FROM THE SALONICA FIRE TO THE RECALL OF SARRAIL
On August 18, 1917, there occurred one of those catastrophes in which
the history of Salonica is so rich. At about three p.m. a fire broke
out in a small house occupied by a poor Jewish widow in the central
part of the old town. For four months not a drop of rain had fallen,
and at Salonica there was no adequate organization for fighting the
flames, except a small and ill-equipped fire-brigade inherited from the
Turks. The Allied Armies had their own fire-engines, but the C.A.A.
had made no arrangements in view of a possible conflagration in the
city, for which the local authorities were supposed to provide. Big
fires were by no means unknown in Salonica; some thirty years before
a considerable part of the town had been destroyed by the flames,
and other fires had occurred fairly frequently. The water supply was
totally inadequate and the pressure very weak. The great majority of
the houses in the old town were of wood and even in the others there
was a great deal of woodwork; as if this were not enough, a high wind
was blowing at the time. All circumstances were therefore propitious
for a first-class fire. In a very short time the flames spread far and
wide, and from the poor hovel of the Jewish widow it soon enveloped
a large part of the city in a vast conflagration. About sunset the
Italian military band was still playing in the Place de la Liberté
near the sea, and no one imagined that the flames could possibly come
so far down (the quarter where it had broken out was half-way up the
hill). But by ten at night the handsome buildings along the sea front
were menaced, and had to be rapidly evacuated; during the night they,
too, caught fire. The heat of the flames was so terrific that, although
these structures were of brick and stone, they were swept away like the
wooden hovels. Even the rails of the railway along the quay on the side
opposite the houses and many yards away from them, were twisted out
of shape by the heat. Throughout the night there was a general exodus
of the population from the awful furnace. One saw families abandoning
their homes carrying some clothes, bedding and other household goods,
which were afterwards set alight by sparks scattered by the wind.
Allied detachments were distributed about the various quarters of the
town to prevent pillaging, to which the local hooligans and a certain
number of soldiers belonging to one or two of the Allied armies devoted
themselves. We were glad to be able to establish that no Italian
soldiers took part in these operations, and the same may be said of the
British. The military lorries, especially those of the British Army,
accomplished admirable salvage work; all through the night and the
following day they plied back and forth between the fire zone and the
British camps outside the city. Our own lorries were for the most part
engaged in clearing our clothing depot, which was the only military
establishment in the centre of Salonica; fortunately the flames only
just reached its outer wall, which was blackened, and a few days later
it was possible to occupy it again. The premises occupied by the C.A.A.
were also evacuated for a day or two, as they were at one moment in
danger, but the fire never actually reached them. Luckily no military
establishment was destroyed, save one or two depots of trifling
importance.
[Illustration: BULGARIAN PRISONERS.]
[Illustration: IN THE “CASTELLETTO” TRENCHES.
To face p. 180.
]
The damage to the city was, however, enormous. All the hotels, very
many business houses, all the best shops, a large number of stores
and warehouses, the post office and other public buildings and a
vast number of private dwellings, especially in the poorer part of
the Jewish quarter, were razed to the ground. The banks were spared,
and so also were the hospitals, and the flames never reached the
new quarters where all the best private houses were situated. One of
the most serious losses, because it was irreparable, was that of the
beautiful church of St. Demetrius, historically and artistically the
most important monument in Salonica.
This catastrophe, although it did not directly affect the Allied
armies, created a problem which the military authorities could not
disregard, viz., that of housing and feeding many thousands of
refugees. By far the greater part of these were Jews, and the Greek
authorities, supported in this by General Sarrail, had at first
contemplated their evacuation, and it was proposed that they should
be sent to Old Greece, to the islands and abroad, so as to avoid
exposing them to hardships and to preserve the city from the dangers of
epidemics, which the excessive overcrowding in the few remaining houses
might easily have caused. This scheme naturally appeared the soundest
from the point of view of public health. Incidentally it also presented
the advantage, from the Greek point of view, that with the exodus of a
large part of the Jewish inhabitants, the Greek element would have come
to constitute an absolute majority of the population, thus eliminating
the danger that at the future Peace Conference, the Salonica Jews,
anything but attached to the Greek régime, might demand autonomy on the
basis of “self-determination.”
In any case the question was settled by the Jews themselves, who, save
a very small minority, refused to depart. They knew that as long as
the Allied armies were there they were assured of a necessary minimum
of food, and that they would be able, in a very short time, to make
good the losses they had suffered, whereas if they went to Old Greece
or elsewhere they would find themselves in the midst of an unfriendly
and poor population, where they could not even manage to earn their
daily bread. It was said of the Salonica Jews, as of the Armenians,
that their idea of paradise was an endless street of shops with Allied
soldiers walking up and down it; Salonica, even after the fire, was
not very different from this picture. The Jews whose houses were
still standing were very generous in giving hospitality to their less
fortunate co-religionists, and everyone was ready to limit the space
occupied. Provisionally, the British gave shelter to many thousands of
the more needy refugees in some large camps on the outskirts of the
city, while the Greek Government and all the Allied armies contributed
towards feeding them. Little by little, all found shelter of some
sort, goodness knows how, and soon trading on a small scale began to
spring up again. At first it would be an itinerant pedlar with a tray
full of reels of cotton, a few pairs of stockings, some yards of linen
or canvas, and a little hardware. Then the tray became a hand-cart,
with a somewhat more abundant stock of goods, and the hand-cart was
next transformed into a stationary cart. A few days later the cart was
sheltered by a few boards; the whole outfit soon began to take on the
appearance of a modest hut, a little better stocked, almost a regular
shop. The profits of these traders, owing to the great scarcity of
goods, were quite fabulous.
For a long time the Greek Government refused to grant any permits to
rebuild in the burnt area, because it contemplated a grandiose plan
of reconstruction, based on an elaborate scheme which should have
made of Salonica a model city, with broad piazze, wide boulevards,
imposing public buildings, stately residences, perfect workmen’s
dwellings, Rowton houses, an elaborate electric tramway system,
electric undergrounds, a university, opera houses, concert halls, and
even a forest on the outskirts. But as all this was in the dim and
distant future and the inhabitants insisted on being allowed to make
some temporary arrangements, permission was finally granted to rebuild
the ground floors of the houses, the authorities reserving the right to
demolish them without compensation if the general reconstruction plan
were carried out. The Salonica merchants did not hesitate to take that
risk, and at once began to rebuild. In a few months they had recouped
themselves for their losses with a broad margin of profit. One cannot
help admiring their persistence, which was amply rewarded. But the
problem of general reconstruction has remained unsolved to this day. A
wealthy business man told me (and his opinion was confirmed by other
experts) that everything depended on the future political status of
the city. If it should be endowed with local autonomy and become a
free port, the money would easily be found, not only for rebuilding
Salonica, but also for the necessary works to prevent the silting up
of the harbour; the local Jews, with their own resources and those of
their co-religionists abroad, would provide it. But if Salonica were
to remain a Greek provincial town, without autonomy, at the mercy of
the Athens politicians, no one would invest any capital in it. Indeed,
many of the most far-sighted and enterprising business men would
leave altogether. I do not know whether this opinion is right, but it
certainly represented the conviction of almost the whole of the city’s
business community.
On August 31st an Italian detachment made a surprise attack on the
summit of Hill 1050. The position was captured with brilliant dash,
but before the troops could entrench themselves adequately they were
exposed to such a terrific artillery and trench-mortar fire that it was
not possible to remain, and General Mombelli, in order to avoid useless
losses, recalled the detachment. There were no enemy counter-attacks.
Early in September, General Sarrail undertook an action at his extreme
left against the Austrians and Bulgarians in Albania, to liberate the
road between Florina and Ersek from the menace of hostile attack, and
to push on the Pogradetz on the Lake of Ochrida. With this object
in view he made up a group consisting of 3 infantry regiments, some
mountain artillery and other minor units. The French line just skirted
the Lake of Ochrida and then turned sharp to the south, east of the
river Cerava, reached Lake Malik near Nishavetz and continued to the
south of the lake, almost parallel with the Koritza-Ersek road. On
September 7th, a column of the 176th Regiment occupied Placa between
the Lakes of Ochrida and Malik, and drove back the enemy beyond the
Cerava. On the 8th, another column forced the passage of the Devoli
river, west of Lake Malik. On the 9th, Pogradetz was occupied, this
being the only place where some resistance was offered, the enemy
forces consisting of Bulgarians, Austrians, Albanians in the Austrian
service, and some Saxon troops sent over expressly from another
sector of the front. The French pushed forward along the west shore
of Lake Ochrida as far as Udunista (9 km. north of Pogradetz) and
spread westward as far as Hill 1704, whence they hoped to command the
Durazzo-Struga road, one of the lines of supply of the extreme right
wing of the enemy. At the same time a column composed of French troops
and Albanian irregulars advanced along the upper Skumbi, and on the
21st a French detachment delivered a surprise attack on Golik (6 or
7 km. south of the Durazzo-Struga road), capturing 480 prisoners and
putting a similar number of the enemy _hors de combat_, with the loss
of only 16 men. Altogether the French made about a thousand prisoners
in these operations. In October, there was a slight renewal of activity
in this area, but the line occupied varied little, and was finally
stabilized along the following points: Udunista, Hill 1704, Velichani
Mokra, Gora Top, and thence southward. There was not, however, a
continuous line, as on the Western fronts or even in other parts of
the Macedonian front, but only a series of more or less isolated
posts. The troops in this sector were formed into what was called the
Provisional Infantry Division, commanded by General Jacquemot. The
detachments forming it soon afterwards returned to their respective
units, but subsequently, in consequence of information received
concerning a probable Bulgarian counter-offensive along the west shore
of Lake Ochrida, with the object of recapturing Pogradetz and perhaps
again menacing the Santi Quaranta road, the Provisional Division was
reconstituted; but the threatened attack never took place.
The French had thus obtained some not indifferent territorial
advantages by means of this very well conducted operation. But they now
found themselves with an extended front and their left flank in the
air, a situation which, in the face of an enterprising enemy, might
have been very dangerous, all the more so as their supplies had to
be transported on mule-back over very difficult country. But neither
the Bulgarians nor the Austrians were then in a position to attempt
operations in that area, which was as arduous for them as for the
French.
During the month of November, in consequence of the terrible disaster
of Caporetto, there were persistent rumours from various sources of
an imminent enemy offensive on the Macedonian and Albanian fronts.
The landing of several German divisions at Durazzo and the arrival of
numerous reinforcements on the Macedonian front from Roumania were
reported, chiefly from neutral countries (Spain and Switzerland).
The Austro-German victory on the Italian front was enthusiastically
fêted by the enemy forces in the Balkans, and a vigorous propaganda
was conducted, especially among the Serbs, by means of grandiloquent
proclamations and invitations to make a separate peace, dropped into
the Allied lines. General Sarrail did not believe in this offensive,
and as things turned out his scepticism proved well founded. All that
actually did happen was a slight increase in the enemy’s battalion
strength. The number of enemy battalions, which had risen from 239 in
February to 267 in May, and had fallen to 237 in August, again rose to
285 in November. These battalions were nearly all Bulgarian, save for
a variable but ever-decreasing number of German battalions--they were
then eight or nine--and the 177th Turkish Regiment, the last remnant
of the 2 Turkish divisions which had been formerly on the Macedonian
front; even this was soon afterwards withdrawn. It appears, however,
that the actual strength of the battalions had been progressively
weakened, so that the increase was more apparent than real.
Besides all their other difficulties, the Russian trouble was now
added. In the early days of the campaign the Russian troops had
fought very well, especially in the operations round Monastir. But
the revolution in Russia had its reaction, although in an attenuated
form, also in Macedonia. At first the trouble was caused by the
partisans of the old régime, who appeared unwilling to go on fighting
for the Russian Republic, and among these there was, it is said, a
Brigadier-General. Then the poisonous Bolshevik infection began to
spread among the troops, destroying all discipline and patriotic
sentiment. Whereas formerly many of the officers had neglected and
brutally ill-treated their men, and often embezzled the army funds, now
the brutalized and ignorant soldiers began to refuse to obey them. The
famous soldiers’ committees were formed, the result of which was the
abolition of all respect for authority and the placing of a premium on
cowardice and treachery. It was impossible to punish a soldier even
if he were guilty of the most infamous crime without the judgment of
the committee, and the latter invariably acquitted the accused. If
the idiotic blunders of Kerenski and the ignoble infamies of Lenin
and Trotzky did not produce such immediate and disastrous effects in
Macedonia as they did in Russia, it is because the Russians were but a
small minority among the other Allied troops who were not infected by
the plague.
At the time of the expedition to Greece the effects of revolutionary
ideas among the Russian troops became even more visible, the conduct
of the men being disgracefully undisciplined and scandalous. Then
there were rumours of “fraternization” at the front between Russians
and Bulgarians, and, although no very serious incidents seem to
have occurred, the mere possibility of them was in itself alarming.
The 7th and 8th Regiments gave most signs of insubordination and
demoralization, and one of the most culpable individuals appear to
have been Colonel Mindru, the Commander of the 7th Regiment, who
hoped to make himself popular by placing himself at the head of the
revolutionary movement. General Dietrich, an excellent officer, had
been recalled to Russia in the summer of 1917, and after a series of
temporary Commanders, General Taranowski had arrived at the beginning
of November to take command of the division. But by that time the
Bolshevik revolution was triumphant, and the Russian division was
going to pieces. At the beginning of January 1918, the Soviets of the
3rd, 7th and 8th Regiments demanded to be withdrawn to the second
line, whereas the 4th was ready to remain in the trenches. The more
insubordinate elements were sent to North Africa to perform almost
forced labour. The others were offered the choice of either continuing
to fight or of working in Macedonia as paid labourers. A small minority
requested to be sent to fight, and were shipped off to France where
they were incorporated in the Russian legion, and so did those of
Polish nationality, who joined the Polish Legion. Some of the others
agreed to work, but the great majority would neither fight nor work,
and these were consequently forced to work, practically as prisoners
of war. It is not likely that the French officers and men who had
charge of them were particularly tender towards these blackguards who
had betrayed the cause of the Entente and were responsible for the
indefinite prolongation of the war, to the total advantage of the
German.
Gradually the Russian Division was dissolved, by no means a simple
matter, owing to the administrative chaos in which its officers had
left it. The Russian officers remaining in Macedonia or relegated
to Greece did not, save a few exceptions, give a very edifying
spectacle of themselves. They continued their unseemly riotous living,
extravagantly spending money obtained no one knew how, and bombarded
the French _Intendance_, to whom the liquidation of the force was
entrusted, for increases of salary, advances, demobilization bonuses,
etc. The total number of Russian troops in Macedonia had been about
15,000, so that their disappearance constituted an appreciable
reduction of effectives.
The discipline of the French troops of the A.F.O. under Sarrail’s
régime had been getting worse and worse, as was proved by the mutinies
which occurred in the 57th Division. The immediate cause of the trouble
was the impossibility of granting leave to the majority of the men who
were entitled to it. Salonica was full of soldiers on their way home
on leave, but who could not depart owing to the scarcity of tonnage.
The worst disorders occurred among the men of the 242nd Infantry
Regiment, who after the end of their period of rest, refused to return
to the trenches. The Command was not in a position to apply extreme
measures, and had to adopt sometimes the strong and sometimes the
gentle manner. Order was, however, finally re-established, and the last
ninety mutineers were surrounded and disarmed without bloodshed (July
1917). Similar incidents occurred in the 2bis Zouaves. General Sarrail
attributed the trouble to the officers who had, he declares, first
encouraged them and then tried to keep in the background.[36]
All these episodes were signs of a very unsatisfactory spirit, and
were calculated to make the French Government ever more doubtful of
Sarrail’s military qualities. Another incident was now to prove the
last straw. We have already spoken of General Sarrail’s situation with
regard to the Allies and to French policy. Partly from a legitimate
desire to see the Armée d’Orient treated with more consideration and
adequately supplied with reinforcement and material, but still more
from his incorrigible tendency to political intrigue, he tried, while
M. Briand was still in office, to provoke a political campaign against
him in France, as he considered him responsible for the troubles of
his Army and attributed to his influence the fact that the French
Government often gave way to the Allies in matters concerning the
Macedonian Campaign. He had sent to Paris a report on the Armée
d’Orient whose conditions he described in the darkest colours,
insisting that this state of things should be remedied adequately,
so as to avoid an otherwise inevitable disaster. So far there was,
of course, no harm. But when the _Bonnet Rouge_ scandal broke out it
appeared from the papers of the traitor Almereyda that he had had a
copy of the Sarrail report in his hands and that he had communicated it
to agents of the German Government, who thus came to know the state of
weakness of the Macedonian force; had the enemy been in a position to
act upon this knowledge the Macedonian campaign might have ended in a
very disastrous manner. But who had communicated the precious document
to Almereyda? It was discovered in the course of the inquiry that he
had received it from a certain Sergeant Paix-Séailles, a journalist and
politician, who in all probability ignored the fact that Almereyda was
a traitor, but wished to make use of him for the campaign against M.
Briand. Paix-Séailles had obtained the document from Captain Mathieu,
an officer attached to the Staff of General Sarrail. Mathieu took
upon himself the whole responsibility for the affair, and received a
disciplinary punishment from the court martial, but it was impossible
to eliminate the general conviction that he would never have made such
use of so confidential a document if he had not been authorized to do
so by his Chief, whose full confidence he enjoyed and whose hostility
to Briand was notorious. About the same time the famous Caillaux
_dossier_ came to light, in which was a plan for the appointment
of General Sarrail as Commander-in-Chief of the French Army; the
appointment was to be made after the _coup d’état_ which Caillaux was
contemplating. Even if Sarrail himself had no knowledge of this scheme,
the mere fact that his name appeared among the persons in whom Caillaux
had confidence made a very bad impression.
On November 13th the Painlevé Cabinet fell and was succeeded by
that of M. Clemenceau. To the latter the Allied Ministers, in the
Versailles meeting of December 2nd, communicated all the complaints
against Sarrail. M. Clemenceau studied the various files concerning him
very carefully, and thus became acquainted with the above-mentioned
episodes. In spite of the pressure of the General’s political friends,
Clemenceau had the courage to cut the Gordian knot without hesitating;
on December 7th Sarrail received his order of recall, on the 22nd he
left Salonica, and after a series of inquiries he was placed on the
retired list.
His departure was welcomed with a sense of relief and satisfaction by
all the Allies, and even among the French officers it caused no regret,
save in a small group of persons in his immediate entourage who had
taken advantage of his friendship to obtain exceptional promotion and
other advantages for themselves. With General Sarrail his Chief of the
Staff, General Michaud, also departed.