THE CAMPAIGN AT THE SOUTH CONCLUDED. 1781.
While the events recorded in the last chapter were passing Washington
was by no means a passive spectator. He held a constant correspondence
with Greene and sent him all the aid he could. Writing to him on the 9th
of January, 1781, he says: "It is impossible for anyone to sympathize
more feelingly with you in the sufferings and distresses of the troops
than I do, and nothing could aggravate my unhappiness so much as the
want of ability to remedy or alleviate the calamities which they suffer
and in which we participate but too largely.
"The brilliant action of General Sumter and the stratagem of Colonel
Washington deserve great commendation. It gives me inexpressible
pleasure to find that such a spirit of enterprise and intrepidity still
prevails." [1]
Writing to Greene again (on the 21st of March, 1781), he says: "You may
be assured that your retreat before Lord Cornwallis is highly applauded
by all ranks and reflects much honor on your military abilities." Such
words, from such a man, must have inspirited Greene amidst his toils and
perils.
Greene, writing to Washington three days after the battle of Guilford
Courthouse, says: "In my former letters I enclosed to your Excellency
the probable strength of the British army, since which they have been
constantly declining. Our force, as you will see by the returns, was
respectable, and the probability of not being able to keep it long
in the field, and the difficulty of subsisting men in this exhausted
country, together with the great advantages which would result from
the action if we were victorious, and the little injury if we were
otherwise, determined me to bring on an action as soon as possible. When
both parties are agreed in a matter all obstacles are soon removed. I
thought the determination warranted by the soundest principles of good
policy and I hope events will prove it so though we were unfortunate.
I regret nothing so much as the loss of my artillery, though it was of
little use to us, nor can it be in this great wilderness. However, as
the enemy have it, we must also."
"Lord Cornwallis," he writes in the same letter, "will not give up
this country without being roundly beaten. I wish our force was more
competent to the business. But I am in hopes, by little and little,
to reduce him in time. His troops are good, well found, and fight with
great obstinacy.
"Virginia has given me every support I could wish or expect since Lord
Cornwallis has been in North Carolina, and nothing has contributed more
to this than the prejudice of the people in favor of your Excellency
which has been extended to me from the friendship you have been pleased
to honor me with."
The reader will not fail to observe the soundness of Greene's judgment
as to the beneficial effect of the battle of Guilford Courthouse. It
was truly a disastrous victory for Cornwallis and a fortunate defeat for
Greene, whose subsequent operations we must now notice.
When Greene took his position at the ironworks on Troublesome creek
after the battle of Guilford Courthouse he expected that Cornwallis
would follow up his advantage and attack him without delay. He therefore
prepared again to fight. His army, indeed, was much diminished, but he
had lost more in numbers than in effective strength. The militia, many
of whom had returned home, had shown themselves very inefficient in
the field. As soon as he received certain information that instead
of pursuing, Cornwallis was retreating, he resolved to follow him and
advanced accordingly.
Greene was now in his turn the pursuer and followed Cornwallis so
closely that skirmishes occasionally happened between his advanced
parties and the rear guard of the British army, but no conflict of
importance ensued. On the morning of the 28th of March he arrived at
Ramsay's Mills, on Deep river, a strong post which the British had
evacuated a few hours before, crossing the river by a bridge erected for
the purpose. There Greene paused and meditated on his future movements.
His army, like that of the British, for some time past had suffered much
from heavy rains, deep roads, and scarcity of provisions. On reaching
Ramsay's Mills his men were starving with hunger and fed voraciously on
some fresh quarters of beef left behind by the British army. The troops
were much exhausted and stood in need of repose and refreshment. Besides
in that critical state of the campaign he found himself reduced to a
handful of Continentals. Most of the militia had left him. Small as his
army was he found great difficulty in procuring subsistence for it.
Cornwallis had fairly the start of the Americans and was advancing to a
place where he would find more plentiful supplies and easily communicate
with the sea; so that Greene was sensible that with the force then under
his command he could make no impression on him. He resolved, therefore,
instead of following his opponent, to proceed to South Carolina. That
step, he thought, would oblige Cornwallis either to follow him or to
abandon his posts in the upper parts of the southern States. If he
followed him North Carolina would be relieved and enabled to raise its
quota of men for the Continental service, but if he remained in that
State or proceeded to the northward it was likely that the greater part
of the British posts in South Carolina and Georgia would be reduced and
that those States would be restored to the Union. He entertained little
apprehension of Cornwallis being able with the force then under his
command to make any permanent impression on the powerful State of
Virginia.
Having refreshed his troops and collected provisions for a few days
Greene moved from Ramsay's Mills, on Deep river, on the 5th of April
(1781), toward Camden, and on the morning of the 20th of the same month
encamped at Logtown in sight of the British works at that place.
Soon after his arrival at Wilmington, Cornwallis received certain
information that Greene was proceeding to South Carolina, and it threw
him into much perplexity. He was alarmed for the safety of Lord Rawdon,
but, though desirous of assisting him, he was convinced that the
Americans were already so far advanced that it was impossible for him
to arrive at Camden in time to succor Rawdon if he should need it. His
lordship's fate and that of his garrison would probably be decided
long before he could reach them, and if Greene should be successful at
Camden, he, by attempting to relieve it, might be hemmed in between the
great rivers and exposed to the most imminent hazard. On the other hand,
if Rawdon should defeat Greene there would be no need of his assistance.
A movement so perilous in the execution and promising so little in the
result was abandoned and Rawdon left to his own resources.
Greene, without regard to the movements of his opponent, pushed on
and established himself at Hobkirk's Hill, about a mile from Rawdon's
headquarters at Camden. The militia having either deserted or their term
of service being expired his force was reduced to 1,800 men, but those
in fact included all on whom he could ever place much dependence.
Camden was occupied by Rawdon with about 800 men, the other troops being
employed upon the defense of detached posts, yet his position was judged
so strong as to afford no hope of success in a direct attack. The object
aimed at was, by throwing out detachments which might capture the forts
and cut off the supplies in his rear, to compel him gradually to fall
back. Lee, for this purpose, was sent with a strong party to cooperate
with Marion and Sumter. The English general seeing the hostile troops
thus reduced to about 1,500, formed the bold resolution of attacking
them. Making a large circuit round a swamp he came upon their left
flank quite unexpectedly, while the soldiers were busied in cooking
and washing. This first surprise was never wholly recovered, yet they
quickly stood to their arms and formed in order of battle. They had even
gained some advantages when the First Maryland regiment, considered the
flower of the army and which had highly distinguished itself both at
Cowpens and Guilford, fell into confusion, and when ordered to make a
retrograde movement, converted it into a complete retreat. The other
corps also, beginning to give ground, Greene thought it expedient to
cause the whole to retire. The loss on each side was about 260 killed
and wounded, and the Americans carried off fifty prisoners, including
six officers.
This battle, commonly called the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, reflected
much honor on Lord Rawdon considering the disproportion of force which
was, in fact, greater than at Guilford, yet it did not change materially
the relative situation of the armies. Greene could still maintain
his position and support the detachments operating in the rear of his
adversary.
Lee and Marion proceeded next against Fort Watson on the Santee which
commanded in a great measure the communication with Charleston. Having
neither artillery nor besieging tools they reared a tower above the
level of the rampart whence their rifle fire drove the defenders, and
themselves then mounted and compelled the garrison to surrender. They
could not, however, prevent Colonel Watson from leading 500 men to
reinforce Lord Rawdon, who then advanced with the intention of bringing
Greene again to action, but found him fallen back upon so strong a
position as to afford no reasonable hope of success. His lordship
finding his convoys intercepted and viewing the generally insecure state
of his posts in the lower country, considered himself under at least
the temporary necessity of retreating thither. He had first in view the
relief of Mott's House, on the Congaree, but before reaching it had the
mortification to find that with the garrison of 165 it had fallen into
the hands of Marion and Lee. He continued his march to Monk's Corner,
where he covered Charleston and the surrounding country.
The partisan chiefs rapidly seized this opportunity of attacking the
interior posts and reduced successively Orangeburg and Granby on
the Congaree, and early in June, Augusta, the key of upper Georgia,
surrendered to Lee and Pickens. In these five forts they made 1,100
prisoners. The most important one, however, was that named Ninety-Six,
on the Saluda, defended by a garrison of 500 men. Orders had been sent
to them to quit and retire downward but the messenger was intercepted
and Colonel Cruger, the commander, made the most active preparations
for its defense. Greene considered the place of such importance that
he undertook the siege in person with 1,000 regulars. He broke ground
before it on the night of the 23d of May (1781), and though much impeded
by a successful sally on the following day, proceeded with such energy
that by the 3d of June the second parallel was completed and the
garrison summoned, but in vain, to surrender. On the 8th, he was
reinforced by Lee from the capture of Augusta and though he encountered
a most gallant and effective resistance trusted that the place must in
due time fall. Three days after, however, he learned that Rawdon, having
received a reinforcement from Ireland, was in full march to relieve
it and had baffled the attempts of Sumter to impede his progress. The
American leader, therefore, feeling himself unable to give battle saw
no prospect of carrying the fortress unless by storm. On the 18th (June,
1781), an attack against the two most commanding outworks was led by
Lee and Campbell, the former of whom carried his point, but the latter,
though he penetrated into the ditch and maintained his party there for
three-quarters of an hour, found them exposed to so destructive a fire
as compelled a general retreat. [2] The siege was immediately raised
and Lord Rawdon, on the 21st, entered the place in triumph. Being again
master of the field, he pressed forward in the hope of bringing his
antagonist to battle but the latter rather chose to fall back towards
the distant point of Charlotte in Virginia, while Rawdon did not attempt
to pursue him beyond the Ennoree.
Notwithstanding this present superiority his lordship, having failed in
his hopes of a decisive victory and viewing the general aspect of the
country, considered it no longer possible to attempt more than covering
the lower districts, of South Carolina. He therefore fell back to
Orangeburg on the Edisto and though he attempted at first to maintain
Cruger with a strong body at Ninety-Six was soon induced to recall
him. Greene, being reinforced by 1,000 men under Marion and Sumter,
reconnoitered his position but, judging it imprudent to attack, retired
to the high hills of the Santee, July the 15th (1781), and both armies,
exhausted by such a series of active movements, took an interval of
repose during the heat of the season.
Lord Rawdon being at this time obliged by ill health to return to
England left the army under the command of Colonel Stuart, who, to cover
the lower country, occupied a position at the point where the Congaree
and Wateree unite in forming the Santee. Greene, having received
reinforcements from the North and collected all his partisan detachments
soon found himself strong enough to try the chance of battle. His
approach on the 7th of September (1781) with this evident view induced
the British to retire down the river to the strong post of Eutaw
Springs, whither the American army immediately followed.
On the 8th of September, Greene determined to attack the British camp,
placing as usual his militia in front, hoping that the English in
charging them would get into confusion, but from apprehension of this
the latter had been warned to keep their posts till ordered to move. The
American front, however, maintained their ground better than usual
and the British having become heated and forgetting the warnings given
pushed forward irregularly. They were then charged by the veterans
of the second line and after a very desperate struggle driven off the
field. There lay in their way, however, a large brick building and
adjacent garden, where Stuart had placed a strong corps which could not
be dislodged and which kept up a deadly fire which checked the victors,
enabling the retreating troops to be formed anew. At the same time
Colonel Washington attacked the British flank, but finding it strongly
posted amongst the woods he was repulsed with great loss and himself
taken prisoner. The American general seeing no hope of making any
further impression, retreated to his previous position. The conflict
lasted four hours and great bravery was shown on both sides. Colonel
Campbell was mortally wounded. Learning the British were dispersing he
exclaimed, like Wolfe at Quebec, "Then I die contented!" and immediately
expired.
In this bloody and doubtful battle both parties claimed the victory
though the Americans with most reason as the general result was greatly
to their advantage. It was certainly far from decisive and the British
loss in killed and wounded was much greater than that of the Americans,
who also carried off above 500 prisoners. The British commander,
prompted as well probably by the result of the day as by the general
state of the country and the numbers and activity of the American light
troops, conceiving himself unable to maintain so advanced a position,
retired during the evening of the 9th (September 1781), and proceeded
down to Monk's Corner, where he covered Charleston and its vicinity. To
this and to Savannah were now limited that proud British authority which
had lately extended so widely over the southern States. [3]
Thus ended the campaign of 1781 in South Carolina. At its commencement
the British were in force all over the State. History affords but a few
instances of commanders who have achieved so much with equal means
as was done by General Greene in the short space of twelve months. He
opened the campaign with gloomy prospects but closed it with glory.
His unpaid and half-naked army had to contend with veteran soldiers,
supplied with everything that the wealth of Great Britain or the plunder
of Carolina could procure. Under all these disadvantages he compelled
superior numbers to retire from the extremity of the State, and confine
themselves in the capital and its vicinity. Had not his mind been of the
firmest texture he would have been discouraged, but his enemies found
him as formidable on the evening of a defeat as on the morning after a
victory.
The reader will not fail to perceive how important a bearing the
operations of Greene in the South had upon those of Washington in the
North. Before recovering North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia,
Greene had partly led and partly driven Cornwallis into Virginia, where
he was destined to be conquered by Washington and the war was thus to be
virtually terminated. How this was accomplished will now be the object
of our attention. Virginia had insensibly, as it were, become the
principal theater of war. General Leslie had been sent thither to
reinforce Cornwallis, who it was hoped might penetrate through the
Carolinas, but after Ferguson's disaster he was ordered to go round by
Charleston. With the view, however, of creating a diversion in favor of
the southern army, Clinton, in December, 1780, sent Arnold with 1,600
men to the Chesapeake. That infamous traitor, displaying all his wonted
activity, overran a great extent of country and captured Richmond, the
capital, destroying great quantities of stores. Washington, most anxious
to strike a blow against him, prevailed upon Destouches, the French
admiral to proceed thither with a land force but the latter was
overtaken by Arbuthnot and endured a hard battle which though not
admitted to be a defeat obliged him to return to Newport; thus Arnold
escaped the danger of falling into the hands of his enraged countrymen.
Clinton, still with the same view, sent another force of 2,000 men under
General Phillips which arrived in the Chesapeake on the 26th of March
(1781). This officer being complete master of the field, overran
the country between the James and York rivers, seized the town of
Petersburg, as also Chesterfield Courthouse, the militia rendezvous, and
other stations, destroying great quantities of shipping and stores, with
all the warehoused tobacco. Lafayette, then in command of about 3,000
men for the defense of Virginia, succeeded by skilful maneuvering in
securing Richmond.
Operations seemed at a stand, when, late in April, intelligence was
received of Cornwallis' march from South Carolina toward Virginia and,
in spite of every effort of Lafayette, he, at the end of May (1781),
joined Phillips at Petersburg, taking the command of the whole army.
Being then decidedly superior he took possession of Richmond and began
a hot pursuit of Lafayette, who retreated into the upper country so
rapidly and so skillfully that he could not be overtaken. The English
general then turned back and sent a detachment under Colonel Simcoe,
who destroyed the chief magazine at the junction of the two branches of
James river. Tarleton pushed his cavalry so swiftly upon Charlotteville,
where the State Assembly was met, that seven members were taken and
the rest very narrowly escaped. Lafayette, however, now returned with a
considerable force and by his maneuvers induced the British commander to
retire to Williamsburg. He afterward continued his retreat to Portsmouth
in the course of which the former made an attack but was repulsed and
would have been totally routed had not his strength been estimated above
its real amount.
The movement of Cornwallis into Virginia had been wholly disapproved by
Clinton who complained that, contrary to all his views and intentions,
the main theater of war had been transferred to a territory into
which he never proposed more than partial inroads, considering it very
difficult to subdue and maintain. His grand object had always been first
to secure New York and, if sufficient strength was afforded, to push
offensive operations thence into the interior. Hoping, therefore, that
the Carolinas, once subdued, might be retained by a small force, he
had repeatedly solicited the partial return of the troops. Cornwallis
defended the movement by observing that his situation at Wilmington,
allowing no time to send for instructions, obliged him to act on his own
responsibility. Communicating also with the government at home he urged
that the Carolinas could not be securely held without the possession
also of Virginia; that this might be attained by a vigorous effort,
and would make Britain mistress of all the southern Colonies, whose
resources could be then employed in conquering the more stubborn regions
of the North. These arguments, recommended by his lordship's brilliant
achievements at Camden and elsewhere, convinced the ministry, and
Lord Germaine wrote to the Commander-in-Chief to direct his principal
attention to the war in Virginia and to the plan of conquest from south
to north. The latter, considering himself thus slighted, solicited
permission to resign and leave the command to an officer who enjoyed
greater confidence, but his merits being highly estimated this tender
was not accepted.
Under the apprehension inspired by the threatening movements of
Washington and the French army against New York, he had ordered a
considerable reinforcement from Virginia, but countermanded it on
receiving the above instructions, along with an additional body of
troops. He had formed, apparently, a favorite plan somewhat of a
compromise between the two. It is nowhere distinctly developed in his
letters, but by a passage in one very active operations were proposed at
the head of the Chesapeake, to be combined probably with a movement from
New York and comprehending Philadelphia and Baltimore. Aware that this
plan required the maritime command of that great inlet, he inquired if
ministers would insure its maintenance, and they made this engagement
without duly considering its difficulties. Under these views he directed
Cornwallis to occupy and fortify a naval position at the entrance of
the bay, specially recommending Old Point Comfort, at the mouth of James
river. This measure did not harmonize with Cornwallis' views; however,
he obeyed, but, the above position being declared by the engineers
indefensible, he recommended, in preference, Yorktown on the York river,
which was agreed to and operations actively commenced at the latter end
of August. The whole British force at this time in Virginia was about
7,000 men.
1. Footnote: Referring to the affair at Rugely's Mills, where Colonel
Washington frightened the militia colonel into a surrender by means of a
pine log mounted like a cannon.
2. Footnote: On this occasion Kosciusko, the Polish general,
particularly distinguished himself.
3. Footnote: In the southern provinces the campaign of 1781 was
uncommonly active. The exertions and sufferings of the army were great.
But the troops were not the only sufferers; the inhabitants were exposed
to many calamities. The success of Colonel Campbell at Savannah laid
Georgia and the Carolinas open to all the horrors which attend the
movements of conflicting armies and the rage of civil dissensions for
two years.
In those provinces the inhabitants were nearly divided between the
British and American interests, and, under the names of Tories and
Whigs, exercised a savage hostility against each other, threatening
the entire depopulation of the country. Besides, each of the contending
armies, claiming the provinces as its own, showed no mercy to those
who, in the fluctuations of war, abandoned its cause or opposed its
pretensions. Numbers were put to death as deserters and traitors at the
different British posts. One of those executions, that of Colonel Hayne,
happened at Charleston on the 4th of August, while Lord Rawdon was in
that town, preparing to sail for Europe, and threatened to produce the
most sanguinary consequences.
Colonel Hayne had served in the American militia during the siege of
Charleston, but, after the capitulation of that place and the expulsion
of the American army from the province, he was, by several concurring
circumstances, constrained, with much reluctance, to subscribe a
declaration of allegiance to the British government being assured that
his services against his country would not be required. He was allowed
to return to his family, but, in violation of the special condition on
which he had signed the declaration, he was soon called on to take up
arms against his countrymen, and was at length threatened with close
confinement in case of further refusal. Colonel Hayne considered this
breach of contract on the part of the British, and their inability
to afford him the protection promised in reward of his allegiance,
as absolving him from the obligations into which he had entered, and
accordingly he returned to the American standard. In the month of July
he was taken prisoner, confined in a loathsome dungeon, and, by the
arbitrary mandate of Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour, without trial,
hanged at Charleston. He behaved with much firmness and dignity, and his
fate awakened a strong sensation.