WASHINGTON CAPTURES CORNWALLIS. 1781.
We have already seen, by the quotation from Washington's journal, how
gloomy was the prospect presented to him at this time. He evidently saw
little to encourage a hope of the favorable termination of the campaign
of that year. Indeed, it is quite apparent that our national affairs
were then at a lower ebb than they had ever been since the period
immediately preceding the battle of Trenton. But by the merciful
interposition of divine Providence, the course of events took a
favorable turn much sooner than he had anticipated. His letter to Col.
John Laurens, on the occasion, already mentioned, of that gentleman's
mission to France to obtain a loan, had been productive of remarkable
effects.
In this paper he detailed the pecuniary embarrassments of the
government, and represented with great earnestness the inability of the
nation to furnish a revenue adequate to the support of the war. He dwelt
on the discontents which the system of impressment had excited among the
people, and expressed his fears that the evils felt in the prosecution
of the war, might weaken the sentiments which began it.
From this state of things he deduced the vital importance of an
immediate and ample supply of money, which might be the foundation for
substantial arrangements of finance, for reviving public credit, and
giving vigor to future operations, as well as of a decided effort of the
allied arms on the continent to effect the great objects of the alliance
in the ensuing campaign.
Next to a supply of money he considered a naval superiority in the
American seas as an object of the deepest interest. To the United States
it would be of decisive importance, and France also might derive great
advantages from transferring the maritime war to the coast of her ally.
The future ability of the United States to repay any loan which might
now be obtained was displayed, and he concluded with assurances that
there was still a fund of inclination and resource in the country, equal
to great and continued exertions, provided the means were afforded of
stopping the progress of disgust by changing the present system and
adopting another more consonant with the spirit of the nation, and more
capable of infusing activity and energy into public measures, of which
a powerful succor in money must be the basis. "The people were
discontented, but it was with the feeble and oppressive mode of
conducting the war, not with the war itself."
With great reason did Washington urge on the cabinet of Versailles the
policy of advancing a sum of money to the United States which might be
adequate to the exigency. Deep was the gloom with which the political
horizon was then overcast. The British in possession of South Carolina
and Georgia had overrun the greater part of North Carolina also, and it
was with equal hazard and address that Greene maintained himself in the
northern frontier of that State.
A second detachment from New York was making a deep impression on
Virginia, where the resistance had been neither so prompt nor so
vigorous as the strength of that State and the unanimity of its citizens
had given reason to expect.
Such were the facts and arguments urged by Washington in his letter to
Colonel Laurens. Its able exposition of the actual state of the country,
and his arguments in support of the application of Congress for a fleet
and army as well as money, when laid before the King and the ministry,
decided them to afford the most ample aid to the American cause. A
loan of $6,000,000 was granted, which was to be placed at Washington's
disposal, but he was happy to be relieved from that responsibility.
A loan from Holland was also guaranteed by the French government, and
large reinforcements of ships and men were sent to the United States.
The intelligence of these succors followed within a few days after the
desponding tone of Washington's journal, to which we have just referred.
Early in May (1781) the Count de Barras, who had been appointed to the
command of the French fleet on the American coast, arrived at Boston,
accompanied by the Viscount de Rochambeau, commander of the land
forces. An interview between Washington and the French commanders was
immediately appointed to be held at Wethersfield, near Hartford, on the
21st (May, 1781), but some movements of the British fleet made de Barras
repair to Newport, while the two generals met at the appointed place and
agreed on a plan of the campaign. It was resolved to unite the French
and American armies on the Hudson and to commence vigorous operations
against New York. The regular army at that station was estimated at only
4,500 men, and though Sir Henry Clinton might be able to reinforce it
with 5,000 or 6,000 militia, yet it was believed he could not maintain
the post without recalling a considerable part of his troops from the
southward and enfeebling the operations of the British in that quarter;
in which case it was resolved to make a vigorous attack on the point
which presented the best prospect of success.
In a letter to General Greene, dated June 1, 1781, Washington thus gives
the result of the conference with Rochambeau: "I have lately had an
interview with Count de Rochambeau at Weathersfield. Our affairs were
very attentively considered in every point of view and it was finally
determined to make an attempt upon New York, with its present garrison,
in preference to a southern operation, as we had not the decided command
of the water. You will readily suppose the reasons which induced this
determination were the inevitable loss of men from so long a march, more
especially in the approaching hot season, and the difficulty, I may say
impossibility, of transporting the necessary baggage, artillery, and
stores by land. If I am supported as I ought to be by the neighboring
States in this operation, which, you know, has always been their
favorite one, I hope that one of these consequences will follow--either
that the enemy will be expelled from the most valuable position which
they hold upon the continent or be obliged to recall part of their force
from the southward to defend it. Should the latter happen you will be
most essentially relieved by it. The French troops will begin their
march this way as soon as certain circumstances will admit. I can only
give you the outlines of our plan. The dangers to which letters are
exposed make it improper to commit to paper the particulars, but, as
matters ripen, I will keep you as well informed as circumstances will
allow."
Washington immediately required the States of New England to have 6,000
militia in readiness to march wherever they might be called for, and
sent an account of the conference at Wethersfield to Congress. His
dispatch was intercepted in the Jerseys and carried to Clinton, who,
alarmed by the plan which it disclosed, made the requisition, already
mentioned, of part of the troops under Cornwallis, and took diligent
precautions for maintaining his post against the meditated attack.
Meanwhile the several States of the Union were extremely dilatory in
furnishing their contingents of troops, and it was found difficult to
procure subsistence for the small number of men already in the field.
The people and their rulers talked loudly of liberty, but each was
anxious to sacrifice as little as possible to maintain it and to devolve
on his neighbor the expense, dangers, and privations of the struggle.
In consequence of this dilatory spirit, when the troops left their
winter quarters in the month of June (1781), and encamped at Peekskill,
the army under Washington did not amount to 5,000 men. This force was so
much inferior to what had been contemplated when the plan of operations
was agreed on at Wethersfield that it became doubtful whether it would
be expedient to adhere to that plan. But the deficiency of the American
force was in some measure compensated by the arrival at Boston of a
reinforcement of 1,500 men to the army under Rochambeau.
The hope of terminating the war in the course of the campaign encouraged
the States to make some exertions. Small as was their military force
it was difficult to find subsistence for the troops, and even after the
army had taken the field there was reason to apprehend that it would be
obliged to abandon the objects of the campaign for want of provisions.
It was at that critical juncture of American affairs that the finances
of the Union were entrusted to Robert Morris, a member of Congress for
Pennsylvania, a man of considerable capital and of much sagacity and
mercantile enterprise. He, as we have already seen, extensively pledged
his personal credit for articles of the first necessity to the army,
and, by an honorable fulfillment of his engagements, did much to restore
public credit and confidence. It was owing mainly to his exertions that
the active and decisive operations of the campaign were not greatly
impeded or entirely defeated by want of subsistence to the army and of
the means of transporting military stores.
By his plan of a national bank, already referred to, Mr. Morris rendered
still more important service. Its notes were to be received as cash into
the treasuries of the several States, and also as an equivalent for the
necessaries which the States were bound to provide for the army. In this
way, and by a liberal and judicious application of his own resources, an
individual afforded the supplies which government was unable to furnish.
The French troops, under Rochambeau, marched from Newport and Boston
toward the Hudson. Both in quarters and on the route their behavior
was exemplary, and gained the respect and good will of the inhabitants.
Toward the end of June (1781) Washington put his army in motion, and,
learning that a royal detachment had passed into the Jerseys, he formed
a plan to surprise the British posts on the north end of York Island,
but it did not succeed, and General Lincoln, who commanded the
Americans, being attacked by a strong British party, a sharp conflict
ensued. Washington marched with his main body to support his detachment,
but on his advance the British retired into their works at Kingsbridge.
Rochambeau, then on his march to join Washington, detached the Duke de
Lauzun with a body of men to support the attack, who advanced with his
troops within supporting distance, but the British had retreated before
they could be brought into action.
Having failed in his design of surprising the British posts Washington
withdrew to Valentine's Hill, and afterward to Dobb's Ferry. While
encamped there, on the 6th of July (1781), the van of the long-expected
French reinforcements under Rochambeau was seen winding down the
neighboring heights. The arrival of these friendly strangers
elevated the minds of the Americans, who received them with sincere
congratulations. Washington labored, by personal attentions, to
conciliate the good will of his allies, and used all the means in
his power to prevent those mutual jealousies and irritations which
frequently prevail between troops of different nations serving in the
same army. An attack on New York was still meditated, and every exertion
made to prepare for its execution, but with the determination, if it
should prove impracticable, vigorously to prosecute some more attainable
object. [1]
On the evening of the 21st of July (1781), the greater part of the
American, and part of the French troops, left their encampment, and
marching rapidly during the night, appeared in order of battle before
the British works at Kingsbridge, at 4 next morning. Washington and
Rochambeau, with the general officers and engineers, viewed the British
lines in their whole extent from right to left, and the same was again
done next morning. But, on the afternoon of the 23d they returned to
their former encampment without having made any attempt on the British
works.
At that time the new levies arrived slowly in the American camp, and
many of those who were sent were mere boys utterly unfit for active
service. The several States discovered much backwardness in complying
with the requisitions of Congress, so that there was reason to apprehend
that the number of troops necessary for besieging New York could not be
procured. This made Washington turn his thoughts more seriously to the
southward than he had hitherto done, but all his movements confirmed
Clinton in the belief that an attack on New York was in contemplation.
As the British Commander-in-Chief, however, at that time received about
3,000 troops from Europe, he thought himself able to defend his post
without withdrawing any part of the force from Virginia. Therefore he
countermanded the requisition which he had before sent to Cornwallis for
part of the troops under his command. The troops were embarked before
the arrival of the counter order, and of their embarkation Lafayette
sent notice to Washington. On the reception of new instructions,
however, as formerly mentioned they were relanded and remained in
Virginia.
No great operation could be undertaken against the British armies so
long as their navy had undisputed command of the coast and of the great
navigable rivers. Washington, as we have seen, had already, through
Colonel Laurens, made an earnest application to the court of France for
such a fleet as might be capable of keeping in check the British navy
in those seas and of affording effectual assistance to the land forces.
That application was not unsuccessful, and towards the middle of the
month of August the agreeable information was received of the approach
of a powerful French fleet to the American coast.
Early in March (1781) the Count de Grasse had sailed from Brest with
twenty-five ships-of-the-line, five of which were destined for the East,
and twenty for the West Indies. After an indecisive encounter in the
Straits of St. Lucie with Sir Samuel Hood, whom Sir George Rodney, the
British admiral in the West Indies had detached to intercept him, Count
de Grasse formed a junction with the ships of his sovereign on that
station and had a fleet superior to that of the British in the West
Indies. De Grasse gave the Americans notice that he would visit their
coast in the month of August and take his station in Chesapeake Bay,
but that his continuance there could only be of short duration. This
dispatch at once determined Washington's resolution with respect to
the main point of attack, and as it was necessary that the projected
operation should be accomplished within a very limited time prompt
decision and indefatigable exertion were indispensable. Though it was
now finally resolved that Virginia should be the grand scene of action,
yet it was prudent to conceal till the last moment this determination
from Sir Henry Clinton, and still to maintain the appearance of
threatening New York.
The defense of the strong posts on the Hudson or North river was
entrusted to General Heath who was instructed to protect the adjacent
country as far as he was able, and for that purpose a respectable force
was put under his command. Every preparation of which circumstances
admitted was made to facilitate the march to the southward. Washington
was to take the command of the expedition and to employ in it all the
French troops and a strong detachment of the American army.
On the 19th of August (1781) a considerable corps was ordered to cross
the Hudson at Dobbs' Ferry and to take a position between Springfield
and Chatham, where they were directed to cover some bakehouses which it
was rumored were to be immediately constructed in the vicinity of those
places in order to encourage the belief that there the troops intended
to establish a permanent post. On the 20th and 21st the main body of the
Americans passed the river at King's ferry, but the French made a longer
circuit and did not complete the passage till the 25th. Desirous of
concealing his object as long as possible, Washington continued his
march some time in such a direction as still to keep up the appearance
of threatening New York. When concealment was no longer practicable he
marched southward with the utmost celerity. His movements had been of
such a doubtful nature that Sir Henry Clinton, it is said, was not fully
convinced of his real destination till he had crossed the Delaware.
Great exertions had been made to procure funds for putting the army
in motion, but, after exhausting every other resource, Washington was
obliged to have recourse to Rochambeau for a supply of cash, which he
received. [2]
On the 2d and 3d of September (1781) the combined American and French
armies passed through Philadelphia, where they were received with
ringing of bells, firing of guns, bonfires, illuminations, and every
demonstration of joy. Meanwhile Count de Grasse, with 3,000 troops on
board, sailed from Cape Francois with a valuable fleet of merchantmen,
which he conducted out of danger, and then steered for Chesapeake Bay
with twenty-eight sail-of-the-line and several frigates. Toward the end
of August (1781) he cast anchor just within the capes, extending across
from Cape Henry to the middle ground. There an officer from Lafayette
waited on the count, and gave him full information concerning the
posture of affairs in Virginia, and the intended plan of operations
against the British army in that State.
Cornwallis was diligently fortifying himself at York and Gloucester.
Lafayette was in a position on James river to prevent his escape into
North Carolina, and the combined army was hastening southward to attack
him. In order to cooperate against Cornwallis De Grasse detached four
ships-of-the-line and some frigates to block up the entrance of York
river, and to carry the land forces which he had brought with him, under
the Marquis de St. Simon, to Lafayette's camp. The rest of his fleet
remained at the entrance of the bay.
Sir George Rodney, who commanded the British fleet in the West Indies,
was not ignorant that the count intended to sail for America, but
knowing that the merchant vessel which he convoyed from Cape Francois
were loaded with valuable cargoes the British admiral believed that he
would send the greater part of his fleet along with them to Europe and
would visit the American coast with a small squadron only.
Accordingly, Rodney detached Sir Samuel Hood with fourteen
sail-of-the-line to America as a sufficient force to counteract the
operations of the French in that quarter. Admiral Hood reached the capes
of Virginia on the 25th of August (1781), a few days before de Grasse
entered the bay and finding no enemy there sailed for Sandy Hook, where
he arrived on the 28th of August.
Admiral Graves, who had succeeded Admiral Arbuthnot in the command of
the British fleet on the American station, was then lying at New York
with seven sail-of-the-line; but two of his ships had been damaged in a
cruise near Boston and were under repair. At the same time that Admiral
Hood gave information of the expected arrival of de Grasse on the
American coast, notice was received of the sailing of de Barras with his
fleet from Newport. Admiral Graves, therefore, without waiting for his
two ships which were under repair, put to sea on the 31st of August with
nineteen sail-of-the-line and steered to the southward.
On reaching the capes of the Chesapeake, early on the morning of the
5th of September (1781), he discovered the French fleet, consisting of
twenty-four ships-of-the-line, lying at anchor in the entrance of the
bay. Neither admiral had any previous knowledge of the vicinity of the
other till the fleets were actually seen. The British stretched into the
bay and soon as Count de Grasse ascertained their hostile character he
ordered his ships to slip their cables, form the line as they could
come up without regard to their specified stations and put to sea. The
British fleet entering the bay and the French leaving it, they were
necessarily sailing in different directions, but Admiral Graves put his
ships on the same tack with the French and about four in the afternoon
a battle began between the van and centre of the fleets which continued
till night. Both sustained considerable damage. The fleets continued
in sight of each other for five days, but de Grasse's object was not to
fight unless to cover Chesapeake Bay, and Admiral Graves, owing to the
inferiority of his force and the crippled state of several of his ships,
was unable to compel him to renew the engagement.
On the 10th (September, 1781), de Grasse bore away for the Chesapeake
and anchored within the capes next day when he had the satisfaction to
find that Admiral de Barras with his fleet from Newport and fourteen
transports laden with heavy artillery and other military stores for
carrying on a siege had safely arrived during his absence. That officer
sailed from Newport on the 25th of August, and making a long circuit to
avoid the British, entered the bay while the contending fleets were at
sea. Admiral Graves followed the French fleet to the Chesapeake, but on
arriving there he found the entrance guarded by a force with which he
was unable to contend. He then sailed for New York and left de Grasse in
the undisputed possession of the bay.
While these naval operations were going on the land forces were not less
actively employed in the prosecution of their respective purposes. The
immediate aim of Washington was to overwhelm Cornwallis and his army
at Yorktown; that of Clinton, to rescue him from his grasp. As soon as
Clinton was convinced of Washington's intention of proceeding to the
southward with a view to bring him back, he employed the infamous
traitor Arnold, with a sufficient naval and military force, on an
expedition against New London. The "parricide," as Jefferson calls him,
had not the slightest objection to fill his pockets with the plunder of
his native State. He passed from Long Island and on the forenoon of the
6th of September (1781) landed his troops on both sides of the harbor;
those on the New London side being under his own immediate orders and
those on the Groton side commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre. As the
works at New London were very imperfect, no vigorous resistance was
there made, and the place was taken possession of with little loss. But
Fort Griswold, on the Groton side, was in a more finished state and the
small garrison made a desperate defense. The British entered the fort at
the point of the bayonet.
Col. William Ledyard, brother of the celebrated traveler, commanded the
fort. Colonel Eyre and Major Montgomery having fallen in the assault,
the command had devolved on Major Bromfield, a New Jersey Tory. After
the works had been carried, Ledyard ordered his men to lay down their
arms. Bromfield called out, "Who commands in this fort?" Ledyard
advanced and presenting his sword, replied, "I did, but you do now."
Bromfield seized the sword and ran Ledyard through the body. This was
the signal for an indiscriminate massacre of a greater part of the
garrison by the Tories, refugees, and Hessians, of which the army
of Arnold was very appropriately composed. Seventy were killed and
thirty-five desperately wounded. The enemy lost 2 officers and 46 men
killed, 8 officers and 135 soldiers wounded. Few Americans had fallen
before the British entered the works.
The loss sustained by the Americans at New London was great, but that
predatory incursion had no effect in diverting Washington from his
purpose or in retarding his march southward. From Philadelphia the
allied armies pursued their route, partly to the head of Elk river,
which falls into the northern extremity of Chesapeake Bay, and partly to
Baltimore, at which places they embarked on board transports
furnished by the French fleet, and the last division of them landed at
Williamsburgh on the 25th of September (1781). Washington, Rochambeau,
and their attendants proceeded to the same place by land, and reached
it ten days before the troops. Virginia had suffered extremely in
the course of the campaign; the inhabitants were clamorous for the
appearance of Washington in his native State, and hailed his arrival
with acclamations of joy.
Washington and Rochambeau immediately repaired on board de Grasse's ship
in order to concert a joint plan of operations against Cornwallis.
De Grasse, convinced that every exertion would be made to relieve his
lordship, and being told that Admiral Digby had arrived at New York with
a reinforcement of six ships-of-the-line, expected to be attacked by a
force little inferior to his own, and, deeming the station which he then
occupied unfavorable to a naval engagement, he was strongly inclined to
leave the bay and to meet the enemy in the open sea. Washington, fully
aware of all the casualties which might occur to prevent his return and
to defeat the previous arrangements, used every argument to dissuade the
French admiral from his purpose, and prevailed with him to remain in the
bay.
As de Grasse could continue only a short time on that station, every
exertion was made to proceed against Cornwallis at Yorktown. Opposite
Yorktown is Gloucester point, which projects considerably into the
river, the breadth of which at that place does not exceed a mile.
Cornwallis had taken possession of both these places and diligently
fortified them. The communication between them was commanded by his
batteries and by some ships-of-war which lay in the river under cover of
his guns. The main body of his army was encamped near Yorktown, beyond
some outer redoubts and field works calculated to retard the approach
of an enemy. Colonel Tarleton, with six or seven hundred men, occupied
Gloucester point.
The combined army, amounting to upwards of 11,000 men, exclusive of the
Virginia militia, under the command of the patriotic Governor Nelson,
was assembled in the vicinity of Williamsburgh, and on the morning
of the 28th of September (1781), marched by different routes toward
Yorktown. About midday the heads of the columns reached the ground
assigned them, and, after driving in the outposts and some cavalry,
encamped for the night. The next day was employed in viewing the British
works and in arranging the plan of attack. At the same time that the
combined army encamped before Yorktown the French fleet anchored at the
mouth of the river and completely prevented the British from escaping by
water as well as from receiving supplies or reinforcements in that way.
The legion of Lauzun and a brigade of militia, amounting to upwards of
4,000 men, commanded by the French general de Choisé, were sent across
the river to watch Gloucester Point and to enclose the British on that
side.
On the 30th (September, 1781) Yorktown was invested. The French troops
formed the left wing of the combined army, extending from the river
above the town to a morass in front of it; the Americans composed the
right wing and occupied the ground between the morass and the river
below the town. Till the 6th of October the besieging army was
assiduously employed in disembarking its heavy artillery and military
stores and in conveying them to camp from the landing place in James
river, a distance of six miles. On the night of the 6th the first
parallel was begun, under the direction of General du Portail, the chief
engineer, 600 yards from the British works. The night was dark, rainy,
and well adapted for such a service; and in the course of it the
besiegers did not lose a man. Their operations seem not to have been
suspected by the besieged till daylight disclosed them in the morning,
when the trenches were so far advanced as in a good measure to cover the
workmen from the fire of the garrison. By the afternoon of the 9th the
batteries were completed, notwithstanding the most strenuous opposition
from the besieged, and immediately opened on the town. From that time an
incessant cannonade was kept up, and the continual discharge of shot
and shells from twenty-four and eighteen pounders and ten-inch mortars,
damaged the unfinished works on the left of the town, silenced the guns
mounted on them and occasioned a considerable loss of men. Some of the
shot and shells from the batteries passed over the town, reached the
shipping in the harbor, and set on fire the Charon of forty-four guns
and three large transports, which were entirely consumed.
"From the bank of the river," says Dr. Thacher, "I had a fine view of
this splendid conflagration. The ships were enwrapped in a torrent
of fire, which, spreading with vivid brightness among the combustible
rigging and running with amazing rapidity to the tops of the several
masts, while all around was thunder and lightning from our numerous
cannon and mortars, and in the darkness of night presented one of the
most sublime and magnificent spectacles that can be imagined. Some of
our shells, overreaching the town, are seen to fall into the river, and
bursting, throw up columns of water, like the spouting of the monsters
of the deep."
On the night of the 11th (October, 1781), the besiegers, laboring with
indefatigable perseverance, began their second parallel, 300 yards
nearer the British works than the first; and the three succeeding days
were assiduously employed in completing it.
During that interval the fire of the garrison was more destructive
than at any other period of the siege. The men in the trenches were
particularly annoyed by two redoubts toward the left of the British
works, and about 200 yards in front of them. Of these it was necessary
to gain possession, and on the 14th preparations were made to carry
them both by storm. In order to avail himself of the spirit of emulation
which existed between the troops of the two nations, and to avoid any
cause of jealousy to either, Washington committed the attack of the one
redoubt to the French and that of the other to the Americans. The latter
were commanded by Lafayette, attended by Col. Alexander Hamilton, who
led the advance, and the former by the Baron de Viomenil.
On the evening of the 14th, as soon as it was dark, the parties marched
to the assault with unloaded arms. The redoubt which the Americans under
Lafayette attacked was defended by a major, some inferior officers, and
forty-five privates. The assailants advanced with such rapidity, without
returning a shot to the heavy fire with which they were received, that
in a few minutes they were in possession of the work, having had 8 men
killed and 7 officers and 25 men wounded in the attack. Eight British
privates were killed; Major Campbell, a captain, an ensign, and
seventeen privates were made prisoners. The rest escaped. Although
the Americans were highly exasperated by the recent massacre of their
countrymen in Fort Griswold by Arnold's detachment, yet not a man of the
British was injured after resistance ceased. Retaliation had been talked
of but was not exercised. [3]
The French advanced with equal courage, but not with equal rapidity. The
American soldiers had removed the abattis themselves. The French waited
for the sappers to remove them according to military rule. While thus
waiting a message was brought from Lafayette to Viomenil, informing
him that he was in his redoubt, and wished to know where the baron was.
"Tell the marquis," replied Viomenil, "that I am not in mine, but will
be in five minutes." The abattis being removed, the redoubt was carried
in very nearly the time prescribed by the baron. There were 120 men in
this redoubt, of whom 18 were killed and 42 taken prisoners; the rest
made their escape. The French lost nearly 100 men killed or wounded.
During the night these two redoubts were included in the second
parallel, and, in the course of next day, some howitzers were placed on
them, which, in the afternoon, opened on the besieged.
"During the assault," says Dr. Thacher, "the British kept up an
incessant firing of cannon and musketry from their whole line. His
Excellency, General Washington, Generals Lincoln and Knox, with their
aids, having dismounted, were standing in an exposed situation, waiting
the result. Colonel Cobb, one of Washington's aids, solicitous for his
safety, said to his Excellency, 'Sir, you are too much exposed here;
had you not better step a little back?' 'Colonel Cobb,' replied his
Excellency, 'if you are afraid, you have liberty to step back.'
"Cornwallis and his garrison had done all that brave men could do to
defend their post. But the industry of the besiegers was persevering
and their approaches rapid. The condition of the British was becoming
desperate. In every quarter their works were torn to pieces by the fire
of the assailants. The batteries already playing upon them had nearly
silenced all their guns, and the second parallel was about to open on
them, which in a few hours would render the place untenable.
Owing to the weakness of his garrison, occasioned by sickness and
the fire of the besiegers, Cornwallis could not spare large sallying
parties, but, in the present distressing crisis, he resolved to make
every effort to impede the progress of the besiegers, and to preserve
his post to the last extremity. For this purpose, a little before
daybreak on the morning of the 16th of October (1781), about 350 men,
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Abercrombie, sallied out against
two batteries, which seemed in the greatest state of forwardness. They
attacked with great impetuosity, killed or wounded a considerable number
of the French troops, who had charge of the works, spiked eleven
guns, and returned with little loss. This exploit was of no permanent
advantage to the garrison, for the guns, having been hastily spiked,
were soon again rendered fit for service.
About 4 in the afternoon of the 16th of October, several batteries of
the second parallel opened on the garrison, and it was obvious that, in
the course of next day, all the batteries of that parallel, mounting
a most formidable artillery, would be ready to play on the town. The
shattered works of the garrison were in no condition to sustain such a
tremendous fire. In the whole front which was attacked the British could
not show a single gun, and their shells were nearly exhausted. In this
extremity Cornwallis formed the desperate resolution of crossing the
river during the night with his effective force and attempting to escape
to the northward. His plan was to leave behind his sick, baggage, and
all encumbrances; to attack de Choisé, who commanded on the Gloucester
side, with his whole force; to mount his own infantry, partly with the
hostile cavalry which he had no doubt of seizing, and partly with such
horses as he might find by the way; to hasten toward the fords of the
great rivers in the upper country, and then, turning northward, to pass
through Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Jerseys, and join the army
at New York. The plan was hazardous, and presented little prospect of
success; but in the forlorn circumstances of the garrison anything that
offered a glimpse of hope was reckoned preferable to the humiliation of
an immediate surrender.
In prosecution of this perilous enterprise the light infantry, most of
the guards, and a part of the Twenty-third regiment embarked in boats,
passed the river, and landed at Gloucester point before midnight.
A storm then arose, which rendered the return of the boats and the
transportation of the rest of the troops equally impracticable. In that
divided state of the British forces the morning of the 17th of October
(1781) dawned, when the batteries of the combined armies opened on the
garrison at Yorktown. As the attempt to escape was entirely defeated
by the storm, the troops that had been carried to Gloucester point were
brought back in the course of the forenoon without much loss, though the
passage was exposed to the artillery of the besiegers. The British
works were in ruins, the garrison was weakened by disease and death, and
exhausted by incessant fatigue. Every ray of hope was extinguished. It
would have been madness any longer to attempt to defend the post and to
expose the brave garrison to the danger of an assault, which would soon
have been made on the place.
At 10 in the forenoon of the 17th Cornwallis sent a flag of truce with
a letter to Washington, proposing a cessation of hostilities for
twenty-four hours, in order to give time to adjust terms for the
surrender of the forts at Yorktown and Gloucester point. To this letter
Washington immediately returned an answer, expressing his ardent desire
to spare the further effusion of blood and his readiness to listen to
such terms as were admissible, but that he could not consent to lose
time in fruitless negotiations, and desired that, previous to the
meeting of commissioners, his lordship's proposals should be transmitted
in writing, for which purpose a suspension of hostilities for two hours
should be granted.
The terms offered by Cornwallis, although not all deemed admissible,
were such as induced the opinion that no great difficulty would occur
in adjusting the conditions of capitulation, and the suspension of
hostilities was continued through the night. Meanwhile, in order
to avoid the delay of useless discussion, Washington drew up and
transmitted to Cornwallis such articles as he was willing to grant,
informing his lordship that, if he approved of them, commissioners might
be immediately appointed to reduce them to form. Accordingly, Viscount
Noailles and Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, whose father was then a
prisoner in the Tower of London, on the 18th met Colonel Dundas and
Major Ross of the British army at Moore's house, in the rear of
the first parallel. They prepared a rough draft, but were unable
definitively to arrange the terms of capitulation.
The draught was to be submitted to Cornwallis, but Washington, resolved
to admit of no delay, directed the articles to be transcribed; and,
on the morning of the 19th, sent them to his lordship, with a letter
expressing his expectation that they would be signed by 11 and that
the garrison would march out at 2 in the afternoon. [4] Finding that
no better terms could be obtained, Cornwallis submitted to a painful
necessity, and, on the 19th of October, surrendered the posts of
Yorktown and Gloucester point to the combined armies of America and
France, on condition that his troops should receive the same honors
of war which had been granted to the garrison of Charleston when
it surrendered to Sir Henry Clinton. The army, artillery, arms,
accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every description
were surrendered to Washington; the ships in the harbor and the seamen
to Count de Grasse.
Cornwallis wished to obtain permission for his European troops to return
home, on condition of not serving against America, France, or their
allies during the war, but this was refused, and it was agreed that they
should remain prisoners of war in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania,
accompanied by a due proportion of officers for their protection and
government. The British general was also desirous of securing from
punishment such Americans as had joined the royal standard, but this
was refused, on the plea that it was a point which belonged to the civil
authority and on which the military power was not competent to decide.
But the end was gained in an indirect way, for Cornwallis was permitted
to send the Bonetta sloop-of-war unsearched to New York, with dispatches
to the Commander-in-Chief and to put on board as many soldiers as he
thought proper, to be accounted for in any subsequent exchange. This was
understood to be a tacit permission to send off the most obnoxious of
the Americans, which was accordingly done.
The officers and soldiers were allowed to retain their private property.
Such officers as were not required to remain with the troops were
permitted to return to Europe or to reside in any part of America not in
possession of the British troops.
Dr. Thacher, who was present during the whole siege, thus describes the
surrender: "At about 12 o'clock the combined army was arranged and drawn
up in two lines, extending more than a mile in length. The Americans
were drawn up in a line on the right side of the road, and the French
occupied the left. At the head of the former the great American
commander, mounted on his noble courser, took his station, attended
by his aides. At the head of the latter was posted the excellent Count
Rochambeau and his suite. The French troops, in complete uniform,
displayed a noble and martial appearance; their band of music, of which
the timbrel formed a part, is a delightful novelty, and produced, while
marching to the ground, a most enchanting effect. The Americans, though
not all in uniform nor their dress so neat, yet exhibited an erect,
soldierly air and every countenance beamed with satisfaction and joy.
The concourse of spectators from the country was prodigious, in point
of numbers nearly equal to the military, but universal silence and order
prevailed. It was about 2 o'clock when the captive army advanced through
the line formed for their reception. Every eye was prepared to gaze on
Lord Cornwallis, the object of peculiar interest and solicitude, but he
disappointed our anxious expectations. Pretending indisposition, he made
General O'Hara his substitute as the leader of his army. This officer
was followed by the conquered troops in a slow and solemn step, with
shouldered arms, colors cased, and drums beating a British march. Having
arrived at the head of the line, General O'Hara, elegantly mounted,
advanced to his Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, taking off his hat
and apologizing for the nonappearance of Earl Cornwallis. With his usual
dignity and politeness, his Excellency pointed to Major-General Lincoln
for directions, by whom the British army was conducted into a spacious
field, where it was intended they should ground their arms. The royal
troops, while marching through the line formed by the allied army,
exhibited a decent and neat appearance as respects arms and clothing,
for their commander opened his store and directed every soldier to be
furnished with a new suit complete prior to the capitulation. But in
their line of march we remarked a disorderly and unsoldierlike conduct;
their step was irregular and their ranks frequently broken. But it was
in the field, when they came to the last act of the drama, that the
spirit and pride of the British soldier was put to the severest test.
Here their mortification could not be concealed. Some of the platoon
officers appeared to be exceedingly chagrined when giving the word,
'Ground arms!' and I am a witness that they performed this duty in a
very unofficerlike manner and that many of the soldiers manifested a
sullen temper, throwing their arms on the pile with violence, as if
determined to render them useless. This irregularity, however, was
checked by the authority of General Lincoln. After having grounded their
arms and divested themselves of their accoutrements, the captive troops
were conducted back to Yorktown and guarded by our troops until they
could be conducted to the place of their destination."
Congress bestowed its thanks freely and fully upon the
Commander-in-Chief, Count de Rochambeau, Count de Grasse, and the
various officers of the different corps, and the brave soldiers under
their command. Two stands of colors, trophies of war, were voted to
Washington and two pieces of cannon to Rochambeau and de Grasse, and it
was also voted that a marble column to commemorate the alliance and the
victory should be erected in Yorktown. On the day after the surrender
the general orders closed as follows: "Divine service shall be performed
tomorrow in the different brigades and divisions. The Commander-in-Chief
recommends that all the troops that are not upon duty do assist at
it with a serious deportment and that sensibility of heart which
the recollection of the surprising and particular interposition of
Providence in our favor claims." A proclamation was also issued by
Congress appointing the 13th of December as a day of thanksgiving
and prayer, on account of this signal and manifest favor of Divine
Providence in behalf of our country.
The news of Cornwallis' surrender was received throughout the country
with the most tumultuous expressions of joy. The worthy New England
Puritans considered it, as Cromwell did the victory at Worcester, "the
crowning mercy." It promised them a return of peace and prosperity. The
people of the middle States regarded it as a guarantee for their speedy
deliverance from the presence of a hated enemy. But to the southern
States it was more than this. It was the retributive justice of Heaven
against a band of cruel and remorseless murderers and robbers, who
had spread desolation and sorrow through their once happy homes. It is
asserted in Gordon's "History of the War" that wherever Cornwallis' army
marched the dwelling-houses were plundered of everything that could be
carried off. The stables of Virginia were plundered of the horses on
which his cavalry rode in their ravaging march through that State.
Millions of property, in tobacco and other merchandise and in private
houses and public buildings, were destroyed by Arnold, Philips, and
Cornwallis in Virginia alone. The very horse which Tarleton had
the impudence to ride on the day of the surrender was stolen from a
planter's stable, who recognized it on the field and compelled Tarleton
to give it up and mount a sorry hack for the occasion.
It was computed at the time that 1,400 widows were made by the war in
the single district of Ninety-Six. The whole devastation occasioned
by the British army, during six months previous to the surrender at
Yorktown, amounted to not less than £3,000,000 sterling, an immense
loss for so short a time, falling, as it did, chiefly on the rural
population. No wonder that they assembled in crowds to witness the
humiliation of Cornwallis and his army. To them it was not only a
triumph, but a great deliverance. Well might the Virginians triumph.
The return of their favorite commander, a son of the soil, had speedily
released their State from ravage and destruction and restored them to
comparative peace and repose.
On the very day of Cornwallis' surrender, Clinton sailed from New York
with reinforcements. He had been perfectly aware of Cornwallis' extreme
peril and was anxious to relieve him, but the fleet had sustained
considerable damage in the battle with de Grasse and some time
was necessarily spent in repairing it. During that interval four
ships-of-the-line arrived from Europe and two from the West Indies. At
length Clinton embarked with 7,000 of his best troops, but was unable to
sail from Sandy Hook till the 19th (1781), the day on which Cornwallis
surrendered. The fleet, consisting of twenty-five ships-of-the-line,
two vessels of fifty guns each, and eight frigates, arrived off
the Chesapeake on the 24th (October, 1781), when Clinton had the
mortification to be informed of the event of the 19th. He remained
on the coast, however, till the 29th, when, every doubt being removed
concerning the capitulation of Cornwallis, whose relief was the sole
object of the expedition, he returned to New York.
While Clinton continued off the Chesapeake, the French fleet, consisting
of thirty-six sail-of-the-line, satisfied with the advantage already
gained, lay at anchor in the bay without making any movement whatever.
Washington, considering the present a favorable opportunity for
following up his success by an expedition against the British army
in Charleston, wrote a letter to Count de Grasse on the day after the
capitulation, requesting him to unite his fleet to the proposed armament
and assist in the expedition. He even went on board the admiral's fleet
to thank him for his late services in the siege and to urge upon him the
feasibility and importance of this plan of operations. But the orders of
his court, ulterior projects, and his engagements with the Spaniards put
it out of the power of the French admiral to continue so long in America
as was required. He, however, remained some days in the bay in order to
cover the embarkation of the troops and of the ordnance to be conveyed
by water to the head of the Elk. [5]
Some brigades proceeded by land to join their companions at that place.
Some cavalry marched to join General Greene, but the French troops,
under Count Rochambeau, remained in Virginia to be in readiness to march
to the south or north, as the circumstances of the next campaign might
require. On the 27th the troops of St. Simon began to embark, in order
to return to the West Indies, and early in November Count de Grasse
sailed for that quarter.
Part of the prisoners were sent to Winchester in Virginia and
Fredericktown, Maryland, the remainder to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Lord
Cornwallis and the principal officers were paroled and sailed for New
York. During their stay at Yorktown, after the surrender, they received
the most delicate attentions from the conquerors. Dr. Thacher, in his
"Military Journal," notices particularly some of these attentions: "Lord
Cornwallis and his officers," he says, "since their capitulation, have
received all the civilities and hospitality which is in the power of
their conquerors to bestow. General Washington, Count Rochambeau, and
other general officers have frequently invited them to entertainments,
and they have expressed their grateful acknowledgments in return. They
cannot avoid feeling the striking contrast between the treatment which
they now experience and that which they have bestowed on our prisoners
who have unfortunately fallen into their hands. It is a dictate of
humanity and benevolence, after sheathing the sword, to relieve and
meliorate the condition of the vanquished prisoner.
"On one occasion, while in the presence of General Washington, Lord
Cornwallis was standing with his head uncovered. His Excellency said to
him, politely, 'My lord, you had better be covered from the cold.' His
lordship, applying his hand to his head, replied, 'It matters not, sir,
what becomes of this head now.'" The reader will not have failed to
notice that the capture of Cornwallis was effected solely by the able
and judicious strategy of Washington. It was he that collected from
different parts of the country the forces that were necessary to enclose
that commander and his hitherto victorious army as it were in a net,
from which there was no possibility of escape. It was he who, by
personal influence and exertion, brought de Grasse to renounce his
expected triumphs at sea and zealously assist in the siege by preventing
Cornwallis from receiving any aid from British naval forces. It was he
who detained de Grasse at a critical moment of the siege, when he
was anxious to go off with the chief part of his force and engage the
British at sea. In short, it was he who provided all, oversaw all,
directed all, and having, by prudence and forethought, as well as
by activity and perseverance, brought all the elements of conquest
together, combined them into one mighty effort with glorious success.
It was the second siege on a grand scale which had been brought to a
brilliant and fortunate conclusion by the wisdom and prudence as well as
the courage and perseverance of Washington. In the first he expelled the
enemy and recovered Boston uninjured, freeing the soil for a time from
the presence of the enemy. In the second, he captured the most renowned
and successful British army in America and dictated his own terms of
surrender to a commander who, from his marquee, had recently given law
to three States of the Union.
1. Footnote: Dr. Thacher, in his Military Journal, has an entry: "July
7th. Our army was drawn up in a line and reviewed by General
Rochambeau, with his Excellency, General Washington, and other general
officers.--July 10th. Another review took place in presence of the
French ambassador from Philadelphia, after which the French army passed
a review in presence of the general officers of both armies." Speaking
of the French army, Dr. Thacher says: "In the officers we recognize
the accomplished gentlemen, free and affable in their manners. Their
military dress and side-arms are elegant. The troops are under
the strictest discipline, and are amply provided with arms and
accoutrements, which are kept in the neatest order. They are in complete
uniform--coats of white broadcloth, trimmed with green, and white
under-dress, and on their heads they wear a singular kind of hat or
chapeau. It is unlike our cocked hats, in having but two corners instead
of three, which gives them a very novel appearance."
2. Footnote: The amount was $20,000 in specie, to be refunded by Robert
Morris on the 1st of October. On the 31st of August, Dr. Thacher says:
"Colonel Laurens arrived at headquarters, camp, Trenton, on his way from
Boston to Philadelphia. He brought two and a half millions of livres in
cash, a part of the French subsidy,--a most seasonable supply, as the
troops were discontented and almost mutinous for want of pay."
3. Footnote: Lafayette (letter to Washington, 16th October, 1781) says
"Your Excellency having personally seen our dispositions, I shall only
give you an account of what passed in the execution. Colonel Gimat's
battalion led the van, and was followed by that of Colonel Hamilton,
who commanded the whole advanced corps. At the same time a party of
eighty men, under Colonel Laurens, turned the redoubt. I beg leave to
refer your Excellency to the report I have received from Colonel
Hamilton, whose well-known talents and gallantry were, on this
occasion, most conspicuous and serviceable. Our obligations to him, to
Colonel Gimat, to Colonel Laurens, and to each and all the officers and
men, are above expression. Not one gun was fired, and the ardor of the
troops did not give time for the sappers to derange the abattis; and
owing to the conduct of the commanders and the bravery of the men, the
redoubt was stormed with uncommon rapidity."
4. Footnote: The whole number of prisoners, exclusive of seamen, was
over 7,000, and the British loss during the siege was between five and
six hundred. The army of the allies consisted of 7,000 American regular
troops, upward of 5,000 French, and 4,000 militia. The loss in killed
and wounded was about 300. The captured property consisted of a large
train of artillery--viz., 75 brass and 69 iron cannon, howitzers, and
mortars; also a large quantity of arms, ammunition, military stores, and
provisions fell to the Americans. One frigate, 2 ships of twenty guns
each, a number of transports and other vessels, and 1,500 seamen were
surrendered to de Grasse.
5. Footnote: On his departure, the Count de Grasse received from
Washington a present of two elegant horses as a token of his friendship
and esteem.