IRRITATION AGAINST GENERAL SARRAIL
One fact which the operations in Greece had made clear was that the
enemy were not at all inclined to carry out an offensive or were not
in a position to do so. If they had had any such intention, no better
occasion could have offered itself than at the moment when several
Allied divisions had been withdrawn and when the troops were depressed
by the unsuccessful offensive. If they did not know how greatly reduced
was the strength of the Allied forces, they could not ignore the
sending of troops to Greece. So favourable a chance of attacking was
never likely to occur again, and at Salonica everybody was expecting
an offensive which might have had disastrous results. But nothing
happened, which was a proof either of disagreement between the Bulgars
and Germans, or of the fact that the enemy did not feel very sure of
themselves. Soon after, the divisions sent to Greece returned to the
Macedonian front, and the immediate danger was over.
Salonica had now ceased to be a capital, and became once more a
provincial town, but its military importance remained, inasmuch as
it was still the centre of important military operations, and the
hotbed of infinite political intrigues. General Pennella, after having
remained only a few weeks in Macedonia, was recalled to Italy to
assume the important position of Chief of Staff to H.R.H. the Duke
d’Aosta (III Army), and the temporary command of the 35th Division
was assumed by Brigadier-General Chiossi. On June 30th Major-General
Ernesto Mombelli arrived at Salonica to take up the Command of the
expeditionary force, which he held until it broke up in July 1919,
He had begun his military career in the mountain artillery, had
passed brilliantly through the Staff College, and then entered the
Staff Corps. In Libya he had distinguished himself as a Commander
of Alpine troops and afterwards of a mixed force of the three arms.
Subsequently he went to Rhodes as Chief of Staff to General Ameglio.
The plan of operations of the successful battle of Psitos was his.
From Rhodes he was sent to Constantinople as Military Attaché, and
remained there until Turkey entered the war, when he was transferred to
Athens. There he had occasion to display the most valuable activity,
both in counter-espionage and in affirming Italy’s steady loyalty
within the Entente. In his dealings with the French and British on
more than one occasion he was able to thwart the shady manœuvres
of the Germans and their Royalist satellites. He had a thorough
knowledge of the political and military situation of the near East,
was endowed with great diplomatic tact, and was a man of the world,
of high character, and imbued with all the best Italian military
traditions. As Commander of the Italian expeditionary force under the
orders of a foreign Commander-in-Chief his position was anything but
easy, as the relations between the 35th Division and the C.A.A. had
never been properly defined. Further, General Sarrail, as we have
seen, was not too favourably inclined towards us, and never missed
an opportunity of giving proof of his antipathy. Our expeditionary
force was not complete--we had no field or medium calibre artillery,
we were inadequately provided with means of transport and lacked
certain materials with which the C.A.A. were bound to supply us, but
which it very often would not or could not provide. There was thus
constant friction, and our troops were finally convinced that General
Sarrail wished to exploit them to the utmost limit without ever
recognizing their merits. But General Mombelli, while defending our
rights and dignity with the greatest possible energy and vivacity in
his dealings with the C.A.A., succeeded in making himself popular,
and in maintaining relations of great courtesy with the successive
Commanders-in-Chief. With the British and Serbian Commanders, as I
have said, his relations were always inspired by the greatest
friendliness, especially with General Milne and Voivod Michich. In all
military operations which he had occasion to carry out, he gave proof
of eminent qualities as a Commander and of gallantry as a soldier. He
was rigid in the matter of discipline, and devoted the greatest care
to the moral and material welfare of his men. He insisted obstinately
on obtaining leave for his troops, although it was claimed that such a
thing was impossible for detachments beyond the sea on account of the
enormous difficulties and dangers of sea transport, but he succeeded,
and not a single ship transporting troops going on or returning from
leave was ever torpedoed. He was relentlessly severe against all who
failed in their military duties, or whose conduct was incompatible with
the dignity of an Italian soldier. He had no consideration for those
officers, very few in number it must be said, who neglected their men
at the front.
[Illustration: A FLOODED ROAD.]
[Illustration: LEAVE-PARTY FROM MACEDONIA ON THE SANTI QUARANTA ROAD.
_Photo by Lieut. Landini._]
To face p. 172.
]
Among the incidents which occurred between the Italians and General
Sarrail, there was one due to the obstruction which the latter
placed in the way of the creation of our lines-of-communication
posts along the Santi Quaranta road in the part which crossed the
French zone. Other incidents arose on account of the attitude of the
local Franco-Greek press which was subsidized by or under the strict
control of the C.A.A. To the Press General Sarrail attributed enormous
importance. Every day he received the journalists, and daily devoted an
hour to listening to the reports of the censorship officers, even in
critical moments when a Commander-in-Chief should have been occupied
with very different matters. For all these reasons General Sarrail made
himself ever more unpopular and impossible. As early as the beginning
of 1916 the British, Italian and Russian Governments had brought
considerable pressure to bear on that of France in favour of the
recall of Sarrail, and it appears that the first to demand this was M.
Isvolski, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, who had been informed of the
complaints against Sarrail, especially those which General Dietrich had
made after the autumn operations.[34] At the same time, Lord Bertie,
British Ambassador in Paris, in a note to the French Government,
pointed out General Sarrail’s preference for political operations, and
verbally dwelt on the difficulties of the relations between him and
the other Commanders, due to his own character and to his entourage.
He added that he was also speaking in the name of Italy and Russia. M.
Briand, then Prime Minister, at first showed annoyance and said that
France refused to discuss the merits of a French General in whom she
had confidence, but to this Lord Bertie replied that if Sarrail was
a French General, the Army d’Orient was international. He quoted the
words attributed to General Cadorna, who is reported to have said: “I
shall send more troops to Macedonia when there is a General to command
them.” All this made a certain impression in France, but the capture of
Monastir raised Sarrail’s prestige, although the exaggerated praises
lavished on him by his political friends did him harm, especially
those of M. Painlevé, the Minister of Public Instruction. Criticism
did not cease, and an Italian Ambassador is reported to have said that
Sarrail “preferred to reap the grain harvest in Thessaly rather than
laurels round Monastir.” An Italian Minister said to a French diplomat
in connexion with the disagreement among the Allies in Macedonia: “All
this would not have happened if you had given us a General who besides
having our sympathy also enjoyed our confidence, but you have sent
to Salonica, and you maintain there, a General who is merely imposed
on you by your internal situation.” The real reason why Sarrail,
who was not popular even in French Government circles, where he was
admitted to be unsuited to his duties, continued to be supported
must be sought in his political antecedents. The men at the head of
affairs in France believed at that time that, after the war, there
would be a strong revival of religious, Legitimist and anti-Republican
feeling, and of the generals of high rank General Sarrail was the only
one on whom the Government, or rather the Radical-Socialist Party,
believed that it could count absolutely for the defence of Republican
institutions. Sarrail, in fact, as I have said, was a FreeMason and an
anti-Clerical, and during the Combes Ministry he had co-operated--the
only field officer who would agree to do so--in the system of _fiches
de delation_ against officers guilty of religious practices. He was
therefore so thoroughly compromised in the eyes of the Clerical,
anti-Masonic, Monarchical parties, that there was no danger of his
coming to an agreement with them. Naturally he was anything but popular
with the enormous majority of officers of all ranks, and even those who
were not fervent Clericals had no sort of regard for him. At the same
time, the French Government did not wish to have him in France, because
they feared him as an incorrigible intriguer and wished to keep him
out of the way. For all these reasons, the Government did not dare to
recall him, although they did not wish to entrust him with an important
Command on any part of the front. They therefore gave evasive replies
to the protests of the Allies.
Nevertheless the Allied Governments again insisted in demanding his
recall. On the eve of the May offensive in 1917, Mr. Lloyd George had
been given the assurance that General Sarrail would be relieved as
soon as the operations were ended. This would also have given time
to reconsider the whole question of the Command in the near East. At
one time it had been proposed to send strong Italian reinforcements
to that front with the Duke of Aosta as Commander-in-Chief of the
Allied armies, but the proposal was dropped. When the offensive came
to an absolutely unsuccessful end, chiefly owing to the failure of
Sarrail, the latter continued to hold his Command in spite of the
ever-increasing irritation at his conduct on the part of all the
Allies, including now even the Crown Prince of Serbia. The French
Government, however, now asked that he should be left in Salonica until
the Greek question had been finally settled. After the abdication
of Constantine and the return of Venizelos, the British Government
reopened the Sarrail question; but M. Painlevé, who had become Minister
of War in the Ribot Cabinet, continued to support him. On July 25th Mr.
Lloyd George said to him: “You assume the whole responsibility, but
as a matter of fact, the Armée d’Orient is now condemned to immobility
because the failure of the Russian offensive (that ordered by Kerensky)
removes all hopes of co-operation between the Russian and Roumanian
Armies and that of the Orient.” But M. Painlevé had such a fanatical
admiration for Sarrail that this responsibility caused him no anxiety
whatever. A few days later, on the fall of the Ribot Cabinet, Painlevé
became Prime Minister.
Although the Allied Governments continued to desire the recall of
Sarrail, they considered that it was advisable to suspend their demand
for the moment. In France there was great depression and pessimism
about the progress of the war, owing to the unsuccessful offensive at
the Chemin des Dames and the enormous losses suffered, as well as to
the serious military mutinies organized by the Socialists, which had to
be repressed with ruthless but just severity. The Allies, therefore,
deemed it inadvisable to add to the embarrassments of the French
Government.
After the May operations, the Governments of France, Great Britain
and Italy were more than ever convinced, as Mr. Lloyd George had
said, that an Allied offensive in Macedonia was impossible, at least
for the moment--perhaps they did not yet understand how large a part
of the failure was due to the strategic errors of General Sarrail.
Although it was not their intention to withdraw the expeditionary force
altogether, a shortening of the front was contemplated. The British,
above all, were anxious to achieve this, and two Divisions (the 10th
and 60th) were already in course of evacuation, being destined for
Palestine, and the French, although they did not withdraw any of their
units, allowed their strengths to drop progressively without filling
the gaps. We alone had, until then, maintained our effectives up to
strength--our 3 brigades comprised 18,000 rifles--but now, seeing that
the Allies were reducing their strengths, we also ended by sending to
Albania and thence to Italy, the so-called 7th Battalions.[35] The
British Government wished that the whole front should be withdrawn
within the entrenched camp at Salonica, and the French were not
altogether opposed to this scheme. Its execution, it is true, presented
serious practical difficulties. A withdrawal of this kind in the face
of an enemy in full efficiency is always a very risky operation. It
would probably have caused the loss of a great many men and of a
large part of the artillery, which it would have been difficult to
transport over the rough ground of Macedonia. Another problem was how
to defend the entrenched camp, if a great deal of the artillery were
lost. The strongest opposition to the scheme came from the Serbs.
The Prince-Regent declared definitely that a withdrawal would have
a disastrous moral effect on the whole Serbian Army, and that if it
were effected he would have great difficulty in exercising authority
over it. Depressed as the troops already were, the evacuation of the
small tract of Serbian territory which they had reconquered with so
much bloodshed, would have produced a regular _débâcle_, and as the
Austrians at that time were offering them extremely advantageous peace
terms, which an influential party in the army were prepared to accept,
it was by no means impossible that the Russian collapse would have
been followed by a Serbian separate peace. Finally, if the Allies had
limited themselves to holding the entrenched camp at Salonica, the
Central Empires would no longer have been prevented from communicating
with their friends in Greece. For all these reasons the plan, which was
really a mad one, was abandoned.
We had another difficulty with General Sarrail concerning the extension
of our front. He was always insisting that we should extend our line
so as to give the French divisions a chance of more frequent turns of
rest, but our sector was one of the most difficult, and the defences
were anything but complete, so that General Petitti had constantly
opposed this request. General Pennella, to whom it was presented
again, replied to the same effect. On General Mombelli, General
Sarrail brought new and stronger pressure to bear with the same end in
view, but after a careful study of the situation, he came to the same
conclusion, and appealed to the Italian _Comando Supremo_. The latter
referred the question to the Commander-in-Chief in France, who stated
that he would try to convince General Sarrail, but that if the latter
insisted on his plan, he would not be able to take upon himself the
responsibility of giving contrary orders. As a matter of fact, however,
General Sarrail did not insist and the Italian front remained for the
moment unchanged.