troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance
of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks
and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually
be on their side at the second collision of the battle; but to
insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be
launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the
proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable,
and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first.
12. From the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth:
"that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the
means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in
strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second
line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of
masses of cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the
decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is
presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of
battles."
In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain
guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never
compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient
substitute for that intuitive _coup-d'oeil_ imparted by experience
in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness.
The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all
arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be
always held in hand,[27] will, therefore, at the critical moment of
the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will
attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention.
This critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties
is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put
forth,--on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to
wrest it from the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to say that, to
make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous
attack upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous.
13. In the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more
effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to
be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and
marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as
skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. The
object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the
troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry
will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the
enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part
of the cavalry must be launched against him. There will then be a
strong probability of his repulse.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 24: In every battle one party must be the assailant and the
other assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party and
defensive for the other.]
[Footnote 25: The letter A in this and other figures of the twelve
orders indicates the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies are
represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the
figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battle
ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns of
attack, in squares, or checkerwise.]
[Footnote 26: An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in
some cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the
enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a rule, a
false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against one
extremity, would be the best method to use against such a line.]
[Footnote 27: The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when
it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final
reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau
decided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and what
Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to every reader of
history.]
ARTICLE XXXII.
Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles.
We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn
an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may
be expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide
détours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of
so many plans seemingly well arranged.
It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which
is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking
place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless,
as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d'oeil_
of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which
he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many
maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded
against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous
in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire
success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to
take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself
have been in the habit of moving in this manner.
It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject.
The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the
force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful,
however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies.
A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any
thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and
seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be
more daring.
A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of
the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these
extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the
armies concerned in them.
In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because
the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards
between their right and the remainder of their army,--the latter part
remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was
the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter
distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had
to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick
was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.
On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau,
because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and
disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of
Marshal Daun.[28] Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric
movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose
line was thus reformed.
The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiar
with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother
wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the
plateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten,--while their left was piled
up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making
a wide _détour_ to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was
speedily surrounded and captured.
No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the
unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of
sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight
thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst
Saint-Cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to
pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of
sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these
divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their
rear. Saint-Cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle.
We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, who had desired to
surround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz,
in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of
the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off
from Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement
of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their
line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and
surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes
Tellnitz and Melnitz.
Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar to
Napoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to
Portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,--seeing
which, the English general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no
support.
If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, he
might have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each case
a total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixty
thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be
unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper
advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way,
Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief
merit was a rapid and practiced tactical _coup-d'oeil_. With the Duke of
York or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have been
successful.
Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo
and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was
almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare
concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will
search in vain in military history for another example of a single
brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies,
and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in
the defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all
probability, to lay down his arms.
At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the
successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center
under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Bernadotte had not rendered opportune
assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have
been the result.
So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that
no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for
it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an
order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find
himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance;
but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his
enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to
regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers
or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were
the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to
outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and
opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the
enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center.
Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications
before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army
preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be
successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected
maneuver during the battle.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 28: For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and
XXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.]
ARTICLE XXXIII.
Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.
The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives
rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war.
In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a
position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as
close and accurate as possible. It often happens, however,--especially
as war is now carried on,--that two armies approach each other, each
intending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. A collision
ensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it
does not anticipate a meeting. One army may also be attacked by another
which has prepared a surprise for it,--as happened to the French at
Rossbach.
A great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a
skillful general and of the warrior able to control events. It is always
possible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commander
may not have great capacity; but victories like those of Lutzen,
Luzzara, Eylau, Abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant genius
endowed with great coolness and using the wisest combinations.
There is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by no
means easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are the
very cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind the
fundamental principles of the art and the different methods of applying
them, in order to a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided
upon at the instant and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms.
Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage,
and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause
their advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they
are traversing. In each army the forces should at the same time be
concentrated so that they may be thrown in a proper direction
considering the object of the march. A grave error would be committed in
deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard; because, even if the
deployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a
badly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advanced
guard with considerable vigor the consequence might be the rout of the
troops which were forming. (See the account of the battle of Rossbach,
Treatise on Grand Operations.)
In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching upon
several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently,
these routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles are
unchanged. The advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then
the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best
suited for carrying out the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the
enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him.
ARTICLE XXXIV.
Of Surprises of Armies.
I shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,--the chief
features in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light
Russian and Turkish cavalry are so well adapted. I shall confine myself
to an examination of the surprise of whole armies.
Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected
than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are
heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to
an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten
and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known
because there are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' War
presents a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that
a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are
sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the
combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity
of the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it
so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from
their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point
intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack.
As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march,
prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan
one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's
camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like a
surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected
attack. The only great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in
1812, where Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his
imprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but
there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his
own negligence.
It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to
fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of
the sort is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly take place;
and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can
give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his
forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events
occur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although
it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which
renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought.
For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities
for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to
prevent such attacks. The regulations for the government of any
well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last.
ARTICLE XXXV.
Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched Camps or
Lines.--Of Coups de Main in General.
There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses,
are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless be
carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether
practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other
means of getting to the parapet.
The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations
as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of _coups de
main_.
This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the strength
of the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on which they are
built; 3d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; 4th, with
the morale of the respective parties. History gives us examples of all
of these varieties.
For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and Warsaw,
the lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of Feldkirch,
Scharnitz, and Assiette. Here I have mentioned several cases, each with
varying circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the intrenchments were
better connected and better constructed than at Warsaw. There was, in
fact, a _tête de pont_ nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for
the archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would
have been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. At
Warsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had
as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended
by a number of desperate men.
Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of
which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as was
suited to a field-work. The camp proper was protected by simple
redoubts, at considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keep
giving it its sole strength.[29]
At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation;
but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so at
Turin, where upon one of the important points there was an insignificant
parapet with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep.
In the latter case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they were
attacked in rear by a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugene
assailed them from without. At Mayence the lines were attacked in front,
only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the right
flank.
The tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are few
in number. If it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attacked
a little before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but if
this operation may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by
no means to be expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp
will permit itself to be surprised,--especially as the regulations of
all services require armies to stand to their arms at dawn. As an attack
by main force seems likely to be the method followed in this case, the
following simple and reasonable directions are laid down:--
1. Silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire,
which at the same time has the effect of discouraging the
defenders.
2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as
fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and
mount the parapet.
3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken,
skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their
support.
4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover
for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible.
5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their
duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of
attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the bodies of
cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground
permits. When all these arrangements are made, there is nothing
more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as
actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the
gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most
daring rashness.
Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for
escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great
advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the
passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets.
Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read,
none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenched
camp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon's dispositions
for attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is
an excellent example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited
as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal
Paskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to be
followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for
attacking Dresden in 1813.
Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or
escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747,--both
preceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since in
neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault.
Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better
interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried,
because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost
impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point.
The capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are described
in the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,)
and that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent
lessons for study.
This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred to, is so
familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of
it; but I cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was
bought and how little it should have been expected. The strategic plan
was certainly admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenza
to Asti by the right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio,
was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. When
we examine the operations near Turin, we must confess that the victors
owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. It required no
great effort of genius upon the part of Prince Eugene to prepare the
order he issued to his army; and he must have felt a profound contempt
for his opponents to execute a march with thirty-five thousand allied
troops of ten different nations between eighty thousand Frenchmen on the
one side and the Alps on the other, and to pass around their camp for
forty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank march that was ever
attempted. The order for the attack was so brief and so devoid of
instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to write a
better. Directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigade
in two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to make
openings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp, make
up the sum total of all the science exhibited by Eugene in order to
carry out his rash undertaking It is true he selected the weak point of
the intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half the
bodies of its defenders.
But I am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanation
of the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. If
they have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by
assault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned by
strategic maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course last
indicated than to attempt a hazardous assault. If, however, there is any
reason for preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one
of the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored.
There have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by the
defenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made at that
point, while the real attack took place at the center, and succeeded
simply because unexpected. In these operations the locality and the
character of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to
be pursued.
The attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps.
It has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the relief
and proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would be
quite difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn away
from the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry of
moderate activity. The ramparts of Ismail and Praga were of this
character; so also was the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevitch so
gloriously defended against Ney, because he preferred making his stand
at the ravines in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet with
an inclination of scarcely thirty degrees.
If one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to think
of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces,
the mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columns
advancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them.
This absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the
enemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive
return upon the assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. A
general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already half
conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to them
when their intrenchments are attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, I
cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a risk
and meet the fate of Tallard at Blenheim could have no just cause of
complaint.
Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and
lines. The first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between
the center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of
the left wing and on the left of the right wing. With this arrangement
succor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which
could not be done were there but one central reserve. It has been
suggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment
is very extensive; but I decidedly incline to the opinion that two are
quite enough. Another recommendation may be given, and it is of great
importance,--that the troops be made to understand they must by no means
despair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point;
because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack
the assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may have
supposed in his power.
COUPS DE MAIN.
These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the
capture of posts of different strength or importance.[30] They partake
of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both
these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a
successful issue. Although _coups de main_ seem to be entirely tactical
operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the
captured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. It will become
necessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main
in Article XXXVI., when speaking of detachments. However tiresome these
repetitions may seem, I am obliged to state here the manner of executing
such operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attack
of intrenchments.
I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these
operations; for their name, _coups de main_, implies that ordinary rules
are not applicable to them. I desire only to call attention to them, and
refer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic,
where they are mentioned.
I have previously stated that important results may often follow from
these enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828, the unsuccessful
attack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796, the remarkable surprises
of Cremona in 1702, of Gibraltar in 1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814,
as well as the escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of the
different kinds of _coup de main_. Some are effected by surprise, others
by open force. Skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the
assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the things
which have an influence upon the successful issue of _coups de main_.
As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer
of the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon
the results of a great strategic operation.
The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that
of a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the
two attacks which were made in 1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in the
Grisons; the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally,
the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of
provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;--such are the
enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engaging
in them may be exposed.
Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with
fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the
same purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and should always be
prepared. Hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of
soldiers, to help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the
intrenchment. An entrance was effected through the sewers at Cremona by
Prince Eugene.
In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for
what has been done once may be done again.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 29: The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August
25) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the
third day, more than one hundred thousand.]
[Footnote 30: The distinction between the importance and the strength of
a post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little
importance, and vice aversá.]
CHAPTER V.
OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN CHARACTER PARTLY STRATEGICAL
AND PARTLY TACTICAL.
ARTICLE XXXVI.
Of Diversions and Great Detachments.
The operations of the detachments an army may send out have so important
a bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty of determining
their strength and the proper occasions for them is one of the greatest
and most delicate responsibilities imposed upon a commander. If nothing
is more useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent out and
having a good _ensemble_ of operations with the main body, it is equally
certain that no expedient is more dangerous when inconsiderately
adopted. Frederick the Great regarded it as one of the essential
qualities of a general to know how to make his adversary send out many
detachments, either with the view of destroying them in detail or of
attacking the main body during their absence.
The division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes been
carried to so great an extent, and with such poor results, that many
persons now believe it better to have none of them. It is undoubtedly
much safer and more agreeable for an army to be kept in a single mass;
but it is a thing at times impossible or incompatible with gaining a
complete or even considerable success. The essential point in this
matter is to send out as few detachments as possible.
There are several kinds of detachments.
1. There are large corps dispatched to a distance from the zone of
operations of the main army, in order to make diversions of greater
or less importance.
2. There are large detachments made in the zone of operations to
cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to guard
a secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if
threatened.
3. There are large detachments made upon the front of operations,
in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main body in some
combined operation.
4. There are small detachments sent to a distance to try the effect
of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have an
important bearing upon the general operations of the campaign.
I understand by diversions those secondary operations carried out at a
distance from the principal zone of operations, at the extremities of a
theater of war, upon the success of which it is sometimes foolishly
supposed the whole campaign depends. Such diversions are useful in but
two cases, the first of which arises when the troops thus employed
cannot conveniently act elsewhere on account of their distance from the
real theater of operations, and the second is that where such a
detachment would receive strong support from the population among which
it was sent,--the latter case belonging rather to political than
military combinations. A few illustrative examples may not be out of
place here.
The unfortunate results for the allied powers of the Anglo-Russian
expedition to Holland, and of that of the Archduke Charles toward the
end of the last century, (which have been referred to in Article XIX.,)
are well known.
In 1805, Napoleon was occupying Naples and Hanover. The allies intended
an Anglo-Russian army to drive him out of Italy, while the combined
forces of England, Russia, and Sweden should drive him from Hanover,
nearly sixty thousand men being designed for these two widely-separated
points. But, while their troops were collecting at the two extremities
of Europe, Napoleon ordered the evacuation of Naples and Hanover,
Saint-Cyr hastened to effect a junction with Massena in the Frioul, and
Bernadotte, leaving Hanover, moved up to take part in the operations of
Ulm and Austerlitz. After these astonishing successes, Napoleon had no
difficulty in retaking Naples and Hanover. This is an example of the
failure of diversions. I will give an instance where such an operation
would have been proper.
In the civil wars of 1793, if the allies had sent twenty thousand men to
La Vendée, they would have accomplished much more than by increasing the
numbers of those who were fighting fruitlessly at Toulon, upon the
Rhine, and in Belgium. Here is a case where a diversion would have been
not only very useful, but decisive.
It has already been stated that, besides diversions to a distance and of
small bodies, large corps are often detached in the zone of operations
of the main army.
If the employment of these large corps thus detached for secondary
objects is more dangerous than the diversions above referred to, it is
no less true that they are often highly proper and, it may be,
indispensable.
These great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. The first are
permanent corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a direction
opposite to the main line of operations, and are to remain throughout a
campaign. The second are corps temporarily detached for the purpose of
assisting in carrying out some special enterprise.
Among the first should be especially enumerated those fractions of an
army that are detached either to form the strategic reserve, of which
mention has been made, or to cover lines of operation and retreat when
the configuration of the theater of the war exposes them to attack. For
example, a Russian army that wishes to cross the Balkan is obliged to
leave a portion of its forces to observe Shumla, Routchouk, and the
valley of the Danube, whose direction is perpendicular to its line of
operations. However successful it may be, a respectable force must
always be left toward Giurgevo or Krajova, and even on the right bank of
the river toward Routchouk.
This single example shows that it is sometimes necessary to have a
double strategic front, and then the detachment of a considerable corps
must be made to offer front to a part of the enemy's army in rear of the
main army. Other localities and other circumstances might be mentioned
where this measure would be equally essential to safety. One case is the
double strategic front of the Tyrol and the Frioul for a French army
passing the Adige. On whichever side it may wish to direct its main
column, a detachment must be left on the other front sufficiently strong
to hold in check the enemy threatening to cut the line of
communications. The third example is the frontier of Spain, which
enables the Spaniards to establish a double front,--one covering the
road to Madrid, the other having Saragossa or Galicia as a base. To
whichever side the invading army turns, a detachment must be left on the
other proportioned in magnitude to the enemy's force in that direction.
All that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous to enlarge
as much as possible the field of operations of such detachments, and to
give them as much power of mobility as possible, in order to enable them
by opportune movements to strike important blows. A most remarkable
illustration of this truth was given by Napoleon in the campaign of
1797. Obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the
valley of the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was operating toward
the Noric Alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the risk
of losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the parts
of his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. Persuaded that
he could be victorious with his army united, he apprehended no
particular danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments upon
his communications.
Great movable and temporary detachments are made for the following
reasons:--
1. To compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations,
or else to cover your own.
2. To intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main body
of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own
reinforcements.
3. To observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing
army, while a blow is struck at the remainder.
4. To carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions,
on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the
success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a
convoy of your own.
5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where
you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an
enterprise in another direction.
6. To mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a
certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison
shut up within the ramparts.
7. To take possession of an important point upon the communications
of an enemy already retreating.
However great may be the temptation to undertake such operations as
those enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they are
always secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to be
successful at the decisive points. A multiplication of detachments must,
therefore, be avoided. Armies have been destroyed for no other reason
than that they were not kept together.
We will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that their
success depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skill
of their designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution.
Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of Charles
XII. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famous
convoy Lowenhaupt was bringing up. Villars entirely defeated at Denain
the large detachment Prince Eugene sent out in 1709 under D'Albermale.
The destruction of the great convoy Laudon took from Frederick during
the siege of Olmutz compelled the king to evacuate Moravia. The fate of
the two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen
in 1759, demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making
detachments, and how dangerous they may be. To come nearer our own
times, the disaster of Vandamme at Culm was a bloody lesson, teaching
that a corps must not be thrust forward too boldly: however, we must
admit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the fault
was not so much in sending out the detachment as in not supporting it
properly, as might easily have been done. That of Fink was destroyed at
Maxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason.
Diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the army are
decidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of engaging the
enemy's attention in one direction, while the mass of the forces is
collected upon another point where the important blow is to be struck.
In such a case, care must be taken not only to avoid engaging the corps
making the demonstration, but to recall it promptly toward the main
body. We will mention two examples as illustrations of these facts.
In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray as to the true direction of his
march, carried his left wing toward Rastadt from Kehl, whilst he was
really filing off his army toward Stockach; his left, having simply
shown itself, returned toward the center by Fribourg in Brisgau.
In 1805, Napoleon, while master of Vienna, detached the corps of
Bernadotte to Iglau to overawe Bohemia and paralyze the Archduke
Ferdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory; in another
direction he sent Davoust to Presburg to show himself in Hungary; but he
withdrew them to Brunn, to take part in the event which was to decide
the issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was the
result of his wise maneuvers. Operations of this kind, so far from being
in opposition to the principles of the art of war, are necessary to
facilitate their application.
It readily appears from what goes before that precise rules cannot be
laid down for these operations, so varied in character, the success of
which depends on so many minute details. Generals should run the risk of
making detachments only after careful consideration and observation of
all the surrounding circumstances. The only reasonable rules on the
subject are these: send out as few detachments as possible, and recall
thorn immediately when their duty is performed. The inconveniences
necessarily attending them may be made as few as practicable, by giving
judicious and carefully-prepared instructions to their commanders:
herein lies the great talent of a good chief of staff.
One of the means of avoiding the disastrous results to which detachments
sometimes lead is to neglect none of the precautions prescribed by
tactics for increasing the strength of any force by posting it in good
positions; but it is generally imprudent to engage in a serious conflict
with too large a body of troops. In such cases ease and rapidity of
motion will be most likely to insure safety. It seldom happens that it
is right for a detachment to resolve to conquer or die in the position
it has taken, whether voluntarily or by order.
It is certain that in all possible cases the rules of tactics and of
field-fortification must be applied by detachments as well as by the
army itself.
Since we have included in the number of useful cases of detachments
those intended for _coups de main_, it is proper to mention a few
examples of this kind to enable the reader to judge for himself. We may
call to mind that one which was executed by the Russians toward the end
of 1828 with the view of taking possession of Sizeboli in the Gulf of
Bourghas. The capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the Russians
rapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential
_point d'appui_ beyond the Balkan, where depots could be established in
advance for the army intending to cross those mountains: in case of
failure, no one was compromised,--not even the small corps which had
been debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the shipping.
In like manner, in the campaign of 1796, the _coup de main_ attempted by
the Austrians for the purpose of taking possession of Kehl and
destroying the bridge whilst Moreau was returning from Bavaria, would
have had very important consequences if it had not failed.
In attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great deal; and,
as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the main army, they may
be freely recommended.
Small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the enemy's
operations belong to the class of detachments that are judicious. A few
hundred horsemen thus risked will be no great loss if captured; and they
may be the means of causing the enemy great injury. The small
detachments sent out by the Russians in 1807, 1812, and 1813 were a
great hinderance to Napoleon's operations, and several times caused his
plans to fail by intercepting his couriers.
For such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold and full
of stratagems. They ought to inflict upon the enemy all the injury they
can without compromising themselves. When an opportunity of striking a
telling blow presents itself, they should not think for a moment of any
dangers or difficulties in their path. Generally, however, address and
presence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless danger, are
qualities more necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness.
For further information on this subject I refer my readers to Chapter
XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Operations, and to Article XLV. of this
work, on light cavalry.
ARTICLE XXXVII.
Passage of Rivers and Other Streams.
The passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already in place
or might be easily constructed, presents none of the combinations
belonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the passage of a large
river, such as the Danube, the Rhine, the Po, the Elbe, the Oder, the
Vistula, the Inn, the Ticino, &c, is an operation worthy the closest
study.
The art of building military bridges is a special branch of military
science, which is committed to pontoniers or sappers. It is not from
this point of view that I propose to consider the passage of a stream,
but as the attack of a military position and as a maneuver.
The passage itself is a tactical operation; but the determination of the
point of passage may have an important connection with all the
operations taking place within the entire theater of the war. The
passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800 is an excellent
illustration of the truth of this remark. Napoleon, a more skillful
strategist than Moreau, desired him to cross at Schaffhausen in order to
take Kray's whole army in reverse, to reach Ulm before him, to cut him
off from Austria and hurl him back upon the Main. Moreau, who had
already a bridge at Basel, preferred passing, with greater convenience
to his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left. The
tactical advantages seemed to his mind much more sure than the
strategical: he preferred the certainty of a partial success to the risk
attending a victory which would have been a decisive one. In the same
campaign Napoleon's passage of the Po is another example of the high
strategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing. The army of
the reserve, after the engagement of the Chiusella, could either march
by the left bank of the Po to Turin, or cross the river at Crescentino
and march directly to Genoa. Napoleon preferred to cross the Ticino,
enter Milan, effect a junction with Moncey who was approaching with
twenty thousand men by the Saint-Gothard pass, then to cross the Po at
Piacenza, expecting to get before Mélas more certainly in that direction
than if he came down too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of
the Danube at Donauwerth and Ingolstadt in 1805 was a very similar
operation. The direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause of
the destruction of Mack's army.
The proper strategic point of passage is easily determined by
recollecting the principles laid down in Article XIX.; and it is here
only necessary to remind the reader that in crossing a river, as in
every other operation, there are permanent or geographical decisive
points, and others which are relative or eventual, depending on the
distribution of the hostile forces.
If the point selected combines strategic advantages with the tactical,
no other point can be better; but if the locality presents obstacles
exceedingly difficult to pass, another must be chosen, and in making the
new selection care should be taken to have the direction of the movement
as nearly as possible coincident with the true strategic direction.
Independently of the general combinations, which exercise a great
influence in fixing the point of passage, there is still another
consideration, connected with the locality itself. The best position is
that where the army after crossing can take its front of operations and
line of battle perpendicular to the river, at least for the first
marches, without being forced to separate into several corps moving upon
different lines. This advantage will also save it the danger of fighting
a battle with a river in rear, as happened to Napoleon at Essling.
Enough has been said with reference to the strategical considerations
influencing the selection of the point of crossing a river. We will now
proceed to speak of the passage itself. History is the best school in
which to study the measures likely to insure the success of such
operations. The ancients deemed the passage of the Granicus--which is a
small stream--a wonderful exploit. So far as this point is concerned,
the people of modern days can cite much greater.
The passage of the Rhine at Tholhuys by Louis XIV. has been greatly
lauded; and it was really remarkable. In our own time, General Dedon has
made famous the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl and of the Danube at
Hochstadt in 1800. His work is a model as far as concerns the details;
and in these operations minute attention to details is every thing. More
recently, three other passages of the Danube, and the ever-famous
passage of the Beresina, have exceeded every thing of the kind
previously seen. The two first were executed by Napoleon at Essling and
at Wagram, in presence of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men
provided with four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where the
bed of the stream is broadest. General Pelet's interesting account of
them should be carefully read. The third was executed by the Russian
army at Satounovo in 1828, which, although not to be compared with the
two just mentioned, was very remarkable on account of the great local
difficulties and the vigorous exertions made to surmount them. The
passage of the Beresina was truly wonderful. My object not being to give
historical details on this subject, I direct my readers to the special
narratives of these events. I will give several general rules to be
observed.
1. It is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of
passage, that he may not accumulate an opposing force there. In
addition to the strategic demonstrations, false attacks must be
made near the real one, to divide the attention and means of the
enemy. For this purpose half of the artillery should be employed to
make a great deal of noise at the points where the passage is not
to be made, whilst perfect silence should be preserved where the
real attempt is to be made.
2. The construction of the bridge should be covered as much as
possible by troops sent over in boats for the purpose of dislodging
the enemy who might interfere with the progress of the work; and
these troops should take possession at once of any villages, woods,
or other obstacles in the vicinity.
3. It is of importance also to arrange large batteries of heavy
caliber, not only to sweep the opposite bank, but to silence any
artillery the enemy might bring up to batter the bridge while
building. For this purpose it is convenient to have the bank from
which the passage is made somewhat higher than the other.
4. The proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives
great facilities for passing over troops in boats and for
constructing the bridge. In like manner, a smaller stream emptying
into the larger near the point of passage is a favorable place for
collecting and concealing boats and materials for the bridge.
5. It is well to choose a position where the river makes a
re-entering bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can
cross their fire in front of the point where the troops are to land
from the boats and where the end of the bridge is to rest, thus
taking the enemy in front and flank when he attempts to oppose the
passage.
6. The locality selected should be near good roads on both banks,
that the army may have good communications to the front and rear on
both banks of the river. For this reason, those points where the
banks are high and steep should be usually avoided.
The rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of course from
those for effecting it, as the duty of the defenders is to counteract
the efforts of the assailants. The important thing is to have the
course of the river watched by bodies of light troops, without
attempting to make a defense at every point. Concentrate rapidly at the
threatened point, in order to overwhelm the enemy while a part only of
his army shall have passed. Imitate the Duke of Vendôme at Cassano, and
the Archduke Charles at Essling in 1809,--the last example being
particularly worthy of praise, although the operation was not so
decidedly successful as might have been expected.
In Article XXI. attention was called to the influence that the passage
of a river, in the opening of a campaign, may have in giving direction
to the lines of operations. We will now see what connection it may have
with subsequent strategic movements.
One of the greatest difficulties to be encountered after a passage is to
cover the bridge against the enemy's efforts to destroy it, without
interfering too much with the free movement of the army. When the army
is numerically very superior to the enemy, or when the river is passed
just after a great victory gained, the difficulty mentioned is trifling;
but when the campaign is just opening, and the two opposing armies are
about equal, the case is very different.
If one hundred thousand Frenchmen pass the Rhine at Strasbourg or at
Manheim in presence of one hundred thousand Austrians, the first thing
to be done will be to drive the enemy in three directions,--first,
before them as far as the Black Forest, secondly, by the right in order
to cover the bridges on the Upper Rhine, and thirdly, by the left to
cover the bridges of Mayence and the Lower Rhine. This necessity is the
cause of an unfortunate division of the forces; but, to make the
inconveniences of this subdivision as few as possible, the idea must be
insisted on that it is by no means essential for the army to be
separated into three equal parts, nor need these detachments remain
absent longer than the few days required for taking possession of the
natural point of concentration of the enemy's forces.
The fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case supposed is one in
which the general finds his position a most trying one; for if he
divides his army to protect his bridges he may be obliged to contend
with one of his subdivisions against the whole of the enemy's force, and
have it overwhelmed; and if he moves his army upon a single line, the
enemy may divide his army and reassemble it at some unexpected point,
the bridges may be captured or destroyed, and the general may find
himself compromised before he has had time or opportunity to gain a
victory.
The best course to be pursued is to place the bridges near a city which
will afford a strong defensive point for their protection, to infuse all
possible vigor and activity into the first operations after the passage,
to fall upon the subdivisions of the enemy's army in succession, and to
beat them in such a way that they will have no further desire of
touching the bridges. In some cases eccentric lines of operations may be
used. If the enemy has divided his one hundred thousand men into several
corps, occupying posts of observation, a passage may be effected with
one hundred thousand men at a single point near the center of the line
of posts, the isolated defensive corps at this position may be
overwhelmed, and two masses of fifty thousand men each may then be
formed, which, by taking diverging lines of operations, can certainly
drive off the successive portions of the opposing army, prevent them
from reuniting, and remove them farther and farther from the bridges.
But if, on the contrary, the passage be effected at one extremity of the
enemy's strategic front, by moving rapidly along this front the enemy
may be beaten throughout its whole extent,--in the same manner that
Frederick tactically beat the Austrian line at Leuthen throughout its
length,--the bridges will be secure in rear of the army, and remain
protected during all the forward movements. It was in this manner that
Jourdan, having passed the Rhine at Dusseldorf in 1795, on the extreme
right of the Austrians, could have advanced in perfect safety toward the
Main. He was driven away because the French, having a double and
exterior line of operations, left one hundred and twenty thousand men
inactive between Mayence and Basel, while Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan
upon the Lahn. But this cannot diminish the importance of the advantages
gained by passing a river upon one extremity of the enemy's strategic
front. A commander-in-chief should either adopt this method, or that
previously explained, of a central mass at the moment of passage, and
the use of eccentric lines afterward, according to the circumstances of
the case, the situation of the frontiers and bases of operations, as
well as the positions of the enemy. The mention of these combinations,
of which something has already been said in the article on lines of
operations, does not appear out of place here, since their connection
with the location of bridges has been the chief point under discussion.
It sometimes happens that, for cogent reasons, a double passage is
attempted upon a single front of operations, as was the case with
Jourdan and Moreau in 1796. If the advantage is gained of having in case
of need a double line of retreat, there is the inconvenience, in thus
operating on the two extremities of the enemy's front, of forcing him,
in a measure, to concentrate on his center, and he may be placed in a
condition to overwhelm separately the two armies which have crossed at
different points. Such an operation will always lead to disastrous
results when the opposing general has sufficient ability to know how to
take advantage of this violation of principles.
In such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may be
diminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of the points,
which then becomes the decisive one, and by concentrating the two
portions by interior lines as rapidly as possible, to prevent the enemy
from destroying them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had observed this
rule, and made a junction of their forces in the direction of
Donauwerth, instead of moving eccentrically, they would probably have
achieved great successes in Bavaria, instead of being driven back upon
the Rhine.
ARTICLE XXXVIII.
Retreats and Pursuits.
Retreats are certainly the most difficult operations in war. This remark
is so true that the celebrated Prince de Ligne said, in his usual
piquant style, that he could not conceive how an army ever succeeded in
retreating. When we think of the physical and moral condition of an army
in full retreat after a lost battle, of the difficulty of preserving
order, and of the disasters to which disorder may lead, it is not hard
to understand why the most experienced generals have hesitated to
attempt such an operation.
What method of retreat shall be recommended? Shall the fight be
continued at all hazards until nightfall and the retreat executed under
cover of the darkness? or is it better not to wait for this last chance,
but to abandon the field of battle while it can be done and a strong
opposition still made to the pursuing army? Should a forced march be
made in the night, in order to get as much start of the enemy as
possible? or is it better to halt after a half-march and make a show of
fighting again? Each of these methods, although entirely proper in
certain cases, might in others prove ruinous to the whole army. If the
theory of war leaves any points unprovided for, that of retreats is
certainly one of them.
If you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may expose
yourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives; and if a forced
retreat must begin when the shades of night are shrouding every thing in
darkness and obscurity, how can you prevent the disintegration of your
army, which does not know what to do, and cannot see to do any thing
properly? If, on the other hand, the field of battle is abandoned in
broad daylight and before all possible efforts have been made to hold
it, you may give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy is
about to do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of the
troops, you may lose their confidence,--as they are always inclined to
blame a prudent general who retreats before the necessity for so doing
may be evident to themselves. Moreover, who can say that a retreat
commenced in the daylight in presence of an enterprising enemy may not
become a rout?
When the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decide
whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of the
enemy as possible,--since this hurried movement might sometimes cause
the destruction of the army, and might, in other circumstances, be its
salvation. All that can be positively asserted on this subject is that,
in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best to
retreat slowly, by short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard of
sufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check
for several hours.
Retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from which
they result. A general may retire of his own accord before fighting, in
order to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to his
present one. This is rather a prudent maneuver than a retreat. It was
thus that Napoleon retired in 1805 from Wischau toward Brunn to draw the
allies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. It was thus that
Wellington retired from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo. This is what I proposed
to do before the attack at Dresden, when the arrival of Napoleon was
known. I represented the necessity of moving toward Dippoldiswalde to
choose a favorable battle-field. It was supposed to be a retreat that I
was proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a retrograde
movement without fighting, which would have been the means of avoiding
the catastrophe of the next day, (August 26, 1813.)
A general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a point
threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line of
retreat. When an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in an
exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearer
its supplies. Finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lost
battle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise.
These are not the only causes having an influence in retreats. Their
character will vary with that of the country, with the distances to be
passed over and the obstacles to be surmounted. They are specially
dangerous in an enemy's country; and when the points at which the
retreats begin are distant from the friendly country and the base of
operations, they become painful and difficult.
From the time of the famous retreat of the Ten Thousand, so justly
celebrated, until the terrible catastrophe which befell the French army
in 1812, history does not make mention of many remarkable retreats. That
of Antony, driven out of Media, was more painful than glorious. That of
the Emperor Julian, harassed by the same Parthians, was a disaster. In
more recent days, the retreat of Charles VIII. to Naples, when he passed
by a corps of the Italian army at Fornovo, was an admirable one. The
retreat of M. de Bellisle from Prague does not deserve the praises it
has received. Those executed by the King of Prussia after raising the
siege of Olmutz and after the surprise at Hochkirch were very well
arranged; but they were for short distances. That of Moreau in 1796,
which was magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, but
not at all extraordinary. The retreat of Lecourbe from Engadin to
Altorf, and that of Macdonald by Pontremoli after the defeat of the
Trebbia, as also that of Suwaroff from the Muttenthal to Chur, were
glorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of short duration.
The retreat of the Russian army from the Niemen to Moscow--a space of
two hundred and forty leagues,--in presence of such an enemy as Napoleon
and such cavalry as the active and daring Murat commanded, was certainly
admirable. It was undoubtedly attended by many favorable circumstances,
but was highly deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed by
the generals who directed its first stages, but also for the admirable
fortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who performed it. Although
the retreat from Moscow was a bloody catastrophe for Napoleon, it was
also glorious for him and the troops who were at Krasnoi and the
Beresina,--because the skeleton of the army was saved, when not a single
man should have returned. In this ever-memorable event both parties
covered themselves with glory.
The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country to be
traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be encountered, the
attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority or
inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstances
which have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out
of consideration the skillful arrangements which the generals may make
for their execution.
A general falling back toward his native land along his line of
magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in good order,
and may effect a retreat with more safety than one compelled to subsist
his army in cantonments, finding it necessary to occupy an extended
position. It would be absurd to pretend that a French army retiring from
Moscow to the Niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry
and draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good order and
with the same steadiness as a Russian army, well provided with every
thing necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an immense
number of light cavalry.
There are five methods of arranging a retreat:--
The first is to march in a single mass and upon one road.
The second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps,
marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order
to avoid confusion, especially in the _matériel_.
The third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads
nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival.
The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads.
The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging
roads.
I have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it is
taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and well
sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. This arrangement is
common to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing to do with the
strategic relations of these operations.
An army falling back in good order, with the intention of fighting as
soon as it shall have received expected reinforcements or as soon as it
shall have reached a certain strategic position, should prefer the first
method, as this particularly insures the compactness of the army and
enables it to be in readiness for battle almost at any moment, since it
is simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and form the remainder
of the troops under their protection as they successively arrive. An
army employing this method must not, however, confine itself to the
single main road, if there are side-roads sufficiently near to be
occupied which may render its movements more rapid and secure.
When Napoleon retired from Smolensk, he used the second method, having
the portions of his army separated by an entire march. He made therein a
great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but
moving along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendicular
direction into the midst of the separated French corps. The three fatal
days of Krasnoi were the result. The employment of this method being
chiefly to avoid incumbering the road, the interval between the
departure of the several corps is sufficiently great when the artillery
may readily file off. Instead of separating the corps by a whole march,
the army would be better divided into two masses and a rear-guard, a
half-march from each other. These masses, moving off in succession with
an interval of two hours between the departure of their several
army-corps, may file off without incumbering the road, at least in
ordinary countries. In crossing the Saint-Bernard or the Balkan, other
calculations would doubtless be necessary.
I apply this idea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand or one
hundred and fifty thousand men, having a rear-guard of twenty thousand
or twenty-five thousand men distant about a half-march in rear. The army
may be divided into two masses of about sixty thousand men each,
encamped at a distance of three or four leagues from each other. Each of
these masses will be subdivided into two or three corps, which may
either move successively along the road or form in two lines across the
road. In either case, if one corps of thirty thousand men moves at five
A.M. and the other at seven, there will be no danger of interference
with each other, unless something unusual should happen; for the second
mass being at the same hours of the day about four leagues behind the
first, they can never be occupying the same part of the road at the same
time.
When there are practicable roads in the neighborhood, suitable at least
for infantry and cavalry, the intervals may be diminished. It is
scarcely necessary to add that such an order of march can only be used
when provisions are plentiful; and the third method is usually the best,
because the army is then marching in battle-order. In long days and in
hot countries the best times for marching are the night and the early
part of the day. It is one of the most difficult problems of logistics
to make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts for
armies; and this is particularly the case in retreats.
Many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of halts, and
great disorder on the march is the consequence, as each brigade or
division takes the responsibility of halting whenever the soldiers are a
little tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. The larger the army and
the more compactly it marches, the more important does it become to
arrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the army
is to move at night. An ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as
much mischief as a rout.
If the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order to
relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will halt
with this object in view. The enemy seeing eighty thousand men in
battle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns;
and then the retreat should recommence at nightfall, to regain the space
which has been lost.
The third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, is
excellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. But, if they
are quite distant, one wing separated from the center and from the other
wing may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force and compels it
to stand on the defensive. The Prussian army moving from Magdeburg
toward the Oder, in 1806, gives an example of this kind.
The fourth method, which consists in following concentric roads, is
undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from each other when the
retreat is ordered. Nothing can be better, in such a case, than to unite
the forces; and the concentric retreat is the only method of effecting
this.
The fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous system of
eccentric lines, which I have attributed to Bulow, and have opposed so
warmly in the earlier editions of my works, because I thought I could
not be mistaken either as to the sense of his remarks on the subject or
as to the object of his system. I gathered from his definition that he
recommended to a retreating army, moving from any given position, to
separate into parts and pursue diverging roads, with the double object
of withdrawing more readily from the enemy in pursuit and of arresting
his march by threatening his flanks and his line of communications. I
found great fault with the system, for the simple reason that a beaten
army is already weak enough, without absurdly still further dividing its
forces and strength in presence of a victorious enemy.
Bulow has found defenders who declare that I mistake his meaning, and
that by the term _eccentric retreat_ he did not understand a retreat
made on several diverging roads, but one which, instead of being
directed toward the center of the base of operations or the center of
the country, should be eccentric to that focus of operations, and along
the line of the frontier of the country.
I may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his language, and
in this case my criticism falls to the ground; for I have strongly
recommended that kind of a retreat to which I have given the name of the
parallel retreat. It is my opinion that an army, leaving the line which
leads from the frontiers to the center of the state, with a view of
moving to the right or the left, may very well pursue a course nearly
parallel to the line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and
its base. It seems to me more rational to give the name of parallel
retreat to such a movement as that described, designating as eccentric
retreat that where diverging roads are followed, all leading from the
strategic front.
However this dispute about words may result, the sole cause of which was
the obscurity of Bulow's text, I find fault only with those retreats
made along several diverging roads, under pretense of covering a greater
extent of frontier and of threatening the enemy on both flanks.
By using these high-sounding words _flanks_, an air of importance may be
given to systems entirely at variance with the principles of the art. An
army in retreat is always in a bad state, either physically or morally;
because a retreat can only be the result of reverses or of numerical
inferiority. Shall such an army be still more weakened by dividing it? I
find no fault with retreats executed in several columns, to increase the
ease of moving, when these columns can support each other; but I am
speaking of those made along diverging lines of operations. Suppose an
army of forty thousand men retreating before another of sixty thousand.
If the first forms four isolated divisions of about ten thousand men,
the enemy may maneuver with two masses of thirty thousand men each. Can
he not turn his adversary, surround, disperse, and ruin in succession
all his divisions? How can they escape such a fate? _By concentration_.
This being in direct opposition to a divergent system, the latter falls
of itself.
I invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. When the leading
divisions of the army of Italy were repulsed by Wurmser, Bonaparte
collected them all together at Roverbella; and, although he had only
forty thousand men, he fought and beat sixty thousand, because he had
only to contend against isolated columns. If he had made a divergent
retreat, what would have become of his army and his victories? Wurmser,
after his first check, made an eccentric retreat, directing his two
wings toward the extremities of the line of defense. What was the
result? His right, although supported by the mountains of the Tyrol, was
beaten at Trent. Bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, and
destroyed that at Bassano and Mantua.
When the Archduke Charles gave way before the first efforts of the
French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an eccentric
movement? Was not the salvation of Germany due to his concentric
retreat? At last Moreau, who had moved with a very extended line of
isolated divisions, perceived that this was an excellent system for his
own destruction, if he stood his ground and fought or adopted the
alternative of retreating. He concentrated his scattered troops, and all
the efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which it
was necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line of two
hundred miles. Such examples must put an end to further discussion.[31]
There are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then
only as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a great
defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection
within the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the
sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the
army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province;
but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on
according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply
absurd.
There is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of
a retreat,--to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the
frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be
parallel to the frontier. For example, when Marshal Soult gave up the
line of the Pyrenees in 1814, he had to choose one of two directions for
his retreat,--either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of France,
or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the Pyrenees.
In the same way, when Frederick retired from Moravia, he marched toward
Bohemia instead of returning to Silesia.
These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that
they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the
center of its power. The propriety of giving such a direction to a
retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the
positions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army may
have for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct
communications with the central portions of the state.
Spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. If a French army
penetrates by way of Bayonne, the Spaniards may base themselves upon
Pampeluna and Saragossa, or upon Leon and the Asturias; and in either
case the French cannot move directly to Madrid, because their line of
operations would be at the mercy of their adversary.
The frontier of the Turkish empire on the Danube presents the same
advantages, if the Turks knew how to profit by them.
In France also the parallel retreat may be used, especially when the
nation itself is not divided into two political parties each of which is
striving for the possession of the capital. If the hostile army
penetrates through the Alps, the French can act on the Rhone and the
Saône, passing around the frontier as far as the Moselle on one side, or
as far as Provence on the other. If the enemy enters the country by way
of Strasbourg, Mayence, or Valenciennes, the same thing can be done. The
occupation of Paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least very
hazardous, so long as a French army remained in good condition and based
upon its circle of fortified towns. The same is the case for all
countries having double fronts of operations.[32]
Austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of the
directions of the Rhetian and Tyrolean Alps and of the river Danube.
Lloyd, however, considers Bohemia and the Tyrol as two bastions
connected by the strong curtain of the river Inn, and regards this
frontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel movements. This
assertion was not well sustained by the events of the campaigns of 1800,
1805, and 1809; but, as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trial
on that ground, the question is still an open one.
It seems to me that the propriety of applying the parallel method
depends mainly upon the existing and the antecedent circumstances of
each case. If a French army should approach from the Rhine by way of
Bavaria, and should find allies in force upon the Lech and the Iser, it
would be a very delicate operation to throw the whole Austrian army into
the Tyrol and into Bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in this
way the forward movement to Vienna. If half the Austrian army is left
upon the Inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an unfortunate
division of force is the consequence; and if it is decided to throw the
whole army into the Tyrol, leaving the way to Vienna open, there would
be great danger incurred if the enemy is at all enterprising. In Italy,
beyond the Mincio, the parallel method would be of difficult application
on the side of the Tyrol, as well as in Bohemia against an enemy
approaching from Saxony, for the reason that the theater of operations
would be too contracted.
In Prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great advantage against
an army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe or the Oder, whilst its
employment would be impossible against a French army moving from the
Rhine, or a Russian army from the Vistula, unless Prussia and Austria
were allies. This is a result of the geographical configuration of the
country, which allows and even favors lateral movements: in the
direction of its greatest dimension, (from Memel to Mayence;) but such a
movement would be disastrous if made from Dresden to Stettin.
When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, a
pursuit always follows.
A retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and by an army
in good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army; and
this is particularly the case after a defeat and when the source of
supplies and reinforcements is at a great distance; for a retreat then
becomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and its
difficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy
in conducting the pursuit.
The boldness and activity of the pursuit will depend, of course, upon
the character of the commanders and upon the _physique_ and _morale_ of
the two armies. It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all cases
of pursuits, but the following points must be recollected:--
1. It is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of
the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own
country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly
or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. Care must,
however, be taken not to make too large a circuit; for there might
then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely.
2. A pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as
possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained;
because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously
followed up.
3. There are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge of
gold for the enemy, no matter what the old Roman proverb may say;
for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to leave a
country, unless in the case when an unexpected success shall have
been gained over him by an army much inferior to his in numbers.
Nothing further of importance can be added to what has been said on the
subject of retreats, as far as they are connected with grand
combinations of strategy. We may profitably indicate several tactical
measures which may render them more easy of execution.
One of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is to
familiarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy may be
resisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the front, and that
the preservation of order is the only means of saving a body of troops
harassed by the enemy during a retrograde movement. Rigid discipline is
at all times the best preservative of good order, but it is of special
importance during a retreat. To enforce discipline, subsistence must be
furnished, that the troops may not be obliged to straggle off for the
purpose of getting supplies by marauding.
It is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to an officer
of great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, in
advance of its movements, examine and select points suitable for
occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. Cavalry can rally so
rapidly on the main body that it is evidently desirable to have
considerable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the
execution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of
thoroughly examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as to
prevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the
retreating columns.
It is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at the
distance of half a day's march from the main body. The rear-guard would
run great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. When,
however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it may
increase the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march to
the rear; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same
degree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy.
If the army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, it
may remain a day's march in rear. This will depend, however, upon its
strength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength of
the pursuing force. If the enemy presses up closely, it is of importance
not to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat is
made in good order. In such a case it is a good plan to halt from time
to time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the
Archduke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach, and
Kleber at Ukerath. Such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account of
the surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body of
troops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies and
spoils.
Passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means devoid of
interest. If the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges over
it, the operation is nothing more than the passage of a defile; but when
the river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge,
it is a maneuver of extreme delicacy. Among the precautions to be
taken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so that
they may be out of the way of the army; for this purpose it is well for
the army to halt a half-day's march from the river. The rear-guard
should also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body,--as
far, in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will
permit. The army may thus file across the bridge without being too much
hurried. The march of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shall
have reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of the
main body has passed. This will be a suitable moment for relieving the
rear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. The rear-guard will pass
through the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross the
river; the enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to give
him battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. The new
rear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross the
river, breaking the bridges after it.
It is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass they form
on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corps
left to hold the enemy in check.
The dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of the
precautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures should always be
taken to throw up intrenchments at the point where the bridge is to be
constructed and the passage made. Where time is not allowed for the
construction of a regular _tête de pont_, a few well-armed redoubts will
be found of great value in covering the retreat of the last troops.
If the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy is only
pressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so when the army is
threatened both in front and rear and the river is guarded by the enemy
in force.
The celebrated passage of the Beresina by the French is one of the most
remarkable examples of such an operation. Never was an army in a more
desperate condition, and never was one extricated more gloriously and
skillfully. Pressed by famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelve
hundred miles from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy in
front and in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surrounded
by vast forests, how could it hope to escape? It paid dearly for the
honor it gained. The mistake of Admiral Tschitchagoff doubtless helped
its escape; but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praise
should be given. We do not know whether to admire most the plan of
operations which brought up the Russian armies from the extremities of
Moldavia, from Moscow, and from Polotzk to the Beresina as to a
rendezvous arranged in peace,--a plan which came near effecting the
capture of their formidable adversary,--or the wonderful firmness of the
lion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies.
The only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to be
closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage,
and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way before the one
which is following the rear of your column can come up. Never place
yourself in a position to be exposed to such danger; for escape in such
a case is rare.
If a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges either by
regular _têtes de font_, or at least by lines of redoubts to cover the
rear-guard, it is natural, also, that the enemy pursuing should use
every effort to destroy the bridges. When the retreat is made down the
bank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also
fire-ships and mills,--a means the Austrians used in 1796 against
Jourdan's army, near Neuwied on the Rhine, where they nearly compromised
the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. The Archduke Charles did the same
thing at Essling in 1809. He broke the bridge over the Danube, and
brought Napoleon to the brink of ruin.
It is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this character
unless there is time for placing a stockade above it. Boats may be
anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floating
bodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 31: Ten years after this first refutation of Bulow's idea, the
concentric retreat of Barclay and Bagration saved the Russian army.
Although it did not prevent Napoleon's first success, it was, in the
end, the cause of his ruin.]
[Footnote 32: In all these calculations I suppose the contending forces
nearly equal. If the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive,
it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directly
upon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along the
frontier. If the armies are equal, this is impossible.]
ARTICLE XXXIX.
Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or when established in Winter
Quarters.
So much has been written on this point, and its connection with my
subject is so indirect, that I shall treat it very briefly.
To maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried on, is
generally difficult, however connected the arrangement may be, and there
is almost always some point exposed to the enemy's attacks. A country
where large towns abound, as Lombardy, Saxony, the Netherlands, Swabia,
or old Prussia, presents more facilities for the establishment of
quarters than one where towns are few; for in the former case the troops
have not only convenient supplies of food, but shelters which permit the
divisions of the army to be kept closely together. In Poland, Russia,
portions of Austria and France, in Spain and in Southern Italy, it is
more difficult to put an army into winter quarters.
Formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter quarters at the
end of October, and all the fighting after that time was of a partisan
character and carried on by the advanced troops forming the outposts.
The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters in Upper Alsace in 1674, by
Turenne, is a good example, from which may be learned the best method of
conducting such an enterprise, and the precautions to be taken on the
other side to prevent its success.
The best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to be the
following. Establish the cantonments very compactly and connectedly and
occupying a space as broad as long, in order to avoid having a too
extended line of troops, which is always easily broken through and
cannot be concentrated in time; cover them by a river, or by an outer
line of troops in huts and with their position strengthened by
field-works; fix upon points of assembly which may be reached by all the
troops before the enemy can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues by
which an enemy may approach constantly patrolled by bodies of cavalry;
finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made at any
point.
In the winter of 1807, Napoleon established his army in cantonments
behind the Passarge in face of the enemy, the advanced guard alone being
hutted near the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &c. The army numbered more
than one hundred and twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisite
in feeding it and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this position
until June. The country was of a favorable character; but this cannot be
expected to be the case everywhere.
An army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very difficult to
have a compact and well-connected system of winter quarters in countries
where large towns are numerous. The difficulty increases with the size
of the army. It must be observed, however, that if the extent of country
occupied increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means
of opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same proportion.
The important point is to be able to assemble fifty thousand or sixty
thousand men in twenty-four hours. With such an army in hand, and with
the certainty of having it rapidly increased, the enemy may be held in
check, no matter how strong he may be, until the whole army is
assembled.
It must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk in going
into winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a body and seems
inclined to make offensive movements; and the conclusion to be drawn
from this fact is, that the only method of giving secure repose to an
army in winter or in the midst of a campaign is to establish it in
quarters protected by a river, or to arrange an armistice.
In the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course of a
campaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of observation, or
waiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the offensive, it will
probably occupy quite compact cantonments. The selection of such
positions requires great experience upon the part of a general, in order
that he may form correct conclusions as to what he may expect the enemy
to do. An army should occupy space enough to enable it to subsist
readily, and it should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to be
ready for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions are
by no means easily reconciled. There is no better arrangement than to
place the divisions of the army in a space nearly a square, so that in
case of need the whole may be assembled at any point where the enemy may
present himself. Nine divisions placed in this way, a half-day's march
from each other, may in twelve hours assemble on the center. The same
rules are to be observed in these cases as were laid down for winter
quarters.
ARTICLE XL.
Descents.
These are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the
most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-prepared
enemy.
Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in
navies, transports are so helpless in presence of the monstrous
three-deckers of the present day, armed as they are with a hundred
cannon, that an army can make a descent only with the assistance of a
numerous fleet of ships of war which can command the sea, at least until
the debarkation of the army takes place.
Before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also the ships of
war; they were moved along at pleasure by using oars, were light, and
could skirt along the coasts; their number was in proportion to the
number of troops to be embarked; and, aside from the danger of tempests,
the operations of a fleet could be arranged with almost as much
certainty as those of an army on land. Ancient history, for these
reasons, gives us examples of more extensive debarkations than modern
times.
Who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by the
Persians upon the Black Sea, the Bosporus, and the Archipelago,--the
innumerable hosts landed in Greece by Xerxes and Darius,--the great
expeditions of the Carthaginians and Romans to Spain and Sicily, that of
Alexander into Asia Minor, those of Cæsar to England and Africa, that
of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe,--the Crusades,--the expeditions
of the Northmen to England, to France, and even to Italy?
Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II.
was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude until that set on
foot by Napoleon against England in 1803. All other marine expeditions
were of no great extent: as, for example, those of Charles V. and of
Sebastian of Portugal to the coast of Africa; also the several descents
of the French into the United States of America, into Egypt and St.
Domingo, of the English to Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp,
Philadelphia. I say nothing of Hoche's projected landing in Ireland; for
that was a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of the
difficulties to be apprehended in such attempts.
The large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of the
world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men, except against
second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult to find transportation
for one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men with their immense
trains of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c.
We were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the vast
problem of the practicability of descents in great force, if it is true
that Napoleon seriously contemplated the transportation of one hundred
and sixty thousand veterans from Boulogne to the British Isles:
unfortunately, his failure to execute this gigantic undertaking has left
us entirely in the dark as to this grave question.
It is not impossible to collect fifty French ships-of-the-line in the
Channel by misleading the English; this was, in fact, upon the point of
being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a favorable wind, to
pass over the flotilla in two days and effect a landing. But what would
become of the army if a storm should disperse the fleet of ships of war
and the English should return in force to the Channel and defeat the
fleet or oblige it to regain its ports?
Posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all future
generations, that this immense undertaking was not carried through, or
at least attempted. Doubtless, many brave men would have met their
deaths; but were not those men mowed down more uselessly on the plains
of Swabia, of Moravia, and of Castile, in the mountains of Portugal and
the forests of Lithuania? What man would not glory in assisting to bring
to a conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seen
between two great nations? At any rate, posterity will find in the
preparations made for this descent one of the most valuable lessons the
present century has furnished for the study of soldiers and of
statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France
from 1803 to 1805 will be among the most remarkable monuments of the
activity, foresight, and skill of Napoleon. It is recommended to the
careful attention of young officers. But, while admitting the
possibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as the
English to Boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada had
had a long sea-voyage to make? How could so many small vessels be kept
moving, even for two days and nights? To what chances of ruin would not
so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! Moreover,
the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh water
that must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor in
preparation and vast means of transportation.
Experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such an
expedition, even for thirty thousand men. From known facts, it is
evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in four
cases:--1st, against colonies or isolated possessions; 2d, against
second-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad;
3d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture a
position which it is important to hold for a time; 4th, to make a
diversion, at once political and military, against a state already
engaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the
point of the descent.
It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character.
About the only recommendations I can make are the following. Deceive
the enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vessels
may anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as much
activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some
strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on
shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protection
to the troops that have landed.
A great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that the
transports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landed
in boats and rafts,--which takes time and gives the enemy great
advantages. If the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed to
great risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats,
tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness
for the proper use of their arms?
I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces
too much by attempting to cover every point. It is an impossibility to
line the entire coast with batteries and battalions for its defense; but
the approaches to those places where large establishments are to be
protected must be closed. Signals should be arranged for giving prompt
notice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable
force should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a
firm foothold.
The configuration of coasts has a great influence upon descents and
their prosecution. There are countries where the coasts are steep and
present few points of easy access for the ships and the troops to be
landed: these few places may be more readily watched, and the descent
becomes more difficult.
Finally, there is a strategical consideration connected with descents
which may be usefully pointed out. The same principle which forbids a
continental army from interposing the mass of its forces between the
enemy and the sea requires, on the contrary, that an army landing upon a
coast should always keep its principal mass in communication with the
shore, which is at once its line of retreat and its base of supplies.
For the same reason, its first care should be to make sure of the
possession of one fortified harbor/ or at least of a tongue of land
which is convenient to a good anchorage and may be easily strengthened
by fortifications, in order that in case of reverse the troops may be
re-embarked without hurry and loss.
CHAPTER VI.
LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.
ARTICLE XLI.
A few Remarks on Logistics in General.
Is logistics simply a science of detail? Or, on the contrary, is it a
general science, forming one of the most essential parts of the art of
war? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designate
collectively the different branches of staff duty,--that is to say, the
different means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinations
of the art?
These questions will seem singular to those persons who are firmly
convinced that nothing more remains to be said about the art of war, and
believe it wrong to search out new definitions where every thing seems
already accurately classified. For my own part, I am persuaded that good
definitions lead to clear ideas; and I acknowledge some embarrassment in
answering these questions which seem so simple.
In the earlier editions of this work I followed the example of other
military writers, and called by the name of _logistics_ the details of
staff duties, which are the subject of regulations for field-service and
of special instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. This
was the result of prejudices consecrated by time. The word _logistics_
is derived, as we know, from the title of the _major général des logìs_,
(translated in German by _Quartiermeister_,) an officer whose duty it
formerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to the
marches of columns, and to locate them upon the ground. Logistics was
then quite limited. But when war began to be waged without camps,
movements became more complicated, and the staff officers had more
extended functions. The chief of staff began to perform the duty of
transmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant points
of the theater of war, and of procuring for him the necessary documents
for arranging plans of operations. The chief of staff was called to the
assistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give information of
them to subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and to
supervise their execution both in their _ensemble_ and in their minute
details: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected with all the
operations of a campaign.
To be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary that a man
should be acquainted with all the various branches of the art of war. If
the term _logistics_ includes all this, the two works of the Archduke
Charles, the voluminous treatises of Guibert, Laroche-Aymon, Bousmard,
and Ternay, all taken together, would hardly give even an incomplete
sketch of what logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less than
the science of applying all possible military knowledge.
It appears from what has been said that the old term _logistics_ is
insufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that the
real duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be made to
instruct them in a proper manner for their performance, should be
accurately prescribed by special regulations in accordance with the
general principles of the art. Governments should take the precaution to
publish well-considered regulations, which should define all the duties
of staff officers and should give clear and accurate instructions as to
the best methods of performing these duties.
The Austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for their
government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was better adapted
to the old methods of carrying on war than the present. This is the only
work of the kind I have seen. There are, no doubt, others, both public
and secret; but I have no knowledge of their existence. Several
generals--as, for instance, Grimoard and Thiebaut--have prepared
manuals for staff officers, and the new royal corps of France has issued
several partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be found a
complete manual on the subject.
If it is agreed that the old _logistics_ had reference only to details
of marches and camps, and, moreover, that the functions of staff
officers at the present day are intimately connected with the most
important strategical combinations, it must be admitted that logistics
includes but a small part of the duties of staff officers; and if we
retain the term we must understand it to be greatly extended and
developed in signification, so as to embrace not only the duties of
ordinary staff officers, but of generals-in-chief.
To convince my readers of this fact, I will mention the principal points
that must be included if we wish to embrace in one view every duty and
detail relating to the movements of armies and the undertakings
resulting from such movements:--
1. The preparation of all the material necessary for setting the
army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign.
Drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the assemblage
of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theater of
operations.
2. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief
for different enterprises, as well as plans of attack in expected
battles.
3. Arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the
measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be
used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to
facilitate the operations of the army.
4. Ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and
procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information as
possible of the positions and movements of the enemy.
5. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements
ordered by the general. Arranging the march of the different
columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner.
Ascertaining certainly that the means requisite for the ease and
safety of marches are prepared. Regulating the manner and time of
halts.
6. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards,
flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions
for their guidance. Providing all the means necessary for the
performance of their duties.
7. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or
their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing
up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand, as well as
their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to
engage in battle, according to the nature of the ground and the
character of the enemy.[33]
8. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen
points of assembly in case of their attack by superior numbers, and
informing them what support they may hope to receive in case of
need.
9. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage,
munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columns and in
their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere with the
movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. Taking
precautions for order and security, both on the march and when
trains are halted and parked.
10. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies.
Collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of
the army, and regulating their use.
11. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations
for their safety, good order, and police.
12. Establishing and organizing lines of operations and supplies,
as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached
bodies. Designating officers capable of organizing and commanding
in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of detachments and
convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also
for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its
base.
13. Organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men,
movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for their
safety.
14. Keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the
flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking
out for their return to the main column as soon as their service on
detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when required, some
center of action, and forming strategic reserves.
15. Organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up
isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction
between the army and its base of operations.
16. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of
the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of
artillery and engineers as to the labors to be performed by those
troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults.
17. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving
order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard;
causing intelligent officers to examine and select positions where
the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his
pursuit, and thus gain time; making provision in advance for the
movement of trains, that nothing shall be left behind, and that
they shall proceed in the most perfect order, taking all proper
precautions to insure safety.
18. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps;
indicating to each principal division of the army a place of
assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders,
instructions, and regulations are implicitly observed.
An examination of this long list--which might easily be made much longer
by entering into greater detail--will lead every reader to remark that
these are the duties rather of the general-in-chief than of staff
officers. This truth I announced some time ago; and it is for the very
purpose of permitting the general-in-chief to give his whole attention
to the supreme direction of the operations that he ought to be provided
with staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution.
Their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately connected; and
woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert! This
want of harmony is often seen,--first, because generals are men and have
faults, and secondly, because in every army there are found individual
interests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff and
hindering them in performing their duties.[34]
It is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain rules for the
guidance of staff officers in all the details of their multifarious
duties; for, in the first place, every different nation has staff
officers with different names and rounds of duties,--so that I should be
obliged to write new rules for each army; in the second place, these
details are fully entered into in special books pertaining to these
subjects.
I will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon some of
the first articles enumerated above:--
1. The measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing the army
to enter upon active operations in the field include all those which are
likely to facilitate the success of the first plan of operations. They
should, as a matter of course, make sure, by frequent inspections, that
the _matériel_ of all the arms of the service is in good order: horses,
carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes, &c. should be carefully
examined and any deficiencies supplied. Bridge-trains, engineer-tool
trains, _matériel_ of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move,
ambulances,--in a word, every thing which conies under the head of
_matériel_,--should be carefully examined and placed in good order.
If the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great rivers,
gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all the small craft
should be collected at the points and at the bank where they will
probably be used. Intelligent officers should examine the most favorable
points both for embarkations and for landings,--preferring those
localities which present the greatest chances of success for a primary
establishment on the opposite bank.
The staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will be
necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to the
proper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such direction
to the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn from them any
thing relative to the projected enterprise.
If the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with the chief
engineer officers what fortifications shall be erected near the base of
operations, when _têtes de ponts_ or intrenched camps are to be
constructed there. If the war is defensive, these works will be built
between the first line of defense and the second base.
2. An essential branch of logistics is certainly that which relates to
making arrangements of marches and attacks, which are fixed by the
general and notice of them given to the proper persons by the chiefs of
staff. The next most important qualification of a general, after that of
knowing how to form good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitating
the execution of his orders by their clearness of style. Whatever may be
the real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of a
commander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if the
general lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as far as he
can, having a proper understanding with the responsible chief.
I have seen two very different methods employed in this branch of the
service. The first, which may be styled the old school, consists in
issuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of the army, general
instructions filled with minute and somewhat pedantic details, so much
the more out of place as they are usually addressed to chiefs of corps,
who are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the same
sort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns just out of
school.
The other method is that of the detached orders given by Napoleon to
his marshals, prescribing for each one simply what concerned himself,
and only informing him what corps were to operate with him, either on
the right or the left, but never pointing out the connection of the
operations of the whole army.[35] I have good reasons for knowing that
he did this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air of
mystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall into the hands
of the enemy and assist him in thwarting his plans.
It is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his plans
secret; and Frederick the Great was right when he said that if his
night-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into the fire.
That kind of secrecy was practicable in Frederick's time, when his whole
army was kept closely about him; but when maneuvers of the vastness of
Napoleon's are executed, and war is waged as in our day, what concert of
action can be expected from generals who are utterly ignorant of what is
going on around them?
Of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. A judicious mean
may be adopted between the eccentric conciseness of Napoleon and the
minute verbosity which laid down for experienced generals like Barclay,
Kleist, and Wittgenstein precise directions for breaking into companies
and reforming again in line of battle,--a piece of nonsense all the more
ridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of the
enemy is impracticable. It would be sufficient, I think, in such cases,
to give the generals special orders relative to their own corps, and to
add a few lines in cipher informing them briefly as to the whole plan of
the operations and the part they are to take individually in executing
it. When a proper cipher is wanting, the order may be transmitted
verbally by an officer capable of understanding it and repeating it
accurately. Indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, and
concert of action would be secured.
3. The army being assembled, and being in readiness to undertake some
enterprise, the important thing will be to secure as much concert and
precision of action as possible, whilst taking all the usual
precaution's to gain accurate information of the route it is to pursue
and to cover its movements thoroughly.
There are two kinds of marches,--those which are made out of sight of
the enemy, and those which are made in his presence, either advancing or
retiring. These marches particularly have undergone great changes in
late years. Formerly, armies seldom came in collision until they had
been several days in presence of each other, and the attacking party had
roads opened by pioneers for the columns to move up parallel to each
other. At present, the attack is made more promptly, and the existing
roads usually answer all purposes. It is, however, of importance, when
an army is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advanced
guard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to remove
obstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &c., if necessary, and
secure the means of easy communication between the different corps of
the army.
In the present manner of marching, the calculation of times and
distances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a different
distance to pass over, in determining the hour of their departure and
giving them instructions the following particulars must be
considered:--1, the distances to be passed over; 2, the amount of
_matériel_ in each train; 3, the nature of the country; 4, the obstacles
placed in the way by the enemy; 5, the fact whether or not it is
important for the march to be concealed or open.
Under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of arranging
the movements of the great corps forming the wings of an army, or of all
those corps not marching with the column attached to the general
head-quarters, will be to trust the details to the experience of the
generals commanding those corps,--being careful, however, to let them
understand that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. It will
then be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and the
object to be attained, the route to be pursued and the hour at which
they will be expected to be in position. They should be informed what
corps are marching either on the same roads with them or on side-roads
to the right or left in order that they may govern themselves
accordingly; they should receive whatever news there may be of the
enemy, and have a line of retreat indicated to them.[36]
All those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for the
chiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and placing them in
position are mere pedantry,--more hurtful than useful. To see that they
march habitually according to regulation or custom is necessary; but
they should be free to arrange their movements so as to arrive at the
appointed place and time, at the risk of being removed from their
command if they fail to do so without sufficient reason. In retreats,
however, which are made along a single road by an army separated into
divisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully regulated.
Each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that its
march may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is convenient
also, even when they form part of a second line, for the head of each
column to be preceded by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with tools
for removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a few of
these workmen should also accompany each train: in like manner, a light
trestle-bridge train will be found very useful.
4. The army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard,
or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the center and each wing
may have its special advanced guard. It is customary for the reserves
and the center to accompany the head-quarters; and the general advanced
guard, when there is one, will usually follow the same road: so that
half the army is thus assembled on the central route. Under these
circumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the
road. It happens sometimes, however, when the important stroke is to be
made in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, the
general head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be moved
in that direction: in this case, all the rules usually regulating the
march of the center must be applied to that wing.
Advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers, capable of
forming correct ideas as to the enemy's movements and of giving an
accurate account of them to the general, thus enabling him to make his
plans understandingly. The commander of the advanced guard should assist
the general in the same way. A general advanced guard should be composed
of light troops of all arms, containing some of the _élite_ troops of
the army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, some
horse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &c., with light trestles and
pontoons for passing small streams. A few good marksmen will not be out
of place. A topographical officer should accompany it, to make a sketch
of the country a mile or two on each side of the road. A body of
irregular cavalry should always be attached, to spare the regular
cavalry and to serve as scouts, because they are best suited to such
service.
5. As the army advances and removes farther from its base, it becomes
the more necessary to have a good line of operations and of depots which
may keep up the connection of the army with its base. The staff officers
will divide the depots into departments, the principal depot being
established in the town which can lodge and supply the greatest number
of men: if there is a fortress suitably situated, it should be selected
as the site of the principal depot.
The secondary depots may be separated by distances of from fifteen to
thirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. The mean distance
apart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles. This will give fifteen
depots upon a line of three hundred miles, which should be divided into
three or four brigades of depots. Each of these will have a commander
and a detachment of troops or of convalescent soldiers, who regulate the
arrangements for accommodating troops and give protection to the
authorities of the country, (if they remain;) they furnish facilities
for transmitting the mails and the necessary escorts; the commander sees
that the roads and bridges are kept in good order. If possible, there
should be a park of several carriages at each depot, certainly at the
principal one in each brigade. The command of all the depots embraced
within certain geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent and
able general officers; for the security of the communications of the
army often depends on their operations.[37] These commands may sometimes
become strategic reserves, as was explained in Art. XXIII.; a few good
battalions, with the assistance of movable detachments passing
continually between the army and the base, will generally be able to
keep open the communications.
6. The study of the measures, partly logistical and partly tactical, to
be taken by the staff officers in bringing the troops from the order of
march to the different orders of battle, is very important, but requires
going into such minute detail that I must pass it over nearly in
silence, contenting myself with referring my readers to the numerous
works specially devoted to this branch of the art of war.
Before leaving this interesting subject, I think a few examples should
be given as illustrations of the great importance of a good system of
logistics. One of these examples is the wonderful concentration of the
French army in the plains of Gera in 1806; another is the entrance of
the army upon the campaign of 1815.
In each of these cases Napoleon possessed the ability to make such
arrangements that his columns, starting from points widely separated,
were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the decisive point of
the zone of operations; and in this way he insured the successful issue
of the campaign. The choice of the decisive point was the result of a
skillful application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangements
for moving the troops give us an example of logistics which originated
in his own closet. It has been long claimed that Berthier framed those
instructions which were conceived with so much precision and usually
transmitted with so much clearness; but I have had frequent
opportunities of knowing that such was not the truth. The emperor was
his own chief staff officer. Provided with a pair of dividers opened to
a distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straight
line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking into
account the windings of the roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched
at full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and the
supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors,
he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty and
precision which were astonishing. Turning his dividers about from point
to point on the map, he decided in a moment the number of marches
necessary for each of his columns to arrive at the desired point by a
certain day; then, placing pins in the new positions, and bearing in
mind the rate of marching that he must assign to each column, and the
hour of its setting out, he dictated those instructions which are alone
enough to make any man famous.
Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from Upper Swabia,
Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte and
Augereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard from Paris, were all
thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously
between Saalfeld, Gera, and Plauen, few persons in the army or in
Germany having any conception of the object of these movements which
seemed so very complicated.
In the same manner, in 1815, when Blücher had his army quietly in
cantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington was
attending _fêtes_ in Brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of
France, Napoleon, who was supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossed
with diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been
but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon
Charleroi and Blücher's quarters, his columns arriving from all points
of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the 14th of June, in the
plains of Beaumont and upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did not
leave Paris until the 12th.)
The combinations described above were the results of wise strategic
calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of
logistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures,
I will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics
came very near leading to fatal consequences. Napoleon having been
recalled from Spain in 1809 by the fact of Austria's taking up arms, and
being certain that this power intended war, he sent Berthier into
Bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was
extended from Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust was
returning from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who had
been on his way to Spain, was retiring toward Ulm by the Strasbourg
route; the Saxons, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers were moving from their
respective countries. The corps were thus separated by great distances,
and the Austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily break
through this spider's web or brush away its threads. Napoleon was justly
uneasy, and ordered Berthier to assemble the army at Ratisbon if the war
had not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it
in a more retired position toward Ulm.
The reason for this alternative order was obvious. If the war had begun,
Ratisbon was too near the Austrian frontier for a point of assembly, as
the corps might thus be thrown separately into the midst of two hundred
thousand enemies; but by fixing upon Ulm as the point of rendezvous the
army would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would have
five or six marches more to make before reaching-it,--which was a
highly-important consideration as the parties were then situated.