines of
maneuvers_.
An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of
operations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or that between
the Danube and the Main, or that between the mountains of Franconia and
the sea. It would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at
most, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior,
directions,--while it would have successively perhaps twenty strategic
lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for
each wing which would join the general line of operations. If it
operated in the zone between the Danube and the Alps, it might adopt,
according to events, the strategic line leading from Ulm on Donauwerth
and Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or that which connects Ulm
with Nuremberg or Mayence.
It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of
operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily
applicable to strategic lines. These may be _concentric_, to inflict a
decisive blow, or _eccentric_, after victory. They are rarely _simple_,
since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when they
are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be _interior_ if
the forces be equal, or _exterior_ in the case of great numerical
superiority. The rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimes
be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when the
forces are equal, to attain an important result without running much
risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to the
important masses.
Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against
one of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations.
The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good
for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply
them to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves
mention,--viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of
these temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations
exposed to the assaults of the enemy. Even this may, however, be done,
to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success;
but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have been
taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the line
of operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to.
We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The Prussian army
was based upon the Rhine, its line of operations extended from Cologne
and Coblentz on Luxembourg and Namur; Wellington's base was Antwerp,
and his line of operations the short road to Brussels. The sudden attack
by Napoleon on Flanders decided Blücher to receive battle parallel to
the English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no
uneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have a good
chance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in
Antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful
maritime allies it would have been destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, and
seeking refuge at Gembloux and then at Wavre, Blücher had but three
strategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht,
that farther north on Venloo, or the one leading to the English army
near Mont St. Jean. He audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the
application of interior strategic lines,--which Napoleon here, perhaps
for the first time in his life, neglected. It will readily be seen that
the line followed from Gembloux by Wavre to Mont St. Jean was neither a
line of operations of the Prussian army nor a line of battle, but a
_strategic line of maneuver_, and was interior. It was bold, because he
exposed fully his own natural line of operations. The fact that he
sought a junction with the English made his movement accord with the
principles of war.
A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz. Leaving
Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he moved to the right
to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his
primitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in
force. His object was to gain communication with Napoleon, whose
intention was to join him by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the
beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing
this change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. He did
nothing of this kind,--either from forgetfulness, or on account of the
feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,--and the severe
losses at Dennewitz were the result.
Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these different
combinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extended
from the Apennines to Verona. When he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredo
and determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valley
of the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser had
moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse.
There were but three courses open to him,--to remain in the narrow
valley of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser,
or the last,--which was sublime, but rash,--to follow him into the
valley of the Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two
passages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man to
hesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavis
to cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano.
The brilliant results of this bold step are well known. The route from
Trent to Bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a
_strategic line of maneuver_ still bolder than that of Blücher on Wavre.
However, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, at
the end of which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten at
Bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with
Verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in
great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall back
either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, which
made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for
even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not have
interfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable him
to anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois
from Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian
general, previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French
army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would
scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beaten
at Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had
advanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there
have been surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted upon
him the fate of Vandamme at Culm.
I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time
and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many
adventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that it
may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its
line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the
enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by
demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what
is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be
adopted under an urgent necessity.
ARTICLE XXIII.
Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases or
Strategic Reserves.
When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or
temporary bases,--which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as
his own frontiers. A river with _têtes de ponts_, and one or two large
towns secure from a _coup de main_ to cover the depots of the army and
to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an
excellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be a
temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations
leading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon would have had a
good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria had remained neutral; but,
she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and
became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of
a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation,
particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is beaten
in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its
own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant
temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases,
and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannot
expect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a
temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic
reserve,--which is purely a modern invention. Its merits and demerits
deserve notice.
STRATEGIC RESERVES.
Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive,
who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of
skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise government
always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them
when they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the army
has its own, and every corps d'armée or division should not fail to
provide one.
The reserves of an army are of two kinds,--those on the battle-field,
and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the
latter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of
war, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend
not only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and
the distance from the base to the front of operations. Whenever an army
takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility of
being compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reserve
between the base and front of operations the advantage of an active
reserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support of
menaced points without weakening the active army. It is true that to
form a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from active
service; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be
instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing central
depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making them
the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, and
adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may be
formed capable of important service.
Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. Even
in 1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he had first Joubert on
the Adige, afterward Victor (returning from the Roman States) in the
neighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and Augereau played the part
alternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont near
Vienna.
In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and Mortier used
them to reduce Hesse. At the same time, other reserves were forming at
Mayence under Kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between
the Rhine and Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When Napoleon
decided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed, with
much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe sixty
thousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg against the English
and to influence Austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her
interests.
The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle, but it was
badly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe at Wittenberg or
Dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving
Prince Hohenlohe and Blücher time to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin.
These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the
country leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the
double object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity,
of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its
flanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve.
Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and
whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the
troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. It is only in distant
invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the
scene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the
frontier, they are quite superfluous. At home they may generally be
dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when new
levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under
the protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be
indispensable.
The general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use of these
reserves according to the state of the country, the length of the line
of operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity of
a hostile state. He also decides upon their position, and endeavors to
use for this purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so much
as the withdrawal of his good troops.
These reserves ought to hold the most important points between the base
and front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have been
reduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and if
there be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw up
intrenched camps or _têtes de ponts_ to protect the depots and to
increase the strength of their positions.
All that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable to
temporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuable
if they possess such well-located pivots.
ARTICLE XXIV.
The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System of Marches.
_By the system of positions_ is understood the old manner of
conducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their supplies
at hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a city, the other
covering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, the
other counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. Such was war
from the Middle Ages to the era of the French Revolution. During this
revolution great changes transpired, and many systems of more or less
value sprang up. War was commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: the
French encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them.
It was not till 1793, when assailed from without and within, that this
system was changed. Thoroughly aroused, France threw one million men in
fourteen armies upon her enemies. These armies had neither tents,
provisions, nor money. On their marches they bivouacked or were
quartered in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means of
success. Their tactics changed also: the troops were put in columns,
which were more easily handled than deployed lines, and, on account of
the broken character of the country of Flanders and the Vosges, they
threw out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover the
columns. This system, which was thus the result of circumstances, at
first met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the
methodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well as their generals. Mack,
to whom was attributed the success of the Prince of Coburg, increased
his reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose
an open order to the fire of skirmishers. It had never occurred to the
poor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried
the positions.
The first generals of the Republic were fighting-men, and nothing more.
The principal direction of affairs was in the hands of Carnot and of the
Committee of Public Safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad.
Carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of the
war. In 1793 he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of
Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly
from point to point, and aided by the troops already collected at these
different points, compelled the enemy to evacuate France.
The campaign of 1794 opened badly. It was the force of circumstances,
and not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movement
of the army of the Moselle on the Sambre; and it was this which led to
the success of Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium.
In 1795 the mistakes of the French were so great that they were imputed
to treachery. The Austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded by
Clairfayt, Chateler, and Schmidt than they had been by Mack and the
Prince of Coburg. The Archduke Charles, applying the principle of
interior lines, triumphed over Moreau and Jourdan in 1796 by a single
march.
Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been large,--either
to procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it
better to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders
to arrange them for battle. The reserves were small detachments,
incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in
overwhelming but a single division. Such was the state of affairs when
Napoleon made his _début_ in Italy. His activity from the beginning
worsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances,
his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. He conquered the
Italian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. His
march on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but justified by the necessity of
overcoming the Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcements
from the Rhine.
The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a new
era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He
adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the
capture or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less
extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies
of two or three divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy was
here fully developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely
corollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the system
of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italy
not to meet with his approval.
It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted to
all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there
can be any return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to the
old system of wars of position. After a comparison of the marches and
camps of the Seven Years' War with those of the _seven weeks'_ war,--as
Napoleon called the campaign of 1806,--or with those of the three months
which elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 till
its arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as to
the relative merits of the two systems.
The system of Napoleon was _to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight,
and then to camp in quiet_. He told me that he knew no other method of
conducting a war than this.
It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his
personal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred in
urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a
throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare
to adopt. This is probably true; but between the extremes of very
distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and,
without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has
marked out. It is probable that the old system of wars of positions will
for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much
modified and improved.
If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches,
humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and
bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun,
are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian
hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is not
likely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has
been demonstrated by Napoleon's wars,--viz.: that remoteness is not a
certain safeguard against invasion,--that a state to be secure must have
a good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and
military institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. Then
the people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve as
reserves to the active armies, which will render the latter more
formidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the more
necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results.
If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,--if nations, instead
of fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to
acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the political
equilibrium,--then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, and
perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale.
Then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand men
return to a mixed system of war,--a mean between the rapid incursions of
Napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. Until
then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced
so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an
active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion.
The science of marches now includes more than details, like the
following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of
departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and
the means of communication between the columns, all of which is a part
of the duties of the staff of an army. Outside and beyond these very
important details, there is a science of marches in the great operations
of strategy. For instance, the march of Napoleon by the Saint-Bernard
to fall upon the communications of Mélas, those made in 1805 by
Donauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806 by Gera to turn the Prussians,
the march of Suwaroff from Turin to the Trebbia to meet Macdonald, that
of the Russian army on Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisive
operations, not because of their relation to Logistics, but on account
of their strategic relations.