ART. ART. XLIII--Posting Troops in Line of Battle.
ART. XLIV.--Formation and Employment of Infantry.
ART. XLV.---Formation and Employment of Cavalry.
ART. XLVI.---Formation and Employment of Artillery.
ART. XLVII.--Employment of the Three Arms together.
CONCLUSION.
SUPPLEMENT.
APPENDIX.
SECOND APPENDIX.
SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.
SUMMARY OF
THE ART OF WAR.
DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR.
The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely
military branches,--viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics,
Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto
unrecognized, might be termed _Diplomacy in its relation to War_.
Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the
profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be
denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is
indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all
the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the
various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it
should have a place in a work like this.
To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:--
1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of
war, either for defense or for invasion.
3. Grand Tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering,--the attack and defense of fortifications.
6. Minor Tactics.
It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four
branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of
engineering.
Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good
infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a
staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.
CHAPTER I.
STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.
Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman
concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and
determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the
war.
A government goes to war,--
To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;
To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce,
manufactures, or agriculture;
To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the
safety of the government or the balance of power;
To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;
To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to
defend them;
To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of
territory;
To defend the threatened independence of the state;
To avenge insulted honor; or,
From a mania for conquest.
It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some
degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for
the proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to
the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and
there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and
conduct of a war, as,--
1. A state may simply make war against another state.
2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each
other.
3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy.
4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary.
5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning
or after it has commenced.
6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an
ally, or upon its own.
7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant
territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and
adventurous.
8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the
enemy.
9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.
War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the
art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the
operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances
of the case.
For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the
Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the
same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to
compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as
they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to
march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper
of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or
between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in
nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by
circumstances and events.
To these different combinations, which belong more or less to
statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management
of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong
exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the
highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general.
ARTICLE I.
Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights.
When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to
enforce them by arms. The public interest must be consulted before
action.
The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and
which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with
the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our
times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars,
though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in
reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the
Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly
settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the
general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by
all Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate
legatee.
Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an
old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus
doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if
he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur
and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as
such attempts can be justified.
In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit
by every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements
should be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step
would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may
be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength
of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory
by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his
own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be
able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. In
an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse
the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the
enemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance,
and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper
guarantees to other states.
ARTICLE II.
Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point of
View.
A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it
without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more
honorable. But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of
awaiting the attack on the frontiers.
There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also
advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with no
internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third
party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile
soil. This course will spare its territory from devastation, carry on
the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers,
and depress the spirits of the adversary. Nevertheless, in a purely
military sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own
territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial
features are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of
the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the
constituted authorities, possesses great advantages.
These plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war;
but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different
with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of
communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of
states and armies. The fact of these modifications has been used to
prove that war knows no rules. Military science rests upon principles
which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and
skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these
variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to
execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed.
For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or Russia would
differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of
Turks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and
possess no steadiness under misfortunes.
ARTICLE III.
Wars of Expediency.
The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II., and the war of the Spanish
Succession, were wars of expediency.
There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful state
undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political
reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to
prevent his aggrandizement. These last are wars of intervention; for a
state will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to
form a coalition for that purpose.
These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war.
ARTICLE IV.
Of Wars with or without Allies.
Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being
equal. Although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker
states in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than
either separately. The ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops,
but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening
portions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. All
history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and
neglected by any power, however formidable.
ARTICLE V.
Wars of Intervention.
To interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a
state than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain.
The power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole
weight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when
it can make decisive use of its resources.
There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internal
affairs of neighboring states; 2. Intervention in external relations.
Whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the
first class, instances are frequent. The Romans acquired power by these
interferences, and the empire of the English India Company was assured
in a similar manner. These interventions are not always successful.
While Russia has added to her power by interference with Poland,
Austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere
in the internal affairs of France during the Revolution.
Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and
perhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has the
right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it
certainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may
reach the adjoining states.
There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign
wars,--viz.: 1, by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2, to maintain
the political equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil consequences of the
war already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not
to be obtained otherwise.
History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect
of these principles. "A state begins to decline when it permits the
immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become
the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the
proper time."
In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a new
and large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be
decisive. Much will depend upon its geographical position in reference
to the armies already in the field. For example, in the winter of 1807
Napoleon crossed the Vistula and ventured to the walls of Königsberg,
leaving Austria on his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had
launched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon the Oder,
it is probable that the power of Napoleon would have been ended; there
is every reason to think that his army could not have regained the
Rhine. Austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundred
thousand men. Two years afterward, with this force she took the field,
and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at the
proper time would have decided the fate of Europe.
There are several kinds of war resulting from these two different
interventions:--
1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force
specified by former treaties.
2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending
his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil.
3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of
war,--which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against
one.
4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or
interferes before the declaration of war.
When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to
treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice
in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and
with an imposing force, the case is quite different.
The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the
Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France:
still, it was a principal party in the North until its occupation of
Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army as
far as Brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fate
of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad
maneuvering of their allies.
Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate
operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations of
this, to which we shall again refer in Article XXIX., in discussing the
military character of these expeditions.
It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these
distant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own
territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities
is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be,
in a measure, an advantage to the state.
In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is
both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the
allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations;
finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with
the common interests. By the neglect of these precautions, the greater
number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult
struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies.
The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the
whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising
than the others. Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807,
but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in 1813.
Napoleon had just collected his forces in Saxony, when Austria, taking
his front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle with
two hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. She
regained in two months the Italian empire and her influence in Germany,
which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. In this intervention
Austria had not only the political but also the military chances in her
favor,--a double result, combining the highest advantages.
Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater
was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible
display of force, she at the same time interfered in a contest already
in progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources and
at the time most opportune for her.
This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful
monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence
when they know how to profit by it.
Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxony
boldly declared war against Charles V., who was master of Spain, Italy,
and the German empire, and had been victorious over Francis I. and held
France in his grasp. This movement carried the war into the Tyrol, and
arrested the great conqueror in his career.
In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring himself hostile
to Louis XIV., changed the state of affairs in Italy, and caused the
recall of the French army from the banks of the Adige to the walls of
Turin, where it encountered the great catastrophe which immortalized
Prince Eugene.
Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these
opportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but they
could not add to the conviction of the reader.
ARTICLE VI.
Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons.
There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining
state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of
great extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,--as Alexander, Cæsar,
and Napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. However,
there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without
incurring great disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus
and the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia,
furnish bloody proofs of these truths.--The love of conquest, however,
was not the only motive with Napoleon: his personal position, and his
contest with England, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was to
make him supreme. It is true that he loved war and its chances; but he
was also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of
yielding to England. It might be said that he was sent into this world
to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. His victories
teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his
disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence.
A war of invasion without good reason--like that of Genghis Khan--is a
crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when
induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives.
The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in object
and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which
threatened the existence of the Spanish nation, and was fatal to its
author; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered the
general interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to a
successful termination because its object met with the approval of the
majority of the people whose territory was invaded.
These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the
same character. The first contributed largely to the fall of Napoleon;
the second restored the relation between France and Spain, which ought
never to have been changed.
Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to attack
than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the
spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at the
proper time.
An invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to the
end to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome.
An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and
likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, as
was well proved by the war in Spain, (1808,) and by the wars of the
Revolution in 1792, 1793, and 1794. In these latter wars, if France was
better prepared than Spain, she had no powerful ally, and she was
attacked by all Europe upon both land and sea.
Although the circumstances were different, the Russian invasion of
Turkey developed, in some respects, the same symptoms of national
resistance. The religious hatred of the Ottoman powerfully incited him
to arms; but the same motive was powerless among the Greeks, who were
twice as numerous as the Turks. Had the interests of the Greeks and
Turks been harmonized, as were those of Alsace with France, the united
people would have been stronger, but they would have lacked the element
of religious fanaticism. The war of 1828 proved that Turkey was
formidable only upon the frontiers, where her bravest troops were found,
while in the interior all was weakness.
When an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from the
inhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its course. The popular
feeling rendered the invasions of Italy, Austria, and Prussia so prompt.
(These military points are treated of in Article XXIX.) But when the
invasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its success
will depend more upon diplomacy than upon strategy. The first step to
insure success will be to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of a
state adjoining the enemy, which will afford reinforcements of troops,
and, what is still more important, give a secure base of operations,
depots of supplies, and a safe refuge in case of disaster. The ally must
have the same interest in success as the invaders, to render all this
possible.
Diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is not
powerless in adjacent invasions; for here a hostile intervention may
arrest the most brilliant successes. The invasions of Austria in 1805
and 1809 might have ended differently if Prussia had interfered. The
invasion of the North of Germany in 1807 was, so to speak, permitted by
Austria. That of Rumelia in 1829 might have ended in disaster, had not a
wise statesmanship by negotiation obviated all chance of intervention.
ARTICLE VII.
Wars of Opinion.
Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes
confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice.
Wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and,
lastly, (which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or exterior
without being intestine or civil.
Wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars of
intervention; for they result either from doctrines which one party
desires to propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it
desires to crush,--in both cases leading to intervention. Although
originating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are most
deplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, and
become vindictive, cruel, and terrible.
The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars of
the League, present nearly the same characteristics. Often religion is
the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of
dogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire
than to preach the Koran, and Philip II., bigot as he was, did not
sustain the League in France for the purpose of advancing the Roman
Church. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a
crusade in Egypt, thought more of the commerce of the Indies than of
gaining possession of the Holy Sepulcher.
The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for
it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. For
instance, the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and Philip II. in France,
had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. It may,
however, happen, as in the Crusades and the wars of Islamism, that the
dogma for which the war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter
enemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful.
The chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are
about equal. It may be recollected how in 1792 associations of fanatics
thought it possible to propagate throughout Europe the famous
declaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justly
alarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing
the lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing
it. The means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are
inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in the
human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it
is the more violent. Time is the true remedy for all bad passions and
for all anarchical doctrines. A civilized nation may bear the yoke of a
factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but these
storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. To attempt to
restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the
explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far
better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to
try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt.
After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if the
Girondists and National Assembly had not been threatened by foreign
armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands
upon the feeble but venerable head of Louis XVI. The Girondists would
never have been crushed by the Mountain but for the reverses of
Dumouriez and the threats of invasion. And if they had been permitted to
clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is
probable that, instead of giving place to the terrible Convention, the
Assembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good,
temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and
the immemorial traditions of the French.
In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not
only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of
an exasperated people. It may be said that the violence of one party
will necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of
another and opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all
the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is
supported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will be the
support of the faction which possesses no such means? What service did
one hundred thousand Vendeans and one hundred thousand Federalists do
for the Coalition in 1793?
History contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the
Revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger of
attacking an intensely-excited nation. However the bad management of the
military operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and before
deducing any certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain what
would have been the result if after the flight of Dumouriez, instead of
destroying and capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the
commanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to
France, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on Paris with
two hundred thousand men. They might have restored the monarchy; and,
again, they might never have returned, at least without the protection
of an equal force on their retreat to the Rhine. It is difficult to
decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would have
depended upon the course of the French nation and the army. The problem
thus presents two equally grave solutions. The campaign of 1793 gave
one; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say.
Experiment alone could have determined it.
The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national
wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the country
should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and
reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of
less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be
made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being
constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its
independence or the integrity of its territory.
The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in favor of
this course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It is true that the
conditions were slightly different; for the French army of 1792 was
made up of more solid elements than that of the Radicals of the Isla de
Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national
war, and a civil war,--while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 was
thoroughly a national war, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of
opinions without the element of nationality; and hence the enormous
difference in the results.
Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angoulême was well carried out.
Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the
above-mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to the Ebro, he there
divided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of
strength of their enemies,--which they could safely do, since they were
sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed the
instructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of
the country and the reduction of the fortresses between the Pyrenees and
the Ebro, in order to provide a base of operations, he would perhaps
have failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloody
one, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country
similar to that of 1807.
Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it
was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it
behooved him to consummate it rapidly. His conduct, so different from
that of the allies in 1793, deserves careful attention from all charged
with similar missions. In three months the army was under the walls of
Cadiz.
If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that statesmanship
was not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid
order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its
commanders, but in the Spanish government, which, yielding to the
counsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height of
its mission. The arbiter between two great hostile interests, Ferdinand
blindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deep
veneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authority
for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. The
nation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it would not have
been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. These camps came anew
into collision, as I predicted in Verona in 1823,--a striking lesson, by
which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land,
although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent
reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to
construct and consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful
conflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated
from all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon the
general interests of the country,--a monarchy capable of rallying to its
support this incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits not
less extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those who
were in the best position to know it.
ARTICLE VIII.
National Wars.
National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of
invasion, are the most formidable of all. This name can only be applied
to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of
them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their
independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its
camp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the
sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured.
The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and,
though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our
admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of
humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. This uprising must not be
confounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutions
of the state and directed by the government.
This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The serfs may
rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters,
affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them
the example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical
people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic
in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its
institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most
dear.
The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a
national invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, and
are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it,
their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of the
facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all
the points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will
be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea.
The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility
of a national defense. In mountainous countries the people are always
most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive
forests.
The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of Burgundy, that
of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by the
Russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally,
the reiterated efforts of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the
inhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer
time than those of the plains,--which is due as much to the difference
in character and customs as to the difference in the natural features of
the countries.
Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of
defense; and the Bocage of La Vendée, so justly celebrated, proves that
any country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or
canals, admits of a formidable defense.
The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well as
in national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the general
conducting them very difficult. The events just mentioned, the contest
of the Netherlands with Philip II. and that of the Americans with the
English, furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary
struggle of La Vendée with the victorious Republic, those of Spain,
Portugal, and the Tyrol against Napoleon, and, finally, those of the
Morea against the Turks, and of Navarre against the armies of Queen
Christina, are still more striking illustrations.
The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by
a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The invader has only an
army: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly
in arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, each
individual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even the
non-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every
means in their power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon which
he encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile and
multiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step.
These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is
difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their
connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the
commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the
slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best
measures to defeat his projects; while the latter, without information
of their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to
gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain safety only
in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man: his
combinations are failures; and when, after the most carefully-concerted
movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is
about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs
of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote, he is
attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications,
destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his
depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must
inevitably yield after a time.
In Spain I was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. When
Ney's corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped the companies of
the artillery-train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of four
brigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no Spanish
forces had been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago
de Compostela, the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo,
Marchand's at Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night the
companies of the train--men and horses--disappeared, and we were never
able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal
escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had
thus made away with them. Four months afterward, Ney with a single
division marched to conquer the Asturias, descending the valley of the
Navia, while Kellermann debouched from Leon by the Oviedo road. A part
of the corps of La Romana which was guarding the Asturias marched behind
the very heights which inclose the valley of the Navia, at most but a
league from our columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: when
he was entering Gijon, the army of La Romana attacked the center of the
regiments of the division Marchand, which, being scattered to guard
Galicia, barely escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the
marshal to Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking as
this. All the gold of Mexico could not have procured reliable
information for the French; what was given was but a lure to make them
fall more readily into snares.
No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a
system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all
the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at
the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy
wherever he may present himself. If this enemy has a regular army of
respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what
force will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure the
safety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies?
The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all the
obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the
occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. What
efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops
of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves for
six years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and
Portuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford,
Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Castaños, Reding, and Ballasteros!
If success be possible in such a war, the following general course will
be most likely to insure it,--viz.: make a display of a mass of troops
proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered,
calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time
and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and,
particularly, deal justly. The examples of Henry IV. in the wars of the
League, of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and
Valencia, of Hoche in La Vendée, are models of their kind, which may be
employed according to circumstances with equal success. The admirable
order and discipline of the armies of Diebitsch and Paskevitch in the
late war were also models, and were not a little conducive to the
success of their enterprises.
The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars
have led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be any
other kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest being
also more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders.
This reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all its
consequences, it would be necessary always to be able to induce the
people to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be
convinced that there would be in the future no wars but those of
conquest, and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are only
to maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public interests,
should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be known when and how
to excite the people to a national war? For example, if one hundred
thousand Germans crossed the Rhine and entered France, originally with
the intention of preventing the conquest of Belgium by France, and
without any other ambitious project, would it be a case where the whole
population--men, women, and children--of Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne,
and Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a Saragossa of every walled
town, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder, pillage, and
incendiarism throughout the country? If all this be not done, and the
Germans, in consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces,
who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate a part of
them, even though at first they had never contemplated it? The
difficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in favor
of national wars. But is there no means of repelling such an invasion
without bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war of
extermination? Is there no mean between these contests between the
people and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? Will
it not be sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, to
organize a militia, or landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their
governments into service, would regulate the part the people should take
in the war, and place just limits to its barbarities?
I answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to the
cases stated above, I will guarantee that fifty thousand regular French
troops, supported by the National Guards of the East, would get the
better of this German army which had crossed the Vosges; for, reduced to
fifty thousand men by many detachments, upon nearing the Meuse or
arriving in Argonne it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands.
To attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that good
national reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive
in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. This system
was used by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by the
whole of Germany in 1813.
I sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopian
philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars of
extermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that the
defenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of good
political alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence.
As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized
assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that
my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and
English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first,--as at
Fontenoy,--preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women,
and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers.
ARTICLE IX.
Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion.
Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally
the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious
sectarianism. In the Middle Ages they were more frequently the
collisions of feudal parties. Religious wars are above all the most
deplorable.
We can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force
against its own subjects in order to crush out factions which would
weaken the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that
it should murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers in
French or Latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is
difficult of conception. Never was a king more to be pitied than Louis
XIV., who persecuted a million of industrious Protestants, who had put
upon the throne his own Protestant ancestor. Wars of fanaticism are
horrible when mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightful
when they are family quarrels. The history of France in the times of the
League should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It is
difficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the time
of Francis I. should in twenty years have fallen into so deplorable a
state of brutality.
To give maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule upon
which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the two
parties or sects to drive the foreigners from the soil, and afterward to
reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. Indeed, the
intervention of a third power in a religious dispute can only be with
ambitious views.
Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a
political disease whose principles threaten social order; and, although
these fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is
possible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. But in
religious disputes this is never the case; and Philip II. could have had
no other object in interfering in the affairs of the League than to
subject France to his influence, or to dismember it.
ARTICLE X.
Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two Wars at Once.
The celebrated maxim of the Romans, not to undertake two great wars at
the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare the
necessity of demonstrating its wisdom.
A government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboring
states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an ally
to come to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance of
the political equilibrium. It will seldom be the case that the nations
allied against it will have the same interest in the war and will enter
into it with all their resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it
will be an ordinary war.
Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, the Emperor Alexander, and Napoleon,
sustained gigantic struggles against united Europe. When such contests
arise from voluntary aggressions, they are proof of a capital error on
the part of the state which invites them; but if they arise from
imperious and inevitable circumstances they must be met by seeking
alliances, or by opposing such means of resistance as shall establish
something like equality between the strength of the parties.
The great coalition against Louis XIV., nominally arising from his
designs on Spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions which had
alarmed his neighbors. To the combined forces of Europe he could only
oppose the faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the more
equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who, indeed, was not slow in adding
to the number of his enemies. Frederick, with only the aid of the
subsidies of England, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different
states, sustained a war against the three most powerful monarchies of
Europe: the division and folly of his opponents were his best friends.
Both these wars, as well as that sustained by Alexander in 1812, it was
almost impossible to avoid.
France had the whole of Europe on its hands in 1793, in consequence of
the extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, and the Utopian ideas of
the Girondists, who boasted that with the support of the English fleets
they would defy all the kings in the world. The result of these absurd
calculations was a frightful upheaval of Europe, from which France
miraculously escaped.
Napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign who has
voluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even three, formidable
wars,--with Spain, with England, and with Russia; but in the last case
he expected the aid of Austria and Prussia, to say nothing of that of
Turkey and Sweden, upon which he counted with too much certainty; so
that the enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has been
generally supposed.
It will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war made
against a single state which is aided by a third acting as an auxiliary,
and two wars conducted at the same time against two powerful nations in
opposite quarters, who employ all their forces and resources. For
instance, the double contest of Napoleon in 1809 against Austria and
Spain aided by England was a very different affair from a contest with
Austria assisted by an auxiliary force of a given strength. These latter
contests belong to ordinary wars.
It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if
possible, and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is more
prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them,
until a proper opportunity for redressing them shall arrive. The rule,
however, is not without exception: the respective forces, the
localities, the possibility of finding allies to restore, in a measure,
equality of strength between the parties, are circumstances which will
influence a government so threatened. We now have fulfilled our task, in
noting both the danger and the means of remedying it.
CHAPTER II.
MILITARY POLICY.
We have already explained what we understand by this title. It embraces
the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. If the
political considerations which we have just discussed be also moral,
there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a
war, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We
include these under the head of _Military Policy_.
Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any
projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy;
and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be
assigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and
without deviating from my intention,--which is, not to give a treatise
on theses subjects, but to point out their relations to military
operations.
Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be
fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves,
their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government
or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters
and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence
of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their
operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established
force of the state and its armament, the military geography and
statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the
resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of
which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.
There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government
should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and
that it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the
arrangement of all plans. We propose to sketch the principal points
which ought to guide in this sort of combinations.
ARTICLE XI.
Military Statistics and Geography.
By the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledge
possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy
with whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in the
topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all
the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the
examination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented in
the whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the
country. Besides the minister of war, the commanding general and his
chief of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty of
cruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in our day,
despite the great strides civilized nations have taken in statistical,
diplomatic, geographical, and topographical sciences. I will cite two
examples of which I was cognizant. In 1796, Moreau's army, entering the
Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, frightful defiles and
forests, and was greatly surprised to discover, after climbing the
declivities of the plateau that slope to the Rhine, that these, with
their spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from the
sources of the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain.
The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his whole army supposed the
interior of Bohemia to be very mountainous,--whereas there is no
district in Europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding
it has been crossed, which may be done in a single march.
All European officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference to
the Balkan and the Turkish force in the interior. It seemed that it was
given out at Constantinople that this province was an almost impregnable
barrier and the palladium of the empire,--an error which I, having lived
in the Alps, did not entertain. Other prejudices, not less deeply
rooted, have led to the belief that a people all the individuals of
which are constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia and
would defend themselves to the last extremity. Experience has proved
that the old regulations which placed the elite of the Janissaries in
the frontier-cities of the Danube made the population of those cities
more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior. In fact, the projects
of reform of the Sultan Mahmoud required the overthrow of the old
system, and there was no time to replace it by the new: so that the
empire was defenseless. Experience has constantly proved that a mere
multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor a
national defense.
Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geography
and statistics of an empire. These sciences are not set forth in
treatises, and are yet to be developed. Lloyd, who wrote an essay upon
them, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe, was not
fortunate in his maxims and predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; he
represents as impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between the
Tyrol and Passau, where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered and triumphed
with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805, and
1809.
But, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the
European staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable for
instruction in them,--at least for the special staff school. Awaiting
the time when some studious officer, profiting by those published and
unpublished documents, shall present Europe with a good military and
strategic geography, we may, thanks to the immense progress of
topography of late years, partially supply the want of it by the
excellent charts published in all European countries within the last
twenty years. At the beginning of the French Revolution topography was
in its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of Cassini, the
works of Bakenberg alone merited the name. The Austrian and Prussian
staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. The
charts published recently at Vienna, at Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, and
Paris, as well as those of the institute of Herder at Fribourg, promise
to future generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors.
Military statistics is not much better known than geography. We have but
vague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies and
navies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed by
a state,--which is far from being the knowledge necessary to plan
operations. Our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important
subjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in military
enterprises.
ARTICLE XII.
Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the Success of a War.
As the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerful
enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts
to allay them. We have nothing to add to what has been said on this
point under the head of national wars.
On the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify his
own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he
endeavors to repress in his adversaries. All armies are alike
susceptible of this spirit: the springs of action and means, only, vary
with the national character. Military eloquence is one means, and has
been the subject of many a treatise. The proclamations of Napoleon and
of Paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and
those of Suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models of
their different kinds. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas, and the
miracles of the Madonna del Pilar, led to the same results by very
different means. In general, a cherished cause, and a general who
inspires confidence by previous success, are powerful means of
electrifying an army and conducing to victory. Some dispute the
advantages of this enthusiasm, and prefer imperturbable coolness in
battle. Both have unmistakable advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasm
impels to the performance of great actions: the difficulty is in
maintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it,
disorder easily results.
The greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of the
armies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted to
rules. A cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic value
of their troops, and that resulting from their organization as compared
with that of the enemy. A Russian general, commanding the most solidly
organized troops in Europe, need not fear to undertake any thing against
undisciplined and unorganized troops in an open country, however brave
may be its individuals.[1] Concert in action makes strength; order
produces this concert, and discipline insures order; and without
discipline and order no success is possible. The Russian general would
not be so bold before European troops having the same instruction and
nearly the same discipline as his own. Finally, a general may attempt
with a Mack as his antagonist what it would be madness to do with a
Napoleon.
The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influences
the boldness of their operations. A general whose genius and hands are
tied by an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match
for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal.
As to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges of
victory, all other things being equal. It is true that great generals
have often been beaten by inferior ones; but an exception does not make
a rule. An order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the
hands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful general
had prepared for himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks which
cannot be foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on that account to
deny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs? This
risk even proves the triumph of the principles, for it happens that they
are applied accidentally by the army against which it was intended to
apply them, and are the cause of its success. But, in admitting this
truth, it may be said that it is an argument against science; this
objection is not well founded, for a general's science consists in
providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of
course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the number of
battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to
accident, it would not invalidate my assertion.
If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it
will readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of
the most delicate points in the science of government and one of the
most essential parts of the military policy of a state. Unfortunately,
this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank,
age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it as
the public interest and justice. This subject is so important that we
will devote to it a separate article.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of
the greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting communication,
&c., and may--as in the case of the French in 1812--make a retreat very
disastrous.]
ARTICLE XIII.
Military Institutions.
One of the most important points of the military policy of a state is
the nature of its military institutions. A good army commanded by a
general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with
a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a
great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general be
combined.
Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:--
1. To have a good recruiting-system;
2. A good organization;
8. A well-organized system of national reserves;
4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as
well as those of a campaign;
5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of
subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the
formalities of the service;
6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation;
7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed;
8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to
defensive and offensive arms;
9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an
organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical
education of its officers;
10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general
administration;
11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing the
principal operations of war;
12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.
To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and
equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of
battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the
troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and
health of veterans.
None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave
inconvenience. A fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but without
national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered Prussia to fall in
fifteen days under the attacks of Napoleon. On the other hand, it has
often been seen of how much advantage it is for a state to have a good
army. It was the care and skill of Philip and Alexander in forming and
instructing their phalanxes and rendering them easy to move, and capable
of the most rapid maneuvers, which enabled the Macedonians to subjugate
India and Persia with a handful of choice troops. It was the excessive
love of his father for soldiers which procured for Frederick the Great
an army capable of executing his great enterprises.
A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus
culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its
standards and its country, instead of by a different course preparing
for it success. We are far from saying that a government should
sacrifice every thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it
ought to make the army the object of its constant care; and if the
prince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him to
fulfill his duty in this respect. In this case--which is, unfortunately,
of too frequent occurrence--the defect must be supplied by wise
institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of the
general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of
national reserves.
There are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow the
executive the power of adopting the best systems. If the armies of the
Roman and French republics, and those of Louis XIV. and Frederick of
Prussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction of
operations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle,
it cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the form
of government exercises a great influence in the development of the
military strength of a nation and the value of its troops.
When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected
by local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous and
penurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive,
whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a
chief devoted to all the national interests.
The abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute to
this deplorable result. Then it will be impossible for the most
far-sighted administration to prepare in advance for a great war,
whether it be demanded by the most important interests of the country at
some future time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resist
sudden aggressions.
In the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the members
of an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be Richelieus,
Pitts, or Louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow the
institutions necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army
to fall into decay? Deceived by the seductive fallacies of an
exaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing themselves and
their constituents that the pleasures of peace are always preferable to
the more statesmanlike preparations for war?
I am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the
sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition of
things would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible,
except under conditions not existing in all countries. I simply mean
that civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in
a short time,--that they should never be found unprepared. And the
wisdom of their institutions may do as much in this work of preparation
as foresight in their administration and the perfection of their system
of military policy.
If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms,
governments subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature are
less suitable than others for the creation or preparation of a
formidable military power, nevertheless, in great crises these
deliberative bodies have sometimes attained very different results, and
have concurred in developing to the full extent the national strength.
Still, the small number of such instances in history makes rather a list
of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed
under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the
extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and
themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures
and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which
overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. Here
it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of
power, rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the
true cause of the display of energy. What happened in the Convention
after the fall of Robespierre and the terrible Committee of Public
Safety proves this, as well as the Chambers of 1815. Now, if the
dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank
of safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion that
countries controlled by elective assemblies must be politically and
militarily weaker than pure monarchies, although in other respects they
present decided advantages.
It is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in
the interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to
degenerate. It is important to foster the military spirit in the armies,
and to exercise them in great maneuvers, which, though but faintly
resembling those of actual war, still are of decided advantage in
preparing them for war. It is not less important to prevent them from
becoming effeminate, which may be done by employing them in labors
useful for the defense of the country.
The isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst
possible systems, and the Russian and Prussian system of divisions and
permanent corps d'armée seems to be much preferable. In general terms,
the Russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; and
if in many points its customs would be useless and impracticable
elsewhere, it must be admitted that many good institutions might well be
copied from it.
As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service,
and at the same time to open a way for merit. Three-fourths of the
promotions in each grade should be made according to the roster, and the
remaining fourth reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. On
the contrary, in time of war the regular order of promotion should be
suspended, or at least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the
other two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services.
The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war:
it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of
success. Every one can recall how nearly fatal to the French at Bylau
and Marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. We may also refer
to the great gain of the heavy French cavalry in the resumption of the
cuirass, which they had for so long thrown aside. Every one knows the
great advantage of the lance. Doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would
not be more effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is a
very different affair. How many brave cavalry soldiers have been the
victims of the prejudice they bore against the lance because it was a
little more trouble to carry than a saber!
The armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the
state which shall take the lead in making them will secure great
advantages. There is little left to be desired in artillery; but the
offensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry deserve the
attention of a provident government.
The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great
revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. Strategy alone
will remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios
and Cæsars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of the
nature of the arms and the organization of the troops.
The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful
rapidity.[2] The Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it
is said the Austrians can now regulate,--the shrapnel howitzers, which
throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet,--the Perkins
steam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion,--will
multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau,
Borodino, Leipsic, and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the
European races.
If governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these
inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the
half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture
with great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will be
obliged to resume its armor of the Middle Ages, without which a
battalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy.
We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor,
and horses also will require the same protection.
While there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is,
however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances which
should lead us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abused
by Napoleon. We will recur to this in the chapter on Tactics.
We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the
military policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government.
1. The prince should receive an education both political and military.
He will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councils
than good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of the
latter himself.
2. If the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be his
first duty and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. He
must confide the glory of his reign and the safety of his states to the
general most capable of directing his armies.
3. The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable
footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by
reserves, which should always be prepared. Its instruction and
discipline should be of a high character, as well as its organization;
its armament should at least be as good as that of its neighbors, and
superior if possible.
4. The matériel of war should also be upon the best footing, and
abundant. The reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals.
National jealousy should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of all
improvements in this matériel made in other countries.
5. It is necessary that the study of the military sciences should be
encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. The scientific
military corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way of
securing for the army men of merit and genius.
6. The general staff in times of peace should be employed in labors
preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives should
be furnished with numerous historical details of the past, and with all
statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and
papers for the present and future. Hence it is essential that the chief
of this corps, with a number of its officers, should be permanently
stationed at the capital in time of peace, and the war-office should be
simply that of the general staff, except that there should be a secret
department for those documents to be concealed from the subalterns of
the corps.
7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography
and the military statistics of other states, so as to know their
material and moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as the
strategic advantages of the two parties. Distinguished officers should
be employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when they
acquit themselves with marked ability.
8. When a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not an
entire plan of operations,--which is always impossible,--but a system of
operations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well
as all the material means necessary to guarantee the success of the
enterprise.
9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the
war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the
country, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of
the army or of the state. In fine, it should be based upon the moral and
material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring
into action; and it ought to take into consideration the probable
alliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the parties
during the war.
10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the
chances of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute
to this condition the importance attached to it by Frederick the Great
in the history of his times. He was probably right at his epoch, when
armies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last
crown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are well
organised money will no longer exercise the same influence,--at least
for one or two campaigns. If England has proved that money will procure
soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country and
honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be made
to support war. France, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and the
enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power which
cannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of its
efforts were none the less striking. Every year the numerous reports of
the cabinet of London, and particularly of M. d'Yvernois, announced that
France was about to break down for want of money, while Napoleon had
200,000,000 francs[3] in the vaults of the Tuileries, all the while
meeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies.
A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very
badly. History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the
strongest nor the happiest. Iron weighs at least as much as gold in the
scales of military strength. Still, we must admit that a happy
combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of
well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, imparts
to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable of
sustaining a long war.
A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which
a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron,
and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. This
result can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of
the enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing
resources to an assailant.
We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are
not directly connected with the art of war. It is sufficient for our
purpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be
for the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances and
localities may make in these relations.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 2: It will be recollected that the author wrote this many
years ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been
attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery, which
he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone important
improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less
marked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's steam-guns; and as yet no
civilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests for
depriving these destructive machines of their efficiency.--TRANSLATORS.]
[Footnote 3: There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fall
of Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous
efforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit in 1811.]
ARTICLE XIV.
The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over Operations.
Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by
the monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain
that if the prince possess the genius of Frederick, Peter the Great, or
Napoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of
performing great actions which he might do himself; for in this he would
be untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country.
As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more
fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince,
(which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will
only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other
respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who
is himself not the head of a state. Leaving out of the question that he
is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much
by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the public
resources for the attainment of his end. He also possesses the powerful
accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be
devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his
enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the
execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and
in secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives to
induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and
the contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he possess no
military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily
influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing good
results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. Each one will
present his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experience
necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit his
judgment to that of his intimates. His general, interfered with and
opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even
if he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign might
accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the
contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. In this case his
presence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead to
great embarrassment. If the army were turned and cut off from its
communications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad
results might not follow from the presence of the sovereign at
head-quarters!
When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his
armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme
direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the
Prussian government with Blücher,--viz.; he should be accompanied by two
generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability,
the other a well-instructed staff officer. If this trinity be
harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army
of Silesia in 1813.
The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it
proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has
frequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurred
that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser,
who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with
the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward
with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendôme at the battle of Audenarde, and, I
think, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is
deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known
that at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity
than Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret
authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and
allow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill
and courage than Mack, who was to be his mentor.
If the prince possess the genius and experience of the Archduke Charles,
he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full
selection of his instruments. If he have not yet acquired the same
titles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general of
the staff, and another general distinguished for his talent in
execution; but in no case will it be wise to invest either of these
counselors with more authority than a voice in consultation.
We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in
person, his most important duty will be to have the position of
commander well filled,--which, unfortunately, is not always done.
Without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the
more modern examples under Louis XIV. and Louis XV. The merit of Prince
Eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (the
ablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. After
Louvois' death, Tallard, Marsin, and Villeroi filled the places of
Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg, and subsequently Soubise and Clermont
succeeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable selections made in the
Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon's preference for
mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enough
to afford the least intelligent government means of making rational
nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise an
influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off the
prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services.
But, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be
profitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will
be difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a
judicious one. In the first place, to make choice of a skillful general
requires either that the person who makes the selection shall be a
military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should be
guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improper
influence of cliques. The embarrassment is certainly less when there is
at hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of
the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gained
a battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it is not
always the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of the
government. It may well happen that after a long period of peace, there
may not be a single general in Europe who has commanded in chief. In
this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is better
than another. Those who have served long in peace will be at the head of
their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this
position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it?
Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their
subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not
astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to their
appropriate positions. The judgment of the prince, misled by
appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well be
deceived in his selections.
One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in
realizing the beautiful fiction of Fénélon in Telemachus, by finding a
faithful, sincere, and generous Philocles, who, standing between the
prince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his
more direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in
reference to selections of individuals best recommended by their
character and abilities. But will this faithful friend never yield to
personal affections? Will he be always free from prejudice? Suwaroff was
rejected by Potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required all
the art of Catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shed
so much luster upon the Russian arms.
It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing
could be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a Cæsar, when he was
ignorant of the great operations of war. Would it have placed Bonaparte
at the head of the army of Italy, when he was known only by two
directors? Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public
sentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crises
and the experience of events.
The most essential qualities for a general will always be as
follow:--First, _A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions_;
Secondly, _A physical courage which takes no account of danger_. His
scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned
characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It
is not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. His
knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be
perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. Next
in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who is
gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others
instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit
conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even
pass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to
merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are
always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of
little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing
that the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all the
glory of its success, even when least entitled to it.
The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to
assign to the command a general of long experience in service with
troops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but little
experience in the management of troops. It is beyond question that war
is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be
able to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment
against an enemy. Peter the Great, Condé, Frederick, and Napoleon are
instances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that an officer from the
staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it will
not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster that
he will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a natural
genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. So, also, a
general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of
conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. So this question
does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or
negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of
the individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to
a rational conclusion:--
1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery,
who has commanded a division or a corps d'armée, will, with equal
chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one
arm or special corps.
2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war,
will be equally fitted for the command.
3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in a
commander-in-chief.
Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united the
requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the
principles of the art of war.
The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the
formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may
advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the
operations. A well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of
organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction
into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal.
Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, never
thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of General
Ruchel,[4] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible
rule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a step
from the sublime to the ridiculous!
Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and
his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man
of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice
of the men who are to be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a
general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit
him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous;
for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or
fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. The
best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of
several designated officers, all of undoubted ability.
It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent
councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more
weight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, if
the commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find
in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of
the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be
expected from operations conducted by others than those who have
originated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operation
which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his
own conception?
I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and
no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than
myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is
absurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the military
officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to
accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount
of dissent.
What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleon
proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the
maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regarded
them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand
difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting
them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been
executed by any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved
failures?
In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be
useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case
they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition,
may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use
every means to insure the success of the movement. This is the only
advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply
consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this
harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce
unfortunate results.
Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means of
organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by
experience, is--
1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight,
and of unshaken firmness in danger.
2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and
faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect
harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to
the friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Blücher,
aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would
not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command
is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon,
a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great
general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system.
Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of
influencing military operations--viz.: that of a council of war at the
seat of government--deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed
from Paris the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also,
from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and
saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he
repaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at
fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot
individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of
war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with the
duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been
but one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether this
opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able to
decide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this
connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of
operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out the
campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give
battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should
determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations,
whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to
these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the
levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points,
it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and
ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be
limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march
to Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate
the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the
unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole
responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those
who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of
directing the army,--a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the
scene of operations.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 4: General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could
save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in
order to form an oblique line.]
ARTICLE XV.
The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies.
The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army
would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a
military spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London,
situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets,
that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military
decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and
habits of the tradesmen of London or the bankers of Paris would sooner
or later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civic
virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the
Romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these
virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor
as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls,
the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that
whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither
neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of
industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they
should always be secondary to the great institutions which make up the
strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and
heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this point; for,
whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront
death in the footsteps of the Cæsars than to fatten upon the public
miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit.
Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the
tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public
estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life,
health, or fortune to the defense of his country.
The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army
with all possible social and public consideration. The second means is
to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state,
in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the
government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a
qualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient military
institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, is a subject
worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to
contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare
against the employment of officers of the army in other public
functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important
offices of administration.[5] It is true that many public employments
demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the
abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would
prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession
of arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officers
retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would
it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not
lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than
in the theaters and public clubs?
It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to
the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high
military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient
to place the profession of the soldier above all others. This was the
early practice of the Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were
bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea
that they were to die by their standards. Even the English--so jealous
of their rights--contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for
the whole length of their lives, and the Russian, in enlisting for
twenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. In such armies, and
in those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not be
advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; but
where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people,
the case is different, and the old Roman laws which required a previous
military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public
employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military
spirit,--particularly in this age, when the attainment of material
comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people.
However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of
government, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in
order to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under
the penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and suffering
insult and dependency.
It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people,
but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. Of
what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be
regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues are
wanting? The forces would be numerous but without valor.
The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite
different things, and should not be confounded, although they produce
the same effects. The first is the effect of passions more or less of a
temporary character,--of a political or religious nature, for instance,
or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon the
skill of the commander and resulting from military institutions, is
more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be the
object of the attention of every far-seeing government.[6] Courage
should be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rank
respected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions
rather than in external forms only.
The officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and
faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is
possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is
more honorable than enthusiasm in success,--since courage alone is
necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a
difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always
opposing to him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet
with a reward equal to that given for a great victory.
By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation
in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over
their enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a
love for great exploits,--in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by
every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage,
punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice,--we may expect to maintain
a high military spirit.
Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: those
formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in
the times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, found them too
heavy in the cool climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was
lost.
I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for
the enemy, lest the _morale_ of the soldier should be shaken if he
encounter an obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes'
troops, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they would
contend in vain against the bayonets of his Egyptians.
The officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panics
which often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled
by discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the
surest hope of safety. It was not from want of courage that one hundred
thousand Turks were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at
Kagoul by Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly
charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they
fought individually, but not in masses and in order. An army seized with
panic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorder
is once introduced all concerted action on the part of individuals
becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no
maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no
resource but in ignominious flight.
Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics;
and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy
it. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have never
been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind
which were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic which
pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle
of Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry after
the victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still
more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteen
hundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Two
days afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most
vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history.
Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes
more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those
who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally
promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken.
In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others.
The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal
degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the
soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity
of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder:
the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of
precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order
contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference of
most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the
slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments
or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the
rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a
momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were
offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still,
the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be
powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree
obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions.
There are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient
for the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of the
soldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and
when their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize
them,--which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out these
exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for
rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not
in preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it.
It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only desired to
trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which
are purely military.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 5: For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officers
from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all
colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. The
most venal deputies will not be those from military life.]
[Footnote 6: It is particularly important that this spirit should
pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable,
and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.]
CHAPTER III.
STRATEGY.
DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations,
consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics,
Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer.
We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them.
In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general
when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest
importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the
necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and
ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation
and handling of a great army.
We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its
commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the
character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war,
and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into
consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies.
The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone
of operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will
select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a
temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction;
namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable
opportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line of
operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. The
temporary positions which the corps d'armée will occupy upon this front
of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions.
When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet
resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel
him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic
lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain
degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be
confounded.
To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made,
lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established.
If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in
annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and
dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may
be carried on without reference to them. If the second of these courses
be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the
result.
The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the
enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will
be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective
point or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective
point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be
commenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after
detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a
strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which,
less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria,
leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty
thousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul.
If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if
it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more
important objective point.
If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an
intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already
occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small
strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and
also the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses large
streams, it will construct _têtes de pont_; and, if the bridges are
within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the
means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the
strategic reserve which may occupy these posts.
Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in
order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is
equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts
and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces.
When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the
field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and
is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter
campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not
differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased
activity and energy to attain prompt success.
Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it,
while discussing combinations which result from these operations.
Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:--
1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the
different combinations of which it admits.
2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and
the most favorable direction for operations.
3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of
operations.
4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.
5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.
6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or
strategic front.
7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different
maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.
8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.
9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.
10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the
army.
11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army,
as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.
12. Points for intrenched camps, _tétes de pont,_ &c.
13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.
These points are principally of importance in the determination of the
first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed
nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises,
disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which
belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy.
The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different
formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is
the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches
and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the
execution of strategical and tactical enterprises.
To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and
comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of
posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the
ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the
ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may
extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics
comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of
strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings
the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution
and the employment of the troops.
It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements,
and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in
the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of
pitched battles the above definition holds good.
Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the
following objects:--
1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle.
2. The offensive in a defensive battle.
3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the
attack of the enemy's line.
4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles.
5. Surprises of armies in the open field.
6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle.
7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps.
8. _Coups de main_.
All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties,
skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and
any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be
regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations.
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all
the operations of war,--a principle which must be followed in all good
combinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:--
1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively,
upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the
communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising
one's own.
2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of
one's forces.
3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the
decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of
the first importance to overthrow.
4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the
decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with
energy.
This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one
objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the
forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in
recognizing those points.
This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to
enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all
necessary explanations for its application upon the field. In Article
XIX. these decisive points will be described, and in Articles from
XVIII. to XXII. will be discussed their relations to the different
combinations. Those students who, having attentively considered what is
there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a
problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending
strategy.
The general theater of operations seldom contains more than three
zones,--the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of
operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each
line of battle, has the same subdivisions,--two extremities and the
center. A direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for
the attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the two
remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be
wholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed in connection
with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it
will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the
question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right,
to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these three
simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of
giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of
strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executive
talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary
to carry out any combinations previously arranged.
We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy
and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated
campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and
the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in
the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other.
OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS.
ARTICLE XVI.
Of the System of Operations.
War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it
shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant
by these terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against a
great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is
attacked, it is an _invasion_; if a province only, or a line of defense
of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally,
if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is
confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the
_initiative_. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly
always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the
assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and
diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the _morale_ of his army, and
generally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens that invasion
excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,--particularly when he
feels that the independence of his country is threatened.
In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad
side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations,
which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles in
the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are
favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the
country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are
generally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck
in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek
a speedy termination of the contest.
For a single operation, which we have called the taking the
_initiative_, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly
in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the masses
upon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take the
initiative. The attacking party knows what he is doing and what he
desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to
strike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy
fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows
where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel
him.
Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less
positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party
taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect
his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail.
The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the
obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which
account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are
about equally balanced.
Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically
from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively
throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become
defensive before it ends.
A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. It
may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passive
defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes.
The object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the
country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to
retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying
obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own
army. He who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then
seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the
contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off
detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to
his progress.
An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive
inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or
artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying
obstacles in the way of the enemy. This plan, when not carried to an
extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has
the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in
his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary;
he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon
the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of
the enemy. This plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and
may have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. It combines the
advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a
prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all
the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take
the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike.