GENERAL GUILLAUMAT
General Sarrail was succeeded by General Guillaumat. The latter was a
man of very different stamp. A good soldier and a thorough gentleman,
he immediately acquired an authority over the other Allied Commanders
such as had never been enjoyed by his predecessor. In France he had
given proof of high military qualities, but he remained a short time
in Macedonia and had no opportunity of carrying out an offensive. His
earnestness of purpose and conduct, however, which were soon made
manifest, argued well for the future, and while the merit of the
victory is justly attributed to General Franchet d’Espérey, the plan of
operations is due, in no small part, to General Guillaumat. Above all
he restored the discipline of the A.F.O., which had been badly shaken
under the unfortunate Sarrail régime. He brought a new Chief of the
Staff with him, General Charpy, who was certainly superior to General
Michaud, but he was to prove not too friendly towards the Italians; he
retained his post until after the end of the campaign.
The Commander of the A.F.O. was also changed in the autumn of 1918,
but for other reasons. General Grossetti was forced to leave Macedonia
owing to a serious illness, which had a fatal ending; he left an
excellent memory of himself, for his fine military qualities and
his character. He was succeeded by General Régnault, late Commander
of a group of divisions in Macedonia; he in his turn was succeeded
by General Henrys. With the successive Commanders of the A.F.O. our
relations were always cordial and friendly, even when they were less so
with the C.A.A. It was in fact much easier for two fine soldiers such
as Generals Petitti and Mombelli to agree with fighting leaders endowed
with qualities similar to their own than with Generals whose attention
was largely monopolized by political affairs.
[Illustration: THE SALONICA FIRE (NIGHT FROM AUGUST 18TH TO 19TH,
1917).]
[Illustration: CAMP OF THE 111TH FLIGHT (ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE).
To face p. 192.
]
While the Armée d’Orient had suffered a reduction of strength in
consequence of the Russian defection, it received in the winter of
1917–18 an unexpected reinforcement in the Serbian Army. During
the early period of the war a large number of Yugoslav subjects of
Austria-Hungary--Serbs, Bosnians and Herzegovinians, Croatians,
Slovenes, etc.--had been made prisoners by the Russians. Not a few had,
in fact, from hatred of their own Government, voluntarily surrendered.
They afterwards declared themselves ready to enlist in the Russian
Army to fight against the Dual Monarchy, and as there were very few
officers among them (the Austro-Hungarian Command was careful to
bestow commissions only on persons on whose loyalty it could depend),
a number of regular officers of the Serbian Army were sent out to
command them. Thus some Yugoslav divisions were formed which fought
gallantly on the Russian side against the Austrians and Germans. When
the revolution broke out in Russia they continued to fight in spite of
the gradual defection of the Russian Army, and in the last offensive in
June and July 1917 in Galicia, which began with a success and ended in
disaster, they found themselves abandoned by their erstwhile comrades
in arms, and suffered enormous losses, as the Russians, infected
with Bolshevism, either ran away or began to “fraternize” with their
own worst enemies. Finally, when the Russian situation had become
manifestly hopeless, they determined to go and join their brothers in
Macedonia. The enterprise was no easy one, for if the distance between
the borders of Galicia and Macedonia was short, invaded Roumania and
hostile Bulgaria stood between. It was therefore necessary to cross
the whole of Russia. The first detachments went to Archangel, where
they embarked for England, thence they travelled across France to
Toulon, there they re-embarked for Italy, and finally came on by road
and rail to Salonica, where they began to arrive at the end of
November, 1917, after a journey of many months. Others followed in
December and January. Those of them whom I saw in the train between
Vralo and Salonica were really fine-looking soldiers; indeed, only
picked men could have had the endurance to face all these difficulties
voluntarily. But the last detachments underwent even more dramatic
vicissitudes. They found themselves in the midst of Bolshevized Russia,
hostile to themselves and a vassal to Germany. Lenin, acting in
Germany’s interests, did not wish to allow them to leave, and it was
only thanks to the absolute anarchy then dominant in the country that
they were able, after infinite difficulties, to continue their journey.
The Bolsheviks at first demanded that the infamous soldiers’ councils
should be instituted among them, but the Yugoslavs refused to destroy
their own discipline. Lenin insisted that every single man should
state individually that he wished to go to Macedonia, and the great
majority did so. But during the journey they had to give up their arms
and encountered every sort of obstacle and obstruction, while Russian
employers and contractors, by offering them very high wages, tried
to induce them to remain in Russia, where no one else wanted to work
any longer; a certain number could not withstand the temptation and
remained behind. The Archangel route being no longer practicable, they
had to travel by the Trans-Siberian railway, so that to go from the
Danube to Salonica they crossed the whole of European Russia, Siberia,
Manchuria and on to Dalny, where they embarked, crossed the China Sea,
the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean,
finally landing at Salonica--a trifle of some 15,000 km.
On reaching Salonica they were sent to the camp at Mikra, re-equipped,
armed and sent on to the front. In all they were 8,000 to 10,000 men;
part of them were distributed among the existing units, so as to infuse
fresh blood into their reduced effectives, but some 3,500 to 4,000
were embodied in a new brigade of 2 regiments attached to the Vardar
Division, which thenceforth assumed the name of Yugoslav Division; its
other brigade, made up of the effectives of its 3 original regiments
(reduced to 2) was called the Vardar Brigade. This division was the
only one in the Serbian Army which comprised 4 regiments.
The arrival of these reinforcements produced a moral effect wholly
out of proportion with the material increase of strength which it
represented. The spirit of the soldiers had been gradually becoming
more and more depressed owing to the long-delayed expectation and
the constant losses which were never made good. They saw everything
in the gloomiest colours and had lost practically all hope of final
victory; the influence of the party favourable to a separate peace with
Austria steadily grew stronger. But the mere sight of these 8,000 new
combatants, who had faced such fearful hardships to reach Macedonia and
who knew that if they were taken prisoners they would receive but short
shrift, spread a new spirit of hope throughout the Serbian Army. These
were the first reinforcements which it had received for about a year.
I went to see some of the Yugoslav detachments which had arrived from
Russia at their camp, and I learned that the great majority of them
were Orthodox Bosnians and Herzegovinians. The Catholic Croatians,
Dalmatians and Slovenes were but a trifling minority. In fact, most
of the Yugoslavs of Croatia, Dalmatia and the Slovene lands, who had
been captured in Russia refused to enrol themselves to fight against
Austria, with very few exceptions, for the inhabitants of those
territories remained faithful henchmen of the Dual Monarchy until the
Armistice.
In Italy there were some 30,000 more Yugoslav prisoners, part of whom
had been captured by the Serbs and then conducted into Albania after
the collapse of the Serbian Army, whence they were afterwards shipped
to Italy. In consequence of the serious crisis of effectives which
paralysed the Serbian Army in Macedonia, the Serbian Government,
then established at Corfu, made application to that of Italy that
all the prisoners of Yugoslav race should be given into its charge.
Negotiations were instituted with this object, but the Italian
Government raised objections of various kinds. There was at first some
hesitation in handing them over to the Serbs for fear of reprisals
by Austria against our own prisoners. It also transpired that at
least a large part of them had no desire to go to fight in Macedonia,
especially those who were not Orthodox. Furthermore, the Serbian
Government committed the _gaffe_ of sending as its representative
to visit the prisoners in question an officer of the Serbian Army,
who was a Slovene from Opcina near Trieste and consequently a future
Italian citizen. On the eve of the general offensive in Macedonia the
negotiations had led to no result, and the Serbian Government made
a show of great irritation against us, attributing our reluctance
to ill-will against the Yugoslav nation. But as a matter of fact,
while the Serbian G.H.Q. at Salonica and the Government at Corfu were
officially and ostentatiously insisting that the prisoners should be
consigned to them, I learned from Serbian officers in very close touch
with the leading generals that the latter were by no means too anxious
to swell the ranks of their army with elements whose loyalty was
regarded with considerable doubt. A few days before the offensive, one
of those officers admitted to me in confidence: “Just now our Command
is so fully occupied with preparations for the coming action that it
has no time to think about the prisoners in Italy. And then we do not
particularly trust these semi-Austrian gentry.” The difficulties raised
by us were the object of complaints made to the other Allies regarding
our conduct, but in truth the Serbian Government was by no means sorry
to have an excuse for dropping the scheme.
By this time almost the whole of the Greek Army had been transported
to Macedonia. The three divisions of the National Defence Army Corps
(except for one regiment retained in Athens) was united under the
command of General Zimbrakakis, and distributed between Nonte and the
Vardar, forming part of the 1st Group of Divisions. Other divisions
belonging to the regular army and reorganized by the French Military
Mission, were moving towards the Struma front. Their effectives were
considerable, as the divisions were all up to strength and almost free
from war losses. But in spite of the intensive training to which they
had been subjected by the French officers at the Naresh camp, both
officers and men still had very scanty notions of modern methods of
warfare. Among the officers, moreover, even after the severe cleansing,
Royalist feeling had by no means disappeared, and a British officer
attached to the Greek Army assured me that at more than one Greek mess
the health of the exiled King was still drunk. The great unknown factor
was the fighting value of these soldiers. Those of the National Defence
Corps were now sufficiently inured to war, but about the others nothing
was known.
As it was necessary, in view of reports of a coming enemy offensive,
to obtain reliable information, local operations were intensified. On
the night of April 14–15, 1918, Greek and British detachments made an
incursion beyond the Struma (north-west of Lake Tahinos), and occupied
various villages; the Bulgars counter-attacked and regained some of the
lost positions. The Greeks had behaved well, although the engagement
was of small importance. The local Greek press, and also the French
papers, inspired by the C.A.A., extolled this episode to the skies as
though it were a first-class victory. Even in the restaurants at Athens
banquets were given, with abundance of champagne, to celebrate the
great triumph.
At the end of May the National Defence Forces carried out a much
more important operation. The enemy occupied a strong position on
the _massif_ known as the Srka di Legen[37] near Huma, which formed
a very awkward salient for the Allies. During the last days of May,
a powerful group of French artillery, together with 2 British 8-inch
guns, were concentrated in that area and opened a heavy bombardment on
the enemy lines. The British heavy batteries on the Smol (left bank
of the Vardar) also contributed their share. On the 29th, the attack
began, and the Greek troops rushed the enemy trenches at dawn on the
30th, supported by a powerful barrage fire. The 1st (Serres), 5th
and 6th (Archipelago) Regiments gained possession of the defensive
positions of the Srka di Legen, while the 7th (Cretan) Regiment
occupied the heights between the two branches of the Ljumnitza River.
On a front of 12 km. and for a depth of 2 km. the whole complicated
maze of formidable defences was thus conquered. The action was so rapid
that the Bulgarian barrage did not begin until the attacking troops
were already well out of their trenches. The enemy counter-attacks,
weakly pushed, were easily repulsed, and the Greeks captured some
1,700 prisoners and a considerable amount of booty, losing from 500 to
600 men, killed and wounded. The Greeks behaved extremely well, and
their Commander, General Ioannou, greatly distinguished himself for
his personal courage. A fresh Bulgarian counter-attack was expected
during the next few days, especially as the Bulgarians were known to
despise the Greeks and it was believed that they would never submit to
a defeat at their hands without attempting a return match; elaborate
defensive preparations were made, and the Greek troops were sent into
the second lines to recuperate, and relieved by French units. But the
counter-attack never materialized, and this was one of the first really
significant signs of the enemy’s depressed _moral_. From Field Marshal
Hindenburg’s memoirs and other sources we gather that the troops
detailed for the counter-attack and for a general attack on the British
lines had refused to march.
The operation had been admirably prepared by the French Staff, and
the artillery concentrated in that area formed a formidable mass. Its
objectives were almost more political than military, and full success
having been achieved, it was very largely exploited and advertised.
The battle of the Srka was indeed a strong encouragement for the
Venizelist party in Greece, and public opinion came to have somewhat
more confidence in the Greek Army. It seems almost paradoxical, but the
Greeks themselves, who were ready to extol in the most exaggerated way
the most modest successes of their troops, in their heart of hearts did
not feel much confidence in them, and as a French officer said to me,
they still believed that the Bulgarians trained by the Germans were
worth more than the Greeks trained by the French. But in one of those
fits of sudden exaltation, characteristic of all Balkan peoples, the
Greeks swerved from a belief in German invincibility and terror of a
Bulgaro-German invasion to the absolute confidence in a complete and
immediate Allied victory obtained by virtue of Greek aid. In the cafés
of Athens there was little to choose between the Marne, Gorizia, the
Somme, Brusiloff’s offensive and the Srka di Legen.
But in spite of all exaggerations, we must remember that this was a
really creditable episode; it exercised a favourable influence on the
Greek mobilization, and showed that the Allies could count on at least
a part of the Greek Army.